To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Sunday, September 14, 2025

Atheists should be regarded as retarded children, even as mentally weak

 

[Disclaimer: In Dhamma drinking is recognised as breaking the moral precept which leads to pain.] 

After all, two will remain,

God and the wine.


I decided to write a prayer book for the atheists. In the distress of our time, I felt sympathy for the sufferers and wanted to help them in this way.

I am aware of the difficulty of my task. I know that I cannot even utter the word “God.” I must speak of him by using all sorts of other names such as kiss or intoxication or cooked ham. I chose wine as the most important name. Hence the title of the book, The Philosophy of Wine, and hence its motto: after all, two will remain, God and the wine.

Circumstances lead me to resort to trickery. Atheists, it is well known, are lamentably haughty people. They only need to glance at God’s name and they will immediately throw the book down. When one touches their obsession, they get into a fury. I think that if I speak of food, drink, tobacco, and love, if I use enigmatic names, then they can be duped. For, besides being conceited, they are, to the same extent, stupid. For example, they altogether ignore this kind of prayer. They think that one can pray only in a church or by murmuring priestly words.

Atheists are our poor in spirit. They are the most needy children of our time. They are poor in spirit but the difference is that they have hardly any hope for the kingdom of heaven. In the past, many were angry with them and fought against them. I consider this method completely unacceptable. To fight? Should a healthy person fight with the lame and the blind? Since they are crippled, they must be approached with good will. Not only should persuasion be avoided but they should not even notice what is happening to them. They should be regarded as retarded children, even as mentally weak, although they hold their mental faculties in high esteem and think that atheism is a sort of perfect knowledge. Why were they fought against in the past? Above all, it seems to me, because atheism, understood as mental deficiency and distorted mood, would get nothing out of life without some kind of compensation. What is this compensation? It is excessive activity. Thus, atheism necessarily led to violence and, since it led to it, atheists had to secure supremacy over the world. Indeed, they secured it. Actually, those who fought against them were envious of them. In my opinion, that was a mistake. When the atheists saw themselves being envied, they became presumptuous.

I have changed tactics. It was not particularly diffi cult. I only needed to reinstate the truth. The truth is that there is nothing to envy in them. What can I envy in the cripple even if he is so po-werful? What can I envy in those who are lame, deaf, idiotic, and half-witted? If I was envious of them, this would mean that I admit that they are right; I would create the impression that I desire what they possess.

I have changed my tactics in the following manner. Instead of fighting against them and making efforts to convert them, I feel sorry for them. And this is not merely a trick. I do not want to take anything away from them. I would like to offer something else whose absence would render them quite weak, poor, and – why to deny it? – ridiculous.

Incidentally, there were other reasons behind those numerous disputes. Indeed, most people thought that atheists were irreligious. Of course, this is out of the question. There are no irreligious people. Atheists are not irreligious, but, in agreement with their pitiful mental deficiency and distorted mood, believe in a comical religion. In fact, they do not only believe in it. They are all bigots. So I say that all of them are, since I have never met an atheist who is not more bigoted than that bad smelling old lady who, on Sundays, in front of the church, sells cheap booklets published on the subject of the miracle-making urine of Saint Homunculus. Of course, the patron-saint of atheistic religion is not Saint Homunculus, but Einstein, and the miracle-making power is not urine, but antiseptics. The name of atheistic bigotry is materialism. This religion contains three dogmas: there is no soul, a human is an animal, death is annihilation. All three can be summed up by simply saying that atheists are terribly afraid of God. Böhme tells us that they live in God’s wrath. They know only the angry God: therefore, they hide themselves and tell lies. They think that by saying that God does not exist, they will cease to be afraid. Instead, of course, they are even more afraid.

Of course, the atheist is a presumptuous man, he does not even want to be different; he has no inclination for humility or love; in other words, he is so feeble that he cannot even display such an inclination. He prefers to remain in his fear, which he denies. He trembles and hides himself and tells lies and becomes increasingly haughty. From such a disconsolate hotchpotch, in which denial, fear, lying, hiding, haughtiness, and bigotry are boiling together, emerges the religious surrogate of materialism.

From this it clearly follows that atheists not only cannot, but also must not, be persuaded by force. They are wayward people, full of worries and self-delusions, and one must handle them with considerable care.

Fortunately, the soul is not like the body. If someone is born maimed, deaf, or, during his life becomes crippled, no human power can change that. The realm of the soul is different. Everyone is born with a wholesome soul and no one can ever lose this health. Everyone can become cured of the deficiencies of the soul. This does not even need a miracle.

A prayer book for the atheists? Namely one that does not even allow them to notice that it teaches them to pray. It is a great thing. Therefore, as Nietzsche says, one must speak only in this manner: cynically and innocently. One must speak wickedly and cunningly, almost with malicious cleverness and, at the same time, with pure heart, serenity, and simplicity, like a songbird.

I must seize this occasion to address a few words to the pietists, that shady sect of atheists. Pietism is nothing else but atheism in disguise. The ordinary materialist is a pitiful soul; his mental faculties are weak, sometimes his heart is completely stupid, and hence, as I have already said several times, one must consider him a cripple who obsessively holds on to his deficiency and considers his clumsiness a significant achievement.

Actually, the pietist is just as godless as the materialist; but, beyond that, he also has a bad consciousness that prompts him to adopt the externals of true religion. The pietist would demand that one live on bran and water; he would like to see the most beautiful women wearing badly cut dresses, he would forbid laughter, and cover the sun with a black veil. The pietist is an abstainer. I know quite well that even my motto roused his indignation; he asked gloomily and angrily, “Come on, what is this blasphemy?” He was scandalized because I dared to say that God is also in cooked ham. Well, he should calm down. He will hear something even more daring. I promise that I will have special consideration for him and miss no occasion to scandalize him to the most serious extent. One should spare the atheist because he is stupid and ignorant and narrow and simple-minded. The pietist cannot expect any indulgence. He should know that I will be watching him from the corner of my eye and the more that he puts on a solemn face, the more I will laugh at him. The more he will express his indignation, the more I will enjoy myself and I will not even tell him why.

THREE

This book must necessarily be divided into three parts. Necessarily because every good book is divided into three parts – three being a perfect way of dividing – but also because the number of wine is also three and this must find its expression in the division. The first part is devoted to the metaphysics of wine. It is not only my goal, but also my ambition, in this part, to lay down the foundation of all future philosophy of wine. Just as Kant sets forth the pivotal thoughts of all subsequent philosophies, which we may accept or counter but never evade and consider as unsaid. In the same manner, I wish, in this part, to expound the universally valid and timeless ideas of the metaphysics of wine.

By using the word “metaphysics,” I know that I step beyond the permissible boundary. However, the word remains hidden. It is nowhere in the title. It is a constraint that I cannot avoid since atheists are even mistrustful of philosophy, although this is the highest term that they are still able to accept. Metaphysics offends their bigotry to such an extent that, for example, they would never have dared to open a book that I had titled The Metaphysics of Wine.

The first part considers wine as a supernatural reality. The second one speaks of wine as nature. As to its character, this part is descriptive. It discusses the properties and types of grapes, the types of wines, the relationship between soil and wine, water and wine; it not only takes special account of our wines but it also pays attention to the most prominent wines from abroad.

The third part deals with the art of wine ceremony. This part inquires about when we should drink and when we should not drink. How should we drink? Where should we drink? From what? Alone? With someone? With a man or a woman? It speaks of the relationship between wine and work, wine and walk, wine and bath, wine and sleep, wine and love. It contains some rules indicating what kind of wine is appropriate for certain occasions, how much is needed, with what kind of food, where to drink it and in what sort of combination.

This part does not pretend at all to be exhaustive. It merely wishes to point out the boundless richness of drinking possibilities and calls upon everyone, even now, to keep adding to the teachings of wine ceremony with ever new chapters.

Such a triple division is in complete harmony with the three main ages of the world history of wine. The meaning corresponding to the metaphysical part is the antediluvian age, during which humanity did not yet know wine, only dreamt about it. After the Flood, Noah planted the first vine and, with this act, a new era began in world history. The third era begins with the transformation of water into wine, and presently we live in this era. World history comes to an end when wine flows from springs and wells, when wine falls from the clouds, when lakes and seas become wine.

The Metaphysics of Wine

WORLD OF THE MOUTH

In our mother’s womb, we are attached to the world through our navel. After our birth, through our mouth. Among our sensory organs, the eyes are the abstract ones; they never establish direct contact with the object they see and they are unable to merge with it. The ear lets things somewhat closer. The hand grasps them. The nose even inhales the vapour of things. The mouth takes in what it desires. I can only come to know what the object is if I taste it. The mouth is the source of immediate experiences. A child knows this.

When he wants to familiarize himself with something, he puts it into his mouths. Later we forget this. Yet I can only come to know who this man is if I have spoken to him with words coming from my mouth; I only learned to know a woman if I have kissed her; I have only made something my own if I have eaten it. The world of the mouth is much more immediate, consequently more religious, than the world of the eyes, the world of the ear or even the world of the hand, because it is closer to reality. Hence, as Novalis tells us, there is a profound kinship between eating and learning. Hence the mother of all of us is the earth, which feeds us through our mouth, and we merge with what it offers to us.

The mouth carries out three activities: it speaks, kisses, and eats. Unfortunately, at this time I have to remain silent about speech and, though reluctantly, about kiss as well. I would merely say that through my mouth I am directly merged with the world and, in such a togetherness, three of my activities are possible: either I give, or I take, or I both give and take. While speaking, I give; while eating, I take, while kissing, I both give and take. The word moves in an outward, the food in an inward direction, the kiss both outward and inward directions, and that makes a circle. Of course, one activity does not exclude the other two but it could even be said to support them, since when the soil nourishes me, it also speaks to me, teaches me, and even kisses me; when I kiss a beautiful woman, I also find nourishment in her as she does in me, and we both feed each other, teach each other, and talk to each other; most of the time we say something whose depth is beyond words.

