To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Tuesday, August 4, 2026

For (not about) Ingmar Bergman


It seems to me presumptuous to try to write or say anything about Ingmar Bergman, and any account is an impertinence: these films stand alone like great beacons in film history. There is nothing one would welcome so much as their liberation from all commentaries, all the ballast of the history of their interpretation; let them shine out once more! It seems to me that there is no other contemporary director whose work is so frequently filtered through the murky windows of 'opinion'; there are no other films as deserving of simply being seen without being pre-analysed as those of Ingmar Bergman. I want to take this opportunity of sending him my best wishes on his birthday - and of not boring him with another 'opinion'. I'd also like to promise him - and myself - that I will go and see all his films again, and this time without the burden of the history of my own responses to them.

When I recollect these, I see myself as a schoolboy sneaking out to the cinema with my girlfriend (although forbidden or, in fact, because forbidden by school, church and parents) to see The Silence. I see myself coming out of it deeply affected, and avoiding all discussion of it with my schoolfriends on subsequent days, just because in our discussions I couldn't have expressed its effect on me. I see myself a couple of years later, as a medical student, stumbling out of a late double bill of The Seventh Seal and Wild Strawberries, and then spending the rest of the night walking in the rain, bewildered and agitated by all these questions of life and death. And then I see myself another couple of years on, a film student now, rejecting Persona and all Bergman's work, arguing instead for a cinema without psychology, where everything should be visible 'on the surface of things'. I think with some embarrassment of my rather glib speeches against the 'depth' and 'portentousness' of Bergman's films, as opposed to the 'physical quality' of the American cinema. And, after another interval I see myself, by now a film-maker myself and in America, emerging from a cinema in San Francisco having cried buckets at a screening of Cries and Whispers, a film that made the 'European cinema of Angst and introversion' that I'd despised ten years ago look like a long-lost home to me, somewhere I would be far happier in than here, in the 'promised land' of the cinema where I was now, and where the 'surface' that I'd once so admired had in the meantime become so smooth and hard that there was really nothing 'behind' it any more. And if as a student I'd inveighed against that 'deep' cinema, I now discovered in myself a longing for 'depth', and felt more than reconciled to Ingmar Bergman.

I'm no expert; I see films the same way as everyone else does: as part of an audience. I know that seeing a film is a 'subjective' process - i.e. you only see the film which the 'objective film' up there on the screen projects on to your inner eye. I think that's even truer of Ingman Bergman's films: we see 'ourselves' in them, but not 'as in a mirror', no, better than that, 'as in a film' ABOUT US.

Wim Wenders
The Logic of Images
July 1988

Monday, August 3, 2026

Lansky- selected quotes 1


Unlike his partner, Bugsy Siegel, Meyer Lansky had no need of sexual conquests to boost his ego. Observation, along with a superficial study of history, had convinced him that men who depended on women for emotional satisfaction were insecure, a little unstable, lacking in the ability to be objective. The endless boasts about broads, the crude jokes, bored him.

Sex, Lansky decided, was a destructive impulse unless kept under rigid control. Like too much drinking, like the use of drugs, it could make a man vulnerable. Napoleon he admired for divorcing his wife in order to assure an heir. Octavius, he thought, set an example for strong men by ignoring Cleopatra’s charms.

Siegel he considered a young rooster; Lucania could be diverted from serious business by the sight of a fresh piece; on the other hand, Lepke had ‘control and profited by other men’s weaknesses.

Lansky’s goal was power. Before he could control others, he knew he had to control himself. Sex could not be ignored, but it could be mastered. The best solution was to find a wife, make her happy with a home and children, and put intercourse on a regulated basis.
*
Capone at that time enjoyed—and the word is meant literally —a national reputation for ferocity. Mafia members were so proud of him that Capone, although a Neapolitan by birth, was belatedly admitted into the Honored Society. He achieved only the rank of capo decina—head of ten—and his power rested on a combination put together originally by his mentor, Johnnie Torrio. Irishmen, Jews, and Italians made up the Chicago Syndicate, and the Mafia, as such, was relegated to a secondary role in the life of the Windy City. Capone had more to fear from George “Bugs” Moran than the Mafia.
**
While much impressed with Torrio and his ability to work with men of all ethnic backgrounds, Lansky considered the Big Seven—and, for that matter, the Americanization of the Mafia —only a step toward the grander scheme he had evolved through his contacts with non-Mafia gangsters in Cleveland, Detroit, Miami, New Orleans, and other cities. Perhaps Torrio sensed his younger friend’s ambitions. A quiet family man, who loved good music, Torrio one day gave Lansky some advice.

“There are two ways to power,” he said. “A Capone can rule for a while by blood and terror, but there will always be some who fight him with his own weapons. On the other hand, the man who can make money, big money, for others will even- tually be regarded as indispensable.” Lansky pointed out it hadn’t worked that way for him in Chicago.

“I was ahead of my time. There was too much easy money around. To get it, all you had to do was kill. Brains weren't needed. That’s why I got out.”

With the Maranzano-Masseria war raging, Lansky wondered if things had changed very much.

“Yes,” said the Old Master. “And they'll change a lot more soon. Prohibition is doomed. With it will go the supply of easy money. Brains will be needed then, my friend. The man who has them will survive while all the muscle-minded bastards rot in jail.”

“Sometimes you have to use muscle,” said Lansky. “People don’t always know what is best for them.” “Correct,” said Torrio. “But learn from my experience. Whenever you have to kill, make your colleagues understand— or at least believe—that the removal of someone is for the common good of all. Then they’ll back you up.” Lansky understood. ‘

“When you had Colosimo rubbed out, it was for the common good. Everybody went along. But when you knocked off Dion O’Banion . . .”

“It started a war,”’ finished Torrio. “It was a personal thing;
the bastard had double-crossed me. I knew it was a mistake, but I was fed up with Chi anyway. Too many bastards thinking they were Mussolini.”

Lansky sat silent, puffing on a cigarette. Torrio didn’t drink or smoke. Then, his thoughts moving ahead, he asked about the Dutchman. Wasn't Torrio taking a considerable chance? With someone who liked to kill?

“We use the tools that come to hand. Dixie Davis keeps Schultz under pretty good control, and he’s got Jimmy Hines in his pocket. To do anything in this town, you’ve got to have Tammany Hall on your side.”’

“Istill don’t like it,” said Lansky. “The Seabury investigation is going to cause a lot more heat. It could be a bad time to ride the Tammany tiger. Look what happened to Miro.”

“You're right of course,” said Torrio. “Roosevelt’s going to get into the act soon too. He’s got to if he wants to beat Al Smith for the nomination.”

“So”

“So I’m making plans. Soon as Repeal comes, I’m going legit.
There'll be plenty of dough in legal liquor so long as I can stay out of sight.” The conversation became technical, and Lansky had much to think about when he went home that night.
*
That Meyer Lansky learned early the value of invisibility was proved by one of the most unique photographs ever taken by the New York police. Informed that some well-known punks were meeting in the Hotel Franconia on West Seventy-second Street, Captain Michael McDermott of the police alien squad led a raid on the hotel. Eight men were rounded up and taken to headquarters where a group picture was made.

Fans of the Mafia have conveniently ignored the picture for obvious reasons. Not one of the men was of Italian or Sicilian descent.

Bugsy Siegel, co-boss with Lansky of the Bugs & Meyer Mob, was there, Louis (Lepke) Buchalter and his co-partner, Jake “Gurrah” Shapiro, who would form Murder, Inc., when Lansky became too important to attend to enforcement duties, were in the picture. There was Philip Kovolick, known var- iously as Phil the Stick and Little Farvel, who in future years would serve Lansky as combination bodyguard, chauffeur, and courier. There was Harry “Big Greenie’”’ Greenburg, whose ultimate murder was ordered by Lansky and executed by Sie- gel. Joseph “Doc’’ Stacher was in the group.

Ultimately he would become one of Lansky’s most valuable aides in the control of international casino gambling and would be deported to Israel when an old man. Hyman “Curly” Holtz, an expert on labor racketeering, had his picture taken with the rest.

So did Harry Téitelbaum and Louis “Shadows” Kravitz, both important members of the Bugs & Meyer Mob. Meyer Lansky was not in the picture. He gave the orders, but it was up to Siegel and Lepke to meet with underlings to see that those orders were carried out.

But in 1934 there was a meeting Lansky could not and did not want to avoid. Top gangsters from around the country gathered to form the National Crime Syndicate.

Information about the conference has leaked out over the years, and only the FBI doubts it happened. Informants tipped New York cops, but the political protection Lansky had worked so hard to achieve paid off: There was no roust, no publicity.

To the long list of stool pigeons who have talked about this meeting, this writer has added a new name. It can’t be revealed, however, for the man is still alive and living in some comfort in Miami Beach. The FBI knows the man, but since he doesn’t have an Italian name, they have never questioned him about his early career. He wouldn’t talk to “the Feebees” anyway.
*
A Manhattan grand jury attempting to probe the numbers racket early in 1935 revolted when it seemed apparent the dis- trict attorney, William C. Dodge, didn’t share the zeal of the jurors. A special prosecutor was requested, and the youthful Dewey—who had convicted Waxey Gordon for the Feds—was appointed. He immediately began a probe of Schultz, who had succeeded in getting back many of his old numbers writers and was beginning to roll again.

Feeling that he had escaped the devil only to land in the deep blue sea, Schultz went to Lansky with a suggestion. If the NCS would knock off Dewey, he would join the syndicate without demanding the return of his other rackets.

“We got to hit him,” urged the Dutchman. “He’s a menace to everybody.”

Lansky, remembering the syndicate’s decision not to hit reporters and cops, promised to take the matter up with the commission. Albert Anastasia, operations chief for the Bums, was intrigued by the challenge and volunteered to investigate the possibilities. A short time later, he presented a detailed outline of the proposed hit. Lansky, Luciano, and Lepke agreed it was practical but vetoed the idea from a policy standpoint.

Lepke said there was no question he was dangerous, but pointed out he was a hero and they dared not touch him.
Lucky felt they had to do something—for all he knew he might be next. What the hell did Dewey want anyway? Lucky asked.

Lansky shrugged. To be governor, what else? Dewey was ambitious—that was his weakness. Don’t worry, said Lansky, sooner or later he’d need them.

“Yeah,” said Lucky, “but in the meantime how do we get him off our backs?”

“If he sends you to the can, I'll get you out. That’s a promise.”

The word of Meyer Lansky was already legendary in the underworld, and no one had more confidence in it than Luci- ano. ‘The man was in deep trouble and knew it. If Dewey didn’t get him, the Intelligence Unit of IRS would. Elmer Irey, the man who got Capone, headed the Intelligence Unit and was feared more than either Dewey or Hoover. After all, unless someone dug up the evidence, Dewey couldn’t prosecute. Or so reasoned Luciano in 1935. He was soon to change his opinion.

