Attached to Suttas on ignorance →
The faculty of self-observation or reflexion is inherent in the structure of our experience. Some degree of reflexion is almost never entirely absent in our waking life, and in the practice of mindfulness it is deliberately cultivated. To describe it simply, we may say that one part of our experience is immediately concerned with the world as its object, while at the same time another part of our experience is concerned with the immediate experience as its object. This second part we may call reflexive experience. It will be clear that when there is avijjā there is avijjā in both parts of our experience, is divided within itself, it is still one single, even if complex, structure.
The effect of this may be seen from the Sabbāsavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) wherein certain wrong views are spoken of. Three of them are:
With self I perceive self;
With self I perceive not-self;
With not-self I perceive self
A man with avijjā, practising reflexion, may identify ‘self’ with both reflexive and immediate experience, or with reflexive experience alone, or with immediate experience alone. He does not conclude that neither is ‘self’, and the reason is clear: it is not possible to get outside avijjā by means of reflexion alone; for however much a man may ‘step back’ from himself to observe himself he cannot help taking avijjā with him. There is just as much avijjā in the self-observer as there is in the self-observed. And this is the very reason why avijjā is so stable in spite of its being sankhata. Simply by reflexion the puthujjana can never observe avijjā and at the same time recognize it as avijjā; for in reflexion avijjā is the Judge as well as the Accused, and the verdict is always ‘Not Guilty’. In order to put an end to avijjā, which is a matter of recognizing avijjā as avijjà, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the puthujjana’s reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is pañisotagàmã (Majjhima iii,6 <M.i,168>), or ‘going against the stream’. The Dhamma gives the puthujjana the outside view of avijjā, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the ariyasāvaka this view has, as it were, ‘taken’ like a graft, and is perpetually available). Thus it will be seen that avijjā in reflexive experience (actual or potential) is the condition for avijjà in immediate experience. It is possible, also, to take a second step back and reflect upon reflexion; but there is still avijjā in this self-observation of self-observation, and we have a third layer of avijjā protecting the first two.
And there is no reason in theory why we should stop here; but however far we go we shall not get beyond avijjā. The hierarchy of avijjā can also be seen from the Suttas in the following way.
But which, friends, is nescience?…
That which is non-knowledge of suffering,
non-knowledge of arising of suffering,
non-knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
non-knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, friends, is called nescience.
And which, monks, is the noble truth of suffering…
And which, monks, is the noble truth of arising of suffering…
And which, monks, is the noble truth of ceasing of suffering…
And which, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering?
Just this noble eight-factored path, that is to say: right view…
And which, monks, is right view?…
That which is knowledge of suffering,
knowledge of arising of suffering,
knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, monks, is called right view.
Avijjā is non-knowledge of the four noble truths. Sammāditthi is knowledge of the four noble truths. But sammāditthi is part of the four noble truths. Thus avijjā is non-knowledge of sammāditthi; that is to say, non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. But since sammāditthi, which is knowledge of the four noble truths, is part of the four noble truths, so avijjā is non-knowledge of knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. And so we can go on indefinitely . But the point to be noted is that each of these successive stages represents an additional layer of (potentially) reflexive avijjā. Non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths is non-knowledge of vijjā, and non-knowledge of vijjā is failure to recognize avijjā as avijjā.
Conversely, it is evident that when avijjā is once recognized anywhere in this structure it must vanish everywhere; for knowledge of the four noble truths entails knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths, and vijjā (‘science’) replaces avijjā (‘nescience’) throughout.*
* Visible forms [Sounds… Images (Ideas)] are dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres… Craving-for-visible-forms [Craving-for-sounds… Craving-for-images (-ideas)] is dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres.
And the converse:
…herein this craving is eliminated, herein it ceases.
Dīgha ii,9 <D.ii,308-11>
Not only is there craving, but there is craving for craving as a condition for craving: indifference to craving destroys it. (Tanhā, be it noted, is not the coarse hankering after what we do not have [which is abhijjhā or covetousness], but the subtle craving for more of what we have. In particular, I am because I crave to be, and with cessation of craving-for-being [bhavatanhā, which is itself dependent on avijjà and, like it, without first beginning—Aïguttara X,vii,2 <A.v,116>], ‘I am’ ceases. Bhavatanhā, in fact, is the craving for more craving on which craving depends.)
