Let us begin by noting that the philosopher-emperor often summarizes the three disciplines—of assent, of desire, and of action—by making the names of virtues correspond to them. Thus the discipline of assent takes on the name of the virtue of “truth"; the discipline of desire acquires the name of the virtue of “temperance"; and the discipline of action, that of the virtue of “justice.” In itself, the substitution of the notion of “truth” for that of “prudence” should not surprise us, for Plato had already once (Republic, 487a5) given the four virtues the names of “truth,” “justice,” “courage,” and “temperance.”
The substitution of “truth” for “prudence” can, however, be perfectly well justified from the perspective of Marcus Aurelius. This is shown by the following lengthy passage (IX, 1), which must be cited for two reasons: first, we can see in it the establishment of an exact correspondence between the discipline of action and justice, the discipline of assent and truth, and the discipline of desire and temperance. Second, it offers an admirable summary of the three exercise-themes.
Justice and the discipline of action
He who commits an injustice commits an impiety. For since universal Nature has constituted rational animals for the sake of each other, so that they might help each other in accordance with their respective merit and never harm each other, he who transgresses the will of Nature most obviously commits an impiety against the most venerable of gods.
Truth and the discipline of assent
He who lies, moreover, also commits an impiety toward the same Goddess. For Universal Nature is the nature of beings; now beings have a relationship of affinity with true attributes [that is, with what can be truly said of them]. Moreover, this Goddess is also named truth, and she is the first cause of all that is true. Therefore, he who willingly lies commits an impiety, in so far as he commits an injustice by deceiving. And he who lies involuntarily also commits an impiety, insofar as he is in disaccord with universal Nature, and he disturbs order insofar as he is in a state of incompatibility with the Nature of the world. For that person is in a state of incompatibility who, of his own free will, tends toward that which is contrary to the truth. He has received from Nature dispositions to know the truth, but since he has neglected them, he is now no longer capable of distinguishing the true from the false.
Temperance and the discipline of desire
Finally, the person who pursues pleasures as goods and who flees pains as evils also commits an impiety. For such a person must necessarily often reproach universal Nature, for Nature attributes a particular lot to the bad and to the good, contrary to their merit; for the bad often live in pleasures and possess that by which they may procure them, while good people encounter only pain and that which is its cause. What is more, he who fears pain will one day come to fear one of the things which must happen in the world, and this is already impious. Nor will he who pursues pleasures be able to keep away from injustice; and this is clearly impious. Concerning things with regard to which universal Nature is equally disposed (for she would not produce both, if she were not disposed toward them in an equal way): with regard to these things, those who wish to follow Nature, and be in perfect community of sentiments with her, must also be in a disposition of “equality.” Therefore, as far as pain and pleasure are concerned, death and life, glory and obscurity, which universal Nature treats in an “equal” manner, he who does not behave in an “equal” manner obviously commits an impiety.
Here it is easy to recognize the three disciplines: that of action, which ordains that people should help one another; that of assent, which consists in distinguishing the true from the false; and that of desire, which consists in accepting the lot which universal Nature has reserved for us. To these three disciplines correspond three virtues. In the discipline of action, we must respect the value hierarchy of people and of things, and thus act in accordance with justice. According to the discipline of assent, our discourse must be true, and the virtue particular to this discipline is truth. He who knowingly lies commits a twofold sin: in the area of assent, since his discourse is not true, and in the area of action, since he is committing an injustice with regard to other people. As for the person who lies involuntarily—in other words, who deceives himself—it is because he has not succeeded in criticizing his judgments and in becoming the master of his assent that he is no longer capable of distinguishing the true from the false. Finally, in the discipline of desire, we must desire only that which universal Nature wants, and we must not desire pleasures or flee sufferings. This discipline is characterized by temperance.
Here, then, Nature appears to us in three aspects. She is the principle of attraction which urges human beings to help one another and to practice justice, and is therefore the basis of justice. She is also the basis of truth; that is to say, the principle which founds the order of discourse, and the necessary relationship which must exist between beings and the true attributes which are said about them. To speak falsely, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, is therefore to be in disaccord with the order of the world. Finally, universal Nature, since she is indifferent to indifferent things, is the basis of temperance, in other words of that virtue which, instead of desiring pleasure, wants to consent to the will of universal Nature.
Marcus here portrays universal Nature as the most ancient and august of goddesses, in such a way that any lapse with regard to the virtues—justice, truth, and temperance—of which this goddess is the model and the principle, is an impiety. The Stoics traditionally identified God, Nature, Truth, Destiny, and Zeus. In Marcus’ time, there were hymns which presented Nature as the most ancient of goddesses. For example, an Orphic hymn3 invokes her in the following terms:
Goddess, mother of all things, celestial mother, very ancient (presbeira) mother.