There are three sorts of nourishment: eating, drinking, and breathing. Those who are well-versed in the great science of tradition know that food has a close relationship with the body; they also know that the meaning corresponding to drink is the soul’s world; as for breathing, it is a spiritual nourishment. To render the spirituality of their being more intense, women apply perfumes and men smoke.(....)

ONE GLASS OF WINE: THE DEATH JUMP OF ATHEISM

All thinking must begin with sensation, says Baader. I understood the logic of his advice and hence began the metaphysics of wine with the most sensuous sense, the mouth. For whatever the eyes and the nose can experience in wine is insignificant in comparison to the knowledge of the mouth. The mouth knows that wine is a hieratic mask, and it knows whose hieratic mask it is.

At this point, by reason of, and in relation to, the foregoing, one must naturally take a stand for immediate life and against abstract life. Abstract life lives only through its eyes, at most through its ears. It does not live through its mouth. Therefore, the eyes and ears are exoteric organs. Nevertheless, the abstract person distrusts even his eyes and ears. He likes to use expressions such as “sensory illusion”, creating the impression that the senses deceive either because of their pitiful impotence or out of intentional calculation. And so, the abstract person invents a gruesome chimera, a colourless, odourless, formless, tasteless, and soundless nothing, destined to substitute the sensory world. Out of this, mostly in recent times, he has created science, morality, law, and the state. Of course, whatever he does, nothing comes of it.

Abstract life is a conceptually designed life, built not upon immediate sensory experiences but upon so-called ideas. In the modern age, we know two sorts of such abstract persons: one is a scientifist, the other is a puritan. It is obvious that both are a variety of atheism.

The characteristic feature of scientifism is that it ignores love but knows sexual instinct; it does not work, but produces; it does not take nourishment, but consumes; it does not sleep, but restores its biological energies; it does not eat meat, potatoes, plums, pears, apples, bread with butter and honey, but calorie, vitamin, carbo-hydrate and protein; it does not drink wine, but alcohol; it weighs itself weekly; if it has a headache, it takes eight sorts of powder; if the grape must causes diarrhoea, it runs to the doctor; it debates the increase of life span; it holds the problems of hygiene unsolvable because, although it can wash the tooth-brush with soap and the soap with water, it cannot, however, wash water with anything.

The scientifist is harmless, awkward, and more comical figure of atheism. The puritan is an aggressive person. For his attack, the strength comes, in no small measure, from the belief that he has found the only right way to live. Someone can be a puritan even if he is a materialist, even if he is an idealist, even if he is a Buddhist, or a Talmudist, because puritanism is not a Weltanshauung, but a temperament. It requires two things: a dismal narrow-mindedness, which blindly adheres to certain definite ideas, and a mad and sly readiness to fight for these very same ideas.

The true strength of puritanism springs from the fact that the puritan is a desperate atheist. He would send to the stake all the woman more beautiful than the average; he would throw all the fatty and sugary food to the pigs; he would condemn the laughing person to life imprisonment; he hates nothing more than wine, in other words and in truth, nothing scares him more than wine. The puritan himself is an abstract person. The heartless one. It is always the heart, rather than reason, that causes the atheists’ trouble. The puritan is the idiot with a hardened heart. World history owes to the puritans its bloodiest battles and most dreadful revolutions. The reason for all this is that the poor person has found an idea instead of God, and he knows it. He knows that he is desperate. He sees his failure, yet he still carries on. If only once he could take part in a dinner at pig killing time, could have enough fillet of pork, fresh and blood sausages, could eat green peppers pickled in vinegar, onion, doughnuts with apricot jam, and he could drink two bottles of Szekszárdi, then he would be saved. But there is no power that could move him to do this.

The knowledge that life has meaning only if it is sacrificed is innate in everyone. Life is successful when I sacrifice it. For a sober and serious person, this task is fulfilled by itself when he places his life at God’s disposal. The atheist, however, is afraid. He is afraid without reason since he must also sacrifice it. He does sacrifice it, but not in a natural manner, for God’s sake, like Abel, but for the sake of some worthless stupidity. For his own sake? If only that were the case! For Pleasure? Power? Richness? Though foolish, still, it somehow can be understood. But the puritan sacrifices himself for an idea. Humanity, he says. Or Freedom! Or Morality! Perhaps: Future! Progress! But what is the meaning of freedom and humanism and future? They are God-surrogates. And what hides behind this self-mortifying madness that is horrible in its proportion? It is that he is a desperate person. He knows his failure, yet he carries on. He knows that he is an unfortunate fool, yet he perseveres. He is severe, he is irritated, he is pugnacious, he is dark, he is vile, he is violent because he is desperate. He fails, yet he carries on. And yet he still carries on. He knows what he is doing, but he does not want to help himself, and, therefore, he becomes more desperate. More desperate and more abstract and more irritated and more wretched and more sly and suspicious and gloomy. And yet again he carries on. The unhappy one.

The scientifist is not worthy of much concern. He is innocent with all his whims and superstitions. One must handle the puritan with great care. For my part, I think that there is only medicine that suits him. Wine. In exactly the same manner as it suits the pietist. For the puritan is the pietist who has already become a terrorist; the pietist is the puritan who whines. The pietist rolls his eyes and is pious. In secret, he collects obscene pictures; when no one sees him, he drinks, mostly brandy, for he considers this as a greater sin, and hence falls into this greater pit. The pietist lives in such a way that, due to the shame, the walls of his room are always burning in red flames. The walls of the puritan’s room are deadly yellow because, even when he is alone, he does not dare to disclose himself. He does it only inwardly. Oh, the poor soul, what kind of mercy can save you if not the wine?

ESCHATOLOGICAL EXCURSUS

People tend to believe that the cause of all troubles is sin. To them sin means that someone lies, steals, cheats, robs, kills, and fornicates. Their ignorance goes so far that they issue immensely grandiloquent laws, in which they even evoke the threat of the gallows. Although these laws are many thousand of years old, until now they have failed to yield any result.

I now hereby lodge a protest against this general belief. Following some careful considerations, I declare that the cause of trouble is not sin. The cause of trouble is deeper-rooted. The cause of trouble is bad behaviour. The sin is merely the consequence of bad behaviour. Hence, following Apostle Paul, I consider the domain of law and morality as abolished and wish to tie the origin of all human activity to the foundation, the religion. But I do this not in an arbitrary fashion and not because I discovered this idea. No. As our contem-porary said, this was the privilege of the creating eschatolologists in their moments of establishing a religion. And I do this because, according to my experience, law and morality abolished sin, at the most, only in appearance; in truth, however, they could never remedy one single trouble. The root of sin, and hence the source of evil, is much, much deeper, beyond the reach of morality and law. Stigmatized by the criminal code, sins are merely the final consequences of bad religious behaviour. I have already said, and hereby I stress it again, everybody must have a religion and a person without religion does not exist. If someone does not believe in the good religion, he will believe in the bad one. Among all the bad religions, atheism is the worst.

But the essential point is this. Bad religion is not the consequence of bad behaviour. No. Bad religion is bad behaviour itself. This bad behaviour is the breeding place of all evils and the source of all sins. It is chiefly the source of moral defects such as vanity, jealousy, greediness, impertinence, boasting, tastelessness. But it is also the source and breeding place of the sins condemned by the criminal code: theft, fraud, murder. The so-called sins are merely the last consequences of bad religion. But the so-called moral faults are also mere consequences. They are the consequences of what? Those of bad behaviour. Those of bad religion. What, then, should we do? Should we enact rigorous laws? Not at all. They pertain only to the symptoms, not to the causes. Should we teach people to acquire moral self-discipline? Practice asceticism? Start self-mortification? No, a hundred times no. These are also mere consequences. The behaviour must be changed. Bad religion must be transformed into good religion. No law books, no jurists, no judges, no kings, no priests, no moralists and no satirists and no heroes of virtue and no preachers and no missionaries teach that, but only the creating eschatologists do it in their moments of founding a religion.

No one should wonder at the important role evil plays in human life. Actually, evil is the only challenge we have to face. At the beginning of beginnings, man committed the first sin. We already know what this sin is. It is not something that clashes with the law book. It would be impossible to condemn it even if we follow the strictest moral teaching. Why? Because the first sin, the deepest sin, the worst evil is bad religion, bad behaviour. At this moment, man was seized with a cramp. The Bible calls it original sin. We have all been carrying this cramp in us ever since, which has settled into the foundation of our being, into our religious behaviour. For this shock can be inherited. Our own bad behaviour irritates us and we frantically search for a relief. The Flood could not wash it out of us. But, together with the rainbow, the drink of relief has appeared. I can comprehend wine only as one of the highest act of grace. Wine brings relief. We have wine. We are able to fi nd relief from the damned shock. Wine brings back our original life, paradise, and shows us the place where we will arrive at the time of the final feast of the world. Only in ecstasy are we able to bear this bridge that spans the first and last day. This ecstasy is wine. (...)

EPILOGUE TO METAPHYSICS (APOLOGY)

With this I have ended all what I wanted to say about the metaphysics of wine. According to the wisdom of tradition, I sketched the closest corresponding meanings of wine and, with the help of the distinction between abstract and immediate life, I explained the sphere of sensory experience pertaining to the mouth. I set forth my theory of the hieratic masks and defined the place of wine in the world. For future centuries it can no longer be modified. He who writes only about wine is bound to return to these observations. With my theory of the divinity of wine and geniuses of wine, I have built a bridge to nature. But before I start to discuss the natural history of wine, I wish to say something to those for whom I have written this book.

