Atta or self

The P.T.S. (London Pali Text Society) Dictionary, suppose that the word attā in the Suttas refers either to a phenomenon of purely historical interest (of the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B.C.) known as a 'soul', or else to the reflexive 'self', apparently of purely grammatical interest. All suggestion that there might be some connexion (of purely vital interest) between 'soul' and 'self' is prudently avoided. Nanavira Thera
Useful notes:

—Your implication that the Buddha asserted that there is no self requires modification. What the Buddha said was 'sabbe dhammā anattā'—no thing is self—, which is not quite the same. 'Sabbe dhammā anattā' means 'if you look for a self you will not find one', which means 'self is a mirage, a deception'. It does not mean that the mirage, as such, does not exist.

-—It is quite obvious that for all men the reality and permanence of their selves, 'I', is taken absolutely for granted;

—The puthujjana takes his existence for granted—cogito ergo sum (which, as Sartre says, is apodictic reflexive evidence of the thinker's existence)—and is in a perpetual state of contradiction.

—With the question of a thing's self-identity (which presents no difficulty if carefully handled) the Buddha's Teaching of anattā has nothing whatsoever to do. Anattā is purely concerned with 'self' as subject ('I'). And this is a matter of considerably greater difficulty than is generally supposed.

—the puthujjana's non-knowledge of dukkha is the dukkha that he has non-knowledge of; and this dukkha that is at the same time non-knowledge of dukkha is the puthujjana's (mistaken) acceptance of what seems to be a 'self' or 'subject' or 'ego' at its face value (as nicca/sukha/attā, 'permanent/pleasant/self').

—the Dhamma is concerned purely and simply with 'self' as subject ('I', 'mine'), which is the very thing that you propose to omit by being objective.

The rationalized “self-theory,” which is called, in whatever form it may take, “both a view and a fetter,” is based upon a subtle fundamental distortion in the act of perceiving, the “conceit ’I am,’” which is “a fetter, but not a view.” Now self-theories may or may not be actually formulated; but if they are, they cannot be described specifically without reference to the five aggregates. For that reason they can, when described, all be reduced to one of the types of what is called the “embodiment view,” (or personality view -sakkayaditthi-) which is set out schematically. These are all given up by the stream-enterer, though the conceit “I am” is not.

“How does there come to be the embodiment view?” — “Here the untaught ordinary man who has no regard for noble ones and is unconversant with their Dhamma and Discipline … sees form as self, or self as possessed of form, or form as in self, or self as in form. (And so with each of the other four aggregates: feeling, perception, determinations, and consciousness.) A well-taught noble disciple does not do this.” (MN 44; MN 109)

“The untaught ordinary man who has no regard for noble ones … gives unreasoned (uncritical) attention in this way: ’Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?’ Or else he wonders about himself now in the presently arisen period in this way: ’Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Whence has this being come? Whither is it bound?’

“When he gives unreasoned attention in this way, then one of six types of view arises in him as true and established: ’My self exists’ or ’My self does not exist’ or ’I perceive self with self’ or ’I perceive not-self with self’ or ’I perceive self with not-self’ or some such view as ’This is my self that speaks and feels and experiences here or there the ripening of good and bad actions; but this my self is permanent, everlasting, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity.’ This field of views is called the thicket of views, the wilderness of views, the contortion of views, the vacillation of views, the fetter of views. The untaught ordinary man bound by the fetter of views is not freed from birth, ageing and death, sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief, and despair: he is not freed from suffering, I say.” (MN 2)
*

“Usually the world is shackled by bias, clinging, and insistence; but one such as this (who has right view), instead of allowing bias, instead of clinging, and instead of deciding about ’my self,’ with such bias, such clinging, and such mental decision in the guise of underlying tendency to insist, he has no doubt or uncertainty that what arises is only arising suffering, and what ceases is only ceasing suffering, and in this his knowledge is independent of others. That is what ’right view’ refers to. ’
SN 12:15
*

On another occasion the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him. Then he asked: “How is it, Master Gotama, does self exist?” When this was said, the Blessed One was silent. “How is it, then, Master Gotama, does self not exist?” And for a second time the Blessed One was silent. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away. Not long after he had gone the Venerable Ānanda asked the Blessed One: “Lord, how is it that when the Blessed One was questioned he did not answer?”

