To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Tuesday, September 9, 2025

On talkativeness


5021 1 It is a troublesome and difficult task that philosophy has in hand when it undertakes to cure garrulousness. For the remedy, words of reason, requires listeners; but the garrulous listen to nobody, for they are always talking. And this is the first symptom of their ailment: looseness of the tongue become impotence of the ears. For it is a deliberate deafness, that of men who, I take it, blame Nature because they have only one tongue, but two ears. If, then, Euripides was right when he said with reference to the unintelligent hearer,

 

I could not fill a man who will not hold

My wise words flooding into unwise ears,

 

it would be more just to say to the garrulous man, or rather about the garrulous man,

 

I could not fill a man who will not take

My wise words flooding into unwise ears,

 

or rather submerging, a man who talks to those who will not listen, and will not listen when others talk. For even if he does listen for a moment, when his loquacity is, as it were, at ebb, the rising tide immediately makes up for it many times over.

They give the name Seven-voiced to the portico at Olympia which reverberates many times from a single utterance; and if but the least word sets garrulousness in motion, straightway it echoes round about on all sides,

Touching the heart-strings never touched before.

Indeed one might think that the babbler’s ears have no passage bored through to the soul, but only to the tongue. Consequently, while others retain what is said, in talkative persons it goes right through in a flux; then they go about like empty vessels, void of sense, but full of noise.

2 1 But if, however, we are resolved to leave no means untried, let us say to the babbler,

Hush, child: in silence many virtues lie,

and among them the two first and greatest, the merits of hearing and being heard; neither of these can happen to talkative persons, but even in that which they desire especially they fail miserably. For in other diseases of the soul, such as love of money, love of glory, love of pleasure, there is at least the possibility of attaining their desires, but for babblers this is very difficult: they desire listeners and cannot get them, since every one runs away headlong. If men are sitting in a public lounge or strolling about in a portico, and see a talker coming up, they quickly give each other the counter-sign to break camp. And just as when silence occurs in an assemblage they say that Hermes has joined the company, so when a chatterbox comes into a dinner-party or social gathering, 503 every one grows silent, not wishing to furnish him a hold; and if he begins of his own accord to open his mouth,

 

As when the North-wind blows along

A sea-beaten headland before the storm,

 

suspecting that they will be tossed about and sea-sick, they rise up and go out. And so it is a talker’s lot when travelling by land or sea, to find volunteer listeners neither as table-companions nor as tent-mates, but only conscripts; for the talker is at you everywhere, catching your cloak, plucking your beard, digging you in the ribs.

 

Then are your feet of the greatest value,

 

as Archilochus says, and on my word the wise Aristotle will agree. For when Aristotle himself was annoyed by a chatterer and bored with some silly stories, and the fellow kept repeating, “Isn’t it wonderful, Aristotle?” “There’s nothing wonderful about that,” said Aristotle, “but that anyone with feet endures you.” To another man of the same sort, who said after a long rigmarole, “Poor philosopher, I’ve wearied you with my talk,” “Heavens, no!” said Aristotle, “I wasn’t listening.” In fact, if chatterers force their talk upon us, the soul surrenders to them the ears to be flooded from outside, but herself within unrolls thoughts of another sort and follows them out by herself. Therefore talkers do not find it easy to secure listeners who either pay attention or believe what they say; for just as they affirm that the seed of persons too prone to lusts of the flesh is barren, so is the speech of babblers ineffectual and fruitless.

3 1 And yet Nature has built about none of our parts so stout a stockade as about the tongue, having placed before it as an outpost the teeth, so that when reason within tightens “the reins of silence,” if the tongue does not obey or restrain itself, we may check its incontinence by biting it till it bleeds. For Euripides says that “disaster is the end,” not of unbolted treasuries or storerooms, but of “unbridled tongues.” And those who believe that storerooms without doors and purses without fastenings are of no use to their owners, yet keep their mouths without lock or door, maintaining as perpetual an outflow as the mouth of the Black Sea, appear to regard speech as the least valuable of all things. They do not, therefore, meet with belief, which is the object of all speech. For this is the proper end and aim of speech, to engender belief in the hearer; but chatterers are disbelieved even if they are telling the truth. For as wheat shut up in a jar is found to have increased in quantity, but to have deteriorated in quality, so when a story finds its way to a chatterer, it generates a large addition of falsehood and thereby destroys its credit.

4 1 Again, every self-respecting and orderly man would, I think, avoid drunkenness. For while, according to some, anger lives next door to madness, drunkenness lives in the same house with it; or rather, drunkenness is madness, shorter in duration, but more culpable, because the will also is involved in it. And there is no fault so generally ascribed to drunkenness as that of intemperate and unlimited speech. “For wine,” says the Poet,

 

Urges a man to sing, though he be wise,

And stirs to merry laughter and the dance.

 

And what is here so very dreadful? Singing and laughing and dancing? Nothing so far —

But it lets slip some word better unsaid:

this is where the dreadful and dangerous part now comes in. And perhaps the Poet has here resolved the question debated by the philosophers, the difference between being under the influence of wine and being drunk, when he speaks of the former as relaxation, but drunkenness as sheer folly. For what is in a man’s heart when he is sober is on his tongue when he is drunk, as those who are given to proverbs say. Therefore when Bias kept silent at a drinking-bout and was taunted with stupidity by a chatterer, 504 “What fool,” said he, “in his cups can hold his tongue?” And when a certain man at Athens was entertaining envoys from the king, at their earnest request he made every effort to gather the philosophers to meet them; and while the rest took part in the general conversation and made their contributions to it, but Zeno kept silent, the strangers, pledging him courteously, said, “And what are we to tell the king about you, Zeno?” “Nothing,” said he, “except that there is an old man at Athens who can hold his tongue at a drinking-party.”

Thus silence is something profound and awesome and sober, but drunkenness is a babbler, for it is foolish and witless, and therefore loquacious also. And the philosophers even in their very definition of drunkenness say that it is intoxicated and foolish talking; thus drinking is not blamed if silence attends the drinking, but it is foolish talk which converts the influence of wine into drunkenness. While it is true that the drunken man talks foolishness in his cups, the chatterer talks foolishness on all occasions, in the market-place, in the theatre, out walking, drunk or sober, by day, by night. As your physician, he is worse than the disease; as your ship-mate, more unpleasant than sea-sickness; his praises are more annoying than another’s blame: we certainly have greater pleasure in company with clever rascals than with honest chatterboxes. In Sophocles, when Ajax uses boisterous language, Nestor, in soothing him, says in words which show his knowledge of character,

CI blame you not: ill your words, but good your deeds.

But these are not our feelings toward the chatterer; on the contrary, the untimeliness of his words destroys and annuls all gratitude for any deed.

5 1 Lysias once composed a speech for a litigant and gave it to him. The man read it through a number of times and came to Lysias in despair and said that the first time he read it the speech seemed to him wonderfully good, but on taking it up a second and third time it appeared completely dull and ineffectual. “Well,” said Lysias laughing, “isn’t it only once that you are going to speak it before the jurors?” And consider the persuasiveness and charm of Lysias! For he is one who, for my part,

DI say has a fair portion in the violet-tressed Muses.

And of the things said about the Poet this is the truest — that Homer alone has survived the fastidiousness of men, since he is ever new and his charm is ever at his best; yet none the less, he spoke and proclaimed that famous remark about himself,

I scorn to tell

A tale again that’s once been clearly told:

and he avoids and fears the satiety which lies in ambush for every tale, leading his hearers from one narrative to another and soothing away the ear’s surfeit by constant novelty. But babblers actually wear out our ears by their repetitions, just as though they were smudging palimpsests.

6 1 Let this, then, be the first thing of which we remind them — that just as wine, discovered for the promotion of pleasure and good fellowship, is sometimes misused to produce discomfort and intoxication by those who compel others to drink it undiluted in large quantities, so speech, which is the most pleasant and human of social ties, is made inhuman and unsocial by those who use it badly and wantonly, because they offend those whom they think they please, are ridiculed for their attempts at gaining admiration, and are disliked because of the very means they employ to gain affection. As, then, he can have no share in Aphroditê who uses her girdle to drive away and alienate those who seek his company, so he who arouses annoyance and hostility with his speech is no friend of the Muses and a stranger to art.

7 1 Now of the other affections and maladies some are dangerous, some detestable, some ridiculous; but garrulousness has all these qualities at once; for babblers are derided for telling what everyone knows, they are hated for bearing bad news, they run into danger they since they cannot refrain from revealing secrets. So it is that Anacharsis, 505 when he had been entertained and feasted at Solon’s house and lay down to sleep, was seen to have his left hand placed upon his private parts, but his right hand upon his mouth; for he believed, quite rightly, that the tongue needs the stronger restraint. It would not be easy, for example, to enumerate as many men who have been ruined by incontinent lust as is the number of cities and empires which a secret revealed has brought to destruction. When Sulla was besieging Athens, he had very little time to waste in the operations

Since other labour was pressing,

Mithridates having ravaged Asia, and the party of Marius being again masters in Rome. But spies heard some old men in a barber’s shop remarking to each other that the Heptachalcon was unguarded and that the city was in danger of being captured at that place; and the spies brought word of this to Sulla, who at once brought up his forces at midnight, led in his army, and almost razed the city to the ground, filling it with carnage and corpses so that the Cerameicus ran with blood. And Sulla’s anger with the Athenians was due more to their words than to their deeds; for they used to revile him and Metella, leaping upon the walls and jesting,

 

Sulla is a mulberry sprinkled with meal;

 

and with much similar idle banter they drew upon themselves, as Plato says, “a very heavy penalty for the lightest of things, words.”

The loquacity of one man, again, prevented Rome from becoming free by the removal of Nero. For but one night remained, after which the tyrant was to die, and all preparations had been made; but the man who was to kill him saw at the palace gates when on his way to the theatre a prisoner about to be led before Nero and lamenting his evil fortune. He approached the prisoner and whispered to him, “Only pray, my good man, that to day may pass by and to morrow you will be thankful to me.” So the prisoner grasped the intended meaning, and reflecting, I suppose, that

 

He is a fool who leaves things close at hand

To follow what is out of reach,

 

chose the surer rather than the more just way of safety. For he revealed to Nero what had been said to him by the man, who was immediately seized, and tortures and fire and the lash were applied to the conspirator as he denied, in the face of constraint, what he had revealed without constraint.

