To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Cioran – quotes from Notebooks

 



E. M. Cioran (1911-1995)
[Source: Notizen/Cahiers 1957-1972, Karolinger]

“Emily Dickinson: 'I felt a funeral in my brain,' I could add, like Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, 'every moment of my life'. The eternal funeral of the mind.” [P. 15]

“I sought my salvation in utopia and found only a little comfort in the apocalypse.” [P. 17]

“To make more plans than an impostor or a researcher, and at the same time to be struck by a lack of will, reaches - without metaphor - to the root of will.” [P. 21]

“What cannot be translated into religious terms doesn't deserve to be lived.” [P. 22]

“Sometimes, deep inside, I feel endless powers. Unfortunately, I don't know what to use them for; I believe in nothing, and to act one must believe, believe, believe... I lose myself every day, then I let the world that resides in me die. With the arrogance of a fool, and yet dawning in disgracefulness, in sterile sadness, in powerlessness and in silence.” [P. 22]

“There is a certain pleasure in resisting the call of suicide.” [P. 23]

“The two greatest sages of late Antiquity: Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, a slave and an emperor.” [P. 23]

“All fame is ridiculous; those who seek it must truly have a taste for decay.” [P. 25]

“I must create a smile, arm myself with it, get under its protection, put something between the world and myself, hide my wounds, finally learn the mask.” [P. 26]

“Success doesn't necessarily encourage success, but failure always encourages failure. Fate is a word that makes sense only in misfortune.” [P. 27]

“Boredom: empty suffering, diffuse agony. One does not experience boredom in hell; only in paradise does one feel bored.” [P. 29]

“No matter how much I exert myself, I could never accept this universe without feeling guilty of deception.” [P. 27]

“There are moments of weakness and doubt in which truth, and even the idea of truth, seems so inaccessible and incomprehensible that the slightest probability appears as an unexpected perspective.” [P. 31]

“Up close, everything that lives, even the tiniest insect, seems full of mystery; from a distance, boundless insignificance. There is a distance that displaces metaphysics; to philosophize means to still be an accomplice of the world.” [P. 31]

"The rudeness of being 'profound.'" [P. 32]

“The entire Hindu philosophy can be summed up as terror, not of death, but of birth.” [P. 33]

“Not taking revenge poisons the soul as much, if not more, than taking revenge. Does one have the right not to take revenge?” [P. 35]

“We exist only for our enemies - and a few friends who don't love us.” [P. 35]

“I would give all the poets for Emily Dickinson.” [P. 35]

“I am a Mongol laid waste by melancholy.” [P. 35]

“Evil is as much a creative force as Good. Yet of the two, it is the more active. For too often Good loafs.” [P. 36]

“With each insult, we hesitate between a slap and a death blow; and this hesitation, which makes us waste precious time, confirms our cowardice.” [P. 39]

“We don't demand freedom, we demand the illusion of freedom. For millennia, humanity has been tormented by this illusion. And since freedom, as they say, is a feeling, what difference is there between being free or thinking you are free?” [P. 40]

“Man is inevitably heading towards catastrophe. To the extent that I remain convinced of this, I am interested in him, with greed, with passion.” [P. 40]

“For a skeptic to be born, a thousand believers must rage.” [P. 41]

“The breadth and depth of a mind are measured by the sufferings that he has endured to attain knowledge. No one knows who has not suffered. A keen intellect can be completely superficial. Every step towards knowledge must be paid for.” [P. 42]

“The story of the Fall may be the profoundest thing ever written. Here everything is told of what we were to experience and suffer. All of history in one page.” [P. 45]

“Some seek fame, others seek truth. I dare to join the latter. An unattainable goal is more seductive than an attainable one. The approval of men - what a humiliation to strive for it!” [P. 55]

“I am only interested in spirits endowed with the dimension of darkness.” [P. 55]

“The spirit flourishes neither in the excesses of freedom nor in those of terror. It requires a bearable constraint.” [P. 63]

“The more I think of life as a phenomenon distinct from matter, the more it frightens me: Life is based on nothing, it is an improvisation, an experiment, an adventure. It seems to me so fragile, so inconsistent, so devoid of any reality, that I cannot contemplate life and its conditions without shuddering. It is only a spectacle, a whim of matter. We would cease to exist if we knew how unreal we are. If one wants to live, one must forbid oneself to think about life, to isolate it in the universe, to want to bring it to the point.” [P. 63]

“There are no pure emotions between individuals who are engaged in the same pursuit. A novelist is not jealous of a philosopher, but novelists inevitably hate each other, as do philosophers, especially poets. Think of the hateful glances prostitutes throw at each other when they share the same sidewalk. Adam was only a beginner; Cain remains our universal sovereign, the true ancestor of our race.” [P. 68]

“If one is unfit for indifference, one cannot live without pleading. The soul is an eternal crucifixion.” [P. 71]

“Lady Macbeth, Brinvilliers - women to my liking. In moments of deep discouragement, there is a certain longing for cruelty.” [P. 71]

“I appreciate a thinker only to the extent that he doesn't conform to his time, just as I admire only those who become renegades of it, or better still, those who betray time and history.” [P. 72]

“If everything continues - the reason is that people lack the courage for hopelessness.” [P. 79]

“My strength: to have found no answer to anything.” [P. 84]

“The only benefit of funerals is to allow us to reconcile with our enemies.” [P. 104]

“To live is to be capable of indignation. The sage is a man who no longer protests. Hence he is not above but alongside life.” [P. 117]

“Every day that passes increases the dangers that threaten humanity. It will pay dearly for the 'progress' it doesn't cease to indulge. The means to preserve life are ridiculous compared to those suspected of destroying it, and whatever man may undertake, he will never be right against this disproportion. What one advances in months or years, one destroys in an instant. What makes destruction in general so immoral is its ease. Except for suicide, all destruction is effortless. These are edifying thoughts…” [P. 120]

“The state of the unconscious is the natural state of life. In it, life is at home, thrives, and finds the benevolent slumber of growth. As soon as it awakens, and especially stays awake, it becomes hurried, burdened, and begins to wither.” [P. 120]

“Among friends, feelings are inevitably false. How can one form a genuine attachment to someone they know too well without hidden intentions?” [P. 120]

“When I think that in my youth I regarded the anarchist as humanity's fulfillment! Is it progress or is it decline to have arrived at a resignation which makes me consider any act of rebellion as a sign of infantilism? And yet, if I no longer rebel, I continue to be indignant (which perhaps comes down to the same thing). This is because life and indignation are virtually equivalent terms. Nothing that is alive is neutral. Neutrality is a victory over life, not life.” [P. 120/121]

“I call 'naive' he who is unaware of his insignificance and consequently enjoys recognition. One can see that this definition encompasses almost the entire human race.” [P. 122]

“To repeat oneself is a sin against the spirit. How I love the writers who have written almost nothing!” [P. 123]

“A book must have weight and present itself as a fatality that, when we read it, gives us the impression that it couldn't have remained unwritten. That in the end it came into being by a decree of Providence.” [P. 123]

“The only realization I am proud of, because I had it so early, before my twentieth year, is that one shouldn't reproduce. My disgust for marriage, family, and all social conventions stems from this. It is a crime to pass on one's faults to offspring, forcing them to endure the same sufferings, perhaps an even worse crossroads than oneself. I have never been able to give life to a being that would have inherited my unhappiness and infirmities. All parents are either irresponsible or murderers. Only animals should give birth. Compassion prevents us from 'reproducing'. It is the worst word I know.” [P. 123]

“In essence, indifference cannot be learned; it is part of a civilization. It is not a goal; it is a gift.” [P. 128]

“'Sadness will last forever.' These seem to have been Van Gogh's last words. I could have spoken them at any moment of my life.” [P. 129]

“The profound word of the Gitâ, that one should always keep in mind: 'It is better to perish by one's own law than to be saved by another's.'” [P. 134]

“I am not afraid of death, but of life. As far back as I can remember, it has always seemed unfathomable and frightening to me. My inability to fit in. Then the fear of people, as if I belonged to a different species. Always the feeling that my interests were in no way in line with theirs.” [P. 142]

“No friend ever tells us the truth. That is why only the silent dialogue with our enemies is fruitful.” [P. 142]

“I have noticed that I am almost always happy when everyone else is not.” [P. 143]

“My inability to tell people the truth directly, in short, my cowardice, has entangled me in more complications than if I had been a moral hero. I fall over people as such, but in the face of an individual, I lack all courage. I am terribly afraid of hurting others and, no doubt, of being hurt myself. One can be afraid because of an excess of sensitivity.” [P. 144]

“I see it confirmed every day, one can have compassion for people, but to love them, that is impossible. Here, precisely on this central point, Christianity is mistaken.” [P. 144]

