To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Thursday, October 23, 2025

Self-observation in recovering sanity


Perceval broke into a spiritual promised land, the pinnacle of the psychotic achievement, for short periods when he would feel “transported to heavenly places.” In this realm of the Gods, he felt he experienced eternity and that he lived beyond birth and death. He sensed a separation between his consciousness and his physical being. Doubt was almost completely gone, but when it flashed he saw what he called the realm of pure imagi-nation, or the divine mind. It led to a kind of numbness in which he became absorbed, fascinated in spiritual pleasure. But at times it wavered like a mirage, and a fear was sown—that he might lose it.

Fear became a rush of energy. He looked back in envy at the height of his spiritual bliss and knew that it had gone. He became more aggressive in his attempt to win spiritual success from the powers. He overturned doubt easily, and any moment of it he saw as a demonic influence. The voices continually issued conflicting commands, but always they demanded further spiritual submission from him. He was in the realm of Paranoia, where he had to protect himself “against attacks from all directions.” He felt that only the exertion of greater energy, speed, and effi-ciency could save him from the nightmarish world that was coming.

On entering the realm of Hell he experienced the full fury of his own projections. He could not tell if he was committing acts of destruction or creation. His speed of mind was tremendous and in a constant momentum of change between giving birth and dying. He was given to feelings of hatred and of being hated, and, while fighting against the projections, he began to strike inward. Voices now ordered him to destroy himself. When the “crack” occurred he was at a peak point of being overwhelmed, alternately burning or being frozen in an environment of terror.

When Perceval first became ill he went through this cycle in about three months. After that, he recycled through it many times. In the last stages of his illness, he would recycle through the six intensified realms in a matter of minutes. It seems that, once done, it became progressively easier to do. He might have a moment or two of rest, or even clarity—particularly during his most despairing moments of the Hell realm—and then it would begin again. There appears to be a significant natural gap, or break, in the Hell realm, where one is open to learning things, to seeing things in a new light—and most importantly, where one is open to human intimacy and friendship. All those possibilities, of course, were absent in Perceval's dismal life at the madhouse.

In his loneliness he often thought of biblical Prophets and many other mystics and saints. They might understand his suffering, he believed, for they had lived through similar experiences; they also had been commanded about, and had been cast from the bliss of heaven into the abyss of the “dark night of the soul.” As do many people in psychosis, Perceval struggled with the ageless question of the subtle distinction between a tempestuous spiritual journey and true madness, and he was certain that he was being acted upon by the same power that had influenced the Prophets and the Apostles.

S TA G E S  O F  R E C O V E R Y

There is a silent despair in the modern world about the possibility of recovery from psychosis. Only occasionally is the despair publicly acknowledged, but privately, for the vast majority of psychiatrists and psychologists, recovery does not exist. They have become accustomed to seeing patients “relapse”—make a temporary adjustment to life and then fall apart under the pressures of life into the same psychotic world as before. They have seen this so often that they have come to believe that relapse is inherent in the illness, the expectable natural history of the disease. This professional belief system has been accepted and has passed into the general culture. Most people have become acclimatized to a belief that psychosis is a terminal illness, and have thus become unconscious and numb to their own despair. When Perceval declared himself recovered, he was met with tremendous scorn. He had been in the madhouse many months by then, and everyone around him believed he was still dangerous to himself and others. The miseries of his treatment persisted. In the course of proclaiming his recovery, he wrote over a hundred letters (some of which the hospital never sent), petitioning his mother, brothers, sisters, friends, lawyers, and the courts for his release from strict confinement and to be given a freedom commensurate with the abilities he had recovered. At first he addressed his mother; she, as his legal guardian, held the key to his confinement. He tried to explain his improvement and his wish for freedom: “After I began to recover from my frightful dream . . . I understood both things and persons to be really what they were—though not always, nor for sometime . . . though in a dream my behavior was still more moderate.” But all of his petitions were denied. He once tried to run away but was caught and restrained. Several famous psychiatrists of the time visited him and prescribed continued asylum treatment. One of them refused his petition, stating that because he wore his hair long and in ringlets (which Perceval called “natural and manly”) in knowing defiance of the hospital code of behavior, and because he refused to simply be a good patient and do what might be necessary for his quick release (like being kinder to his worthy family and less accusatory of his physicians), his judgment was obviously impaired and his mind required continued treatment.

How he longed to be away from the excitement and provocation of asylum life and to be in a more simplified environment where he might work at stabilizing his mind. Although he was held in confinement for another two years, he kept his longing for freedom alive.

Almost incredibly, during this time and while utterly alone Perceval was discovering a pathway to recovery from psychosis. It is difficult for us to know just how unique that discovery was or to appreciate how often and silently such an event may currently be happening in our hospitals and asylums. Clearly, Perceval had no scheme to do it, at least at first.

Recovery was an evolution in process: He had decisions to make at each step of the way, and there were many side roads and environmental obstructions. Although it is now popularly believed that recovery is improbable for people who are as ill as Perceval, not only did Perceval fully recover—and only the course of his life can demonstrate that—but he did so under the conditions of madhouse care!

The hectic course of his recovery reveals some basic principles, which apply to anyone during the cyclic journey of psychosis. When these insights made it clear to him just what he had to do to recover, he set an iron determination in that direction. It is through these principles that the story of Perceval's recovery can best be told.

The Wisdom of Recovery

There are experiences of sudden “shock” or “astonishment,” momentary “islands of clarity” and awakening. At such a moment Perceval said “scales fell from my eyes.” Often these moments are accompanied by horror at the self-deception in which one has been immersed.

There is also a more gradual awakening that occurs in the intervals between the sharp points of clarity. This happens bit by bit, sometimes agonizingly slowly, sometimes bitterly. But it also includes moments of delight and confidence. Although this sequence happens over and over again and its progression is cumulative, an active, continuous effort is required on the part of the one recovering from psychosis.

Each stage of recovery has its own particular danger. The danger of being drawn back into the whirlpool dream of psychosis is powerful, beckoning, and even irresistible. One can become enamored with the sudden awakenings and easily miss the point by turning them into self-aggrandizements or by attempting to create them at will. And during the periods of gradual awakening, one sometimes feels exquisitely precarious, combining what Perceval called a “child's sensitivity and an imbecile ability to control wild thoughts.'' There is a continual undertow of grief and nostalgia to relax back into the dream. Compared to the vivid display of losing one’s mind, recovery feels boring and hopeless. One’s intention and effort may give way. There is no other way to describe what is needed to accomplish the dangerous journey of recovery other than calling it courage.

Recovery is neither a distinct event nor a border to cross over. Moments of recovery are happening all the time, even in the midst of losing mind. Insanity and sanity are occurring together. Wildness of mind and clarity of intelligence are arising side by side. Spontaneous insights about how to recover actually present themselves as veiled messages within a delusion itself, and they are either recognized or lost.

If any stage of the natural unfolding of recovery is thwarted, frustrated, or actively opposed by the environment, the effort is either abandoned com-pletely or it becomes as it did with Perceval, a grim struggle for survival.

The implication of these principles is enormous, for it means that everyone has the capacity to recover from psychosis and that it might be done in similar stages: a virtual unwinding of psychosis. The following stages are described from the point of view of Perceval's experience. Each stage involved a recognition or insight into the nature of his own psychosis. Each stage is a quality of mind, not in the sense of an intensified realm but a particular moment of sanity within a realm, having its own emotions, logic, and serious dilemmas. Although they do not always follow in sequential order, they can be something of a guide through the predicaments inherent to the recovery process.

Detachment From Delusion

Within the first months in the madhouse, Perceval admitted to himself that nothing could deter him from attempting to comply with the commands of his delusion short of his own death. All his determined efforts at spiritual submission in the past had only led to this. He now openly acknowledged his total enslavement.

But then, as early as one month after the “crack,” he had startling glimpses of recovery:

A kind of confidence of mind came in me the evening after I had been threatened (by voices), and saw the thunderbolt fall harmlessly by my side . . . nothing ensuing, confidence again came in me, and this night a change took place in the tone of the voices.

Then, this kind of event happened several more times. That is what it took. He said that only “repeated experience of the falsehood of the promises made to me in delusion could succeed in making me relinquish altogether my attempts to comply.” Whatever this “confidence” was, it had the effect of also altering the delusion itself.

Doubt was returning. It spelled the beginning of the end of his bondage to delusion. But recovery beyond this point he said was “long in coming,” taking six months to complete, because soon after the episode of the failed thunderbolt Perceval was strapped to his bed and “became here again a sport of the wildest delusion.”

The shock of doubt allowed doubt to gain a foothold. Memories and reminders of that doubt lingered. But each moment of clarity was opposed by a recoil or aftershock, a rapid alternation between clarity and delusion. Gradually, the delusion itself was affected; with each moment of clarity there appeared a new edition of the delusion—a compromise delusion—which took into account his increased awareness and still exhorted him to maintain an allegiance to miraculous powers.

I have so long been deceived by my spirits that I now did not believe them when they told the truth. I discovered at last that I was on earth, in natural, although very painful circumstances, in a madhouse . . . and I knew I was looked upon as a child.

He slowly concluded, from the incessant contradictions within the commands of the voices, that the voices were as confused as he was. In this way, the voices were gradually weakened and eventually terminated— and Perceval makes a point of this—one at a time.

Discipline And Effort

Frustratingly, shortly after each successful “disobedience” to the spirits, he would again unconsciously relapse into reckless obedience. Only further discipline and effort could counteract that kind of deterioration of his willpower.

Voices sporadically occurred (at first making no sense) that urged him to “recollect” himself; that is, to become more aware of his situation and prevent “going into a wrong state of mind . . . by keeping my head to my heart and my heart to my head.” He repeated this slogan to himself over and over again throughout his recovery as a means of reminding himself to keep his body and mind together: “Without that, my head wandered from my heart and my heart turned from my head all through the day.” Voices told him he was “ruminating all day long,” and a “moving white light appeared as a guide” and would indicate to him when he was lost in thought.

