To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label Intelligent Design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intelligent Design. Show all posts

Friday, September 25, 2026

Catch-23


Science journals regularly publish articles attacking intelligent design, but they routinely reject articles defending intelligent design. For example, Darwinists have criticized Michael Behe’s arguments for ID (Chapter Ten) in many peer-reviewed science journals, including Nature, Trends in Ecology and Evolution, and the Quarterly Review of Biology. But those journals routinely refuse to publish Behe’s responses. One journal editor to whom Behe submitted a response cited a reviewer who wrote: “In this referee’s judgment, the manuscript of Michael Behe does not contribute anything useful to evolutionary science.” The editor of another journal wrote to Behe: “As you no doubt know, our journal has supported and demonstrated a strong evolutionary position from the very beginning, and believes that evolutionary explanations of all structures and phenomena of life are possible and inevitable. Hence a position such as yours . . . cannot be appropriate for our pages.”16

In Joseph Heller’s classic novel about World War II, Catch-22, an aviator could be excused from combat duty for being crazy. But a rule specified that he first had to request an excuse, and anyone who requested an excuse from combat duty was obviously not crazy, so such requests were invariably denied. The rule that made it impossible to be excused from combat duty was called “Catch-22.”

Darwinists use a similar rule—I call it “Catch-23”—to exclude intelligent design from science: intelligent design is not scientific, so it can’t be published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. How do we know it’s not scientific? Because it isn’t published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. 17 Catch-23!

The 2004 publication of Meyer’s article shattered the rule. It also alarmed Darwinists at the Smithsonian Institution (SI), with which the Biological Society of Washington (BSW) is loosely affiliated. Smithsonian Darwinists teamed up with the militantly pro-Darwin National Center for Science Education (NCSE) to control the damage to their cause. NCSE staffers sent long, detailed e-mails attacking Meyer’s article to high officials at the Smithsonian. The NCSE then worked closely with Smithsonian employees to develop a strategy of character assassination to punish Sternberg for publishing the article. To protect himself, Sternberg lodged a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), established by Congress to investigate such cases.18


Frankenstein’s castle?

To Dr. Richard Sternberg, concerning his treatment by the Smithsonian Institution (SI) after publishing a peer-reviewed article by Dr. Stephen C. Meyer on intelligent design: “Our preliminary investigation indicates that retaliation came in many forms. It came in the form of attempts to change your working conditions. . . . During the process you were personally investigated and your professional competence was attacked. Misinformation was disseminated throughout the SI and to outside sources. The allegations against you were later determined to be false. It is also clear that a hostile work environment was created with the ultimate goal of forcing you out of the SI.”

—U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 2005

In August 2005, the OSC sent Sternberg a letter notifying him that a recent administrative decision had removed his case from their jurisdiction, but confirming that “members of NCSE worked closely with SI and NMNH members in outlining a strategy to have you investigated and discredited,” noting that “OSC questions the use of appropriated funds to work with an outside advocacy group for this purpose.” The OSC letter also confirmed that the management of the Smithsonian had falsely accused Sternberg of mishandling specimens in his research and of violating Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington policies in the publication of Meyer’s article. These accusations “were published to several outside organizations,” severely damaging Sternberg’s reputation. The managers later admitted that the accusations were false, but the OSC saw no evidence that “any effort was made to recall or correct these comments once the truth was known.” There were other abuses, too, but since the OSC lost jurisdiction over the Sternberg case “the SI is now refusing to cooperate with our investigation.” Nevertheless, the OSC concluded that the management of the publicly funded Smithsonian Institution had deliberately “created a hostile working environment” for Sternberg, hoping that he would “leave or resign.”19

To investigate the Darwinists’ accusation that Sternberg had circumvented the normal peer-review process, the president of the Council of the BSW reviewed the file, and he found that the peer review had been properly conducted. Nevertheless, the council subsequently issued a statement declaring that “the Meyer paper does not meet the scientific standards of the Proceedings.”20 Although the BSW stopped short of formally retracting the article, the Darwinists did not end their ruthless campaign of character assassination against Sternberg.

Catch-23 is still enforced by most science journals, but it is now supplemented with an additional rule: if intelligent design theorists do manage to publish in a peer-reviewed science journal, Darwinists will make sure the editor suffers grievously for it.


16 Michael J. Behe, “Correspondence with Science Journals: Response to Critics Concerning Peer-Review,” Discovery Institute (August 2, 2000). Available online (April 2006) at: http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=450.

17 Jonathan Wells, “Catch-23,” Research News & Opportunities in Science and Theology, July/August 2002. Available online (April 2006) at: http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=1212.

18 Jim Giles, “Peer-reviewed paper defends theory of intelligent design,” Nature 431 (2004): 114. Trevor Stokes, “Intelligent design study appears,” The Scientist 5 (September 3, 2004): 4. Available online (April 2006) at: http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20040903/04/ See the home page of Richard M. v. Sternberg, available online (April 2006) at: http://www.rsternberg.net/. The NCSE’s and SI’s misbehavior were documented by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The OSC’s August 2005 report is available online (April 2006) at: http://www.rsternberg.net/OSC_ltr.htm.

19 David Klinghoffer, “The Branding of a Heretic,” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2005. Available online (January 2006) at: http://www.opinion-journal.com/taste/?id=110006220. Joyce Howard Price, “Researcher Claims Bias by Smithsonian,” Washington Times, February 13, 2005. Available online (January 2006) at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050213-121441-8610r.htm. Letter from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel to Dr. Richard Sternberg, August 5, 2005. Available online (January 2006) at: http://www.rsternberg.net/Documents/OSC-Sternbergpreclosure-ltr2.pdf. Barbara Bradley Haggerty, “Profile: Intelligent Design and Academic Freedom,” transcript of “All Things Considered” (NPR), November 10, 2005. Available online (January 2006) at: http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&program=CSC%20-%20Views%20and%20News&id=3083.

20 Richard Monastersky, “Biology Journal Says It Mistakenly Published paper That Attacks Darwinian Evolution,” Chronicle of Higher Education Daily News, September 10, 2004. “Statement from the Council of the Biological Society of Washington,” October 4, 2004. Available online (April 2006) at: http://www.biolsocwash.org/id_statement.html.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to Darwinism and Intelligent Design 

Jonathan Wells 

Saturday, August 29, 2026

It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God, I don’t want there to be a God

 I recall a question on a final exam near the beginning of my graduate studies at Caltech: Which of the biological macromolecules is apt to have been the first “living” molecule, and why? If that sounds like Greek to you, relax. I promise to write in plain English. All you need to know is that the question is about how life began, posed with the unstated assumption that it began by ordinary molecular processes. That assumption had been ingrained in biological thinking for so long that it went without saying. Every student in the class understood this, but I understood it more critically than most did. I knew the expected response to the test question, but through my critical lens, that response seemed scientifically questionable. So I had a choice: Do I go with the flow, or do I push against it?

I decided to give the expected answer in full and then—for extra credit—to state why I found that answer unconvincing. I explained why, contrary to the consensus view, I didn’t think any molecule has what would be needed to start life. As shrewd as that seemed at the time, I learned when my exam was returned (with points deducted) that we students were expected not only to know current thinking in biology but also to accept it without resistance. We were there as much to be acculturated as educated.

I had learned my lesson. The stream of scientific consensus flows with an almost irresistible current.

Almost.

AWKWARD SCIENCE

Of all the controversial ideas to come from modern science, none has brought more awkwardness than Darwin’s idea of evolution through natural selection. We know natural selection means “survival of the fittest,” which in one sense isn’t at all controversial. Indeed, Darwin’s observation that fitter individuals are apt to have more offspring is so obvious it hardly needs to be stated. But how can something with so little content—a truism—possibly explain the astounding richness of life?

The biggest question on everyone’s minds has never been the question of survival but rather the question of origin—our origin in particular. How did we get here? Even if you think natural selection is the answer, you have to admit to a degree of internal conflict over the matter. Francis Crick acknowledged this conflict, at least implicitly, when he cautioned that “biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved.”1 So if Darwin’s claim is true, then it’s a truth we all find ourselves doubting—at least subconsciously—and if it’s false, then we’re to be commended for doubting it. Awkwardness clings to it either way.

In fact, though you won’t see this in any textbook, Darwin implicitly conceded something that adds to the unease surrounding his theory. All six editions of his book On the Origin of Species include a few paragraphs in the conclusion where he addressed the widespread rejection of his theory by his scientific peers. He began with a question: “Why, it may be asked, have all the most eminent living naturalists and geologists rejected this view of the mutability of species?” The answer, he thought, was their closed-mindedness. Sensing little hope of opening more than a few of those minds, he decided to “look with confidence to the future, to young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with impartiality.”2To Darwin’s own great surprise, this near total rejection of his theory turned to near total acceptance within just a few years. Up to the publication of the fifth edition of his book in 1869, his original gloomy assessment of the reception of his work wasn’t in need of revision. Then in 1872, a mere three years later, the sixth edition followed those original paragraphs with this commentary:

As a record of a former state of things, I have retained in the foregoing paragraphs, and elsewhere, several sentences which imply that naturalists believe in the separate creation of each species; and I have been much censured for having thus expressed myself. But undoubtedly this was the general belief when the first edition of the present work appeared. I formerly spoke to very many naturalists on the subject of evolution, and never once met with any sympathetic agreement. It is probable that some did then believe in evolution, but they were either silent, or expressed themselves so ambiguously that it was not easy to understand their meaning. Now things are wholly changed, and almost every naturalist admits the great principle of evolution.3What would cause such a sudden reversal of scientific opinion? Did a new scientific discovery appear in the late 1860s or early 1870s—potent enough to convince the skeptics that Darwin was right after all? Clearly not, as Darwin surely would have cited such a decisive finding. But if science itself wasn’t the cause of the change, then what was?

Whether he intended to or not, Darwin reveals here that peer pressure is a part of science, happening behind the scenes as the various scientific interests compete against one another for influence. If it’s a plain historical fact that the experts didn’t side with Darwin in the early 1860s, then why would he have been “much censured” by his peers for saying so? It’s as though his colleagues wanted all mention of opposition expunged from the record now that this opposition had faded. Darwin resisted the pressure applied to him on that occasion, but what if others, perhaps under even greater pressure, were less able to resist? Might the earlier inability of some scientists to express their support of Darwin’s theory—the silence and ambiguity of expression Darwin referred to—have been the result of peer pressure too? And if so, then might the sudden change in Darwin’s favor have been more like a change of power than a change of minds—a sudden reversal of the stream’s flow?

