On the Brahmajāla

 Attached to Brahmajāla Sutta →

Instead of asking: "Is Dhamma atheistic or theistic" I prefer to ask "where is the place of atheism and theism in Brahmajāla".

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One thing among many others to be noticed here is that the Buddha is careful to spread a net with which to intercept all speculative views.

This is the Brahmajāla, the “Divine Net,” which as the first discourse of the whole Sutta Piṭaka forms as it were a kind of filter for the mind; or to change the analogy, a tabulation by whose means (if rightly used) all speculative views can be identified, traced down to the fallacy or unjustified assumption from which they spring, and neutralized. This Net, in fact, classifies all possible speculative views (rationalist or irrationalist) under a scheme of sixty-two types.

These 62 types are not descriptions of individual philosophies of other individual teachers contemporary with the Buddha (a number of those are mentioned as well elsewhere in the Suttas), but are the comprehensive net (after revealing the basic assumptions on which these speculative views all grow) with which to catch any wrong viewpoints that can be put forward. (Ultimately, these must all be traceable to the contact of self-identification in some form, however misinterpreted, but that cannot be gone into here.)*

Nanamoli Thera

* “As to the various views that arise in the world, householder, ‘The world is eternal', the world is not eternal', 'the world is finite', 'the world is infinite', 'soul and body are the same', 'soul and body are the different', ‘the Tathāgata exists after death',  ‘the Tathāgata does not exist after death’, ‘the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death’, ‘the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’—these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajāla: when there is personality view, these views come to be; when there is no personality view, these views do not come to be.”

“But, venerable sir, how does identity view come to be?”

“Here, householder, the uninstructed worldling, who has no regard for the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who has no regard for the good persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in  form. He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... determinations as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. It is in such a way that personality view comes to be.”

“And, venerable sir, how does personality view not come to be?”

“Here, householder, the instructed noble disciple, who has regard for the noble ones and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, who has regard for the good persons and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He does not regard feeling as self … or perception as self … or determinations as self ... or consciousness as self ... or self as in consciousness. It is in such a way that personality view does not come to be.”  SN 41 : 3

**
“When, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands as they really are the origin and passing away of the six bases of contact, their satisfaction, unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, then he understands what transcends all these views.

“Whatever recluses or brahmins, bhikkhus, are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, speculators about the past and the future together, hold settled views about the past and the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future—all are trapped in this net with its sixty-two divisions. Whenever they emerge, they emerge caught within this net, trapped and contained within this very net.

“Just as, bhikkhus, a skillful fisherman or a fisherman’s apprentice, after spreading a fine-meshed net over a small pool of water, might think: ‘Whatever sizeable creatures there are in this pool, all are trapped within this net, trapped and contained in this very net’—in the same way, all those recluses and brahmins are trapped in this net with its sixty-two divisions. Whenever they emerge, they emerge caught within this net, trapped and contained within this very net.

“The body of the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, stands with the leash that bound it to being cut. As long as his body stands, gods and men shall see him. But with the breakup of the body and the exhaustion of the life-faculty, gods and men shall see him no more.

“Just as, bhikkhus, when the stalk of a bunch of mangoes has been cut, all the mangoes connected to the stalk follow along with it, in the same way, the body of the Tathāgata stands with the leash that bound it to existence cut. As long as his body stands, gods and men shall see  him. But with the breakup of the body and the exhaustion of the life-faculty, gods and men shall see him no more.”

**
Ability to localize any modern view in the Brahmajala is a good thing, but not indispensable for the arising of the right view. However it is absolutely necessary to understand that all these views are derived from sakkayaditthi and the holder of any of them is an attavadin, victim of attavad'upadana.

In the dependent arising it is described as: "with upādāna as condition, bhava" (being). Since the Tathagata is liberated by non-clinging, his state has to be described as bhavanirodho. So while gods and men see certain puggala (an individual) known as Tathagata, actually and in the truth, Tathāgata is not to be found.

Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra-, and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found".

Puthujjana is imprisoned in the Brahmajāla and his state is that of being. Brahmajāla is the magic Net, imprisoning anyone who doesn't see it. As soon as one sees Brahmajāla one gets outside it. Arising of perception of impermanence releases one from Brahmajāla, but it is so, because it prevents one from self-identification with "whatever is the subject to arising is the subject to cessation" -self is associated with perception of permanence, so being without it, puthujjana is the victim of wrong self-identification. (Of course any self-identification is a wrong one.).