A distinct kind of effort was required to recollect himself and bring himself back to the details of his physical world. When he could do that there came a synchronization of body and mind that strengthened his ability to resist the temptations of delusion. For example, on attempting to write letters, every syllable of these letters

I saw by illusion before I wrote them, but many other sentences also appeared besides which those I chose; and often these sentences made light of or contradicted what went before— turning me to ridicule and that ridicule goading me to anger and mad-ness, and I had great labor and difficulty to collect myself to seize those that were at all consecutive—or not too violent—or not too impassioned. This was extremely painful.22

Any sudden bursting of an illusion or of a glaring self-deception would “stupefy” him. At that moment his wild thoughts would cease and allow him to see things clearly. It took an effort to utilize that moment and not be distracted from it:

I caught the reflection of my countenance in the mirror. I was shocked and stood still; my countenance looked round and unmeaning. I cried to myself, ‘Ichabod! my glory has departed from me’; then I said to myself what a hypocrite I look like! So far, I was in a right state of mind; but the next thought was, 'How shall I set about to destroy my hypocrisy'; then I became again a lunatic.23

Puncturing a delusion, he realized, might come from simple sensations or even a scattered fact, and he began to seek them out. Once, he wrote to his brother to check out a memory as to the correct date of the death of his dog (which figured largely in one of his delusions), and its contradiction to the delusion once again “astonished” him. Another time, by requesting a copy of his baptismal certificate, he instantly dissolved his belief in the spirit voices who told him that he was not really his mother's son. “To confirm the suspicion I had of being deluded my mind needed these circumstantial evidences to be corrected entirely of its errors.” He noticed that there were perceptions whose sudden impact he had been avoiding, as if by a reflex. When he saw his face: “I observed on catching my face in the pane of glass that my head involuntarily turned away and I turned back to observe what had struck me.” It looked disfigured and moronic, and it “recollected” him. After this event, Perceval always carried a pocket mirror with him, so that he could quickly check and see if he looked like a madman or not. Finding “errors” everywhere within his delusions, a defiance against the voice of delusion rose up in him. He would hold himself back from action: “I began to hesitate before I acted and joked inwardly at the absurdities of my delusions.” Then, he habitually disobeyed the voices:

"It was usually a reason now for me to do anything, if I heard a spirit forbid it. I was sorry I had not done so before, being prevented by superstitious fear, for it seemed to bring me to my senses and make me calm and reasonable.” But even as his conviction in the delusions was eroding, “new delusions suc-ceeded those that were dissipated.” The effort had to begin again.

Discovery

His loneliness was profound. While living in a split world, where delu-sion existed side by side with reality, his sense of detachment from people was alarming: “They were dead to me, and I dead to them, and yet with that painful apprehension of a dream, I was cut off from them by a charm, by a riddle I was every moment on the point of guessing.”

His curiosity was engaged. The presence of other people called him out from self-absorption, even when this put him at the risk of being punished for it by the voices. “A beautiful servant girl whom I called Louisa” had such an effect:

The sight of a female at all beautiful was enchanting to me. I now began to recover my reflection rapidly and to make observations upon character and people around me.24

The spirit voices themselves “directed my attention with greater rapidity” to the “variety of situation and ornament.” Then he could make many distinctions and discriminations between reality and that which took place within the thick veil of illusion: “As I came gradually to my right mind I used to burst into fits of laughter at the discovery of the absurdity of my delusion.”

He “experimented” and played with his delusory perceptions. What he discovered intrigued him, and he began to further examine the nature of his strange perceptual processes. He discovered that he had an exaggerated tendency to “dream” even while awake; that is, to pull back from see-ing outward sensations and to see instead the images of memory.

These “investigations” were carried out during brief periods when he pushed himself to stand at the mental precipice between dream and reality, a precarious position. Such an episode might begin by accident: He would be struck by the sudden appearance of a voice or a vision, and then quickly decipher it down to its component parts, as one can sometimes do on awakening from a night dream. In doing this, Perceval first saw a simple “illusion,” like an afterimage, echo, or misperception. Built upon that, a hallucination rapidly took form by an elaboration on the ordinary illusion, which had only been a “trick” of the eye or ear: “I saw and discovered the slight that was played upon me. A trick, which until I became stronger in health, made me doubt that the objects around me were real.”

Immediately upon that, he noticed a second trick, which changed the meaning of the perception. This second overlay was caused by what Perceval called the “power of resemblance.” This function reshaped the illusion to the likeness of a memory. Then a third trick created a sense of conviction, by a power to personify the illusion or grant it the privilege of independent existence. When a newly created existence arose it would begin to act for, against, or indifferent to him. The delusion became solidified beyond doubt when he engaged it in dialogue.

As Perceval's discipline of self-observation became sharpened, he saw that all these steps occurred very quickly and outside his awareness. He was astonished by the speed at which a delusion could be put together and that he could even track that degree of speed. In short, he discovered that wildness of thought and disordered sensations together create hallucination, but only when one enters into dialogue with it does one become truly insane.

This self-observation and many of Perceval's further observations about the nature of psychotic perception are some of the most insightful ever made and are central to understanding the process of recovery. The examples that follow demonstrate an accumulation of insight about his own wildness of mind, all of which he needed in order to cut through his intoxication with delusion. They are presented in the same order as they occurred to him.

1. I discovered one day, when I thought I was attending to a voice that was speaking to me, that, my mind being suddenly directed to outward objects—the sound remained but the voice was gone; the sound proceeded from a neighboring room or from a draught of air through the window or doorway. I found, moreover, if I threw myself back into the same state of absence of mind, that the voice returned, and I subsequently observed that the style of address would appear to change according to the mood of mind I was in; still later, while I was continuing these observations, I found that although these voices usually come to me without thought on my part, I had sometimes a power, to a certain extent, to choose what I would hear.²⁵

2. The thunder, the bellowing of cattle, the sounds of a bell, and other noises, conveyed to me threats, or sentences of exhortation and the like; but I had till now looked at these things as marvelous and I was afraid to examine into them. Now I was more bold.²⁶

3. Prosecuting my examinations still further, I found that the breathing of my nostrils also, particularly when I was agitated, had been and was clothed with words and sentences. I then closed my ears with my fingers, and I found that if I did not hear words—at least I heard a disagreeable singing or humming in the ears—and that those sounds, which were often used to convey distinct words and sentences, and which at other times seemed to the fancy like the earnest cries, or confused debating, or expostulations of many spirits, still remained audible; from which I concluded that they were really produced in the head or brain, though they appeared high in the air, or perhaps in the cornice of the ceiling of the room; and I recognized that all the voices I had heard in me, had been produced by the power of the Deity to give speech to sounds of this nature produced by the action of the pulses, or muscles, or humours, &c. in the body—and that in like manner all the voices I had been made to fancy outside of me, were either formed from or upon different casual sounds around me; or from and upon these internal sounds.²⁷

4. Upon discovering the nature of an illusion caused by the projection of an afterimage; I drew from this the following inferences: that neither when I had seen persons or ghosts around me—neither when I saw visions of things—neither when I dreamt—were the objects really and truly outside of my body; but that the ghosts, visions, and dreams are formed by the power . . . in reproducing figures as they had before been seen on the retina of the eye—or otherwise to the mind—or by arranging minute particles in the visual organs, so as to form a resemblance or pic-ture of these figures—or by combining the arrangements of internal particles and shades with external lines and shades and etc. so as to produce such a resemblance and then making the soul to conceive, by practicing on the visual organs, that what it perceived really within the body exists outside, throwing it in a manner out as the specter is thrown out of a magic lantern.²⁸

5. Though I still occasionally heard these voices and saw visions, I did not heed them more then I would my own thoughts, or than I would dreams, or the ideas of others. Nay, more than that, I rather acted diametrically opposed to them.²⁹

The strength to face one's delusion comes from all such insights into the simple deceptions that go into creating a psychotic perception. Once, a magnificent vision of a naked woman, said to be his eldest sister, suddenly arose before him from the bushes in the garden and beckoned him. Just choose her, the voices told him. Recollecting how he had been so deceived by visions, he turned away, saying, “She might come up if she would, or go down if she would—that I would not meddle with the matter! At this rude reply the vision disappeared.

This response to a vision became Perceval's second most important slogan for recovery. It became his mental practice for recovery: a way of saying no to internal fascinations.
Anyone awakening from a night dream, a daydream, or even a moment of absentmindedness “comes to.” This is usually a moment of sudden expansion of awareness into one's environment. It is this kind of environmental awareness that Perceval tried to cultivate in himself. He studied the mechanism in himself: “Having to recollect myself, I became more aware of my real position, my thoughts being called out from myself to outward objects.” He pinpointed the sensation of being “called out” from delusion as being a kind of passionate energy toward the world—shot out like an arrow to sensory objects—and he tried to train himself to recognize it more quickly. But there was a major obstacle. He found that this sudden openness to his sensory environment was chronically being interrupted and covered over by a mechanism that felt like a “film,” or a fog, insidiously descending over his mind and clouding his awareness. Inevitably, he found himself projecting images onto this film, images that became animated, thus cutting him off from external sensory awareness. He finally solved this riddle by practicing at becoming quick enough to recognize the subtle sensation of the film as it first came to him, and then cutting through it. Thus, the sensation of the film itself became his moment of “recollection,” the reMinder To Wake Himself Up.

Courage

Each time Perceval woke up to the “barbarous circumstance” of asylum life, he became morbidly dejected with guilt, grief, and “a deep sense of self-disgust and degradation.” He noted that when this happened to himself or any of the other inmates, the response was to “become wild or apa-thetic.” He tells of “the gradual destruction of a fine old man who was placed in exactly similar situations as my own.” He watched how the old man's behavior became progressively more slovenly until he became unconcerned with even the slightest dignities of living. The elderly man had been stripped of humanity. Then, with amazement, Perceval saw all his own behavior in the same light. He, too, was deteriorating, was becoming animal! At this point he knew fully that he was as much a victim of his malignant environment as he was of his delusions. He called this shock of awareness “a mercy”; for the old man it was a tragedy, but for Perceval it was an insight that had been mercifully granted to him.

A dreadful sympathy awakened in him, for himself and for all the other patients around him. He was filled with an energy of compassionate outrage. For the first time, Perceval committed himself to follow a plan of action: He would direct himself toward “health” in every aspect of his life. He then devoted himself to becoming well, to being strong enough to speak for all the others who would never leave the asylum—to tell the truth about the horrors of their treatment. He took a vow:

I resolved—I was necessitated—to pit my strength and abilities against that system, to fail in no duty to myself and to my country; but at the risk of my life, or my health, and even my understanding, to become thoroughly acquainted with its windings, in order to expose and unravel the wickedness and the folly that maintained it, and to unmask the plausible villainy that carries it on.³⁰

This singular event of the awakening of compassion was a quantum leap in Perceval's course of recovery from psychosis. It is the case for many other people as well; a compassionate interest and even a dedication to be of service to other people is crucial to the later stages of recovery.