8 1 Zeno the philosopher, in order that even against his will no secret should be betrayed by his body when under torture, bit his tongue through and spat it out at the despot. And Leaena also has a splendid reward for her self-control. She was a courtesan belonging to the group led by Harmodius and Aristogeiton and shared in the conspiracy against the tyrants — with her hopes, all a woman could do; for she also had joined in the revels about that noble mixing-bowl of Eros and through the god had been initiated into the secrets which might not be revealed. When, therefore, the conspirators failed and were put to death, she was questioned and commanded to reveal those who still escaped detection; but she would not do so and continued steadfast, proving that those men had experienced a passion not unworthy of themselves in loving a woman like her. And the Athenians caused a bronze lioness without a tongue to be made and set up in the gates of the Acropolis, representing by the spirited courage of the animal Leaena’s invincible character, and by its tonguelessness her power of silence in keeping a holy secret.

No spoken word, it is true, has ever done such service as have in many instances words unspoken; for it is possible at some later time to tell what you have kept silent, but never to keep silent what once has been spoken — that has been spilled, and has made its way abroad. Hence, I think, in speaking we have men as teachers, but in keeping silent we have gods, and we receive from them this lesson of silence at initiations into the Mysteries. 506 And the Poet has made the most eloquent Odysseus the most reticent, and also his son and his wife and his nurse; for you hear the nurse saying,

 

I’ll hold it safe like sturdy oak or iron.

And Odysseus himself, as he sat beside Penelopê,

Did pity in his heart his wife in tears,

But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids

Like horn or iron.

 

So full of self-control was his body in every limb, and Reason, with all parts in perfect obedience and submission, ordered his eyes not to weep, his tongue not to utter a sound, his heart not to tremble or bark:

 

His heart remained enduring in obedience,

 

since his reason extended even to his irrational or involuntary movements and made amenable and subservient to itself both his breath and his blood. Of such character were also most of his companions; for even when they were dragged about and dashed upon the ground by the Cyclops, they would not denounce Odysseus nor show that fire-sharpened instrument prepared against the monster’s eye, but preferred to be eaten raw rather than to tell a single word of the secret — an example of self-control and loyalty which cannot be surpassed. Therefore Pittacus did not do badly, when the king of Egypt sent him a sacrificial animal and bade him cut out the fairest and foulest meat, when he cut out and sent him the tongue, as being the instrument of both the greatest good and the greatest evil.

9 1 And Ino in Euripides, speaking out boldly concerning herself, says that she knows how to be

 

Silent in season, to speak where speech is safe.

 

For those who have received a noble and truly royal education learn first to be silent, and then to speak. For example, that famous king Antigonus, when his son asked him at what hour they were to break camp, said, “What are you afraid of? That you alone may not hear the trumpet?” This was not, surely, because he would not entrust a secret to the man to whom he intended to leave his kingdom? No, he was teaching his son to be self-controlled and guarded about such matters. And the old Metellus, when on a campaign he was asked some such question, said, “If I thought my shirt was privy to that secret, I would have stripped it off and put it in the fire.” And Eumenes, when he heard that Craterus was advancing, told none of his friends, but pretended that it was Neoptolemus. For his soldiers despised Neoptolemus, but both repulsed the reputation of Craterus and admired his valour. No one else knew the truth, and they joined battle, won the victory, killed Craterus without knowing it, and only recognized him when he was dead. So successfully did silence manoeuvre the contest and keep hidden so formidable an opponent that his friends admired Eumenes for not forewarning them rather than blamed him. And even if some do blame you, it is better that men should criticize you when they are already saved through mistrust than that they should accuse you when they are being destroyed because you did trust them.

10 1 Yet, speaking generally, who has left himself the right to speak out boldly against one who has not kept silent? If the story ought not to have been known, it was wrong for it to be told to another; and if you have let the secret slip from yourself and yet seek to confine it to another, you have taken refuge in another’s good faith when you have already abandoned your own. And if he turns out to be no better than yourself, you are deservedly ruined; if better, you are saved beyond all expectation, since you have found another more faithful on your own behalf than you yourself are. “But this man is my friend.” Yet he has another friend, whom he will likewise trust as I trust him; and his friend, again, will trust another friend. Thus, then, the story goes on increasing and multiplying by link after link of incontinent betrayal. For just as the monad does not pass out of its own boundaries, 507 but remains once and for all one (for which reason it is called a monad), and as the dyad is the indeterminate beginning or difference (for by doubling it at once shifts from unity to plurality), so a story confined to its first possessor is truly secret; but if it passes to another, it has acquired the status of rumour. The Poet, in fact, says that “words” are “winged”: neither when you let go from your hands a winged thing is it easy to get it back again, nor when a word is let slip from the mouth is it possible to arrest and control it, but it is borne away

Circling on swift wings,

and is scattered abroad from one to another. So when a ship has been caught by a wind, they try to check it, deadening its speed with cables and anchors, but if a story runs out of harbour, so to speak, there is no roadstead or anchorage for it, but, carried away with a great noise and reverberation, it dashes upon the man who uttered it and submerges him in some great and terrible danger.

 

With but a little torch one might set fire

To Ida’s rock; and tell one man a tale,

Soon all the town will know.

 

11 The Roman Senate was once for many days debating in strict privacy a certain secret policy; and since the matter gave rise to much uncertainty and suspicion, a woman prudent in other respects, but yet a woman, kept pestering her husband and persistently begging to learn the secret. She vowed with imprecations upon herself that she would keep silent, and wept and moaned because she was not trusted. And the Roman, wishing to bring home her folly by proof, said, “Wife, you have won; listen to a terrible and portentous matter. We have been informed by the priests that a lark has been seen flying about with a golden helmet and a spear; we are therefore examining the portent whether it be good or bad, and are in constant consultation with the augurs. But do you hold your tongue.” So saying he went off to the Forum. But his wife at once seized the first maid to come into the room and beat her own breast and tore her hair. “Alas,” she cried, “for my husband and my country! What will become of us?” wishing, and in fact instructing, the maid to ask, “Why, what has happened?” So when the maid asked the question, she told the tale and added that refrain common to every babbler, “Keep this quiet and tell it to no one!” The little maid had scarcely left her when she herself tells the tale to that fellow servant who, she saw, had least to do; and this servant, in turn, told it to her lover who was paying a visit. With such speed was the story rolled out into the Forum that it preceded its inventor: he was met by an acquaintance who said, “Have you just now come down to the Forum from home?” “This very moment,” said he. “Then you have heard nothing?” “Why, is there any news?” “A lark has been seen flying about with a gold helmet and a spear and the magistrates are going to convene the senate about the matter.” And the husband laughed and said, “All praise to your speed, my wife! The story has even reached the Forum before me!” So he interviewed the magistrates and relieved them of their anxiety; but, by way of punishing his wife, as soon as he entered home, he said, “Wife, you have ruined me! The secret has been discovered to have been made public from my house; consequently I am to be exiled from my native land because you lack self-control.” When she denied it and said, “What, didn’t you hear it in company with three hundred others?” “Three hundred, nonsense!” said he. “You made such a fuss that I had to invent the whole story to try you out.” Thus this man made trial of his wife cautiously and in complete safety, pouring, as it were into a leaky vessel, 508 not wine or oil, but water.

But Fulvius, the friend of Caesar Augustus, heard the emperor, now an old man, lamenting the desolation of his house: two of his grandsons were dead, and Postumius, the only one surviving, was in exile because of some false accusation, and thus he was forced to import his wife’s son into the imperial succession; yet he pitied his grandson and was planning to recall him from abroad. Fulvius divulged what he had heard to his own wife, and she to Livia; and Livia bitterly rebuked Caesar: if he had formed this design long ago, why did he not send for his grandson, instead of making her an object of enmity and strife to the successor to the empire. Accordingly, when Fulvius came to him in the morning, as was his custom, and said, “Hail, Caesar,” Caesar replied, “Farewell, Fulvius.” And Fulvius took his meaning and went away; going home at once, he sent for his wife, “Caesar has found out,” he said, “that I have not kept his secret, and therefore I intend to kill myself.” “It is right that you should,” said his wife, “since, after living with me for so long a time, you have not learned to guard against my incontinent tongue. But let me die first.” And, taking the sword, she dispatched herself before her husband.

12 1 Philippides, the comic poet, therefore, made the right answer when King Lysimachus courteously asked him, “What is there of mine that I may share with you?” and he replied, “Anything you like, Sire, except your secrets.” And to garrulousness is attached also a vice no less serious than itself, inquisitiveness. For babblers wish to hear many things so that they may have many things to tell. And they go about tracking down and searching out especially those stories that have been kept hidden and are not to be revealed, storing up for their foolish gossip, as it were, a second-hand stock of hucksters’ wares; then, like children with a piece of ice, they are neither able to hold it nor willing to let it go. Or rather, the secrets are like reptiles which they catch and place in their bosoms, yet cannot confine them there, but are devoured by them; for pipefish and vipers, they say, burst in giving birth, and secrets, when they escape, destroy and ruin those who cannot keep them.

Seleucus the Victorious lost his entire army and power in the battle against the Gauls; he tore off his crown with his own hands and fled on horseback with three or four companions. When he had travelled a long journey through winding ways and trackless wilds, at length becoming desperate from lack of food he approached a certain farmhouse. By chance he found the master himself and begged bread and water from him. And the farmer gave him lavishly both these and whatever else there was in a farmstead, and while entertaining him hospitably, recognized the face of the king. In his joy at the fortunate chance of rendering service he could not restrain himself or dissemble as did the king, who wished to remain unknown, but he escorted the king to the highway and, on taking leave, said, “Fare well, King Seleucus.” And Seleucus, stretching out his right hand to him and drawing him towards himself as though to kiss him, gave a sign to one of his companions to cut off the man’s head with a sword:

Still speaking his head was mingled with the dust.

But if the man had remained silent at that time and had mastered himself for a little while, when the king later won success and regained power, he would have earned, I fancy, an even larger reward for his silence than for his hospitality.

This man, it is true, had as something of an excuse for his incontinence his hopes and the friendly service he had rendered; 13 1 but most talkers do not even have a reason for destroying themselves. For example, people were once talking in a barber’s shop about how adamantine and unbreakable the despotism of Dionysius was. The barber laughed and said, “Fancy your saying that about Dionysius, when I have my razor at his throat every few days or so!” 509 When Dionysius heard this, he crucified the barber.

It is not strange that barbers are a talkative clan, for the greatest chatterboxes stream in and sit in their chairs, so that they are themselves infected with the habit. It was a witty answer, for instance, that King Archelaüs gave to a loquacious barber, who, as he wrapped his towel around him, asked, “How shall I cut your hair, Sire?” “In silence,” said Archelaüs. And it was a barber also who first announced the great disaster of the Athenians in Sicily, having learned it in the Peiraeus from a slave, one of those who had escaped from the island. Then the barber left his shop and hurried at full speed to the city,

 

Lest another might win the glory

of imparting the news to the city,

and he come second.