Nanavira Thera:

Now the Pali texts say that the Buddha taught anicca/dukkha/ anattā, and the average Theravàdin, monk or layman, seems to take for granted that aniccatā, or impermanence, means that things are perpetually changing, that they do not remain the same for two consecutive moments. Failing to make the necessary distinctions, they understand this as implying perpetual flux of everything all the time. This, of course, destroys the principle of self-identity, ‘A is A’; for unless something endures unchanged for at least a certain interval of time you cannot even make the assertion ‘this is A’ since the word ‘is’ has lost its meaning. Bypassing dukkha as some-thing we all know about, they arrive at anattā as meaning ‘without self-identity’. Granted the premise that anicca means ‘in continuous flux’, this conclusion is impeccable. Unfortunately, in doing away with the principle of self-identity, you do away with things—including change, which is also a thing. This means that for the puthujjana, who does not see aniccatā, things exist, and for the arahat, who has seen aniccatā, things do not exist. Thus the Mahàyànist contention is proved.

The difficulty arises when we deal with the sekha, who is in between the two; are we to say for him that ‘things partly exist and partly do not exist’, or that for him ‘some things exist and some do not’ (in which case we seem to have Eddington and the quantum theory)?

The former, no doubt, would be preferable, but what is one to make of a partly non-existent thing? And in any case we have the curious state of affairs that there is change (or impermanence) only so long as it is not seen; for in the very instant that it is seen it vanishes. (This is certainly true of avijjā*—see A Note on Paticcasamuppāda §24—but the vanishing of avijjā, as I understand it, leaves impermanence intact and does not interfere with the three Laws of Thought.) I still don’t think the Notes are Mr. Blofeld’s cup of tea, but I shall be interested to see whether he is able to absorb them into Mahàyàna—if one has a mystical outlook, based on the principle that A is not A, there is nothing that cannot be reconciled with anything else.

Q: How can ignorance be known? To know ignorance presupposes knowledge.
M: Quite right. The very admission: 'I am ignorant' is the dawn of knowledge. An ignorant man is ignorant of his ignorance. You can say that ignorance does not exist, for the moment it is seen it is no more. Therefore, you may call it unconsciousness or blindness.

To repeat, all imprisoned in the Brahmajāla are victims of attavad'upadana. Self doesn't have to be mentioned explicitly, but any of 62 views asserts an existence of self at least implicitly. For example "world" is always in relationship with "self". Apart that, no such thing as objective "external" reality  exists.

The way to truth lies through the destruction of the false. To destroy the false, you must question your most inveterate beliefs. Of these the idea that you are the body is the worst. With the body comes the world, with the world — God, who is supposed to have created the world and thus it starts — fears, religions, prayers, sacrifices, all sorts of systems — all to protect and support the child-man, frightened out of his wits by monsters of his own making. realise that what you are cannot be born nor die and with the fear gone all suffering ends.

What the mind invents, the mind destroys. But the real is not invented and cannot be destroyed. Hold on to that over which the mind has no power. What I am telling you about is neither in the past nor in the future. Nor is it in the daily life as it flows in the now. It is timeless and the total timelessness of it is beyond the mind. Nisrgadatta Maharaj

In the terms of the real / unreal the self as well conceit "I am" are fake reality. "Reality" since for one who takes his own experience for granted, there's actually nothing more real than his own self. Quite a few Buddhists think that self mentioned in Suttas refers to "soul" in which naive Christians believe (but we know better - it doesn't exist!; or more respectable, still deluded Hindu  pastulate as "Self" which obviously neither exist.

The P.T.S. (London Pali Text Society) Dictionary, for example, supposes that the word attā in the Suttas refers either to a phenomenon of purely historical interest (of the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B.C.) known as a ‘soul’, or else to the reflexive ‘self’, apparently of purely grammatical interest. All suggestion that there might be some connexion (of purely vital interest) between ‘soul’ and ‘self’ is prudently avoided.