I know that every atheist was shocked after the first sentences of the book because of the pert tone I dared to use with him. As he progressed in his reading, his shock became even greater, and, at some places, he almost had to strongly protest against such a disparaging tone. At last he had to calm himself down with the thought that the author of the book was not supercilious but merely displaying an air of superciliousness. But suspicions immediately awakened in him and the question kept haunting him: the author calls him poor in spirit, but by what right? Where does he take the courage to feel pity for him, to call him stupid, idiotic, crippled, even imbecile? What an impertinence on his part to use this didactic tone! How dare he to give advice and talk down to him as if he was a schoolchild? What annoyed him, above all, was that he expected an unctuous sermon and, in its stead, he got almost the opposite. Well now, if things are truly as the atheist asserts, then I make amends to the angry reader and declare that I had no intention to offend him. May I be allowed to explain my intentions and to sum up my defence against the raised charges with two points?

First: I did not wish at all to use a supercilious tone because religion forbids it. The supercilious is superior only in appearance. Religion does not allow such a conduct. I think that the superciliousness perceived by the atheist was not superciliousness, but, in all certainty, a genuine superiority. This, however, I was not willing to hide. Here we deal with real superiority; it is not only mine over him, but that of all persons of good religion over those of bad religion.

With this I made a very important observation. It should have been made long ago and I wondered why others, perhaps more initiated than I am, did not make it. According to this observation, the person of good religion, necessarily and under all circumstances, enjoys a superiority over the person of bad religion. He is above him in intelligence, feeling, heart, earnestness and, this is my discovery, he is above him in the immediate enjoyment of life. Therefore, there is no need for the person of good religion to be supercilious. In any event, thanks to his position, he possesses a huge superiority. At last, it had to be said that Christianity is not a fabricated, but a genuine, superiority. It had to be said, and what existed in every respect since eternity – and what will always exist – had to be expressed.

After all, I do not really understand, apart from the already mentioned case – the case of violently seized world power – where the often emphasized superiority of the atheists is. In parenthesis: I would not bet any money on the persistence of this power. How could the delusion claiming that the atheist is above the religious person in intelligence, enjoyment of life, thinking, practical sense, presence of mind, and humanity have spread? Perhaps the claim never did refer to a superiority, but merely to a shameless caddishness through which he intimidated the more modest religious person. Of course, the glory lasted only until this moment, only until someone appeared who did not become scared. Now that this has been exposed, in all probability, the situation will very quickly change.

The second point of my defence is as follows: did I ridicule the atheist? Did I make him appear stupid? Did I call him crippled? I did not have to ridicule him because he is ridicule. I did not even have to make him appear stupid. The matter was such that the postponement of its announcement in public was no longer possible. Confident in his violent shamelessness, selfish villainy, great wealth, and big mouth, the atheist has so far created the belief that he is the absolute master of the world, the most intelligent person, he is triumphant and strong and skilful and invincible. Now, however, it came to light that nothing of this is true. On the contrary.

I realize that, for atheists, the recognition of this fact is painful. But I cannot do anything about it. The only thing in my power is to further reveal to him his hopeless situation and show him the right way. This is what I have undertaken and it is with this disposition that I begin the second part of the book.

From: Béla Hamvas
The Philosophy of Wine
Translated from the Hungarian by Gábor Csepregi


The discreet charm of celibacy or liberation from sexual enslavement

Attached to Sensual Pleasures→

Of course, listening to Beethoven also is sensuality, but when you have said ‘sex’ you have said all. A man who can give up sex can give up Beethoven. Nanavira Thera

Sex is an acquired habit. Go beyond. As long as your focus is on the body, you will remain in the clutches of food and sex, fear and death.
Just stop thinking you are the bodies and the problems of love and sex will lose their meaning. With all sense of limitation gone, fear, pain and the search for pleasure — all cease. Only awareness remains. Nisargadatta Maharaj
***

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus: “Bhikkhus!”
“Venerable sir!” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other form that so obsesses the mind of a man as the form of a woman. The form of a woman obsesses the mind of a man.”

2 (2)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other sound that so obsesses the mind of a man as the sound of a woman. The sound of a woman obsesses the mind of a man.”

3 (3)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other odor that so obsesses the mind of a man as the odor of a woman. The odor of a woman obsesses the mind of a man.”

4 (4)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other taste that so obsesses the mind of a man as the taste of a woman. The taste of a woman obsesses the mind of a man.”

5 (5)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other touch that so obsesses the mind of a man as the touch of a woman. The touch of a woman obsesses the mind of a man.”

6 (6)21“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other form that so obsesses the mind of a woman as the form of a man. The form of a man obsesses the mind of a woman.”

7 (7)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other sound that so obsesses the mind of a woman as the sound of a man. The sound of a man obsesses the mind of a woman.”

8 (8)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other odor that so obsesses the mind of a woman as the odor of a man. The odor of a man obsesses the mind of a woman.”

9 (9)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other taste that so obsesses the mind of a woman as the taste of a man. The taste of a man obsesses the mind of a woman.”

10 (10)
“Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other touch that so obsesses the mind of a woman as the touch of a man. The touch of a man obsesses the mind of a woman.”
AN 1:20
*
Bondage (1)
“Bhikkhus, a woman binds a man in eight ways. What eight? A woman binds a man by her form … by her smile … by her speech … by singing [197] … by weeping … by her appearance … by a present1668 … by her touch.1669 A woman binds a man in these eight ways. Those beings are thoroughly bound who are bound by touch.”

Bondage (2)
“Bhikkhus, a man binds a woman in eight ways. What eight? A man binds a woman by his form … by his smile … by his speech … by singing … by weeping … by his appearance … by a present … by his touch. A man binds a woman in these eight ways. Those beings are thoroughly bound who are bound by touch.”
AN 8:17/18

Bondage
Now on that occasion a great mass of people had been put in bondage by King Pasenadi of Kosala—some with ropes, some with clogs, some with chains. Then, in the morning, a number of bhikkhus dressed ... and said to the Blessed One: “Here, venerable sir, a great mass of people have been put in bondage by King Pasenadi of Kosala, some with ropes, some with clogs, some with chains.”

Then the Blessed One, having understood the meaning of this, on that occasion recited these verses:

“That bond, the wise say, is not strong
Made of iron, wood, or rope;
But infatuation with jewellery and earrings,
Anxious concern for wives and children—
This, the wise say, is the strong bond,
Degrading, supple, hard to escape.
But even this they cut and wander forth, <176>
Unconcerned, having abandoned sensual pleasures.”
SN 3:10

Mother and Son

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Now on that occasion a mother and a son, being respectively a bhikkhunī and a bhikkhu, had entered the rains residence at Sāvatthī. They often wanted to see one another, the mother often wanting to see her son, and the son his mother. Because they often saw one another, a bond was formed; because a bond formed, intimacy arose; because there was intimacy, lust found an opening. With their minds in the grip of lust, without having given up the training and declared their weakness, they engaged in sexual intercourse. Then a number of bhikkhus approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and reported what had happened.
[The Blessed One said:]

“Bhikkhus, did that foolish man think: ‘A mother does not fall in love with her son, or a son with his mother’? (1) Bhikkhus, I do not see even one other form that is as tantalizing, sensuous, intoxicating, captivating, infatuating, and as much of an obstacle to achieving the unsurpassed security from bondage as the form of a woman. Beings who are lustful for the form of a woman—ravenous, tied to it, infatuated, and blindly absorbed in it—sorrow for a long time under the control of a woman’s form. (2) I do not see even one other sound … (3) … even one other odor … (4) … even one other taste … (5) … even one other touch that is as tantalizing, sensuous, intoxicating, captivating, infatuating, and as much of an obstacle to achieving the unsurpassed security from bondage as the touch of a woman. Beings who are lustful for the touch of a woman—ravenous, tied to it, infatuated, and blindly absorbed in it—sorrow for a long time under the control of a woman’s touch.

“Bhikkhus, while walking, a woman obsesses the mind of a man; while standing … while sitting … while lying down … while laughing … while speaking … while singing … while crying a woman obsesses the mind of a man. When swollen, too, a woman obsesses the mind of a man. Even when dead, a woman obsesses the mind of a man. If, bhikkhus, one could rightly say of anything: ‘Entirely a snare of Māra,’ it is precisely of women that one could say this.”

One might talk with a murderous foe,
one might talk with an evil spirit,
one might even approach a viper
whose bite means certain death;
but with a woman, one to one,
one should never talk.
They bind one whose mind is muddled
with a glance and a smile,
with their dress in disarray,
and with gentle speech.
It is not safe to approach such a person
though she is swollen and dead.
These five objects of sensual pleasure
are seen in a woman’s body:
forms, sounds, tastes, and odors,
and also delightful touches.
Those swept up by the flood of sensuality,
who do not fully understand sense pleasures,
are plunged headlong into saṃsāra, [into] time,
destination, and existence upon existence.
But those who have fully understood sense pleasures
live without fear from any quarter.
Having attained the destruction of the taints,
while in the world, they have gone beyond.
AN 5:55
*
Union

“Bhikkhus, I will teach you a Dhamma exposition on union and disengagement. Listen….
“And what is that Dhamma exposition on union and disengagement?

“A woman, bhikkhus, attends internally to her feminine faculty, her feminine comportment, her feminine appearance, her feminine aspect, her feminine desire, her feminine voice, her feminine ornamentation. She becomes excited by these and takes delight in them. Excited by them, taking delight in them, she attends externally to [a man’s] masculine faculty, his masculine comportment, his masculine appearance, his masculine aspect, his masculine desire, his masculine voice, his masculine ornamentation. She becomes excited by these and takes delight in them. Excited by them, taking delight in them, she desires union externally, and she also desires the pleasure and joy that arise on account of such union. Beings who are delighted with their femininity enter upon union with men. It is in this way that a woman does not transcend her femininity.