 

A panic naturally arose and the people gathered in assembly and tried to come at the origin of the rumour. So the barber was brought forward and questioned; yet he did not even know the name of his informant, but referred the origin to a nameless and unknown person. The assembly was enraged and cried out, “Torture the cursèd fellow! Put him on the rack! He has fabricated and concocted this tale! Who else heard it? Who believed it?” The wheel was brought and the man was stretched upon it. Meanwhile there arrived bearers of the disastrous news, men who had escaped from the slaughter itself. All, therefore, dispersed, each to his private mourning, leaving the wretched fellow bound on the wheel. But when he was set free late in the day when it was already nearly evening, he asked the executioner if they had also heard “how the general, Nicias, had died.” Such an unconquerable and incorrigible evil does habit make garrulity.

14 1 And yet, just as those who have drunk bitter and evil-smelling drugs are disgusted with the cups as well, so those who bear ill tidings cause disgust and hatred in those who hear them. Therefore Sophocles has very neatly raised the question:

Gu. Is it in ear or soul that you are stung? —

Cr. But why seek to define where lies my pain? —

Gu. The doer grieves your heart, I but your ears.

Be that as it may, speakers also cause pain, just as doers do, but none the less there is no checking or chastening a loose tongue.

The temple of Athena of the Brazen House at Sparta was discovered to have been plundered, and an empty flask was found lying inside. The large crowd which had quickly formed was quite at a loss, when one of the bystanders said, “If you wish, I shall tell you what occurs to me about that flask. I think that the robbers, before undertaking so dangerous a task, drank hemlock and brought along wine, so that, if they should escape detection, by drinking the unmixed wine they might quench the poison and rid themselves of its evil effects, and so might get away safely; but if they should be caught, that they might die an easy and painless death from the poison before they should be put to the torture.” When he had said this, the explanation appeared so very complicated and subtle that it did not seem to come from fancy, but from knowledge; and the people surrounded him and questioned him one after another, “Who are you?” “Who knows you?” “How did you come to know this?” and at last he was put through so thorough an examination that he confessed to being one of the robbers.

Were not the murderers of Ibycus caught in the same way? They were sitting in a theatre, and when cranes came in sight, they laughed and whispered to each other that the avengers of Ibycus were come. Persons sitting near overheard them, and since Ibycus had disappeared and now for a long time had been sought, they caught at this remark and reported it to the magistrates. And thus the slayers were convicted and led off to prison, not punished by the cranes, 510 but compelled to confess the murder by the infirmity of their own tongues, as it were some Fury or spirit of vengeance. For as in the body the neighbouring parts are borne by attraction toward diseased and suffering parts, so the tongue of babblers, ever inflamed and throbbing, draws and gathers to itself some portion of what has been kept concealed and should not be revealed. Therefore the tongue must be fenced in, and reason must ever lie, like a barrier, in the tongue’s way, checking its flow and keeping it from slipping, in order that we may not be thought to be less sensible than geese, of whom they relate that when from Cilicia they cross Mt. Taurus, which is full of eagles, they take a great stone in their mouths to serve as a bolt or bridle for their scream, and pass over at night unobserved.

 

15 1 Now if anyone were to ask,

Who is the most wicked and the most abandoned man,

no one would pass the traitor by and name anyone else. So Euthycrates “roofed his house with the timber he got from Macedon,” as Demosthenes says, and Philocrates received much money and “bought strumpets and fish”; and to Euphorbus and Philagrus, who betrayed Eretria, the king gave land. But the babbler is a traitor who volunteers his services without pay: he does not betray horses or city-walls, but divulges secrets connected with lawsuits, party strife, and political manoeuvres. No one thanks him, but he himself, if he can win a hearing, must owe thanks. The result is that the verse directed at the man who recklessly and injudiciously pours forth and squanders his own possessions,

You are not generous: it’s your disease,

You love to give,

fits the foolish talker also: “You are no friend or well-wisher in revealing this: it’s your disease, you love to be babbling and prating.”

16 1 But these remarks are not to be regarded as an accusation against garrulity, but an attempt to cure it; for we get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our ailments, but the diagnosis must come first; since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what does not distress him, and we only grow distressed with our ailments when we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them. Thus, in the present instance, we perceive in the case of babblers that they are hated when they wish to be liked, that they cause annoyance when they wish to please, that they are laughed at when they think they are admired, that they spend their money without any gain, that they wrong their friends, help their enemies, and destroy themselves. Consequently this is the first step in curing the disease — by the application of reason to discover the shameful and painful effects that result from it.

17 1 And the second is that we must apply our reasoning powers to the effects of the opposite behaviour, always hearing and remembering and keeping close at hand the praises bestowed on reticence, and the solemn, holy, and mysterious character of silence, remembering also that terse and pithy speakers and those who can pack much sense into a short speech are more admired and loved, and are considered to be wiser, than these unbridled and headstrong talkers. Plato, in fact, commends such pithy men, declaring that they are like skilful throwers of the javelin, for what they say is crisp, solid, and compact. And Lycurgus, constraining his fellow-citizens from their earliest childhood to acquire this clever habit by means of silence, made them concise and terse in speech. For just as the Celtiberians make steel from iron by burying it in the earth and then cleaning off the large earthy accumulation, so the speech of Spartans has no dross, but being disciplined by the removal of all superfluities, it is tempered to complete efficiency; for this capacity of theirs for aphoristic speech and for quickness 511 and the ability to turn out a neat phrase in repartee is the fruit of much silence.

And we must be careful to offer to chatterers examples of this terseness, so that they may see how charming and how effective they are. For example: “The Spartans to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth.” And again, when Philip wrote to them, “If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out,” they wrote back, “If.” And when King Demetrius was annoyed and shouted, “Have the Spartans sent only one envoy to me ?” the envoy replied undismayed, “One to one.”

And among the men of old also sententious speakers are admired, and upon the temple of the Pythian Apollo the Amphictyons inscribed, not the Iliad and the Odyssey or the paeans of Pindar, but “Know thyself” and “Avoid extremes” and “Give a pledge and mischief is at hand,” admiring, as they did, the compactness and simplicity of the expression which contains within a small compass a well-forged sentiment. And is not the god himself fond of conciseness and brevity in his oracles, and is he not called Loxias because he avoids prolixity rather than obscurity? And are not those who indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done, praised and admired exceedingly? So Heracleitus, when his fellow-citizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord, mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal, stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed, thus demonstrating to them that to be satisfied with whatever they happen upon and not to want expensive things is to keep cities in peace and concord. And Scilurus, king of the Scythians, left behind him eighty sons; when he was dying, he asked for a bundle of spear shafts and bade his sons take it and break it in pieces, tied closely together as the shafts were. When they gave up the task, he himself drew all the spears out one by one and easily broke them in two, thus revealing that the harmony and concord of his sons was a strong and invincible thing, but that their disunion would be weak and unstable.

18 1 If anyone will but review and recollect constantly these and similar instances, he may conceivably stop taking pleasure in foolish chatter. But as for me, that famous case of the slave puts me utterly to shame when I reflect what immense importance it is to pay attention to what is said and to be master of our purpose. Pupius Piso, the orator, not wishing to be troubled, ordered his slaves to speak only in answer to questions and not a word more. Subsequently, wishing to pay honour to Clodius when he was a magistrate, Piso gave orders that he be invited to dinner and prepared what was, we may suppose, a sumptuous banquet. When the hour came, the other guests were present, but Clodius was still expected, and Piso repeatedly sent the slave who regularly carried invitations to see if Clodius was approaching. And when evening came and he was finally despaired of, Piso said to the slave, “See here, did you give him the invitation?” I did,” said the slave. “Why hasn’t he come then?” “Because he declined.” “Then why didn’t you tell me at once?” “Because you didn’t ask me that.” So a Roman slave, but the Athenian slave while digging will tell his master

On what terms the truce is made,

so great in all things is the force of habit. And of this let us now speak.

19 1 For it is impossible to check the babbler by gripping the reins, as it were; his disease must be mastered by habituation. In the first place, then, when questions are asked of neighbours, let him accustom himself to remaining silent until all have refused a response:

 

For counsel’s aim is not that of a race,

 

as Sophocles says, nor, indeed, is this the aim of speaking and answering. For in a race the victory is his who comes in first; but here, if another makes a sufficient answer, it is proper to join in the approval and assent and so acquire the reputation of being a friendly fellow. 512 But if such an answer is not made, the it is not invidious or inopportune both to point out the answer others have not known and thus to fill in the gap. And, in particular, let us be on our guard, when someone else has been asked a question, that we do not forestall him by taking the answer out of his mouth. For perhaps there are other times also when it is not seemly, another having been asked, to shoulder him aside and volunteer ourselves, since we shall seem to be casting a slur both on the man asked, as being unable to furnish what is demanded of him, and on the asker, as being ignorant of the source from which he can get help; and, in particular, such precipitancy and boldness in answering questions smacks of insolence. For one who tries to get in the answer ahead of the man who is questioned suggests, “What do you need him for?” or “What does he know?” or “When I am present, no one else should be asked about these matters.” And yet we often ask people questions, not because we need an answer, but to elicit some friendly word from them, and because we wish to draw them on to friendly converse, as Socrates with Theaetetus and Charmides. So to take the answer out of another’s mouth, to divert another’s hearing and attract his attention and wrest it from some other, is as bad as to run up and kiss someone who wished to be kissed by somebody else, or to turn toward yourself someone who was looking at another; since, even if he who has been asked cannot give the information, it is proper to practise restraint and conform oneself to the wish of the asker and thus to encounter with modesty and decorum the situation, an invitation, as it were, given to another. And it is also true that if persons who are asked questions make mistakes in their answers, they meet with just indulgence; but he who voluntarily undertakes an answer and anticipates another is unpleasant even if he corrects a mistake, and if he makes a mistake himself, he affords a malicious joy to one and all, and becomes an object of ridicule.

20 1 Then the second matter for diligent practice concerns our own answers; to these the chatterer must pay very close attention: Din the first place, that he may not inadvertently give a serious answer to those who provoke him to talk merely that they may insolently ridicule him. For some persons who require no information, but merely to divert and amuse themselves, devise questions and put them to men of this sort to set going their foolish twaddle. Against this talkers should be on their guard and not leap upon a subject quickly, or as though grateful that it is offered to them, but should first consider both the character of the questioner and the necessity for the question. And when it appears that the questioner is really anxious to learn, the babbler must accustom himself to stop and leave between the question and the answer an interval, in which the asker may add anything he wishes and he himself may reflect upon his reply instead of overrunning and obscuring the question by giving a long string of answers in a hurry while the question is still being asked. For although the Pythian priestess is accustomed to deliver some oracles on the instant, even before the question is put — for the god whom she serves

Understands the dumb and hears when no man speaks —

yet the man who wishes to make a careful answer must wait to apprehend exactly the sense and the intent of him who asks the question, lest it befall, as the proverb has it,

They asked for buckets, but tubs were refused.