Modern scholar Venerable Analayo says:

Ñāṇavīra Thera  also offers the assessment that, although even for an arahant “there is certainly consciousness and so on, there is no apparent ‘self’ for whom there is consciousness.” In fact, “[a]ctually and in truth … there is, even in this very life, no arahat to be found.” The assertion that an arahant is not found in truth and fact comes with a reference to a Pāli discourse presenting the clarification that no Tathāgata can be found to exist in truth and fact. However, this concerns the tetralemma on the existence or non-existence of a Tathāgata after death, which is based on the mistaken notion of a self, held by some contemporaries of the Buddha.

So according to Ven Analayo "some contemporaries of the Buddha" were attavadins but same obviously weren't. In fact this statement isn't actually entirely false, since any ariyasavaka living in the time of the Buddha wasn't the victim of attavad'upadana, but ...😌

The modern Buddhist unfortunately is as much victim of attavad'upadana as the venerable yogin who remembers his previous existences and based on that comes to conclusion:

For this reason I know this: the self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. And though these beings roam and wander (through the round of existence), pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself.’

There's nothing wrong with the memory of the venerable yogin, but since he misunderstands his own experience here and now, interpreting it in the terms atta ca loko ca, he does the same with his memory. Modern atheist as ucchedavadian takes his self as much for granted - as monolithic extra-temporal entity moving from the birth towards the death. The difference lies in the fact that he assumes that at the death time his self will be annihilated.

On the lower level sasattavada has this advantage that it is usually associated with mundane right view: "my future depends on quality of my actions so I should avoid unwholesome actions and perform wholesome actions". In the case of ucchedavada it is not so. Of course modern atheist can be much more moral then avarage Buddhist or Christian, but it is because there are other foundations of the high moral standard, not only belief in  kamma vipaka. Nevertheless "ideas have consequences", and who assumes that the end of the present life is the end of conscious experience actually proposes that:

‘There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ (...)

‘When one acts or makes others act, when one mutilates or makes others mutilate, when one tortures or makes others inflict torture, when one inflicts sorrow or makes others inflict sorrow, when one oppresses or makes others inflict oppression, when one intimidates or makes others inflict intimidation, when one kills living beings, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, plunders wealth, commits burglary, ambushes highways, seduces another’s wife, utters falsehood—no evil is done by the doer. If, with a razor-rimmed wheel, one were to make the living beings on this earth into one mass of flesh, into one heap of flesh, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the south bank of the Ganges killing and slaughtering, mutilating and making others mutilate, torturing and making others inflict torture, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving gifts and making others give gifts, making offerings and making others make offerings, because of this there would be no merit and no outcome of merit. By giving, by taming oneself, by restraint, by speaking truth, there is no merit and no outcome of merit.’
MN 60

In short, his view implicates that after the death of the body, the psychopath causing tremendous suffering for others and moral good person have an equal status. This itself is the wrong view even on mundane level. As such it is or can be much more harmful than sasattavada. It is harmful anyway since it opposes the right view: "we are totally responsible for our actions and we will experience results of them, accordingly to quality of our actions". And could be even more harmful - as in the case of psychopath - who actually acts according to such view.

But psychopathy usually is associated with high IQ, so it is not impossible for the psychopath to believe in rebirth and so struggle against his own unwholesome tendencies. After all, indifferent to welfare of others, he still isn't indifferent to his own happiness.

Moder Buddhist should first establish himself firmly in the mundane right view. And based on this foundation try to understand doctrine of anattā. Both are the part of Dhamma and as such are perfectly compatible with each other.

Only an arahat is beyond the morality, his experience actually can be described as the cessation of morality, but it is so because possibility of immortal actions was totally eradicated.

Hegel, it seems, in his Phänomenologie des Geistes, has said that there can only be an ethical consciousness in so far as there is disagreement between nature and ethics: if ethical behaviour became natural, conscience would disappear. And from this it follows that if ethical action is the absolute aim, the absolute aim must also be the absence of ethical action. This is quite right; but is ethical action the absolute aim? The difficulty is, precisely, to see the action that puts an end to action in the ethical sense. Whereas unskilful action is absolutely blameworthy as leading only to future unpleasure and to the arising of action, there is action, leading to a bright future, that yet does not lead to the ending of action. See Majjhima vi,7 <M.i,387-92>. The generous man, the virtuous man, the man even who purifies his mind in samādhi, without right view remains a puthujjana, and so does not escape reproach:

One who lays down this body, Sāriputta, and takes hold of another body, he I say is blameworthy .
MN 144

Summarize: surely the mere ability to distinguish between ucchedavada "there's no self" and Buddha Teaching "all things are not self" doesn't guarantee an escape from Brahmajāla, but inability to do so, guarantee the continuation of such enslavement.

