To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.
Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)
Nanamoli Thera
Tuesday, February 18, 2020
The very purpose of “strategic bombing” was genocide
“You must understand that this war is not against Hitler or National Socialism, but against the strength of the German people, which is to be smashed once and for all, regardless whether it is in the hands of Hitler or a Jesuit priest.” Winston Churchill, 1940, as quoted in Emrys Hughes book, “Winston Churchill, His Career in War and Peace.”
Frederick Lindemann, who became known as 1st Viscount Cherwell, was a Jew born in Baden-Baden, Germany but raised in England. He went back to Germany to obtain his PhD in physics from the University of Berlin, after which, he returned to England. Lindemann was an early pioneer of British aviation technological development, and when Churchill became Prime Minister, he appointed Lindemann as the British government’s (and his) leading scientific adviser. As a Jew, Lindemann harbored a pathological hatred, not only of the National Socialists (“Nazis”), but of Germany and the German people, and was an enthusiastic advocate of International Jewry’s “total war” then being waged against Germany. Vengeance against the Germans motivated his every action and opinion. He was a leading advocate from the start of “area bombing” of German cities, and devised a “plan” to carry it out.
The “Lindemann plan” proposed that Britain should forget military targets and concentrate air attacks on Germany’s civilian population in order to break the morale of the German people. After their morale was broken, Lindemann believed, and Churchill believed also, the German public would demand an unconditional surrender to the Allies. His plan proposed that “bombing must be directed to working class houses. Middle class houses have too much space round them, so are bound to waste bombs.”
“It should be emphasized,” Lindemann said, “that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories.” In other words, killing massive numbers of civilians should be the primary aim of the bombing raids.
Lindemann was not writing in a vacuum when he created the Lindemann Plan.
Professor Solly Zuckerman and Professor Desmond Bernal, both Jews, also did studies on the effects of area bombing on structures and people, and both became strong advocates of massive bombing of Germany. Bombing cities as a means of waging total war had already become an accepted strategy among the members of Britain’s “war party.” Britain began developing and building long range, heavy bombers as early as 1933. The United States did the same. The Lancaster, the B17 and the B24 were built for no purpose except to destroy cities and inflict massive casualties on the German population. Military operations require small, fast, “tactical” planes. Thousand plane armadas of four-engine, heavy “strategic” bombers had no military purpose. Colonel (later Brigadier General) Robin Olds, a highly respected officer and USAF fighter pilot who served in both WWII and Vietnam, stated more than once that the so-called strategic bombing program was ineffective, wasteful and pointless. It is generally acknowledged today that the strategic bombing program did not shorten the war by a single day, and that in the end, it served no military purpose. After all, Germany reached her highest level of war production in the last months of the war when the bombing was most intense.
Colonel Olds, among many others, was of the opinion that fighter bombers carrying a single bomb flying low and fast would have been far more effective against German military and strategic targets. He said that a single Mustang could have dropped a five hundred pound bomb through the window of any factory in Germany. It was impossible to hit a factory with a huge formation of bombers flying at 25,000 feet without destroying everything for miles around it. He also emphasized that this would have greatly minimized civilian casualties. Perhaps the colonel was naive. Perhaps he did not understand that the very purpose of “strategic bombing” was to maximize civilian casualties. In a word, the purpose of “strategic bombing” was genocide!!
While Britain and the United States were building thousands upon thousands of four-engine, long range, heavy bombers, designed for no purpose except the destruction of cities and the slaughter of massive numbers of civilians, Germany built only light, maneuverable, low altitude bombers designed for ground support. These planes were unsuitable for genocidal terror bombing. Hitler only undertook the bombing of British civilian targets reluctantly, three months after the RAF began a campaign of carpet bombing German cities. Hitler would have been willing at any time to stop the slaughter.
Churchill’s War Cabinet adopted the Lindemann Plan in March, 1942, which then became Britain’s official policy. This decision of the War Cabinet was kept a closely guarded secret from the British public throughout the war and for many years afterwards. The British people were told that only military and industrial targets were bombed, and any damage beyond that was unintentional. The true nature of British bombing of German cities and civilians was revealed in 1961 in a book titled Science and Government by the physicist and novelist, Sir Charles Snow. The following passage from the book was immediately translated and published in several languages:
“Early in 1942 Professor Lindemann, by this time Lord Cherwell and a member of the Cabinet, laid a cabinet paper before the Cabinet on the strategic bombing of Germany. It described in quantitative terms the effect on Germany of a British bombing offensive in the next eighteen months (approximately March 1942–September 1943).
The paper laid down a strategic policy. The bombing must be directed essentially against German working-class houses. Middle-class houses have too much space round them and so are bound to waste bombs; factories and “military objectives” had long since been forgotten, except in official bulletins, since they were much too difficult to find and hit. The paper claimed that—given a total concentration of effort on the production and use of aircraft—it would be possible, in all the larger towns of Germany (that is, those with more than 50,000 inhabitants), to destroy 50 per cent of all houses.”
Angus Calder wrote, in his book, “The Peoples’ War,” 1969: “It may be Inconvenient History but England rather than Germany initiated the murderous slaughter of bombing civilians thus bringing about retaliation. [Neville] Chamberlain conceded that it [bombing of civilians and cities]was “absolutely contrary to International law.” It began in 1940 and Churchill believed it held the secret of victory. He was convinced that raids of sufficient intensity could destroy Germany’s morale, and so his War Cabinet planned a campaign that abandoned the accepted practice of attacking the enemy’s armed forces and, instead made civilians the primary target. Night after night, RAF bombers in ever increasing numbers struck throughout Germany, usually at working class housing, because it was more densely packed.”
Britain devoted more of her resources to RAF Bomber Command than to all the other branches of the British military combined. Having discovered early in the war that it was nearly impossible to hit a small target such as a factory or a runway from high in the air, Bomber Command decided to concentrate entire air wings into bomber raids of a thousand planes at a time on German cities. To avoid airplane losses to German fighter planes and anti-aircraft fire from the ground, these massive attacks were flown only at night at high altitude. The British gave up on military targets early in the war and decided to concentrate entirely on Germany’s cities, using the city centers as their aiming point. The city centers were the oldest part of the cities, dating back to the middle ages and beyond. In the city centers the streets were narrow and the buildings were close together, constructed mostly of highly flammable wood, covered with plaster, which ignited easily and burned furiously. The people in these old cities suffered agonizing deaths as they were fried, cooked, and broiled by the fires, or blown to pieces by the explosions.
The Myth of German Villainy
Benton L. Bradberry
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