“A man, bhikkhus, attends internally to his masculine faculty, his masculine comportment, his masculine appearance, his masculine aspect, his masculine desire, his masculine voice, his masculine ornamentation. He becomes excited by these and takes delight in them. Excited by them, taking delight in them, he attends externally to [a woman’s] feminine faculty, her feminine comportment, her feminine appearance, her feminine aspect, her feminine desire, her feminine voice, her feminine ornamentation. He becomes excited by these and takes delight in them. Excited by them, taking delight in them, he desires union externally, and he also desires the pleasure and joy that arise on account of such union. Beings who are delighted with their masculinity enter upon union with women. It is in this way that a man does not transcend his masculinity.

“This is how union comes about. And how does disengagement come about?

“A woman, bhikkhus, does not attend internally to her feminine faculty … to her feminine ornamentation. She does not become excited by these or take delight in them. Not excited by them, not taking delight in them, she does not attend externally to [a man’s] masculine faculty … his masculine ornamentation. She does not become excited by these or take delight in them. Not excited by them, not taking delight in them, she does not desire union externally, nor does she desire the pleasure and joy that arise on account of such union. Beings who are not delighted with their femininity become disengaged from men. It is in this way that a woman transcends her femininity.

“A man, bhikkhus, does not attend internally to his masculine faculty … his masculine ornamentation. He does not become excited by these or take delight in them. Not excited by them, not taking delight in them, he does not attend externally to [a woman’s] feminine faculty … her feminine ornamentation. He does not become excited by these or take delight in them. Not excited by them, not taking delight in them, he does not desire union externally, nor does he desire the pleasure and joy that arise on account of such union. Beings who are not delighted with their masculinity become disengaged from women. It is in this way that a man transcends his masculinity.

“This is how disengagement comes about.

“This, bhikkhus, is the Dhamma exposition on union and disengagement.”
AN 7:51
*

Sexual Intercourse

Then the brahmin Jāṇussoṇī approached the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him … and said to him:

“Does Master Gotama also claim to be one who lives the celibate life?"

“If, brahmin, one could rightly say of anyone: ‘He lives the complete and pure celibate life—unbroken, flawless, unblemished, unblotched,’ it is precisely of me that one might say this. For I live the complete and pure celibate life—unbroken, flawless, unblemished, unblotched.”

“But what, Master Gotama, is a breach, flaw, blemish, and blotch of the celibate life?”

(1) “Here, brahmin, some ascetic or brahmin, claiming to be perfectly celibate, does not actually engage in intercourse with women. But he consents to being rubbed, massaged, bathed, and kneaded by them. He relishes this, desires it, and finds satisfaction in it. This is a breach, flaw, blemish, and blotch of the celibate life. He is called one who lives an impure celibate life, one who is fettered by the bond of sexuality. He is not freed from birth, from old age and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and anguish; he is not freed from suffering, I say.

(2) “Again, some ascetic or brahmin, claiming to be perfectly celibate, does not actually engage in intercourse with women; nor does he consent to being rubbed, massaged, bathed, and kneaded by them. But he jokes with women, plays with them, and amuses himself with them….

(3) “… he does not joke with women, play with them, and amuse himself with them … but he gazes and stares straight into their eyes….

(4) “… he does not gaze and stare straight into women’s eyes … but he listens to their voices behind a wall or through a rampart as they laugh, talk, sing, or weep….

(5) “… he does not listen to the voices of women behind a wall or through a rampart as they laugh, talk, sing, or weep … but he recollects laughing, talking, and playing with them in the past….

(6) “… he does not recollect laughing, talking, and playing with women in the past … but he looks at a householder or a householder’s son enjoying himself furnished and endowed with the five objects of sensual pleasure….

(7) “… he does not look at a householder or a householder’s son enjoying himself furnished and endowed with the five objects of sensual pleasure, but he lives the spiritual life aspiring for [rebirth in] a certain order of devas, [thinking]: ‘By this virtuous behavior, observance, austerity, or spiritual life I will be a deva or one [in the retinue] of the devas.’ He relishes this, desires it, and finds satisfaction in it. This, too, is a breach, flaw, blemish, and blotch of the celibate life. He is called one who lives an impure celibate life, one who is fettered by the bond of sexuality. He is not freed from birth, from old age and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and anguish; he is not freed from suffering, I say.

“So long, brahmin, as I saw that I had not abandoned one or another of these seven bonds of sexuality, I did not claim to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in the world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, in this population with its ascetics and brahmins, its devas and humans. But when I did not see even one of these seven bonds of sexuality that I had not abandoned, then I claimed to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in this world with … its devas and humans.

“The knowledge and vision arose in me: ‘Unshakable is my liberation of mind; this is my last birth; now there is no more renewed existence.’” (...)
AN 7:50
*
No Satiation

“Bhikkhus, there are three things that give no satiation by indulging in them. What three? (1) There is no satiation by indulging in sleep. (2) There is no satiation by indulging in liquor and wine. (3) There is no satiation by indulging in sexual intercourse. These are the three things that give no satiation by indulging in them.”
AN 3: 108
*

159 (9) The Bhikkhunī

On one occasion the Venerable Ānanda was dwelling at Kosambī in Ghosita’s Park. Then a certain bhikkhunī addressed a man thus: ‘Come, good man, approach Master Ānanda and pay homage to him in my name with your head at his feet. Then say: ‘Bhante, the bhikkhunī so-and-so is sick, afflicted, gravely ill. She pays homage to Master Ānanda with her head at his feet.’ Then say: ‘It would be good, Bhante, if, out of compassion, Master Ānanda would come to visit that bhikkhunī in the bhikkhunīs’ quarters.’”

“Yes, noble lady,” that man replied. He then approached the Venerable Ānanda, [145] paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and delivered his message. The Venerable Ānanda consented by silence.

Then the Venerable Ānanda dressed, took his bowl and robe, and went to the bhikkhunīs’ quarters. When that bhikkhunī saw the Venerable Ānanda coming in the distance, she covered herself from the head down and lay down on her bed. Then the Venerable Ānanda approached that bhikkhunī, sat down in the appointed seat, and said to her:

“Sister, this body has originated from nutriment; in dependence on nutriment, nutriment is to be abandoned. This body has originated from craving; in dependence on craving, craving is to be abandoned. This body has originated from conceit; in dependence on conceit, conceit is to be abandoned. This body has originated from sexual intercourse, but in regard to sexual intercourse the Blessed One has declared the demolition of the bridge.


(1) “When it was said: ‘This body, sister, has originated from nutriment; in dependence on nutriment, nutriment is to be abandoned,’ for what reason was this said? Here, sister, reflecting carefully, a bhikkhu consumes food neither for amusement nor for intoxication nor for the sake of physical beauty and attractiveness, but only for the support and maintenance of this body, for avoiding harm, and for assisting the spiritual life, considering: ‘Thus I shall terminate the old feeling and not arouse a new feeling, and I shall be healthy and blameless and dwell at ease.’ Some time later, in dependence upon nutriment, he abandons nutriment. When it was said: ‘This body, sister, has originated from nutriment; in dependence on nutriment, nutriment is to be abandoned,’ it is because of this that this was said.

(2) “When it was said: ‘This body has originated from craving; in dependence on craving, craving is to be abandoned,’ for what reason was this said? Here, sister, a bhikkhu hears: ‘The bhikkhu named so-and-so, with the destruction of the taints, has realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, he dwells in it.’ He thinks: ‘When will I, with the destruction of the taints, realize for myself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, dwell in it?’ Some time later, in dependence upon craving, he abandons craving. When it was said: ‘This body has originated from craving; in dependence on craving, craving is to be abandoned,’ it was because of this that this was said.

(3) “When it was said: ‘This body has originated from conceit; in dependence on conceit, conceit is to be abandoned.’ With reference to what was this said? Here, sister, a bhikkhu hears: ‘The bhikkhu named so-and-so, with the destruction of the taints, has realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, he dwells in it.’ He thinks: ‘That venerable one, with the destruction of the taints, has realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, and having entered upon it, he dwells in it. Why, so can I!’ Some time later, in dependence upon conceit, he abandons conceit. When it was said: ‘This body has originated from conceit; in dependence on conceit, conceit is to be abandoned,’ it was because of this that this was said.

(4) “This body, sister, has originated from sexual intercourse, but in regard to sexual intercourse the Blessed One has declared the demolition of the bridge.”

Then that bhikkhunī got up from her bed, arranged her upper robe over one shoulder, and having prostrated herself with her head at the Venerable Ānanda’s feet, she said to the Venerable Ānanda: “Bhante, I have committed a transgression in that I so foolishly, stupidly, and unskillfully behaved as I did. Bhante, may Master Ānanda accept my transgression seen as a transgression for the sake of future restraint.”

“Surely, sister, you have committed a transgression in that you so foolishly, stupidly, and unskillfully behaved as you did. But since you see your transgression as a transgression and make amends for it in accordance with the Dhamma, we accept it. For it is growth in the Noble One’s discipline that one sees one’s transgression as a transgression, makes amends for it in accordance with the Dhamma, and undertakes future restraint.”  AN 4:159

One Who Visits Families (1)

“Bhikkhus, there are these five dangers for one who visits families. What five? [259] (1) One commits the offense of going to visit [families] without taking leave [of another bhikkhu]. (2) One commits the offense of sitting privately [with a woman]. (3) One commits the offense of sitting on a concealed seat [with a woman]. (4) One commits the offense of teaching the Dhamma to a woman in more than five or six sentences. (5) One is infested by sensual thoughts. These are the five dangers for one who visits families.”