We have good reason to consider this possibility. The question of what controls the stream—why it flows this way and not that, and why it changes when it does—is every bit as important now as it was back then. If yesterday’s scientists were influenced as much by human factors as by data, wouldn’t this be equally true of today’s scientists? And if it is true, what does this mean for the received wisdom of our day, which holds the evolutionary view to be the only one worth taking seriously?

As we think more about how science works, we’ll see that those rare people who oppose the stream are the ones to watch.

HEROIC MISFITS

Thankfully, every generation has had a handful of rebels who are compelled to do just that. A countercurrent of awkwardness flows from these misfits in refreshing waves. Among the most beautiful examples of this I’ve come across is a man named Thomas Nagel, a professor of philosophy at New York University. He’s a highly unusual atheist, the author of a superb wave-making book titled Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False.4

By way of background, the flag that has flown for many generations over the academy of higher education is that of a broad school of thought known as materialism.5 The meaning here isn’t the common one (an obsession with flashy cars or expensive clothes) but rather the view that matter—the stuff of physics—underlies everything real. Even if they don’t use this term, atheists tend to subscribe to the materialist view of reality, believing God to be a product of the human imagination, which they believe to be a product of material evolution. Theists, on the other hand, believe the reverse—that the material universe was brought into existence by God, who is not material. Both views accept the reality of the physical world, but one sees this as the only reality whereas the other doesn’t.

People on either side of this divide might think constructive dialogue is hopeless because everyone on the other side has fallen prey to wishful thinking. In practice, however, I find that atheists are more inclined toward this. Atheists have a pronounced leaning toward scientism, which is the belief that science is the only reliable source of truth. It’s entirely understandable, then, that belief in God might look to them like wishful thinking—as though people of faith have let their hearts overpower their heads. Although people of serious faith (myself included) know this to be a misconception, our holistic understanding of human belief and behavior certainly does include the heart along with the head. We fully acknowledge that emotion can get in the way of clear thinking, but since we see this as a very general condition of humanity, we would never offer it as a particular weakness of atheism, the way so many atheists offer it as a particular weakness of theism.

TWO -ISMS WORTH REMEMBERING

materialism:

the belief that physical stuff underlies everything real

scientism:

the belief that science is the only reliable source of truth

Returning to Thomas Nagel, as you may have guessed from the title of his book, he isn’t your typical atheist. Most significantly, he roundly rejects the simplistic scientism that so many atheists still cling to. His atheism is heart-driven, and he isn’t afraid to say so:

I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind.6

As a first-rate philosopher of the mind, Nagel actually changes the debate with this candid version of atheism. In light of his example, thoughtful atheists no longer have the luxury of assuming their worldview just works somehow—that dead molecules somehow formed simple life, and that simple life somehow formed us, despite all the apparent difficulties. Nor do they have the luxury of dismissing every argument against atheism on grounds of religious bias. Thoughtful theists, for their part, can no longer assume that atheism necessarily breeds contempt for faith.

Nagel is living proof that the awkwardness of bare-naked honesty doesn’t compare to the reward of engaging seriously the matters that concern us most—a principle that will serve us well as we begin our journey together. You need no special training to join this expedition. All you need is a healthy dose of curiosity and a healthy tolerance of the good kind of awkwardness—the kind that comes from challenging claims that ought to be challenged.

THE BIG QUESTION

Again, that one big question of our origin unites us—not because we agree on the answer but because we should all agree on the importance of finding the answer. Throughout history, it has been the foremost question of people searching for understanding: What is the source from which everything else came? Or, to bring it closer to home: To what or to whom do we owe our existence? This has to be the starting point for people who take life seriously—scientists and nonscientists alike. We cannot rest without the answer, because absolutely everything of importance is riding on it. To know where everything came from is to know where we came from, and where we came from has everything to do with who we are, and who we are has everything to do with how we ought to live.

THE BIG QUESTION

To what or to whom do we owe our existence?

If all goes well, our journey in this book will take us to the answer. We’ll know we have arrived when we have an answer that not only rings true but also distinguishes itself as the one answer that rings true. There should be no credible alternative.

A map will be helpful as we begin. My aim over the next four chapters isn’t to answer the big question but instead to show where we should be looking for the answer. Chapter 2 will introduce the intuition that creates internal conflict in all of us by tugging against Darwin’s claims. This design intuition, as we will call it, is the very intuition Crick wanted us to suppress. Chapters 3 and 4 will be a short account of the unexpected lessons I learned while seeking a scientific solution to this internal conflict. These lessons weren’t about the proteins I was studying but about the people I interacted with along the way—really, about people in general. With those lessons in hand, we’ll see in chapter 5 that the answer we’re seeking is to be found not in technical science but in something much more familiar—something I call common science. There will be plenty of glimpses of technical science along the way, but all of these will be presented with the nontechnical reader in mind. In the end, we’ll see that mastery of technical subjects isn’t at all needed in order for us to know the answer to the big question. Common science will be perfectly adequate.

The next section of the book—chapters 6 through 9—will be a journey through the important aspects of common science. The point of chapter 6 will be to provide a better understanding of what life is and what it isn’t, which will prove helpful as we progress to the matter of where life came from. Chapter 7 will be a common-science refutation of the idea that natural selection explains how life came to exist in its countless remarkable forms. With natural selection off the table, chapter 8 will be an exploration of searching, showing that the many inventions needed for new life forms to evolve would have had to be found accidentally. Chapter 9 will finish the section by showing why invention can’t actually happen that way. The intuition that Crick wanted us to suppress will end up being confirmed instead.

But all this only tells us what the answer to our question isn’t. To arrive at a satisfying understanding of what the answer is will require us to continue our journey a bit further. In chapter 10 we will revisit the question of what life is, viewing it this time through the lens of invention. The following two chapters, 11 and 12, will serve as a reality check, first by considering carefully whether we have overlooked anything in rejecting the evolutionary explanation of life and then by asking whether the scientific community’s defense of evolution looks more like a “science thing” or a “culture thing.” Finally, chapters 13 and 14 complete our journey. There we examine the nature of life and humanity more deeply—leading to a clear picture of what the answer to the big question is—after which I offer a glimpse of what I hope biology will look like in the not-too-distant future, after a great many people join us on this journey.

Undeniable 

How Biology Confirms Our Intuition That Life Is Designed 

Douglas Axe

Friday, December 12, 2025

The Mystery of Life Origin

 FOREWORD Robert J. Marks and John West

In 1984, three courageous scientists—Charles  Thaxton,  Walter Bradley, and  Roger Olsen—published a rigorous reassessment of then-current scientific theories about the origin of life.  Published by the Philosophical Library (the publisher of works by Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Max Planck, and many other eminent scientists and thinkers), The Mystery of Life’s Origins challenged the scientific orthodoxy of the time and provoked significant interest in the scientific community. Long-time NASA scientist Robert  Jastrow hailed the book as “a very well thought-out and clearly written analysis,” while  Robert Shapiro, Professor of Chemistry at New York University, lauded it as “an important contribution to the origin of life field.”

The book’s core message was startling: Current approaches to the origin of life were abysmal failures, and wholesale re-thinking was required. As the authors put it:

the difficulty is fundamental. It applies equally to discarded, present, and possible future models of chemical evolution. We believe the problem is analogous to that of the medieval alchemist who was commissioned to change copper into gold... You can’t get gold out of copper, apples out of oranges, or information out of negative thermal entropy. There does not seem to be any physical basis for the widespread assumption implicit in the idea that an open system is a sufficient explanation for the complexity of life.

At the end of the book, the authors suggested that the origin of life might have required what philosopher Michael  Polanyi called “a profoundly informative intervention” or what they themselves called an “ intelligent cause.” Most scientists of the time did not want to hear that revolutionary proposal; but the authors’ words inspired a new generation of scientists and scholars who were dedicated to seeking evidence of purpose and  intelligent design throughout nature.

By republishing The Mystery of Life’s Origin on the occasion of its 35th anniversary, we seek to recognize the signal accomplishment of its original authors, plus the hard work of  Jon Buell of the  Foundation for Thought and Ethics, who helped bring the book to reality. In the new introduction by  David Klinghoffer, you will get to read the behind-the-scenes story of how the book came to be written—and the transformative impact it had on many. The original text has been lightly updated. The fact that only light updating was needed is a testament to the meticulous scholarship of the authors and to the enduring nature of the problem they identified in origin of life studies.

Although the text of the original Mystery of Life’s Origin forms the first part of this volume, this book is much more than an historical appreciation. Its second half, “The State of the Debate,” includes new chapters assessing the state of origin of life research today by chemist  James Tour of Rice University, physicist  Brian Miller, astronomer  Guillermo Gonzalez, biologist  Jonathan Wells, and philosopher of science  Stephen C. Meyer. Those who want to understand not only the history of science’s quest to understand the origin of life, but its current status, will find this book an invaluable guide.

(...)

INTRODUCTION:  INTELLIGENT DESIGN’S ORIGINAL EDITION David Klinghoffer

How does life emerge from that which is not alive? This elicit mystery exercises a peculiar fascination, with the power to elicit remarkable feats of imagination. As the novelist Mary Shelley recalled, her invention of the story of  Frankenstein traced back to conversations she witnessed between Lord Byron and her husband  Percy Shelley. Holidaying in Switzerland in the summer of 1816, they spoke late into the night, past the “witching hour,” about “the principle of life, and whether there was any probability of its ever being discovered and communicated.” Up for discussion was gossip about “experiments of  Dr. Darwin” (Erasmus, the grandfather of Charles) who “by some extraordinary means” produced “voluntary motion” in a length of spaghetti. The poets alluded to “galvanism,” electrical experiments by  Luigi Galvani, spurring thoughts that “a corpse would be reanimated.”1 Later, sleepless in her bed, Mrs. Shelley would experience a vision, receiving the seed for one of the great horror novels.

Less horrific but hardly less imaginative are scenarios of unguided “chemical evolution,” or abiogenesis, featured in high school and college biology textbooks, taken as gospel by the media and preached as such by a range of authoritative popular and scholarly figures in the culture. Simple experimental work by  Louis Pasteur in the early 1860s demonstrated that life does not spontaneously generate itself, not from spaghetti, not from anything. Instead, life comes from life. How then may science explain the origin of the very first life?

