The most usual English rendering, which will be employed here, is “not-self” (or “not self”), though the words “soulless,” “egoless,” and “impersonal” are often used for it. (The rendering “Self” with a capital is not justified owing to the absence of capitals in Indian alphabets.)
Derivation and Usage Etymologically anattā (adj. or n.) consists of the negative prefix an- plus attā (cf. Vedic Sanskrit ātman). There are two main Pali forms of the word: attā (instr. attanā) and atta (instr. attena). Neither form seems to be used in the plural in 100 the Tipiṭaka, the singular form being used with a plural verb subject. There is also a rare subsidiary form: atumo (e.g., Sn 782; Nidd I 60; AN 3:99/A I 249 (appātumo)) and tumo (e.g., Sn 890).
As principal Tipiṭaka (and Commentary) uses of the very commonly employed attā and atta, the following five types of examples may be cited:
1. as “one-self” in the more or less colloquial sense: attā hi attano nātho (Dhp 124/V 160), attanā va kataṃ pāpaṃ (Dhp 12 5/V 161), attānaṃ na dade poso (SN 1:78/S I 44), ahaṃ… parisuddhakāyakammantataṃ attani samanupassamāno (MN 4/M I 17), attahitāya paṭipanno no parahitāya (AN 4:95/A II 95), n’ev’ajjhagā piyataraṃ attanā kvaci, evam piyo puthu attā paresaṃ (S N 3:8/S I 75), yam hi appiyo appiyassa kareyya taṃ te attanā va attano karonti (SN 3:4/S I 72– 2), pahitatta (MN 4/M I 22), attānuvāda (AN 4:121/A II 121), attakilamathānuyoga (SN 56:11/S V 421), attadīpa (DN 16/D II 100), attānaṃ gaveseyyātha (Vin Mv I), etc.;
2. as “one’s own person” (including the physical and mental body): attapaṭilābha (DN 9/D I 195), attabhāva (AN 3:125/A I 279; DN 33/D III 231; Dhs 597), appātumo and mahattā (AN 3:99/A I 249), brahmabhūtena attanā viharati (MN 51/M I 349), paccattaṃ ajjhattaṃ (MN 28/M I 185; for four kinds of ajjhatta see Dhs-a 46),
3. self as a “subtle metaphysical entity” (always 101 repudiated as unidentifiable and undiscoverable): atthi me attā (MN 2/M I 8), rūpaṃ attato samanupassati (MN 44/M I 300), attānudiṭṭhi (DN 15/vol. II 22), attavādupādāna (MN 11/M I 66), suññaṃ idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā (MN 106/M II 263), rūpaṃ bhikkhave anattā (SN 22:59/S III 66), etc.;
4. enclitic -atta in the sense of “-ness”: socitattam (DN 22/D II 306); and 5. confusion with atta as pp. of odādati and niratta as pp. of nirassati: attamano (MN 2/M I 12) explained as sakamano (D-a I 155), attaṃ nirattaṃ (Sn vv. 787, 858, 919, and 1098 commented on as a pun at Mahāniddesa pp. 82 = 248 = 352 and by Paramatthajotikā (Hewavitarne ed.) pp. 422, 476).
Attā
The first two senses of attā distinguished above may be assumed to have been ordinary usage and no subject of disagreement between the Buddha and his opponents (see DN 9, cited below). The last two are of minor import and need not concern us beyond noting them. The characteristic of not-self (anatta-lakkhaṇa) deals with the third, the unidentifiable entity that is conceived, sought and made the subject of a certain class of views: self-views (attānudiṭṭhi).
Many suttas classify the conflicting notions of the nature of self held by opponents of the Buddha. It could, for instance, be claimed that it had materiality, or was immaterial, or both; or neither; was percipient of oneness, or of plurality, or of the limited, or of the measureless; was eternal, or non-eternal, or both, or neither; had only pleasure, or only pain, or both, or neither; each of these theories being maintained by its propounder as “the only truth and all else wrong” (MN 102, etc.). Or else it could be described as having materiality either limited or infinite, or as immaterial and either limited or infinite. And then whichever of these four is adopted, it may be seen as such now, or due to be such (upon rebirth), or in this way: “Though it is not yet real, still I shall contrive for its reality” (DN 15/D II 64). All these rationalised views (diṭṭhi) stem from uncritical acceptance or overlooking of an underlying tendency (anusaya) or fetter (saṃyojana), a natural predisposition to regard or to identify some aspect or other (in the situation of perceiving a percept) as “This is mine” or “This is what I am” or “This is my self” (e.g. MN 22). These two levels (the self-view and the I-sense) are respectively what are called the “(lower or immediate) fetter of views” (diṭṭhi-saṃyojana) and the “(higher or remoter) fetter of conceit” (māna-saṃyojana). The first is abandoned with the attainment of the first stage of realisation (the path of stream-entry) while the second is abandoned only with the fourth and final stage (the path of arahatship; see DN 33). (It may be noted here in parenthesis that the rendering of māna by “pride,” though not wrong, severs the semantic relationship with maññati and maññanā, which it is most important to preserve intact for the understanding of this situation.)