There was a shift of allegiance toward health in everything he did, and he resolved to “follow a plan calculated to compose and strengthen me, to arouse and cheer me—if I had not had resolution to adhere to such a plan, there might have been risk of return of illness, perhaps of insanity . . .. I braced up my mind also to courageous and virtuous efforts.”

He experimented with new efforts at bringing his body and mind into harmony to overcome the physical and mental torpor of asylum life:

“Whenever my thoughts and hands were most occupied I became, I suppose, nearest to sound state of mind, and consequently more aware of my situation,” and he also remarked “that all, or many of the faculties of mind and body should be called into play at one time, and above all things that the body should be occupied.” He also experimented with his breathing and discerned a peculiar interdependence of mind and breath, finding that his mind could be calmed and controlled by “regulated respirations.”

He tried to watch more closely how he ate his food, finding that the rate at which he ate and the qualities of food and their effect on him were all interrelated to his state of mind. He tested his ability to exercise by walking fast and was overcome with grief at the extent of his physical deterioration. He became concerned with his general health, and wrote to his mother to send him (which she did) the “dental materials” he needed to care for his teeth. He fought the hospital authorities to the end and finally was allowed to have some religious books sent to him.

Whenever he could be alone in his hospital room he stealthily wrote about these efforts and kept his journal hidden from the staff. He knew that they were especially interested in his notations about abusive treatment and his eventual plans for malpractice accusations. Because they would sometimes find his notes, he often wrote sensitive material in Portuguese.

Only after many letters, and what the legal establishment called his relentless badgering, did Perceval gain his release from Dr. Fox's asylum. His aged mother and his brothers gave in, and two of his elder brothers came for him. All the time while riding away in a coach from the asylum, he thought they were bringing him home. It was not until they got to the doors of Dr. C. Newington’s madhouse at Ticehurst, in Sussex, did Perceval realize what had happened. The new madhouse turned out to be more humane, and at least allowed him to take walks in the enclosed garden. His treatment here was not nearly as harsh, but he resisted it as best he could, and he continued his letter writing! Now, more often, he wrote to the Metropolitan Commission of Hospitals, to certain judges and members of Parliament, and in all the letters he demanded an immediate examination of his sanity.

He insisted to his family that they remove him from the madhouse and place him in a private home with a family or with attendants to care for him.

I needed quiet, I needed tranquility; I needed security, I needed even at times seclusion—I could not obtain them. At the same time I needed cheerful scenes and lively images, to be relieved from the sad sights and distressing associations of a madhouse; I required my mind and my body to be braced, the one by honest, virtuous, and correct conversation, the other by manly and free exercise; and above all, after the coarse and brutal fellowship I had been reduced to, I sighed for the delicacy and refinements of female society.³¹ At the same time that he was becoming more outwardly defiant of the hospital authorities, he was also mentally rejecting and just saying “No!” to visionary commands. The hallucinations became forgiving, softer, and at times encouraged him toward health. But he painfully discovered that he had to stand fast even against voices that called themselves friends. He had to forcibly take command of his own thought processes. This, he said, was the greatest effort of all. It meant assuming the power to direct his thinking—the very same power that, when he was losing his mind, he had attacked and abandoned. His previous practices of turning away doubt, spiritual submission, and nonhesitation had to be reversed. He did this by actively renouncing his emotional attachment to the the voices—neither fearing threatening voices nor taking pleasure in hopeful voices. Soon, his fascination with the presences, voices, and spirits ceased.

R E E N T R Y

Soon after Perceval was transferred to the second asylum he wrote to his mother and her attorney to inform them that he held them legally responsible for their having submitted him to
abusive treatment, and for holding him in the hospital against his will; he wished to be immediately released to a family lodging. He had heard that this method of treatment was being done by two doctors in London, and he requested that he be put under their supervision. Again, there was a round of visiting doctors and inane interviews. Once again, they urged him to remain at the Ticehurst madhouse and not to cause further grief to his family, who had suffered enough by his illness.

But something new was apparent in the behavior of the examining doctors and magistrates—they were fearful of his being released. He saw their professional greed at wanting to keep him as a patient. He saw their fear at his potentially exposing them to investigation. He suspected that they were also under the influence of his family, who wanted him to remain in the hospital. But he came to the conclusion that the greatest influence on their rejection of his appeal was that they were unworldly people, conventional and deeply prejudiced—merely “exceedingly simple” and fearful.

Finally, at the age of thirty-one, after three years in the madhouses, Perceval's intimidation of his family and the doctors forced his discharge. Physically ill, mentally exhausted, and vulnerable to becoming quickly overexcited, he moved to London and spent some time recuperating at a home-care lodging in Seven Oaks. He needed a great deal of rest!

In the following year, he married a woman named Anna Gardner, and two years later the first of their four daughters was born. They lived mostly in a home in the Kensington area of London, and it was there that Perceval made his fateful decision to write a book describing his experience. The book was to contain all the notes and letters that he wrote while in the asylums, including his accusations against his doctors and his own family. His friends argued against it; they said he would be bitterly attacked for such an expose, that it would only harm himself and his fam-ily and children, and that he should put those terrible years behind him.

He recalled the vow he had made to himself to speak in the name of the other inmates and how it had been the mainstay of his recovery: to use all his energy and his sanity to expose and break the system of madhouse care.

I reflected how many were in the same predicament as myself . . . and I said, who shall speak for them if I do not—who shall plead for them if I remain silent? How can I betray them and myself too by subscribing to the subtle villainy, cruelty, and tyranny of the doctors?³² He moved to Paris for the next year and during that time, largely from memory, wrote of his illness and his confinement. The writing itself frightened him. He feared that by vividly bringing back all his memories he might once again put himself on the verge of madness. He was also rightly apprehensive that he might overwhelm his readers in his flood of painful and accusatory words. While writing, he sometimes felt a return of insanity—an upsurge of a living memory, like the voracious eating of chained madmen—but then he would clear his mind “by pausing and drawing a deep breath, sobbing or sighing, as the cloud of former recollections has passed over me.” On the front page of the book he added a quote from the Aeneid. An aged warrior is requested to recount the siege and rape of Troy:

Oh Queen—too terrible for tongues, the pain you ask me to renew, the tale of how the Damaians could destroy the wealth of Troy, that kingdom of lament: for I myself saw these sad things, I took large part in them.

While still in Paris, he met at the Salpetriere Hospital with Dr. Jean-Etienne Esquirol, a giant of French psychiatry and soon to become a leading figure in the reform of asylum abuses. Esquirol helped Perceval and advised him as to the political actions he might take in England. But he was disturbed by the extremity of Perceval's conviction that all private madhouses should be abolished, feeling that the only innovations possible within psychiatry would come from the private sector.

Without realizing it, Perceval had stepped into the great debate then taking place in French psychiatry, one that repeats itself right down to our present time: Is psychosis a disorder of the intellect and will, as Esquirol argued, or is it a hereditary and degenerative brain disease, as championed at the Rouen asylum (which Perceval also visited) by Dr. Jacques Joseph Moreau?
Back in London, Perceval felt he also had something to say about this issue. He concluded that the study of a mystery like that of insanity—a study that to him was the “most grand and terrible”—was too important and instructive to be left in the hands of the physicians. He titled his book A Narrative of the Treatment Experienced by a Gentleman, During a State of Mental Derangement: Designed to Explain the Causes and the Nature of Insanity (and to Expose the Injudicious Conduct Pursued Towards Many Unfortunate Sufferers Under that Calamity). He published it anonymously in 1838, and it had immediate consequences on the course of his life.

Outrage

Living with barely controlled outrage is the experience of many people who return from the asylums. As for Perceval, he felt himself to be a lonely survivor and witness to an atrocity, one that was continuing without public awareness and that would continue far into the future. There were few, he believed, who could genuinely speak for the insane other than himself.

“And yet who is on my side? where shall I find the energy to reform these abuses?” His situation was not unlike those early escapees from the concentration camps who told of what was being done but were met with crit-icisms of “exaggeration” and hysteria.³³ Perceval always seemed to provoke the criticism of being too “excessive, intemperate, or over-indulgent” in describing his experiences. To this he answered:

I consider this one of the cruellest trials of the lunatic—that on their recovery, by the formality of society, they are not allowed to utter their sentiments in the tone and manner becoming their situation... in expect-ing from such as have been insane, and are sensible of their misfortune, the same tone, gesture, cadence, and placidity, that meets them in persons who have not been through any extraordinary vicissitudes.³⁴

When Perceval learned that one Richard Paternoster, a civil service clerk, was being unjustly confined at Dr. Finch's madhouse in Kensington, he helped to create the public pressure that led to Paternoster's discharge. When he was freed from confinement, Paternoster advertised in the Times of London “for fellow sufferers to join him in a campaign to redress abuses in the madhouse system.”³⁵ Perceval joined him immediately, and together they began to petition the city magistrates for an investigation into asylum treatment. They were soon joined by William Baily (an inventor and veteran of five years in a mad-house), Richard Saumarez (a surgeon who had two insane brothers), and Dr. John Parkin (another former patient).

In 1840 Perceval published a second, expanded volume of his Narrative, and this book was even more clearly dedicated to social action. One of the spearheads of action was to be his legal prosecution of his mother and Dr. Fox. No action of Perceval's met with so much suspicion of his judgment, doubt about his sanity, and accusations of his being a traitor to his class and country than his declaration to prosecute his own mother.

Could this be outrage running wild? Many people recovering from psychosis have been known to get stuck in a sense of justifiable outrage, feeling the energy of outrage to be an essential ingredient of their health.

Certainly, Perceval felt this way. He especially became impatient with people who could not see, or would not see, the abuse of power taking place in the asylum and the world around them.

The Assassination

He understood that it could happen again at any time. He might be labeled insane by his family or the lunatic doctors, and he might once again fall into the snare of the madhouse. He was already under suspicion by the Home Office for distributing literature that they said was calcu-lated to inflame the lower classes. Paternoster himself had been whisked away by the police in the middle of the night following a financial dispute with his father. Perceval and his group of former patients worked in an atmosphere of potential violence; the age of Victoria was also the age of wrongful confinement.