Perhaps little bit of common sense is enough to see the difference, people are selfish and this is the problem which has to be solved. Psychology recognises such phenomena as self-bias or self-deception. Even puthujjana writes such books as "Ego is your enemy". In certain sense such message is quite valid, but it implies that there is some person who will survive after ego is erradicated.

Doctrine of anattā undermines the very existence of the subject, and self in the form of attavad'upadana is an aspect of it. So in fact in this sense "self" is phenomenal.

‘Self’ as subject can be briefly discussed as follows. As pointed out in Phassa [b], the puthujjana thinks ‘things are mine (i.e. are my concern) because I am, because I exist’. He takes the subject (‘I’) for granted; and if things are appropriated, that is because he, the subject, exists. The ditthisampanna (or sotāpanna) sees, however, that this is the wrong way round. He sees that the notion ‘I am’ arises because things (so long as there is any trace of avijjā) present themselves as ‘mine’. This significance (or intention, or determination), ‘mine’ or ‘for me’—see A Note On Pañiccasamuppàda [e]—, is, in a sense, a void, a negative aspect of the present thing (or existing phenomenon), since it simply points to a subject; and the puthujjana, not seeing impermanence (or more specifically, not seeing the impermanence of this ubiquitous determination), deceives himself into supposing that there actually exists a subject—‘self’—independent of the object (which latter, as the ditthisampanna well understands, is merely the positive aspect of the phenomenon—that which is ‘for me’). In this way it may be seen that the puthujjana’s experience, pañc’upādānakkhandhā, has a negative aspect (the subject) and a positive aspect (the object). But care is needed; for, in fact, the division subject/object is not a simple negative/positive division. If it were, only the positive would be present (as an existing phenomenon) and the negative (the subject) would not be present at all—it would simply not exist. But the subject is, in a sense, phenomenal: it (or he) is an existing phenomenal negative, a negative that appears; for the puthujjana asserts the present reality of his ‘self’ (‘the irreplaceable being that I am’). The fact is, that the intention or determination ‘mine’, pointing to a subject, is a complex structure involving avijjā. The subject is not simply a negative in relation to the positive object: it (or he) is master over the object, and is thus a kind of positive negative, a master who does not appear explicitly but who, somehow or other, nevertheless exists. It is this master whom the puthujjana, when he engages in reflexion, is seeking to identify—in vain! This delusive mastery of subject over object must be rigorously distinguished from the reflexive power of control or choice that is exercised in voluntary action by puthujjana and arahat alike. Nanavira Thera

So while the statement "there is no self" is totally divorced from reality, to adopt oneself to puthujjana understanding Buddha can assert the existence of self - it corresponds accordingly to three states of being:

“There are these three types of acquisition of self: the gross, the mind-constituted, and the formless…. The first has (material) form, consists of the four great entities and consumes physical food. The second has form and is constituted by mind with all the limbs and lacking no faculty. The third is formless and consists in perception…. I teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of acquisitions of self in order that in you, who put the teaching into practice, defiling qualities may be abandoned and cleansing qualities increased, and that you may, by realisation yourselves here and now with direct knowledge, enter upon and abide in the fullness of understanding’s perfection…. If it is thought that to do that is a painful abiding, that is not so; on the contrary, by doing that there is gladness, happiness, tranquillity, mindfulness, full awareness, and a pleasant abiding.”

Nanamoli Thera: The Buddha went on to say that from one  rebirth to another any one of these three kinds of acquisition of self can succeed another. That being so, it cannot be successfully argued that only one of them is true and the others wrong; one can only say that the term for any one does not fit the other two; just as, with milk from a cow, curd from milk, butter from curd, ghee from butter, and fine-extract of ghee from ghee, the term of each fits only that and none of the others, yet they are not disconnected. The Buddha concluded:

“These are worldly usages, worldly language, worldly terms of communication, worldly descriptions, by which a Perfect One communicates without misapprehending them.”
DN 9 (condensed)