To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Friday, August 22, 2025

A Critical Examination of Bhikkhu Bodhi's Critical Examination of Ñanavra Thera’ s “A Note on Paticcasamuppada”


INTRODUCTION

It is good to notice that Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi is very independent intellectually, and he doesn't hesitate to criticise even the Lord Buddha and Suttas:

Here what he writes in the commentary to Brahmajala DN 1:

Just as a fisherman casting his net over a small pond can be sure that all fish of a certain size will be caught within the net, so, the Buddha declares, whatever thinkers speculate about the past or the future can with certainty be found within the net of his teaching.

Whether the sutta, in its present form, really does succeed in matching this claim is difficult to assess. On reflection it seems that many views from the history of philosophy and theology can be called to mind which resist being neatly classified into the scheme the sutta sets up, while other views can be found which agree in their basic credo with those cited in the sutta but appear to spring from causes other than the limited number that the sutta states they can all be ultimately traced to. Some of these will be noted when we turn to a separate discussion of the individual views.

While some scholars may admire such intellectual independence, average Tathagata's discipline will rather attribute it to lack of knowledge of the Four Noble Truths which knowledge include in itself recognition that "ultimately the number of views" spring from indeed very limited number of causes, namely one: sakkāyadiṭṭhi.

“As to the various views that arise in the world, householder, ‘The world is eternal’ …—these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajāla: when there is personality view, these views come to be; when there is no identity view, these views do not come to be.”
SN 41: 3

Generally Lord Buddha was quite sceptical about intellectual independence of his disciples, and discourage it:

“Bhikkhus, for a faithful disciple who is intent on fathoming the Teacher’s Dispensation, it is natural that he conduct himself thus: ‘The Blessed One is the Teacher, I am a disciple; the Blessed One knows, I do not know.’"
MN 70

So what it is, that Venerable Bodhi, doesn't know? In his Critical Examination, Venerable Bodhi admits that he doesn't understand suffering:

An unbiased and complete survey of the Nikāyas, however, would reveal that the problem of dukkha to which the Buddha’ s Teaching is addressed is not primarily existential anxiety , nor even the distorted sense of self of which such anxiety may be symptomatic. The primary problem of dukkha with which the Buddha is concerned, in its most comprehensive and fundamental dimensions, is the problem of our bondage to samsāra—the round of repeated birth, aging, and death.

An unbiased and complete survey of the Nikāyas, however, reveals that "the distorted sense of self" is precisely the very problem of dukkha, not understood by the puthujjana.

“This world, Kaccāna, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence. But this one [with right view] does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about ‘my self.’ He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge about this is independent of others. It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view. SN 12: 15

Since Bhikkhu Bodhi so openly admits here his lack of understanding what constitutes suffering in Dhamma, our Critical Examination could stop here. It is so, because it is not scholarly paper, and the only aim of it is to encourage reader to develop faith in Venerable Nanavira's writings. However let's us point out one more obvious contradiction of Dhamma, in Bhikkhu Bodhi's "examination".

Bhikkhu Bodhi:

While the two triads are expressed in Páli by the same three compounds—kāyasankhāra, vacīsankhāra, cittasankhāra—Ven. Ñánavīra overlooks a fact of prime importance for determining their meaning: namely , that in the Suttas the contexts in which the two triads appear are always kept rigorously separate. The definition of the three sankhārā found in the Cúllavedalla Sutta, and elsewhere in the Canon (at S IV 293), does not occur in the context of PS nor in a context that even touches on PS. This particular definition of the three types of sankhārā—kāyasankhāra, vacīsankhāra, cittasankhāra—always occurs in the course of a discussion on the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (saññávedayita-nirodha). It is intended to prepare the way for an explanation of the order in which the three types of saòkhárá cease when a monk enters the attainment of cessation.

Do we understand Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi properly? Is he really trying to teach us that cessation of sankharas isn't related to dependent arising? Even if so, there is no reason why we should not prefer Suttas, which indeed teach us that there is strictly relationship between stilling of all sankharas and the cessation of dependent arising.

It is hard for such a generation to see this truth, that is to say, specific conditionality, dependent arising. And it is hard to see this truth, that is to say, stilling of all sankhaeas, relinquishing of the essentials of existence, exhaustion of craving, fading of lust, cessation, Nibbāna.MN 26

Or even more direct affirmation of strict relationship between the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling and nibbana or cessation of dependent arising:

But the Blessed One has said: “Whatever is felt is included in suffering.” Now with reference to what was this stated by the Blessed One?’”