 Charles Darwin in 1871 famously speculated in a letter to  Joseph Hooker, “But if (and oh what a big if) we could conceive in some warm little pond with all sorts of ammonia and phosphoric salts, light, heat, electricity etcetera present, that a protein compound was chemically formed, ready to undergo still more complex changes.”2 The “warm little pond” generating “protein compounds” is not far off from textbook orthodoxy today. Students are taught that a prebiotic soup gave rise to key biotic chemicals, amino acids, stimulated by atmospheric electricity—galvanism in a modern guise—as demonstrated in the famed  Miller-Urey experiment of 1952. One feat of imagination here lies in conceiving by what “extraordinary means” such building blocks came together, unguided, in precisely the right order to give rise to biological information, the digital code of DNA and RNA, that underlies all life on Earth.

In 1969, San Francisco State University biologist  Dean Kenyon would give the theory of chemical evolution its then most up-to-date presentation, in an influential text,  Biochemical Predestination. By 1984, Kenyon had abandoned the theory altogether in favor of what would later be called intelligent design. His public confession of apostasy came in the Foreword of a short yet remarkable book, The Mystery of Life’s Origin: Reassessing Current Theories, by chemist  Charles B. Thaxton, materials scientist  Walter L. Bradley, and geochemist  Roger L. Olsen.  Discovery Institute Press is delighted to offer this new version of the book, the Ur-text or original edition of the modern theory of intelligent design, along with supplementary essays by scholars updating and extending the work. These new chapters, by synthetic organic chemist James Tour, physicist Brian Miller, astronomer Guillermo Gonzalez, biologist Jonathan Wells, and philosopher of biology Stephen Meyer, present the current state of the debate that Thaxton and his co-authors sparked in 1984. The enigma they identified remains, hardly resolved by further technical research amplified and distorted by press releases and hysterical headlines, but rather, if anything, compounded as science has advanced.

For anyone familiar with today’s  intelligent design theory, to read The Mystery of Life’s Origin is to experience a powerful sense of déjà vu. Surely we have walked these halls before. Or rather, Mystery is the hall down which ID walked before it emerged into history as “intelligent design.” The now familiar phrase appears nowhere in the text. But other phrases, persons, and motifs, the stock-in-trade of the modern ID theorist, are present. That is most notably, thickly so in the book’s Epilogue, authored by Dr. Thaxton, where the technical details are left behind and a forthright argument for a design hypothesis is offered. Stephen Meyer has been forthcoming about his intellectual debt to Thaxton. In a sense, Mystery is a daring first draft of what would become Meyer’s own work, especially in  Signature in the Cell. Here we have the “principle of uniformity,”3 “the present is a key to the past,”4 adducing what “we know by experience” about how “intelligent investigators” act,5 the role of the “idea of creation” in the “origin of modern science,”6 the injunction to “follow the evidence where it leads,”7 how “certain effects always have intelligent causes,”8 Shannon information,  Michael Polanyi, “ specified complexity,”9 taking Darwin himself as a historical precedent in one’s argumentation, conceiving of the search for truth about biological origins as akin to the work of a detective in a murder mystery, and more.

A separate article could be written tracing the influence of such themes from Thaxton, Bradley, and Olsen on Meyer alone, reflected in his books including the forthcoming  The Return of the  God Hypothesis. That last formulation, the “God hypothesis,” first used by Meyer in the title of a 1999 essay in the Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, itself appears in the Epilogue of Mystery.10 Thaxton uses it to contrast different theaters of scientific investigation, “ operation science” versus “ origin science,” where consideration of a transcendent intelligent agent as being at work in causing certain events either doesn’t belong at all, or might in fact be permissible. In Signature in the Cell, Meyer would later write that this “terminology” was “admittedly cumbersome.”11 For “origin science” he substitutes “historical science.”

When I spoke to Thaxton recently, he explained that the “God hypothesis” was simply the shorthand way professors talked about the idea when Thaxton was a post-doctoral student at Harvard in the philosophy of science. Other key ID concepts and habits of thought came to him from this same period in his post-PhD studies. For example, looking to Darwin as a model or precedent for one’s arguments, as Meyer does, was something he picked up from historian of science  Reijer Hooykaas (1906–1994), whom he came to know at this time. “ Uniformitarianism” is via the geologist  Charles Lyell (1797–1875), but Hooykaas wrote a book about it in 1963,  The Principle of Uniformity in Geology, Biology, and Theology. Shannon information was from information theorist  Hubert Yockey (1916–2016), referring to mathematician  Claude Shannon (1916–2001), and “specified complexity,” now much associated with mathematician and intelligent design proponent  William Dembski, from chemist  Leslie Orgel (1927–2007). The advice to “follow the evidence where it leads,” or as it is sometimes found, “We must follow the argument wherever it leads,” a staple of writers on intelligent design, is a paraphrase from Socrates in Plato’s Republic. In Allan Bloom’s translation (394d), “[W]herever the argument, like a wind, tends, thither must we go.”12In other words, the interest of The Mystery of Life’s Origin lies partly in the question of an idea’s origin. Meyer and Thaxton form a link with scientific and philosophical investigations of the 20th century, the 19th century, and before, much as intelligent design more broadly connects Greek philosophy, especially  Anaxagoras (5th century B.C.), with the thinking of Darwin’s colleague turned rival,  Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913). Without going into needless detail, or searching too far back into the past, this Introduction will sketch some of the immediate historical background behind the writing of Mystery and its subsequent influence on the evolution of the theory of ID.

It is impossible to fully disentangle the study of biological origins from reflections and speculations of a theological nature. Proponents of Darwinian evolution habitually advance arguments about God in support of their theory: “God, if he exists, and there seems to be no reason to think he does, surely wouldn’t have done it this way.” Much of the curiosity we feel about how life originated similarly derives from the observation that a purely naturalistic explanation is not what a theist would expect, and an explanation incorporating design or teleology is not what a materialist or an atheist would expect. Today, some of the most prominent exponents of  neo-Darwinism are also outspoken and evangelizing atheists. Which is fair enough. That fact by itself does not invalidate their scientific thinking. So there is no shock or scandal in the fact that the idea for the book that became The Mystery of Life’s Origin was first discussed among a group of friends and colleagues affiliated with  Probe Ministries, operated by  Jon Buell and his associate  James Williams to advocate a Christian worldview. Buell would go on in 1981 to launch the  Foundation for Thought and Ethics, in Dallas, Texas, publishing books on scientific, historical, and ethical subjects. This publishing work was absorbed in 2016 as an imprint of Discovery Institute Press.

Buell knew Mystery co-author Walter Bradley from Bradley’s days as a PhD student at the University of Texas. In 1975, Buell was seeking an author for a rigorous book on evolution, and he proposed it to Bradley, then a professor at the Colorado School of Mines. Bradley wasn’t interested in that focus, so he made a counter-proposal: a book on the origin of life. As he told Discovery Institute’s  John West in an interview, he suspected that could be the “ultimate barrier to this whole question of life and evolution,” the “hardest step,” “how you get started from scratch”—meaning, life from nonlife.13 The study of the origin of life is by necessity multidisciplinary. It joins biology to fields with which Bradley’s expertise, materials science, is more closely linked: biochemistry, physical chemistry, chemical kinetics, thermodynamics. “Interestingly enough,” he says, “most of the people that I have met, who are doing work as biologists, seldom know very much about what I think of as more fundamental and theoretical chemistry. And so a lot of what they do is pretty qualitative.”

Qualitative speculation was what Bradley wanted to avoid. Talking and teaching about the subject, including a 1974 guest lecture he gave on “Thermodynamics and the Origin of Life” at Colorado State University, convinced him he was onto something. One key question, the atmosphere of the early Earth, seemed to call for training in another field: geochemistry. For this, he sought out the collaboration of a co-author,  Roger Olsen, then a PhD student in geochemistry at the Colorado School of Mines. “Some of the ideas of what people would want to believe about  abiogenesis are very dependent on what the initial atmosphere was like,” Bradley recalls of his thinking at the time. “For example, if you have too much oxygen, then there’s no hope.” Olsen’s research could shed light on this. “Roger concluded that we never did have a reducing atmosphere,” as the  Miller-Urey experiment assumed, an assumption that “didn’t have a snowball’s chance in hell.” An oxidizing atmosphere spelled doom for life’s presumed chemical forerunners.

Bradley and Olsen had been working on their origin-of-life manuscript for six months when  Charles Thaxton moved down to Dallas from Boston, where he had done post-doctoral studies at Harvard and Brandeis Universities, in the history of science and molecular biology, respectively. The text of The Mystery of Life’s Origin furnishes a single brief autobiographical reference, in the Epilogue, but it is an intriguing one. It reflects Thaxton’s experience: “When we are asked to consider ‘far out’ or ‘strange’ ideas such as  Special Creation, as were the authors just a few years ago, typically the response is exactly that mentioned by [David] Bohm as cited earlier.” This response is one of “violent disturbance.” Moreover, “The process… can sometimes be painful (it was to one of the authors) but the quest for truth has never been easy, and has on more than a few occasions been known to make one unpopular.”14Thaxton, introduced to religious faith by his mother, had in college gone through a period of disbelief. Scientific knowledge seemed to crowd out any role for a deity. It was as a graduate student in physical chemistry at Iowa State that he first delved into the problem of abiogenesis. Until that point, he had thought that chemistry fully accounted for life’s origins. The assumption turned out to be too simple. The pain and disturbance he referred to in the book was, first, the feeling of having betrayed his mother, and, second, the feeling of having betrayed those who looked to him as respectable materialist.

 After moving to Dallas with his wife and first son, Thaxton went to work with Jon Buell. It was late 1975, and, as Thaxton told John West in an interview, “Buell came in one day and presented me with a manuscript that he’d had on his desk.”15 It was by Walter Bradley and Roger Olsen, the first draft of what would become The Mystery of Life’s Origin. “So I read through it,” Thaxton says, “and my first reaction was, wow, this is kind of interesting. But why is there not more chemistry in it?” He noted this objection to Buell, who invited him to come on a visit to meet with Bradley and Olsen in College Station, Texas, where by this time Bradley had moved to teach at Texas A&M. In Bradley’s living room, they discussed the book, and Buell encouraged Thaxton to share his reservation about the dearth of chemistry. Bradley and Olsen both almost simultaneously spoke up and said, “Well, you’re the chemist. You write it!”