Perceval's immediate family, which included a number of prominent gentry in politics and the ministry, was appalled at the public exposure of his insanity, but much more so at the legal action he was directing against his mother. To them, it was surely an act of uncalled-for revenge. To him, it was the most precise and cutting action possible to present his case: His mother, just like the public, was being duped into believing the heartless advice of the lunatic doctors. Only later did Perceval find out that, from the beginning, one of his brothers had wanted to have him released from the asylum and brought to a private lodging next to his brother's home; but his mother (on the advice of the asylum) vetoed this plan. Before his discharge, he asked his mother to join with him in a suit against Dr. Fox; she refused.

Now, he felt he had no choice but to proceed alone. The malpractice prosecution might arouse public attention to asylum treatment, help provoke investigative hearings, and reduce the plight of those wrongfully confined. Also, he hoped this legal action would secure the rightful inheritance from his father, which his mother had withheld from him since his internment.

It is a strange irony that Perceval must have come to appear to his family as a haunting replica of the man who, many years before, had murdered his beloved father. The story is as follows: In 1812, when John was nine years old, his father was shot to death in the lobby of the House of Commons. The assassin, John Bellingham, was noted to be insane (as Bellingham's father had been) and was summarily hanged one week after the event. One report said: “It was one week from homicide to homicide.

This trial was called a case of judicial murder of an insane man and was explicitly rejected as having no legal precedential authority.”³⁶ Bellingham had lived a life of misfortune and bankruptcy and had been imprisoned for embezzlement. After that, he never ceased to petition and harass members of the government for compensation for what he felt was a wrongful imprisonment. He began to feel that he had to kill someone in order to bring his grievances to public attention, and Spencer Perceval—a man known for his generosity and aid to the poor—was the one*. When John Perceval, twenty-six years later, began his incessant letters and petitions for asylum reform, his family heard echoes and rumors of a dangerous person, a chronic complainer against the system, an avenger, possibly violent.

Throughout this his mother pleaded ignorance. She had no idea how badly he was being treated. In any case, she felt that the doctors knew what they were doing. They told her that John might become violent if he were removed from their treatment. That was enough for her, she had experienced enough violence in her family.

Soon after the publication of his second book, Perceval abandoned his threats of prosecution, possibly because his writings and activities were already achieving his goals.

Recovering Sanity
A Compassionate Approach to Understanding and Treating Psychosis

Edward M. Podvoll, M.D.

* The war against France lasted from 1792 until 1815. Among the principal objectives of this pointless bloodletting was to destroy Napoléon’s debt- and interest-free system of finance. (See Chapter III). During this period England also waged a war against the United States from 1812 until 1814. This war, as was the case with the war against France, was instigated by England at the behest of banker Mayer Amschel Rothschild (real name Bauer) after the United States Congress refused to renew the charter of the Rothschild-controlled[60] Bank of the United States, which had been the central bank of America from 1791 until 1811.[61] Mayer Amschel Rothschild is famously credited with having said: “Give me control of the economics of a country, and I care not who makes her laws. The few who understand the system, will either be so interested from its profits or so dependent on its favours, that there will be no opposition from that class.” British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval (1809-12) tried to stop this completely futile war, but was assassinated on 11 May 1812 in the lobby of the House of Commons by John Bellingham, a political radical, who had been set up by Rothschild.[62]

[62] www.tomatobubble.com/fh1.html NWO Forbidden History (1765-1816). Concurrent with his appointment as prime minister on 4 October 1809, Perceval also served as Chancellor of the Exchequer, to which office he was appointed on 28 March 1807. He was thus fully acquainted with intricacies of high finance. During his chancellorship his Secretary to the Treasury was John Charles Herries, a personal friend and secret confidant of Nathan Rothschild. See N. Ferguson, The House of Rothschild, Money’s Prophets 1798-1848, Vol. 1, Penguin Books, London, 1999, 86. (Professor Ferguson is an insider, who attended the 2012 Bilderberg conference held in Chantilly, Virginia, USA). (...)

Concurrently Perceval was facing increased pressure from Nathan Rothschild to make a declaration of war on the United States. He refused. The British army was already bogged down in a stalemate situation in Spain and Portugal (The Peninsular War 1808-1814) with Napoléon’s forces, and he had no desire to commit more troops and treasure, financed by more interest- bearing bank loans, simply in order to save Rothschild’s sinking banking interests in America.

The assassin of Spencer Perceval, John Bellingham, was born about 1769 in St Neots, Huntingdonshire. From 1800-1802 he worked in Archangelsk as an agent for importers and exporters. He returned to Russia in 1804, and in November of that year he was falsely accused of having reneged on a debt of 4,890 roubles which subsequently led to his imprisonment for four years. On his release Bellingham took up residence in Duke Street, Liverpool. He unsuccessfully petitioned the government for compensation.

Bellingham, a bitter and aggrieved man, fell into company with two dissolute American merchants, Thomas Wilson and Elisha Peck, who were both keen to have Orders in Council, which forbade neutral nations from trading with France abrogated. These Orders in Council had been introduced by Perceval in response to Napoléon’s Continental Blockade which the latter had instituted in 1806 and prohibited trade with Britain and Ireland. Their continuation was due to be debated in parliament on that fateful evening. Thus we observe a confluence of interests, a disturbed and resentful man, two greedy merchants and the puppet master Rothschild pulling the strings in the background.

At 5.15 p.m. on 11 May 1812 as Perceval entered the lobby of the House of Commons, Bellingham stepped forward and shot him in the heart. Perceval collapsed uttering “Murder...... oh my God”[110] and within minutes was dead. Four days later Bellingham was put on trial at the Old Bailey. The trial lasted three days. A plea of insanity was rejected. The brevity of the trial was presumably related to the necessity of preventing any untoward disclosures. As is customary with this type of political assassination the “lone assassin” theory has to be preserved at all costs. On 18 May 1812 Bellingham was hanged. A few weeks later after Perceval’s murder the Orders in Council forbidding neutral nations trading with France were revoked.

A History of Central Banking and the Enslavement of Mankind

Stephen Mitford Goodson


 



Monday, October 20, 2025

Anarcho-Tyranny Strikes Again in Scandinavia


For many decades following World War Two, Sweden was presented to an impressed but gullible world as the very model of a safe, tolerant, liberal, progressive, welfare-state paradise. Now, it seems to many outsiders like myself to have become much more of an unsafe, unfree, intolerant, intolerable, failed-state dystopia instead.

Granny, Get Your Gun

A harmless 80-year-old Swedish woman is currently being prosecuted for illegal weapons possession after a long-forgotten antique hunting rifle she had borrowed from a shooting club and failed to return for some reason was found locked away in a sealed storage unit dating back to the 1960s when it was being cleared out. No license was needed for such things back then, so the woman was committing no offence whatsoever when she shut it away. However, as the item still works, by absent-mindedly failing to apply for a permit in the interim, she has technically now been rendered a massive gun-criminal. Common sense would dictate the Swedish state should just have thrown this whole issue aside without any comment or censure. But common sense no longer applies in the deliberately ruined legal systems of the contemporary West.

The whole debacle has raised the question of whether or not the senior will receive a jail term. If so, as the crime of possessing an unlicensed firearm carries with it a potential punishment of five years, it is a safe bet the Swedish state would essentially be sentencing the pensioner-prisoner to die in despair behind bars.

No such worries for the 13-year-old “Swedish” (or, more probably, “Swedish from a migrant background”) boy apprehended for shooting six people in the town of Gävle with a rather more consciously illegally acquired firearm during the very same week the 80-year-old gangsta granny was reported as being questioned by police. The boy will not be tried as an adult, even though facing charges of attempted murder, so is most unlikely to spend the rest of his (regrettably) rather longer remaining lifespan rotting away inside a Swedish cell. Instead, said early reports, “It is unclear whether he will be kept in custody” at all, despite being an alleged gunman.

Moves are afoot to lower Sweden’s age of criminal responsibility from the current age of 15 to 13, and begin incarcerating minors, but this will surely come too soon to treat the bullet-happy teen from Gävle in this fashion. And many malevolent forces in society don’t want this measure to happen at all. Even in spite of the currently unfolding immigration-fueled national adolescent crimewave, still liberal do-gooders from left-wing organizations like Sweden’s Children’s Rights in Society (BRIS) warn that the proposed move “could backfire, pushing gangs to recruit even younger children.”

Presumably there’s a limit to how young they can go? Once Sweden’s babies begin killing people, we will know the country really has been successfully third worldificated by mass immigration.

Political Vehicle

Being both legally a child and, most probably, an ethnic minority one, the accused from Gävle is much more likely to be treated as a victim than as a criminal. And that is a deliberate ruling-class policy decision. As many readers will know, the phenomenon is called anarcho-tyranny, a term coined by the writer Sam Francis, and it has been a widespread strategy across Sweden—and wider Europe and North America—for many years now. Most present Western governments hate their own people, and love their intended outside replacements, and it should be no surprise today’s criminal justice system reflects this fact accordingly.

Chosen randomly from amongst innumerable others, we have the German girl sent to prison for calling a foreign gang-rapist a “pig” and a “disgusting freak” online, whereas the foreign gang-rapist himself emerged without any jail time whatsoever. Or the father in England who says he was thrown into a cell by police for daring try to rescue his daughter from a Muslim rape-den. Also in Britain, there was the recent case of a former Muslim charged with hate-crimes offenses for burning a Koran, whilst the Muslim who consequently attempted to stab him to death for “blasphemy” was let off with a non-custodial sentence by a judge on the grounds the initial book-burning must have quite naturally caused him to have “lost his temper”, a classic case of two-tier justice in the land of Two-Tier Keir if ever there was one.

Within Sweden itself, an absolutely classic illustration came as far back as 2013, during a prolonged outbreak of rioting and arson in the capital Stockholm over the course of several nights, mainly at the hands of yet more imported non-Swedish youths whom the state strangely chose to hardly bother arresting. As the youths also torched police stations, maybe there was just nowhere available left to hold them?

Stockholm’s then-Chief of Police, Mats Löfving, openly explained his force’s distinctly stand-offish tactics to Swedish newspaper Expressen at the time as follows: “Our ambition is really to do as little as possible.” Mission achieved! And so Stockholm burned, in particular its cars, with Löfving more than happy to stand there and idly warm his hands by their exploding engine-flames:

We go to the crime scenes, but when we get there we stand and wait. If we see a burning car, we let it burn if there is no risk of the fire spreading to other cars or buildings nearby. By doing so we minimize the risk of having rocks thrown at us.