The overlooked fundamental conceit “I am” (asmi-māna) (a mirage that, in the act of perceiving, is believed will fulfil its counterpart, the intuitive sense of lack, which is craving) in the basic ontological structure of ordinary perception provokes the average man with no knowledge of the Buddha’s teaching to indulge in uncritical speculation about what this may be that “I am,” and consequently to build up self-theories. He perceives (sañjānāti); but the very act of his perceiving is tendentious so that he simultaneously conceives (maññati) his percepts with an I-tendency. But a stream-enterer, who has attained the first stage of realisation, has direct acquaintance (abhijānāti) where the ordinary man has perception, owing to which fact the former has the possibility of hastening his attainment of arahatship; and an arahat has no more conceivings (maññanā) at all. So long as a man leaves intact this fundamental tendency to conceive in the very act of perceiving, accompanied by the tendency to formulate views, he will look for answers to the questions that these two tendencies together prompt him to ask, and he will invent them and try to prove them. “This is how he gives unreasoned attention [ayoniso-manasikāra]: ’Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?’ Or else he is doubtful in himself about the presently arisen extent thus: ’Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Whence will this creature have come? Whither will it be bound?’ “When he gives unreasoned attention in this way one of the six kinds of view arises in him: the view ’A self exists for me’ arises as true and established, or the view ’No self exists for me’… or the view ’I perceive self with self’… or the view ’I perceive not-self with self’… or the view ’I perceive self with not-self” arises in him as true and established. Or else he has some such view as ’It is this my self that speaks and feels and that experiences here and there the ripening of good and bad actions; but this my self is permanent, ever lasting, eternal, not subject to change, and it will endure as long as eternity.’ This field of views is called the thicket of views, the wilderness of views, the vacillation of views, the fetter of views. No untaught ordinary man bound by the fetter of views is freed from birth, ageing, and death; from sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief, and despair; he is not freed from suffering, I say.” (MN 2/M I 8)
In assuming that “I was“ etc. cannot be analysed, all these philosophical systems attempt to settle with unilateral certainty the dialectic questions of “What was I?” etc. and to dispose of them on an inadequate ontological basis of self-identity without querying how the questions come to be put in the first place or what is the structural nature of being. But any one answer “I am this” cannot be decisively established over its contrary opposite, though it can be fortified by arguments, more or less logical or emotional, introducing my self” and defining relations between it and what it is considered not to be, endowing it then with certain qualities and values and with either eternal or temporary permanence according to bent. The impossibility of establishing absolutely any one of these views as the only truth may lead to abuse and even to violence in the end, since it is often thought important to be right.
The pre-rational conceit “I am” (asmi-māna) is a “fetter but not a view” (M-a Diṭṭhikathā/M-a I 143). To perceive is to recognise and identify (see Vism Ch. 14/p. 462). In perceiving a percept the “untaught ordinary man “automatically conceives in the positional terms of “I,” which then must seem involved in an I-relationship to the percept: either as identical with it, or as contained in it or as separate from it, or owning it as “mine.” That relationship so conceived is relished (favoured and approved) through want of full knowledge of the situation (MN 1; cf. MN 49).