With the decision to leave Dewey alone—much to Anastasia’s disgust—there remained the problem of Schultz. That proved much simpler. The Dutchman was sentenced to death for reasons of policy as well as greed. Schultz was an old-timer, a Mustache Pete in his own right. To knock him off would produce no heat—just the reverse.

“It’s a public service,” said Lepke, and Lansky nodded. Even Johnnie Torrio smiled.

On October 23, 1935, Dutch Schultz was burned down in the Palace Chophouse in Newark. Because of Anastasia’s attitude the job was given to Charlie “the Bug” Workman, a veteran killer from the old Bugs & Meyer Mob. Just to give the execution an NCS flavor, a killer was imported from the Cleveland Syndicate. After all, Dalitz and Company had a personal interest.

The Dutchman lived a few hours and mumbled to police ste- nographers who sat beside his bed. He kept talking about John, apparently blaming him for the shooting. Years were to pass before police identified the mysterious John as Torrio. And when they did, most of them agreed Torrio deserved a lot of credit. Removing the Dutchman was indeed a public service.

As much as anything, the killing of Schultz signaled an end to the era of independent warfare and free-lance competition.
The National Crime Syndicate had survived its first challenge.
*
Lansky met with Lepke a few days after the blast to consider what to do. Both men agreed quickly that to attempt to operate another opium plant would be highly reckless, indeed. However, Lepke was not ready to quit the narcotics business.

Back in the twenties when Rothstein decided rum-running was getting out of hand, he turned to narcotics smuggling.
Yasha Katzenberg had been his principal aide in setting up pipelines to Hong Kong. He knew the ropes and would be willing to try again. Lepke had a fix in with certain Customs officials in New York and could guarantee the passage of any number of trunks that Katzenberg could send or bring back from the Orient.

“Tt’s foolproof, Meyer,” said Lepke.

Lansky stared at the soft eyes of his old friend. With his control of the clothing industry in New York, to say nothing of a hundred other rackets, Lepke had become a top man in the NCS. Yet his ambition grew with his wealth, and perhaps his ego as well.

Gambling was one thing—a clean racket—but horse was another. Politicians and the public could wink at handbooks and casinos; the dope trade was safe only as long as it was concealed.

The explosion of Seymour Avenue wouldn’t be forgotten. A shift to smuggling was a step in the right direction, but only a step. Better by far to put the racket back on the shelf for a while and concentrate on other things. To continue would be to court disaster.

So Lansky reasoned, but he said nothing of his thoughts. Let Lepke stick his neck out if he wished.

“Sounds like a good idea, Lep,” said Lansky softly, “but count me out. I’m overextended now, if you know what I mean.”

Lepke knew. In fact, he had warned his friend about spreading himself too thin about the country. Too much dependence on other people. “You don’t mind if I go on without you?”

“Hell, no,” said Lansky. “Go ahead and best of luck. Maybe later when some of my joints start paying off, I can buy in on your deal.” “Any time,” said Lepke, and the two men shook hands warmly.

“Need any help with the fur business?” asked Lansky as he headed for the door.

“Nah,” said Lepke. “It’s in the box.”

The reference was to a federal indictment returned in 1933 which charged Lepke, “Gurrah” Shapiro, and 156 others with violating interstate commerce laws related to the fur trade.
Trial of the case was pending. All the defendants were found guilty and given the maximum sentence—two years in prison and a $10,000 fine. Little enough, but more than Lepke wanted. When Judge John C. Knox refused to permit bail pending appeal, Lepke turned to U.S. Circuit Judge Martin T.
Manton, who had rendered service for “Big Bill’’ Dwyer back in the twenties. Manton promptly released Lepke on $3,000 bail and later was presiding judge when the circuit court reversed Lepke’s conviction.

As the man had said, it was “‘in the box.”
*
“Yeah, and we helped the bastard get there.” Lucky snorted.
“And what good did it do us? Think he’d give me a pardon?”

“Not Roosevelt,” said Lansky, “but maybe Dewey will.”

“Are you hitting the horse?” asked Luciano. “He’s going to put me in and then let me out?”

“Stranger things have happened in politics,” replied his friend. “Just remember my promise.”

On the night of February 1, 1936, special prosecutor Dewey struck. More than 40 brothels in Manhattan and Brooklyn were raided by flying squads of detectives working under Dewey’s orders. More than 100 prostitutes were arrested as well as a number of pimps.

The grilling went on for days. Dewey hoped to find a few squealers who, in return for a deal, would put the finger on Luciano. He succeeded. Whether or not their song was sincere remains a matter of some dispute. Luciano maintained until his death that he was framed. Lansky believed him.

When enough madams had told stories implicating Lucky as the Boss, and a few pimps had added confirmation, the hunt for Lucky began. As previously noted, he was found in Hot Springs and, after considerable difficulty, returned to New York where a new indictment containing ninety-one counts was waiting. Extortion and organized harlotry were the charges. Bail was set at $350,000.

The trial was a circus. Dewey paraded scores of whores, madams, and pimps to the stand, giving New Yorkers a picture of commercial sex sufficient to jade the appetite of any voyeur. Almost all of them said what was expected—that Charlie Lucky was the Boss.

Conviction was a foregone conclusion, bearing in mind the reputations of Dewey as the “fighting district attorney” and Luciano as “the czar of organized crime.”

In his opening address, Dewey acknowledged that “never did Lucky or any codefendant actually see or collect from the whores,” but he painted him as the man at the top who gave the orders.

Testifying in his own behalf, Lucky stated that his business was “gambling houses and booking horses.” He might have saved his breath. After the jury had found him guilty on all counts, the presentence report added insult to injury. It stated in part:

“His ideals of life resolved themselves into money to spend, beautiful women to enjoy, silk underclothes, and places to go in style.”

Spotlighted were not the factors that made him dangerous to society—his long and dangerous fight to Americanize the Mafia, the way he had helped introduce business methods into crime —just the easy vices that brought him publicity and made hima target for ambitious politicians.

Reading those words in Florida, Meyer Lansky found confirmation of the personal policies he had decided on long before. Survival in the jungle of crime and politics required not only courage, brains, and patience, but also limited appetites.
*
Lucky was looking ahead. Relying on Lansky’s promise, he expected to get out of prison within a reasonable time and wanted to keep his organization intact. Adonis was loyal and wouldn’t try to take over, and the help of the Honored Society would strengthen Lansky’s position.

To the capos in the various cities went couriers with the message: “Cooperate with Lansky; he has promised to spring the Boss.” In thus passing the word, Lucky hoped to put his friend on the spot. If he kept his word, he stood to gain tremendous prestige. If he failed, the Honored Society would know whom to blame.

Lansky was shrewd enough to know exactly what Lucky was doing and was entirely agreeable; it fitted perfectly into his general program. The man who got Luciano out of prison would achieve an almost unique status within the organization. ‘This was directly in line with his ultimate objective.

At that point Lansky had no specific plan of action to achieve his goal. Carefully he had marked his potential rivals; they would be taken care of one by one over the years. It was a game for Meyer Lansky, a game of wits with living players. Wealth was not the objective, for of that he had more than enough, nor were the trappings of power. It was the exercise of power that Lansky enjoyed; to study others, to profit by their mistakes was his technique. He was only thirty-four when Lucky was con- victed. He had plenty of time.

The execution of Dutch Schultz in 1935 got his name on the front page of the New York Times. But it was only one name among many. The conviction of Lucky in 1936 brought more publicity, but again he was not singled out. Few people outside the NCS had any idea of his active role in many parts of the country. His task at this point was to create a base for future operations, to make friends by helping individual gangsters make money, while remaining as much of a mystery as possible.
*
Meyer Lansky’s instincts in staying out of the deal with Lepke were soon justified. The stakes were too high and there was too much heat. Someone talked, and the Federal Narcotics Bureau got the jump on Dewey, whose men were probing the garment industry and the bakery racket, in a race to get Lepke.

From his hiding place, Lepke called on all the resources of Murder, Inc., to eliminate the witnesses against him.
Albert Anastasia, who was paymaster of the Bums, was happy to oblige. Not only did he keep the gangster well hidden, but he personally ordered the execution of at least twelve witnesses.

The silent war between the invisible Lepke on the one hand, and the forces of law and order on the other, was a natural for ambitious politicians and empire builders. The hunt for Lepke became the biggest sensation since the Lindbergh kidnapping.

One million “wanted” circulars were distributed throughout the country, and the search was literally worldwide. He was ru- mored to be in Poland; other stories had him in Havana under the protection of Batista; he was said to be in Greece where Katzenberg was captured.

J. Edgar Hoover called Lepke “the most dangerous criminal in America” and dropped the pursuit of bank robbers to meet with his rival gang buster, Tom Dewey. Sitting in was Harry J.
Anslinger, head of the Federal Narcotics Bureau, and New York Police Commissioner Lewis J. Valentine. For the first time a coordinated effort against crime was worked out. The four men decided to continue their individual efforts but to pool all information at the top level. The FBI offered a $5,000 reward, and Dewey added another $25,000. Little enough, considering the money and power available to Lepke.

It was the time of the Big Heat. Lansky found business in Havana and stayed there much of the time, while keeping in close touch with developments in New York. Even then he wasn’t safe. The FBI interviewed him at the Hotel Nacional in 1939. Beyond listing his office address as 1450 Broadway, New York City, Lansky gave little information. He hadn’t seen Lepke for years, he said, but was certain the guy wasn’t in Havana.

Lansky had every reason to be certain—he knew Lepke had never left New York. While the greatest manhunt in history shook the bushes from Boston to Los Angeles, Lepke was living like a king in a variety of hideouts provided by Anastasia.

He put on some weight, grew a bushy mustache, and took long walks. Meanwhile, he bossed his industrial rackets and gave contracts for the elimination of possible witnesses.
Big as he was, Lepke had to have the consent of the board of directors before ordering anyone knocked off. Lansky, as a ranking member, had to give his consent, and it posed some problems. Lepke had to be given his way, up to a point. To refuse to cooperate would have endangered all Lansky’s plans. Yet Lansky wanted some witnesses to survive; he wanted Lepke caught and convicted. Timing was the important thing. If the heat continued long enough, it would be possible to argue that Lepke had to be sacrificed for the good of the rackets.

Harry “Big Greenie” Greenberg provided an object lesson. A longtime enforcer for Lepke, Big Greenie went on the lam when the heat began. He got as far as Montreal before his money ran out. Reasoning that Lepke wanted him to stay lost and had plenty of cash, he wrote to a friend in New York asking for dough. Implicit in the request was the threat that if Lepke didn’t supply it, Big Greenie might just try for the $30,000 reward the cops had put on Lepke’s head.