One Who Visits Families (2)

“Bhikkhus, there are these five dangers when a bhikkhu who visits families bonds too closely with them. What five? (1) He often gets to see women. (2) When he often gets to see them, he bonds with them. (3) When he bonds with them, they become intimate. (4) When they become intimate, lust finds an opening. (5) When his mind is in the grip of lust, it can be expected that he will lead the spiritual life dissatisfied, commit a certain defiled offense, or give up the training and return to the lower life.1226 These are the five dangers when a bhikkhu who visits families bonds too closely with them.”
AN 5:225/6

Bhāradvāja

On one occasion the Venerable Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja was dwelling at Kosambı̄ in Ghosita’s Park.116 Then King Udena approached the Venerable Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him:

“Master Bhāradvāja, what is the cause and reason why these young bhikkhus, lads with black hair, endowed with the blessing of youth, in the prime of life, who have not dallied with sensual pleasures, lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously?

“Great king, this was said by the Blessed One who knows and sees, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One: ‘Come, bhikkhus, towards women old enough to be your mother set up the idea that they are your mother; towards those of an age to be your sisters set up the idea that they are your sisters; towards those young enough to be your daughters set up the idea that they are your daughters.’ This is a cause and reason, great king, why these young bhikkhus … lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously.”

“The mind is wanton, Master Bhāradvāja. Sometimes states of lust arise even towards women old enough to be one’s mother; sometimes they arise towards women of an age to be one’s sister; sometimes they arise towards women young enough to be one’s daughter. Is there any other cause and reason why these young bhikkhus … lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously?”

“Great king, this was said by the Blessed One who knows and sees, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One: ‘Come, bhikkhus, review this very body upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hairs, enclosed in skin, as full of many kinds of impurities: “There are in this body head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone-marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, contents of the stomach, excrement, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, saliva, snot, fluid of the joints, urine.”’ This too, great king, is a cause and reason why these young bhikkhus … lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously.”

“That is easy, Master Bhāradvāja, for those bhikkhus who are developed in body, developed in virtue, developed in mind, developed in wisdom. But it is difficult for those bhikkhus who are undeveloped in body, undeveloped in virtue, undeveloped in mind, undeveloped in wisdom. Sometimes, though one thinks, ‘I will attend to the body as foul,’ one beholds it as beautiful.  Is there any other cause and reason why these young bhikkhus … lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously?"

“Great king, this was said by the Blessed One who knows and sees, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One: ‘Come, bhikkhus, dwell guarding the doors of the sense faculties. Having seen a form with the eye, do not grasp its signs and features. Since, if you leave the eye faculty unguarded, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and displeasure might invade you, practise the way of its restraint, guard the eye faculty, undertake the restraint of the eye faculty. Having heard a sound with the ear... Having smelt an odour with the nose ... Having savoured a taste with the tongue ... Having felt a tactile object with the body ... Having cognized a mental phenomenon with the mind, do not grasp its signs and features. Since, if you leave the mind faculty unguarded, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and displeasure might invade you, practise the way of its restraint, guard the mind faculty, undertake the restraint of the mind faculty.’ This too, great king, is a cause and reason why these young bhikkhus … lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously.”

“It is wonderful, Master Bhāradvāja! It is amazing, Master Bhāradvāja! How well this has been stated by the Blessed One who knows and sees, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One. So this is the cause and reason why these young bhikkhus, lads with black hair, endowed with the blessing of youth, in the prime of life, who have not dallied with sensual pleasures, lead the complete and pure holy life all their lives and maintain it continuously. In my case too, when I enter my harem unguarded in body, speech, and mind, without setting up mindfulness, unrestrained in the sense faculties, on that occasion states of lust assail me forcefully. But when I enter my harem guarded in body, speech, and mind,  with mindfulness set up, restrained in the sense faculties, on that occasion states of lust do not assail me in such a way. (...)
SN 35:128



Friday, September 12, 2025

The Need to Justify Our Actions The Costs and Benefits of Dissonance Reduction


IT WAS SHOCKING NEWS: 39 PEOPLE WERE FOUND DEAD AT A LUXURY ESTATE IN RANCHO SANTA FE, CALIFORNIA, PARTICIPANTS IN A MASS SUICIDE. All were members of an obscure cult called Heaven’s Gate. Each body was laid out neatly, feet clad in brand-new black Nikes, face covered with a purple shroud.

The cult members died willingly and peacefully, leaving behind videotapes describing their reasons for suicide: They believed that the Hale-Bopp Comet, a recently discovered comet streaking across the night skies, was their ticket to a new life in paradise. They were convinced that in Hale-Bopp’s wake was a gigantic spaceship whose mission was to carry them off to a new incarnation.

To be picked up by the spaceship, they first needed to rid themselves of their current “containers.” That is, they needed to leave their own bodies by ending their lives. Alas, no spaceship ever came.
Several weeks before the mass suicide, some members of the cult purchased an expensive, high-powered telescope. They wanted to get a clearer view of the comet and the spaceship that they believed was traveling behind it. A few days later, they returned the telescope and politely asked for their money back. When the store manager asked them if they had problems with the scope, they replied, “Well, gosh, we found the comet, but we can’t find anything following it” (Ferris, 1997). Although the store manager tried to convince them that there was nothing wrong with the telescope and that nothing was following the comet, they remained unconvinced. Given their premise, their logic was impeccable: We know an alien spaceship is following behind the Hale-Bopp Comet. If an expensive telescope has failed to reveal that spaceship, then there is something wrong with the telescope.

Their thinking might strike you as strange, irrational, or stupid, but, generally speaking, the members of the Heaven’s Gate cult were none of those things. Neighbors who knew them considered them pleasant, smart, and reasonable. What is the process by which intelligent, sane people can succumb to such fantastic thinking and self-destructive behavior? We will attempt to explain their actions at the end of this chapter. For now, we will simply state that their behavior is not unfathomable. It is simply an extreme example of a normal human tendency: the need to justify our actions and commitments.

The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance

During the past half-century, social psychologists have discovered that one of the most powerful determinants of human behavior stems from our need to preserve a stable, positive self-image (Aronson, 1969, 1998). Most people believe they are above average—more ethical and competent, better drivers, better leaders, better judges of character, and more attractive than the majority (Fine, 2008; Gilovich, 1991). But if most of us see ourselves as reasonable, moral, and smart, what happens when we are confronted with information implying that we have behaved in ways that are unreasonable, immoral, or stupid? That is the subject of this chapter.

Maintaining a Positive Self-Image

The feeling of discomfort caused by performing an action that is discrepant from one’s self-concept is called cognitive dissonance. Leon Festinger (1957) was the first to investigate the precise workings of this phenomenon and elaborated his findings in what is arguably social psychology’s most important and most provocative theory.

Cognitive dissonance always produces discomfort, and in response we try to reduce it. The process is similar to the effects of hunger and thirst: Discomfort motivates us to eat or drink. But unlike satisfying hunger or thirst by eating or drinking, the path to reducing dissonance is not always simple or obvious. In fact, it can lead to fascinating changes in the way we think about the world and the way we behave. How can we reduce dissonance? There are three basic ways (see Figure 1):

• By changing our behavior to bring it in line with the dissonant cognition.
• By attempting to justify our behavior through changing one of the dissonant cognitions.
• By attempting to justify our behavior by adding new cognitions.

To illustrate each of these, let’s look at something that millions of people do several times a day: smoke cigarettes. If you are a smoker, you are likely to experience dissonance because you know that this behavior significantly increases the risks of lung cancer, emphysema, and earlier death. How can you reduce this dissonance? The most direct way is to change your behavior and give up smoking. Your behavior would then be consistent with your knowledge of the link between smoking and cancer. Although many people have succeeded in quitting, it’s not easy; many have tried and failed. What do these people do? It would be wrong to assume that they simply swallow hard, light up, and prepare to die. They don’t. Researchers studied the behavior and attitudes of heavy smokers who attended a smoking cessation clinic but then relapsed into heavy smoking again. What do you suppose the researchers discovered? Heavy smokers who tried to quit and failed managed to lower their perception of the dangers of smoking.

In this way, they could continue to smoke without feeling terrible about it (Gibbons, Eggleston, & Benthin, 1997). A study of more than 360 adolescent smokers found the same thing: the greater their dependence on smoking and the greater the trouble they had quitting, the more justifications they came up with to keep smoking (Kleinjan, van den Eijnden, & Engels, 2009).

Smokers can come up with some pretty creative justifications. Some convince themselves that the data linking cigarette smoking to cancer are inconclusive. Or they say that smoking is worth the risk of cancer and emphysema because it is so enjoyable, and besides it relaxes them and reduces nervous tension and in this way actually improves their health. Some add a cognition that allows them to focus on the vivid exception: “Look at my grandfather. He’s 87 years old, and he’s been smoking a pack a day since he was 12. That proves it’s not always bad for you.” Another popular way of reducing dissonance through adding a new cognition is self-affirmation, in which a person focuses on one or more of his or her good qualities to lessen the dissonant sting caused by doing something foolish: “Yeah, I feel pretty stupid to still be smoking, but boy am I a good cook. In fact, let me tell you about this new recipe . . .” (Steele, 1988; Mc Connell & Brown, 2010).

These justifications may sound silly to the nonsmoker, but that is our point. As the smokers’ rationales show, people experiencing dissonance will often deny or distort reality to reduce it. People who don’t want to give up scientifically discredited ideas, refuse to practice safe sex, or receive bad news about their health can be equally “creative” in denying evidence and reducing their discomfort (Aronson, 1997; Croyle & Jemmott, 1990; Kassarjian & Cohen, 1965; Leishman, 1988).