The rational self-view (attānudiṭṭhi) is both a “fetter and a view.” Though the conceit “I am” is normally associated with the tendency to formulate views, these views need not by any means be definitely formulated; but whenever they are, none can be specifically described without reference to the five categories affected by clinging (upādānakkhandha: see SN 22:47 cited below). For that reason they can all be reduced to one of the types of what is called the “embodiment view” (sakkāyadiṭṭhi, from sat (or saṃ) plus kāya = “true (or existent) body”) which is set up schematically as follows: “The untaught ordinary man who disregards the ariyas… sees materiality [rūpa] as self, or self as possessed of materiality, or materiality in self, or self in materiality. [And likewise with feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), formations (saṅkhāra), and consciousness (viññāṇa]” (MN 44/M I 300). These four self-identifications embracing the five categories make twenty types. For each of the four basic modes of identifying, the Paṭisambhidāmagga gives a simile as follows: “How does he see [say, materiality] as self? … Just as if a man saw a lighted lamp’s flame and colour as identical; thus, ’What the flame is, that the colour is; what the colour is that the flame is’… How does he see self as possessed of [say, materiality]? … Just as if there were a tree possessed of shade such that a man might say, ’This is the tree, this is the shade; the tree is one, the shade another; but this tree is possessed of this shade in virtue of this shade’… How does he see [say, materiality] in self? … Just as if there were a scented flower such that a man might say, ’This is the flower, this is the scent; the flower is one, the scent another; but the scent is in this flower’ … How does he see self in [say, materiality]? … Just as if a gem were placed in a casket such that a man might say, ’This is the gem, this is the casket; the gem is one, the casket another; but this gem is in this casket.’” (M-a Diṭṭhikathā/vol. I 144–5) Self so viewed is then taken either as eternal (e.g., “This is self, this the world; after death I shall be permanent, ever-lasting…” (MN 22 cited below)) or as temporarily permanent but eventually annihilated (e.g., “As soon as this self is annihilated… that is peace…” (It 49/p. 43). All possible views of whatever shade are again classified under sixty-two types in the first Sutta of the Dīgha-Nikāya called Brahmajāla Sutta or the “Divine Net.” In this “net” all possible views are “caught” and so it can be seen how they come to be.
Now all these views (and all these standpoints for views (diṭṭhiṭṭhānā)) are formed (or conditioned; saṅkhata) because “it is impossible that anyone shall experience [them] apart from contact [phassa]… and with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving [taṇhā]; with craving as condition, clinging [upādāna]; with clinging as condition, being [bhava]; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing and death come to be, and also sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair; that is how there is an origin to this whole aggregate-mass of suffering“ (DN 1/D I 43–5). The structure of the conceit “I am” and the views to which it gives rise, is, in fact nothing else than the structure of being, the structure of what is “impermanent, formed, and dependently originated.” “A Tathāgata understands that thus ’[These views] are formed and [consequently] gross; but there is cessation of formations: there is that.’ By knowing and seeing the escape from them a Tathāgata transcends them [tad upātivatto]” (MN 102/M II 229–30).
The Buddha explains how he uses the word attā (self) in the second sense, namely, the “person” or “individual” noted above: “There are these three kinds of acquisition of self [atta-patilābha]: gross, constituted of mind, and immaterial… The first has materiality and consists of the four great entities [elements of earth, water, fire, and air], and consumes physical food; the second is constituted by mind with all the limbs and lacking no faculty; the third consists of perception … I teach the Doctrine [dhamma] for the abandoning of acquisitions of self in order that in you, who put the teaching into practise, defiling ideas may be abandoned and cleansing ideas increase; and that you, by realisation yourselves here and now with direct knowledge, enter upon and abide in the fullness of understanding’s perfection… If it is thought that to do that is an unpleasant abiding, that is not so; on the contrary, by doing that there is gladness, happiness, tranquillity, mindfulness, full awareness and a pleasant [blissful] abiding… These are worldly usages, worldly language, worldly terms of communication, worldly descriptions, by which a Tathāgata communicates without misapprehending them.” (DN 9/D I 195–202 abbr.)
It is only after this sketch of views that we can treat of the doctrine of not-self (for views in general see especially DN 1 and 2; MN 102; Diṭṭhi-Saṃyutta; M-a Diṭṭhikathā; and Vibh).
Definitions of Anattā
The first discourse given by the Buddha after his Enlightenment set out the Four Noble Truths. The second stated the characteristic of not-self as follows: “Bhikkhus, materiality is not self. Were materiality self, then this materiality would not lead to affliction, and one could say of materiality ’Let my materiality be thus, let my materiality be not thus.’ And it is because materiality is not self that materiality leads to affliction and one cannot say of materiality ’Let my materiality be thus, let my materiality be not thus’” [And similarly with feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness.] The Buddha then continued: “How do you conceive this, bhikkhus? Is materiality permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, Lord.” — “Is what is impermanent pleasure or pain?” — “Pain, Lord.” — “Is what is impermanent, painful and subject to change fit to be seen thus: ’This is mine, this is what I am, this is my self’?” — “No, Lord.” [And similarly with the other four categories.] “Consequently, bhikkhus, any kind of materiality [feeling, perception, formations, consciousness] whatever, whether past, future or presently arisen, in oneself or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, is all [to be seen thus], ’This is not mine, this is not what I am, this is not my self.’ That is how it should be seen with right understanding as it actually is.” (SN 22:58/S III 66) The characteristic is stated more succinctly in this way: “The eye [ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, and the six external bases] is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering is not self” (SN 35:1/S IV 1); or, “All is not-self. And what is the all that is not self? The eye is not self…” (SN 35:45/S IV 28); or again, “All things [dhamma] are not-self” (e.g. Dhp 20, 7/V 279). The canonical commentary, the Paṭisambhidāmagga adds “Materiality [etc.] is not-self in the sense that it has no core [sāra]” (M-a Ñāṇakathā/M-a I 37).