It was a reckless thing to do. To have paid Big Greenie anything after a threat would only invite more demands later. The man was dangerous—and not just to Lepke. If he talked, he could put Meyer Lansky in the soup, for he had worked with Lansky in the garment industry as well as with Lepke.
A kangaroo court met in Prospect Park one night and passed the death sentence on the absent Greenberg. The contract went to Albert “Allie” —Tannenbaum, a trusted triggerman who had learned the ropes with the Bugs & Meyer Mob. Allie immediately went to Montreal, but Big Greenie had decided discretion was the better part of valor. He had disappeared. He surfaced briefly in Detroit but vanished once more before ‘Tannenbaum could get there. Months passed and no word. Meanwhile, the increasing heat on both the syndicate and the Mafia had cooled the respect and, indeed, the affection in which Lepke was held.

The word spread that Lep was kill crazy, and even those who had no legitimate reason to be worried felt threatened. Lansky passed the word that a deal could be made for Lepke. He could be turned over to the Feds and put away on the narcotics rap. Then, when the time was ripe, he could be sprung. He might be through as a racketeer, but he had stashed away plenty of loot—he wouldn’t starve.

Anastasia objected, arguing that the heat would soon pass.
Big Albert sensed that if he could save Lepke, he would be well rewarded and perhaps replace Lansky as the syndicate’s gambling man. Lansky, he argued, was too soft. If Dewey had been knocked off back in 1935 as Dutch Schultz suggested, all this trouble wouldn’t have happened.

But in confiding his suspicions to Lepke, he aroused a fear in the man. Lepke knew well the unwritten law that any man could be hit if he refused to cooperate for the good of the organization. Lansky was powerful enough to persuade the board of directors to sentence Lepke to death. Anastasia could protect him from the FBI, from Dewey, but no one could protect him from the judgment of the NCS.

As Lepke wavered, at the right pyschological moment Lansky sent in Dimples Wolensky with a bright thought. A deal had been made with J. Edgar Hoover, he said. Hoover guaranteed that Lepke would remain in federal custody and his coopera- tion would be taken into account if he were convicted on the narcotics rap.

Hoover, as head of the “G-men,” had a national reputation.
While he had never moved against organized crime as such, and, in fact, denied that such an animal existed, he was a national hero. If you couldn’t trust Hoover, you couldn’t trust anyone—or so Lepke reasoned.

A deal of sorts was worked out. Details have been buried in the FBI files for obvious reasons. One version has leaked out, however, and it differs from the popular one so publicized by Walter Winchell.

The head of a giant liquor company, whose roots went back to Prohibition and whose friends included Johnnie Torrio and Meyer Lansky, made contact with a high-ranking subordinate of Hoover, and arrangements were made to surrender Lepke.
The aide was told that Lepke would be promised no state prosecution; Hoover was not informed of the promise. The aide was later given a good job by the liquor man.

Winchell, the newspaper columnist and radio personality, had been broadcasting appeals to Lepke to surrender and was brought into the act to explain how contact was made. In re- turn he would get the scoop of the year, and Hoover’s prestige would be enhanced beyond the wildest dreams of his press agents. Everyone, in fact, would profit but Lepke.

The story of the surrender has been told many times. Anastasia, still sullen, still protesting, drove Lepke from  Third Street, Brooklyn—the last of his hideouts—to Manhattan. On Fifth Avenue at Twenty-eighth Street, the car stopped. Lepke, wearing dark glasses, got out and walked to a parked car where Winchell and Hoover waited.

“Mr. Hoover, this is Lepke,” Winchell said formally.

“How do you do?” said Hoover, as the man he had hunted throughout the world sat down beside him.

“Glad to meet you, I’m sure,” said Lepke.

But he was considerably less glad by the time the ride ended.
Lepke discovered that Hoover knew—or pretended to know— of no deal. As far as he was concerned, Lepke had just surrendered as any good citizen would do upon learning he was wanted by the FBI.

Actually, Lepke wasn’t legally wanted. The FBI had entered the hunt on the assumption that Lepke as a fugitive from a federal indictment had fled across state lines to avoid prosecution. In fact, of course, Lepke hadn’t left New York City.

Lepke almost leaped from the moving car when he learned the truth. But a glance out the window convinced him that to do so would be instant death. The FBI had not allowed its chief to go on a dangerous mission alone. Cars that had been hidden in the shadows were escorting them now, and those cars were filled with special agents who had gunned down John Dillinger as soon as he made a gesture toward his pocket. The FBI had made its reputation up to that point by killing—not convicting—the Ma Barkers of the Midwest. The public applauded as FBI spokesmen pointed out how the state had been saved the expense of a trial.

While there was life, there was hope, decided Lepke, and he stayed where he was. But his thoughts turned to Moey Dimples who had sold him a bill of goods.

Anastasia remembered Dimples too, and perhaps that is the reason why four years later the man with the cutest nickname in all Mobdom was shot down in midtown Manhattan. Had Albert dared, he would have gone after Lansky—the man who he believed gave Dimples his orders—but Lansky was bigger than ever. Anastasia decided to wait.
Despite his temper, he, too, possessed patience. To have killed Lansky, assuming it were possible, would have brought down the vengeance of the Mafia which was still waiting for Lansky to get Lucky out of prison.

In Havana Lansky heard the news with ironic amusement.
Lepke would be convicted on the narcotics charge and sen- tenced to fourteen years. But that was only the beginning.
Dewey, enraged when Hoover and Winchell captured the headlines, charged that Hoover had broken their pact on pooling information. Dewey had not been informed of the deal and didn’t even know Lepke was in New York until he read it in the paper.

Nevertheless, he made the best of a bad situation. Lepke was promptly indicted for his extortions in the bakery field. Conviction was easily obtained, and Lepke—still claiming he had been double-crossed—was given another sentence. This time it was for thirty years to life, and Dewey could claim to have achieved twice as much as the Feds.

The surrender of Lepke, coming as it did a few months after the conviction of Johnnie Torrio on income-tax charges, made 1939 a decisive year for Lansky.
*
The case of Big Greenie was not as easily closed. When Greenberg reappeared after months in hiding, the problem of Lepke had been solved; yet the danger to Lansky remained.
Which may help to explain why Bugsy Siegel risked his neck.
Greenberg was found in Hollywood, California, the personal province of the handsome Siegel. Perhaps he was trying to get as far away from New York as possible. On the other hand, he might have hoped to make peace with Lansky by appealing to Siegel. If so, he waited too late to try.

Bugsy immediately reported Greenberg’s location and personally rushed East to decide what should be done.
In conferences with Zwillman, Adonis, and by courier, with Lansky, the original death sentence was reaffirmed. Siegel went home to keep an eye on the target while Tannenbaum made ready to finish him off.

From a waterfront pier two guns were stolen and delivered to Tannenbaum just before he boarded a plane in Newark. The courier was Longie Zwillman.

In Los Angeles a few hitches developed, and Siegel—who hadn’t killed anyone for several years—decided he’d better oversee the execution in person. A lot had happened since Siegel won his spurs with the Bugs & Meyer Mob, and even the reckless Bugsy had learned the value of insulation. Yet here he was, the West Coast representative of the National Crime Syndicate, going out on a hit like any two-bit gunman. Perhaps he feared that if Big Greenie talked, he as well as Lansky would be implicated. Or perhaps he was just bored and thought a killing would help keep the restless Jack Dragna in his place.

Big Greenie was living at 1804 Vista Del Mar and taking full precautions. He went out only at night to buy a newspaper. On November 22, 1939, almost three months after Lepke surren- dered, he left as usual to buy a paper. Returning a few minutes later, he passed two cars parked at the curb. One car blinked its light, a signal to the gunman waiting in the shadows in front of Big Greenie’s house.

Unsuspecting, Greenberg stopped. The gunman walked over and pumped several bullets into him. Burton Turkus, the assist- ant district attorney who investigated the case, identified the killer as Frankie Carbo, the Mob’s fight manager who in his day handled several world champions. Siegel and Tannenbaum waited in the cars. Later that night, Tannenbaum was driven to San Francisco where he caught a plane back to New York to report mission accomplished.

Siegel went home to telephone Lansky, then at the Nacional in Havana. The conversation was cryptic.

“Know something, Meyer?” asked Bugsy.

“What?” asked Lansky.

“Tomorrow's Thanksgiving,” said his ex-partner. “You can celebrate.” There was a brief pause, then as casual as ever, Lansky commented:

“You’re wrong, Ben. Today is Thanksgiving here and I’m already celebrating.” Siegel looked at his watch and remembered the time differential.

“Damned if you ain’t right,” he said.

The Big Heat in New York, coupled with Lepke’s attempted war of extermination, had made a lot of minor punks nervous and angry. Inevitably, one of them decided to talk—and he set off a chain reaction without precedent in criminal history.
The man who started it all was Harry Rudolph, an allegedly unstable character considered somewhat crazy by police and hoods as well. On January 24, 1940, the district attorney of Kings County (Brooklyn) received a note from Rudolph, who was then in the city workhouse serving time for a misdemeanor. Rudolph wanted to talk about a murder.

The D.A.’s men went to see Rudolph. He had been brooding about the murder of Alex Alpert, a good friend, who had been knocked off by the “Bums of Brownsville” on November 25, 1933. When asked why he waited so long to talk, Rudolph replied that he had been trying to talk for years but no one was interested. Either his reputation as loony had prevented anyone from taking him seriously, or his insistence on the existence of a murder mob sounded too preposterous.

The district attorney’s office was then engaged in a drive to rid the streets of hoodlums. Rudolph’s story gave them an excuse to pick up three notorious hoods and at least hold them for trial. An indictment was quickly secured and warrants issued. One of the men named was Able “Kid Twist’ Reles, an old as- sociate of the Bugs & Meyer Mob.

A day later, Reles walked in and surrendered. He had been arrested many times and, in fact, was currently charged with vagrancy and free on bond. This time he was sent to the Tombs to await trial. Slowly it dawned on him that this rap might be serious. An attorney visited him on March 21 and apparently confirmed his worst fears. Immediately after the lawyer left, the Kid wrote a note to his wife instructing her to tell the district attorney, William O’Dwyer, that he wanted to talk.

In retrospect, the decision of Reles was not surprising. For several years minor gangsters had been singing to Tom Dewey in return for immunity. As the boys put it to each other: “I went down to Dewey’s office and cut myself a piece of cake.” The surrender of Lepke convinced a lot of hoods that it was time to look after themselves. Reles, one of the smartest, wasn’t worried about the Alpert killing; he knew all too well that under New York law more than the testimony of one man was needed. But there were scores of other murders, and who knew when someone else would get the bright idea to squeal first? If anyone were going to sing, Reles wanted to be the canary.