“The role of insomnia in history. From Caligula to Hitler. Is the inability to sleep the cause or the consequence of cruelty? The tyrant lies awake: that is what defines him as such.” [P. 147]

“One speaks of the diseases of the will, and forgets that the will itself is a disease, that to want is not a natural action.” [P. 150]

“From a Christian, I have only the desire to torment myself and unnecessarily burden my conscience and my days.” [P. 162]

“As soon as one doesn't accept the irreparable, one falls back into the obsession of suicide.” [P. 165]

“The sufferings of those one loves are morally more unbearable than one's own.” [P. 165]

“One doesn't become better as one ages, one only learns to hide one's shame.” [P. 168]

“First condition of a perfect society: being able to kill all those one detests.” [P. 175]

“The whole secret of life is to surrender to illusions without knowing that they are illusions. Once you recognize them as such, the spell is broken.” [P. 175]

“The melancholy of being understood - for a writer, there is none greater.” [P. 210]

“The true prophet is the one who suffers from the horror of the future without believing in 'progress.'” [P. 221]

“Children who are not ashamed of their parents are irrevocably condemned to mediocrity. Nothing makes one more sterile than admiring one's 'creators.'” [P. 227]

“Only the failed works allow us to glimpse the essence of art.” [P. 227]

“In a century, or perhaps even sooner, people will speak of our time as an earthly paradise. When the whole earth is populated, humanity will only be able to draw hope from the past…” [P. 233]

“No one digests an insult or humiliation, no matter how insignificant it may be. Revenge is the fundamental fact of the moral universe.” [P. 235]

“I am not a pessimist, I love this terrible world.” [P. 235]

“I can only love those who show a certain impotence in the face of life.” [P. 236]

“Every newborn is for me one more unhappy person, just as every death is one less. It's a mechanical reaction of mine. Condolences for birth, congratulations for death.” [P. 247]

“When the Olympic gods descended to earth, they often took the form of an animal. This says a lot about their appreciation for humans.” [P. 257]

“'Judge no one until you have put yourself in his place.' This old saying (where does it come from?) makes any judgment impossible, for we judge someone precisely because we cannot put ourselves in his place.” [P. 257]

“If one wants to know what life is worth, it is important to remember that the only thing that reconciles us with it is sleep, that is, exactly what it is not: its negation.” [P. 259]

“Suffering created me, suffering will destroy me. I am its creation. In return, I render it a service: it lives through me, persists through my sacrifices.” [P. 261]

“When the fear of death fades, everything becomes frighteningly simple.” [P. 273]

“The enormous sadness in the eyes of a gorilla. An elegiac animal. It is from this stare that I am descended.” [P. 289]

“'No creature can attain the highest degree of nature without ceasing to exist.' (Thomas Aquinas) This is the anticipated response to the aberrations of the Übermensch. Man is condemned to be what he is. He cannot change his nature. He can even (not) improve himself without punishment. To be fallen is his nature. Much more, it is his way of life.” [P. 296]

“I have almost always ended by adopting the opinions of those I most opposed. (The Iron Guard, which I had detested at the start, became for me a phobic obsession.) Having attacked Joseph de Maistre, I suffered his contagion. The enemy insidiously triumphs over a man without character. By dint of thinking against someone or something, you become its prisoner, and reach the point of loving that servitude.” [P. 306]

“Nietzsche tires me. My weariness sometimes reaches the point of disgust. One cannot embrace a thinker whose ideal lies in the opposite of what he is. There is something repulsive about the weak pretending to be strong, about the weak without pity. All this is good for adolescents.” [P. 328]

“Greatness exists only where a man stands alone against all others.” [P. 341]

“The Demiurge is called Ialdabaôth in Hebrew, which means 'Son of Chaos.'” [P. 341]

“To withdraw into oneself forever, like God after creation!” [P. 343]

"'Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct.'" (F. H. Bradley) [P. 352]

“Injustice is not a mystery but the visible essence of this world.” [P. 355]

“For some, the prospect of dying (Proust, Hitler...) impels them to a frenzy of activity: they want to conclude everything, complete their work, and thereby become eternal; not a moment to lose, they are stimulated by the notion of their end - for others, the same prospect paralyzes them, leads them to a sterile sagesse, and keeps them from working: what's the use? The idea of their end flatters their apathy, instead of disturbing it; whereas among the first group, it rouses every energy, good as well as bad. Who is right here, where is reason? It is hard to say, especially since both reactions are justified. Everything depends on our inclinations, on our nature. In order to really know someone, you have to know what the thought of his end releases in him: is it exciting or benumbing? Lucky those who set to work because they think they're going to die, who in this idea find a truly dynamic impulse! Less fortunate those who lay down their arms and wait, for they have too much time to envisage their conclusion. They die during all the moments they dedicate to the idea of death: moribund in the full sense of the word, inexhaustibly moribund.” [P. 359]

“I think I would be the worst psychiatrist one could imagine, because I would understand and agree with all my patients.” [P. 360]

“Time is my life, my blood; the others - vampires who feed on it, exhausting me. Someone is robbing me of my substance, or at least gnawing at it.” [P. 364]

“If this universe were cleansed of life, there would be nothing to complain about.” [P. 372]

“The only interesting part of any doctrine of salvation (whether religious or political) is the destructive part.” [P. 399]

“You cannot argue with physical pain.” [P. 425]

“Life in its most beautiful moment is merely a balance of its disadvantages.” [P. 431]

“Hitler's marriage with Eva Braun took place a few hours before their suicide. An official was hurriedly summoned, and asked each of them separately the obligatory question: 'Are you Aryan?' They answered in the affirmative. If Hitler had said: 'No,' that would have been the most extraordinary answer in History.” [P. 446]

“The scapegoat. We cannot do without it, its existence is required by our biological constitution. Someone must pay for our faults and our failures; if we consider ourselves as alone responsible, what complications, what additional tortures! To have a good conscience, is all that we ask: the scapegoat serves that function. It takes an almost superhuman effort to be able to assume the blame ourselves for everything. But when we have made the effort we have the distinct sensation that we are approaching the truth. Alas! This doesn't make us more modest, only more vainglorious.” [P. 466/467]

“My love of Bach has overwhelmed me again. I love to listen to him in the dark. I turn off the light and take my pleasure in a tomb. Sometimes it's as if I were listening to music after my death.” [P. 526]

“Those who don't die young deserve to die.” [P. 545]

“There is no means to prove that being is preferable to non-being.” [P. 548]

“If revenge were to miraculously disappear, almost the entire human race would become a victim of previously unknown mental illnesses.” [P. 551]

“Every noble attitude is false. Insults are unforgivable, except those from strangers, - never if they come from a friend or an acquaintance.” [P. 556]

“Never hurt anyone: how to manage this? By not manifesting yourself. For every action hurts someone. By abstaining, one spares every one. But perhaps death is even better than abstention.” [P. 556]

“What an extraordinary sensation, for a writer, to be forgotten! To be posthumous in one's own lifetime, no longer to see one's name anywhere. For all literature is a question of names and of nothing else. To have a name, the expression speaks volumes. Well then, no longer having a name, if one has ever had such a thing, may be better than having one. Such is the price of freedom. Freedom, and even more: deliverance. A name - all that remains of a being. It's stupefying that one can toil and torment oneself for such a trifle.” [P. 556/557]

“One is driven by the demon every time one doesn't want to play the 'game,' every time one speaks a truth that necessarily goes against oneself.” [P. 557]

“Suicide is the most normal act one can commit. Every thought should lead to it, and every career should end with it. It should replace the unwanted and humiliating end everywhere. Everyone should choose his last hour.” [P. 564]

“Only the one who questions the very fact of existence is truly revolutionary; all others, the anarchist first and foremost, pact with the established order.” [P. 566]

“Children turn against their parents; and parents deserve their fate. Everything turns against everything; everyone creates their own enemy. Such is the law.” [P. 570]

“'Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires.'" (Blake) [P. 571]

“Over time, tolerance brings forth more evil than intolerance - that is the true drama of history. If this assertion is true, it is the greatest indictment against man.” [P. 576]

“To be able to kill oneself and not do it is to be an autocrat who doesn't make use of his authority.” [P. 599]

“If a person forces himself to believe in something, it is only to avoid killing himself, for suicide is the logical consequence of the realisation that nothing withstands rigorous analysis, cruel reflection.” [P. 599]

“I am always afraid of scandal, I am always afraid of defamation, against which there is no defense. But I say to myself: if I were dead, what would it matter to me if people said these or those abominations about me? For the most honorable man in the world, death is not only a liberation, but an acquittal. One is no longer guilty; one is no longer a monster once six feet under. Death is truly immoral. Suicide even more so. One feels like committing all sorts of crimes and saying to oneself: what does it matter, a single bullet would free me from guilt, and I would find a peace as perfect as that enjoyed by the innocent.” [P. 606]