Ācariya Buddhaghosa’s definitions are as follows: “The characteristics of impermanence and suffering are known whether Buddhas arise or not. But that of not-self is not known unless there is a Buddha; … for the knowledge of it is the province of none but a Buddha” (Āyatana Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā/Vibh-a 49–50). “The Blessed One in some instances shows not-self-ness through impermanence (as in MN 148 cited below), in some through suffering (as in SN 22:59 cited above), and in some through both (as in SN 22:76 111 or 35:1 cited above). Why is that? While impermanence and suffering are both evident, not-self is not evident” (MA ad MN 22/M II 113); for “the characteristic of not-self seems non-evident, obscure, arcane, impenetrable, hard to illustrate and hard to describe” (Vibh-a, 49). He distinguishes “the not-self and the characteristic of not-self… Those same five categories [which are impermanent and suffering] are not-self because of the words ’What is suffering is not self.’ Why? Because there is no exercising mastery over them. The mode of insusceptibility to the exercise of mastery [avasavattana] is the characteristic of not-self” (Vism Ch. 21/p. 640). Again “[The eye] is not-self in the sense of insusceptibility to the exercise of mastery over it. Or alternatively, because there is no exercising of mastery over it in the following three instances, namely, ’Let it when arisen not reach presence’ or ’Let it when already reached presence not age’ or ’Let it when already reached ageing not dissolve’; it is void of that mode of exercise of mastery.
Therefore it is not-self for four reasons: it is void, it has no owner, it cannot be done with as one wants, and it denies self” (Vibh-a 48; cf. M-a II 113). The Vibhāvini-Tīkā (commentary to the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha) says “Not-self is the absence [abhāva] of self as conjectured by other teachers; that not-self as a characteristic is the characteristic of not-self.”
Treatment of Anattā in Suttas and Commentaries
What is conditioned by not-self cannot be called self:
“Materiality [etc.] is not self. The cause and condition for the arising of materiality [etc.] are not self; so how could materiality [etc.] which is brought to being by what is not self be self?” (SN 22:20/S III 24; cf. SN 35:142/S IV 130) Nor can what is possessed of rise and fall: “If anyone says that the eye [for instance] is self, that is not tenable. The eye’s rise and fall [dependent on its conditions] is evident, from which it follows that self would rise and fall. That is why, should anyone say that the eye is self, that is not tenable.” (MN 148/M III 282-3) Craving, however, provides an emotional attachment to the survival of the personality: “Here someone’s view is this: ’This is self, this the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity.’ He hears a Tathāgata or a Tathāgata’s disciple teaching the True Idea for the elimination of all standpoints for views; all decisions [about ’my self’], insistencies and underlying tendencies; for the stilling of all formations; for the relinquishment of all essentials [of existence; upadhi]; for the exhaustion of craving; for fading out, cessation, extinction [nibbāna]. He thinks thus: ’So I shall be annihilated! So I shall be lost! So I shall be no more!’ Then he sorrows and laments, beating his breast; he weeps and becomes distraught. That is how there is anguish [paritassanā] about what is non-existent in oneself [ajjhattaṃ asati] …” (MN 22/M I 136–7) Some shrink back in that way from the truth; but some go too far the other way:
“Some who are humiliated, ashamed and disgusted with being [bhava], relish [the idea of] non-being [vibhava] thus: ’As soon as this self is annihilated on the dissolution of the body, after death, that is peace, that is the supreme goal, that is reality [yathāva].’” (It 49/p. 44) But “One who has eyes sees how what is [bhūta] has come to be, and by so doing he practises the way to dispassion [disgust] for it” (ibid.).