All he asked of O’Dwyer was complete immunity in all murders. In effect, he got what he wanted. O’Dwyer promised to give him immunity in every case in which he supplied information. If he held back anything, and evidence could be secured elsewhere, he’d have to take his chances. It was a shrewd deal; only by making a complete confession about every murder in which he was involved could he be sure of ultimate freedom.

He also recognized that if he were to live to enjoy that freedom, he had better nail as many gangsters as possible.
So the song began. Blessed with almost total recall, Reles wore out a string of stenographers as he talked for twelve straight days, supplying intimate details of more than eighty- five murders and information about a thousand more.
One of them—just one of them—was the execution of Big Greenie in Hollywood, California. Reles could link Bugsy Sie- gel to the crime, having been present at some of the conferences in New York prior to the killing. He could also finger Allie Tannenbaum who had carried two guns West and participated in the rub-out. Allie was picked up immediately, and after sit- ting in a cell for a few weeks decided that, like Reles, he’d better make a deal. In due course he got around to the murder of Big Greenie.

Under heavy guard, Reles and Tannenbaum were flown to Los Angeles and, amid great secrecy, testified before a grand jury. Five men were indicted for murder, and among them were Frankie Carbo and Bugsy Siegel. But both had vanished before the indictment was made public.

Siegel was found hiding in the attic of his $200,000 thirty-fiveroom home. When he denied knowing any Big Greenie, he was reminded of the picture made years before when he, Lepke, Big Greenie, and several others were arrested in the Hotel Franconia. Bugsy had no comment.

After being questioned in a hotel room, Siegel was taken to jail where a horde of reporters and photographers was waiting. He borrowed a comb and a necktie from an obliging detective, dusted off his shoes, and faced the press his usual debonair self.

Jail was not too great a burden for Bugsy. Evidence was un- covered showing that he lived like a king in prison and was permitted to go out for a night on the town when he became too bored. To the Hollywood starlets, he was now a bigger man than ever—a romantic figure. After making dozens of gangster movies, the stars and would-be stars found it thrilling to have a real one in their midst. Records seized from Bugsy’s home proved just how popular he had become—and how much money he had borrowed from film personalities who never expected to get it back.

To an uneasy Lansky, Bugsy sent a message of reassurance:
“Don’t shit in your pants, bud; I’ve got the D.A. in my jock strap.” How much of this was a boast remains unknown, but on December 11, 1940, John Dockweiler, the newly elected district attorney of Los Angeles County, went into court and moved the indictment be dismissed. Only later was it learned that Siegel had contributed $30,000 of the Mob’s money to Dockweiler’s campaign. Allegedly, from his cell Bugsy wrote an angry letter demanding a refund and got it. He also gained his freedom.

California authorities have since blamed O’Dwyer back in Brooklyn. Allegedly, O’Dwyer—who, like Tom Dewey, had po- litical ambitions—didn’t want to risk his precious stool pigeons out in the wilds of California where any conviction would feather some other prosecutor's nest. Allegedly, he refused to let Reles and Tannenbaum fly out to testify.
Burton Turkus, the assistant district attorney who did most of the work for O’Dwyer in the Murder, Inc., probe, gave an- other explanation. It was discovered that one of the local wit- nesses—that is, California witnesses—had not told the whole truth, so the indictment was thrown out. Bugsy, now more of a celebrity than ever, went free.

Some months later, a bewildering series of events began that even now is not fully explained.

Early in September, 1941, O’Dwyer permitted Tannenbaum to fly West again to testify once more before a grand jury. A new indictment was returned, this time naming only Siegel and Carbo as alleged murderers. Lepke, who had been named in the original indictment as a coconspirator, was not mentioned. Apparently the theory that Greenberg had been killed to protect Lepke, and on his orders, had been dropped.
On September 15, 1941, Lepke went on trial again—this time for a New York murder. Reles and Tannenbaum were the principal witnesses, but there were others who could supply the necessary corroboration to Tannenbaum’s testimony.
Tannenbaum testified on November 11, 1941, and his tale of murder put Lepke in the electric chair.

One day later, Abe Reles, the canary who could sing but couldn’t fly, went out the window of the Half Moon Hotel on Coney Island where he had been guarded by picked men behind steel doors. He was found dead on the pavement.
The murder of Reles—no one who knew the man believed he killed himself or died by accident attempting to escape— didn’t help Lepke. On December 1, 1941, Louis Buchalter—to use Lepke’s right name—was found guilty of murder in the first degree. Next day, a stern judge sentenced him to die.
But Reles’ death got Bugsy Siegel off the hook in far-distant California. As in New York, state law required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice. Tannenbaum’s testimony was not enough, and there was no other witness to confirm Siegel’s part in the death of Big Greenie. Shortly thereafter, the second indictment against Siegel was dismissed. The case was closed.

The details of how Reles was tossed out the window while six guards slept have never been made public. The entire affair was hushed up, and not even the Kefauver Committee could unravel it.

A newspaper report quoting an unidentified official got little attention. The official allegedly said: “A well-known West Coast tracketeer was sent here a month ago with orders to see that Reles escaped or was killed.” Another story reported that “powerful West Coast interests” got word to Reles that he would be $50,000 richer if he fled before the trial of Bugsy Siegel.

An official investigation of these reports uncovered the fact that a visitor to Brooklyn, just before Reles went out the win- dow, was none other than Meyer Lansky.

Hank Messick 

The question of self-identity of things


Attached to ANICCA - impermanence in Dhamma  (philosophical considerations)


The question of self-identity arises either when a thing is seen from two points of view at once (as in reflexion,b for example; or when it is at the same time the object of two different senses—I am now both looking at my pen and touching it with my fingers, and I might wonder if it is the same pen in the two simultaneous experiences [see Rupa]), or when a thing is seen to endure in time, when the question may be asked if it continues to be the same thing (the answer being, that a thing at any one given level of generality is the invariant of a transformation—see Anicca [a] & Fundamental Structure—, and that ‘to remain the same’ means just this).c With the question of a thing’s self-identity (which presents no particular difficulty) the Buddha’s Teaching of anattā has nothing whatsoever to do: anattā is purely concerned with ‘self’ as subject. (See Paticcasamuppāda [c].)
***
You ask whether aniccatā (or impermanence) in the Dhamma does not refer to things regarded objectively rather than subjectively. Certainly, aniccatā does not not refer to things regarded objectively (note the double negative); and there are, no doubt, passages in the Suttas where this meaning is intended (or at least not excluded). It is clear enough that a person regarding any thing as objectively permanent (as the Christians, for example, regard God or heaven or hell) cannot even begin to understand the Buddha's Teaching. An aspiring Buddhist must first of all understand that there is no single thing (objectively speaking) that lasts for ever.

But if aniccatā means no more than this, we soon run into difficulties; for modern physical science, which is as objective as can be, says the same thing—indeed, it goes further and says that everything is constantly changing. And this is precisely the point of view of our modern commentators. The Buddha, as you may know, has said, Yad aniccam tam dukkham; yam dukkham tad anattā ('What is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering is not-self'); and I was told that one gentleman several years ago argued from this that since a stone is impermanent it must therefore experience suffering. And not only he, but also most of the Buddhist world agree that since a stone is impermanent—i.e. in perpetual flux (according to the scientific concept)—it has no lasting self-identity; that is to say, it is anattā or not-self. The notion that a stone feels pain will probably find few supporters outside Jain circles; but this objective interpretation of the Buddha's Teaching of anattā is firmly established.

'But what' perhaps you may ask 'is wrong with this?' In the first place, it implies that modern science has caught up with the Buddha's Teaching (which, presumably, we can now afford to throw overboard, since science is bound to make further progress)—see, in this connexion, note (j) in the Preface of Notes, beginning 'It is all the fashion...'. In the second place, it involves the self-contradictory notion of universal flux—remember the disciple of Heraclitus, who said that one cannot cross the same river even once (meaning that if everything is in movement there is no movement at all).[a] In the third place, if aniccatā refers only to things regarded objectively and not subjectively (as you suggest), the subject is ipso facto left out of account, and the only meaning that is left for attā or 'self' is the self-identity of the object. But—as I point out in the admittedly very difficult article ATTĀ—the Dhamma is concerned purely and simply with 'self' as subject ('I', 'mine'), which is the very thing that you propose to omit by being objective. The fact is, that the triad, anicca/dukkha/anattā has no intelligible application if applied objectively to things. The objective application of aniccatā is valid in the exact measure that objectivity is valid—that is to say, on a very coarse and limited level only. Objectivity is an abstraction or rationalization from subjectivity—even the scientist when he is engaged on his experiments is at that time subjective, but when he has finished his series of experiments he eliminates the subjectivity (himself) and is left with the objective result. This means that though there can be no objectivity without an underlying subjectivity, there can quite possibly be subjectivity without objectivity; and the objective aniccatā is only distantly related to the much finer and more subtle subjective aniccatā. It must be remembered that it is only the ariya, and not the puthujjana, who perceives pure subjective aniccatā (it is in seeing subjective aniccatā that the puthujjana becomes ariya; and at that time he is wholly subjective—the coarse objective perception of aniccatā has been left far behind)—see, in this connexion, PARAMATTHA SACCA §4 (I think). Objective aniccatā can be found outside the Buddha's Teaching, but not subjective aniccatā.[b]

Let us, however, consider your particular example—a person of whom you are fond. Suppose it is your son; and suppose (as indeed we may hope) that he has a long life ahead of him and that he arrives at death (which he cannot avoid) as an old man, many years after your own death. Subjectively speaking from your point of view, he is impermanent on account of the fact that you yourself die before him and thereby your experience of him is cut off. More strictly speaking, he is impermanent for you on account of the fact that even in this life your experience of him is not continuous—you only see him from time to time. Objectively speaking, according to your suggestion, he is impermanent because he himself will die in due course, and you will not survive to witness his death. But if this is to be completely objective (as far as complete objectivity is possible) the last part of this statement is irrelevant. To be completely objective we must say:

All men are mortal.
Lionel Samaratunga's son is a man.
Therefore Lionel Samaratunga's son is mortal.