Except by the cars’ angry owners, perhaps. But then, the cars’ owners were likely to be ordinary law-abiding citizens, rather than angry violent immigrant mobs, and thus rather easier to simply ignore: or, indeed, to actively police into oblivion. Out surveying the destruction one morning, a reporter from Swedish news outlet Fria Tider —often identified as a far-right “junk news” outlet, which probably means you can trust it—was astonished to see a traffic warden from local parking company P-Service issuing a fine to a burnt-out vehicle with a smashed windscreen and severe internal fire damage but, crucially, a still-legible license plate.

That the car was now clearly undrivable was “irrelevant”, according to the warden. The vehicle lacked the necessary permit-paper on display proving its parking had been paid for—probably because it had just been burnt to cinders by a petrol-bomb—so the letter of the law said the owner had to be punished by the courts without fail. Petty rules had been broken, and the usually law-abiding citizen must be forced to pay for this fact, whilst non-petty rules being broken, like an immigrant setting the car on fire in the first place, were evidently far less worthy of immediate enforcement.

The photograph of this event taken by the Fria Tider reporter really does say a thousand words. If you had asked AI to generate an image emblematic of precisely how European race-based anarcho-tyranny looks in action, the dangerous online disinformation-spewing picture-bot couldn’t have done any better than this.

Stockholm Syndrome

An even worse manifestation of anarcho-tyranny is when someone law-abiding has a serious crime committed against them by a privileged state-protected “victim” group, and then ends up being arrested and punished themselves, merely for complaining about the fact.

The classic example within a Swedish context occurred in 2016, when a 65-year-old pensioner, Christina Nilsson Öberg, who had foolishly ventured outside without packing her illegal 100-year-old hunting rifle, was beaten, hospitalized and mugged by a gang of youths during a bicycle ride. Unfortunately, the youths happened to be non-white Afghans, not white Swedes, so the police closed the case without prosecting anyone and apprehended Öberg for subsequently complaining about this sad chain of events online.

Calling the robbers “black mold” and “beardless youths”, besides asking for their deportation, Öberg had no idea her Facebook page was being secretly monitored by an online Stasi-style thought-police spying operation called Näthatsgranskaren (Net Hate Examiner), who make it their business to seek out the social media pages of people who have suffered crimes at the hands of Mohammedans and then make sure they dare not tell anyone the truth about the fact.

The Swedish police may not have been able to apprehend the Afghan robbers, but handcuffing a 66-year-old who had typed the highly offensive word “beardless” about a Muslim was an altogether easier case to crack, with Öberg’s phone and iPad being seized as evidence, her home being searched, the old woman being interrogated, and a lengthy 200-page report on her activities being compiled as a “preliminary investigation”. Öberg had the presence of mind to claim it was not her who had typed the offending comments, however, but someone else unknown and unnamed with access to her accounts, so a doubtless highly disappointed judge felt he had to let her off, the “crime” being thereby technically non-attributable.

However, unlike with the actual mugging, dogged hate-crime investigators did not give up the trail and, sometime later, Öberg was summoned to appear before an appeals court, where she says she was sentenced to three months in jail on eight separate counts (i.e., eight separate Facebook comments) of “committing hardship against an ethnic group”. The Swedish government should have been sentenced themselves for committing an exactly similar crime against their own people.

Öberg’s later account of her imprisonment amongst drug-addicts and other actual criminals was harrowing indeed:

We have a sick legal system in Sweden, it is the truth [i.e., the innocent] that should be rewarded and it is evil [i.e., the guilty] that should be punished … [Non-white prisoners] bullied me because [the state said] I was a RACIST. They hit me into a pole, so my teeth broke out … I was denied help with my teeth by the correctional services, they had made up a lie and I was not allowed to appeal. However, could I sue the state??? If I had been from Afghanistan, I would never have been imprisoned, and I would have obviously received my compensation without having to fight for it. I am Swedish, I have no value in my own country. Seeing how Sweden is being crushed day by day because of incompetent people who should be locked up, how much should WE Swedes tolerate?? I can’t stand it anymore, we live in a war-zone where foreign criminals set the rules.

No, Europeans today live in a war-zone where white-hating anarcho-tyrants in government set the rules, the foreign criminals are just the fortunate ones who happen to benefit from the whole fact.

Sweden, a model for the world? More like a model for the end of it.

Steven Tucker
https://counter-currents.com/2025/10/anarcho-tyranny-strikes-again-in-scandinavia/


Respect has its origins in fear

On Respect Between the Sexes

We live in an age when ordinary standards of civility have collapsed yet somehow there is universal agreement that even morons and criminals deserve to be treated with “respect.” We are urged to extend respect even to other species and the planet as a whole. Sometimes self-respect is enjoined upon us. Within my experience, the most common such injunction is addressed to men, who exhorted ad nauseam to respect women. It would be a bold fellow indeed who presumed to disagree. When was the last time you heard anyone suggest that men ought to hold women in contempt?

In fact, it took me several decades of living in this world before I realized that I had never once heard anyone speak of the desirability of having respect flow in the opposite direction as well. But shouldn’t we want to see mutual respect between the sexes? And is it reasonable to expect male respect for women never to falter in the absence of any reciprocity?

Talk of the respect men owe to women is not exactly new, either. In Victorian Britain, land of old-fashioned gallantry, one sometimes heard references to “the respect due to a lady.” But a closer look reveals that respect was not always their due. For example, I recall reading an anecdote from that era concerning a woman who was successfully prosecuted for cruelty to animals. In reporting on the case, a newspaper remarked that the defendant had “forfeited the respect due to her sex.” In other words, she was rightly punished for her actions as any man would have been.

(...)


Strictly speaking, “the respect due to a lady” is an inaccurate figure of speech. The merely biological fact of having been born female clearly does not entitle anyone to respect. What the Victorians really meant was that every woman should enjoy a presumption of respectability—i.e., should be treated with respect “on credit,” as it were—unless and until her behavior proved her unworthy. A sexual indiscretion was one important way in which a woman could lose respectability, of course, but there were others. Savagely flogging a defenseless horse is not ladylike, as that Victorian newspaper reporter correctly perceived.

In other words, respect in the proper sense must be earned by one’s behavior. A presumption of respectability is a mere point of courtesy, and may apply to men as well. Demands for universal respect are in part symptomatic of a decline in conceptual clarity, specifically, a growing inability to distinguish between genuine respect and mere civility.

Perhaps the advocates of “respecting women” assume any fellow deserving the slightest regard from the ladies can be certain of getting it in full. But I am not so sure. Women have participated in the general decline in civility characteristic of our time. They swear and tell dirty jokes as only sailors used to do, and even saying “please” and “thank you” may be too much to expect from some of them. I have on occasion been simply shocked at the rudeness I have observed women practice both toward myself and to other men, and I have heard other men make similar observations. This is less likely to be a response to male unworthiness than a failure to socialize our daughters properly. They might have benefitted from being taught early in life by some authority figure such as their parents that women should treat men with some minimal degree of civility. This ought to be possible, for women have clearly internalized the message that men owe them unlimited respect with marvelous success.

If we want to consider the matter of respect between the sexes thoroughly, we must start our inquiry from the beginning, and that means asking where the phenomenon we call respect comes from. This question comes under the heading of what the philosopher Nietzsche called the “genealogy of morals.” For respect is a moral idea and found in many forms, from the crudest to the most refined. Yet its origins are best grasped not in the highly civilized and ceremonious forms of etiquette which might be found (for example) at a royal court, but precisely at the very lowest and crudest levels of human existence.

If the reader wishes to go where he may hear respect discussed most frequently and with the greatest possible sense of practical urgency, I recommend he visit a maximum-security prison. Inmates obsess over the “respect” they believe themselves owed by others, and are beside themselves with rage when they do not get it. Wardens must run a tight ship to prevent mutual demands for respect from boiling over into deadly riots.

It does not take an intelligent observer very long to realize that what jailbirds mean by respect is simply that other people should be afraid of them. At its most basic and primitive level, respect is fear, specifically the fear of physical violence or death. At the dawn of human history, and even earlier in primate bands, life was harsh and unpredictable. A victim of aggression could not simply call up the police to enforce laws or attorneys and judges to regulate disputes. To avoid being victimized by others, it was useful to respond as aggressively as possible to any threat. Even today, after many centuries of civilization, social environments like this can still be found. Think of playgrounds with insufficient adult supervision, or urban slums—and most especially in the prisons where so many slum-dwelling “badasses” end up. Such men will be happy to regale you with plenty of talk about respect, but they never mean by it anything much going beyond the sheer physical fear they wish to arouse in others so as not to be victimized by them.

(...)

This origin in the fear aroused by others’ power to harm us explains why we still teach children respect, as well as good behavior more generally, through punishment. It is what first teaches the child to respect its parents, then gradually to respect their wishes, and finally (in the most successful cases) to internalize the principles the parents mean to inculcate through the punishment. A whole history of human moral development, whether in the individual or the race, might be written as the narration of such a process of increasingly refined and internalized discipline. But the beginning of moral education lies in fear; and since the world in a sense begins anew every time a child is born, fear can never be dispensed with entirely.

Just as human coexistence and religious worship took a cruder form in primitive societies from what can be observed today, so relations between the sexes were probably not originally marked by any very ennobling conception of male gallantry or female decorum, nor by any very demanding sense of honor in either sex. Many still-observable sex differences are traceable to the sheer fact that men are on average a good deal bigger and stronger than women, so much so that the average man is physically capable of killing the average woman with his bare hands. In a state of savagery, a man can get sex or anything else he happens to want from a woman (e.g., foodstuffs) simply by using force. He can also seriously harm or kill her out of mere anger.

Such male behavior is, of course, sternly punished by law in all civilized societies. But the danger of rape or other violence from uncivilized men must have had at least one positive consequence: primitive women probably respected men in the original sense of the term, viz., by being afraid of them. If they pressed a man too far, they might find themselves in serious danger. This set some limits upon how bad their behavior could get. In a shameless feminist girlboss society of “liberated” females, there really are not many such limits.

And it is not as if women had no means of countering male violence, real or merely threatened. Most of female psychology comes from their evolved ability to get what they want without using force. Women attain their ends using lies, deceit, scheming, manipulation, backbiting, innuendo, and a whole arsenal of ugly tricks whose only common denominator is an avoidance of direct confrontation and force such as would correctly be described as “unmanly” if practiced by a male. The battle of the sexes, in other words, is a battle between force and cunning, and as in other contexts, cunning usually proves more effective.