In any case this ravenous hunger for talking must be checked so that it may not seem as though a stream which has long been pressing hard upon the tongue were being gladly discharged at the instance of the question. Socrates, in fact, used to control his thirst in this manner — he would not allow himself to drink after exercise until he had drawn up and poured out the first bucketful, so that his irrational part might be trained to await the time dictated by reason.

21 1 513 Furthermore, there are three kinds of answers to questions: the barely necessary, the polite, and the superfluous. For example, if someone asks, “Is Socrates at home?” one person may reply, as it were unwillingly and grudgingly, “Not at home.” And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic style, he may omit the “At home” and only utter the bare negative. So the Spartans, when Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large “No” on the paper and sent it back. Another will answer more politely, “He is not at home, but at the bank,” and if he wants to give fuller measure may add, “waiting there for some guests.” But your over-officious and garrulous man, particularly if he happens to have read Antimachus of Colophon, will say, “He is not at home, but at the bank, waiting for some Ionian guests on whose behalf he has had a letter from Alcibiades who is near Miletus staying with Tissaphernes, the satrap of the Great King, who formerly used to help the Spartans, but now is attaching himself to the Athenians because of Alcibiades. For Alcibiades desires to be restored to his native country and therefore is causing Tissaphernes to change sides.” And he will run on, reciting at full stretch the whole eighth book of Thucydides, and deluge the questioner until, before he has done, Miletus is at war again and Alcibiades exiled for the second time.

Regarding this tendency especially, one must keep talkativeness within bounds by following the question step by step and circumscribing the answer within a circle to which the questioner’s need gives the center and the radius. So when Carneades, who had not yet acquired a great reputation, was disputing in a gymnasium, the director sent and bade him lower his voice, which was a very loud one. And when Carneades said, “Give me something to regulate my voice,” the director aptly rejoined, “I am giving you the person conversing with you.” So, in making an answer, let the wishes of the questioner provide the regulation.

22 1 Moreover, just as Socrates used to urge men to be on their guard against those foods which induce us to eat when we are not hungry, and against those liquids which induce us to drink when we are not thirsty, so it is with the babbler as regards subjects for talk: those in which he takes most delight and employs ad nauseam he should fear and stoutly resist when they stream in upon him. For example, military men are great tellers of war-stories, and the Poet introduces Nestor in that character, often narrating his own deeds of prowess. Again, as one might expect, those who have scored a victory in the law-courts or have had some unexpected success at the courts of governors or kings are attacked, as it were, by a malady which never leaves them, by the desire to call to mind and tell over and over again how they made their entrance, how they were presented, how they argued, how they held forth, how they confuted some opponents or accusers, how they were applauded. For their delight is far more loquacious than that well-known insomnia in the comedy: it often fans itself into new flame and makes itself ever fresh with each successive telling. They are, therefore, ready to slip into such subjects on any pretext. For not only

Where one feels pain, there will he keep his hand,

but also what causes pleasure draws the voice toward itself and twists the tongue from a desire to dwell perpetually on the joys of remembrance. So also with lovers, who chiefly occupy themselves with conversation that recalls some memory of the objects of their love; and if they cannot talk to human beings, they will speak of their passion to inanimate things:

 

O dearest bed!

and

O blessèd lamp, Bacchis thought you a god,

And greatest god you are if she thinks so.

 

There is, however, really not a pin’s difference to the chatterer what subjects may arise; 514 nevertheless he that has a greater weakness for one class of subjects than for the other should be on his guard against these subjects and force himself to hold back and withdraw as far as possible from them, since they are always able, because of the pleasure they give, to lure him on to dilate upon them. And talkers have this same difficulty with those subjects in which they think that they surpass all others because of some experience or acquired habit. For such a person, being self-centred and vain,

Will give the chief part of the day to that

In which he chances to surpass himself;

the great reader will spend it in narrating tales, the literary expert in technical discussions, the wide traveller and wanderer over the face of the earth in stories of foreign parts. We must, therefore, be on our guard against these subjects also, since garrulity is enticed by them, like a beast making for familiar haunts. And Cyrus’s conduct was admirable, because he challenged his mates to match themselves with him, not in those contests in which he was superior, but in those in which he was less skilled than they, so that he might cause no pain by surpassing them and might also have the advantage of learning something. But the chatterer, on the contrary, if some topic comes up from which he can learn and find out something he does not know, thrusts it aside and diverts it, being unable to give even so small a fee as silence, but he works steadily around until he drives the conversation into the stale and well-worn paths of twaddle. Just so, in my native town, there was a man who chanced to have read two or three books of Ephorus, and would always bore everybody to death and put every dinner-party to rout by invariably narrating the battle of Leuctra and its sequel; so he got the nickname of “Epameinondas.”

23 1 Nevertheless, this is the least of the evils, and we should turn garrulity into these channels; for talkativeness will be less unpleasant when its excesses are in some learned subject. Yet such persons must accustom themselves to do some writing and so argue all by themselves. So Antipater the Stoic, since, as it seems, he could not and would not come to close quarters with Carneades and his violent attacks upon the Stoa, used to fill whole books with written disputations against him, and so earned the sobriquet of “Pen-valiant.” But with the talker, such shadow-boxing with the pen and such alarums, by keeping him away from the multitude, may perhaps make him less of a daily burden to his associates, just as dogs that vent their anger on sticks and stones are less savage to men. And it will also be very advantageous for chatterers to frequent invariably the company of their superiors and elders, out of respect for whose opinion they will become accustomed to silence.

And with these exercises in habituation it is proper to intermix and entwine that well-known vigilance and habit of reflection, at the very moment when we are about to speak and the words are hurrying to our lips, “What is this remark that is so pressing and importunate? What object is my tongue panting for? What good will come of its being said or what ill of its being suppressed?” For it is not as though the remark were some oppressive weight which one ought to get rid of, since it stays by you all the same even if it is spoken; when men talk, it is either for their own sake, because they need something, or to benefit their hearers, or they seek to ingratiate themselves with each other by seasoning with the salt of conversation the pastime or business in which they happen to be engaged. But if a remark is neither useful to the speaker nor of serious importance to the hearers, and if pleasure or charm is not in it, why is it made? For the futile and purposeless can exist in speech as well as in deeds.

And over and above all else we must keep at hand and in our minds the saying of Simonides, 515 that he had often repented of speaking, but never of holding his tongue. We must remember also that practice is master of all things and stronger than anything else; since people can even get rid of hiccoughs and coughs by resisting them resolutely and with much pain and trouble. But silence, as Hippocrates says, not only prevents thirst, but also never causes sorrow and suffering.

Plutarch 

Moralia

Sunday, September 7, 2025

Why Not Use the Apollo Technology?

 Gravity of Falling Objects

 The one way to determine whether the astronauts are really on the Moon is to measure the gravity by observing the time it takes for objects to fall. NASAX made sure that there were many such possibilities to determine the gravity by having the astronauts needlessly throwing all manner of objects at every opportunity. Here are a few examples of objects being thrown taken from Apollo 16 on the first EVA (App 12.36).

In all other missions, we also see the same unnecessary throwing of all manner of objects. I say unnecessary but for NASA-X it was an important aspect of the hoax in order to falsely “prove” that the astronauts were really on the Moon. The exception is Apollo 11 in which we do not see anything being thrown. Perhaps it was a later idea of NASA-X.

The pro-NASA fan club has been eager to use these instances as absolute proof that the astronauts were really on the Moon. I find this quite bizarre, do they really imagine that NASA-X would have been so dumb as to forget that we could calculate the gravity from the videos? Or do they fail to properly understand what a hoax is all about? Of course, NASA-X took this into account and used counter-balanced wires on the astronauts and slow-motion photography as we have already discussed. As we have seen they provided ample opportunity to calculate the gravity from the numerous instances of objects being purposefully thrown around on the Moon. They also introduced pendulums to provide more opportunity for us to make the gravity calculation.

Although NASA-X were quite clever in this gravity deception, it was far from perfect and they made several glaring errors. There were other instances that NASA-X seemingly forgot or failed to imagine. For example, the swinging flag that we discussed in Chapter 8 “Defying Gravity” (see App 8.08).

Gravity of Falling Sand

 Although, NASA-X were able to manipulate the videos to respect the lesser gravity on the Moon for objects thrown and the jumps of astronauts. They were unable to accomplish this simultaneously for the falling sand. In Chapter 8 “Defying Gravity” we also examined the “Big Navy Salute” made by astronaut John Young on the Apollo 16 mission (see App 8.10) in which the astronaut falls according to the gravity of the Moon but the sand falls according to Earth's gravity. It was not possible with the techniques used to fake both these events at the same time.

Here we have a close look at some of the astronaut jumps all taken from Apollo 16 but you can observe numerous such instances in all the other Apollo Missions (App 12.37). In all cases, the sand clearly falls faster than the astronaut which according to the laws of physics is impossible. In manipulating the “observable” gravity of the astronaut they were unable to simultaneously do the same for the falling sand. So what we observe is the astronaut behaving as though he is on the Moon and the sand behaving as though it is on Earth. This is incontestable evidence of the NASA-X fakery. When the evidence is so clear and indisputable how can the pro-NASA fan club members be so blind? It is this blindness to the evidence shown by the pro-NASA group that leads one to consider whether they are simply NASA shills and are simply acting disingenuously.

*

Poor Safety Procedures

 Thomas Baron was a safety inspector during the construction of Apollo 1. After the fire in the Apollo 1 capsule, he testified before Congress on 21 April 1967 that the Apollo programme was in such disarray that NASA would never make it to the Moon. Note, that this was just 15 months before the launch of Apollo 8 which allegedly took the first astronauts into orbit around the Moon.

Baron had submitted a detailed 500-page report to Congress detailing his findings (App 4.04). He believed that his opinions made him a target and he reported that he and his family had been harassed. One week after he had testified his car mysteriously stalled on a level railway crossing and was struck by a train. He, his wife, and step-daughter died in the accident. The accident was officially judged to be suicide. Some Sceptics, the foremost being Bill Kaysing (App 4.05), believe that Baron was murdered to silence him. It is interesting to note that Baron's report on the failings of the NASA Project Apollo disappeared and has never been found.