“If the fear of death were to miraculously disappear, life would have no protection at all: it would be at the mercy of our first whim. It would lose all value and perhaps all meaning. The sages who urge us so vehemently to free ourselves from this fear do not know what they are doing. They don't realize that they are destroyers.” [P. 623]

“The greatest misfortunes are those foreseen.” [P. 627]

“To understand other people, you must be obsessed by yourself to the point of disgust, such disgust being a symptom of health, a necessary condition in order to look beyond your own troubles.” [P.638]

“An advancing army knows nothing, doesn't even suspect defeat. Mankind drags itself forward in the belief that it is rushing towards victory. Where it is really heading is only glimpsed by those who have turned away from the march, those who anticipate the end.” [P.639]

“The truth is in neither revolution nor in reaction. It resides in the questioning both of society and of those who attack it.” [P.647]

“Health, like freedom, has no positive content, since you don't consciously enjoy it when you possess it. It contributes nothing to you, it can enrich no one. So it would be absurd to say that someone made some discovery or had some vision because he was feeling well. It is when you feel ill that you discover something new, health being a state of absence, since you are not conscious of it. You would have to be able to tell yourself at any moment at all: I am feeling well, and from this derive a real, conscious well-being. But such consciousness would be in contradiction with health and would merely prove that health is or is about to be compromised. Any conscious health is a threatened health. Health is a good, certainly, but those who possess it have been denied the opportunity of knowing their happiness. And one might speak without exaggeration of a just punishment of the healthy.” [P.647/648]

“One should humble man. The resulting dangers are much less than those caused by arrogance. A naturally arrogant animal - the only means to bring him to reason is to show him what mud he is made of.” [P.652]

"'My life is the hesitation before birth.' (Kafka) ... As I have always felt.” [P.658]

“My task is to awaken people from their eternal slumber, even though I know that I am committing a crime and that it would be a thousand times better to leave them in it. Even if they are awakened - I have nothing to offer them.” [P.680]

“Life is extraordinary, in the sense that the sexual act is extraordinary: during, and not after. Once you position yourself outside of life and consider it from an external point of view, everything collapses, everything seems deception, as after the sexual performance. All pleasure is extraordinary and unreal, as is the case for every act of life.” [P.689]

“You have to let people say what they want. Eventually the truth will be reestablished. Anything is better than humiliation. Injustice is necessary to the mind; it fortifies, cleanses it. A victim is always, with regard to lucidity, above his persecutors. To be a victim is to understand.” [P.693]

“Spring and suicide are two related concepts for me. Spring represents an idea that I am not ripe enough for, or rather one that doesn't fit into my system.” [P.698]

“In essence, I only love religions that have transcended the idea of God. That is why I hold Buddhism in such high regard.” [P.701]

“I believe that there is no greater pleasure than trampling upon that which one has worshipped.” [P.702]

“Attachment is the origin of all servitudes. The more you want to be free, the less you tie yourself to beings and things. But once you are tied to them, what a drama it is to be released! We begin living by creating ties for ourselves; the older we grow the stronger they become. A moment comes when we understand that they represent so many chains, that it is too late to shake them off, for we are too used to them.” [P.715]

“Being born is a catastrophe, we are all survivors of birth.” [P.730]

“Perceiving thought as a self-destructive poison, the product of a viper turned against itself.” [P.731]

“Only he who creates the void around us does us a service. My gratitude to those who have made me more alone, who - in spite of themselves, but no matter - have contributed to my spiritual consolidation.” [P.736]

“Man has been deceived by the gods. There is no other way to understand history.” [P.753]

“Birth and guilt are correlative concepts. Objective guilt, I am inclined to say: a mistake for which one cannot be held responsible, although one can imagine that one is. Thus, I can attribute the guilt of my birth to myself, but no one will consider me 'guilty.'” [P.753]

“How am I responsible for my birth? - I am responsible as soon as I am happy to be born.” [P.753]

“The Anti-Zarathustra. It is more likely that the future belongs to the subhuman rather than to the superhuman. It is ridiculous to speak of the superhuman, for ever since man has existed he has done nothing but surpass himself, to tear himself out of his origins. But he tears himself out of them only to fall back into them better; and when he is farthest from his beginnings he will fall deeper than ever. He will pay dearly for his will to ascend and transcend. I see man shrinking more and more until there is nothing left of him.” [P.753]

“One who lacks the strength to take revenge, or who overcomes the desire to take revenge, is impure.” [P.759]

“He who lacked the courage to kill himself in his youth will blame himself for the rest of his life.” [P.763]

“To write about suicide is to have left it behind.” [P.770]

“People accept without excessive terror the notion of eternal sleep; on the other hand, an eternal waking (which is what immortality would be, if such a thing were conceivable) is unbearable, in thought as in fact: it gives you the shivers.” [P.821]

“What is called 'pessimism' is nothing but the 'art of living', the art of tasting the bitter flavor of everything that exists.” [P.838]

“He who has a sense of justice should go into the desert.” [P.862]

“If I had a son, he would have been a murderer.” [P.868]

“To feel destructive impulses doesn't mean to be evil, but rather to be out of balance. One can be good and a monster, an angel and a murderer at the same time.” [P.871]

“The only revolution, the only upheaval that interests me and that I really understand is the apocalypse. A social change is not significant enough.” [P.878]

“The truth lies in discouragement. Therefore courage, hope, lies, ignorance, are false. To live is to opt for the unreal, the non-true. There is a heroism of truth and a heroism of falsehood. Which should one advocate for? There are those who waver between the two for their entire existence, unable to commit. Perhaps in this wavering lies the true secret, or at least the art of not erring.” [P.883]

“Everything is surrender, except unrest, except the unquenchable thirst for truth.” [P.890]

“I think it is a given that a balanced mind of an ordinary constitution is incapable of imagining the future, or even of grasping a single aspect of it. This has always been the case and will be even more so in the future. For a common mind cannot feel or imagine the extent of what man is capable of, both in good and, above all, in evil. To understand the future is to understand one more stage on the path towards the end of humanity. This is precisely what man refuses to imagine. A lower wisdom prevents them from doing so. Here, the prophet demonstrates their superiority, derived from a very precise matter: because their instinct for self-preservation is deeply shaken. This is their weakness but also their strength. If they had kept their defenses and self-preservation reflexes intact, they wouldn't have the audacity to look beyond the present.” [P.898]

“Universal happiness would only be possible in the midst of a completely disillusioned humanity, which, at the same time, shouldn't be so embittered, a humanity that would be thrilled to have no more illusions...” [P.939]

“Not committing suicide is a sign of complicity.” [P.939]

“Being conscious is a drama that ends with death. Let us at least hope so.” [P.966]

“Clairvoyance doesn't eradicate the desire to live, it simply renders one unfit for life.” [P.971]

“If the whole world had 'understood,' history would have ended long ago. But it is biologically impossible to 'understand.' And even if all but one were to succeed, history would continue because of him. Because of a single illusion!” [P.972]

“Every truth, at the moment of its discovery, gives a feeling of liberation; then it becomes a chain. The same can be said of a god; in the beginning, when one clings to Him, one breathes a sigh of relief - and then one suffocates.” [P.976]

“Last night I told Christabel that I love life, but that doesn't prevent me from believing that it would be better for me and everyone else never to have existed. She disagrees and replies, 'Every being is unique, so...' I have noticed that people are incapable of radically questioning their own lives. Why is that? Because everyone looks at themselves from the inside and believes they are necessary, indispensable. Each person feels like a whole, like the entirety. Once you identify completely with yourself (and almost all living beings do), you react like God, you are God. How could one then accept the idea that it would have been better never to have existed? Only by living both within and on the edge of oneself can one simultaneously experience the feeling of one's own uniqueness and worthlessness, and accept, without a trace of despair, that it would have been better, on the whole, never to have existed.” [P.976]

“One must liberate oneself from life without hating it.” [P.982]

“Every living person is a defeated one, for birth is only the prelude to surrender.” [P.985]

“There is no more wrong attitude than to have understood everything and yet continue living.” [P.996]

“Non-consent to death is the greatest drama of mortals.” [P.996]

“Without the notion of a failed universe, the spectacle of injustice under every regime would put even an indifferent man in a straitjacket.” [P.1006]

Thank you for reading!


https://www.reddit.com/user/_AmaNesciri_/

Redemption through abstention: The sex-negative antinatalism of Norbert Grabowsky (1861–1922)

 

Hello everyone.