And that is essentially what he did. Bradley was teaching and the now Dr. Olsen had switched to private industry. Thaxton was the “fresh man” on the project with the time to further develop the book. “I had a lot of studying to do, and I did,” he says. “Night and day for weeks and weeks and months, and it turned into several years in fact, before it was all done.” Olsen had written about the atmosphere of the early Earth in Chapter 5 (“Reassessing the Early Earth and Its Atmosphere”), while Bradley wrote Chapters 7, 8, and 9 (“Thermodynamics of Living Systems,” “Thermodynamics and the Origin of Life,” and “Specifying How Work Is to Be Done”). “Then Thaxton wrote the majority of the rest of it,” according to Bradley, including the Epilogue which departs from pure scientific discussion and drew most of the fire once the book came out.

One problem was that the chapters seemed to reflect different voices, different terminologies and ways of arguing. As Thaxton recalls, it needed to be largely rewritten to sound “like a science book, not an engineering book.” So, “I redid the whole manuscript, just started from scratch, just started over. And we completely went through that process at least two or three times.” By 1978, it was done, and ready to be sent for scientific review, by a dozen or more scientists, some friendly to the thesis, others unfriendly.

One prominent scientist specializing in the origin-of-life field, presumed to be unfriendly but a fair critic nonetheless, was Dean Kenyon. Kenyon, exchanging letters with Thaxton in 1981, had read the book in its manuscript form and was interested enough to invite Buell and Thaxton to visit with him. They flew to San Francisco for the meeting. Thaxton did not know at the time that Kenyon had privately come to doubt his own chemical evolutionary theory.

“My stomach was all the way up in my throat as we sat in Kenyon’s office that day,” Thaxton recalls. “I remember asking him what he thought of the book.” In response, Kenyon fixed him with a stern look, then smiled and said, “I thought it was terrific.” This emboldened Thaxton, for he had come with an additional plan, beyond asking Kenyon for his view of their work. He was going to ask Kenyon to write the Fore-word. He plunged in. “Well, then why don’t you write the Foreword to the book?” Thaxton asked. “And he said, ‘Well, I was hoping you would ask.’”

In the opinion of historian Ronald Numbers, in his book The Creationists, Kenyon’s contribution, a leading origin-of-life theorist “confessing that he no longer believed in naturalistic evolution,” was the “most striking feature of their book.”16 As Kenyon wrote, “It is very likely that research on life’s origins will move in somewhat different directions once the professionals have read this important work.” He concludes, “All scientists interested in the origin-of-life problem would do well to study this book carefully and to evaluate their own work in the light of its arguments.”17 Such an endorsement, for the three authors, was a coup that almost could not be topped.

The process of reviewing having been completed and needed changes having been made, it was time to seek a publisher. This task fell to  Jon Buell. The goal was to reach a secular audience, not a religious one, and the style of the book indicates as much. To be strictly avoided, says Thaxton, was anything that sounded remotely “religious.” He notes, “We wanted to make sure we weren’t preaching.” Yet finding a publisher was no simple matter. Then as now, the faintest hint of “creationism” was enough to set teeth on edge, even though the Thaxton book clearly did not support creationism in its most precise meaning of recruiting science on behalf of Biblical literalism. It probably did not help that a prominent Supreme Court case involving “creation science,”  McLean v. Arkansas, was being argued about this time, in 1981. The case was decided in January 1982, finding that teaching creationism in public schools violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

As of late 1982, Buell was still in search of a publisher. Cornell University Press and MIT Press had both expressed initial interest, with “almost identical” final results, as Thaxton recalls. At Cornell, two internal reviewers read the book and delivered a split opinion, in favor and against. So a third was called in, a prominent scientist. Thaxton wonders if it was  Carl Sagan. The acquisitions editor involved,  Eric Halpern, wrote to Buell with the bad news, indicating that, “As you will see, the report falls far short of giving us the basis for a favorable recommendation to our faculty Board.”18 The “masked” report is indeed scathing, blasting the book for its “superficial” arguments, though interesting in how it shows how little has changed in conventional thinking about life’s origin over the past four decades. The anonymous Cornell reviewer harrumphs, “Because the experiments have not yet produced a cell in the laboratory it is unrealistic to dismiss the effort.” Researchers are still saying the same today, in very similar terms. Astronomer  Abraham Loeb at Harvard, for one, writing in 2019 in Scientific American, considers the prospects of “produc[ing] synthetic life out of raw chemicals” in the lab, but concedes “even if we dismiss these prospects as unrealistic with our current technologies, another civilization that happened to be billions of years more technologically advanced than we are might have” done so.19By return mail on  Foundation for Thought and Ethics letterhead, Thaxton responded to Halpern, noting that while expert review was only to be expected from a university publisher, “it is difficult to escape the feeling that we have been sandbagged by someone who feels threatened by criticisms raised” in the book. He pointed out that their book had been sent accompanied by endorsements from “noted chemical evolution scholars,” organic chemist  Gordon Shaw at the University of Bradford in England, as well as  Dean Kenyon. The reviewer had dismissed the manuscript as “a complete misrepresentation,” lacking originality or comprehension. Yet Kenyon had called it “one of the best critical analyses of origin-of-life I have read to date.” Thaxton asked why Halpern had not wondered at the stark discrepancy of views: “[C]onsider the implication of the allegations of your reader. To accept his word that we have submitted a shallow, often answered critique, is to charge the readers we cited in our Prospectus with having their critical faculties so numbed they could not detect superficial criticisms. And these are noted scholars.”

Writing to Halpern at Cornell, Thaxton included an independent analysis from the editor at the MIT Press who had been “enthusiastic” about the book, only to lose his job because the publisher cut its division devoted to the life sciences. The editor,  Grahame J. C. Smith, had particularly praised Walter Bradley’s coverage of thermodynamic issues. These chapters were “so good that the rest of the book might be geared to cohesiveness with that part of the book.”20 He particularly liked Chapter 8, which he called “really excellent” and “Wonderful!” He had many helpful editorial suggestions and criticisms.

Thaxton had asked Halpern at Cornell to reconsider, but Halpern, in a final reply on December 23, 1982, courteously refused. With his masked “distinguished scholar in the field of chemical evolution” harshly opposed, he would have needed to seek additional support from Cornell scientists, and he did not want to take that course.

In the end, Buell and Thaxton went with an old and distinguished New York publisher, Philosophical Library, which while not a university or strictly scientific press could boast an impressive list of authors, prominent scientists and others. They have published a collection by Albert Einstein, Out of My Later Years (1950), and their backlist features books by Werner Heisenberg, Max Planck, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, even Charles Darwin, including a range of Nobel Prize winners.21 They also allowed the  Foundation for Thought and Ethics to market the book. Far from a religious publisher, Philosophical Library was an appropriate choice for a scientific audience. A second edition of the book was published by Lewis and Stanley, in Dallas. The move was made, says Thaxton, simply because “we can do everything much faster, without having to have big turnarounds, and waits, and so on.”

The book came trailing endorsements besides Kenyon’s. The back-cover highlights praise from astronomer  Robert Jastrow of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (“a very well thought-out and clearly written analysis”) and from one of the best-known scholars on the origin of life, chemist Robert Shapiro at New York University (“an important contribution,” “brings together the major scientific arguments that demonstrate the inadequacy of current theories,” although “I do not share the final philosophical conclusion”). Shapiro published his own book on the topic two years later,  Origins: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth (1986).

The subsequent reception by scientists helps to explain the spark that The Mystery of Life’s Origin provided for a nascent  intelligent design movement. The reception did not come immediately. In fact, the anxious authors were initially troubled by the lack of a response. “It was dead silence,” says Thaxton. “Nobody said anything. And I was so dejected, and disappointed. It was like you drop it out there and — not a ripple. Nothing. No effect at all.” The publisher was reassuring. “‘Don’t worry,’ he said, ‘it takes a year’” for a book like this to get its due.

So they waited. And while they did, we can pause briefly to remember how, for skeptics of evolution, whether chemical or biological, it was a different world from ours. In 1984, the full array of resources deployed today to intimidate dissenters didn’t exist. There were no evolution professors speculating on their blogs about pre-publication books and poisoning the well against new ideas. Nor were there any pseudonymous Darwinist reviewers on Amazon posting enflamed reviews of books they hadn’t purchased much less read. Everyone wrote under his own name, and named editors served in the role of gatekeeper, thus taking responsibility. It was a fine thing to be alive before the Internet. Interest had to build organically, more honestly, via typescripts and printed matter transiting through the U.S. mail. As a side benefit, there was no Wikipedia with its unknown yet wildly influential editors, many bearing fantastical pseudonyms instead of real names, disseminating misinformation about any controversial subject and on call 24/7, at a moment’s notice, to undo an earnest effort to correct misstatements. As of 2017,  Walter Bradley himself was among those ID scientists to have their Wikipedia entry disemboweled or erased by Wiki editors. Even Wikipedia co-founder Larry Sanger has called the encyclopedia’s treatment of intelligent design “appallingly biased.”22 This is how opinions on profound subjects are developed and spread now.

Is what I have just recounted an irrelevant aside? No, it’s not. I bring it up because, despite the aggravating interaction with Cornell University Press, the response from expert scientists to The Mystery of Life’s Origin is impressive for how relatively relaxed, if not necessarily open-minded, the scientific establishment was. And in fact, the publisher’s estimate of a year was about right. “So that was what happened,” says Thaxton. “When the reviewers started, wow, it was like they all started coming at once.”

Among the most significant voices to be raised was that of biochemist  Sidney W. Fox at the University of Miami, a leading origin-of-life researcher. Thaxton calls him a “propagandist” for the naturalistic interpretation of  abiogenesis. His June 1985 review in The Quarterly Review of Biology was loaded with ridicule, sniffing that of the writers, “Not one is listed in American Men and Women of Science, 14th edition.”23 Yet there is also a hint of grudging respect: “the authors of The Mystery present antievolutionary arguments with force.”

Fox, as Thaxton recalls, was “more significant than  Stanley Miller [of Miller-Urey fame] was, in the early days, in promoting all the origin-of-life materials in the high school textbooks and so on. In the late Fifties, early Sixties, it was all  Sidney Fox. Everywhere. All the time.” So despite the dyspeptic tenor of the review, it was an honor to get one from Fox at all. And despite the shot at their lack of status in the establishment pecking order, Thaxton notes the irony that they had a somewhat intimate connection: He inherited Fox’s old office at Iowa State from when Fox was a postdoctoral student there. “In fact,” Thaxton remembers, “I had to clean out a lot of stuff that it turns out was his.”