The Clavius website has a more critical assessment of Thomas Baron and indicates that he was somewhat overzealous in his work (App 4.06). Note, that we should not be so surprised that the Clavius website portrays Thomas Baron in such a bad light given that the Webmaster Jay Windley is one of the leading NASA Fanboys. However, it does make the point that if NASA were going to silence him then why wait until after he had presented his evidence to Congress. It would have been more logical to have him silenced before, but then again the damming details of his investigation may not have been fully known beforehand. Although his original report has been lost, or purposefully disposed of, you can get some idea of his claims in this excerpt posted on the Clavius website (App 4.07). You can also read Baron's testimony to Congress on the Clavius website (App 4.08).

The outcome of this tragedy was that Project Apollo was suspended pending a thorough investigation which resulted in a further delay of one year following a complete redesign of the Command Module. In March 1967 the NASA Director James Webb testified in front of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics expressing doubts about the chances of fulfilling Kennedy's goal. He was the very man who just six years previously had confidently told President Kennedy that a man on the Moon could be achieved within the decade. One year later on 7 October 1968, James Webb suddenly left NASA just three months before the Apollo 8 flight to the Moon. This followed the sudden resignation of the NASA Assistant Director Robert Seamans in January that same year. We also had Mercury astronaut Walter Schirra announcing his departure from NASA just 4 days after James Webb had announced his departure.

One has to wonder why, when the Apollo Moon landing was less than a year away, did these people decide to leave NASA in such a hurry. It is at this juncture in 1967, or perhaps 1966, that some sceptics contend that the decision was made to fake the Moon landings.

*

Why Not Use the Apollo Technology

 NASA has shown terrible custodianship of significant noteworthy ancient rarities concerning the Apollo Missions and the complete dismissal for overseeing mechanical worth. Almost certainly our doubters would contend that this a not an issue of good custodianship, but rather to a greater degree a conscious and deliberate, endeavor to annihilate proof that might be decided to be implicating when inspected with present day strategies for investigation. Truly, the misfortunes of antiques are practically epic in scale and one needs to address why NASA has been so determinately careless.

The Apollo Moon arrivals have been proclaimed as probably the best accomplishment of humankind and one would expect that all the documentation and mechanical accomplishments would be painstakingly saved for posterity.

 Regrettably, and shockingly, this doesn't appear to have been the situation. Apparently NASA has been not exactly upright in protecting these significant ancient rarities. This is astounding for two reasons, as a matter of first importance, the memorable idea of the accomplishment, in this cutting edge period we will generally hold as valuable all that actions the advancement and accomplishments of humankind. Also, the data was without a doubt of significant value for future space projects.

Now NASA intends to return into space with the Orion Project and gives off an impression of being battling to construct the innovation with which to do this. Doubters would firmly contend, and they do vociferously, that we apparently had the innovation to leave low Earth circle and make due in space fifty years prior. They question how NASA might have been so absolutely thoughtless, or were there other affecting explanations behind this apparent incompetence. The doubt is there for the cynics to add to their contentions that NASA faked the Moon arrivals and is presently attempting to obliterate whatever might at last demonstrate the fakery, especially when analyzed with current techniques for analysis.

The Hoax of NASA ...
Cushawa Eduardo
.com


Let’s begin with the lap of honour

 

How churlish, to think ill of this! Or might there really be something more behind it? Did the United States actually put its moon programme into the hands of Walt Disney? Or has Hollywood at least been playing a larger part in the affair than anyone has wanted to admit? Is this, perhaps, the source of von Braun’s inexplicable confidence that there would be a successful landing on the moon in the near future? Those around him were certainly puzzled by his confidence. What about the huge technical difficulties on the one hand and of course the political and financial problems on the other? When planning for the event began, humanity had not yet even succeeded in putting a satellite into orbit round the earth, nor had Gagarin set the alarm bells ringing in the United States. But there must have been something that made Wernher von Braun so sure that people would soon be landing on the moon. Was it, perhaps, his close collaboration with Walt Disney? ‘The uncertain future of the moon project was the source of many worries among adherents of the program,’ wrote Stuhlinger and Ordway:

But, surprisingly, not for von Braun. He never lost his serene mood and high spirits. To his co-workers, he described positive steps forward in exciting detail, and he reported the delaying tactics as if they were not really relevant. Years later, he confided to friends: ‘From about 1956 on, I was convinced that the moon-landing project would succeed, and after 1958, I had no doubt that it would be assigned to a civilian space agency, and that our team would play a major role in the project. All these ups and down were merely ripples on the surface’. 77 

‘What was the source of this imperturbable belief?’ even Stuhlinger and Ordway ask themselves. What indeed? How could Wernher von Braun seriously assume that a project as Utopian as a landing on the moon would become reality within the foreseeable future? Only a few years earlier his V2 rockets had been staggering barely 100 kilometres across the English Channel with less rather than more certainty of reaching London. Now rockets were exploding regularly on the launching pads, and the United States had not even put a small satellite into orbit – let alone any ‘astronauts’. Yet von Braun was quite sure that in only a few years such astronauts would not only be flying in orbit but would depart from it and land safely on the moon some 384,000 kilometres away. What breathtaking optimism!

Although the United States had not yet even become committed officially to a moon programme, von Braun was already working from the end of the 1950s on new, large rocket engines for a ‘moon rocket’. Contrary to what we are told by the official version of history, it was not John F. Kennedy but people like Wernher von Braun and Walt Disney who were propounding the concept of a moon landing long before Kennedy gave his famous speech in 1961. As early as 1959, while the Soviets were sending their first capsules into space and possibly secretly experimenting with human cosmonauts, experts were at work in the United States on their decisive counter-attack. ‘Operating pretty much in a political vacuum in terms of policy guidance, NASA planners chose a lunar landing objective fully two years before President Kennedy announced his choice of the lunar landing as a national goal,’ wrote John M. Logsdon, Director of the Space Policy Institute. 78 

This was an astonishing view into the future considering that the hour did not finally strike for those planners until 12 April 1961 when the Soviet Union presented Yuri Gagarin to the world as the first human being in space. Only then were all doors and all budgetary floodgates opened in the United States for a manned moon landing. On 20 April 1961 President Kennedy asked Vice-President Johnson where and how the Soviets could be beaten in the space race: ‘Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man?’ As chance would have it, von Braun and his team already had plans for the moon landing in their desks: ‘We do not have a good chance of beating the Soviets to a manned “laboratory in space”,’ he wrote in a memo to Vice-President Johnson. But: ‘We have an excellent chance of beating the Soviets to the first landing of a crew on the moon (including return capability, of course).’ 79 

How could he be so confident? Surely a manned laboratory in orbit would be an easier exercise than the complex journey to the moon? Until then he himself had always seen a space station as being, in addition to its military usefulness, a prerequisite for trips to other heavenly bodies. ‘From this base the flight to the moon will be a mere step compared with the distances we shall have to reckon with in space,’ he had written earlier. 80  Originally von Braun thought it necessary to take the step of having a base in space before travelling to other heavenly bodies. There, close to the earth, not only could equipment be assembled but also crews could gain experience of longer sojourns in space. Navigation and manoeuvring on a journey to the moon are much more complicated and subject to breakdown than a launch into orbit which they had only just learnt to carry out. And in case of astronauts suffering health problems they could be brought back to earth from a space base in a matter of hours. Yet all of a sudden something must have made him turn this logical conception on its head, putting the journey to the moon before the construction of a base in space.

A space station would also have been an easily attainable propaganda success, since one could have declared anything to be a space station, for example a continuously orbiting Gemini or Apollo capsule. Or they could simply have adapted one of the large, barrel-shaped rocket stages to function as a space station and launched that into orbit. This was in fact done, but not until after the landing on the moon.

In 1973, one year after the final moon landing, the USA put its Skylab into orbit, thus creating the prerequisite for what it had already supposedly achieved. The USA was behaving like a pianist practising his scales after giving a really great concert. In 1961, in the memo to Vice-President Johnson already mentioned, von Braun recommended that the US should seek its fortune in a completely unforeseeable adventure. Where scientists and bureaucrats normally prefer to cover themselves, von Braun leaned right out of the window. On 8 May 1961 NASA administrator James E. Webb and Defense Secretary McNamara sent a further memo to the Vice-President – to be passed on to Kennedy: ‘Dramatic successes in space symbolize the technological prowess and organizational capacity of a nation,’ it read. ‘Therefore great successes in space contribute to national prestige ... We suggest including a manned landing on the moon before the end of the decade in our national space program.’ 81 

On 25 May 1961, six weeks after Gagarin’s flight, Kennedy only had to translate this into the impressive words already mentioned about a landing on the moon before the end of the decade. It was, he said, ‘time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth...’ A leading role in space as the key to the future, possibly even to a leading role on earth – is that not rather an exaggeration? Not at all. On the contrary, the image of the American flag on the moon remains to this day an important symbol of American superiority. It is not for nothing, for example, that the cover of the German paperback version of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book The Grand Chessboard sports a picture not of an American bomber or cargo plane, of the Pentagon or the White House, but of an astronaut saluting the American flag on the moon with the lunar module in the background. The subtitle of the book is: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.

ONE SMALL STEP?

THE GREAT MOON HOAX AND THE RACE

 TO DOMINATE EARTH FROM SPACE

GERHARD WISNEWSKI

Space and time are the great subjective mistakes which we all agree in making and on and in which we build all our disagreements


Attached to Timeless everlasting NOW or beyond assumption that one has duration→

There is an inherent special ambiguity about the “present” as an idea or as an existent, which it does not seem to share with the past or the future. Some argue that the present has no duration, being simply a surface between past and future, while others talk of its duration though they can’t agree on what length it ought to have and take specious refuge in a “spacious present.” Without paying particular attention to these two views, I find the mere fact that they are asserted indicates that the notion is elastic in the minds of other people and so too I find it in my own. Also the “present” seems to me equally admissible both for “what I am doing now” (extended) and for “what is present to me now” (instantaneous). And the first (subjective) may be the “shortest thought flash conceivable” or “my whole life I am living” or “eternity of past and future in the now. In the last (objective), all temporalization, in its three “orthogonal dimensions” of past, future and present, “appear present” as follows: the past was (present), the present is (present), the future will be (present), and (this is an important point) all three together eternally may be.

Again concern with the past (taken as probable) gives us historians (and Hegel), concern with the future (taken as possible) gives us scientists, politicians and astrologers (and Hegel), concern with the past and future gives us logicians (and Hegel). The Buddha recommends concern with the present in the Bhaddekaratta-sutta, and this is only possible by introspection which reveals the ambiguity, absurdity and contingency of eternity in time. Again, perhaps, the past is the legitimate field of knowledge (which comprehends), the future is the legitimate field of faith (faith being ignorant man’s instrument for groping beyond where knowledge extends). The present is the legitimate field for describing, in terms of the three times, and for remembering what one has described.