Even in civilized societies, men continue to oppose force to cunning in dealing with women, but the force is generally that of law rather than their fists. Traditional European marriage law, for example, granted primary custody of children to their father. As Hobbes saw, there was nothing natural or necessary about this:

If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother. And therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth upon her will, and is consequently hers. (Leviathan I:20)

Paternal investment in offspring is very rare even in the great apes which are our closest evolutionary cousins, probably because apes do not grasp the causal connection between mating and reproduction. Fatherhood in more than the bare biological sense is not a fact of nature but created by the laws of matrimony, established once primitive men discovered their own contribution to reproduction. It was quickly found that men would invest heavily in children if they could be certain the children were theirs. Marriage began as a male invention designed to give them paternity confidence.

We may be sure women objected to the idea of lifelong marriage when it was first introduced, for it meant they could not longer mate as they pleased. In practice, this meant mating exclusively with high-status men: in primitive hunter-gatherer bands, sixty percent of men fail to reproduce. Marriage allows more men to become fathers, but also means that some girls get stuck with low-status “losers.” Men were stronger, however, and carried their point, creating the patriarchal, male-headed family.

Eventually women themselves became the biggest champions of the institution of marriage—they have always been the more impressionable sex—whereas men more frequently sought to expand their reproductive potential with extramarital escapades. But we must not be deceived into thinking this familiar situation is how things began. As Nietzsche understood, the origins of moral institutions often bear little resemblance to the behavior observed in more civilized eras and societies. Marriage was almost certainly invented by men in response to their discovery of fatherhood. Its advantages over instinctive Darwinian mating must have quickly become apparent. Perhaps the best testament to the institution’s success is the ease with which later generations of men were brought to believe their women “naturally monogamous.”

We may hope that the force of law and social shaming were used more frequently than husbands’ fists in inculcating marital fidelity upon those first wives, but as we have already pointed out, force of some kind cannot be dispensed with. It is how respect first arises, and is the original instrument of moral training, whether of the child or of the human race as a whole.

And in primitive societies that do not enforce monogamy, men as a group do not enjoy a great deal of respect from women. I once attended a lecture by the late anthropologist Henry Harpending, who spent much time with the bushmen of the Kalahari. He reported that women in bushman society commonly regard the men as silly creatures. Most of the time they seem to wish the men would just go away and leave them alone.

It struck me upon hearing this that Dr. Harpending need not have travelled all the way to the deserts of Namibia to observe such a society. We Americans have been instructed for several decades now that women can do everything men can do. Their professional careers can be just as successful and lucrative provided only they are not “discriminated against”—and any failure of work to be lucrative and “fulfilling” for them is proof of such discrimination. Lesbianism is a perfectly legitimate alternative to marriage, and it is a moral outrage if such women are not allowed to adopt or conceive through artificial insemination. Women have a right to divorce their husbands for any reason or for no reason at all, and are not to be criticized for separating their children from their father, who is merely an optional add-on and not a necessary part of the family. In short, as we’ve been told, a woman needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle. And the thanks men get for stoically putting up with all of this—they have not, after all, had much choice—is to be portrayed as “abusers” by feminists with masochistic fantasies!

Declining phases of civilization are marked by a recrudescence of the primitive. The “women’s liberation” movement has in effect made the ways of some of the most backward peoples known to anthropology into an ideal which our own society is condemned for failing to match. But our failure has not been for any lack of trying. Radical changes in marital and employment law over the past several decades have been motivated by a determination to render men superfluous (although this has often been done by increasing women’s dependence upon the state, i.e., upon men as a faceless collective). The result is a society in which women regard men as a kind of optional economic resource and occasional sperm donor. Why depend upon a husband to provide for you when a “family” court can simply extract resources from him by force? It is impossible that women should continue to respect men under such circumstances.

Samuel Johnson wrote: “Nature has given women so much power that the law has very wisely given them little.” This is correct. The tendency of law in traditionally arranged Western societies has been to make up for the natural advantages women enjoy in the battle of the sexes. Reforming the laws to increase women’s natural power rather than mitigating it results in an unworkable imbalance. When we take from men the possibility of using the force of law and institutions against women, yet leave women their full powers of sexual attraction and cunning, we get not equality but female despotism. And there are no grounds for hoping that women will prove an exception to the rule that power corrupts. “Liberated” women simply run roughshod over their own families and society as a whole.

I cannot furnish the objective data I might which for in this matter, but I do catch wind of relevant anecdotes, such as the wife who starts filling out divorce papers any time her husband does not let her have her way. Knowing what would be in store for himself and his children, the unfortunate husband simply gives in every time.

It would be hard to exaggerate how unnatural and unhealthy such a relationship is. It is difficult to imagine likely that even the woman herself is happy with it. Normal women want to respect their husbands, but are unable to do so as long as they are permitted to wield arbitrary power over them. Most men also sincerely enjoy gratifying their wives’ wishes where possible, but this cannot mean submitting to their commands under threat of being hauled into divorce court.

As Johnson seems to have perceived, manhood relies on the force of law in a way that femininity does not (at least assuming men do not want to go back to simply using their fists). Respect between the sexes can be re-established, but not by mindlessly exhorting women to it, as is now done with men. The laws governing work and family must be restored to something like their former state, returning to men their ability to support a wife and children as well as the proper legal authority that goes with this role. In effect, men get respect from women by demanding it. It would, admittedly, be nice if women could learn to respect men out of sheer recognition of the goodness of our hearts, but this is simply not how respect works. Respect has its origins in fear, just as all authority relies ultimately upon force.

Women who accept the traditional conditions of marriage and fulfill their duties as wives and mothers to the best of their abilities will most often find themselves enjoying the respect of their men. If and when that happens, perhaps we will finally cease to be deafened by female demands for “respect.

F. Roger Devlin
https://counter-currents.com/2025/10/on-respect-between-the-sexes/


Sunday, October 19, 2025

How Rabid Zionism Split the Libertarian World

 Like archaeologists uncovering layers of forgotten civilizations, the Block-Hoppe schism reveals that beneath every high-minded intellectual movement lies the bedrock of tribal identity, waiting to reassert itself when abstract principles collide with the eternal reality of us versus them.

The quiet corridors of libertarian academia echoed with a familiar tension. Beneath the polished language of universal principles, old loyalties and invisible borders stirred once more. What seemed like an argument over ideas was, at its core, a reckoning of identities no theory could contain.

The recent falling out between economist Walter Block and the Ludwig von Mises Institute was not a routine dispute over doctrine. It revealed something far deeper, a reminder that even among those who preach the supremacy of logic and liberty, human nature resists the purity of abstraction. Intellectual movements, however rational they may appear, remain vulnerable to the same ethnic and cultural divisions that have divided men for centuries.

Walter Edward Block embodied this paradox. He emerged from the intellectual heart of Brooklyn’s Jewish community, a world where fierce debate was a form of devotion. Born in 1941 to Abraham and Ruth Block, he began as a socialist idealist and evolved into one of the most uncompromising defenders of anarcho-capitalism.

Block’s conversion began with an encounter that would shape the trajectory of libertarian thought. Attending an Ayn Rand lecture as an undergraduate, followed by meetings with Nathaniel Branden and Leonard Peikoff, he eventually found his intellectual home under Murray Rothbard’s mentorship. This progression from Objectivism to Austrian economics positioned Block as one of the rising Jewish voices in the Austrian school.

His 1976 masterwork Defending the Undefendable established Block as libertarianism’s most provocative voice, willing to defend society’s most marginal figures—prostitutes, blackmailers, and drug dealers— through the rigorous application of property rights theory. The book’s central thesis separated economic analysis from moral judgment, creating a framework that embodied Block’s Jewish character of challenging gentile norms wherever possible.

With over two dozen books and more than 700 scholarly articles, Block constructed an intellectual empire spanning road privatization, water capitalism, and space economics. His positions at institutions such as Baruch College, Holy Cross, and Loyola University New Orleans provided platforms for developing anarcho-capitalism while maintaining respectability within academic circles. Yet beneath this impressive scholarly output lay dormant ethnic loyalties that would eventually surface with explosive consequences.

The October Revelation: Block’s Zionist Awakening

The October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks triggered an ethnic awakening within Block that betrayed his libertarian commitment to non-aggression and a non-interventionist foreign policy. In his Wall Street Journal op-ed he penned with Argentine economist Alan Futerman “The Moral Duty to Destroy Hamas,” Block revealed convictions that had apparently been gestating beneath his libertarian exterior for years.

His call for “total, unrestrictive support” for Israel represented a complete abandonment of libertarian non-interventionism. Block argued that “Hamas needs to be destroyed for the same reason and by the same method that the Nazis were,” explicitly comparing the conflict to World War II’s total war paradigm. This was not merely policy disagreement but a fundamental rejection of the non-aggression principle that forms libertarianism’s cornerstone.

More dramatically, Block’s “Open Letter to the Children of Gaza” revealed depths of ethnic passion that stunned even his closest associates. Addressing Palestinian children directly, he declared that “your parents launched a despicable, unwarranted attack on October 7” while conveniently overlooking the long history of Jewish expropriation of Palestinian lands dating back to the 1880s—a campaign of extermination that the United States government has fully endorsed through its ongoing flow of military aid, economic support, and diplomatic cover. And of course, he didn’t mention Israel’s oppressive control over Gaza—making Gaza into an open-air prison. Who could live like that?

These positions revealed Block not as a consistent libertarian applying universal principles, but as a Jewish intellectual whose ethnic solidarity ultimately trumped philosophical commitments when forced to choose between abstract theory and tribal loyalty.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe: The Libertarian Contrarian Who Stood Up to Block
Standing in stark opposition to Block’s ethnic particularism was Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a German-born philosopher whose contrarian positions place him at odds with virtually every aspect of 20th-century political consensus. Hoppe’s intellectual journey from German academia to American libertarianism produced the most radical critique of democratic governance within the movement, making him perhaps libertarianism’s most polemical voice.

Block’s Wall Street Journal essay, coupled with his longer-running claim that Jewish homesteading and inheritance justify Israel’s territorial rights, put him sharply at odds with libertarians who ground foreign-policy ethics in the non-aggression principle (NAP).