“Bhikkhus, the possession that one might possess that is permanent, everlasting… do you see any such possession?” — “No, Lord.” — “The self-theory clinging whereby one might cling that would never arouse sorrow and… despair in him who might cling thereby; do you see any such self-theory clinging?” — “No, Lord.” — “The view as support that one might take as support that would never arouse sorrow and… despair in him who might take it as support; do you see any such view as support?” — “No, Lord.” — “…Bhikkhus, there being self, there would be self’s property?” — “Yes, Lord.” — “…Or there being self’s property, there would be self?” — “Yes, Lord.” — “Bhikkhus, self and self’s property being non-apprehendable as true and established [saccato thetato: cf. use at MN 2], then would not this view ’This is self, this the world; after death I shall be permanent… endure as long as eternity’ be the pure perfection of a fool’s idea?” — “How not, Lord? It would be the pure perfection of a fool’s idea.” (MN 22/M I 137–8)
The Wanderer Vacchagotta, during one of his numerous visits to the Buddha, asked: “How is it, Master Gotama: does self exist [atth’attā]?” When this was said, the Blessed One was silent. “How then, does self not exist [natth’attā]?” A second time the Blessed One was silent. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away. Soon after he had gone the venerable Ānanda asked, “Lord, why did the Blessed One not answer the wanderer Vacchagotta’s question?” “Ānanda, if, when asked ’Does self exist?’ I had answered ’Self exists’ that would have been the belief [laddhi] of those who hold the theory of eternalness; and if, when asked ’Does self not exist?’ I had answered ’Self does not exist,’ that would have been the belief of those who hold the theory of annihilation. Again if, when asked ’Does self exist?’ I had answered ’Self exists,’ would that have been in conformity with my knowledge that ’All things are not-self’?” “No, Lord.” “And if, on being asked ’Does self not exist?’ I had answered ’Self does not exist,’ then Vacchagotta, who is already confused, would have become still more confused, [wondering] ’My self certainly existed, but it does not exist now.’” (S 45:10/S IV 400–1)
Self is conceivable only on the basis of clinging to [assuming] the five categories. But so conceived, it must always founder owing to the radical impermanence of their existence. And no other basis for it is possible since no other can be found which does not fall within them (see SN 22:47/S III 46 quoted below and SN 21:151/S III 182).
Why this characteristic is hard to see is explained in the commentaries as follows:
The characteristic of not-self does not become apparent because, when resolution into the various elements is not given attention, it is concealed by compactness. However… when the resolution of the compact [ghana-vinibbhoga] is effected by resolving it into its elements, the characteristic of not-self becomes apparent in its true nature. (Vism Ch. 21/p.
640) The Paramatthamañjūsā further explains as follows, “Resolution of the compact” is effected by resolving [what appears compact] in this way: “The earth element is one, the water element is another” and so on, distinguishing each one. And in this way: “Contact is one, feeling is another” and so on, distinguishing each one. “When the resolution of the compact is effected” means that what is compact as a mass [samūha] or as a function [kicca] or as a supporting object [ārammaṇa] has been analysed. For when material and non-material dhammas have arisen, mutually steadying each other [i.e., “name and form”], then, owing to misinterpreting [abhinivesa] that as a unity, compactness of mass is assumed through failure to subject formations [saṅkhāra] to pressure. And likewise compactness of function is assumed when, although definite differences exist in such and such dhammas or functions, they are taken as one. And likewise compactness of supporting-object is assumed when, although differences exist in the ways in which dhammas that take supporting-objects make them so, those supporting-objects are taken as one. But when they are seen after resolving them by means of knowledge into these elements, they disintegrate like froth subjected to compression by the hand. They are mere dhammas occurring dependent on conditions and void. That is how the characteristic of not-self becomes more evident. (Vism-a 824)
The Visuddhimagga repeatedly emphasises that no “doer” (kāraka) is discoverable, but only “doing” (kiriyā); Ch. 16/p. 513; 19/p. 602); that there is no “experiencer” (upabhuñjaka) of the fruit of action (Ch. 17 p. 555); and that there is no “one who feels” (vedaka: Ch. 17/p. 576). The simile of the blind man able to walk who mounts on his shoulder the cripple who can see so that together they can travel as far as they like is used to illustrate the radical contingency of dhammas (Ch. 18/p. 596), and contingency also forms the subject of a verse quoted from the Mahā-Niddesa (Vism, Ch. 20/p. 624– 5).