**
Such faith (of stream enterer) decides in advance that nothing arisen can reveal any permanence at all, however brief. Since all subsequent evidence supports the decision, if that evidence is not forgotten, craving is progressively stultified in the impossibility of finding any arisen thing worth craving for, and is progressively displaced by the joy of liberation. The first problem, though, that of time, is properly a matter for insight (vipassanā) and can only be dealt with here by hints and pointers because of lack of space. (...)

To question the objectivity of time is not new even to Western philosophy. While objective reality of time and space still remains one of the assumptions made by scientists for which they have no proof, Immanuel Kant argued irrefutably for the pure subjectivity of both. But almost a millennium and a half before him, Ācariya Buddhaghosa wrote, “What is called ‘time’ is conceived in terms of such and such dhammas … But that [time] should be understood as only a mere conceptual description, since it is non-existent as to any individual essence of its own.” (Atthasālinī. Space is analogously treated elsewhere). A century or two later it was observed that “Nibbāna [extinction] is not like other dhammas. In fact because of its extreme profundity it cannot be made the object of consciousness by one who has not yet reached it. That is why it has to be reached by change-of-lineage cognizance [gotrabhū], which has profundity surpassing the three periods of time” (Mūlaṭīkā).
**

Friday, September 5, 2025

HOW DO I LOVE ME? LET ME COUNT THE WAYS

 Attached to ATTA→

The great counseling psychologist Carl Rogers once objected to the religious doctrine that humanity’s problems arise from excessive self-love—a.k.a. pride, the foundation of the seven deadly sins. In his experience, most people instead “despise themselves, regard themselves as worthless and unlovable.” As the comedian Groucho Marx once jested, “I wouldn’t want to belong to any club that would accept me as a member.”

Actually, most of us have a good reputation with ourselves. In studies of self-esteem, even those who score relatively low will fall in the midrange of possible scores. Responding to statements such as “I have good ideas” or “I am fun to be with” with a middling “somewhat” or “sometimes” will mark you as having low self-esteem. In every one of fifty-three countries studied, the average self-esteem score was above the midpoint of the scale’s range of possible scores.

High self-esteem scores are but the first pointer to one of psychology’s most provocative, life-relevant, and oft-replicated findings: we humans commonly exhibit self-serving bias. We perceive ourselves as better than most and explain events in self-enhancing ways. If that doesn’t surprise you (Rogers’s belief notwithstanding), consider how this phenomenon lurks in the human psyche, starting with the better-than-average phenomenon.

The sixth-century B.C. Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu said that someone “who is sane [will never] over-reach himself, over-spend himself, over-rate himself.” If so, then nearly all of us are a little insane.

Name any subjective and socially desirable dimension—intelligence, looks, health, tolerance, insightfulness, job competence, morality, and so on—and I will guarantee you that most people will see themselves as better than the average person.

The humorist Dave Barry had that idea: “The one thing that unites all human beings, regardless of age, gender, religion, economic status, or ethnic background, is that, deep down inside, we all believe that we are above-average drivers.” Indeed, drivers—even most drivers who have been hospitalized in accidents—believe themselves to be safer and more skilled than the average driver.

A sampling of other research findings:

Competence: In surveys, 90 percent of business managers have rated their performance as superior to that of their average peer. The same is true of college instructors, more than 90 percent of whom have rated their teaching as better than average. Eighty-six percent of Australians rated their job performance as above average; only 1 percent rated their performance as below average. And most surgeons believed their patients’ mortality is lower than average. When merit raises are distributed, many workers will surely feel mistreated with an average or even below-average reward. And when most people in a group believe they are underpaid and underappreciated, given their “better-than-average” contributions, disharmony and envy will surely result.

Ethics and virtues: “How would you rate your own morals and values on a scale from 1 to 100 (100 being perfect)?” In a national survey, 50 percent of respondents rated themselves 90 or higher; only 11 percent said 74 or below. Thus, most American businesspeople saw themselves as more ethical than the average businessperson. Most Dutch high school students rated themselves as more honest, persistent, reliable, and friendly than their average peer. And most folks saw themselves as more likely than others to give to charity, give up their bus seat to a pregnant woman, or donate blood. University students reported they are more likely (90 percent) than their peers (75 percent) to vote in an upcoming election, although only 69 percent actually did. (Their predictions of others’ behavior were more accurate than their self-predictions.)

Health: Most people viewed themselves as healthier than most of their neighbors. And most college students believed they would outlive the actuarial prediction of their age of death by ten years—a finding that Freud foresaw in his reputed joke about the husband who told his wife, “If one of us dies, I shall move to Paris.”

Attractiveness: Is it your experience, as it is mine, that most photographs of you don’t quite do you justice? One clever experiment showed people several faces—one their own, the others being their face morphed with those of less and more attractive faces. Asked which was their own real face, most folks identified an attractively enhanced version of their actual face.

Effort: As a general rule, group members’ estimates of what fraction of the effort they contribute to a joint task will usually sum to more than 100 percent. In a survey of heterosexual married partners, 49 percent of husbands estimated that they did half to most of the childcare, while only 31 percent of their wives agreed. And while 56 percent of the husbands said they do most of the cooking, 70 percent of the wives said they did.

My wife and I used to pitch our dirty laundry each night on the floor next to our clothes hamper. The next morning, one of us would move the clothes into the hamper. When she suggested I not leave this mundane task to her, I thought, “What? I already do it 75 percent of the time!” So I asked how often she thought she picked up the clothes. “Oh,” she replied, “about 75 percent of the time.” And we wonder why some happy honeymooners mature into aggrieved spouses?

Social skills: I first stumbled across the better-than-average phenomenon when noting a peculiar result buried in a College Board survey of 829,000 high school seniors. Asked to rate themselves in “ability to get along with others,” almost none (less than one-half of 1 percent) rated themselves below average. Sixty percent rated themselves in the top 10 percent. And 25 percent put themselves in the top 1 percent.

So, we all live in Garrison Keillor’s fictional Lake Wobegon—where “all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average.” The Lake Wobegon effect, as I have called it, is strongest for traits that are not just socially desirable but also subjective: for social skill more than for math ability; for honesty more than running speed; for leadership skill more than singing ability.

We not only tend to see ourselves as better than most; we also explain good and bad events in ways that protect or enhance our self-regard. “Victory finds a hundred fathers but defeat is an orphan,” wrote the Italian diplomat Count Galeazzo Ciano, words later echoed by John F. Kennedy. That’s an apt summary of many dozens of experiments. In each, people have accepted credit when informed they’ve succeeded, attributing their success to their effort and ability. But when told they’ve failed, they attribute the result to something external—perhaps bad luck or the “impossible” task.

In real-life settings, athletes credit themselves for victories and more often attribute losses to bad breaks, bad refereeing, or the other team’s exceptional performance or dirty play. And those better-than-average drivers? On insurance forms, they have explained accidents as “An invisible car came out of nowhere, struck my car, and vanished,” or “As I reached an intersection, a hedge sprang up, obscuring my vision, and I did not see the other car,” or even “A pedestrian hit me and went under my car.”

Students similarly sustain their positive self-understanding by accepting responsibility for successes and verbally distancing themselves from failures. “I got an A on my psych test,” but “The professor gave me a C on my lit essay.”

Situations that blend chance and skill are made-to-order conditions for these self-serving attributions. When I win at Scrabble, it’s confirmation of my vast verbal reservoir. When I lose, it’s because “Who could do anything with a Q but no U?”

So, when business profits soar, CEOs welcome large bonuses for leading their companies to success. And when their companies lose money, well, “It’s what one would expect in a down market.”

Self-serving attributions feed bargaining impasses, worker-management disputes, and marital disagreements. While managers often blame disappointing results on workers’ inability or indolence, the workers will more often attribute the underperformance to poor management or an excessive workload. And it likely will not surprise you to know that divorced people usually attribute most of their marital problems to their partner.

To some extent, self-serving bias is a natural result of how we observe and process information. I could more easily picture myself putting the dirty clothes in the hamper than all the times I didn’t. And my wife, too, was surely more likely to notice and recall her own actions than mine. But our biased perceptions also reflect our self-enhancing emotions. As much research shows, we’re not just cool information-processing computers; we’re motivated to find self-affirmation—to boost our self-image. Given a generic description of our personality based on a test or even our astrological sign, we’re likely to find it credible—when it is favorable. Flattery feels factual.

Ironically, this bias is so potent that, as the Princeton social psychologist Emily Pronin observed, people’s “bias blind spot” even leads them to think themselves less vulnerable thanaverage to self-serving bias, which they more readily see in others. In politics as in relationships, others, we agree, are biased, but we are more objective. We are not so different from the Pharisee who prayed, “God, I thank you that I am not like other people.”

I hear you objecting, “But I often hear people putting themselves down, and I sometimes feel inferior myself.” Indeed, all of us some of the time feel inferior when comparing ourselves with those a step or two higher on the ladder of looks, grades, or income. And some of us much of the time—notably those suffering from depression—do not exhibit self-serving bias. In experiments, depressed folks do not see themselves as better than average or shirk responsibility for failure. They are, in the words of one prominent researcher, “sadder but wiser”—a phenomenon that clinical researchers call “depressive realism.”

Self-serving bias is social psychology’s modern story of pride. Although pride often goes before a fall, there’s adaptive wisdom in moderate self-serving bias. Some self-disparagement can be subtly self-serving. Putting ourselves down can elicit reassuring words from friends: “I wish I weren’t so ugly” may elicit “Oh, come now, you’re so cute.”

Believing in our relative superiority also emboldens us to venture and potentially succeed where others fear to go. The opposite—doubting our relative competence and social skill, and blaming setbacks on ourselves—undercuts our potential for leadership or success.

Even so, self-serving pride is often perilous. In a debate with Carl Rogers, the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr argued that humanity’s original sin—its fundamental flaw—is excessive self-love, pretension, and pride. Self-serving pride leads us to disparage one another. The flip side of assuming credit for our individual and group achievements is blaming the seemingly less deserving poor for their poverty and the oppressed for their oppression. (...)

In one of his eighteenth-century sermons, Samuel Johnson recognized the phenomenon: “He that overvalues himself will undervalue others, and he that undervalues others will oppress them.”

How Do We Know Ourselves 

David G. Myers 

Nandakovāda Sutta - Advice from Nandaka


1. THUS HAVE I HEARD. On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park.

2. Then Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī together with five hundred bhikkhunīs went to the Blessed One. After paying homage to the Blessed One, she stood at one side and said to him: “Venerable sir, let the Blessed One advise the bhikkhunīs, let the Blessed One instruct the bhikkhunīs, let the Blessed One give the bhikkhunīs a talk on the Dhamma.”