Hoppe answered with a public severing of ties. In his “Open Letter to Walter E. Block,” he charged that Block had revealed himself as “an unhinged, bloodthirsty monster” and that the stance amounted to “a complete and uninhibited rejection and renunciation of the non-aggression principle.” Hoppe’s critique went beyond rhetoric. He proclaimed that Block’s position endorsed collective guilt and “indiscriminate slaughter of innocents,” abandoning methodological individualism.

Institutionally, the fallout was swift and decisive. By 2024, Block was no longer listed as a senior fellow at the Mises Institute, and access to much of his archival writing on affiliated platforms was curtailed. Although not fired in a formal employment sense, his long association with the Institute had effectively ended. Block, for his part, framed his stance as consistent with libertarian property theory and Jewish tradition.

Rather than a purely ideological statement, Block’s pro-Zionist outburst appears to mark an ethnic awakening akin to the one Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg described, wherein the Six-Day War “united American Jews with deep Jewish commitments as they have never been united before, and … evoked such commitments in many Jews who previously seemed untouched by them.”

Hoppe’s sharp rebuke of Block forms only a single episode in a longer saga of intellectual defiance that has rendered him a lightning rod even within libertarian ranks. His 2001 work Democracy: The God That Failed articulates a systematic challenge to democratic legitimacy that extends far beyond typical libertarian anti-statism. Rather than viewing democracy as the least objectionable form of government, Hoppe argues that democratic institutions actively accelerate civilizational decline. His preference for monarchy over democracy places him in direct opposition to fundamental assumptions underlying both liberal and conservative political thought.

Some of Hoppe’s most controversial contributions to libertarian thought also concern his idea of “covenant communities” structured around the notion of “physical removal.” These entities, as he conceives them, would claim an absolute prerogative to exclude those considered misaligned with their norms, effectively transforming property rights into instruments of communal self-definition.

Writing in Democracy: The God That Failed, Hoppe argues that maintaining libertarian social order requires active exclusion of ideological opponents. “There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society,” he declares, extending this principle to “advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centered lifestyles such as, for instance, individual hedonism, parasitism, nature-environment worship, homosexuality, or communism.”

Similarly, Hoppe has stirred the pot on the immigration question in contrast to Jewish libertarians like Block who are notorious open borders boosters. Despite describing himself as an anarcho-capitalist who favors abolishing the nation-state, Hoppe supports immigration restrictions, arguing that unlimited immigration constitutes forced integration that violates native peoples’ rights.

The Jewish Intellectual Foundation of Libertarianism

Hoppe’s divergence on immigration highlights how libertarianism’s internal debates often mirror the worldviews of its founding intellectuals, many of whom were Jewish and profoundly shaped the movement’s philosophical trajectory.

It’s no secret that libertarian movement’s development has been profoundly shaped by Jewish intellectual leadership. This pattern extends from the movement’s Austrian School foundations through its contemporary institutional structure.

Ludwig von Mises, whose Austrian School economics provided libertarianism’s theoretical foundation, was born to a Jewish family in what is now Ukraine. His development of praxeology and systematic critique of socialist economics established the intellectual framework that would influence generations of libertarian scholars. Murray Rothbard, perhaps the most influential libertarian theorist of the 20th century, was born to Jewish parents and founded anarcho-capitalism while establishing the Mises Institute. Curiously, Rothbard had more of a populist turn toward the end of his life, where he advocated for a strategy of “right-wing populism” that endorsed the presidential campaigns of David Duke and Pat Buchanan.

Milton Friedman’s Nobel Prize-winning advocacy for free markets brought libertarian ideas to mainstream public attention through works like “Free to Choose,” while his policy proposals for school vouchers and a negative income tax brought libertarian policies into DC think tank circles. Ayn Rand, born Alisa Zinovyevna Rosenbaum to Jewish parents in Russia, developed the philosophy of Objectivism and wrote novels that profoundly shaped libertarian culture despite her rejection of the libertarian label.

In addition to promoting capitalism, Rand and Friedman expressed strong support for Israel, revealing how ethnic identity influences supposedly universal philosophical positions.  Rand’s support for Israel proved particularly significant given her influence on free-market thought in the United States. In her 1974 address to West Point cadets, Rand declared her support for “Israel against the Arabs for the very same reason” that she supported American settlers against Native Americans. She argued that “Israel is being attacked for being civilized, and being specifically a technological society” while describing Arabs as representing “centuries of brute stagnation and superstition.”

Rand’s position that America should “give all the help possible to Israel” including “technology and military weapons” represented a clear departure from libertarian non-interventionism that often rejects both direct military intervention and the provision of military aid to belligerents in foreign conflicts. Her justification that Israel represented “the progress of Man’s mind” against “primitive” Arab culture revealed how ethnic solidarity could override Rand’s purported commitment to individual liberties and anti-collectivist thought.

Unsurprisingly, Friedman was also an admirer of the Jewish state. When Friedman visited Israel in 1977, shortly after Menachem Begin’s election, he was invited to advise the new Likud government as it sought to move away from more dirigiste economic policies. His admiration for Israel’s early economic management predated this visit. And like most American Jews, Friedman would look the other way at the plight of the Palestinians facing constant Jewish aggression. Writing in his 1969 Newsweek column, “Invisible Occupation,” Friedman observed during a trip to the West Bank, “Much to my surprise, there was almost no sign of a military presence. … I had no feeling whatsoever of being in occupied territory.” He commended Israel’s “wise policy that involved almost literal laissez-faire in the economic sphere,” concluding that “to a casual observer, the area appears to be prospering.”

With regards to the viability of the Israeli state, Friedman also maintained that “Israel would hardly have been viable without the massive contributions that it received from world Jewry… primarily from the U.S.,” arguing that democratic capitalism, not socialism, made such aid possible: “If these donor countries had been socialist, such support would not have been possible.” Decades later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would adopt Friedman’s free-market ideas as the intellectual blueprint for his own reforms. Netanyahu frequently invoked Friedman, saying: “I am very appreciative of the fact that someone I have the utmost respect for, Milton Friedman, said that, when I was finance minister, that finally Israel has a finance minister that believes in and promotes free market ideas.” In 2005, Friedman reciprocated the admiration, praising Netanyahu for recognizing that Israel had long been held back by “rigid government intervention… socialist policies… and unnecessary state ownership of critical means of production.”

*   *   *

The libertarian movement’s significant Jewish intellectual leadership, combined with theoretical commitment to universalist principles, creates vulnerabilities to ethnic tensions when specific policy questions force choices between abstract philosophy and ethnic solidarity. Regardless of what one thinks about libertarianism, the case of Walter Block’s removal from the Mises Institute highlights the inherently adversarial nature of Jews and non-Jews in political movements. The Block-Hoppe conflict reveals challenges facing intellectual movements with significant Jewish participation. While such movements have witnessed Jewish intellectual contributions, they also become vulnerable to inevitable tensions that arise when Jewish ethnic interests conflict with movement ideology. Block’s passionate Zionism ultimately proved incompatible with libertarian anti-interventionism, leading him to walk away from the intellectual community he had contributed to for over four decades.

Like archaeologists uncovering layers of forgotten civilizations, the Block-Hoppe schism reveals that beneath every high-minded intellectual movement lies the bedrock of tribal identity, waiting to reassert itself when abstract principles collide with the eternal reality of us versus them.

Jose Nino →



Saturday, October 18, 2025

Opening Up Frontiers


(in which we discover that the inhabitants of Formosa get around on hippopotamuses and rhinoceroses)

After having studied the different types of nonjourney and some of the situations which might lead us to talk about them, the time has come to put forward some suggestions on how to acquit ourselves in such situations, which as we’ve seen are more frequent than you might think, and which each of us risks having to face at some moment or other.

Seldom having traveled myself and already having found myself having to talk about imaginary places on many an occasion, I am not badly placed to offer some tips to those who fear being confronted with the necessity of having to reinvent space without being contradicted. And we can see that far from falling victim to the situation, it is possible to profit from it and gain a better knowledge of the places in question and of oneself.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, an inhabitant of Formosa1 called George Psalmanazar appeared in London and was an immediate sensation, rapidly gaining huge popularity.

He said he had been kidnapped from his island by Jesuits who had taken him to France and tried in vain to convert him to Catholicism. He spoke both Latin and English, and the religious persecution he’d suffered immediately won the hearts of the Anglican community in London, who took him under their wing.

Psalmanazar took it upon himself to promote his native island, largely ignored in Europe. He soon became very successful, partly because of his original style of dress—he wore exotic, baroque outfits—and his diet—he ate only raw meat—but above all for the novel information he was able to supply on his home country. His stories were mind-blowing.

His reputation grew even more after the 1704 publication of his work An Historical and Geographical Description of Formosa, an Island Subject to the Emperor of Japan. It had been preceded by an autobiography, which had swiftly been reprinted and was translated into several languages. The success of the book, which was due to the revelations it contained, led the author to give lectures to learned societies and increased his fame even more, not only in England but across Europe.

It is true that Psalmanazar furnished a considerable amount of firsthand information on this country about which little was known at the time. He made it known that Formosa, whose capital was Xternetsa, was a dependency of Japan and not of China, as had been incorrectly believed for a long time, and that the ruling regime was a monarchy.

Psalmanazar also provided some original insights into the country’s customs. It was thanks to him that we learned that the inhabitants wore clothes that accurately reflected their social rank, that they were polygamous, that they ate their wives if they discovered them to be unfaithful and that human sacrifice was practiced regularly.2We also discovered through Psalmanazar that the inhabitants of Formosa mainly ate snakes, that they lived underground in circular houses, and they didn’t only use horses and camels to get around but also rode hippopotamuses and rhinoceroses.3

But Psalmanazar didn’t content himself with providing precious information on life and customs on Formosa. He also allowed us to study its language.4 Not only was he a fluent speaker, but he could also write it without difficulty. He explained that it used twenty characters, different from the characters used in China or Japan; it had six distinct tenses; and variations were made by using auxiliaries and tones.

In order to improve our knowledge, he was able to provide a translation of the Lord’s Prayer which began with the words, “Amy Pornio dan chin Ornio vicy, Gnayjorhe sai Lory, Eyfodere sai Bagalin, jorhe sai domino apo chin Ornio.” Formosa’s language aroused keen interest among intellectuals, including Leibniz, and because of its rigor, continued to be studied by linguists decades after Psalmanazar’s fraud had been brought to light.