The August 1985 Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine was another story. Professor  James F. Jekel, in the Yale School of Medicine, was warmly congratulative. “To all who share the comfortable assumption that the scientific problems of abiogenesis are mostly resolved, this book will come as a real surprise,” he wrote. He concluded: “The volume as a whole is devastating to a relaxed acceptance of current theories of abio-genesis. It is well written, and, though technical, much of the book is within the reach of the informed non-scientist.” It is “strongly recommended to anyone interested in the problem of chemical and biological origins.”24An eminent scientist at Yale, biophysicist  Harold J. Morowitz, had a fascinating mixed response. Morowitz testified in the 1981  McLean v. Arkansas “creation science” trial and was no friend of what would be come to be called intelligent design, writing in 2005 in the Chronicle of Higher Education that “Only creationists support the theory of intelligent design.”25 According to his New York Times obituary in 2016, “He was best known for applying thermodynamic theory to biology, exploring how “the energy that flows through a system acts to organize that system.”26 So he was in a strong position to evaluate the section of The Mystery of Life’s Origin, authored by Walter Bradley, that dealt with that subject. Some years after Mystery was published, through a lucky personal connection, Charles Thaxton was able to get his book in front of the eminent Dr. Morowitz. “I contacted Morowitz about reading it,” says Thaxton. “I thought, well, gee whiz here’s a way to find out what he thinks about what Bradley has done. But I didn’t tell him that that’s what I was interested in.”

Morowitz wrote a two-page private review.27 He dismissed the Epilogue as “philosophically naïve,” and “philosophically unfair,” noting that it contains no mention of Bishop Berkeley or Benedict Spinoza. As to the science behind the book, however, he wrote, it is a “very substantial effort,” a “scientifically useful critique of a very sizable literature,” and “the authors have certainly succeeded in showing that we are very far from a convincing experimentally verifiable understanding of how something as complex as the simplest contemporary cells could have arisen.” Yet the “assumption that the problem lies beyond present-day natural science seems premature.”

There was one thing missing from the review, and it was odd given Morowitz’s own expertise. Thaxton sought an opportunity to ask him about it by phone. Thaxton said, “I’m very curious. You said some positive things about our book. But you were the expert on thermodynamics at the Arkansas trial, and yet you had not one thing to say about our treatment of thermodynamics in The Mystery of Life’s Origin. Can you tell me why?” As Thaxton remembers, over the telephone line, “There was a long, long pause. I mean, very disturbingly so. Long pause. And I said, ‘Are you still there?’ And he said, ‘Yes. I’m just thinking.’ And I said, ‘Well, can you answer?’ And he said, ‘Well, I didn’t see anything wrong with it, so I didn’t say anything about it.’” Morowitz is still today held up as a champion against “misuses of the second law of thermodynamics,” as the Darwin-lobbying  National Center for Science Education puts it.28 Yet Thaxton draws the evident conclusion from Morowitz’s response: “That means he agreed with what Bradley said. Right?” It seems so. (...)

THE MYSTERY OF LIFE’S ORIGIN

THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY


CHARLES B. THAXTON, WALTER L. BRADLEY, ROGER L. OLSEN, JAMES TOUR,

STEPHEN MEYER, JONATHAN WELLS, GUILLERMO GONZALEZ, BRIAN MILLER, DAVID KLINGHOFFER

Friday, December 13, 2024

No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot Bu Purchased Without Intelligence

 How a designer gets from thought to thing is, at least in broad strokes, straightforward: (1) A designer conceives a purpose. (2) To accomplish that purpose, the designer forms a plan. (3) To execute the plan, the designer specifies building materials and assembly instructions. (4) Finally, the designer or some surrogate applies the assembly instructions to the building materials. What emerges is a designed object, and the designer is successful to the degree that the object fulfills the designer's purpose. In the case of human designers, this four-part design process is uncontroversial. Baking a cake, driving a car, embezzling funds, and building a supercomputer each presuppose it. Not only do we repeatedly engage in this four-part design process, but we have witnessed other people engage in it countless times. Given a sufficiently detailed causal history, we are able to track this process from start to finish.

But suppose a detailed causal history is lacking and we are not able to track the design process. Suppose instead that all we have is an object, and we must decide whether it emerged from such a design process. In that case, how do we decide whether the object is in fact designed? If the object in question is sufficiently like other objects that we know were designed, then there may be no difficulty inferring design. For instance, if we find a scrap of paper with writing on it, we infer a human author even if we know nothing about the paper's causal history. We are all familiar with humans writing on scraps of paper, and there is no reason to suppose that this scrap of paper requires a different type of causal story.

Nevertheless, when it comes to living things, the biological community holds that a very different type of causal story is required. To be sure, the biological community admits that biological systems appear to be designed. For instance, Richard Dawkins writes, "Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose."i Likewise, Francis Crick writes, "Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved."' Or consider the title of Renato Dulbecco's biology text: The Design of Life.' The term "design" is everywhere in the biological literature. Even so, its use is carefully regulated. According to the biological community, the appearance of design in biology is misleading. This is not to deny that biology is filled with marvelous contrivances. Biologists readily admit as much. Yet as far as the biological community is concerned, living things are not the result of the four-part design process described above.

But how does the biological community know that living things are only apparently and not actually designed? According to Francisco Ayala, Charles Darwin provided the answer: "The functional design of organisms and their features would therefore seem to argue for the existence of a designer. It was Darwin's greatest accomplishment to show that the directive organization of living beings can be explained as the result of a natural process, natural selection, without any need to resort to a Creator or other external agent. The origin and adaptation of organisms in their profusion and wondrous variations were thus brought into the realm of science."4 Is it really the case, however, that the directive organization of living beings can be explained without recourse to a designer? And would employing a designer in biological explanations necessarily take us out of the realm of science? The purpose of this book is to answer these two questions.

The title of this book, No Free Lunch, refers to a collection of mathematical theorems proved in the past five years about evolutionary algorithms. The upshot of these theorems is that evolutionary algorithms, far from being universal problem solvers, are in fact quite limited problem solvers that depend crucially on additional information not inherent in the algorithms before they are able to solve any interesting problems. This additional information needs to be carefully specified and fine-tuned, and such specification and fine-tuning is always thoroughly teleological. Consequently, evolutionary algorithms are incapable of providing a computational justification for the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection and random variation as the primary creative force in biology. The subtitle, Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased without Intelligence, refers to that form of information, known as specified complexity or complex specified information, that is increas ingly coming to be regarded as a reliable empirical marker of purpose, intelligence, and design.

What is specified complexity? An object, event, or structure exhibits specified complexity if it is both complex (i.e., one of many live possibilities) and specified (i.e., displays an independently given pattern). A long sequence of randomly strewn Scrabble pieces is complex without being specified. A short sequence spelling the word "the" is specified without being complex. A sequence corresponding to a Shakespearean sonnet is both complex and specified. In The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities,5 I argued that specified complexity is a reliable empirical marker of intelligence. Nevertheless, critics of my argument have claimed that evolutionary algorithms, and the Darwinian mechanism in particular, can deliver specified complexity apart from intelligence.6 I anticipated this criticism in The Design Inference but did not address it there in detail. Filling in the details is the task of the present volume.

The Design Inference laid the groundwork. This book demonstrates the inadequacy of the Darwinian mechanism to generate specified complexity. Darwinists themselves have made possible such a refutation. By assimilating the Darwinian mechanism to evolutionary algorithms, they have invited a mathematical assessment of the power of the Darwinian mechanism to generate life's diversity. Such an assessment, begun with the No Free Lunch theorems of David Wolpert and William Macready (see section 4.6), will in this book be taken to its logical conclusion. The conclusion is that Darwinian mechanisms of any kind, whether in nature or in silico, are in principle incapable of generating specified complexity. Coupled with the growing evidence in cosmology and biology that nature is chock-full of specified complexity (cf. the fine-tuning of cosmological constants and the irreducible complexity of biochemical systems), this conclusion implies that naturalistic explanations are incomplete and that design constitutes a legitimate and fundamental mode of scientific explanation.

In arguing that naturalistic explanations are incomplete or, equivalently, that natural causes cannot account for all the features of the natural world, I am placing natural causes in contradistinction to intelligent causes. The scientific community has itself drawn this distinction in its use of these twin categories of causation. Thus, in the quote earlier by Francisco Ayala, "Darwin's greatest accomplishment [was] to show that the directive organization of living beings can be explained as the result of a natural process, natural selection, without any need to resort to a Creator or other external agent."7 Natural causes, as the scientific community understands them, are causes that operate according to deterministic and nondeterministic laws and that can be characterized in terms of chance, necessity, or their combination (cf. Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity).8 To be sure, if one is more liberal about what one means by natural causes and includes among natural causes telic processes that are not reducible to chance and necessity (as the ancient Stoics did by endowing nature with immanent teleology), then my claim that natural causes are incomplete dissolves. But that is not how the scientific community by and large understands natural causes.

The distinction between natural and intelligent causes now raises an interesting question when it comes to embodied intelligences like ourselves, who are at once physical systems and intelligent agents: Are embodied intelligences natural causes? Even if the actions of an embodied intelligence proceed solely by natural causes, being determined entirely by the constitution and dynamics of the physical system that embodies it, that does not mean the origin of that system can be explained by reference solely to natural causes. Such systems could exhibit derived intentionality in which the underlying source of intentionality is irreducible to natural causes (cf. a digital computer). I will argue that intelligent agency, even when conditioned by a physical system that embodies it, cannot be reduced to natural causes without remainder. Moreover, I will argue that specified complexity is precisely the remainder that remains unaccounted for. Indeed, I will argue that the defining feature of intelligent causes is their ability to create novel information and, in particular, specified complexity.

Design has had a turbulent intellectual history. The chief difficulty with design to date has consisted in discovering a conceptually powerful formulation of it that will fruitfully advance science. While I fully grant that the history of design arguments warrants misgivings, they do not apply to the present project. The theory of design I envision is not an atavistic return to the design arguments of William Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises. William Paley was in no position to formulate the conceptual framework for design that I will be developing in this book. This new framework depends on advances in probability theory, computer science, the concept of information, molecular biology, and the philosophy of science-to name but a few. Within this framework design promises to become an effective conceptual tool for investigating and understanding the world.

Increased philosophical and scientific sophistication, however, is not alone in separating my approach to design from Paley's. Paley's approach was closely linked to his prior religious and metaphysical commitments. Mine is not. Paley's designer was nothing short of the triune God of Christianity, a transcendent, personal, moral being with all the perfections commonly attributed to this God. On the other hand, the designer that emerges from a theory of intelligent design is an intelligence capable of originating the complexity and specificity that we find throughout the cosmos and especially in biological systems. Persons with theological commitments can co-opt this designer and identify this designer with the object of their worship. But this move is strictly optional as far as the actual science of intelligent design is concerned.