If you are interested in the history of antinatalism, perhaps you have already seen our new video about Kurnig, the first modern antinatalist, who, among other things, published a number of books and pamphlets on antinatalism in German and French in the late 19th and very early 20th century. In that video Karim Akerma and I discuss Kurnig’s life, work, and legacy as well as the literary scenes he moved in, and I also present some of my more recent findings. As Dr. Akerma pointed out, it is important to note that Kurnig was not a “singularity”, he did not write in a literary or intellectual vacuum. Sure, Kurnig may have been the most active and arguably the most adamant of his kind, but there were more people who held similar beliefs: Marie Huot was mentioned already, but today I want to introduce you to another very obscure – and perhaps even more bizarre – writer and thinker. During my research on Kurnig there was one name in particular that popped up quite frequently, and often in the same breath as Kurnig: Norbert Grabowsky.

Grabowsky’s life and work

Norbert Grabowsky was born in January 1861 in Ostrów Wielkopolski. He studied medicine and eventually became a doctor but did not obtain a health insurance license, and despite his profession he found himself in financial trouble throughout much of his life. In addition to his day job, he published a number of short books in which he laid out his philosophy. Grabowsky died in 1922 in Leipzig.

Like Kurnig, Grabowsky published in the publishing house of Max Spohr in Leipzig – in fact, Grabowsky’s 1894 work Die verkehrte Geschlechtsempfindung oder die mannmännliche und weibweibliche Liebe (“Inverted Sexual Feeling or Man-Manly and Woman-Womanly Love”) got his publisher into quite a bit of legal trouble. Both Kurnig’s and Grabowsky’s works were actively read and discussed by people in the emerging science of sexology, as both of them held rather unconventional views on human sexuality. As you know, Kurnig was a staunch proponent of voluntary non-procreation (or “natal abstinence”), but Grabowsky went one step further and advocated for complete sexual abstinence – an even more radical and outspoken “apostle of virginity” than Philipp Mainländer himself. What these three gentlemen had it common is that all of them greatly admired and were strongly inspired by Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical pessimism and shared his pessimistic diagnosis of life on Earth but departed from, or even outright rejected, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics.

Now, Grabowsky was strongly opposed to all forms of sexual intercourse for a variety of odd reasons – but, among other things, he was very explicit about his antinatalism, as he viewed sexual reproduction as “perpetuating the misery of existence by imposing it on others” (Fortpflanzung des Daseinselends auf Andere) and as a great moral wrong that is to be avoided. Grabowsky also considered all sexual orientations and preferences that do not result in procreation, especially homosexuality, to be “subconscious struggles against procreation” and even attempted to demonstrate that “normal” heterosexual intercourse is no less “perverse”, “disgusting”, and reprehensible than those already widely condemned deviant sexual practices – which he, of course, condemned, too, but for other reasons, since he believed that all kinds of sexual and sensual love severely damaged one’s individual integrity and prevented mankind from attaining true cognition and higher levels of spirituality (Vergeistigung), which can only be achieved through a total rejection of sex. These ideas bring Grabowsky quite close to Otto Weininger (1880–1903), who was familiar with Grabowsky’s work and also referred to it in his infamous book Sex and Character, as well as to Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) and his Kreutzer Sonata – another work frequently compared to Grabowsky’s in early sexological literature. Grabowsky declared sex to be “the greatest enemy of our destiny”, and for this reason he was not too fond of the concurring Neo-Malthusian movement in France, which he felt did not address the core of the issue at hand, and he feared that recent developments in contraception will lead to even more sexual intercourse – and greater moral corruption – overall.

Grabowsky insisted that the social question is primarily a sexual question. Not only will sexual abstinence bring about moral progress, but it will also spare countless unborn beings from coming into existence and avoid a “procreative Ponzi scheme” (as David Benatar would put it). He writes:

How the course of human history has unfolded so far has been a matter of necessity. But it is also a necessity that humanity increasingly reaches greater moral and spiritual development. And the social question will also be brought ever closer to its solution, wars will also cease more and more (the abolition of wars is the solution to the social question of the social question among the individual nations). The complete solution to the social question will only be achieved with the extinction of mankind. [Enthaltsamkeit …, p. 48.]

Unlike Kurnig and many other pessimists, however, Grabowsky strongly believed in a life after death, and that earthly hardships will eventually be rewarded with heavenly bliss in the afterlife because, according to Grabowsky, the total amount of happiness in the world will always remain constant:

Since every mature person must give up hope of earthly happiness (he can only acquire peace of mind in the prospect of the hereafter), it is not justifiable for him to leave behind descendants of his misery in this sad world. It is enough that I have suffered. Why do I need to pass on my suffering to others? I want to be good and take up my cross alone, without passing it on to other shoulders. And that is the general reason for my decision of permanent sexual abstinence. […]

The probability of continued existence already exists because the earthly pain imposed on us through no fault of our own demands with compelling necessity a compensation for ourselves, which, however, cannot be found in this life. However, this probability of continued existence can only lead us to maintain our own existence despite the misery of our existence. But the mature person may not, on the basis of continued existence, grant himself the right to bring offspring into this world at will. Just as little as he may inflict an evil on anyone else with the excuse that fate will direct it for the best. [Enthaltsamkeit …, p. 8, 15.]

In addition to his work outlining his opposition to procreation, sex and sensual love, Grabowsky also wrote about – and against – all kinds of things, including diatribes against mainstream philosophy, music (of all things), vegetarianism, tobacco and alcohol. Nonetheless, he considered himself to be a brilliant thinker on par with Spinoza, Kant and Schopenhauer, who perfected what these philosophers failed to do and who, after some five millennia, finally solved the greatest mysteries of the world – Grabowsky even claimed that his contributions “surpassed the discoveries of Copernicus and Columbus”. Unsurprisingly, he was deeply outraged at the public mostly ignored his work and did not honour his “groundbreaking achievements”, which he felt should have brought him great fame and glory instead. He complained he did not have a single friend or supporter in the world, and significant portions of his work consist of bitter complaints about his very frustrating personal situation as a destitute physician and writer and as a misunderstood genius and saviour of humanity who is constantly wresting with his sexual demons.

Now, what do you make of this? Norbert Grabowsky was definitely an odd character and an unorthodox thinker whose ideas never found favour and are completely forgotten today. Was he just an extreme case of “sour grapes”? Or can we find some traces of brilliance in his work, too? I listed and linked some of his books below so you can read it for yourselves, if you are interested, and draw your own conclusions.

a selection of Norbert Grabowsky’s books

The curious case of Johann Robeck (1672–1735)


Introduction

Perhaps you have come across his name before. You might remember this passage from part 3 of Al Alvarez’s The Savage God: A Study of Suicide (1973; pp. 143–144 in my 2002 paperback edition):

First and most important, suicide is a closed world with its own irresistible logic. This is not to say that people commit suicide, as the Stoics did, coolly, deliberately, as a rational choice between rational alternatives. The Romans may have disciplined themselves into accepting this frigid logic but those who have done so in modern history are, in the last analysis, monsters. And like all monsters, they are hard to find. In 1735 John Robeck, a Swedish philosopher, completed a long Stoic defence of suicide as a just, right and desirable act; he then carefully put his principles into practice by giving away his property and drowning himself in the Weser. His death was the sensation of the day. It provoked Voltaire to comment, through one of the characters in Candide: ‘I have seen a prodigious number of people who hold their existence in execration; but I have only seen a dozen who voluntarily put an end to their misery, three negroes, four Englishmen, four Genevois, and a German professor called Robeck.’ Even for Voltaire, the supreme rationalist, a purely rational suicide was something prodigious and slightly grotesque.

The words quoted can be found in chapter 12 of Voltaire’s Candide, ou l’optimisme (Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol 48, p. 162), they are spoken by an old woman who, in spite of her pessimistic outlook on life and all the suffering she had to endure, clings to life.

Johann Robeck, his work and his fate are also mentioned in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, III, 21 (tr. Kenrick, pp. 159, 169):

You would have me apply to the test of reason: I will; let us reason. You desire me to deliberate in proportion to the importance of the question in debate; I agree to it. Let us investigate truth with temper and moderation; let us discuss this general proposition with the same indifference we should treat any other. Roebeck wrote an apology for suicide before he put an end end to his life. I will not, after his example, write a book on the subject, neither am I well satisfied with that which he has penned, but I hope in this discussion at least to imitate his moderation.

[…]

A strange letter this for the discussion of such a subject! Do men argue so coolly on a question of this nature, when they examine it on their own accounts? Is the letter a forgery, or does the author reason only with an intent to be refuted? What makes our opinion in this particular dubious, is the example of Robeck, which he cites, and which seems to warrant his own. Robeck deliberated so gravely, that he had patience to write a book, a large, voluminous, weighty, and dispassionate book; and when he had concluded, according to his principles, that it was lawful to put an end to our being, he destroyed himself with the same composure that he wrote. Let us beware of the prejudices of the times, and of particular countries. When suicide is out of fashion, we conclude that none but madmen destroy themselves; all the efforts of courage appear chimerical to dastardly minds; every one judges of others by himself. Nevertheless, how many instances are there, well attested, of men, in every other respect perfectly discreet, who, without remorse, rage, or despair, have quitted life for no other reason than because it was a burthen to them, and have died with more composure than they lived.