When you understand dissonance, you will see it in action all around you: in the politician who opposes prostitution but is caught with a high-priced call girl (“oh, a call girl isn’t really a prostitute”), in the people who predict the end of the world but who, fortunately, turn out to be wrong (“our prediction was accurate; we just used numbers from the wrong chapter of the Bible”). In one study, researchers wondered how gay men who were strongly identified with their Christian church dealt with anti-gay pronouncements from their ministers. One way to resolve dissonance would be to change their behavior—that is, to change their church or even leave their religion. But those who decide to stay in the church resolve dissonance by focusing on the shortcomings of the minister; for example, they say, “It’s not my religion that promotes this prejudice— it’s the bigotry of this particular preacher” (Pitt, 2010).

Why We Overestimate the Pain of Disappointment

Imagine that you have just interviewed for the job of your dreams. You expect to be very disappointed if you don’t get the job. Then, to your utter amazement, you don’t get the job. How long do you think your disappointment will last? The answer is: It depends on how successfully you reduce the dissonance caused by not getting the job. When you first get the bad news, you will be disappointed; however, more than likely you will soon put a spin on it that makes you feel better. It was a dead-end job anyway. And that interviewer was a jerk.

Interestingly, people often do not anticipate how successfully they will reduce dissonance. When people think about how they will react to future negative events, they show an  impact bias, whereby they overestimate the intensity and duration of their negative emotional reactions. For example, people overestimate how dreadful they will feel following a romantic breakup, loss of a job, or not getting into the dorm they wanted (Dunn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2003; Gilbert et al., 1998; Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).

Given that people have successfully reduced dissonance in the past, why is it that they are not aware that they will do so in the future? The answer is that the process of reducing dissonance is largely unconscious. Indeed, dissonance reduction works better that way (Gilbert et al., 1998). It is not very effective to hear ourselves say, “I’ll try to make myself feel better by convincing myself that the person who just rejected me is an idiot.” It is more effective if we unconsciously transform our view of the interviewer; we feel better believing that anyone could see that he is an idiot (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973). Because the dissonance-reduction process is mostly unconscious, we do not anticipate that it will save us from future anguish.

Self-Esteem and Dissonance

Who do you think feels the greatest dissonance after doing something cruel, foolish, or incompetent: a person with high self-esteem or low? The answer is the former; people with the highest self-esteem experience the most dissonance when they behave in ways that are contrary to their high opinion of themselves, and they will work harder to reduce it than will those with average levels of self-esteem. When people who have low self-esteem commit a stupid or immoral action, they do not feel as much dissonance, because the cognition “I have done an awful thing” is consonant with the cognition “I am a schlunk; I’m always doing awful things.”

In a classic experiment, researchers predicted that individuals who had been given a boost to their self-esteem would be less likely to cheat, if given the opportunity to do so, than individuals who had a lower opinion of themselves (Aronson & Mettee, 1968). After all, if you think of yourself as a decent person, cheating would be dissonant with that self-concept. However, people who have had a temporary blow to their self-esteem, and thus are feeling low and worthless, might be more likely to cheat at cards, kick their dog, or do any number of things consistent with having a low opinion of themselves.

In this experiment, the self-esteem of college students was temporarily modified by giving the subjects false information about their personalities. After taking a personality test, one-third of the students were given positive feedback; they were told that the test indicated that they were mature, interesting, deep, and so forth. Another third of the students were given negative feedback; they were told that the test revealed that they were relatively immature, uninteresting, shallow, and the like. The remaining one-third of the students were not given any information about the results of the test. Immediately afterward, the students were scheduled to participate in an experiment conducted by a different psychologist who had no apparent relation to the personality inventory. As part of this second experiment, the participants played a game of cards against some of their fellow students. They were allowed to bet money and keep whatever they won. In the course of the game, they were given a few opportunities to cheat and thereby win a sizable sum of cash. The findings confirmed the prediction of dissonance theory: The students who had gotten the positive feedback were least likely to take the opportunity to cheat; the students who had gotten the negative feedback were most likely to cheat; and the control group fell in between.

If high self-esteem can serve as a buffer against dishonest or self-defeating behavior because people strive to keep their self-concepts consonant with their actions, this research has wide-ranging applications. For example, many African American children believe that they “don’t have what it takes” to succeed academically, so they don’t work hard, so they don’t do as well as they might—all of this perfectly, if tragically, consonant. A team of social psychologists conducted a simple intervention, which they replicated three times with three different classrooms (Cohen et al., 2009). They bolstered African American children’s self-esteem by having them do structured, self-affirming writing assignments. The children had to focus their attention on their good qualities in areas outside of academics and their most important values (e.g., religion, music, or love for their family). This self-affirmation raised their general self-esteem, which in turn reduced their academic anxiety, resulting in better performance. The lowest-achieving black students benefitted the most, and the benefits persisted in a follow-up study two years later. Thus, changing the students’ negative self-perceptions had long-term benefits both on self-esteem and performance on objective exams.

Do these results sound too good to be true? They are not. Still, we must be cautious in generalizing from them. Bolstering self-esteem can’t be done in an artificial way. To be effective, this kind of intervention must be grounded in reality (Kernis, 2001). If a person were to look in the mirror and say, “Boy, I sure am terrific,” it is unlikely to help much; the person has to focus on his or her actual strengths, positive values, and good qualities and then strive to make them consonant with his or her actions.

Rational Behavior versus Rationalizing Behavior

Most people think of themselves as rational beings, and generally they are right: We are certainly capable of rational thought. But as we’ve seen, the need to maintain our self-esteem leads to thinking that is not always rational; rather, it is rationalizing. People who are in the midst of reducing dissonance are so involved with convincing themselves that they are right that they frequently end up behaving irrationally and maladaptively.

During the late 1950s, when segregation was still widespread, two social psychologists did a simple experiment in a southern town ( Jones & Kohler, 1959). They selected people who were deeply committed to a position on the issue of racial segregation: some strongly supported segregation; others opposed it just as strongly. Next, the researchers presented these individuals with a series of arguments on both sides of the issue. Some of the arguments were plausible, and others were rather silly. The question was: Which of the arguments would people remember best?

If the participants were behaving in a purely rational way, we would expect them to remember the plausible arguments best and the implausible arguments least, regardless of how they felt about segregation. But what does dissonance theory predict? A silly argument that supports your own position arouses some dissonance because it raises doubts about the wisdom of that position or the intelligence of people who agree with it. Likewise, a sensible argument on the other side of the issue also arouses some dissonance because it raises the possibility that the other side
might be smarter or more accurate than you had thought. Because these arguments arouse dissonance, we try not to think about them. This is exactly what the researchers found. The participants remembered the plausible arguments agreeing with their own position and the implausible arguments agreeing with the opposing position. Subsequent research has yielded similar results on many issues, from whether or not the death penalty deters people from committing murder to the risks of contracting HIV through heterosexual contact (e.g., Biek, Wood, & Chaiken, 1996; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Hart et al., 2009).

In sum, we humans do not always process information in an unbiased way. Sometimes, of course, we pursue new information because we want to be accurate in our views or make the wisest decisions. But once we are committed to our views and beliefs, most of us distort new information in a way that confirms them (Hart et al., 2009; Ross, 2010).

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions

Every time we make a decision, we experience dissonance. How come? Suppose you are about to buy a car, but you are torn between a van and a subcompact. You know that each has advantages and disadvantages: The van would be more convenient. You can sleep in it during long trips, and it has plenty of power, but it gets poor mileage and it’s hard to park. The subcompact is a lot less roomy, and you wonder about its safety: but it is less expensive to buy, it’s a lot zip-pier to drive, and it has a pretty good repair record. Before you decide, you will probably get as much information as you can. You go online and read what the experts say about each model’s safety, gas consumption, and reliability. You’ll talk with friends who own a van or a subcompact. You’ll probably visit automobile dealers to test-drive the vehicles to see how each one feels. All this predecision behavior is perfectly rational.

Let’s assume you decide to buy the subcompact. We predict that your behavior will change in a specific way: You will begin to think more and more about the number of miles to the gallon as though it were the most important thing in the world. Simultaneously, you will almost certainly downplay the fact that you can’t sleep in your subcompact. Who wants to sleep in their car on a long trip anyway? Similarly, you will barely remember that your new small car can put you at considerable risk of harm in a collision. How does this shift in thinking happen?

Distorting Our Likes and Dislikes

In any decision, whether it is between two cars, two colleges, or two potential lovers, the chosen alternative is seldom entirely positive and the rejected alternative is seldom entirely negative. After the decision, your cognition that you are a smart person is dissonant with all the negative things about the car, college, or lover you chose; that cognition is also dissonant with all the positive aspects of the car, college, or lover you rejected. We call this postdecision dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that to help yourself feel better about the decision, you will do some unconscious mental work to try to reduce the dissonance.

What kind of work? In a classic experiment, Jack Brehm (1956) posed as a representative of a consumer testing service and asked women to rate the attractiveness and desirability of several kinds of small appliances. Each woman was told that as a reward for having participated in the survey, she could have one of the appliances as a gift. She was given a choice between two of the products she had rated as being equally attractive. After she made her decision, each woman was asked to rerate all the products. After receiving the appliance of their choice, the women rated its attractiveness somewhat higher than they had the first time. Not only that, but they drastically lowered their rating of the appliance they might have chosen but decided to reject.

In other words, following a decision, to reduce dissonance we change the way we feel about the chosen and unchosen alternatives, cognitively spreading them apart in our own minds in order to make ourselves feel better about the choice we made.

The Permanence of the Decision

The more important the decision, the greater the dissonance. Deciding which car to buy is clearly more important than deciding between a toaster and a coffeemaker; deciding which person to marry is clearly more important than deciding which car to buy. Decisions also vary in terms of how permanent they are—that is, how difficult they are to revoke. It is a lot easier to trade in your new car for another one than it is to get out of an unhappy marriage. The more permanent and less revocable the decision, the stronger is the need to reduce dissonance.