“If, when I was asked ’Does self exist?’ I had answered ’Self exists,’ that would have been the belief of those who hold the theory of eternalism. And if, when I was asked ’Does self not exist?’ I had answered ’Self does not exist,’ that would have been the belief of those who hold the theory of annihilationism. Again, if, when asked ’Does self exist?’ I had answered ’Self exists,’ would that have been in conformity with my knowledge that all things are not-self? And if, when asked ’Does self not exist?’ I had answered ’Self does not exist,’ then confused as he already is, Ānanda, the wanderer Vacchagotta would have become still more confused, assuming: ’Surely then I had a self before and now have none.’” [SN 44:10]

*

“Aggivessana, are you not asserting thus: ‘Material form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, determinations are my self, consciousness is my self’?” “I assert thus, Master Gotama: ‘Material form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, determinations are my self, consciousness is my self.’ And so does this great multitude.”

“What has this great multitude to do with you, Aggivessana? Please confine yourself to your own assertion alone.” “Then, Master Gotama, I assert thus: ‘Material form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, determinations are my self, consciousness is my self.’” 

“In that case, Aggivessana, I shall ask you a question in return. Answer it as you choose. What do you think, Aggivessana? Would a head-anointed noble king — for example, King Pasenadi of Kosala or King Ajātasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha — exercise the power in his own realm to execute those who should be executed, to fine those who should be fined, and to banish those who should be banished?” 

“Master Gotama, a head-anointed noble king — for example, King Pasenadi of Kosala or King Ajātasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha — would exercise the power in his own realm to execute those who should be executed, to fine those who should be fined, and to banish those who should be banished. For even these [oligarchic] communities and societies such as the Vajjians and the Mallians exercise the power in their own realm to execute those who should be executed, to fine those who should be fined, and to banish those who should be banished; so all the more so should a head-anointed noble king such as King Pasenadi of Kosala or King Ajātasattu Vedehiputta of Magadha. He would exercise it, Master Gotama, and he would be worthy to exercise it.” 

“What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Material form is my self,’ do you exercise any such power over that material form as to say: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus’?” When this was said, Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son was silent. A second time the Blessed One asked the same question, and a second time Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son was silent. Then the Blessed One said to him: “Aggivessana, answer now. Now is not the time to be silent. If anyone, when asked a reasonable question up to the third time by the Tathāgata, still does not answer, his head splits into seven pieces there and then.” 

 Now on that occasion a thunderbolt-wielding spirit holding an iron thunderbolt that burned, blazed, and glowed, appeared in the air above Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son, thinking: “If this Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son, when asked a reasonable question up to the third time by the Blessed One, still does not answer, I shall split his head into seven pieces here and now.” The Blessed One saw the thunderbolt-wielding spirit and so did Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son. Then Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son was frightened, alarmed, and terrified. Seeking his shelter, asylum, and refuge in the Blessed One himself, he said: “Ask me, Master Gotama, I will answer.” 

“What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Material form is my self,’ do you exercise any such power over that material form as to say: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” 

“Pay attention, Aggivessana, pay attention how you reply! What you said afterwards does not agree with what you said before, nor does what you said before agree with what you said afterwards. What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Feeling is my self,’ do you exercise any power over that feeling as to say: ‘Let my feeling be thus; let my feeling not be thus’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” 

“Pay attention, Aggivessana, pay attention how you reply! What you said afterwards does not agree with what you said before, nor does what you said before agree with what you said afterwards. What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Perception is my self,’ do you exercise any power over that perception as to say: ‘Let my perception be thus; let my perception not be thus’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” 

 “Pay attention, Aggivessana, pay attention how you reply! What you said afterwards does not agree with what you said before, nor does what you said before agree with what you said afterwards. What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Determinations are my self,’ do you exercise any such power over those determinations as to say: ‘Let my formations be thus; let my formations not be thus’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” 

“Pay attention, Aggivessana, pay attention how you reply! What you said afterwards does not agree with what you said before, nor does what you said before agree with what you said afterwards. What do you think, Aggivessana? When you say thus: ‘Consciousness is my self,’ do you exercise any such power over that consciousness as to say: ‘Let my consciousness be thus; let my consciousness not be thus’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” 

“Pay attention, Aggivessana, pay attention how you reply! What you said afterwards does not agree with what you said before, nor does what you said before agree with what you said afterwards. 

What do you think, Aggivessana, is material form permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, Master Gotama.” — “Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?” — “Suffering, Master Gotama.” — “Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” “What do you think, Aggivessana? Is feeling permanent or impermanent?… Is perception permanent or impermanent?… Are determinations permanent or impermanent?… Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?” — “Impermanent, Master Gotama.” — “Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?” — “Suffering, Master Gotama.” — “Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?” — “No, Master Gotama.” 