“Good, good, bhikkhu! These three feelings have been spoken of by me: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. These three feelings have been spoken of by me. And I have also said: ‘Whatever is felt is included in suffering.’ That has been stated by me with reference to the impermanence of sankharas. That has been stated by me with reference to sankharas being subject to destruction … to sankharas being subject to vanishing … to sankharas being subject to fading away … to sankharas being subject to cessation … to sankharas being subject to change.

“Then, bhikkhu, I have also taught the successive cessation of sankharas. For one who has attained the first jhāna, speech has ceased. For one who has attained the second jhāna, thought and examination have ceased. For one who has attained the third jhāna, rapture has ceased. For one who has attained the fourth jhāna, in-breathing and out-breathing have ceased. For one who has attained the base of the infinity of space, the perception of form has ceased. For one who has attained the base of the infinity of consciousness, the perception pertaining to the base of the infinity of space has ceased. For one who has attained the base of nothingness, the perception pertaining to the base of the infinity of consciousness has ceased. For one who has attained the base of neither-perception-nor-nonperception, the perception pertaining to the base of nothingness has ceased. For one who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling, perception and feeling have ceased. For a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed, lust has ceased, hatred has ceased, delusion has ceased.
“Then, bhikkhu, I have also taught the successive subsiding of sankharas.

So much for Bhikkhu Bodhi's understanding of Dhamma. Unfortunately in the case of sankharas, Bhikkhu Bodhi fails even on the level of objective scholarship. In his commentary to MN 9 he writes about kāyasankhāra, vacīsankhāra, cittasankhāra:

In the context of the doctrine of dependent origination, formations (sankhārā) are wholesome and unwholesome volitions, or, in short, kamma. The bodily formation is volition that is expressed through the body, the verbal formation volition that is expressed by speech, and the mental formation volition that remains internal without coming to bodily or verbal expression.

But he does so without giving the Pali names of these sankharas, so the reader is likely to be measled taking venerable translator opinion which contradicts Sutta definition of these sankharas as valid, reliable and trustworthy. Bhikkhu Bodhi thinks, that he is wiser than Suttas, and refuses to follow simple logic that if kāyasankhāra, vacīsankhāra, cittasankhāra appear in the context of the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling and as well in the context of dependent arising it must mean that there is a vital connection between these two subjects. But as a scholar he should at least to provide the Pali names of these sankharas, so reader can think for himself.

In his commentary to SN 12 : 2 Bhikkhu Bodhi writes

This triad of saṅkhārā should not be confused with the triad discussed at 41:6 (IV 293,14-28, also at MN I 301,17-29). I have added “volitional” to the present set to distinguish them from the other, though the Pāli terms are identical. The latter triad is always introduced in relation to the cessation of perception and feeling and is never brought into connection with dependent origination.

So Pali terms are identical and the cessation of perception and feeling  is never brought into connection with dependent origination. And this triad of saṅkhārā should not be confused with the triad discussed at 41:6 (IV 293,14-28, also at MN I 301,17-29).

But who is confused here?

It looks like Bhikkhu Bodhi in his eagerness to criticise what he doesn't understand, has forgotten that Pali scholarship has some specific qualityies absent in other forms of scholarship:

“Bhikkhus, there was once a foolish Magadhan cowherd who, in the last month of the rainy season, in the autumn, without examining the near shore or the further shore of the river Ganges, drove his cattle across to the other shore in the Videhan country at a place that had no ford. Then the cattle bunched together in mid-stream in the river Ganges, and they met with calamity and disaster. Why was that? Because that foolish Magadhan cowherd, in the last month of the rainy season, in the autumn, without examining the near shore or the further shore of the river Ganges, drove his cattle across to the other shore in the Videhan country at a place that had no ford.

“So too, bhikkhus, as to those recluses and brahmins who are unskilled in this world and the other world, unskilled in Māra’s realm and what is outside Māra’s realm, unskilled in the realm of Death and what is outside the realm of Death—it will lead to the harm and suffering for a long time of those who think they should listen to them and place faith in them". MN 34

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