So stated, it is quite generally true, and is the concern of no-one in particular. It is so generally true that it would serve in a textbook of logic as an example of a syllogism in Barbara[2] (though usually, instead of Lionel Samaratunga's son, it is Socrates whose mortality is logically demonstrated).[c]
 
But how many students of logic are going to shed tears when they read that Lionel Samaratunga's son is destined to die? How many have so much as heard of Lionel Samaratunga, let alone of his son? (And anyway, how many students of logic shed a tear even over the death of Socrates, of whom they may perhaps have heard?) But if you were to come across this syllogism unexpectedly, it is not impossible that you might feel emotionally moved (as perhaps at this very moment you may be feeling a little uncomfortable at my having chosen an example so near home). And why should this be so? Because you are fond of Lionel Samaratunga's son and cannot regard this syllogism in Barbara, which speaks of his mortality, quite so objectively as a student of logic. In other words, as soon as feeling comes in at the door objectivity flies out the window. Feeling, being private and not public, is subjective and not objective (see my letter to Dr. de Silva discussing Prof. Jefferson's article[3]). And the Buddha has said (A. III,61: i,176) that it is 'to one who feels' that he teaches the Four Noble Truths. So, then, the Dhamma must essentially refer to a subjective aniccatā—i.e. one that entails dukkha—and not, in any fundamental sense, to an objective aniccatā, which we can leave to students of logic and their professors. (Feeling is not a logical category at all.)
'But how' you might be wondering 'can the death of my son be a subjective matter for me, supposing (as is likely) that I die first?' At this point I am glad to be able to quote the late Venerable Ñānamoli Thera (Pathways, p. 36):

Consciousness without an object is impossible—not conceivable—and objects without consciousness, when talked about, are only a verbal abstraction; one cannot talk or think about objects that have no relation to consciousness. The two are inseparable and it is only a verbal abstraction to talk about them separately (legitimate of course in a limited sphere).

The very fact that you are able to think the death of your son makes it an object of consciousness (and therefore subjective)—it is an image or a series of images, and images are the objects of mind-consciousness (manoviññāna). So however objectively you think you are thinking your son's death, the whole thought is within subjectivity. Even though it may be highly improbable that you will actually be present at your son's death, you are nevertheless present in imagination whenever you think it—you imagine your son an old man lying sick on his deathbed, and you yourself are watching the scene (still in imagination) from some definite point of view (standing at the foot of the bed, for example). At once the perception of your son's impermanence is there (an imaginary perception, of course); but if your imagination is vivid, and you are strongly attached to your son, and you are perhaps fatigued after a trying day's work, this may be enough to bring real tears to your eyes, even though the entire scene is enacted in the realm of the imaginary. (I know, for my own part, that I am far more strongly moved by episodes in books than by those in real life, which usually leave me cold. This, of course, is what the author of the book is aiming at when he uses what Kierkegaard calls 'the foreshortened perspective of the aesthetic', which leaves out unromantic details—the hero's interview with his bank manager about his overdraft; the heroine's visit to the dentist to have two decayed teeth stopped—in order to heighten the reader's emotional tension. My emotional reaction is entirely in the sphere of the imaginary; for what is the real in this case?—a number of marks in black printer's ink on a few white sheets of paper.[d])
 
To sum up. The Dhamma does indeed permit you to regard the material object before you as something that will perish at some future time; but this is not so purely objective a matter as you might think (the purer the objectivity, the more meagre the real content; and, vice versa, the reality of the material object before you imposes a limit on the degree of objectivity with which you can regard it). The fact that the mere thought of somebody's or something's eventual decay (about which you will perhaps know nothing when it actually takes place) is capable of arousing feelings of one sort or another is evidence for this.[e] But in any case, as one progresses in meditation one advances from the coarser to the finer, and the objective (speculative or rational) aniccatā is the first thing to be eliminated. After that, one gradually reduces mixed subjective-and-objective thoughts or imaginings or memories about past and future aniccatā. And finally, one is wholly concentrated on perception of aniccatā in the present experience; and this is purely subjective. Only when this has been achieved is it possible to extend the same pure subjectivity to past and future (this is called dhammanvaye ñānam, to which I make references in NA CA SO and PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [a]; this, properly speaking, is beyond the range of the puthujjana.

Footnotes:
[53.a] I have made a point, in the Notes, of objecting to this notion; and one of the reasons why I am anxious that the note on fundamental structure should not be excluded is that it offers a quite different, and essentially subjective (or reflexive) approach to the philosophical problem of change and time. If, as you said, you have managed to gather something from the second part of FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE, you will perhaps be aware that the objective notion of universal flux is hardly adequate—that the problem of impermanence cannot be dealt with objectively.

[53.b] Two points. (i) The word 'subjective' has the same ambiguity as the word 'self': it is used both for the reflexive attitude (or, at the minimum, assertion of the individual point of view) and for the subject ('I', 'myself'). As pointed out in ATTĀ, the puthujjana is not able to dissociate these two things, but the sekha sees that in the arahat the latter (the conceit 'I am') has come to an end while the former (the individual point of view, with the possibility of reflexion) still remains. (Kierkegaard actually identifies reflexion with selfhood.)

     (ii) The Notes are concerned only with the essential application of the Buddha's Teaching, and consequently there is no mention of objective aniccatā (or of other things on the same level). This is by design, not by accident. Most people, as soon as they arrive at the objective perception of aniccatā, are quite satisfied that they have now understood the Buddha's Teaching, and they do not see that there is anything further to be done.

The Notes are intended to be difficult—to challenge the complacency of these people and make them really think for themselves (instead of simply agreeing with what they have read in some book or other and imagining that this constitutes thought). It is hardly to be expected at this rate that the Notes will ever be popular.

[53.c] Actually, to have a syllogism in Barbara, we must be still more general and say: 'All men are mortal. All Lionel Samaratunga's sons are men. Therefore all Lionel Samaratunga's sons are mortal'. In this way it is not assumed that Lionel Samaratunga necessarily has any sons: all that is asserted is that if he has any sons, they are mortal. We could even go further and leave out all mention of Lionel Samaratunga, but the syllogism then becomes so general as to have very little content. Every increase in objectivity takes us further from reality.

[53.d] Incidentally, when an apparently aesthetic writer does not use the foreshortened perspective he at once becomes an ethical or moral writer. James Joyce's Ulysses is an outstanding example. Though the book was once banned for obscenity, it is nevertheless profoundly moral. The Ven. Soma Thera, when he read it, was inspired with a strong disgust with life and desire for solitude. The book is about seven hundred pages, and takes about as long to read as the total period of time covered by the action of the book—eighteen hours.

[53.e] Does a judge feel nothing at the thought of the impending dissolution (which he will not witness) of the material object before him, if that object happens to be a guilty murderer he has just sentenced to death? Justice Amory, I believe, used to treat himself to muffins for tea on such occasions. Did he eat them objectively, I wonder. (The fact that one can feel pleasure at the perception of the impermanence of something one dislikes shows that the Buddha's yad aniccam tam dukkham is a very much more subtle affair.)

***
I can’t tell you very much about the Eleatics—the Elastics, if you prefer—, except that (according to Kierkegaard) they held the doctrine that ‘everything is and nothing comes into being’. Parmenides, I think, was an Eleatic, and you will see his views on pp. 14-15 of Russell’s M&L. The doctrine of the Eleatics is the opposite of Heraclitus and his flux: but as K. points out, both are speculative views, abstracting from existence where change and unchange are combined (and so back to Bradley!).

As to Achilles and the tortoise, the problem as stated by Russell on p. 88 makes the assumption that all ‘places’ are the same size. But if Achilles is going faster than the tortoise each ‘place’ that he goes to must be correspondingly larger (i.e. longer) than the tortoise’s ‘places’.

There is thus no paradox. But there is also the assumption that one can be in a ‘place’ in a ‘point-instant’ of time—i.e. no time at all. This is really the root of the trouble, both for Zeno and for Russell—they assume that time (or being, or existence) is made up of instants of no time, which is a misunderstanding. However many instants of no time you add together (or put contiguously) you still get no time. So Russell, seeing this, says (p. 82) ‘there is no such thing as the next moment’, which means that though his moments are ‘in time’ they are not ‘part of time’. But he does not go on to explain what ‘time’ is.

The fact is, that one cannot use the word ‘be’ in connexion with a point-instant of time, and one cannot say that Achilles, or the Arrow, ‘is’ in a particular place at each ‘moment’ (understood as a point-instant).

(The solution to the problem of time, as I suggest in Fundamental Structure, lies in a hierarchy of ‘moments’, each understood as a ‘unit of time’, and each with a sub-structure of a plurality of similar moments but of a lesser order.) But as to the problem of Achilles and the tortoise, all we need to say is that during each second of time both Achilles and the tortoise are within the boundaries of a certain extent or strip of ground, but since Achilles is moving faster than the tortoise his successive strips of ground (each occupied for one second) are longer than the tortoise’s. So Achilles catches the tortoise. But note that since we decide upon one second of time (or whatever it may actually be) as the limit to the fineness of our perception, we are unable to find out what Achilles or the tortoise is doing within each second. We know that during any given second Achilles is occupying a certain strip of ground (he is in that strip), but we are not entitled to say whether he is moving or stationary. (This does not say what movement is—which needs a more elaborate discussion—, but it does solve Zeno’s problem, or at least indicates the solution.)

As a solution to impermanence you suggest that we might forgo ‘an impermanent use of what is impermanent’. Impossible! We are making impermanent use of what is impermanent all the time—and this is as true for the arahat as it is for the puthujjana. So long as there is consciousness at all there is the passage of time, and the passage of time consists in the use of things, whether we like it or not. The eating of food, the breathing of breaths, the thinking of thoughts, the dreaming of dreams—all are impermanent use of what is impermanent.

Only in nirodhasamāpatti does this lapse for any living being.
In the last Sutta of the Majjhima (M. 152: iii,298-9) the desperate expedient is suggested of ‘not seeing forms with the eye, not hearing sounds with the ear’, but the Buddha ridicules this, saying that this is already achieved by a blind and deaf man. He goes on to indicate upekhā, indifference, as the proper way. The fault does not lie in the impermanence (which is inevitable), but in attachment to (and repulsion from) the impermanent. Get rid of attachment (and repulsion) and you get rid of the suffering of impermanence. The arahat makes impermanent use of the impermanent, but with indifference, and the only suffering he has is bodily pain or discomfort when it arises (and that, too, finally ceases when his body breaks up).

Sunday, August 2, 2026

The Singer of Tales

 Preface

by Harry Levin

The term "literature," presupposing the use of letters, assumes that verbal works of imagination are transmitted by means of writing and reading. The expression "oral literature" is obviously a contradiction in terms. Yet we live at a time when literacy itself has become so diluted that it can scarcely be invoked as an esthetic criterion. The Word as spoken or sung, together with a visual image of the speaker or singer, has meanwhile been regaining its hold through electrical engineering. A culture based upon the printed book, which has prevailed from the Renaissance until lately, has bequeathed to us—along with its immeasurable riches—snobberies which ought to be cast aside. We ought to take a fresh look at tradition, considered not as the inert acceptance of a fossilized corpus of themes and conventions, but as an organic habit of re-creating what has been received and is handed on. It may be that we ought to re-examine the concept of originality, which is relatively modern as a shibboleth of criticism; there may be other and better ways of being original than that concern for the writer's own individuality which characterizes so much of our self-conscious fiction. We may even come to believe that, great as some authors have been, their greatness is finally surpassed by that of the craft they have served; hence, whenever we reckon their contributions, we should also remember their obligations; no credit need be lost if some of it is shared anonymously with others trained in the same techniques and imparting the same mythology.