Suññatā
“’Void world, void world’ is said, Lord. In what way is ’Void world’ said?” — “It is because of what is void of self or self’s property that ’Void world’ is said, Ānanda. And what is void of self or self’s property? The eye… forms… eye-consciousness… eye-contact… any feeling, whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant, that 118 arises born of eye-contact, is void of self or self’s property [and likewise with the other five bases].” (SN 35:85; S IV 54)
Voidness as “voidness in formations” (saṅkhāra-suññatā) (for instance, the more general as void of the more particular) is exemplified in one Sutta (MN 121), and “voidness of self” (atta-suññatā) in another (MN 122; see also MN 43 and 44). Voidness is variously classified in the Suññakathā of the Paṭisambhidāmagga. The “void mind-deliverance” (suññata-cetovimutti) is that connected with atta-suññatā (MN 43).
The conceit “I am”
One discourse shows how the tendency to perceive in terms of “I” underlies theories of self: “Whenever samaṇas or brāhmaṇas see self in its various types, all of them see the five categories affected by clinging, on one or other of them. What five? Here an untaught ordinary man who disregards the ariyas, is unconversant with their teaching and undisciplined in it… sees materiality as self, or self as possessed of materiality, or materiality in self, or self in materiality; he sees feeling… perception… formations… consciousness as self, or self as possessed of consciousness, or self in consciousness, or consciousness in self. So he has this way of seeing [samanupassanā] and also this attitude [adhigata] ’I am.’ When there is the attitude ’I am’ then there is the organisation [avakkanti] of the five faculties [indriya] of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. There is mind [mano], and there are ideas [dhamma], and there is the element of ignorance [avijjā-dhātu]. When an untaught ordinary man is touched by whatever is felt born of the contact of ignorance, it occurs to him ’I am’ and ’I am this’ and ’I shall be’ and ’I shall not be’ and ’I shall be formed’ and ’I shall be formless’ and ’I shall be percipient’ and ’I shall be non-percipient’ and ’I shall be neither percipient nor non-percipient.’ Now in the case of the well-taught disciple of the ariyas; while the five faculties persist in the same way, nevertheless ignorance is abandoned and knowledge [vijjā] arisen in him. With the fading out of ignorance and the arising of knowledge it no more occurs to him ’I am’ and… ’I shall be neither percipient nor non-percipient.’” (SN 22:47/S III 46–7) “’I am’ is derivative, not un-derivative. Derivative upon what? Derivative upon materiality [and the rest].” (SN 22:83/S III 105) It is this conceit that takes on the appearance of pride: “When any samaṇa or brāhmaṇa, with materiality [etc.] as the means, which is impermanent, painful, and subject to change, says ’I am superior’ or ’I am equal’ or ’I am inferior,’ what is that if not blindness to what actually is?” (SN 22:42/S III 48)
Again, when the Elder Khemaka was questioned by other elders, he said: “I do not see in these five categories affected by clinging any self or self’s property… Yet I am not an arahat with taints exhausted [khīṇāsava]. On the contrary I still have the attitudes [adhigata] ’I am’ with respect to these five categories affected by clinging, although I do not say ’I am this’ [with respect to them]… I do not say ’I am materiality’ or ’I am feeling’ or ’I am perception’ or ’I am formations’ or ’I am consciousness,’ nor do I say ’I am apart from consciousness.’ Yet I still have the attitude ’I am’ with respect to the five categories affected by clinging, although I do not say ’I am this’ [with respect to them]. Although a disciple of the ariyas may have abandoned the five immediate fetters [of embodiment-view, uncertainty, misapprehension of virtue and duty, desire for sensuality, and ill will, and so reached the third stage of realisation, the path of non-return], still his conceit ’I am,’ desire [chanda] ’I am,’ underlying tendency ’I am,’ with respect to the five categories affected by clinging remains unabolished. Later he abides contemplating rise and fall thus: ’Such is materiality, such its origin, such its disappearance,’ [and so with the rest], and by so doing his conceit ’I am’ eventually comes to be abolished.” (SN 22:89/S III 128–32 abbr.)