The crucial question for science is whether design helps us understand the world, and especially the biological world, better than we do now when we systematically eschew teleological notions from our scientific theorizing. Thus, a scientist may view design and its appeal to a designer as simply a fruitful device for understanding the world, not attaching any significance to questions such as whether a theory of design is in some ultimate sense true or whether the designer actually exists. Philosophers of science would call this a constructive empiricist approach to design. Scientists in the business of manufacturing theoretical entities like quarks, strings, and cold dark matter could therefore view the designer as just one more theoretical entity to be added to the list. I follow here Ludwig Wittgenstein, who wrote, "What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view."9 If design cannot be made into a fertile new point of view that inspires exciting new areas of scientific investigation, then it deserves to wither and die. Yet before that happens, it deserves a fair chance to succeed.

One of my main motivations in writing this book is to free science from arbitrary constraints that, in my view, stifle inquiry, undermine education, turn scientists into a secular priesthood, and in the end prevent intelligent design from receiving a fair hearing. The subtitle of Richard Dawkins's The Blind Watchmaker reads Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design. Dawkins may be right that design is absent from the universe. But science needs to address not only the evidence that reveals the universe to be without design but also the evidence that reveals the universe to be with design. Evidence is a two-edged sword: claims capable of being refuted by evidence are also capable of being supported by evidence. Even if design ends up being rejected as an unfruitful explanatory tool for science, such a negative outcome for design needs to result from the evidence for and against design being fairly considered. Darwin himself would have agreed: "A fair result can be obtained only by fully stating and balancing the facts and arguments on both sides of each question."" Consequently, any rejection of design must not result from imposing arbitrary constraints on science that rule out design prior to any consideration of evidence.

Two main constraints have historically been used to keep design outside the natural sciences: methodological naturalism and dysteleology. According to methodological naturalism, in explaining any natural phenomenon, the natural sciences are properly permitted to invoke only natural causes to the exclusion of intelligent causes. On the other hand, dysteleology refers to inferior design-typically design that is either evil or incompetent. Dysteleology rules out design from the natural sciences on account of the inferior design that nature is said to exhibit. In this book, I will address methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is a regulative principle that purports to keep science on the straight and narrow by limiting science to natural causes. I intend to show that it does nothing of the sort but instead constitutes a straitjacket that actively impedes the progress of science.

On the other hand, I will not have anything to say about dysteleology. Dysteleology might present a problem if all design in nature were wicked or incompetent and continually flouted our moral and aesthetic yardsticks. But that is not the case. To be sure, there are microbes that seem designed to do a number on the mammalian nervous system and biological structures that look cobbled together by a long trial-and-error evolutionary process. But there are also biological examples of nano-engineering that surpass anything human engineers have concocted or entertain hopes of concocting. Dysteleology is primarily a theological problem." To exclude design from biology simply because not all examples of biological design live up to our expectations of what a designer should or should not have done is an evasion. The problem of design in biology is real and pervasive, and needs to be addressed head on and not sidestepped because our presuppositions about design happen to rule out imperfect design. Nature is a mixed bag. It is not William Paley's happy world of everything in delicate harmony and balance. It is not the widely caricatured Darwinian world of nature red in tooth and claw. Nature contains evil design, jerry-built design, and exquisite design. Science needs to come to terms with design as such and not dismiss it in the name of dysteleology.

A possible terminological confusion over the phrase "intelligent design" needs to be cleared up. The confusion centers on what the adjective "intelligent" is doing in the phrase "intelligent design." "Intelligent" can mean nothing more than being the result of an intelligent agent, even one who acts stupidly. On the other hand, it can mean that an intelligent agent acted with consummate skill and mastery. Critics of intelligent design often understand the "intelligent" in intelligent design in the latter sense and thus presume that intelligent design must entail optimal design. The intelligent design community, on the other hand, understands the "intelligent" in intelligent design simply to refer to intelligent agency (irrespective of skill, mas tery, or cleverness) and thus separates intelligent design from optimality of design. But why then place the adjective intelligent in front of the noun design? Does not design already include the idea of intelligent agency, so that juxtaposing the two becomes redundant? Redundancy is avoided because intelligent design needs also to be distinguished from apparent design. Because design in biology so often connotes apparent design, putting intelligent in front of design ensures that the design we are talking about is not merely apparent but also actual. Whether that intelligence acts cleverly or stupidly, wisely or unwisely, optimally or suboptimally are separate questions.

Who will want to read No Free Lunch? The audience includes anyone interested in seriously exploring the scope and validity of Darwinism as well as in learning how the emerging theory of intelligent design promises to supersede it. Napoleon III remarked that one never destroys a thing until one has replaced it. Similarly, Thomas Kuhn, in the language of paradigms and paradigm shifts, claimed that for a paradigm to shift, there has to be a new paradigm in place ready to be shifted into. Throughout my work, I have not been content merely to critique existing theory but have instead striven to provide a positive more-encompassing framework within which to reconceptualize phenomena inadequately explained by existing theory. Much of No Free Lunch will be accessible to an educated lay audience. Many of the ideas have been presented in published articles and public lectures. I have seen how the ideas in this book have played themselves out under fire. The chapters are therefore tailored to questions people are actually asking. The virtue of this book is filling in the details. And the devil is in the details.

I have tried to keep technical discussions to a minimum. I am no fan of notation-heavy prose and avoid it whenever possible. A book of this sort, however, poses a peculiar challenge. Forms of thinking that turn biological complexity into a free lunch pervade science and are deeply entrenched. It does no good therefore to speak in generalities or point to certain obvious tensions (e.g., how can intelligence arise out of an inherently unintelligent Darwinian process? or how can we have any confidence in the reliability of our cognitive faculties if we are the result of a brute natural process for which survival and reproduction is everything and truth-seeking is incidental?). Make the book too obvious, and no one will pay it any mind. Make it too technical, and no one will read it. My strategy in writing this book, therefore, has been to include just enough technical discussion so that experts can fill in the details as well as sufficient elaboration of the technical discussion so that nonexperts feel the force of the design inference. Whether I have been successful is for others to judge.

No Free Lunch has the following logical structure. Chapter 1 presents a nontechnical summary of my work on inferring design and makes the connection between my previous work and Darwinism explicit. Chapter 2 rebuts critics who argue that specified complexity is not a well-defined concept and cannot form the basis for a compelling design inference. In particular, I offer there a simplified account of specification. Chapter 3 translates the designinferential framework of chapters 1 and 2 into a more powerful informationtheoretic framework. Chapter 4 shows how this information-theoretic approach to design withstands and then overturns the challenge of evolutionary algorithms. In particular, I show that evolutionary algorithms cannot generate specified complexity. Chapter 5 then shows how the theoretical apparatus developed in the previous chapters can be applied to actual biological systems. Finally, chapter 6 examines what intelligent design means for science.

What follows is a chapter by chapter summary of the book.

Chapter 1: The Third Mode of Explanation. How is design empirically detectable and thus distinguishable from the two generally accepted modes of scientific explanation, chance and necessity? To detect design, two features must be present: complexity and specification. Complexity guarantees that the object in question is not so simple that it can readily be attributed to chance. Specification guarantees that the object exhibits the right sort of pattern associated with intelligent causes. Specified complexity thus becomes a criterion for detecting design empirically. Having proposed a theoretical apparatus for detecting design, I next consider the challenge that Darwin posed to design historically and indicate why his challenge is viewed among many scientists as counting decisively against design. Essentially, Darwin opposed to design the joint action of chance and necessity and therewith promised to explain the complex ordered structures in biology that prior to him were attributed to design.

Chapter 2: Another Way to Detect Design? Many in the scientific and philosophical community have staked their hopes on explaining specified complexity by means of evolutionary algorithms. Yet even without evolutionary algorithms to explain specified complexity, few are prepared to embrace design. One approach, now increasingly championed by the philosopher of science Elliott Sober, is to attack specified complexity headon and claim that it is a spurious concept, incapable of rendering design testable in the case of natural objects, and that a precise probabilistic and complexity-theoretic analysis of specified complexity vitiates the concept entirely. In critiquing my approach to detecting design, Sober has tied himself to a likelihood framework for probability that is itself highly problematic. This chapter demonstrates that specified complexity is a well-defined con cept and that it readily withstands the criticisms raised by Sober and his colleagues.

Chapter 3: Specified Complexity as Information. Intelligent design can be formulated as a theory of information. Within such a theory, specified complexity becomes a form of information that reliably signals design. As a form of information specified complexity also becomes a proper object for scientific investigation. This chapter takes the ideas of chapters 1 and 2 and translates them into an information-theoretic framework. This reframing of intelligent design within information theory powerfully extends the designinferential framework developed in chapter 1 and makes it possible accurately to assess the power (or lack thereof) of the Darwinian mechanism. The upshot of this chapter is a conservation law governing the origin and flow of information. From this law it follows that specified complexity is not reducible to natural causes and that the origin of specified complexity is best sought in intelligent causes. Intelligent design thereby becomes a theory for detecting and measuring information, explaining its origin, and tracing its flow.

Chapter 4: Evolutionary Algorithms. This chapter is the climax of the book. Here I examine evolutionary algorithms, which constitute the mathematical underpinnings of Darwinism. I show that evolutionary algorithms are in principle incapable of generating specified complexity. Whereas this result follows immediately from the conservation of information law in chapter 3, this law involves a high level of abstraction, so that simply applying the law does not make clear just how limited evolutionary algorithms really are. In this chapter I therefore examine the nuts and bolts of the evolutionary algorithms: phase spaces, fitness landscapes, and optimization algorithms. An elementary combinatorial analysis shows that evolutionary algorithms can no more generate specified complexity than can five letters fill ten mailboxes.

Chapter 5: The Emergence of Irreducibly Complex Systems. Specified complexity as a reliable empirical marker of intelligence is all fine and well, but if there are no complex specified systems in nature, what then? The previous chapters establish that specified complexity reliably signals design, not that specified complexity is actualized in any concrete physical system. This chapter examines how we determine whether a physical system exhibits specified complexity. The key to this determination, at least in biology, is Michael Behe's notion of irreducible complexity. Irreducibly complex biological systems exhibit specified complexity. Irreducible complexity is therefore a special case of specified complexity. Because specified complexity is a probabilistic notion, determining whether a physical system exhibits speci- fled complexity requires being able to calculate probabilities. One of the objections to intelligent design becoming a viable scientific research program is that one cannot calculate the probabilities needed to confirm specified complexity for actual systems in nature. This chapter shows that even though precise calculations may not always be possible, setting bounds for the relevant probabilities is possible, and that this is adequate for establishing specified complexity in practice.