The present study sets forth the considered findings from twenty-five years of collection, transcription, and interpretation in the field of oral literature. These years have been strategic for applying scholarly methods to a subject which first developed amid the enthusiasms of the Romantic Movement; a systematic approach has been made feasible by the more recent development of facilities for intensive travel and phonographic reproduction; and literary history has been empowered to draw upon—and, reciprocally, to illustrate—folklore, anthropology, musicology, linguistics, and other related disciplines. The issue upon which such investigations still converge is all too well known, under its classical aspect, as the Homeric Problem. That problem may have remained unsolved for centuries because it was irrelevantly formulated: because, on the one hand, a single literate author was taken for granted and, on the other, the main alternative was a quasi-mystical belief in communal origins. Those presuppositions have been radically challenged by the sharp insight and the rich documentation {xxxi|xxxii} to which this volume offers a key. Its authority rests on a monumental substructure, Serbocroatian Heroic Songs, the series of texts, translations, and commentaries now being published under the joint auspices of Harvard University Press and the Serbian Academy of Sciences. Here, by way of critical prolegomenon and editorial parergon, the editor sums up what he has learned in bringing together that unique body of epic material.

What is more, and what commands a special interest transcending that material, he concretely discerns and lucidly states the principles he has been watching at work. Moreover, in the second part of the book, he extends their application to the Iliad and the Odyssey, and demonstrates their relevance to Beowulf, the Chanson de Roland, and other epics previously conceived as "literary." Careful stylistic and thematic analysis of such works has raised questions, and stimulated certain conjectures, as to the form and function of heroic poetry. These hypotheses, through a happy conjunction of opportunity and ingenuity, have been fully tested in a "living laboratory": the school of nonliterate bards, surviving yet declining in Yugoslavia and other South Slavic regions, has been caught at perhaps the latest possible moment; and its recorded songs provide both a solid basis for comparative studies and a new comprehension of oral technique. Through a wealth of contextual testimony, we are permitted to witness the act of composition—which, as Professor Lord makes abundantly clear, is at once a transmission and a creation. Vividly he communicates to us his personal sense of contact with the singers, as he and his collaborator sought them out or listened to them in Turkish coffeehouses during the nights of the Ramazan. In the mind's ear, we too are enabled to hear them, improvising out of their fabulous memories, filling in with stock epithets and ornamental formulas, accompanying themselves on their one-stringed fiddle, the gusle. And we are led to realize, more acutely than we could have done before, that the epic is not merely a genre but a way of life.

Formally, it might be described as a dynamic structure. Indeed the whole undertaking might be viewed, from some degree of distance, as an inquiry into the dynamics of poetic construction. The poem is, by this definition, a song; its performer is, at the same time, its composer; whatever he performs, he re-creates; his art of improvisation is firmly grounded upon his control of traditional components; and the tales he tells bear a family resemblance to many sung in other countries under other circumstances. The canons of esthetics, and even those of epistemology, should be at least as well satisfied by that approximation to the artistic event, at the very instant it happens, as they are by the frequent distortions of print or of the personalities behind it. Our conception of Homer, in particular, has not been helped by reinterpretations which cast him in the mold of latter-day authorship. Yet it is greatly enhanced, not undermined, by being approached through a more precise understanding of those patterns which he supremely {xxxii|xxxiii} exemplifies and those standards which he establishes for others working in his medium. Professor Lord appreciates, as perceptively as any critic or commentator, the "subtlety and intricacy" of the Homeric poems. He never loses sight of the qualitative distinction between Homer and Petar Vidić. But since he has heard and talked with Petar Vidić, while Homer himself remains an opaque attribution, the humble guslar has light to throw upon the Ionian epos. More significant than our value-judgments, which we are always free to make as we like, is our knowledge of literature as a process, endlessly multiform and continuous.

Professor Lord's exposition speaks for itself, with an expert attention to detail which will meet both Hellenists and Slavicists upon their respective grounds. It is not because I would presume to mediate between specialists that I have set down these preliminary impressions, but because I am glad to attest a fortiori what The Singer of Tales can mean to a lay critic or common reader. It was my privilege to study with Milman Parry during the period, so prematurely cut short, when he was teaching Classics in Harvard College. Thus, by sheer good luck, I have been among those who watched his project from its inception, and who—after having feared that his accidental death would terminate it—have rejoiced to see it carried toward this completion. No one who knew Parry is likely to forget his incisive powers of formulation or to underrate the range and depth of his cosmopolitan mind. He has been appropriately hailed, by an eminent archeologist, as the Darwin of oral literature; for if the évolution des genres has been scientifically corroborated, it is largely owing to his discovery. Yet, as he himself would have been the first to admit, it was only a beginning; and he generously acknowledged the prescient counsel of his own teacher, Antoine Meillet. Albert Lord, in his turn, has become much more than the ablest of Parry's disciples. It should be recognized, in spite of his devoted modesty, that he too has pioneered; he has contributed many ideas and important modifications; his comprehensive mastery of the field has taken him far beyond any of his forerunners; it is he who has turned an exciting aperçu into a convincing argument. The Parry-Lord theory, like the epic itself, is the product of an imaginative collaboration.


Cambridge, Massachusetts 

15 May 1959 {xxxiii|}

Foreword

This book is about Homer. He is our Singer of Tales. Yet, in a larger sense, he represents all singers of tales from time immemorial and unrecorded to the present. Our book is about these other singers as well. Each of them, even the most mediocre, is as much a part of the tradition of oral epic singing as is Homer, its most talented representative. Among the singers of modern times there is none to equal Homer, but he who approaches the master most closely in our experience of epic song is Avdo Međedović of Bijelo Polje, Yugoslavia. He is our present-day Balkan Singer of Tales.

We believe that the epic singers from the dawn of human consciousness have been a deeply significant group and have contributed abundantly to the spiritual and intellectual growth of man. Although only two segments of the Indo-European peoples have been treated here in any detail, namely the Greeks and the Slavs (or more truly the speakers of Serbocroatian and of Bulgarian), it is my hope that the book is not parochial. Narrowness has never been excusable, whether it be ethnic, geographic, religious, social, or even academic, least of all in the space age. Of the epic songs of the past (or of the present for that matter) Homer's have always been recognized as supreme. When our collecting began in the nineteen-thirties the Yugoslav oral epic was accessible, alive, and distinguished. Russian and central Asiatic oral traditions might have done as well for purposes of comparative study, but for an American professor at that time they were not within easy reach.

This book concentrates on only one aspect of the singers' art. Our immediate purpose is to comprehend the manner in which they compose, learn, and transmit their epics. It is a study in the processes of composition of oral narrative poetry. Hence the reader must not seek here a survey of oral epics, or a history of oral epic in the Balkans or elsewhere.

Introduction 

In the early thirties of this century, when Milman Parry began to write the book from which this one takes its name, [1] what was needed most in Homeric scholarship was a more exact knowledge of the way in which oral epic poets learn and compose their songs. Now in the late fifties of the same century the need is still great; in spite of the number of books about Homer and his poems, about epic poetry in general, and about specific epic traditions in various parts of the world, the student of epic still lacks a precise idea of the actual technique of poiesis in its literal meaning. Thanks to Parry, however, we have the material for the research necessary to determine what this technique is. He has left us his collection of South Slavic texts, which is the record on phonograph discs and in manuscripts of experiments in the laboratory of the living epic tradition of the Yugoslavs. [2] In 1935 Milman Parry was Assistant Professor of Classics at Harvard University. He had already made a name for himself in classical scholarship by his masterly analysis of the technique of the formulaic epithets in the Iliad and the Odyssey. [3] This work had convinced him that the poems of Homer were traditional epics, and he soon came to realize that they must also be oral compositions. [4] He therefore set himself the task of proving, incontrovertibly if it were possible, the oral character of the poems, and to that end he turned to the study of the Yugoslav epics. In the autumn of 1935, he wrote:

 

The aim of the study was to fix with exactness the form of oral story poetry, to see wherein it differs from the form of written story poetry. Its method was to observe singers working in a thriving tradition of unlettered song and see how the form of their songs hangs upon their having to learn and practice their art without reading and writing. The principles of oral form thus gotten would be useful in two ways. They would be a starting point for a comparative study of oral poetry which sought to see how the way of life of a people gives rise to a poetry of a given kind and a given degree of excellence. Secondly, they would be useful in the study of the great poems which have come down to us as lonely relics of a dim past: we would know how to work backwards from their form so as to learn how they must have been made. [5] In Part I of this book I shall attempt to fulfill Parry's purpose of setting forth with exactness the form of oral narrative poetry, drawing my illustrative {3|4} material from this collection; in Part II I shall use the principles presented in Part I in studying the form of some of the great epic poems from the past. Because I intend to limit the scope of this book to a consideration of oral form and manner of composition, a discussion of a broader sort which would aim at seeing "how the way of life of a people gives rise to a poetry of a given kind and a given degree of excellence" will not be fully entered upon. Yet considerations of this kind will inevitably occupy us to some extent in this book. It is hoped that what is said here will be of use for future comparative study of oral poetry.

***

The burden of the first few chapters of Part I will be to work out in fullness of detail a definition of oral epic song. Stated briefly, oral epic song is narrative poetry composed in a manner evolved over many generations by singers of tales who did not know how to write; it consists of the building of metrical lines and half lines by means of formulas and formulaic expressions and of the building of songs by the use of themes. This is the technical sense in which I shall use the word "oral" and "oral epic" in this book. By formula I mean "a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea." This definition is Parry's. [6] By formulaic expression I denote a line or half line constructed on the pattern of the formulas. By theme I refer to the repeated incidents and descriptive passages in the songs.

These definitions are but the bare bones of the living organism which is oral epic. We shall peer into the structural heart of the formulas to discern the various patterns which merge to give them form. We shall see that the formulas are not the ossified clichés which they have the reputation of being, but that they are capable of change and are indeed frequently highly productive of other and new formulas. We shall come to realize the way in which themes can be expanded and contracted, and the manner in which they are joined together to form the final product which is the song. We shall note the difference both in the internal structure and in the external connection of themes as they are used by different singers.

Finally we shall turn our attention to the song itself. We shall see that in a very real sense every performance is a separate song; for every performance is unique, and every performance bears the signature of its poet singer. He may have learned his song and the technique of its construction from others, but good or bad, the song produced in performance is his own. The audience knows it as his because he is before them. The singer of tales is at once the tradition and an individual creator. [7] His manner of composition differs from that used by a writer in that the oral poet makes no conscious effort to break the traditional phrases and incidents; he is forced by the rapidity of composition in performance to use these traditional elements. [8] To him they are not merely necessary, however; they are also right. He {4|5} seeks no others, and yet he practices great freedom in his use of them because they are themselves flexible. His art consists not so much in learning through repetition the time-worn formulas as in the ability to compose and recompose the phrases for the idea of the moment on the pattern established by the basic formulas. He is not a conscious iconoclast, but a traditional creative artist. His traditional style also has individuality, and it is possible to distinguish the songs of one singer from those of another, even when we have only the bare text without music and vocal nuance.