3. Now on that occasion the elder bhikkhus were taking turns in advising the bhikkhunīs, but the venerable Nandaka did not want to advise them when his turn came. Then the Blessed One addressed the venerable Ānanda: “Ānanda, whose turn is it today to advise the bhikkhunīs?”
“Venerable sir, it is the venerable Nandaka’s turn to advise the bhikkhunīs, but he does not want to advise them even though it is his turn.”

4. Then the Blessed One addressed the venerable Nandaka: “Advise the bhikkhunīs, Nandaka. Instruct the bhikkhunīs, Nandaka. Give the bhikkhunīs a talk on the Dhamma, brahmin.”
“Yes, venerable sir,”.the venerable Nandaka replied. Then, in the morning, the venerable Nandaka dressed, and taking his bowl and outer robe, went into Sāvatthī for alms. When he had wandered for alms in Sāvatthī and had returned from his almsround, after his meal he went with a companion to the Rājaka Park. The bhikkhunīs saw the venerable Nandaka coming in the distance and prepared a seat and set out water for the feet. The venerable Nandaka sat down on the seat made ready and washed his feet. The bhikkhunīs paid homage to him and sat down at one side. When they were seated, the venerable Nandaka told the bhikkhunīs:

5. “Sisters, this talk will be in the form of questions. When you understand you should say: ‘We understand’; when you do not understand you should say: ‘We do not understand’; when you are doubtful or perplexed you should ask me: ‘How is this, venerable sir? What is the meaning of this?’” “Venerable sir, we are satisfied and pleased with the master Nandaka in that he invites us even with this much.”

6. “Sisters, what do you think? Is the eye permanent or impermanent?” —“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir.”

“Sisters, what do you think? Is the ear....the nose...the tongue...the body...the mind permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because, venerable sir, we have already seen this well as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘These six internal bases are impermanent.’”

“Good, good, sisters! So it is with a noble disciple who sees this as it actually is with proper wisdom.

7. “Sisters, what do you think? Are forms…sounds…odours… flavours…tangibles…mind-objects permanent or impermanent?” —“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because, venerable sir, we have already seen this well as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘These six external bases are impermanent.’”

“Good, good, sisters! So it is with a noble disciple who sees this as it actually is with proper wisdom.

8. “Sisters, what do you think? Is eye-consciousness… … ear-consciousness…nose-consciousness…tongue-consciousness… body-consciousness…mind-consciousness permanent or impermanent?” —“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”— “Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because, venerable sir, we have already seen this well as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘These six classes of consciousness are impermanent.’”

“Good, good, sisters! So it is with a noble disciple who sees this as it actually is with proper wisdom.

9. “Sisters, suppose an oil-lamp is burning: its oil is impermanent and subject to change, its wick is impermanent and subject to change, its flame is impermanent and subject to change, and its radiance is impermanent and subject to change. Now would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus: ‘While this oil-lamp is burning, its oil, wick, and flame are impermanent and subject to change, but its radiance is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because, venerable sir, while that oil-lamp is burning, its oil, wick, and flame are impermanent and subject to change, so its radiance must be impermanent and subject to change.”

“So too, sisters, would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus: ‘These six internal bases are impermanent and subject to change, but the pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling that one experiences in dependence upon the six internal bases is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because each feeling arises in dependence upon its corresponding condition, and with the cessation of its corresponding condition, the feeling ceases.”

“Good, good, sisters! So it is with a noble disciple who sees this as it actually is with proper wisdom.

10. “Sisters, suppose a great tree is standing possessed of heartwood: its root is impermanent and subject to change, its trunk is impermanent and subject to change, its branches and foliage are impermanent and subject to change, and its shadow is impermanent and subject to change. Now would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus: ‘The root, trunk, branches, and foliage of this great tree standing possessed of heartwood are impermanent and subject to change, but its shadow is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because, venerable sir, the root, trunk, branches, and foliage of this great tree standing possessed of heartwood are impermanent and subject to change, so its shadow must be impermanent and subject to change.”

“So too, sisters, would anyone be speaking rightly who spoke thus: ‘These six external bases are impermanent and subject to change, but the pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling that one experiences in dependence upon the six external bases is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because each feeling arises in dependence upon its corresponding condition, and with the cessation of its corresponding condition, the feeling ceases.”

“Good, good, sisters! So it is with a noble disciple who sees this as it actually is with proper wisdom.

11. “Sisters, suppose a skilled butcher or his apprentice were to kill a cow and carve it up with a sharp butcher’s knife. Without damaging the inner mass of flesh and without damaging the outer hide, he would cut, sever, and carve away the inner tendons, sinews, and ligaments with the sharp butcher’s knife. Then having cut, severed, and carved all this away, he would remove the outer hide and cover the cow again with that same hide. Would he be speaking rightly if he were to say: ‘This cow is joined to this hide just as it was before’?”

“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because if that skilled butcher or his apprentice were to kill a cow…and cut, sever, and carve all that away, even though he covers the cow again with that same hide and says: ‘This cow is joined to this hide just as it was before,’ that cow would still be disjoined from that hide.”

12. “Sisters, I have given this simile in order to convey a meaning. This is the meaning: ‘The inner mass of flesh’ is a term for the six internal bases. ‘The outer hide’ is a term for the six external bases. ‘The inner tendons, sinews, and ligaments’ is a term for delight and lust. ‘The sharp butcher’s knife’ is a term for noble wisdom—the noble wisdom that cuts, severs, and carves away the inner defilements, fetters, and bonds.

13. “Sisters, there are these seven enlightenment factors through the development and cultivation of which a bhikkhu, by realising for himself with direct knowledge, here and now enters upon and abides in the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom that are taintless with the destruction of the taints. What are the seven? Here, sisters, a bhikkhu develops the mindfulness enlightenment factor, which is supported by seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, and ripens in relinquishment. He develops the investigation-of-states enlightenment factor… the energy enlightenment factor…the rapture enlightenment factor…the tranquillity enlightenment factor…the concentration enlightenment factor…the equanimity enlightenment factor, which is supported by seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, and ripens in relinquishment. These are the seven enlightenment factors through the development and cultivation of which a bhikkhu, by realising for himself with direct knowledge, here and now enters upon and abides in the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom that are taintless with the destruction of the taints.”

14. When the venerable Nandaka had advised the bhikkhunīs thus, he dismissed them, saying: “Go, sisters, it is time.” Then the bhikkhunīs, having delighted and rejoiced in the venerable Nandaka’s words, rose from their seats, and after paying homage to the venerable Nandaka, departed keeping him on their right. They went to the Blessed One, and after paying homage to him, stood at one side. The Blessed One told them: “Go, sisters, it is time.” Then the bhikkhunīs paid homage to the Blessed One and departed keeping him on their right.

15. Soon after they had left, the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus: “Bhikkhus, just as on the Uposatha day of the fourteenth people are not doubtful or perplexed as to whether the moon is incomplete or full, since then the moon is clearly incomplete, so too, those bhikkhunīs are satisfied with Nandaka’s teaching of the Dhamma, but their intention has not yet been fulfilled.”

16–26. Then the Blessed One addressed the venerable Nandaka: “Well then, Nandaka, tomorrow too you should advise those bhikkhunīs in exactly the same way.”

“Yes, venerable sir,” the venerable Nandaka replied. Then, the next morning, the venerable Nandaka dressed...(repeat verbatim §§4–14 above, as far as) …Then the bhikkhunīs paid homage to the Blessed One and departed keeping him on their right.

27. Soon after they had left, the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus: “Bhikkhus, just as on the Uposatha day of the fifteenth people are not doubtful or perplexed as to whether the moon is incomplete or full, since then the moon is clearly full, so too, those bhikkhunīs are satisfied with Nandaka’s teaching of the Dhamma and their intention has been fulfilled. Bhikkhus, even the least advanced of those five hundred bhikkhunīs is a stream-enterer, no longer subject to perdition, bound [for deliverance], headed for enlightenment.”

That is what the Blessed One said. The bhikkhus were satisfied and delighted in the Blessed One’s words.


Tuesday, September 2, 2025

Social Sciences as Sorcery by Stanislav Andreski - Foreword


To forestall any possible misunderstanding, I must state emphatically at the outset that I neither accuse nor even suspect anyone mentioned by name in this book of deliberately concocting a stunt, disseminating falsehoods knowingly, or of being prompted by a desire for dishonest gain or an advancement obtained through corruption. A renowned author would have to have a most extraordinary character (indeed, he would have to be in a way superhuman) to be able to write prolifically in the full knowledge that his works are worthless and that he is a charlatan whose fame is entirely undeserved and based solely on the stupidity and gullibility of his admirers. Even if he had some doubts about the correctness of his approach at some stage of his career, success and adulation would soon persuade him of his own genius and the epoch-making value of his concoctions. When, in consequence of acquiring a controlling position in the distribution of funds, appointments and promotions, he becomes surrounded by sycophants courting his favours, he is most unlikely to see through their motivation; and, like wealthy and powerful people in other walks of life, will tend to take flattery at its face value, accepting it as a sincere appreciation (and therefore confirmation). Rather than among noted writers, cynical charlatans can be found among manipulators who write little or nothing, and whose egos are consequently not invested in any particular notion or approach, and who do not care, therefore, which gimmick they use to milk fund-dispensing bodies. Although I know one or two individuals of this kind, none of them is mentioned by name - which would not only entail unprovable imputations of motive, but also be beside the point, as my task here is to combat wrong ideas . . . not to compile a list of shady academics. Even individuals of this type, moreover, find hard-boiled cynicism difficult to sustain and normally end by persuading themselves of the value of whatever they are doing, because nobody likes to admit to himself that he is making a living by unworthy means. In any case, the most deadly agents of cultural infections are not the brazen cynics, but the sectarians prone to self-delusion and the timorous organization men anxious not to miss the band-waggon, who unquestioningly equate popularity and worldly success with intrinsic merit. As the present book deals with the phenomena which must be judged as undesirable from the standpoint of intellectual progress, the references to the literature are as a rule derogatory. This does not mean that I believe that nothing of value has been produced; but one cannot write about everything at once, and this is a tract rather than a treatise. Numerous positive contributions to knowledge are cited in my previous publications, and many more will be mentioned in other books which are in preparation, particularly if I live long enough to write a general treatise. I argue on the pages which follow that much of what passes as scientific study of human behaviour boils down to an equivalent of sorcery, but fortunately there are other things as well.

Why Foul One's Nest?