So, who is this guy, this early advocate of a right to die, this shining example of rational suicide? Let me tell you: Most information you can find on him, both in printed publications and on the internet (including the English Wikipedia entry), is very unreliable. (People can’t even get his name and his year of death right…) Was he German or Swedish? What was his profession? And, most importantly, what did he actually have to say about suicide?

I have done a lot of research on him, and I’ve got to set a few things straight here. Let me start with a brief overview of his life.

Biography

Johan(n) Robeck (note: some Swedish sources give his name as Jonas) was born in Kalmar, Sweden, on September 13, 1672, in a distinguished and respectable family: His father, Matt(h)ias Robeck, was the mayor of the town. He enjoyed a good upbringing, and his exceptional talents didn’t go unnoticed. He studied theology and philosophy for ten years at the university of Uppsala, Sweden. He wrote a philosophical dissertation, which he sought to defend, but, for reasons unknown, he was not permitted to do so. Frustrated, he left his native Sweden and went to Germany.

Robeck converted to Catholicism in Hildesheim, Germany, and joined the Jesuit order in 1705. He became a priest and rose to pretty high ranks, and he spent the next three decades carrying out various missions throughout Europe for the Jesuit order and the Catholic church, eventually settling in 1727 near my hometown of Hamburg, Germany. He did not, however, return to Sweden.

In 1734, Robeck left the Jesuit order and came to the town of Rinteln, Germany, in order to devote himself to his studies, especially of the Stoics, at the local university (which, by the way, closed in 1810) under Professor Johann Nicolaus Funck (1698–1778). During this time, he buried himself in his books, became a recluse, and rarely even left his room. After spending a year in Rinteln, Robeck wrote a letter to Funck, announcing he was going to undertake a final journey, citing health reasons (“an excess of black bile”). He donated most of his books and manuscripts and some money to the library and gave away most of his possessions, and, though they had not been very close, he tasked Funck with publishing one of his works and sent him the money for the printing expenses. Thus, Robeck set out for Bremen, Germany, taking only a modest suitcase with a couple of personal belongings with him. But once he arrived in Bremen, on June 17, 1735, he sent those back to Funck and, in a final letter, advised him to give them to the poor.

Then Robeck reportedly, wearing his finest clothes, rented a small boat, and, to the dismay of the bystanders, departed from the shore alone. Three days later, his corpse was found in the river Weser, about three miles from the city, and buried in a nearby village.

Upon receiving these news, Funck decided to print what would be Robeck’s famous defence of suicide. Funck was confronted with the difficult task of editing the controversial work of an esteemed colleague he fundamentally disagreed with, but, fulfilling his wish, he added an index, as well as a 52-page preface and a lot of annotations, which often take up most of the page, to try to refute Robeck’s arguments. The book was published in the following year.

• Iohannis Robeck Calmaria–Suedi exercitatio philosophica de εὐλόγῳ ἐξαγωγῇ, sive morte voluntaria philosophorum et bonorum virorum, etiam Iudaeorum et Christianorum. Recensuit, perpetuis animadversionibus notavit, praefatus est et indicem rerum locupletissimum addidit Ioh. Nicolaus Funccius Marburgensis. Rintelii 1736. (LII + 319 + 20 pp.) (Scan)

Funck’s preface includes a biographical section (pp. I–X), also quoting Robeck’s letters, and this is probably the only reliable primary source we have on Robeck’s biography.

Some 17 years later, in 1753, Funck edited another one of Robeck’s manuscripts. This was, essentially, the second part of his treatise – not just a new edition with a different title, as this biography claims. Again, Funck added an index and a lot of annotations as well as an essay on the causes of suicide.

• Iohannis Robeck Calmaria–Suedi de morte voluntaria exercitatio, sive examen calumniarum, nugarum et fallaciarum, quibus tanquam argumentis utuntur εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς consensus generis humani, salutis et gloriae bonorum virorum honestarumque feminarum hostes et oppugnatores. Perpetuis animadversionibus notavit, praefatus est et indicem rerum addidit Iohannes Nicolaus Funccius Marburgensis. Marburgi 1753. (36 + 384 + 16 pp.) (Scan 1, Scan 2)

Let us now take a look at the work itself.

Part I

After some preliminary reflections and discussions, Robeck presents twelve arguments for the moral permissibility of voluntary death. I will attempt to give a brief outline of these here:

[pp. 101–102] The utter weakness and ridiculousness of his opponents’ arguments.

[pp. 102–123] There is no actual law that obliges us to love life so much that we may under no circumstances end it. A love for the good is innate in us, but it is not the cardinal rule of our actions. Instincts themselves do not yet constitute a law; laws are usually contrary to instincts. We are endowed with reason to control our animal nature. Self-love is older and stronger than what could be prescribed by law, and therefore, such a law would be redundant. The love of bodily life is the source of all sins and vices. — The commandment to love our neighbours as ourselves does not actually command self-love, which is presupposed and only serves as some kind of benchmark. Self-love even remains in those who choose voluntary death, some people even killed themselves out of self-love. Christ declares only the love of God and the love of neighbour to be the most important commandments, not the love of oneself, and only by virtue of the other two, self-love becomes reasonable. As with vice, sad consequences are connected to the act of committing suicide, but, likewise, also with not committing suicide.

[pp. 124–138] Unlike with animals, the love of life is not the primary driving force for thoughts, decisions and deliberate acts, and not the aim which they are, or should be, directed at. It is merely subordinate to the “main love” of happiness (εὐδαιμονία), and this type of love is peculiar to rational beings. We do not love happiness for the sake of life, but we love life as a means to achieve the supreme good of happiness. Thus, if life is only a means of unhappiness, it is not worth preserving. If we are allowed, in many cases, to kill others, why not ourselves?

[pp. 139–142] The body itself has very little value, it only receives its value through its use, and it is preserved for this reason alone. If it becomes harmful and corrupted, it may be disposed of and destroyed, like other things of this kind; it would perish anyway after a short time due to its perishable nature.

[pp. 143–156] Though philosophers have come to different conclusions about the soul, life and its purpose, nevertheless, according to all it is permissible to take one’s own life for “just and necessary” reasons. Regardless of whether the soul is simple or complex, immortal or mortal, it is always the highest and most excellent good. (Remember, guys: Главное это душа!) The body, when compared to the soul, is inferior and merely a tool, and often a useless one, often a hindrance, burden, fetters, and pain. If the soul, too, is material and mortal, then it is foolish for one, when a painful and shameful death is imminent, not to choose an easy and honourable one; if the soul is immaterial and immortal, then it is not necessary to choose a death with long agonies rather than a milder and shorter one. Likewise, it is not necessary to let oneself be abused and then killed rather than dying without disgrace by one’s own hand. Regarding the highest good, all philosophers agree that it is not life itself, but something else, for example, virtue (perfected reason), the absence of pain, etc.

[pp. 157–164] When benefits stop being beneficial, and when they start being useless, harmful and painful, and when you can barely keep them without losing virtue, then it does not make sense to force someone to keep those, or prevent them from disposing of those. God is not such a tyrant. We should, in fact, ask ourselves the question if death is, perhaps, even preferable to life as it is; many wise authors, both Christian and Pagan, have expressed a preference for death.

[pp. 164–166] Whatever can be said against voluntary death, could also be said against self-defense, that is, defending one’s life, one’s chastity, or one’s property by killing an attacker. This kind of self-defence also seems to be inconsistent with the commandments not to kill, to love one’s neighbour as oneself, to lay down one’s life for others, to resist injustice, to regard God as the master of life, to expel no one from the ‘station of life’, etc.

[pp. 167–170] In certain cases, killing oneself is in accordance with perfect reason, which is above all laws and all human authority, which judges good and evil, which is in accordance with both Nature and itself immutable, and which deserves no less respect and authority than the Holy Scripture, and more obedience than the orders of the powers that be, as it is the highest good humans can act on. It does not, however, demand that humans, under all circumstances, including the most horrible ones, continue living, as the previous arguments and refutations have shown.

[pp. 171–178] Voluntary death is the protection of natural laws, of virtues and of duties, a pillar of freedom, tranquillity, and happiness, as far as these are attainable, and master over necessity; it dismantles the excuses of shamefulness, it reveals the effects of superstition, cowardice, and excessive love of life, all of which try to hide themselves.