*
(ii) Reality is the non-existence of things. In other words, things do not really exist, they only appear to do so on account of our ignorance (avijjā). (George Borrow tells of a Spanish gypsy in the last century whose grandfather held this view, so it hardly needs a Buddha to declare it. It seems to be closely allied to the Hindu notion of māyā— that all is illusion.) Now the Pali texts say that the Buddha taught anicca/dukkha/ anattā, and the average Theravādin, monk or layman, seems to take for granted that aniccatā, or impermanence, means that things are perpetually changing, that they do not remain the same for two consecutive moments. Failing to make the necessary distinctions they understand this as implying perpetual flux of everything all the time. This, of course, destroys the principle of self-identity, ‘A is A’; for unless something endures unchanged for at least a certain interval of time you cannot even make the assertion ‘this is A’ since the word ‘is’ has lost its meaning. Bypassing dukkha as something we all know about, they arrive at anattā as meaning ‘without self-identity’. (This is Mr. Wettimuny’s theme, following Dahlke. I do not think he is aware that he is putting himself among the Mahāyānists.) Granted the premise that anicca means ‘in continuous flux’, this conclusion is impeccable. Unfortunately, in doing away with the principle of self-identity, you do away with things—including change, which is also a thing. This means that for the puthujjana, who does not see aniccatā, things exist, and for the arahat, who has seen aniccatā, things do not exist. Thus the Mahāyānists contention is proved.
The difficulty arises when we deal with the sekha, who is in between the two; are we to say for him that ‘things partly exist and partly do not exist’, or that for him ‘some things exist and some do not’ (in which case we seem to have Eddington and the quantum theory)? The former, no doubt, would be preferable, but what is one to make of a partly non-existent thing? And in any case we have the curious state of affairs that there is change (or impermanence) only so long as it is not seen; for in the very instant that it is seen it vanishes. (This is certainly true of avijjā—see A Note on Pañiccasamuppāda §24—but the vanishing of avijjā★,
★, as I understand it, leaves impermanence intact and does not interfere with the three Laws of Thought.)
★NM You can say that ignorance does not exist, for the moment it is seen it is no more. Therefore, you may call it unconsciousness or blindness.
*
Mr. Wijerama has written a very intelligible letter, and I have found something to say in reply; but whether my reply will make things clear is another matter—the question of change and movement is notoriously perplexing and not easily disentangled. But even without entirely clarifying the situation, it is necessary to point out the source of certain current misinterpretations of the Dhamma—in particular, the view that ‘since everything is always changing nothing really exists, and it is only our ignorance that makes us think that things do exist’, which is quite erroneous but very widespread.
*
The attitude you speak of, that of cursing the world and oneself, is, in a sense, the beginning of wisdom. Revolt is the first reaction of an intelligent man when he begins to understand the desperate nature of his situation in the world; and it is probably true to say that nothing great has ever been achieved except by a man in revolt against his situation. But revolt alone is not enough—it eventually contradicts itself. A man in blind revolt is like someone in a railway compartment trying to stop the train by pushing against the opposite seat with his feet: he may be strong enough to damage the compartment, but the damaged compartment will nevertheless continue to move with the train. Except for the arahat, we are all in this train of samsara, and the problem is to stop the train whilst still travelling in it. Direct action, direct revolt, won’t do; but something, certainly, must be done. That it is, in fact, possible to stop the train from within we know from the Buddha, who has himself done it:
I, monks, being myself subject to birth, decay, and death, having seen the misery of subjection to birth, decay, and death, went in search of the unborn, undecaying, undying, uttermost quietus of extinction (nibbāna), and I reached the unborn, undecaying, undying, uttermost quietus of extinction. <M. 26: i,167> Revolt by all means, but let the weapons be intelligence and patience, not disorder and violence; and the first thing to do is to find out exactly what it is that you are revolting against. Perhaps you will come to see that what you are revolting against is avijjā. Nanavira Thera
*
There is progress all the time. Everything contributes to progress. But this is the progress of ignorance. The circles of ignorance may be ever widening, yet it remains a bondage all the same. In due course a Guru appears to teach and inspire us to practise Yoga and a ripening takes place as a result of which the immemorial night of ignorance dissolves before the rising sun of wisdom. But in reality nothing happened. The sun is always there, there is no night to it; the mind blinded by the 'I am the body' idea spins out endlessly its thread of illusion.