“What do you think, Aggivessana? When one adheres to suffering, resorts to suffering, holds to suffering, and regards what is suffering thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self,’ could one ever fully understand suffering oneself or abide with suffering utterly destroyed?” “How could one, Master Gotama? No, Master Gotama.” 

*“What do you think, Aggivessana? That being so, do you not adhere to suffering, resort to suffering, hold to suffering, and regard what is suffering thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?” “How could I not, Master Gotama? Yes, Master Gotama.”

MN 35

*

How far, Ānanda, does one consider self? One considers self, Ānanda, in regard to feeling: 'My self is feeling. My self is not in fact feeling, my self is devoid of feeling. My self is not in fact feeling but neither is my self devoid of feeling, my self feels, it is the nature of my self to feel'.

Herein, Ānanda, to one who says 'My self is feeling' this would be the reply: 'There are, friend, these three feelings, pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling: which of these three feelings do you consider to be self?' Whenever, Ānanda, one feels a pleasant feeling, at that time one neither feels an unpleasant feeling, nor does one feel neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling; at that time one feels only a pleasant feeling. Whenever, Ānanda, one feels an unpleasant feeling, at that time one neither feels a pleasant feeling nor does one feel neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling. Whenever, Ānanda, one feels neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling, at that time one neither feels a pleasant feeling, nor does one feel an unpleasant feeling.

A pleasant feeling, Ānanda, is impermanent, determined, dependently arisen, it has the nature of exhaustion, of dissolution, of fading out, of cessation. An unpleasant feeling, Ānanda, is impermanent, determined, dependently arisen, it has the nature of exhaustion, of dissolution, of fading out, of cessation. A neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling, Ānanda, is impermanent, determined, dependently arisen. It has the nature of exhaustion, of dissolution, of fading out, of cessation.

In one to whom it occurs, when feeling a pleasant (unpleasant, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant) feeling, 'This is my self', it will also occur, when that same pleasant (unpleasant, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant) feeling ceases, 'My self has dissolved'.

Thus, one who says 'My self is feeling' is considering self to be something that is here and now impermanent, a mixture of pleasure and unpleasure, and that has the nature of rising and falling. Therefore, Ānanda, it will not do to consider 'My self is feeling'.

Herein, Ānanda, to one who says 'My self indeed is not feeling; my self is devoid of feeling', this would be the reply: 'But where, friend, there is no feeling at all, would there be any saying "I am"?'

– No indeed, Lord.

– Therefore, Ānanda, it will not do to consider 'My self indeed is not feeling, my self is devoid of feeling'.

Herein, Ānanda, to one who says 'My self, indeed, is not feeling, nor yet is my self devoid of feeling; my self feels; to feel is the nature of my self', this would be the reply: 'Were all feeling, friend, in every way whatsoever to cease without remainder, were feeling altogether absent, with cessation of feeling would there be any saying "It is this that I am"?'

– No indeed, Lord.

– Therefore, Ānanda, it will not do to consider 'My self, indeed, is not feeling, nor yet is my self devoid of feeling; my self feels; to feel is the nature of my self'.

When, Ānanda, a monk does not consider self to be feeling, nor considers self to be void of feeling, nor considers 'My self feels, to feel is the nature of my self', he, not so considering, holds to nothing in the world; not holding, he is not anxious; not being anxious, he individually becomes extinct; 'Birth is exhausted, the life of purity is fulfilled, what was to be done is done, there is no more of this existence to come', so he understands.

For one, Ānanda, to say of a monk whose mind is thus released that his view is 'After death the Tathāgata is (the Tathāgata is not; the Tathāgata both is and is not; the Tathāgata neither is nor is not)' – that would not be proper. Why is this? In however far, Ānanda, there is designation, in however far there is mode of designation, in however far there is expression, in however far there is mode of expression, in however far the is description, in however far there is mode of description, in however far there is understanding, in however far there is the sphere of understanding, in however far there is the round, in however far there is the coursing on – it is by directly knowing this that a monk is released. To say of a monk released by directly knowing this, that he does not know, that he does not see, that his views are thus – that would not be proper.
D. 15