A hymn by Mesomedes, one of Hadrian’s freedmen, which also dates from the second century A.D., begins:
Principle and origin of all, very ancient Mother of the world, Night, Light, and Silence.4
In our long passage from Marcus, we can note a certain tendency to privilege the importance of justice as compared to the other virtues. Impiety toward Nature consists in injustice, not only if one refuses to practice justice toward other human beings, but also if one lies to them, and even if, involuntarily, one cannot distinguish the true from the false. For then one destroys the order of Nature, and introduces a discordant note into universal harmony. Likewise, if we accuse Nature of injustice in her distribution of lots among good and evil people, then we ourselves are committing an injustice. We find a similar idea expressed in XI, 10, 4:
Justice cannot be preserved if we attribute importance to unimportant things, or if we are easily deceived; if we give our assent too rapidly, or if we change our mind too often.
To give importance to unimportant things is not to practice the discipline of desire, and hence to sin against temperance; whereas to be easily deceived, or to be too rapid or changeable in our judgments, means not to practice the discipline of assent, and hence to sin against truth.
Truth, justice, and temperance can thus designate the three disciplines, as in XII, 15:
Whereas the flame of a lamp shines until it goes out, and does not lose its luster, will the truth, justice, and temperance which are within you be extinguished before their time?
Elsewhere (XII, 3, 3), the soul’s guiding principle, when it frees itself of everything foreign to it,
does what is just, wills the events which happen, and tells the truth.
Nothing, says Marcus (VIII, 32, 2), can prevent us from acting
in accordance with justice, temperance, and prudence.
Sometimes, as in this last example and the following one, we find some variations in the names of the virtues; yet the tripartite scheme is retained (III, 9, 2):
Absence of hurry in judgment, a feeling of kinship toward other human beings, and obedient consent to the gods.
Alongside this triad of virtues, we sometimes find the traditional quaternium, adapted and brought into line with the tripartite structure (III, 6, 1):
If you find something in human life better than justice, truth, temperance, and bravery…
In fact, the continuation of this passage reduces these four virtues to the disciplines of desire and of action (III, 6, 1), when it becomes apparent that they consist
in thought which is content with itself (in those things in which it is possible to act in accordance with right reason), and which is content with Destiny (in those things which are allotted to us, independently of our will).
The virtues are linked to the functions of the soul: truth and the intellectual virtues are linked to reason; justice to active impulses; and temperance to desire. Where, then, can we find a place for courage? It seems to be shared between temperance, qua strength in adversity and suffering, and justice, qua active force.
We find no trace of this theory of the virtues in the Discourses of Epictetus, as reported by Arrian. This does not prove, however, that it did not exist. As I have said, it was impossible for Arrian to have transmitted all of the teachings of Epictetus; moreover, the discourses which he did note down do not correspond to a systematic exposition of the whole of philosophy.
Be that as it may, a first sketch of this doctrine may be glimpsed well before Epictetus. In Cicero’s treatise On Duties,5 which in its first book reproduces the teachings of Panaetius, the ancient virtue of prudence becomes “the knowledge of truth"; justice is based on the social links between human beings; strength becomes greatness of soul, linked to scorn for the things which do not depend on us; and temperance submits our desires to reason. In a way, then, Panaetian strength and temperance correspond to the discipline of desire in Marcus Aurelius. In the last analysis such comparisons are rather tenuous, but they do allow us to glimpse an evolution of the Stoic doctrine of the virtues, which culminates in the synthesis attested in Marcus.
Joy
In Marcus’ view, these three disciplines and virtues bring to the soul the only true joy which exists in the world, since they place the soul in the possession of all that is necessary: the one absolute value.
Living beings experience joy when they fulfill the function for which they are made, and act in accordance with their nature. As we have seen, man fulfills his function qua man, and follows his nature as well as universal Nature, when he consents to order: the order of the universe as fixed by Destiny; the order of the City of the World and of human beings, based as it is upon the mutual attraction of rational beings, and hence on the proper nature of mankind; and finally to the order of discourse, which reproduces the relation which Nature has established between substances and attributes, and above all between events which necessarily follow upon one another. It is therefore by practicing the three disciplines that man follows Nature, and finds his joy:
Philosophy wants only that which your nature wants. You, however, wanted something else, which was not in accordance with nature. And yet, what is more attractive than what is in conformity with nature? Is this not how pleasure leads us astray?6 Look and see, however, if there is anything more attractive than greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, benevolence, and piety; for what is more attractive than wisdom itself? (V, 9, 3–5).
You must consider the activity which it is possible for you to carry out in conformity with your own nature as a delight—and that is always possible for you (X, 33, 2).
For the person who strives at every moment to live, act, will, and desire in conformity with his rational nature and with universal Nature, life is constantly renewed happiness. In the words of Seneca:7 “The effect of wisdom is a continuous joy… and only the strong, the just, and the temperate can possess this joy.” Marcus Aurelius often returns to this theme:
To do what is just with all one’s soul, and to tell the truth. What remains for you to do but enjoy life, linking each good thing to the next, without leaving the slightest interval between them? (XII, 29, 3).