Chapter 6: Design as a Scientific Research Program. Having shown that specified complexity is a reliable empirical marker of intelligence and having overturned the main scientific objections raised against it, I conclude this book by examining what science will look like once design is readmitted to full scientific status. The worry is that attributing design to natural systems will stultify science in the sense that once a scientist concedes that some natural system is designed, all the scientist's work is over. But this is not the case. Design raises a host of novel and interesting research questions that it does not make sense to ask within a strictly Darwinian or naturalistic framework. One such question is teasing apart the effects of natural and intelligent causation. For instance, a rusted old Cadillac is clearly designed but also shows the effects of natural causes (i.e., weathering). Intelligent design is capable of accommodating the legitimate insights of Darwinian theory. In particular, intelligent design admits a place for the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection and random variation. But as a framework for doing science, intelligent design offers additional tools for investigating nature that render it conceptually more powerful than Darwinism.

Ideally, this book should be read from start to finish. Nevertheless, because this is not always possible, let me offer the following suggestions for reading the book. Chapter 1 is the most accessible chapter in the book and is prerequisite for everything that follows. This material needs to be under the reader's belt. Sections 1.1 to 1.7 present a nontechnical summary of my previous work on inferring design, and readers familiar with it can skip these sections without loss. On the other hand, sections 1.8 to 1.10 are new and make explicit the connection between my previous work and Darwinism. Readers definitely need to read these sections. Chapter 2 is primarily directed at critics. This is the most technical chapter, and readers persuaded by my previous work may want to skip it on their initial reading. Chapters 3 and 4 translate the design-theoretic framework of chapters 1 and 2 into an information-theoretic framework. Chapter 3 presents the general theory whereas chapter 4 looks specifically at evolutionary algorithms. For nontechnical readers, I recommend a light perusal of chapter 3 and then a careful examination of chapter 4. Chapter 5 brings theory in contact with biological real ity. This is where most of the current controversy lies, and readers will not want to miss this chapter. Chapter 6, on the other hand, looks at the broader implications of intelligent design for science and can be read at leisure.

There are nontechnical readers who can comfortably wade past technical mathematical discussions without being intimidated; and then there are math phobics whose eyes glaze over and brains shut down at the sight of technical mathematical discussions. This book can also be read with profit by math phobics. I suggest reading sections 1.1-1.10, 5.1-5.7, 5.9, and 6.1- 6.10 in order. The only thing one needs to know about mathematics to read these sections is that powers of ten count the number of zeroes following a one. Thus 103 is 1,000 (a thousand has three zeroes after the initial one), 106 is 1,000,000 (a million has six zeroes after the initial one), etc. Reading these sections will provide a good overview of the current debate regarding intelligent design, particularly as it relates to Michael Behe's work on irreducibly complex molecular machines. Math phobics who then want to see why evolutionary algorithms cannot do the design work that Darwinists regularly attribute to these algorithms can read sections 4.1-4.2 and 4.7-4.9.

One final caution: Even though much in this book will look familiar to readers acquainted with my previous work, this familiarity can be deceiving. I have already noted that sections 1.1 to 1.7 present a nontechnical summary of my work on inferring design and that readers familiar with it can skip these sections without loss. But other sections, though apparently covering old ground, in fact differ markedly from previous work. For instance, two of my running examples in The Design Inference were the Caputo case (an instance of apparent ballot-line fraud) and algorithmic information theory. The case studies in sections 2.3 and 2.4 re-examine these examples in light of criticisms brought against them. Except for chapter 1, arguments and topics revisited are in almost every instance reworked or beefed up.

My debts to friends, foes, colleagues, and institutions are many. Let me begin with the Templeton Foundation. In the fall of 1999 1 received one of seven book awards from the Templeton Foundation to write a book titled Being as Communion: The Science and Metaphysics of Information. After making the proposal and receiving the award, it became clear to me that the science of information (and specifically the science of complex specified information) required a book of its own. Indeed, before one can take seriously the metaphysics of information one must take seriously the science of information (perhaps this is why editions of Aristotle's work always list his Physics before his Metaphysics). I therefore decided to divide this project in two, handling the science of information in the present volume and the metaphysics of information in a subsequent volume, to be titled Being as Communion: The Metaphysics of Information.

William A. Dembski

No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot Bu Purchased Without Intelligence 

Wednesday, December 11, 2024

Why do evolutionary biologists think Michael Behe's work on irreducible complexity has been discredited?

 

GET ON THE INTERNET AND READ SOME of the criticisms of Michael Behe's work, and you'll think he is a crank, a fraud and a knave. His work, we are told, has been "thoroughly discredited," "completely demolished" and "utterly destroyed." Critics reluctantly concede that his discussions of biochemistry (Behe's field of expertise) are unobjectionable. But when it comes to his definition and use of irreducible complexity, critics regard him as misguided and safely to be ignored. Critics contend that the biological community has carefully considered Behe's work, found it deeply flawed and therefore rejected it. But in fact the biological community is still coming to terms with Behe's work. Behe has focused attention on a major conceptual problem in evolutionary biology. The problem was noted before, but not in so stark a form.

Behe's challenge has been so unsettling that many in the biological community find it easier to pretend his work has been discredited than actually to engage it. The biology department at one well-regarded evangelical Christian institution is a surprising case in point. Its biology faculty, by last report, remain adamantly opposed to Behe and intelligent design but at the same time have explicitly refused even to read his work lest they dignify it with their time and attention. And so a convenient fiction has emerged in which biologists continually reassure each other that Behe has been refuted but either fail to provide an actual refutation or attack a caricature of Behe's case against Darwinian evolution. Yet to a dispassionate outsider, it's clear that something significant is afoot. If the worst humiliation is not to be taken seriously, then Behe is being taken all too seriously.

Indeed, Behe has attracted a band of vocal and passionate critics who engage him at length. The controversy centers on a book that Behe published in 1996, Darwin's Black Box. This widely influential book opened a great many ideas, central among them the concept of irreducible complexity. As Behe defines it, an integrated multipart functional system is irreducibly complex if removing any of its parts destroys the system's function. Critics have interpreted Behe's use of this concept in one of two ways, neither of which does justice to Behe's project. Thus critics see Behe as making either a purely logical or a purely empirical point. The logical point is this: Certain structures are provably inaccessible to a Darwinian mechanism. They have property P (i.e., irreducible complexity). But certain biological structures also have property P, so they, too, must be inaccessible to a Darwinian mechanism. The empirical point is this: Certain biological structures are awfully complicated. There is not even a suggestion in the literature concerning how the Darwinian mechanism might construct them. So chances are that something beyond natural selection was responsible for their creation.

So stated, these are fundamentally different points and involve very different questions. If Behe seeks to make a purely logical point, then his model needs to be rigorous and mathematical after the fashion of Noam Chomsky's demonstration that, for example, finite state automata are incapable of generating certain languages. If he wishes to make a purely empirical point, then he wastes his time bringing in the notion of irreducible complexity when what he really means is simply that the evolutionary pathways of certain biological objects have yet to be adequately explained. According to critics, the conflation of these two different theses, the logical and the empirical, works rhetorically, but for a bad reason: it suggests in virtue of the sonority of the words irreducible complexity that something rigorous or well-defined is at issue when what is really at issue, provided Behe has abjured the logical point, is what has always been at issue between Darwinists and their critics-the idea that life is simply too complicated to result from a blind, undirected, hit-or-miss, trial-and-error Darwinian process.

According to Darwinists, neither the logical point nor the empirical point nor a conflation of the two poses any challenge to their theory. Let's consider these options in turn. As for the logical point, irreducible complexity clearly cannot close off all logically possible avenues of Darwinian evolution. What irreducible complexity says is that all parts of a system are indispensable in the sense that if you remove a part and don't alter the other parts, you cannot recover the original function of the system. But that leaves the possibility of removing parts and modifying others to recover the original function. Also it leaves the possibility of removing parts and isolating subsystems that serve some other function (a function that could conceivably be subject to selection pressure). Irreducible complexity, treated as a logical restriction, therefore leaves some loopholes for the Darwinian mechanism. (Critics sometimes portray Behe as denying this point, but in fact Behe never denied such logically possible loopholes.)

As for the empirical point, it seems merely to commit the standard fallacy of arguing from ignorance. So what if certain biological systems are incredibly complicated and we haven't figured out how they originated? That doesn't mean the Darwinian mechanism or some other material mechanism didn't do it. It may just mean that we haven't figured out how those mechanisms did it quite yet. And as for conflating the logical and empirical points, that's the most disreputable option of all, for it makes Behe and fellow design theorists guilty of equivocation, of using irreducible complexity to make a logical or empirical point as expedience dictates.

But this is too easy. In fact, Behe's project is more subtle than any of these criticisms suggests. Behe's project is properly conceived as making three key points: a logical, an empirical and an explanatory point. What's more, he conflates none of them. The logical point is this: Certain artificial structures are provably inaccessible to a direct Darwinian pathway because they have property P (i.e., irreducible complexity). But certain biological structures also have property P, so they, too, must be inaccessible to a direct Darwinian pathway. This formulation looks similar to the previous logical point, but it differs in one crucial respect. In the previous formulation, inaccessibility was with respect to the Darwinian mechanism in toto and therefore with respect to all Darwinian pathways whatsoever, both direct and indirect. Here, the restriction is only on direct Darwinian pathways.

A direct Darwinian pathway is one in which a system evolves by natural selection, incrementally enhancing a given function. As the system evolves, the function does not. Thus we might imagine that in the evolution of the heart, its function from the start was to pump blood. In that case a direct Darwinian pathway might account for it. On the other hand, we might imagine that in the evolution of the heart its function was initially to make loud thumping sounds to ward off predators and that only later did it take on the function of pumping blood. In that case an indirect Darwinian pathway would be needed to account for it. Here the pathway is indirect because not only does the system evolve but so does the system's function. Now, as a logical point, Behe was only concerned with direct Darwinian pathways. This becomes immediately evident from reading Darwin's Black Box since in his definition of irreducible complexity, the function of the system in question always stays put.