[pp. 178–300] There are countless examples among all peoples (Greeks, Romans, Asians, and Africans) that, through their expressed opinions, customs, and institutions, approve of such a death. There is no nation among which it would be considered forbidden to kill oneself without harm to others, for a good, just, important, and necessary cause. If anything, those who did it, are seen as great, useful, and honourable examples of a brave soul that despises life and death, while those who allowed themselves to suffer most shameful things are seen as degenerate and cowardly.

[pp. 301–306] If one is not allowed to end one’s life if there is a good reason to do so, then the use of life, wisdom, and virtue would be significantly reduced, if not eliminated altogether. One would have to abandon oneself to the wantonness and abuse of the fools and the wicked.
[pp. 307–319] The option of voluntary death is, for a wise and brave person, a strong motivation for excellent deeds; life, if you are required to keep it no matter what, is a hindrance for such deeds. Superstitious and cowardly people will, with their words, sayings, pretenses, interpretations, and threats, never be able to overcome the common human nature; and those that have a shameful and sorrowful life ahead of them, the end of which they must expect, but not bring about themselves, will not, by themselves, refuse the option of voluntary death, unless the means are taken away from them. For example, Samson’s most glorious deed was his final one, which overshadows all other actions in his life, as the Holy Scripture makes clear by stating that, in his death, he has killed more enemies than in his life. If you take voluntary death away, then all of that last glory of Samson, the enemies’ death and sorrow, the friends’ joy, and the welfare of the fatherland would be taken away along with it.

Part II

In this treatise, Robeck focusses on refuting common objections and counter-arguments made by those who deny that there is voluntary death is, or can be, morally permissible – in particular Lactantius, Augustine, Lipsius, and Rachelius. However, at the end of the work (pp. 378–379), Robeck also explains in which cases he believes suicide is not permissible:

Addo demum et adversariis concedo, atque severius etiam, quam ipsi, damno necem non sui modo, sed et aliorum, imo vel pecudis, si temere, inconsulte, promiscue, ex ira, odio, furore, crudelitate et quocunque vitio, malove impetu vel affectu fiat. […] Damno etiam, si quis se vel educat, vel occidat, dum Deo, patriae, civibus, proximis utiliter servire potest: praesertim sine intolerabili, aut graviore tormento sui. Confiteor hunc talem peccare, facereque aliquam quasi iniuriam Deo, et illis quibus prodesse posset vivus. Quod si nihil aliud velint urgeantque adversarii, lis omnis est finita; imo nulla ab initio fuit.

“Finally, I add and concede to my opponents, and, even more harshly than they themselves, I condemn murder not only of oneself, but also of others, indeed, even of cattle, if it is done without good cause, without due care and consideration, without distinction, out of anger, hate, rage, cruelty, and any vice, or bad impulse or passion. […] I also condemn, if someone ‘releases’, or kills, themself, while they can still serve God, their fatherland, fellow citizens, and close ones in a useful way: especially (if it happens) without unbearable or greater torment. I admit: Such a one sins and commits some kind of injustice against God and those to whom they could be of use while they were alive. Therefore, if my opponents want and press nothing else, then the whole debate is settled, in fact, there has never been one from the start.” (my own translation)

Conclusion

Johann Robeck may have been an odd person, but he was an extremely learned man. He dedicated most of his life to his extensive philosophical and theological studies and was held in high regard by his peers. He was not shy to show his vast knowledge and erudition, and he often cites passages from Christian, Greek and Roman authors as well as from contemporary scholars. Robeck draws a lot on Stoic philosophy, especially on Seneca’s 70th epistle. Some, as we have seen, describe his style as cold and rational, others as impassionated or even enthusiastic, and, of course, his own biases shine through here and there. It is true that the structure of the work seems somewhat convoluted at times. But one thing is for sure: He was very serious about the subject and his position, and even his most vehement critics praised the elegance of his Latin and his level of erudition.

Robeck’s work was a major contribution to the discussion of the ethics of suicide in the age of Enlightenment. Before him, there had been, for example, John Donne (1572–1631), who had already written an infamous book entitled Βιαθάνατος [Biathanatos]: A Declaration of that Paradox, or Thesis, that Self-homicide is not so Naturally Sin, that it may never be otherwise. Wherein the Nature, and the extent of all those Laws, which seem to be violated by this Act, are diligently surveyed, which was published posthumously in 1648, some 40 years after its composition, and offered an attempt to “descandalize” the phenomenon of suicide. Remarkably, Donne himself confessed: “I have often such a sickly inclination”. A few years after Robeck, perhaps following in his footsteps, David Hume (1711–1776) wrote his influential essay “On Suicide” (1755).

I believe Robeck’s work is definitely worth reading and deserves to reach a wider audience. Unfortunately, it is written entirely in Latin – but, fortunately, I am fluent in Latin. I have already transcribed both books, save for Funck’s annotations, which took me a couple of months. I am currently proof-reading the whole thing and looking for a way to adapt his 18th century orthography and formatting to somewhat more readable standards. Once that is done, I am thinking about translating the work into English. This will require even more time and effort than my Kurnig project, but please let me know if you’re interested, or if you would like to help.

Edit: Here is my work in progress file of the Latin text.

Thank you for reading.

originally posted on Reddit [2022-12-01]

https://lennysarchive.wordpress.com/2024/04/11/a-well-travelled-jesuit-priest-a-reclusive-scholar-a-convoluted-defence-of-voluntary-death-and-a-corpse-in-a-river-the-curious-case-of-johann-robeck-1672-1735/

Ulrich Horstmann’s “Das Untier” (1983): An introduction for non-German readers

 


Hello everyone.

Unless you’re German – and even then – I assume you’re not familiar with Ulrich Horstmann, as he is virtually unknown outside of Germany. Which is a great pity, considering how important his contributions to pessimistic philosophy are, and how radical the positions voiced in his own works are.

Let me first give you a brief introduction: Who is Ulrich Horstmann?

Ulrich Horstmann (*1949) is a German writer, philosopher and now retired professor of English and American literature at the University of Gießen. Besides his successful academic career, in which he did research on pessimism and the concept of melancholy, he edited a number of works by authors such as Robert Burton and Philipp Mainländer (in fact, Horstmann’s 1989 edition of Mainländer’s Philosophie der Erlösung played a major part in bringing this long-forgotten philosopher back from the dead, so to speak), as well as anthologies of melancholic and suicidal literature. It’s quite clear that Horstmann has a penchant for the darker realms of thinking and philosophy, his favourites include A. Schopenhauer and E. M. Cioran, and this also reflects in his own way of writing and thinking: Being a prolific writer, he published a number of novels, collections of essays, aphorisms, and poems, all of which share his distinctive, masterful style and deeply pessimist, even misanthropic, mindset – a true literary prophet of doom and gloom, as they say!

Ulrich Horstmann is probably most known for his highly controversial 1983 book Das Untier, which I believe should be of particular interest for people who subscribe to “life extinctionist” worldviews, and given how scarce the English-language resources on this work are (here is one of the very few English articles that deal with his philosophy), I thought I could, perhaps, fill this gap.

Das Untier … Well, how do you even translate the title? “Tier” in German means “animal”, and the prefix “Un-” denotes something negative, or horrifying, something inherently evil, or something that should not even exist. So, “Untier” is often translated as “beast” or “monster”. For Horstmann’s book, however, the distinguished antinatalist philosopher Karim Akerma came up with “The Beast That is Not a Beast”. It is precisely this term – “Untier” – which Horstmann uses instead of the euphemism “human”.

His book is an outline of the history of mankind and philosophy, but from a very unique perspective, for which Horstmann coined the term “anthropofugal”, which means the opposite of our common anthropocentric worldview, rejecting any emotionally biased bonds with the species he belongs to. From this perspective, he goes on to describe the development of human thought and actions, especially the violent and destructive aspects, which, he argues, point to mankind’s destiny being its self-destruction.

He then proceeds to describe the development and the power of modern weapons. But while most people back then (keep in mind, this book was written during the Cold War) warned against the destructive potential of these weapons and campaigned for peace, Horstmann did the exact opposite: In his book, he actually argued, openly and unironically, in favour of a total annihilation of the human race, a complete destruction of the planet, and the eradication of every trace of life by means of a final, massive thermonuclear strike in order to end suffering once and for all. This state, the earth having become like a moon after a pasteurization of the entire biosphere, is what Horstmann, as a harbinger of the apocalypse, calls, in grandiose style, the true paradise.