Atta

In the arahat's reflexion what appears reflexively is only pañcakkhandhā, which he calls 'myself' simply for want of any other term. But in the puthujjana's reflexion what appears reflexively is pañc'upādānakkhandhā, or sakkāya; and sakkāya (q.v.), when it appears reflexively, appears (in one way or another) as being and belonging to an extra-temporal changeless 'self' (i.e. a soul). The puthujjana confuses (as the arahat does not) the self-identity of simple reflexion—as with a mirror, where the same thing is seen from two points of view at once ('the thing itself', 'the selfsame thing')—with the 'self' as the subject that appears in reflexion—'my self' (i.e. 'I itself', i.e. 'the I that appears when I reflect'). For the puthujjana the word self is necessarily ambiguous, since he cannot conceive of any reflexion not involving reflexive experience of the subject—i.e. not involving manifestation of a soul. Since the self of self-identity is involved in the structure of the subject appearing in reflexion ('my self' = 'I itself'), it is sometimes taken (when recourse is not had to a supposed Transcendental Being) as the basic principle of all subjectivity. The subject is then conceived as a hypostasized play of reflexions of one kind or another, the hypostasis itself somehow deriving from (or being motivated by) the play of reflexions. The puthujjana, however, does not see that attainment of arahattā removes all trace of the desire or conceit '(I) am', leaving the entire reflexive structure intact—in other words, that subjectivity is a parasite on experience. Indeed, it is by his very failure to see this that he remains a puthujjana.

The question of self-identity arises either when a thing is seen from two points of view at once (as in reflexion,[a] for example; or when it is at the same time the object of two different senses—I am now both looking at my pen and touching it with my fingers, and I might wonder if it is the same pen in the two simultaneous experiences [see RŪPA]), or when a thing is seen to endure in time, when the question may be asked if it continues to be the same thing (the answer being, that a thing at any one given level of generality is the invariant of a transformation—see ANICCA [a] & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE—, and that 'to remain the same' means just this).[b] With the question of a thing's self-identity (which presents no particular difficulty) the Buddha's Teaching of anattā has nothing whatsoever to do: anattā is purely concerned with 'self' as subject. (See PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [c].)

'Self' as subject can be briefly discussed as follows. As pointed out in PHASSA [b], the puthujjana thinks 'things are mine (i.e. are my concern) because I am, because I exist'. He takes the subject ('I') for granted; and if things are appropriated, that is because he, the subject, exists. The ditthisampanna (or sotāpanna) sees, however, that this is the wrong way round. He sees that the notion 'I am' arises because things (so long as there is any trace of avijjā) present themselves as 'mine'. This significance (or intention, or determination), 'mine' or 'for me'—see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [e]—, is, in a sense, a void, a negative aspect of the present thing (or existing phenomenon), since it simply points to a subject; and the puthujjana, not seeing impermanence (or more specifically, not seeing the impermanence of this ubiquitous determination), deceives himself into supposing that there actually exists a subject—'self'—independent of the object (which latter, as the ditthisampanna well understands, is merely the positive aspect of the phenomenon—that which is 'for me'). In this way it may be seen that the puthujjana's experience, pañc'upādānakkhandhā, has a negativeaspect (the subject) and a positive aspect (the object). But care is needed; for, in fact, the division subject/object is not a simple negative/positive division. If it were, only the positive would be present (as an existing phenomenon) and the negative (the subject) would not be present at all—it would simply not exist. But the subject is, in a sense, phenomenal: it (or he) is an existing phenomenal negative, a negative that appears; for the puthujjana asserts the present reality of his 'self' ('the irreplaceable being that I am'). The fact is, that the intention or determination 'mine', pointing to a subject, is a complex structure involving avijjā. The subject is not simply a negative in relation to the positive object: it (or he) is master over the object, and is thus a kind of positive negative, a master who does not appear explicitly but who, somehow or other, nevertheless exists.[c] It is this master whom the puthujjana, when he engages in reflexion, is seeking to identify—in vain![d] This delusive mastery of subject over object must be rigorously distinguished from the reflexive power of control or choice that is exercised in voluntary action by puthujjana and arahat alike.

For a discussion of sabbe dhammā anattā see DHAMMA.


Footnotes:

[a] In immediate experience the thing is present; in reflexive experience the thing is again present, but as implicit in a more general thing. Thus in reflexion the thing is twice present, once immediately and once reflexively. This is true of reflexion both in the loose sense (as reflection or discursive thinking) and a fortiori in the stricter sense (for the reason that reflection involves reflexion, though not vice versa). See MANO and also VIÑÑĀNA [d].

