Dhamma

Nanavira Thera – Sankhāra

SAṄKHĀRA

A full discussion of this key word is given in A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA. It is there maintained that the word sankhāra, in all contexts, means 'something that something else depends on', that is to say a determination (determinant).

 It might be thought that this introduces an unnecessary complication into such passages as Vayadhammā sankhārā appamādena sampādetha ('To disappear is the nature of determinations; strive unremittingly') and Aniccā vata sankhārā uppādavayadhammino ('Impermanent indeed are determinations; to arise (appear) and disappear is their nature') (Dīgha ii,3 <D.ii,156&7>). 

Why, instead of telling us that things(dhammā) are impermanent and bound to disappear, should the Buddha take us out of our way to let us know that things that things depend on are impermanent and bound to disappear? The answer is that the Dhamma does not set out to explain, but to lead—it is opanayika. This means that the Dhamma is not seeking disinterested intellectual approval, but to provoke an effort of comprehension or insight leading to the abandonment of attavāda and eventually of asmimāna. Its method is therefore necessarily indirect: we can only stop regarding this as 'self' if we see that what this depends on is impermanent (see DHAMMA for more detail). 

Consider, for example, the Mahāsudassanasuttanta (Dīgha ii,4 <D.ii,169-99>), where the Buddha describes in detail the rich endowments and possessions of King Mahāsudassana, and then finishes: Pass'Ānanda sabbe te sankhārā atītā niruddhā viparinatā. Evam aniccā kho Ānanda sankhārā, evam addhuvā kho Ānanda sankhārā, yāvañ c'idam Ānanda alam eva sabbasankhāresu nibbinditum, alam virajjitum, alam vimuccitum. ('See, Ānanda, how all those determinations have passed, have ceased, have altered. So impermanent, Ānanda, are determinations, so unlasting, Ānanda, are determinations, that this, Ānanda, is enough for weariness of all determinations, enough for dispassion, enough for release.') 

This is not a simple statement that all those things, being impermanent by nature, are now no more; it is a lever to prize the notion of 'selfhood' out of its firm socket. Those things were sankhārā: they were things on which King Mahāsudassana depended for his very identity; they determined his person as 'King Mahāsudassana', and with their cessation the thought 'I am King Mahāsudassana' came to an end. More formally, those sankhārāwere nāmarúpa, the condition for phassa (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>[9]), upon which sakkāyaditthi depends (cf. Dīgha i,1 <D.i,42-3> together with Citta Samy. 3 <S.iv,287>).
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So far are the expressions cittasankhāra and manosankhāra from being interchangeable that their respective definitions actually seem to be mutually exclusive. Cittasankhāra is saññā ca vedanā ca; manosankhāra is manosañcetanā; and the passage from the Salāyatana Samyutta (ix,10) quoted in §5 makes an explicit distinction between vedanā, cetanā, and saññā. But the two expressions are really quite different in kind, and are not to be directly opposed to each other at all. (i) The citta of cittasankhāra is not synonymous with the mano of manosankhāra: citta, here, means (conscious) experience generally, whereas manodistinguishes thought from word and deed. (ii) The word sankhāra has a different sense in the two cases: in the first it means 'determination' in a quite general sense (§11); in the second it is a particular kind of determination, viz intention or volition. (iii) The two compounds are grammatically different: cittasankhāra is a dutiya (accusative) tappurisa, cittam + sankhāro, 'that which determines mind (citta)'; manosankhāra is a tatiya(instrumentive) tappurisa, manasā + sankhāro, 'determination (intention or volition) by mind (mano)', i.e. mental action (as opposed to verbal and bodily action)—cf. Majjhima vi,7 <M.i,389>. Clearly enough (ii) and (iii) will apply mutatis mutandis to the two senses of the expressions kāyasankhāra and vacīsankhāra.

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In addition to the foregoing, you may refer to §15 of A NOTE ON P.S. and particularly the two sentences starting 'Sankhārapaccayā viññānam....' Here the discussion is drawing finer distinctions, and it is most improbable that the Venerable Objector has made anything of it at all. §19 shows that though the breathing is kāyasankhāra because it is bound up with the body, it is sankhāra also as cetanā inasmuch as it is experience(all experience is intentional), and is thus entitled to a place in the paticcasamuppāda as sankhāra on two separate counts.

Confusion is possible if we ask 'As experience, what kind of intention is breathing?'; for the answer is that it is kāyasañcetanā, 'body-intention', along with all other intentional bodily actions (such as walking). And, referring again to §16, you will see that kāyasañcetanā is kāyasankhāra. Thus breathing is twice kāyasankhāra. But the word kāyasankhāra, 'body-determination', is a grammatical compound that can be resolved in two distinct ways: (i) as 'what determines the body', and (ii) as 'a determination that is bodily'. In the first it is the breaths (as bound up with the body—the body depends on the breathing), and in the second it is any determination (specified by the Sutta of §16 as intention) involving the body (breathing, walking, etc.).

Vacīsankhāra, 'speech-determination', also has this double sense: in the first it is 'what determines speech', which is thinking-and-pondering; and in the second it is 'a determination (as intention) that is verbal', as (for example) swearing. But thinking-and-pondering is not speech-determination in the second sense: as intentional action (sañcetanā) it is obviously mind-determination. But, with 'mind-determination', only the English is ambiguous, not the Pali: for the first sense of 'mind-determination' we have cittasankhāra, and for the second sense we have manosankhāra.

The traditional interpretation takes advantage of this verbal ambiguity—ignoring the citta/mano discrepancy—to define sankhārā in the p.s. as exclusively cetanā. (I think, perhaps, if you want to see the distinction clearly, you might take 'thinking-and-pondering' as a test-case. Thinking-and-pondering is said in the Cūlavedalla Sutta (which gives the first sense of vacīsankhāra) to be speech-determination, for the following reason: 'First having thought and pondered, then one breaks into speech.' Ask yourself 'Is thinking-and-pondering speech-determination also in the sense of being verbal action?'.) Now, it seems, it is I who am accused of confusing these two senses (in the reverse direction, of course). This can only be made by someone who takes for granted the traditional interpretation of p.s.—if the interpretation is not pre-judged, purely verbal considerations as well as those of consistency support the Notes.

The discussion, as you see, is rather involved, and there is a temptation to cut the Gordian knot by ignoring these distinctions. Unless one is capable of following the intricacies of the situation, and is actually prepared to do so, a certain amount of good will is necessary if the interpretation of the Notes is to be accepted. Unfortunately there seems to be little reason to suppose that the Venerable Objector possesses either the capacity or the good will. But I do not see that any purpose would be served by setting out the argument in greater detail: as I remark in §7, the note is not a polemic, and if the reader is not already dissatisfied with the traditional interpretation no amount of argument will convince him.

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