Enjoy and take your rest in one thing only: to pass from one action carried out in the service of the human community to another action accomplished in the service of the human community, together with the remembrance of God (VI, 7).
For man, joy consists in doing what is proper to man. What is proper to man is benevolence toward other human beings, who are his relatives; disdain for movements based on sense-perception; criticism of deceptive representations; and the contemplation of universal Nature, and of that which happens in conformity with its will (VIII, 26).
Joy, then, is the sign of an action’s perfection. It is only when we love human beings from the bottom of our hearts, and not merely out of duty, that we feel pleasure in benefiting them (VII, 13, 3), just because we then have the feeling of belonging to the same living organism, and of being the limbs of the body of rational beings.
Unlike Epicurean pleasure, Stoic joy is not the motive and the end of moral action: rather, virtue is its own reward. Virtue seeks nothing above and beyond itself; instead, for the Stoics, joy, like Aristotelian pleasure, comes along as an extra surplus in addition to action in conformity with nature, “like beauty for those in the flower of youth.”8 In the words of Seneca:9Pleasure is not a reward for virtue, nor its cause, but is something added on to it. Virtue is not chosen because it causes pleasure; but if it is chosen, it does cause pleasure.
The joy which arises from virtue… like happiness and tranquillity… are consequences of the greatest good, but they do not constitute it.10
Such joy is not, moreover, an irrational passion, because it is in conformity with reason. According to the Stoics, it is rather a “good emotion” or a “good affection.”11The joy produced by action accomplished in accordance with Nature is a participation in Nature’s love for the All that she has produced, and in the mutual love of the parts of the Whole.
For mankind, to be happy means feeling the sentiment of participating in an ineluctable movement, issuing from the impulse given to the All by original Reason, in order to realize the good of the All. In the word physis, which we translate as “nature,” the Greeks perceived the idea of a movement of growth, of unfolding, and, as the Stoics used to say, of “swelling”12 (emphysēsis). To be happy meant to embrace this expansive movement, and thus to go in the same direction as Nature, and to feel, as it were, the joy which she herself feels in her creative movement.
This is why Marcus, when he describes joy, uses images which evoke progress on the right path and in the right direction, and the accord of our desires, wills, and thoughts with the path of Nature. It is then that “rational nature follows the path that is proper to it” (VIII, 7, 1). The Stoics13 defined happiness as euroia biou, “the good flowing of life.” Marcus likes to link this image (II, 5, 3; V, 9, 5; X, 6, 6) to that of “progress in the right direction”—that is, in the direction of Nature (V, 34, 1). While the material elements move up, move down, or turn in a circle,
the movement of virtue does not resemble any of these physical motions, but is something divine, and it proceeds along the right path, which it is hard for us to imagine (VI, 17).
This right path is the “straight line” or “right road”—that of Nature herself, whose way is always straight ahead (X, 11, 4). Her way is short and direct (IV, 51):
Get to the end of your race in a straight line, following your own nature and universal Nature, for both of these follow the same way (V, 3, 2).
Here, Marcus is reviving an ancient image which had been used by Plato:14
The God who, as ancient tradition will have it, holds the beginning, end, and middle of all things, gets to the end of his race in a straight line, in accordance with the order of nature.
Already in Plato, then, the order of nature appears as a triumphant movement which reaches its end without ever allowing itself to be distracted from the rectitude of its decision and its intention. According to Marcus, the movement of the governing part of the soul—the movement of the intellect—also proceeds in a straight line, like the sun, which illuminates that which is in its way, and in a sense assimilates it to itself (VIII, 57). For the Stoics, all moral action reaches its goal straightaway, insofar as it is its own end, and insofar as it finds its perfection in its very activity. A propos of this topic, Marcus recalls the technical expression katorthōsis, which the Stoics used to designate such actions: it means that they follow a straight way (V, 14).
Joy has its roots in that profound tendency of living beings which impels them to love that which makes them exist, and this means not only their own structure and unity, but the All, without which they would be nothing, and of which they are integral parts. It also means Nature and her irresistible movement, of which they are but a tiny moment, but with which they identify themselves wholly, by means of their moral will.
Finally, and most important, joy is based on the recognition of the unique value of the one necessary thing that can exist in this human world: the purity of moral intention. We cannot find
in human life, a good superior to justice, truth, temperance, and strength (III, 6, 1),
and this, therefore, is the good which we must enjoy (VI, 47, 6):
Only one thing has value down here: to spend one’s life in truth and justice, all the while remaining benevolent to liars and to the unjust.
From: THE INNER CITADEL
The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius
Pierre Hadot
Translated by Michael Chase
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