Does Behe's definition of irreducible complexity render certain structures provably inaccessible to direct Darwinian pathways? As laid out in Darwin's Black Box, Behe's definition actually needed a little fine-tuning. The problem is that Behe didn't address systems that could retain their function by removing parts and then modifying the other parts that remained. (Behe considered only removal, not modification.) But there's a quick fix here, which I describe in chapter five of No Free Lunch, and that is simply to strengthen the concept of irreducible complexity to include a minimal complexity condition. Essentially this condition says that the system cannot be simplified and still retain the level of function needed for selective advantage. With this proviso, irreducible complexity logically rules out direct Darwinian pathways. Note that many of the irreducibly complex systems Behe considers (notably the bacterial flagellum) satisfy this proviso.

In ruling out direct Darwinian pathways to irreducibly complex systems, Behe isn't saying it's logically impossible for the Darwinian mechanism to attain such systems. It's logically possible for just about anything to attain any other thing via a vastly improbable or fortuitous event. For instance, it's logically possible that with my very limited chess ability I might defeat the reigning world champion, Vladimir Kramnik, in ten straight games. But if I do so, it will be despite my limited chess ability and not because of it. Likewise, if the Darwinian mechanism is the means by which a direct Darwinian pathway leads to an irreducibly complex biochemical system, then it is despite the intrinsic properties or capacities of that mechanism. Thus, in saying that irreducibly complex biochemical systems are provably inaccessible to direct Darwinian pathways, design proponents are saying that the Darwinian mechanism has no intrinsic capacity for generating such systems except as vastly improbable or fortuitous events. Accordingly, to attribute irreducible complexity to a direct Darwinian pathway is like attributing Mount Rushmore to wind and erosion. There's a sheer possibility that wind and erosion could sculpt Mount Rushmore, but not a realistic one.

With direct Darwinian pathways ruled out, that leaves indirect Darwinian pathways. Here Behe's point is no longer logical but empirical. The fact is that for irreducibly complex biochemical systems, no indirect Darwinian pathways are known. At best, biologists have been able to isolate subsystems of such systems that perform other functions. But any reasonably complicated machine always includes subsystems that perform functions distinct from the original machine. So the mere occurrence or identification of subsystems that could perform some function on their own is no evidence for an indirect Darwinian pathway leading to the system. What's needed is a seamless Darwinian account that's both detailed and testable of how subsystems undergoing coevolution could gradually transform into an irreducibly complex system. No such accounts are available or forthcoming. Indeed, if such accounts were available, critics would merely need to cite them, and intelligent design would be finished.

Critics of Behe are at this point quick to throw the argument-from-ignorance objection his way, but this criticism can't be justified. A common way to formulate this criticism is to say, "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." But as with so many overused expressions, this one requires nuancing. Certainly this dictum appropriately characterizes many everyday circumstances. Imagine, for instance, someone feverishly hunting about the house for a missing set of car keys, searching under every object, casing the house, bringing in reinforcements and then, the next morning, when all hope is gone, finding them on top of the car outside. In this case the absence of evidence prior to finding the car keys was not evidence of absence. Yet with the car keys there was independent evidence of their existence in the first place.

But what if we weren't sure that there even were any car keys? The situation in evolutionary biology is even more extreme than that. One might not be sure our hypothetical set of car keys exist, but at least one has the reassurance that car keys exist generally. Indirect Darwinian pathways are more like the supposed leprechauns that Johnny is certain are hiding in his room. Imagine this child were so ardent and convincing that he set all of Scotland Yard, indeed some of the best minds of the age, onto the task of searching meticulously, tirelessly, decade after decade, for these supposed leprechauns, for any solid evidence at all of their prior habitation of the bedroom. And then imagine that in all those decades, the detectives, driven by gold fever for the leprechaun's treasure, let's say, never flagged in searching out and postulating new ways of catching a glimpse of a leprechaun, a leprechaun hair, a leprechaun fingerprint, any solid clue at all. After these many decades, with not a single solid clue to show for all that work, what should one say to the aging parents of the now aging boy if these parents decided there were no leprechauns in the boy's room? Would it be logical to shake your finger at the parents and tell them, "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Step aside and let the experts get back to work." That would be absurd. And yet that, essentially, is what evolutionary biologists are telling us concerning that utterly fruitless search for credible indirect Darwinian pathways to account for irreducible complexity.

If after repeated attempts you don't find what you expect to find after looking in all the right places and if you never had any evidence that the thing you were looking for existed in the first place, then you have reason to think that the thing you are looking for doesn't exist at all. That's precisely Behe's point about indirect Darwinian pathways. (See his chapter in Darwin's Black Box titled "Publish or Perish.") It's not just that we don't know of such a pathway for, say, the bacterial flagellum (the irreducibly complex biochemical machine that has become the mascot of the intelligent design movement). It's that we don't know of such pathways for any such systems. The absence here is pervasive and systemic. That's why critics of Darwinism like Franklin Harold and James Shapiro (neither of which is an intelligent design supporter) argue that positing as-yet-undiscovered indirect Darwinian pathways for such systems constitute "wishful speculations."

Behe's logical point is that irreducible complexity renders biological structures provably inaccessible to direct Darwinian pathways. Behe's empirical point is that the failure of evolutionary biology to discover indirect Darwinian pathways leading to irreducibly complex biological structures is pervasive and systemic, and that such a failure is reason to doubt that indirect Darwinian pathways are the answer to irreducible complexity. The logical and empirical points together constitute a devastating indictment of the Darwinian mechanism, which has routinely been touted as capable of solving all problems of biological complexity once an initial life form is on the scene. Even so, the logical and empirical points together don't answer how one gets from the failure of Darwinism to account for irreducibly complex systems to the legitimacy of employing design to account for them.

This is where the third main point of Behe's project-Behe's explanatory point-comes in. Scientific explanations come in many forms and guises, but the one thing they cannot afford to be without is causal adequacy. A scientific explanation needs to invoke causal powers sufficient to explain the effect in question. Otherwise, the effect is unexplained. The effect in question for Behe is the irreducible complexity of certain biochem ical machines. How did such systems come about? Not by a direct Darwinian pathway, for irreducible complexity rules that out on logical grounds. And apparently not by indirect Darwinian pathways either, for the absence of scientific evidence here is complete. (Critics who claim otherwise are bluffing.) What's more, appealing to unknown material mechanisms is even more tenuous.

Thus, when it comes to irreducibly complex biochemical systems, there's no evidence that material mechanisms are causally adequate to bring them about. But what about intelligence? It is well known that intelligence produces irreducibly complex systems. (For example, humans regularly produce machines that exhibit irreducible complexity.) Intelligence is thus known to be causally adequate to bring about irreducible complexity. Behe's explanatory point, therefore, is that on the basis of causal adequacy, intelligent design is a better scientific explanation than Darwinism for the irreducible complexity of biochemical systems.

Behe's logical and empirical points are mainly negative: they focus on limitations of the Darwinian mechanism. Behe's explanatory point, by contrast, is positive: it provides positive grounds for thinking that irreducibly complex biochemical systems are in fact designed. One question about these points is now likely to remain. Behe uses the logical point to rule out direct Darwinian pathways and the empirical point to rule out indirect Darwinian pathways to irreducible complexity. But the absence of empirical evidence for direct Darwinian pathways leading to irreducible complexity is as complete as for indirect Darwinian pathways. It might seem, then, that the logical point is superfluous inasmuch as the empirical point dispenses with both types of Darwinian pathways. But in fact the logical point helps tighten the noose around Darwinism in a way that the empirical point can't.

If you look at the best confirmed examples of Darwinian evolution in the literature (from Darwin to the present), what you find is natural selection steadily improving a given feature that is performing a given function in a given way. Indeed, the very notion of "improvement" (which plays such an important role in Darwin's Origin of Species) typically connotes that a given thing is getting better in a given respect. Improvement in this sense corresponds to a direct Darwinian pathway. By contrast, an indirect Darwinian pathway (where one function gives way to another function and thus can no longer improve because it no longer exists), though often inferred by evolutionary biologists from fossil or molecular data, tends to be much more difficult to establish rigorously.

The reason is not hard to see: By definition natural selection selects for preexisting function. It cannot select for future function. Once a novel function is realized, the Darwinian mechanism can select for it as well. But making this transition is the hard part. How does one evolve from a system exhibiting a preexisting selectable function to a new system exhibiting a novel selectable function? Natural selection is no help here, and all the weight is on random variation to come up with the right and needed modifications during the crucial transition time when functions are changing (or, as Darwin put it in his Origin of Species, "unless profitable variations do occur, natural selection can do nothing"). The actual evidence that random variation can produce the successive modifications needed to evolve irreducible complexity is nil.

Behe's logical point about irreducible complexity ruling out direct Darwinian pathways therefore rules out the form of Darwinian evolution that is best confirmed. What's more, it rules out the only form of Darwinian evolution that is open to logical analysis. Indirect Darwinian pathways, by contrast, are so open-ended that no logical analysis is capable of constraining them. (Almost invariably they are left unspecified, thus rendering them neither falsifiable nor testable.) Behe's logical point therefore takes logic as far as it can in constraining the Darwinian mechanism and leaves empirical considerations to rule out what remains. And since logical inferences are inherently stronger than empirical inferences, Behe has made his critique of the Darwinian mechanism as strong and tight as possible. It's not just that certain biological systems are so complex that we can't imagine how they evolved by Darwinian pathways. Rather, we can show conclusively that they could not have evolved by direct Darwinian pathways and that indirect Darwinian pathways, which have always been on much less stable ground, are utterly without empirical support.

To sum up, Behe is significant in the debate between intelligent design and Darwinism because he has taught us how to evaluate the relative merits of each. He has done this by giving us the concept of irreducible complexity and by showing us how to employ it. By carefully analyzing and disentangling the logical, the empirical and the explanatory implications of irreducible complexity for the Darwinian mechanism, Behe has demonstrated that intelligent design is at the very least a viable contender in any attempt to explain the irreducible complexity of biochemical systems. What's more, he has shown how to bridge the scientific theory of design with our commonsense intuitions about design. In media reports on intelligent design, one often hears the following sound bite: "Life is too com plicated to have arisen by natural forces, so it must have been designed." This sound bite captures many people's intuitions about intelligent design, but it is too simplistic for scientific purposes. Behe has shown us how to interpret this claim, substituting the rigorously defined phrase irreducibly complex for the vague and undefined phrase too complicated, and he has shown us how to reason our way properly from the inadequacy of undirected natural forces to design.

THE DESIGN REVOLUTION

ANSWERING THE TOUGHEST QUESTIONS ABOUT INTELLIGENT DESIGN

William A. Dembski