Of course Psalmanazar didn’t come from Formosa. Born in France, he had adopted this ersatz identity after first having passed for an Irish pilgrim in order to travel around Europe more freely. He was happy to explain himself in his Memoirs, a book in which he recounted in detail the circumstances that led him to create this fiction.

Despite the success of his deception and the lack of criticism he received, it seems that Psalmanazar ended up feeling guilty about the way he had made fun of the English intelligentsia. While he didn’t denounce himself during his lifetime, he dedicated himself to the study of theology and became a specialist in issues related to the Hebrew religion. It might be assumed that this was what led him to participate in a dictionary of religions for which he provided the entry on Formosa in which he criticized Psalmanazar’s trickery, writing of himself in the third person.

When you think of the number of improbabilities with which he embellished his stories, it is astonishing that Psalmanazar was able to construct this pretense and maintain it for several years. For example, there was the number of children he claimed were sacrificed each year on Formosa—twenty thousand—which led certain skeptical spirits to remark that at that rate, the population would rapidly become extinct.

Moreover, even if few people visited the island at that time, some Europeans did go there and their accounts were radically different from Psalmanazar’s, who, with great composure, replied that they had only visited part of the island, never having ventured beyond the west coast.

The most surprising thing was that Psalmanazar, who had pale skin and blond hair, didn’t correspond in the slightest to the picture one might have had of an inhabitant of Formosa. But the majority of his interlocutors didn’t seem surprised by this—at that time, the concept of race wasn’t decisive in the perception of otherness. And Psalmanazar explained eruditely that members of the intellectual class on the island were pale skinned because they lived underground.

How did Psalmanazar go about fooling so many people? The first reason he managed to convince so many intellectuals and for such a long period of time was the verisimilitude of his description of Formosa and his own personal investment in the simulation.

With Psalmanazar, we rediscover the play of intertwined places that I noted earlier. For the real country of Formosa, which was difficult to visit at the time, Psalmanazar substituted an imaginary country that he knew how to reinvent in every aspect without ever having been there. But this substitution doesn’t become intelligible until we take into account what I proposed calling the “inner landscape” of the author and the eternally lost “original place” that he never stops searching for in vain through all of his confabulations, just like every one of us.

It is notable in fact that Psalmanazar, by engaging in this deception, isn’t only looking for the tangible social benefits he might gain from describing a virtually unknown land; he also attempts to construct a true romance of his origins by inventing for himself a new identity and a new history, going so far as to develop a new language whose rules he had better know, given that he is the only person in the world who can speak it.

To this end, Psalmanazar’s Formosa is a compromise formation in the Freudian sense, like a dream or a delirium. Psalmanazar recreates himself through an imaginary Formosa that allows him to deploy an infantile fantasy of omnipotence—just as Rosie Ruiz and Jean-Claude Romand did in their own ways. He invents his own origins and those of everyone close to him and creates a comprehensive family saga of which he is the hero.

Psalmanazar’s second quality is the possession of a fertile imagination. In this, he fits into the tradition of authors like Marco Polo and Margaret Mead’s female informants—like them he is capable of inventing a plethora of picturesque elements that capture and retain the public’s attention.

It is impossible to hope to speak with any conviction of places you haven’t been to without a vivid imagination. The capacity to dream and to make others dream is essential to anyone wanting to describe an unknown place and hoping to capture the imagination of their readers and listeners.5

This imagination is deployed in several ways that appear contradictory. First of all, Psalmanazar invents a country to suit his taste, gives it a political system, an economy, a language, customs, and even endows it with a unique animal husbandry. What he constructs is a complete world, capable of functioning, like the imaginary realms that populate travelogues and children’s games.

This imagination relies upon a strong sense of faux realism, or what one might call true detail. Like Chateaubriand, with his detailed descriptions of the flowers and insects of parts of America that he took good care not to explore, Psalmanazar nurtures the tiniest elements of his stories to create a credible illusion of an alternative reality.

But, as specific as it is, the place invented by Psalmanazar cannot clearly be situated in any particular locality. Although it has a determined geographical location, it could just as easily be found anywhere at all. The truth is that Psalmanazar combined several travelogues from different continents, and his montage contains elements from the Aztec and Inca civilizations—starting with human sacrifices—as well as from the Japanese and Chinese.6

It is no trivial matter that Psalmanazar transports hippopotamuses and rhinoceroses to Formosa, anticipating Henri Michaux’s gesture when he added camels to his description of Honfleur.7 Transporting animals or objects from one country to another, prevalent in the accounts of armchair travelers, shows that there is a different kind of space here than the one that prevails in the real world, a place that is much more flexible and mobile than the one in which we operate on a daily basis.

This apparently contradictory mixture of precision and ambiguity is essential to the invention of a haven of refuge conducive to the imagination. The details guarantee the existence of the imaginary place and the veracity of the account; the ambiguity allows the reader or listener to project themselves individually according to a particular hook offered by the account and to find a singular space that chimes with their own inner landscape.

But personal investment and imagination would not have been sufficient to explain—any more than in Margaret Mead’s case—that such an absurd fiction could be sustained for so long and accepted by the scientific community like a realist document. A model of individual compromise, Psalmanazar’s Formosa is also, when you take a closer look, a model of collective compromise.

If you think about it, the description of Formosa is just as much a plural work as a singular fiction. As we have already seen, the conversations we can have about places we don’t know do not only concern the places and ourselves, but also involve the people we are addressing ourselves to, often benevolent accomplices.

Michael Keevak showed in the book he wrote on Psalmanazar that the latter’s success can be explained by the fact that Psalmanazar addressed a disquisition to the English that they wanted to hear, particularly in terms of religion, and offered them an image of themselves that they found recognizable:

Psalmanazar, in short, wasn’t just the perfect response to the start of a period of fascination for exotic chinoiseries, but also the solution to a growing desire amongst Europeans to meet exotic specimens who weren’t overly exotic: as Linda Lomeris wrote, foreigners should function as a kind of mirror of the subjective preoccupations of Europeans. Psalmanazar might have been a stranger who ate raw meat and spoke a completely foreign language, but he didn’t present the slightest menace. After all, he was a noble savage, he was Anglican, and (in particular?) he was white.8

Psalmanazar’s Formosa functioned as a collective compromise in the sense that it allowed an entire community—who weren’t necessarily, on the unconscious plane, as fooled as they led us to believe—to think about their relationship to a remote foreign country. As such, this fiction allowed real psychological work to be done, in the same way that Margaret Mead’s imaginary Samoans offered Americans a transitional place onto which they could project their unconscious desires and be a step ahead in thinking about sexual liberation.

Hence the importance of the spatial jamming that Psalmanazar engages in by presenting a place that is just as specific as it is unsuitable. His rewriting of Formosa is all the more liable to please a vast audience because it isn’t too limited geographically, nor too personal in terms of fantasy, but caters to all. In doing this, he places Formosa in the universalized space of a collective mythology in which numerous readers can find themselves.

The bric-a-brac country that Psalmanazar constructs with the support of his benevolent audience shows that, like numerous armchair travelers, he doesn’t play with the real geographical place addressed by science, but with an aberrant space that is the same as the one literature invents to describe the world.

This aberrant space is resolutely atopic—that is to say, it doesn’t experience the limitations that organize the geography of the real world. It possesses great mobility, like dreams do, dominated as it is in the same way by the primary processes of the unconscious. It is possible to move at full speed from one location to another as Rosie Ruiz did, as though no distance was insurmountable.

It establishes communication between geographical places that are not adjacent to each other in the real world but separated by large distances by renewing the frontiers. It is therefore not surprising that in this space, animals are able to move without difficulty from one continent to another and settle in new territories where one would never come across them normally.

And it is equally likely that, profiting from the mobility of the literary space and this opening of frontiers that disrupts circulation in the real world, the characters of certain works of fiction profit from this by passing from one text to another and settling in a world that seems more hospitable to them.

If we don’t take into account the atopic character of literary space, we cannot hope to understand the extent to which it involves a different space from that of the real world, nor grasp the multitude of discrete events that occur, sometimes without even the writer’s knowledge, and which merit our attention.

Paying attention to the atopic character of literary space is essential when describing places you haven’t been to, since this atopia and the new traffic rules it establishes between worlds encourage a generous opening up of the field of descriptions by no longer limiting them to a single evoked area.

In fact, it encourages supplementing described areas with elements borrowed from other real or imaginary worlds as Psalmanazar does, elements that it might be desirable to have in the story in order to make the descriptions of the place one hopes to have others experience more sensitive and relevant.

1.    UP–

2.    Psalmanazar’s book, published in 1704, was reissued in 1705 in a new version that accentuated the cruelty of Formosa’s morals. See the analysis of the two versions in Richard M. Swiderski’s The False Formosan: George Psalmanazar and the Eighteenth-Century Experiment of Identity (San Francisco, CA: Mellen Research University Press, 1991), 66.

3.    See Swiderski on Formosa’s abundant fauna, which included lions, bears and wolves (ibid., 75).

4.    For a detailed analysis of the language of Psalmanazar, see Michael Keevak, The Pretended Asian: George Psalmanazar’s Eighteenth-Century Formosan Hoax (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2004), 61.

5.    And Psalmanazar does it with enough conviction to win the support of his interlocutors. In his Memoirs, he tells how he had resolved that, once having made an assertion, he would never to go back on it, whatever unlikelihood might be revealed or contradiction made by witnesses (George Psalmanazar, Memoirs of ****. Commonly Known by the Name of George Psalmanazar; a Reputed Native of Formosa. Written by Himself in Order to Be Published after His Death (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Ecco Print Editions, Dublin, 2011), 141.

6.    Formosa’s language is a montage, too. Its articles (oi hic, ey haec, ai hoc) are inspired by Latin (see Swiderski, 75).

7.    “In the past I had too much respect for nature. I placed myself in front of things and landscapes and I let them be.

That’s over, from now on I’m going to intervene.

I was at Honfleur and I was bored. So I resolutely added some camels. It wasn’t really called for. Never mind, it was my idea. Besides, I went about this with the greatest prudence. I introduced them first of all on very busy days, on Saturdays in the marketplace.” Henri Michaux, La nuit remue (Paris: Les Éditions Gallimard, 1967). English translation by Michele Hutchison.

8.    Michael Keevak, The Pretended Asian, 53.

Pierre Bayard

How to Talk About Places You've Never Been