***

The need for a clarification of the oral process of composition is reflected in the many terms which are used for oral narrative poetry. To no small degree difficulties have arisen because of the ambiguity of terminology and because each school has chosen a different facet of this poetry as distinctive. The term "oral" emphasizes, I believe, the basic distinction between oral narrative poetry and that which we term literary epic. But it too carries some ambiguity. Certain of the misunderstandings of Parry's oral theory arise from the failure to recognize his special use of the word "oral." For example, one often hears that oral poetry is poetry that was written to be recited. Oral, however, does not mean merely oral presentation. Oral epics are performed orally, it is true, but so can any other poem be performed orally. What is important is not the oral performance but rather the composition during oral performance. [9] There may be ambiguity also when we say that the oral poet learns his songs orally, composes them orally, and transmits them orally to others. Like so many statements made in the debate on the oral theory, this one too is perfectly true if the word "oral" is understood in the technical sense in which it will be presented in this book. But if the reader interprets oral learning as listening to something repeated in exactly the same form many times, if he equates it with oral memorization by rote, then he will fail to grasp the peculiar process involved in learning oral epic. The same may be said for oral composition. If we equate it with improvisation in a broad sense, we are again in error. Improvisation is not a bad term for the process, but it too must be modified by the restrictions of the particular style. The exact way in which oral composition differs from free improvisation will, I hope, emerge from the following chapters. It is true also that oral epic is transmitted by word of mouth from one singer to another, but if we understand thereby the transmission of a fixed text or the kind of transmission involved when A tells В what happened and В tells С and so on with all natural errors of lapse of memory and exaggeration and distortion, then we do not fully comprehend what oral transmission of oral epic is. With oral poetry we are dealing with a particular and distinctive process in which oral learning, oral composition, and oral transmission almost merge; they seem to be different facets of the same process. {5|6}

The word "epic," itself, indeed, has come in time to have many meanings. Epic sometimes is taken to mean simply a long poem in "high style." Yet a very great number of the poems which interest us in this book are comparatively short; length, in fact, is not a criterion of epic poetry. Other definitions of epic equate it with heroic poetry. Indeed the term "heroic poetry" is sometimes used (by Sir Cecil M. Bowra, for example) to avoid the very ambiguity in the word epic which troubles us. Yet purists might very well point out that many of the songs which we include in oral narrative poetry are romantic or historical and not heroic, no matter what definition of the hero one may choose. In oral narrative poetry, as a matter of fact, I wish to include all story poetry, the romantic or historical as well as the heroic; otherwise I would have to exclude a considerable body of medieval metrical narrative.

That whole body of verse that we have now agreed to designate as oral has been called by many names; the terminological battle is a serious one. Those who call it "folk epic" are carrying on a nineteenth century concept of composition by the "folk" which has long since been proved invalid. At one time when "folk epic" referred to a theory of composition, it was a justifiable term. It pointed to a method of composition as the distinction between oral narrative poetry and "written" poetry. It was looking in the right direction. But when its theory of composition was invalidated, because no one could show how the people as a whole could compose a poem, then the technical meaning of the term was lost and it came to be equated in a derogatory sense with "peasant." The attention was then shifted from the way in which the poetry was made, first to the social status of those who practiced it, and then to the content and quality of the poetry itself. Although it may be true that this kind of poetry has survived longest among peasant populations, it has done so not because it is essentially "peasant" poetry, but rather because the peasant society has remained illiterate longer than urban society. [10] Indeed this poetry has more often been aristocratic and courtly than of the folk. It would seem even from its origins to have belonged to serious ceremonial occasions, to ritual, to celebration. The term "folk poetry" becomes more and more inadequate, more and more restricted in time and place. To apply the term to the medieval epics or to the Homeric poems is ever more inadmissible.

Another reason why this poetry should cease to be denominated as "folk epic" is that outside the circle of folklore enthusiasts the connotations of "folk" in many countries tend to be derogatory. One thinks of the simple peasant with his "quaint" ideas, his fairy stories, and children's tales. The use of folk stories as entertainment for young children has its ironic aspects; we are beginning to realize the serious symbolism and meaning of folk tales, which, if rightly understood, would be far from proper fare for children. Moreover, if we mean by "folk epic" to indicate that oral epic shares some of its subject matter with folk tale and all that is seriously {6|7} implied in that term, we are ignoring or underestimating all the other subjects of oral epic, historical, legendary, and heroic: we have outgrown the appellation "folk epic." It is no longer exact, and in time it has come to misrepresent oral epic poetry rather than to describe it.

Similar objections can be brought against the term "popular," the Latin derivative equivalent to "folk." While this term avoids the "simple peasant" connotations of "folk," its literal meaning has been overlaid with another set of unfortunate implications from its use in English to denote "popular music" and "popular songs."

The fever of nationalism in the nineteenth century led to the use of oral epics for nationalist propaganda. The poems glorified the heroes of the nation's past; they depicted the struggles of the nation against outside foes. Hence the hero emerged as a "national" hero, and the poems themselves were labeled "national" epics. In some of the Slavic countries the word narodni has a useful ambiguity, since it means both "folk" and "national." As a term to designate oral epic "national" is woefully inadequate and an insidious imposter.

Some scholars have sought to avoid the pitfalls of the three terms already discussed, folk, popular, and national, by recourse to the word "primitive." It sounds somehow more "scientific" because it has been borrowed from the social science of anthropology. But here too the ambiguity is great and the connotations hardly less flattering than those of "folk" in some countries. If the idea behind the use of "primitive" for this poetry is that oral epic poetry precedes written poetry in time in the cultural growth of a society, then its use would be legitimate, because as a rule oral poetry does precede written poetry, but it would, like the other terms, still miss the fundamental difference in form between the two.

In summary, any term that is used to designate oral narrative poetry in an attempt to distinguish it from written narrative poetry must contain some indication of the difference in form. It is because the terms which we have discussed above failed to comprehend this distinction that they have proved themselves to be inadequate. Any terms, also, carrying implications derogatory to either oral narrative poetry or written poetry (as, for example, such terms as "authentic" and "artificial"; "primary" and "secondary") must be abandoned, for they represent an attitude that is neither scholarly nor critical. Both these forms are artistic expressions, each with its own legitimacy. We should not seek to judge but to understand.

If the need for a clarification of the process which produces oral narrative poetry is reflected in the confusion of terms which have been used to designate that poetry, this need is even more apparent, of course, in the variety of theories put forth in the last two centuries (and which still survive in one form or another today) to explain the peculiar phenomenon of oral epic. On the one hand there has been a solid block of loyalists to the literary tradition who have maintained through thick and thin that the {7|8} Homeric poems, as well as the great epics from medieval times, are written literary productions by a single author.

These loyalists have found themselves defending their position from attacks by those who from time to time raised annoying questions. One of the earliest questions posed was whether writing existed in the ninth century B.C., the traditional date of Homer. This was first raised by Josephus; [11] it came to the fore again in D'Aubignac [12] in the early eighteenth century and reached its classic expression in Friedrich August Wolf's famed Prolegomena (1795). A second problem was formulated during the seventeenth century and played a great role in the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes; this was the problem of the "errors" or inconsistencies in the Homeric poems. D'Aubignac, Perrault, Giambattista Vico, Robert Wood, and others led once again to Wolf and the later Separatists. A third question concerned the unusual length of the Homeric poems. If there was no writing in Homer's time, how could such long poems be preserved until the time of writing? In fact, how could poems of such length come into being at all without the aid of writing? Clearly this was a corollary of the first question raised. Among the earlier scholars who attempted to answer this question the name of Robert Wood stands out. A fourth problem arose from the increased knowledge of and interest in medieval minstrelsy and contemporary oral poetry during the eighteenth century and later. Here again we may begin with D’Aubignac and continue with Thomas Blackwell, Percy, Macpherson, Herder, Goethe, and a host of others. There was, fifthly, also the problem, inherited from ancient times, of the meaning of the Peisistratean legend about the recension of the Homeric poems. And finally with the development of linguistic studies in the nineteenth century the question was raised about the possibility of one man using dialect forms from several regions and archaisms from different periods.

These were the chief questions that were current in Homeric scholarship and still are. In answering them some scholars have gone so far as to deny even the existence of Homer, but the usual answer has been some form of multiple authorship for the poems with Homer at one end or the other of a series of poets. Sometimes he was the originator whose poems were carried through oral tradition or whose works were modified by later poets; more often he was the last of the redactors or compilers or, in an attempt to bridge the gap between Unitarians and Separatists, he was the great poet who reworked oral tradition into a "literary" poem. The concept of multiple authorship led scholars naturally to the dissection of the Homeric poems in an attempt to see what parts were done by different authors. They were thus led also to seek the "original" or archetype of the poems.

The doubt as to the existence of writing in Homer's time has given Homerists three choices: to seek proof that the doubt was ill founded and that there was writing as early as the traditional date of Homer; to change Homer's date, bringing it down to a period when writing was possible; to {8|9} leave Homer's date where it was and to cover the intervening years to the age of writing by oral transmission of Homer's poems.

The most significant step in proving that writing was possible and indeed existed not only in the ninth century but earlier has been made only recently in the discovery that Linear В is Greek. Although none of the texts yet deciphered is literary, [13] the old argument of Josephus and Wolf has had the ground cut from under it. Ironically enough, however, the proof has come at a time when many scholars realize that the existence of writing or even of a literary tradition does not necessarily mean that Homer's poems belong in the category of "written" literature; and many realize, and have realized for some time, that obviously our Homeric texts could not have been preserved had there not been writing in Homer's day. Valuable as the decipherment of Linear В is, it is no longer relevant to the Homeric problem.

Unless not only literary texts are discovered in Linear В but also some evidence can be unearthed to prove that epic poetry was being written down during the period of Linear B, its decipherment cannot help us much in determining Homer's date. Some Homeric names seem to have been deciphered, Hector and Achilles, for example, but this might indicate no more than that these were common names or that songs about these heroes existed; it tells us nothing about our poems. There is no evidence at all at this point that Homer was written down in Linear В and later copied in the Greek alphabet that we know. Were there such evidence, we would be justified in moving Homer's date back. So the problem of the date of Homer still remains with us.