In a simple but clever experiment, social psychologists intercepted people at a racetrack who were on their way to place $2 bets and asked them how certain they were that their horses would win (Knox & Inkster, 1968). The investigators also approached other bettors just as they were leaving the $2 window, after having placed their bets, and asked them the same question. Almost invariably, people who had already placed their bets gave their horses a much better chance of winning than did those who had not yet placed their bets. Because only a few minutes separated one group from another, nothing real had occurred to increase the probability of winning; the only thing that had changed was the finality of the decision—and hence the dissonance it produced.

Moving from the racetrack to the Harvard campus, other investigators tested the irrevocability hypothesis in a photography class (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). In their study, participants were recruited through an advertisement for students interested in learning photography while taking part in a psychology experiment. Students were informed that they would shoot some photographs and print two of them. They would rate the two photographs and then get to choose one to keep. The other would be kept for administrative reasons. The students were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In Condition One, students were informed that they had the option of exchanging photographs within a five-day period; in Condition Two, students were told that their choice was final. The researchers found that prior to making the choice between the two photographs, the students liked them equally. The experimenters then contacted the students two, four, and nine days after they had made their choice to find out if those who had a choice to exchange photographs liked the one they chose more or less than did those in the no-choice (irrevocable) condition. And, indeed, the students who had the option of exchanging photographs liked the one they finally ended up with less than did those who made the final choice on the first day.

Interestingly, when students were asked to predict whether keeping their options open would make them more or less happy with their decision, they predicted that keeping their options open would make them happier. They were wrong. Because they underestimated the discomfort of dissonance, they failed to realize that the finality of the decision would make them happier.

Creating the Illusion of Irrevocability

The irrevocability of a decision always increases dissonance and the motivation to reduce it. Because of this, unscrupulous salespeople have developed techniques for creating the illusion that irrevocability exists. One such technique is called lowballing (Cialdini, 2009; Cialdini et al., 1978; Weyant, 1996). Robert Cialdini, a distinguished social psychologist, temporarily joined the sales force of an automobile dealership to observe this technique closely. Here’s how it works: You enter an automobile showroom intent on buying a particular car. Having already priced it at several dealerships, you know you can purchase it for about $18,000. You are approached by a personable middle-aged man who tells you he can sell you one for $17,679.

Excited by the bargain, you agree to write out a check for the down payment so that he can take it to the manager as proof that you are a serious customer. Meanwhile, you imagine yourself driving home in your shiny new bargain. Ten minutes later the salesperson returns, looking forlorn. He tells you that in his zeal to give you a good deal, he miscalculated and the sales manager caught it. The price of the car comes to $18,178. You are disappointed. Moreover, you are pretty sure you can get it a bit cheaper elsewhere. The decision to buy is not irrevocable. And yet in this situation far more people will go ahead with the deal than if the original asking price had been $18,178, even though the reason for buying the car from this particular dealer—the bargain price—no longer exists (Cialdini, 2009; Cialdini et al., 1978).

There are at least three reasons why lowballing works. First, although the customer’s decision to buy is reversible, a commitment of sorts does exist. Signing a check for a down payment creates the illusion of irrevocability, even though, if the car buyer thought about it, he or she would quickly realize that it is a nonbinding contract. In the world of high-pressure sales, however, even a temporary illusion can have real consequences. Second, the feeling of commitment triggered the anticipation of an exciting event: driving out with a new car. To have had the anticipated event thwarted (by not going ahead with the deal) would have been a big letdown. Third, although the final price is substantially higher than the customer thought it would be, it is probably only slightly higher than the price at another dealership. Under these circumstances, the customer in effect says, “Oh, what the heck. I’m here, I’ve already filled out the forms, I’ve written out the check—why wait?” Thus, by using dissonance reduction and the illu-sion of irrevocability, high-pressure salespeople increase the probability that you will decide to buy their product at their price.

The Decision to Behave Immorally

Of course, decisions about cars, appliances, racehorses, and even presidential candidates are the easy ones. Often, however, our choices involve moral and ethical issues. When is it OK to lie to a friend, and when is it not? When is an act stealing, and when is it just “what everyone does”? How people reduce dissonance following a difficult moral decision has implications for their self-esteem and for whether they behave more or less ethically in the future.

Take the issue of cheating on an exam. Suppose you are a college sophomore taking the final exam in organic chemistry. Ever since you can remember, you have wanted to be a surgeon, and you think that your admission to medical school will depend heavily on how well you do in this course. A key question involves some material you know fairly well, but because so much is riding on this exam, you feel acute anxiety and draw a blank. You glance at your neighbor’s paper and discover that she is just completing her answer to the crucial question. Your conscience tells you it’s wrong to cheat, and yet, if you don’t cheat, you are certain to get a poor grade. And if you get a poor grade, you are convinced that there goes medical school.

Regardless of whether you decide to cheat or not, the threat to your self-esteem arouses dissonance. If you cheat, your belief or cognition “I am a decent, moral person” is dissonant with your cognition “I have just committed an immoral act.” If you decide to resist temptation, your cognition “I want to become a surgeon” is dissonant with your cognition “I could have nailed a good grade and admission to medical school, but I chose not to. Wow, was I stupid!”

Suppose that after a difficult struggle, you decide to cheat. According to dissonance theory, it is likely that you would try to justify the action by finding a way to minimize its negative aspects. In this case, an efficient path to reducing dissonance would involve changing your attitude about cheating. You would adopt a more lenient attitude toward cheating, convincing yourself that it is a victimless crime that doesn’t hurt anybody, that everybody does it, and that, therefore it’s not really so bad.

Suppose, by contrast, after a difficult struggle, you decide not to cheat. How would you reduce your dissonance? Again, you could change your attitude about the morality of the act, but this time in the opposite direction. That is, to justify giving up a good grade, you convince yourself that cheating is a heinous sin, that it’s one of the lowest things a person can do, and that cheaters should be rooted out and severely punished.

How Dissonance Affects Personal Values

What has happened is not merely a rationalization of your own behavior, but a change in your system of values. Thus, two people acting in two different ways could have started out with almost identical attitudes toward cheating. One came within an inch of cheating but decided to resist, while the other came within an inch of resisting but decided to cheat. After they had made their decisions, however, their attitudes toward cheating would diverge sharply as a consequence of their actions (see Figure 2 on next page).

These speculations were tested by Judson Mills (1958) in an experiment he performed in an elementary school. Mills first measured the attitudes of sixth graders toward cheating. He then had them participate in a competitive exam, with prizes awarded to the winners. The situation was arranged so that it was almost impossible to win without cheating. Mills made it easy for the children to cheat and created the illusion that they could not be detected. Under these conditions, as one might expect, some of the students cheated and others did not. The next day, the sixth graders were again asked to indicate how they felt about cheating. Sure enough, the children who had cheated became more lenient toward cheating, and those who had resisted the temptation to cheat adopted a harsher attitude.

Our prediction is that as you read this, you are thinking about your own beliefs about cheating and how they might relate to your own behavior. Not long ago, a scandal broke out at a Florida busi-ness school. In one course, a professor discovered, more than half the students had cribbed from an exam stolen in advance. When interviewed, those who cheated said things like, “Hey, no big deal. Everyone does it.” Those who refrained from cheating said, “What the cheaters did was awful. They are lazy and unethical. And they are planning for careers in business?”

Take another look at Figure 2 and imagine yourself at the top of that pyramid, about to make any important decision, such as whether to stay with a current romantic partner or break up, use illegal drugs or not, choose this major or that one, get involved in politics or not. Keep in mind that once you make a decision, you are going to justify it to reduce dissonance, and that justification may later make it hard for you to change your mind . . . even when you should.

Dissonance, Culture, and the Brain (...)

Some Final Thoughts on Dissonance: Learning from Our Mistakes

At the beginning of this chapter, we raised a vital question regarding the followers of Heaven’s Gate: How could intelligent people allow themselves to be led into what the overwhelming majority of us see as senseless behavior resulting in mass suicide? Of course, many factors were operating, including the charismatic power of each of the leaders, the existence of social support for the views of the group from other members, and the relative isolation of each group from dissenting views, producing a closed system—a little like living in a roomful of mirrors.

Yet, in addition to these factors, one of the single most powerful forces was the existence of a high degree of cognitive dissonance within the minds of the participants.  After reading this chapter, you now realize that when individuals make an important decision and invest heavily in that decision (in terms of time, effort, sacrifice, and commitment), the result is a strong need to justify those actions and that investment. The more they give up and the harder they work, the greater will be the need to convince themselves that their views are correct. The members of the Heaven’s Gate cult made monumental sacrifices for their beliefs: they abandoned their friends and families, left their professions, relinquished their money and possessions, moved to another part of the world, and worked hard and long for the particular cause they believed in—all increasing their commitment to the belief.

By understanding cognitive dissonance, therefore, you can understand why the Heaven’s Gate people, having bought a telescope that failed to reveal a spaceship that wasn’t there, concluded that the telescope was faulty. To have believed otherwise would have created too much dissonance to bear. That they went on to abandon their “containers,” believing that they were moving on to a higher incarnation, is not unfathomable. It is simply an extreme manifestation of a process that we have seen in operation over and over again throughout this chapter.

Perhaps you are thinking, “Well, but they were a strange, isolated cult.” But, as we have seen, dissonance reduction affects everyone. Much of the time, dissonance-reducing behavior can be useful because it allows us to maintain self-esteem. Yet if we were to spend all our time and energy defending our egos, we would never learn from our mistakes, bad decisions, and incorrect beliefs. Instead, we would ignore them, justify them, or, worse still, attempt to turn them into virtues. We would get stuck within the confines of our narrow minds and fail to grow or change. And, in extreme cases, we might end up justifying our own smaller Heaven’s Gates—mistakes that can harm ourselves and others.