To judge by quantity, the social sciences are going through a period of unprecedented progress: with congresses and conferences mushrooming, printed matter piling up, and the number of professionals increasing at such a rate that, unless arrested, it would overtake the population of the globe within a few hundred years. Most of the practitioners wax enthusiastic about this proliferation, and add to the flood by writing exultant surveys of their crafts 'to-day', readily affixing the label of 'revolution' to all kinds of most insignificant steps forward . . . or even backwards; and sometimes even claiming to have crossed the threshold separating their fields from the exact sciences. What is particularly dismaying is that not only does the flood of publications reveal an abundance of pompous bluff and a paucity of new ideas, but even the old and valuable insights which we have inherited from our illustrious ancestors are being drowned in a torrent of meaningless verbiage and useless technicalities. Pretentious and nebulous verbosity, interminable repetition of platitudes and disguised propaganda are the order of the day, while at least 95% of research is indeed re-search for things that have been found long ago and many times since. In comparison with half a century ago, the average quality of the publications (apart from those which deal with techniques rather than the substance) has declined in a number of fields. Such a far-reaching verdict naturally calls for evidence, and much of the present book is devoted to supplying it. But perhaps even more interesting than to prove is to explain; and this is the second task of this book, the third being to offer a few hints on how this sorry state can be, if not remedied, at least alleviated.

I shall, among other things, try to show how the bent towards sterility and deception in the study of human affairs stems from widespread cultural, political and economic trends of our time so that the present work can be put under the vague heading of sociology of knowledge, although 'sociology of non-knowledge more correctly describes the bulk of its contents. As such an attempt ineluctably leads to the question of vested interests, and entails imputation of unworthy motives I hasten to say that I know very well that logically an argumentum ad hominem proves nothing. Nevertheless, in matters where uncertainty prevails and information is mostly accepted on trust one is justified in trying to rouse the reading public to a more critical watchfulness by showing that in the study of human affairs evasion and deception are as a rule much more profitable than telling the truth. To repeat what has been said in the foreword, I do not think that the argumentum ad hominem in terms of vested interests applies to the motives of the inventors of fads, who are much more likely to be doctrinaires and visionaries so wrapped up in the cocoon of their imagination that they cannot see the world as it is. After all, in every society with widespread literacy there are people writing all conceivable kinds of nonsense. Many of them never get as far as the printer, and among those who pass this hurdle, many remain unread, neglected, or quickly forgotten, while others are boosted, acclaimed and idolized. It is at the level of the process of social selection, which governs the dissemination of ideas, that the question of their subservience to vested interests is more germane. The general problem of the relationship between ideas and interests is one of the most difficult and fundamental. Marx based all his political analyses on the assumption that social classes uphold ideologies which serve their interests, a theory which seemed to be contradicted by the fact that no believer will admit that he has chosen his tenets for their value as instruments in the struggle for wealth and power. Freud's concept of the unconscious, however, implies what knight be described as the unconscious cunning - the idea which has been developed in a form especially applicable to politics by Alfred Adler. If such mechanisms of the mind can produce unconscious subterfuges and strategies in individuals' behaviour there is no reason why they should not operate on a mass level. But by what kind of evidence can we back imputations of this kind? What makes the problem even more difficult is Pareto's convincing point that the ruling classes often espouse doctrines which usher them along the road to a collective demise. The mechanisms of selection (emphasized by Spencer), which weed out 'unfit' patterns of organization, normally insure that only those social aggregates endure which cherish beliefs which bolster up their structure and mode of existence. But, since disintegration and destruction of collectivities of all kinds and

and sizes are just as. conspicuous as their continuing survival, Pareto's view (or model, if you like) is as applicable as Marx's. A satisfactory theory will have to synthesize these valid partial insights and transcend them, but this is not the place for such an attempt. In the present essay I cannot go beyond imputations, resting upon circumstantial evidence of congruence between systems of ideas and collective interests, of roughly the same degree of plausibility (or vulnerability) as the usual marxist assertions about the connections between the contents of an ideology and the class interests. The chief intellectual shortcoming of the marxists on this score is, firstly that they restrict unduly the applicability of their master's key concept only to groupings (i.e., social classes) which he himself has singled out; and secondly that (naturally enough) they will not apply this scheme of interpretation to themselves and their own beliefs. Every craft, every occupation - no matter whether shady or even downright criminal - gravitates towards the principle that 'dog does not eat dog'. The ancient and exclusive professions - such as law and medicine - emphasize this rule to the point of endowing it with the halo of a fundamental canon of ethics. The teachers, too, ostracize those who openly criticize their colleagues and undermine their standing in the eyes of the pupils. As with all other human arrangements, this custom has good and bad sides. Without something of this kind, it would be difficult to maintain the friendly relations required for fruitful co-operation, be it in a workshop, an operating theatre or a boardroom. By consistent tripping one another up and in mutual recriminations people can not only make their lives a misery but alio condemn their work to failure. Since a patient peace of mind and the chances of recovery depend to a considerable extent on his faith in the physician - which in turn depends on the latter's personal reputation as well as on the status of the profession - the effectiveness of medical care would be gravely impaired if practitioners fell into the habit of denigrating one another. Likewise the teachers who undermine each other's standing in the eyes of the pupils will end by being unable to teach at all; given that the adolescents are normally prone to disorder and the number of those with a spontaneous desire to learn always remains small. On the other side of the balance, however, there can be little doubt that the appeal of the 'dog does not eat dog' principle derives its strength less from an altruistic concern for fruitfulness of the work - except in so far as this makes life easier - than from the quest for collective advantage, be it pecuniary or honorific. By strictly enforcing occupational solidarity, the medical profession has not only attained affluence which in most countries is grossly out of proportion to its relative level of skill - not to speak of the extremely advantageous immunity from punishment for incompetence and negligence - but has also been able to procure for its members a substantial psychic income by putting them in a position where they can play God, regardless of frequent shortcomings of knowledge and intelligence. True, members of the medical profession enjoy an especially favourable position because they handle people at their weakest: when they are afraid and in need of a solace; reduced to the condition of patients - a very revealing word which goes far to explain why in so many public hospitals (at least in Britain) the front entrance is reserved for suppliers of the services, while the customers have to sneak in through the back door. The lawyers too manage to boost up their prestige and income by couching documents in needlessly abstruse language, designed to impede a layman's understanding, and to compel him to resort to costly legal advice. Among the suppliers of services of immediate utility to the consumers, the custom of refraining from mutual criticism merely serves as a shield against responsibility for negligence and a prop for monopolistic gains; but when it comes to an occupation which justifies its existence by claiming that it is dedicated to the pursuit of general truths, an adherence to the 'dog does not eat dog' principle usually amounts to a collusion in parasitism and fraud. Businessmen who do not feel squeamish about admitting that their main goal is to make money, and whose occupational ethics consist of few moral prohibitions have less use for dissimulation than those who earn their living in an occupation ostensibly devoted to the furtherance of higher ideals; and the higher these are, the harder it is to live up to them, and the greater the temptation of (and the scope for) hypocrisy. Honesty is the best policy for the purveyor when the customer knows what he wants, is able to judge the quality of what he gets, and pays out of his own pocket. Most people can judge the quality of shoes or scissors, and hence nobody has made a fortune by producing shoes which immediately fall apart or scissors which do not cut. In building houses, on the other hand, the defects of the work or the materials can remain concealed for much longer, and consequently shoddiness often brings profit in this line of business. The merits of a therapy, to take another example, cannot easily be assessed, and for this reason medical practice has been for centuries entangled with a charlatanry from which it is not entirely free even to-day. Nonetheless, no matter how difficult it may be to evaluate a physician's or a lawyer's services, they clearly minister to concrete needs. But what kind of services does a philosopher or a student of society render, and to whom? Who cares whether they are worth anything or not? Can those who care judge their merit? And, if so, do they decide on the rewards or bear the cost? Doubts about the worth of their services are seldom entertained by the practitioners; and if ever raised, are promptly warded off with invocations of professional standards with their presumptive power to ensure integrity and progress. Looking at this matter realistically, however, one can find few grounds for assuming that all the professions inherently gravitate towards honest service rather than monopolistic exploitation or parasitism. In reality it all depends on what kind of behaviour leads to wealth and status (or, to put it another way, on the link between true merit and reward. To analyse various types of work from this standpoint would provide a useful programme for the sociology of occupation, which might lift it above its present level of uninspired cataloguing. Seen from this angle, the social sciences appear an activity without any intrinsic mechanisms of retribution: where anybody can get away with anything. Criticising the prevailing trends and the top people may be profitable if done with the backing of a powerful pressure group – perhaps a fifth column subsidized from abroad. But unfortunately, the contours of truth never coincide with the frontiers between embattled parties and cliques. So, a free thinker can consider himself lucky if he lives in a setting where he merely gets cold-shouldered rather than imprisoned and called 'a pig who fouls his nest' - to use the felicitous expression which the Soviet police chief, Semichastny, applied to Boris Pasternak. Whether exhortation helps much may seriously be doubted, for despite centuries of inveighing against stealing and cheating, these misdemeanours do not appear to be less common nowadays than at the time of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to envisage how any standards whatsoever can continue to exist without some people taking upon themselves the task of affirming them and preaching against vice. As one could spend a whole life and fill an encyclopaedia trying to expose all the foolish antics which pass for a scientific study of human conduct, I have limited myself to a few influential examples. In any case, demolishing the idols of pseudo-science is relatively easy, and the more interesting and important task is to explain why they have found and are finding such a wide acceptance. I do not envisage that this blast of my trumpet will bring down the walls of pseudo-science, which are manned by too many stout defenders: the slaves of routine who (to use Bertrand Russell's expression) 'would rather die than think', mercenary go-getters, docile educational employees who judge ideas by the status of their propounders, or the woolly minded lost souls yearning for gurus. Nevertheless, despite the advanced stage of cretinization which our civilization has reached under the impact of the mass media, there are still some people about who like to use their brains without the lure of material gain; and it is for them that this book is intended. But if they are in a minority, then how can the truth prevail? The answer (which gives some ground for hope) is that people interested in ideas, and prepared to think them through and express them regardless of personal disadvantage, have always been few; and if knowledge could not advance without a majority on the right side, there would never have been any progress at all - because it has always been easier to get into the limelight, as well as to make money, by charlatanry, doctrinairism, sycophancy and soothing or stirring oratory than by logical and fearless thinking. No, the reason why human understanding has been able to advance in the past, and may do so in the future, is that true insights are cumulative and retain their value regardless of what happens to their discoverers; while fads and stunts may bring an immediate profit to the impresarios, but lead nowhere in the long run, cancel each other out, and are dropped as soon as their promoters are no longer there (or have lost the power) to direct the show. Anyway, let us not despair.

From the book Social Sciences as Sorcery
Stanislav Andreski