*
M: It is ignorance of yourself that makes you afraid and also unaware that you are afraid. Don't try not to be afraid. Break down the wall of ignorance first. People are afraid to die, because they do not know what is death. The jnani has died before his death, he saw that there was nothing to be afraid of. The moment you know your real being, you are afraid of nothing. Death gives freedom and power. To be free in the world, you must die to the world. Then the universe is your own, it becomes your body, an expression and a tool. The happiness of being absolutely free is beyond description. On the other hand, he who is afraid of freedom cannot die.
Q: You mean that one who cannot die, cannot live?
M: Put it as you like; attachment is bondage, detachment is freedom. To crave is to slave.
Nisargadatta Maharaj
*
Ignorance must never be lost sight of (as lack of knowledge, hiddenness in probability, or forgetting, or transcendence, or uncertainty à la Heisenberg). Any system that explains existence without it does not explain it.
*
If ignorance is an essential component of existence (whether as the finite unknowing of the infinite, or as the basis of Dependent Arising, or as the Uncertainty Principle in Atomic Physics), then any theory that does not take account of and include ignorance cannot claim to represent existence or the world fully.
The fact that a theory works in practice, by experience, proves that it does so take account, or it would not work. But to show openly or incautiously such ignorance would be offensive, indecent, taboo, and so it is normally hidden, normally inadvertedly.
*
My existence is my presence now, or my present life (birth-to-death); my non-existence is my previous lives (before birth) and my future lives (after death). Both together compose me:
I am composed of both together. The objective materialist who, as a solalterist, forgets himself, takes existence as an all-truth, subordinating “I-me.” The religionist who believes in the permanence of the soul, takes the solipsistic “I-me” as an all-truth, subordinating existence.
*
If number is definable as what you can count, it is therefore finite, but an infinite number (see Russell, Mysticism and Logic) is what you cannot count, and is therefore not a number except by a pun (vide Russell’s statement that “the number of finite numbers is infinite”—which in “straight” language should be stated as no number of numbers is countable”). A definition of infinity is self-contradictory, verbally, since it involves placing a limit (finis) to that which is stated to have none.
395. What I believe I know, I do not yet fully know: what I know I believe, I no longer fully believe.
396. Ignorance screens the truth. It is on that screen that people paint pictures and write underneath their labels “god” and “not-god” and “theism” and “atheism.”
467. What the psychologists—no, psychoanalysts call a ‘fully integrated personality’ is he not simply one who lives (loudly and contradictorily and humanely) according to the Old Testament pattern? The New Testament is not an integrating force: ‘I bring not peace, but a sword …’
468. Why should ‘integration’ be a good thing?
‘Integration’ as integration of ignorance and craving in the personality, just as we now have ignorance and force integrated in the atom with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle—‘Ignorance’
and ‘Force’—those old myths?
483. Knowledge emerges from ignorance as its ‘opposite,’ faith needs and uses ignorance for its medium, since it is essentially the aid for knowledge beyond its own field.
The three have a triangular relationship in an act (with no true opposite for any of the three).
In the ordinary sense knowledge is certain that what is is and that no action is possible. Faith is certain that no result is impossible. Ignorance is not certain how the action is being done, which changes what is known to be into what it is not.
484. One’s thoughts are like nothing so much than an uncorrected text full of mistakes.
485. People seem to approach religion for one of two main reasons or for both mixed together: They are moved either by a wish to discover truth (leaving that vague word vague here) or by a need to find justification for a predilection. Of the first, an outstanding example is, perhaps Kierkegaard. The second is far the more common. In myself I find elements of both. Perhaps the two merge with the incompatibility of two lines that meet at right-angles, and from the meeting-point some set out in one direction and some in the other.