It’s bad enough when ordinary people get caught up in the self-justifying cycle, but when a political leader does so, the consequences can be devastating for the nation and the world (Tavris & Aronson, 2007). In 2003, President George W. Bush wanted to believe that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear and biochemical weapons that posed a threat to America and Europe. He needed this belief to be true to justify his decision to launch a preemptive war, although Iraq posed no immediate threat to the United States and none of its citizens had been involved in the attacks of 9/11. According to White House insider Scott  McClellan (2009), this need led the president and his advisers to interpret CIA reports as definitive proof of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, even though the reports were ambiguous and were contradicted by other evidence (Stewart, 2011; Wilson, 2005).[Jewish "advisers", just wanted to attack Irak, and had no any dissonance to be reduced].

After the invasion of Iraq, administration officials, when asked “Where are the WMD?,” said that Iraq is a big country and that Saddam Hussein had them well hidden, but they were sure they would be found. As the months dragged on and still no WMD were discovered, the administration officials had to admit that there were none. Now what? How did President Bush and his staff reduce dissonance between “We believed there were WMD that justified this war” and “We were wrong”? By adding new cognitions to justify the war: Now they said that the U.S. mission was to liberate the nation from a cruel dictator and give the Iraqi people the blessings of democratic institutions. Even if things are not going well now, they said, history will vindicate us in 10 or 20 or 50 years. To an observer, these justifications are inadequate; after all, there are many brutal dictators in the world, and no one can foresee the long-term results of any war begun for a short-term purpose. But to President Bush and his advisers, the justifications seemed reasonable (Bush, 2010).

Of course we cannot be certain what was going on in President Bush’s mind, but some five decades of research on cognitive dissonance suggests that the president and his advisers may not have been intentionally deceiving the American people; it is more likely that, like the members of Heaven’s Gate, they were deceiving themselves, blinding themselves to the possibility of being wrong. [The author is trying to reduce his own dissonance 😊]. (...)

Few of us will ever wield the power of a world leader or end our lives in a cult waiting for a spaceship to transport us to another planet. But, on a smaller scale, in our zeal to protect our self-concept, we often make foolish mistakes and compound that failure by blinding ourselves to the possibility of learning from them. Is there hope? We think so. Although the process of self-justification is unconscious, once we know that we are prone to justify our actions, we can begin to monitor our thinking and, in effect, “catch ourselves in the act.” If we can learn to examine our behavior critically and dispassionately, we stand a chance of breaking out of the cycle of action followed by self-justification followed by more committed action. Admittedly, acknowledging our mistakes and taking responsibility for them is easier said than done. Imagine that you are a prosecutor who has worked hard for many years to put “bad guys” in prison. You’re the good guy. How will you respond to the dissonant information that DNA testing suggests that a few of those bad guys you put away might be innocent? Will you welcome this evidence with an open mind, because you would like justice to be done, or will you reject it, because it might show that you were wrong? Unfortunately—but not surprisingly for those who understand dissonance theory—many prosecutors in America make the latter choice: they resist and block the efforts by convicted prisoners to reopen their cases and get DNA tests (Tavris & Aronson, 2007). Their dissonance-reducing reasoning is something like this: “Well, even if he wasn’t guilty of this crime, he was surely guilty of something else; after all, he’s a bad guy.”

But at least one prosecutor chose to resolve that dissonance in a more courageous way. Thomas Vanes had routinely sought the death penalty or extreme prison sentences for defendants convicted of horrible crimes. One man, Larry Mayes, served more than 20 years for rape before DNA testing cleared him of the crime. “When [Mayes] requested a DNA retest on that rape kit,” he wrote, “I assisted in tracking down the old evidence, convinced that the current tests would put to rest his long-standing claim of innocence. But he was right, and I was wrong. Hard facts trumped opinion and belief, as they should. It was a sobering lesson, and none of the easy-to-reach rationalizations (just doing my job, it was the jurors who convicted him, the appellate courts had upheld the conviction) completely lessen the sense of responsibility—moral, if not legal—that comes with the conviction of an innocent man” (quoted in T avris & Aronson, 2007, p. 157).

Throughout our lives, all of us, in our roles as family members, workers, professionals, and citizens, will be confronted with evidence that we were wrong about something important to us—something we did or something we believed. Will you step off the pyramid in the direction of justifying that mistake . . . or will you strive to correct it?

Summary

What is theory of cognitive dissonance, and how do people avoid dissonance to maintain a stable, positive self-image?

■ The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance

Most people need to see themselves as intelligent, sensible, and decent folks who behave with integrity. This chapter is about the behavior changes and cognitive distortions that occur when we are faced with evidence that we have done something that is not intelligent, sensible, or decent—the mental effort we expend to maintain that positive self-image.

• Maintaining a positive self-image
According to cognitive dissonance theory, people experience discomfort (dissonance) when they behave in ways that are inconsistent with their conception of themselves (self-image). To reduce the dissonance, people either (1) change their behavior to bring it in line with their cognitions about themselves, (2) justify their behavior by changing one of their cognitions, or (3) attempt to justify their behavior by inventing new cognitions. One common kind of new cognition is self-affirmation, focusing on a positive quality to offset feelings of having acted foolishly. When people’s self-esteem is temporarily enhanced, they are less likely to cheat or commit other unethical acts, and more likely to work hard to improve their grades, so as to keep their behavior consonant with their self-concept. But people are not good at anticipating how they will cope with future negative events; they show an impact bias, overestimating how bad they will feel, because they don’t realize that they will be able to reduce dissonance.

• Rational behavior versus rationalizing behavior
Humans often process information in a biased way, one that fits our preconceived notions. The explanation for this is that information or ideas that disagree with our views arouse dissonance. And we humans avoid dissonance even at the expense of rational behavior.

• Decisions, decisions, decisions

Decisions arouse dissonance because they require choosing one thing and not the other. The thought that we may have made the wrong choice causes discomfort—postdecision dissonance— because it would threaten our self-image as one who makes good decisions. After the choice is final, the mind diminishes the discomfort through so-lidifying the case for the item chosen or the course of action taken. That is how dissonance reduction can change a person’s values and morality: once an unethi-cal act is committed, the person experiencing disso-nance justifies it, thereby increasing the likelihood of committing it again.

• Dissonance, culture, and the brain
Dissonance seems to be hardwired in the brain; different parts of the brain are activated when people are in a state of mental conflict or have made a choice. Because postdecision dissonance has been observed in monkeys but not other species, many researchers believe it must have an evolutionarily adaptive purpose in primates. However, although cognitive dissonance seems to be universal, occurring in non-Western cultures as well as Western ones, the content of what creates dissonant cognitions and the process and intensity of dissonance reduction do vary across cultures, reflecting the difference in cultural norms.

How is the justification of effort a product of cognitive dissonance, and what are some practical applications for reducing dissonance?

■ Self-Justification in Everyday Life
Researchers have studied the forms of dissonance reduction and their application in many spheres of life.

• The justification of effort
People tend to increase their liking for something they have worked hard to attain, even if the thing they have attained is not something they would otherwise like. This explains the intense loyalty that initiated recruits feel for their fraternities and military institutions after undergoing hazing.

• External versus internal justification
When we perform an action because of the ample external reward to do it, then the action has little or no effect on our attitudes or beliefs. However, if the reward is not big enough to justify the action, we find ourselves experiencing cognitive dissonance because there is little external justification for what we did. This activates an internal justification process to justify the action to ourselves. The internal process of self-justification has a much more powerful effect on an individual’s long-term values and behaviors than does a situation where the external justifications are evident. When people publicly advocate something that is counter to what they believe or how they behave, called counterattitudinal advocacy, they will feel dissonance. Counterattitudinal advocacy has been used to change people’s attitudes in many ways, from their preju-dices to self-defeating beliefs and harmful practices such as bulimia.

• Punishment and self-persuasion
Another way of getting people to change is not by administering severe punishment, but insufficient or mild punishment, as the forbidden-toy experiment demonstrated. The less severe the threat or the smaller the reward, the less external justification the person has for compliance, and thus the greater the need for internal justification. The resulting self-persuasion becomes internalized and lasts longer than temporary obedience to avoid a punishment.

• The hypocrisy paradigm
Inducing hypocrisy— making people face the difference between what they say and what they do—is one way to use the human tendency to reduce dissonance to foster socially beneficial behaviors. In the case of an AIDS-prevention experiment, participants videotaped speeches about the importance of using condoms and they were made aware of their own failure to use them. To reduce dissonance, they changed their behavior—they purchased condoms.

• Justifying good deeds and harmful acts
A clever application of cognitive dissonance theory is to get someone to like you by having them do you a favor. The reason this works is that the person needs to internally justify the fact that they did something nice for you. The converse is true as well. If you harm another person, to reduce the threat to your self-image that could come from doing a bad deed, you will tend to justify what you did by denigrating your victim: the person deserved it, or he or she is not “one of us” anyway. In extreme cases such as conflict and war, many people will embrace the cognition that the victim or enemy deserved everything they got because they are less than human.

How can people avoid the traps of self-justification and other dissonance-reducing behavior?

■ Some Final Thoughts on Dissonance: Learning from Our Mistakes

Much of the behavior described in this chapter may seem startling: people coming to dislike others more after doing them harm, people liking others more after doing them a favor, people believing a lie they’ve told only if there is little or no reward for telling it. These behaviors would be difficult for us to understand if it weren’t for the insights provided by the theory of cognitive dissonance.

There are times when dissonance reduction is counterproductive because it solidifies negative values and behaviors, and this applies to everyone from members of small cults to national leaders. Although the process of reducing dissonance is unconscious, it is possible to intervene in the process. Knowing that humans are dissonance-reducing animals can make us more aware of the process. The next time we feel the discomfort of having acted counter to our values, we can consciously pause the self-justification process to reflect on our action.

Social Psychology
Aronson Wilson Akert