In imagining a world where all life is extinct and no humans – and no philosophers – are left, he takes it upon himself to write a piece of what he calls “Eventualitätsphilosophie”, or, extreme case scenario philosophy. As this cannot be done to retroactively legitimize the actions that would lead to such a scenario, it has to be done beforehand, in advance, so to speak, which, at the same time, places the author well outside of both conventional philosophy and satire. However, it should be noted that the work is not devoid of satirical elements: It is prefaced by a quote of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662): Se moquer de la philosophie c’est vraiment philosopher. (“To mock philosophy is to philosophize truly.”), there are some allusions to Jonathan Swift, and the tone of the book can get somewhat satirical when Horstmann mocks the useless efforts of peace activists, or when he points out flaws in the systems of renowned philosophers (especially Leibniz and Hegel) and describes their obliviousness to mankind’s destructive side and their failure to recognize that humans shouldn’t even be here in the first place. A. Schopenhauer, E. von Hartmann and E. M. Cioran, on the other hand, receive lots of praise, not only for their acknowledgement of suffering in the world, but also for their suggestions as to how mankind could use its destructive forces and resources to end this suffering. (And, I’m sure, so would Mainländer, had Horstmann been acquainted with his philosophy by the time he wrote Das Untier!)

When it was first released, Das Untier caused a major controversy, Horstmann got lots of hate mail and even death threats, but it also won him the Kleist Prize of literature. Today, with nuclear threats being once again on the news every day, it makes a very interesting, and highly relevant, read.

Now, where can you find and read Das Untier? A PDF version is available for free download at Horstmann’s personal website www.untier.de.

Sadly, as far as I know, it has not been translated into English yet. But at least I was able to find an auto-generated translation of the book here, perhaps this could give you an idea. As you might know, right now, I’m working on an English translation of a German antinatalist philosopher who goes by the name of Kurnig (for more information, check this post), whose literary style, however, is much easier to understand and to translate than Horstmann’s. But who knows what the future might bring…

So what what are your thoughts on this? Would you be interested in reading the book, or have you, perhaps, read it already?

Thank you for reading.

originally published on Reddit [2022-08-02]

Also check out my updated presentation of Das Untier on Voidcast #5

https://lennysarchive.wordpress.com/about/

Saturday, October 17, 2026

The Hermit of Wallasey Village


all info by Steve Jones (fellow admin on North Wirral Facebook Group)

Gotthold Johann Frederick Krueger, who had been known locally as Frederick Krueger, the Wallasey Hermit, was found dead in his hut in a field adjoining Green Lane, Wallasey, on 8th March 1909 by a labourer, Charles Webster of 2 Russell Road. He had lived in the area for up to 30 years and although everyone knew who he was, few knew much about him.

At the inquest some of his past was revealed. He was born in Mecklenburg about 1848 and his family was said to have been on the personal staff of the King of Prussia. He had graduated at Rostock, Munich and Leipzig Universities; was a Greek and Latin scholar as well as being fluent in English, French and Italian; not only a brilliant musician - a concert pianist of some note - but also a composer of some repute; and practised law in Germany; and had been a member of the German Diplomatic Corps where he was supposed to have gone to Peking to represent his country but came to England instead.

It was thought that he had lived in the Wallasey Village area for about 30 years, spending the last 20 years as a recluse living in a corrugated-iron hut on the Wallasey Golf Club links, off Green Lane. He apparently had no relatives in England and his main source of income was a small allowance from Germany. This was barely enough to maintain him but some locals, feeling an affection for him, gave him money out of charity. Probably the only person he was in direct contact with was Samuel Howard, market gardener of Green Lane, Wallasey, at whose address Krueger used to receive any mail. He was in the habit of calling on the market gardener two or three times a week for fresh water.

When Wallasey Golf Club was founded and laid out in 1891, Krueger was already living on the site of the new course and his garden became an out of bounds for the 8th hole. This lasted until 1953 when the rule was abandoned.

On Monday 8th March at 8am, Charles Webster, who was working in a field near Krueger's hut and hadn't seen the hermit for some time, knocked at his door. Receiving no answer but seeing what he thought was a body lying on the floor, he called at the police station. PC Robert Gilpin, stationed at Wallasey, went with Webster and breaking down the door found the hermit in a kneeling position, dead. Very few people had seen inside the hut which was 15ft long, 6ft wide, 12ft high and partioned into three. There was an extensive library including classical subjects in Latin and Greek, and also music by Wagner, Mozart and Krueger himself. However, it was a total clutter.

Removing the body to the Poulton Reading Room in Limekiln Lane was a problem as they had to keep Krueger's five retriever dogs at bay. The corpse was in a very dirty condition and although there was no marks of violence, the Coroner stated that the skin on the left cheek and by the bridge of the nose had been gnawed by rats and that the deceased had suffered from a strangulated hernia and peritonitis, which was the cause of death. The deceased had been dead for three to four days.

Everyone talked about the hermit of Wallasey, who was described as being very hunched, a Bohemian type with a drooping moustache, but very few knew him. He was heard to say that he had no friends and wished to exist alone and all he desired was the right to pass his days in study and contemplation. Why did this highly educated and talented man abandon his cultured world for a country where he had no connections and live the life of a recluse? The Wallasey Villagers clubbed together to pay for a proper funeral, so that he would not have to be buried in a pauper's grave. Frederick Krueger's secret died with him in a small ramshackle hut in Wallasey.

The Age of Solitude. Beyond the stigma: How intentional silence is becoming a modern survival strategy for the soul.




Introduction: The Quiet Revolution of Being Alone

Being alone has never been easy. Throughout history, solitude has been conceived as loneliness—something to be pitied or feared, a condition of the rejected or unwanted. It was the opposite of belonging, an shadow cast by human failure to connect.

And yet, solitude is being repackaged today. In the calm of a corner café, on solitary walks of many miles, or in nights without screens, increasingly people are discovering that solitude can be an act of empowerment, even liberation. No longer connoting loneliness, solitude is increasingly being redefined as a decision: a conscious taking of time and space for reflection, renewal, and focus.

This isn't a fleeting lifestyle phenomenon—it's a fundamental shift in culture. In an age that's both hyperconnected and overstimulated, loneliness is increasingly becoming a survival strategy and a declaration of what it is to live well.

Solitude Throughout Time: From Sacred Practice to Suspicion

The irony of solitude is that even though it has sometimes been demonized, it has at other times been sanctified throughout history.

In spiritual cultures, isolation was a path to transcendence. Christian desert monks of the 3rd and 4th centuries withdrew from the turmoil of the Roman Empire to live in caves, believing silence brought them closer to God. Buddhist monks sat in mountain caves to eliminate illusions. Sufi mystics withdrew to practice khalwa—spiritual solitude.

For artists and philosophers, solitude has always been fertile ground. Thoreau's Walden was a paean of individualism and union with nature. Nietzsche warned that art required distance from "the herd." The Romantic poets, wandering singly through wood and meadow, found in solitude a spiritual affinity with nature.

And yet, there remained suspicion. In most cultures, the lone person was considered strange, even threatening. The 20th century tended to value extroversion—being social was seen as the sign of sanity and achievement. In post-war America, suburban living centered on suburban block parties and corporate collaboration. Loneliness, on the other hand, had the scent of deviance.

This ambivalence still exists today, but it is beginning to shift.

Why Solitude Now? The Modern Drivers of a Movement

Different forces are converging to make loneliness not only more common, but even more appealing.

1. Technology Fatigue.

Our phones make us always available. From Slack notifications, WhatsApp conversations, and Instagram tales, we are rarely alone even when physically remote. The majority now crave solitude as a cure for the fatigue of being always on. A 2023 Pew survey found that nearly 60% of young adults actually schedule "offline time" per week.

2. City Overstimulation.

From cacophonous traffic to bright billboards, modern cities overstimulate our senses. Noise pollution alone has been linked to heightened stress and cardiovascular disease. Aloneness—especially in nature—grants sensory relief.

3. Mental Health and Self-Care.

As burnout speeds up, solitude is increasingly offered as therapy. Loneliness is quoted by psychologists as reducing stress, improving concentration, and maintaining emotions in check. What was once viewed as antisocial now carries the guise of self-care.

4. Generational Shifts.

Millennials and Gen Z are remaking the social playbook. Marriage, children, and group-based living are not the norm anymore. Autonomy, independence, and adaptive lifestyles are coveted by most—solitude snugly fits into these.

5. The Pandemic Reset.

COVID-19, traumatic as it was, rendered solitude the norm. Lockdowns forced individuals to confront solitude. For others, it revealed nice surprises: freedom from the commute, room for hobbies, reflection. Many chose to maintain solitude in the life after the pandemic.

The Psychology of Solitude: Benefits and Threats

The Bright Side.

When voted into office, solitude provides remarkable benefits:

• Creativity. Excellent ideas often come not from brainstorming in groups, but from quiet contemplation alone. Neuroscientists find that "default mode network" brain activity—correlated with creativity—is strongest in quiet, introspective time.

• Self-Reflection. Solitude enables us to think about our own lives without other people's pressure. Journaling, meditating, or daydreaming quietly can bring clarity.

• Restoration. Solitude reduces mental fatigue, lowers cortisol levels, and replenishes emotional reservoirs.