The Continuity of the Person
On a certain occasion it had been stated by the Buddha how, when a man knows and sees the five categories, whatever their mode (thus “This is not mine, this is not what I am, this is not myself.”), there come to be no more underlying tendencies to treat this body with its consciousness, and all external signs, in terms of “I” and mine” (ahaṅkāra-mamaṅkāra). Then in a certain bhikkhu’s mind this thought arose “So, it seems, materiality is not self, nor are feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. Then what self will the action done by the not-self touch?” (MN 109/M III 18–9). He was rebuked for ignoring the Buddha’s teaching of dependency. Again, when the Buddha was asked by the naked ascetic Kassapa whether suffering was of one’s own making, or of another’s, or both, or neither, the Buddha replied “Do not put it like that.” When asked whether there was no suffering or whether the Buddha neither knew nor saw it, the Buddha replied that there was, and that he both knew and saw it. He then said “Kassapa, if one asserts that ’He who makes [it] feels [it]; being one existent from the beginning, his suffering is of his own making,’ then one arrives at eternalism. But if one asserts that one makes [it], another feels [it]; being one existent crushed out by feeling, his suffering is of another’s making,’ then one arrives at annihilationism. Instead of resorting to either extreme a Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle way [by dependent origination]” (SN 12:17/S II 20).
Now what is called an “acquisition of self” (atta-paṭilābha;
see end of section on “Attā,” above), in other words, the person or individuality, may be physical or mental or immaterial according to the plane of being (sensual, material, or immaterial) in which rebirth has taken place.
Also from birth to birth any one kind can succeed and so must exclude any other. That being so, it cannot be successfully argued that only one of the three kinds is true and the others wrong. One can only say that the term for each one does not apply to the other two. Just as with milk from a cow, curd from milk, butter from curd, ghee from butter, and fine-extract of ghee from ghee, the term for each applies only to that and not to any of the others. (But they are not disconnected.) That is how there are these “worldly usages… by which a Tathāgata communicates without misapprehending [them]” (DN 9/D I 201–2).
“Individual self-hood” (atta-bhāva) is what the physical body is called; or it is simply the pentad of categories, since it is actually only a descriptive device derived (upāda-paññatti) from the pentad of categories (Vism Ch. 9/p. 310).
“Here when the categories are not fully known, there is naming [abhidhāna] of them and of the consciousness as ’self,’ that is, the physical body or alternatively the five categories… [it is] presence [sabhāva] as a mere description in the case of what is called a ’being’ [bhūta], though in the ultimate sense the ’being’ is non-existent [avijjamāna]” (Vism-a 298).
A Tathāgata is indescribable in terms of being or of 123 consciousness: “Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu’s mind [citta] is… liberated, the gods… when they seek him do not find the consciousness of one who is thus-gone [tathāgata] with anything as its support. Why is that? One thus-gone is here and now no longer knowable, I say. So saying, so proclaiming, I have been baselessly, vainly, falsely, and wrongly misrepresented by some samaṇas and brāhmaṇas thus: ’The samaṇa Gotama is one who leads away [to loss: venayika], he describes an existent creature’s annihilation, loss, non-being.’ As I am not, as I do not proclaim, so I have been… wrongly misrepresented.” (MN 22/M I 140; cf. MN 72/M I 487) For these and other reasons the Buddha refused to answer the “ten undecided matters” (avyākata) ending with the four logical questions whether after death a Tathāgata is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not (see, e.g.. SN 44; MN 72). These ten, and some others also not answered, all contain some concealed assumptions, in fact, which either of the answers “Yes” or “No” would alike confirm.
Arguments Used Against Self-Theories
“Self” in any form, particular or absolute, one or many, cannot be conceived apart from identification, without which no meaningful statement can be made about it… and any identification is always wrong: yena yena hi maññati tato taṃ hoti aññathā (Ud 33). There are three principal types of argument used by the Buddha, with which he exposes self-theories by means of the very basis on which they are built. These are: (1) “affliction” (or insusceptibility to the exercise of mastery), (2) “impermanence” and (3) “non-existence” (of the kind postulated).
1. If self is identified with any of the five categories indiscriminately or with, say, the eye, then since one cannot have any of these as one wishes in the way “Let it be thus, let it be not thus,” one suffers affliction by it and so cannot claim to have mastery over it. Consequently it cannot rightly be called “self” (MN 35).
2. If it is claimed that self is consciousness, then it can be shown that because consciousness always arises dependent on impermanent conditions, it too is impermanent (MN 38;
109). Again, if self is identified with feeling, it can be asked:
With pleasant or unpleasant or neutral feeling? Whichever is admitted, then since the three kinds of feeling come and go (for when one is present the others are absent), self must come and go too. Consequently such a self is likewise untenable (DN 15).
3. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that self is “not feeling and has nothing to do with it,” then it can be asked whether, where there is no feeling at all, one can say “I am,” and no affirmative answer can be given. (For without feeling there would be no experience on which the mirage “I am” depends.) Again, if it is claimed that self “while not feeling is not without experience of feeling since it feels and is inseparable from the idea of feeling,” then it can be asked whether, if feeling altogether ceased, one could say “I am this,” and no affirmative answer can be given (for without feeling there could be no means of identifying what “I am” (DN 15).