488. Action The ‘actional’ attitude has two complementary modes: (1) The voluntary (’active’) (’exercise of will’, ‘free will’, control, doing, etc.), and (2) the unvoluntary (’passive’) (‘limitation of will’, ‘out-of-control’, ‘inaction’, etc.). These two modes are constantly interlocking and alternating in the process of existence-as-becoming. The Result of an Action comes under (2). (1) looks to (2):.that is, any act is done with respect to its expected result, without which is no act at all. This means what is called an ACT is, in fact, an experienced transition from the voluntary (active) state of (1) to the unvoluntary (passive) state of (2), e. g., the active, voluntary igniting of a fire-work is an example of (1), while the passive, involuntary, nose-tickling firework’s independent buzzing (or the ensuing sneeze), is an example of (2). This whole ACT, as an ‘experience of a transition’ from the one type of constitutive cognizance to the other, opposite, type—on the voluntary-involuntary dimension—involves the manifestation of faith-ignorance already discussed: faith that the result will ensue as expected, and ignorance in the actual experience of the act-as-transition). For simplicity’s sake the examples cited are those of the elation conscious-body/inanimate-thing; but the relation of the Act/result between two conscious bodies (‘persons’) is not essentially different in its basic structure—as I/not-I—from the first-mentioned: then I am this result: what I am is out of my control. More briefly, these two are respectively expressed by the words ‘I’ and ‘me’—‘I’ voluntarily make ‘me’ the involuntary result, ‘me’ being the reflection I see in the not-I.
508. The honest man is describable only in terms of dishonesty.
For his honest quality he possesses in the form of his acts. And acts are alterations made. But he is not his acts: he is not what he possesses: he is not honest or he is his acts: but then by acting he is a changing, and so cannot remain honest, or in other terms: he is what he is not, if he is what he has.
509. Singularity is the identity of two; duplicity is the non-identity of one. Identity = ignorance of duplicity, duplicity = ignorance of identity. Need assumes the identity of what it needs and the duplicity of what it does not need (needs to reject).
510. In the “flow” of time the only constant is space. In the “extension” of space the only continuity is time. Time is inconstant, space is discontinuous. Time is constant in one place, space is continuous in one moment.
511. There are two ways of attempting to deal with the appalling difficulties of choice on the higher ethical levels (Truth/ beauty/goodness; family/country, war/peace, principles/ persons…): (1) one can attempt to justify a one-sided choice, and this is what philosophies of value and religions attempt to do through reason and faith (feeling,) respectively. But this always founders or is never safe from foundering. (2) Or the dialectic can be squarely faced in the fact that no one-sided solution of it is ever justifiable by reason or by faith. And here enters the question not of acceptance or refusal, nor of affirmation or denial, but of letting-go. The letting-go, however, is limited, in life at least (and without taking death into account) by the boundary of ability to let go.
512. All action, regarded (mathematically) as a function of me, and I being a function of ignorance, action is a function of reflected ignorance.
616. In the Round (i.e., Paṭicca-samuppāda) as arising, ignorance must function, on the pre-logical level as forgetting and as infinite transcendence, and on the logical level as forgetting and the presence of the Assumption (i.e., the impersonal God/ Godlessness or the personal Absolutism/Relativism).
In the pre-logical, ignorance is omnipresent, i.e., as transcendence and as change (—forgetting); but in the logical, it can be pushed aside partly, because the possibility of right view appearing partially and intellectually and patchily, though what the realization of cessation of craving is, is a cataclysm.
Ignorance and craving/clinging constitute (with consciousness) the purely temporal contingency. They are influenceable by will. Consciousness is the absolute negation in virtue of which ignorance and craving can pose the positive ‘world.’ Bhava which is positive, describes the constitution of the moving spatio-temporal contingency which is (a) possible in virtue of the negation consisting in consciousness, and is (b) factual in virtue of the limitations of viewing things imposed by ignorance, and limitations of time/action imposed by craving/clinging.
(On dependent arising) To the question: “What are these sets of terms intended to describe?” we may answer tentatively that they are intended to describe experience of any possible kind where ignorance (that is lack of personal realization of the Truths) is present.
638. To be is to be contingent: nothing, of which it can be said that ‘it is,’ can be said to be alone and independent.
But being is a member of the paṭicca-samuppāda as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.
The destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being.
When ignorance is no more, then consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all; for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no more ignorance then it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in MN 22).
The Absolute receives absolution only from consciousness, and by that act its absoluteness is very particular.
The Incomprehensible is only incomprehensible when comprehended as such: uncomprehended, it is comprehendible as incomprehensible.
Do I know the ignorance of unknowledge, or am I ignorant of the knowledge of my ignorance?
The most illusory of all illusions is the illusion that there is no illusion.
What is certain? Probability. What is probable? Certainty. Can I doubt that I know with certainty my own doubt?
540. Existence described as a system of null-functions activated into partial non-nullity by ignorance. Nanamoli Thera
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