• Autonomy. Alone time enhances agency, offering relief from social expectation.

The Shadow Side.

When solitude turns to isolation, however, risks are incurred:

• Loneliness. Persistent lack of connection is associated with depression and premature death. The U.S. Surgeon General has even labeled loneliness a public health epidemic.

• Social Atrophy. Over-withdrawal can blunt social skills, with re-entry becoming more difficult.

• Stigma. In extroverted societies, alone people can be misunderstood or suspect.

Finally, the distinction is in choice. Solitude is uplifting when voluntary, but damaging when involuntary.

Solitude vs. Isolation: Fasting vs. Starvation

The line between solitude and isolation can be drawn by analogy: solitude is like fasting, while isolation is like starvation. Both are abstentions, but one of them is voluntary and potentially enriching, while the other is coerced and debilitating.

This is significant. The dominance of voluntary solitude today signals empowerment, not abandonment.

Cultural Attitudes: East and West Diverge—Then Converge

Cultural attitudes towards solitude vary extensively.

Extroversion has been idealized in America and much of Western Europe for decades. "Team players" are what employers desire. Children are pressured to have friends and be involved in activities. The solitary student is typically branded "shy" or "troubled.".

Conversely, solitude is widely accepted in many Asian cultures. Sabi—the stillness of solitude—has been cherished by Japanese culture for centuries. Retreat into nature is rejoiced in by the Daoist philosophers in China. Sages who retreat to contemplate are venerated figures in India.

But globalization and technology are eroding these frontiers. In Tokyo, as in New York, people hunger for private escapes from crowded metros and from screen life. A 2021 cross-cultural survey found that teens on the two sides of the Pacific both highly valued solitude as essential to well-being.

How Solitude Is Reshaping Relationships, Community, and Work

The impacts of solitude extend far beyond individual psychology.

1. Relationships.

Solitude is transforming the way that people envision intimacy. Increasing numbers of couples live apart in close relationships—so-called "LAT" (Living Apart Together) partnerships. Friends might get together less frequently, but have richer exchanges when they do. Solitude reimagines closeness not as continuous presence, but as purposeful presence.

2. Communities.

Willful solitude allows for a shift towards less structured, more fluid modes of affiliation. Instead of close but obligatory communities, people are forming interest-based communities, often on-line, where one joins voluntarily. Solitude does not kill off community—it remakes it in more independent forms.

3. Work.

The office is undergoing a revolution of solitude. Remote work, hybrid calendars, and philosophies of "deep work" all recognize that uninterrupted alone time is necessary to productivity. Companies like Basecamp and GitLab explicitly encourage solitude to foster concentration.

Real-World Stories: Solitude in Practice

• Maya, a programmer in Berlin, teleworks three days a week. She spends afternoons alone walking in parks without headphones. "It's the only time I feel I can hear myself think," she says. It keeps her isolated as much as anything but makes her more energetic in team meetings.

• Carlos, a writer in Mexico City, rents a tiny cabin outside the city twice a year for a week of complete solitude. No internet, no phone. “It’s my creative reset,” he explains. “Every big project I’ve finished started in those silent weeks.”

• Ayumi, a nurse in Tokyo, began eating lunch alone during the pandemic. Necessity became preference. "I used to feel ashamed having lunch alone. Now I value it. It's my little act of recovery."

These stories remind us of loneliness not as social withdrawal but as the way for refueling so that connection can be deeper.

Expert Views

Psychologist Dr. Thuy-vy Nguyen noted that loneliness is a learned skill: "People feel uncomfortable at first. But after practicing, solitude proves to be a good tool for emotional regulation."

Philosopher Paul Tillich described solitude as "the glory of being alone," in contrast with loneliness as "the pain of being alone."

MIT sociologist Sherry Turkle warns in Alone Together that without the ability to be alone, true intimacy is eclipsed: "If we don't learn to be alone, we will only know how to be lonely."

Solitude in the Digital Age: Resistance or Adaptation?

Is the modern welcome to solitude a resistance—or an adaptation?

On the one hand, it resists the hyperconnected consumerist and social media ethos. To be alone is to reject constant productivity and attention-seeking. Solitude is a rebellion in silence.

On the other hand, it's adaptation. In a time of overstimulation, solitude is balance. Like noise-canceling headphones on a loud train, it's a survival technique.

Perhaps it is both. Solitude in our era is rebellion and accommodation: denial of noise, accommodation to overloading.

The Future: A New Culture of Solitude

As solitude becomes more accepted, society itself may alter in unanticipated ways. Offices may designate "solitude zones." Schools may teach the value of quiet reflection as well as collaboration. Relationships may thrive not through constant contact but through respected boundaries of solitude.

Loneliness may even revolutionize politics and culture. A culture comfortable with loneliness may be immune to polarization fueled by digital echo chambers, as individuals rooted in contemplation may be less likely to react.

Conclusion: The Paradox of Solitude and Belonging

The era of solitude does not portend the demise of community. Instead, it may prophesy its resurgence. Solitude, when self-chosen, allows human beings to recharge and return to society better grounded, truer to themselves, and more capable of relating.

To learn to be alone, we paradoxically expand our capacity for belonging. Solitude is not absence—it is presence. It is presence with oneself, with nature, with mind, and, lastly, with others.

The ascendance of voluntary solitude is not an opting out of society but a rebalancing of it. Perhaps the future will not be about how we connect but how judiciously we oscillate between isolation and people.

In a seething world, solitude is the new frontier of liberty.

About the Creator

The Chaos Cabinet
A collection of fragments—stories, essays, and ideas stitched together like constellations. A little of everything, for the curious mind.

https://vocal.media/authors/the-chaos-cabinet

https://vocal.media/psyche

Picard, Max. The World of Silence. review

 

Chicago: Regnery, 1989. (U.S. ed., English translation)

This classic work is so filled with aphoristic passages that it is easy to lose sight of the larger premise. That premise, that silence is not the absence of noise, the absence of something, but is a phenomenon in itself, was startlingly clear only when this work first appeared in 1948.

As a German Swiss Catholic theologian, Picard is strongly influenced by the Catholic phenomenologist Gabriel Marcel, who wrote the preface to this edition, but also by related philosophers such as Heidegger, and by the whole thrust of lyric German poets like Rilke and Holderlin. Equally strong, however, is the influence of the post-war atmosphere of cautious post-modern conservatism, at home in, say, Gilson, Maritain, and Thibaud - reconstructionists and rehabilitators of a broken world.

To Picard the theologian, then, silence is to be contrasted with language, the gift of consciousness that distinguishes the rational being from the universe, capable of silence and noise. Silence is the context of consciousness, language is the expression of creation. Picard sees language not as the product of the evolution of consciousness but as the gift of God, a divine jump-start for consciousness.

Through the many short chapters of his work, Picard offers impressions of the role of silence in balancing human effort and conserving virtue. But Picard's insistence on the supremacy of language versus the noise of modern technology (from construction noise to the radio) is a weak protest against time and change.

While Picard is to be commended for rescuing silence from its philosophical enemies, several resources for breaking the paradox that he proposes may be found elsewhere. For example, Ricouer's transcendence of modernity as a path, or the Zen limnology that breaks the absolutized boundary of language with silence. There are other channels into which we can navigate without depending upon language or our present "reality."

We can see Picard's hesitancy in a passage in the chapter "Nature and Silence":

The silence of nature is a conflicting silence from the human point of view. It is a blessed silence because it gives man an intuitive feeling of the great silence that was before the world and out of which everything arose. And it is oppressive at the same time because it puts man back into the state in which the word might be taken away from him again into that original silence.

But isn't this exactly what death is, this "taken away from" and return to "original silence"? This state must be explored not because it can be posited but because it suggests the natural restful state of the universe, wherein lies the consciousness we enjoy, wherein is found God. But Picard's orthodoxy makes him wary of approximating his discovery of silence, pushing it metaphysically or theologically to reveal itself. This is the ultimate irresolution of an otherwise breakthrough work.

This work is invaluable in inoculating us against the fear of silence, in seeing silence as a natural state, in preparing us for a life of silence if we choose, the beginning of a mysticism of silence and solitude, and a death which is, after all, silence.

Picard's compelling and even beautiful passages in favorite chapters such as "Nature and Silence," "Poetry and Silence," "The Plastic Arts and Silence," and "Illness, Death and Silence" show us that Picard has a solid instinct. Here are three samples.

Chinese pictures are like figures in a moonlit mist over the world of silence, woven from moon threads over the silence.

The seasons move in silence through the changing year. Spring does not come from winter; it comes from the silence from which winter came.

In the fables of the Golden Age we are told that men understood the language of all animals, trees, flowers, and grasses. That is a reminder of the fact that in the first language that had just come from the fullness of silence, there was still the all-containing fullness.



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