Wolf and some of his predecessors turned to the Peisistratean legend to answer the question of date, as has Carpenter in our own century, although the latter's reasons are different from those of Wolf. Carpenter reflects our growing knowledge of oral literature and seeks a time when the writing down of the poems would make sense in the context of this knowledge. To him Peisistratus seems the most likely person to sponsor this. Certainly he is right that the Peisistratean legend is an invaluable clue, one that cannot be ignored but which demands explanation and interpretation. But Carpenter has been little heeded, and the date accepted now by most scholars is the second half of the eighth century.

Those scholars who made the third choice were moving in the right direction, namely towards oral tradition, but in putting the poet of our Homeric texts before the period of writing, they were unwittingly creating more problems than they were as yet equipped to handle. Their choice was a compromise. Oral tradition was a fickle mistress with whom to flirt. But scholars could call in to their help the "fantastic memories" so "well attested" of illiterate people. They felt that a text could remain from one generation to another unaltered, or altered only by inconsequential lapses of memory. This myth has remained strong even to the present day. The main points of confusion in the theory of those scholars who made the third {9|10} choice arose from the belief that in oral tradition there is a fixed text which is transmitted unchanged from one generation to another.

The quarrel about the errors and inconsistencies in the Homeric poems, inherited from the seventeenth century, has continued steadily until our own times. In its narrower aspects the strife has resulted in a stalemate; the real inconsistencies still remain unexplained in spite of the ingenuity of the Unitarians, who have to their credit the checking of the excesses of the Separatists. [14] The picture of the great Homer nodding has looked more like an excuse than an explanation. Bowra's remark in Tradition and Design in the Iliad that the oral poet concentrates on one passage at a time is closer to the truth. We have been gaining much perspective on the inconsistencies, despite the hard core of apologist opinion. Of far greater importance than the labeling of the inconsistencies themselves has been the theory of multiple authorship which emerged when the quarrel over the "errors" began to find added fuel from the attention paid to still living bards and bardic traditions and to medieval minstrelsy. The many theories of multiple authorship of the Homeric poems have contributed more to Homeric scholarship than any other single concept. Not that they were right. But they led in productive directions. They were honest attempts to meet the challenge offered by the growing body of oral ballads and epics as well as of medieval epic.

The theories of multiple authorship can be divided into two general classes. The first, and the earliest, saw the Homeric poems as compilations of shorter songs, stitched together by their compiler. D'Aubignac presented this in his Conjectures in 1715, but it was Lachmann and his followers in the nineteenth century who made serious attempts to dissect the poems according to this lieder theorie. The attempts were unsuccessful and unconvincing; for the dissectors could not agree on where to use the scalpel. The theory was discredited.

A second general approach moved in vertical rather than horizontal lines. The scholars who used this approach abandoned the idea of a compilation, even of poems of different times and places, and conceived of an original kernel which was modified by a succession of later authors. Usually to them Homer was not a compiler but the last and greatest of the redactors. They too whisked out the scalpel and began to peel off the layers in the Homeric poems. Linguistic and dialect evidence came to their assistance. But they were equally unsuccessful and their theories too have been discarded, although with considerably less finality than those of the first group.

The work of the first group of dissectors led to several valuable compilations. Lönnrot put together the Finnish Kalevala, the Estonians entered the competition with the Kalevipoeg, and the Serbs attempted a number of "national" epics on the Kosovo theme. But nothing comparable to the Homeric poems was produced. The problem of the way in which the {10|11} Homeric poems had attained their length, if they were not literary productions of a single author, remained unsolved.

So also did the problem of the variety of dialect and archaic forms in the poems. One of the attempts to solve this problem was the theory of a special poetic language, a kind of artificial dialect which was the property of epic poets. This of course did not solve anything. It merely put a label on the diction as found in the poems and pushed into the background the question of how such a diction could have been formed.

Hand in hand with the theory of multiple authorship went the emphasis on a search for the archetype. Leaf's work is typical of this trend. His five strata began with an original and then discerned expansions and interpolations of later periods. One still hears echoes of this kind of dissection, for example, in MacKay's The Wrath of Homer.

The work of all these theorists should not be dismissed as without avail, certainly not with the tired yet vituperative cynicism of Allen in his Origins and Transmissions. The service of these scholars has been in essence to point out the peculiarities of language and structure of the Homeric poems, peculiarities that we now recognize to be those of oral poetry. The inconsistencies, the mixture of dialects, the archaisms, the repetitions and epic "tags," and even the manner of composition by addition and expansion of themes have been noted and catalogued by these scholars. The questioned existence of writing led them to use the word "oral" and their experience of folk epic seemed further to justify this term. The elements that were needed to crystallize the answers to their questions were there. It is a strange phenomenon in intellectual history as well as in scholarship that the great minds herein represented, minds which could formulate the most ingenious speculation, failed to realize that there might be some other way of composing a poem than that known to their own experience. They knew and spoke often of folk ballad and epic, they were aware of variants in these genres, yet they could see only two ways in which those variants could come into being: by lapse of memory or by willful change. This seemed so obvious, so much an unquestioned basic assumption, that they never thought to investigate exactly how a traditional poetry operated. They always thought in terms of a fixed text or a fixed group of texts to which a poet did something for a reason within his own artistic or intellectual self. They could not conceive of a poet composing a line in a certain way because of necessity or because of the demands of his traditional art.

I believe that the greatest moment in recent Homeric scholarship was expressed by Milman Parry when he wrote his field notes for his collection of South Slavic texts and spoke of his growing realization that what he had been calling traditional was in fact oral:

 

My first studies were on the style of the Homeric poems and led me to understand that so highly formulaic a style could be only traditional. I failed, however, at the time to understand {11|12} as fully as I should have that a style such as that of Homer must not only be traditional but also must be oral. It was largely due to the remarks of my teacher M. Antoine Meillet that I came to see, dimly at first, that a true understanding of the Homeric poems could only come with a full understanding of the nature of oral poetry. [15] The real impact of this revelation of Milman Parry has not yet been fully felt in Homeric scholarship, which has chosen to disdain oral epic and to move into the more abstruse kinds of literary criticism. [16] Although often referred to, the oral theory of Milman Parry is at best but vaguely understood. It is the purpose of this book to present that theory as fully and yet as simply as possible. Parry himself did not live long enough after making his monumental collection to think out his theory in detail, let alone to develop it and present it to the learned world in completeness. Working from the clues that he left, I have tried to build an edifice of which he might approve. {12|}

Footnotes

  1. In 1935, when Parry returned from Yugoslavia, he began a book entitled The Singer of Tales. This was to contain the results of his study of the problems of oral form. He had written only a few pages before his death. These pages have been published in my article, "Homer, Parry, and Huso," AJA, 52:34–44 (Jan.–March 1948). 

 2. The Milman Parry Collection is now housed in the Harvard University Library. It contains over 3500 twelve-inch aluminum phonograph discs recorded in various parts of Yugoslavia in 1934 and 1935. There are both epic and lyric songs in the collection as well as recorded conversations with the singers about their lives and their art. There are over 12,500 texts in the collection, some of which are on the phonograph records; the remainder are songs taken down by dictation. Fuller accounts of the Parry Collection may be found in "Homer, Parry, and Huso," AJA, 52:34–44, in Serbo-Croatian Folk Songs, by Béla Bartók and Albert B. Lord (New York, 1951), and in the introduction to Volume I of Serbocroatian Heroic Songs, by Milman Parry and Albert B. Lord (Cambridge, Mass., and Belgrade, 1954), which is the first volume of translations of Parry Collection texts to appear. Volume II containing Serbocroatian texts translated in Volume I has also been published. Volumes III and IV of the series, which it is expected will contain over twenty volumes, are in preparation. 

3. L'Epithète traditionnelle dans Homère (Paris, 1928). 

4. See his "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making. I: Homer and Homeric Style," HSCP, 41:73–147 (1930), and "II: The Homeric Language as the Language of an Oral Poetry," HSCP, 43:1–50 (1932). 

5. See Note 1 above. 

 6. "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making. I: Homer and Homeric Style," HSCP, 41:80. 

 7. I emphasize the creative or dynamic role of the individual performer throughout this book in order to counteract the impression in some quarters that the oral poet is merely a transmitter; that all originality is closed to him. Perhaps the words "create" and "originality" are too strong; they may lead to misunderstanding. Yet I believe that the evidence of the actual texts, both as studied from the Parry Collection, and as reported in studies by other scholars who have worked with an abundance of texts and variants, indicates that at the moment of performance the singer, or narrator, produces something unique. The degree of uniqueness varies with the particular circumstances and with the individual performer, provided, of course, that one is dealing with a true oral poet and not with a mere reciter to begin with. It would, however, be a mistake to equate the creative process and function of the oral poet with those of the literary poet, as I attempt to show later in the book. A somewhat different point of view is presented in an important paper, published in 1929, "Die Folklore als eine besondere Form des Schaffens," Donum Natalicium Schrijnen (Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1929), pp. 900–913, by P. Bogatyrev and R. Jakobson. They apply very interestingly on a theoretical level Saussure's distinction between langue and parole to folklore. It might be worth suggesting that we have in the case of oral epic performance something that is neither langue nor parole, but some third form; as Lévi-Strauss has intimated in the case of myths (see his paper, "The Structural Study of Myth," Journal of American Folklore, 68 (1955):430. Or again with Lévi-Strauss we might question whether we have something that is both langue and parole at the same time under different aspects, thus making a third form of communication, or of relationship, peculiar to oral verbal art. 

8. See Marcel Jousse, Etudes de psychologie linguistique. Le style orale rythmique et mnémotechnique chez les verbo-moteurs (Paris, 1925). 

9. It should be clear from this and from what follows that sacred texts which must be preserved word for word, if there be such, could not be oral in any except the most literal sense. Bogatyrev and Jakobson (p. 912) mention the Vedic hymns and say: "Dort, wo die Rolle der Gemeinschaft allein in der Aufbewahrung eines zu einem unantastbaren Kanon erhobenen dichterischen Werkes besteht, gibt es keine schöpferische Zensur, keine Improvisation, kein kollektives Schaffen mehr." 

10. Or perhaps in some cases because what was in writing belonged to the ecclesiastical and not to the popular milieu. See, in the case of Russia, Jakobson's "Commentary" to the English translation of A. N. Afanas'ev, Russian Fairy Tales (New York, 1945), pp. 632 ff. 

11. Flavius Josephus, Contra Apionem, i, 2. [ back ] 12. François Hédelin, Abbé d'Aubignac, Conjectures académiques ou Dissertation sur l'Iliade (Paris, 1715). [ back ] 13. See Joshua Whatmough, Poetic, Scientific, and Other Forms of Discourse (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956), p. 86. [ back ] 14. See F. M. Combellack, "Contemporary Unitarians and Homeric Originality," AJP, 71:337–364 (1950). [ back ] 15. Parry and Lord, I, 3. [ back ] 16. The recent book of Cedric Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), and the work of several years ago of Rhys Carpenter, Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946) are important exceptions.

Albert Bates Lord The Singer of Tales