This last argument, among others, precludes predicating attā of nibbāna, which is called “cessation of perception and feeling” (see e.g. It 44/It p.38).
The characteristic of not-self, unlike those of impermanence and suffering, does not have its opposite applied to extinction: attā cannot be, and never is, applied to nibbāna.
Anatta as a Subject for Contemplation and Basis for Judgment
When asked how he taught his followers, the Buddha replied:
“I discipline my hearers thus…: ’Bhikkhus, materiality is impermanent, and so are feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness; materiality is not-self, and so are feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. All formations are impermanent; all things [dhammā] are not-self.’” (MN 35/M I 230)
The contemplation is described as follows: “What is perception of not-self? Here a bhikkhu, gone to the forest, or to the root of a tree, or to a room that is void, considers thus: “Eye is not self, forms are not self, ear… sounds… nose… odours… tongue… flavours… body… tangibles… mind… ideas are not self. That is how he abides contemplating not-self in these six in-oneself-and-external bases.” (AN 10:60/A V 109)
Whatever is conditioned should be judged according to its actual nature of impermanence and contingency, no matter whether it is a pleasant abiding (sukha-vihāra) or a quiet abiding (santa-vihāra). “Whatever is there to be included as materiality, or feeling, or perception, or formations, or consciousness, such things [dhammā] he sees as impermanent, as suffering, as ailment, as a cancer, as a dart, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, as not self” (MN 64/M I 435; AN 4:124/A II 128:
elaborated by M-a quoted at Vism Ch. 20/p. 611).
And again, “Whatever is not yours, abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will be long for your welfare and happiness. What is not yours? Materiality is not yours …” (MN 22/M I 140). “When a bhikkhu abides much with his mind fortified by perception of not-self in suffering, his mind is rid of conceits that treat in terms of ’I’ and ’mine’ this body with its consciousness, and all external signs” (AN 7:46/A IV 53).
And “When a bhikkhu sees six rewards it should be enough for him to establish perception of not-self unlimitedly in all formations. What six? ’I shall be aloof [atammaya] from the world of all [from all the world]; I shall be no more impeded by treating in terms of ’I’ and likewise of ’mine;’ I shall come to possess knowledge not shared [by all]; and I shall see clearly causation, and also causally arisen things’” (AN 6:104/A III 444).
“When a man knows and sees the eye [etc.] as not self, his fetters come to be abolished” (SN 35:55/S IV 31–2) and “Perception of not-self reaches the abolition of the conceit ’I am,’ which is extinction [nibbāna] here and now” (Ud 4.1/p.37). Lastly, “It is impossible that anyone with right view should see any thing as self” (MN 115/M III 64).
The perception of not-self is the third of the “Eighteen Principal Insights” (mahā-vipassanā; see the article “Anicca”), of which the Visuddhi magga says “One who maintains in being the contemplation of not-self abandons perception of self,” and “contemplation of not-self and contemplation of voidness are one in meaning and only the letter is different” (Vism Ch. 20/p. 628) since “one who maintains in being the contemplation of not-self abandons misinterpreting [abhinivesa].” On the development of the contemplation of not-self based on rise and fall given in the Visuddhimagga (Ch. 21) see the article “Anicca.”
The Paṭisambhidāmagga connects this contemplation especially with the faculty of understanding (paññā), and it is there called the third “Gateway to Liberation.” “When one gives attention to not-self, the understanding faculty is outstanding” (see article “Anicca”).
Sources Vinaya Mahāvagga, Dīgha Nikāya (D), Majjhima Nikāya (M), Saṃyutta Nikāya (S), Aṅguttara Nikāya (A), Udāna (Ud), Itivuttaka (It), Suttanipāta (Sn), Paṭisambhidāmagga (M-a), Mahāniddesa, Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Dhs), Papañcasūdanī (M-a), Visuddhimagga (Vism), Atthasālini (Dhs-a), Sammohavinodanī (Vibh-a), Paramatthamañjūsā = Mahā Ṭīkā (Vism-a Sinhalese Vidyodaya ed. pp. 1–647, Burmese ed. pp.
744–910), Vibhāvinī Ṭīkā SN = Saṃyutta-Nikāya. The first figure refers to the number of the Saṃyutta, the second to the Sutta.
References are to the Pali Text Society’s Pali editions unless otherwise stated. All quotations specially translated for this article.
No comments:
Post a Comment