[b] 'It takes two to make the same, and the least we can have is some change of event in a self-same thing, or the return to that thing from some suggested difference.'—F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Oxford (1883) 1958, I,v,§1.

[c] With the exception of consciousness (which cannot be directly qualified—see VIÑÑĀNA [c]—every determination has a positive as well as a negative aspect: it is positive in so far as it is in itself something, and negative in so far as it is not what it determines. This is evident enough in the case of a thing's potentialities, which are given as images (or absents) together with the real (or present) thing. But the positive negativity of the subject, which is what concerns us here, is by no means such a simple affair: the subject presents itself (or himself), at the same time, as certainly more elusive, and yet as no less real, than the object.

Images are present as absent (or negative) reality, but as images (or images of images) they are present, or real. Also, being plural, they are more elusive, individually, than reality, which is singular (see NĀMA). The imaginary, therefore, in any given part of it, combines reality with elusiveness; and it is thus easily supposed that what is imaginary is subjective and what is real is objective. But imagination survives the disappearance of subjectivity (asmimāna, asmī ti chanda): Samvijjati kho āvuso Bhagavato mano, vijānāti Bhagavā manasā dhammam, chandarāgo Bhagavato n'atthi, suvimuttacitto Bhagavā. ('The Auspicious One, friend, possesses a mind (mano); the Auspicious One cognizes images (ideas) with the mind; desire-&-lust for the Auspicious One there is not; the Auspicious One is wholly freed in heart (citta). (Cf. Salāyatana Samy. xviii,5, quoted at PHASSA [d].)') Salāyatana Samy. xviii,5 <S.iv.164> The elusiveness of images is not at all the same as the elusiveness of the subject. (It is in this sense that science, in claiming to deal only with reality, calls itself objective.)

[d] 'I urge the following dilemma. If your Ego has no content, it is nothing, and it therefore is not experienced; but if on the other hand it is anything, it is a phenomenon in time.'—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Oxford (1893) 1962, Ch. XXIII.

*
Sabbe sankhārā aniccā; Sabbe sankhārā dukkhā; Sabbe dhammā anattā. ('All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self.') Attā, 'self', is fundamentally a notion of mastery over things (cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Samy. vi,7 <S.iii,66>[7]). But this notion is entertained only if it is pleasurable,[c] and it is only pleasurable provided the mastery is assumed to be permanent; for a mastery—which is essentially a kind of absolute timelessness, an unmovedmoving of things—that is undermined by impermanence is no mastery at all, but a mockery. Thus the regarding of a thing, a dhamma, as attā or 'self' can survive for only so long as the notion gives pleasure, and it only gives pleasure for so long as that dhamma can be considered as permanent (for the regarding of a thing as 'self' endows it with the illusion of a kind of super-stability in time). In itself, as a dhamma regarded as attā, its impermanence is not manifest (for it is pleasant to consider it as permanent); but when it is seen to be dependent upon other dhammā not considered to be permanent, its impermanence does then become manifest. To see impermanence in what is regarded as attā, one must emerge from the confines of the individual dhamma itself and see that it depends on what is impermanent. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) aniccā is said, meaning 'All things that things (dhammā) depend on are impermanent'. A given dhamma, as a dhamma regarded as attā, is, on account of being so regarded, considered to be pleasant; but when it is seen to be dependent upon some other dhamma that, not being regarded as attā, is manifestly unpleasurable (owing to the invariable false perception of permanence, of super-stability, in one not free from asmimāna), then its own unpleasurableness becomes manifest. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) dukkhā is said. When this is seen—i.e. when perception of permanence and pleasure is understood to be false --, the notion 'This dhamma is my attā' comes to an end, and is replaced by sabbe dhammā anattā. Note that it is the sotāpannawho, knowing and seeing that his perception of permanence and pleasure is false, is free from this notion of 'self', though not from the more subtle conceit '(I) am' (asmimāna);[d] but it is only the arahat who is entirely free from the (false) perception of permanence and pleasure, and 'for him' perception of impermanence is no longer unpleasurable. (See also A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §12 & PARAMATTHA SACCA.)

[c] This notion is pleasurable only if it is itself taken as permanent (it is my notion); thus it does not escape sankhāradukkha. But unless this notion is brought to an end there is no escape from sankhāradukkha. The linchpin is carried by the wheel as it turns; but so long as it carries the linchpin the wheel will turn. (That 'self' is spoken of here as a notion should not mislead the reader into supposing that a purely abstract idea, based upon faulty reasoning, is what is referred to. The puthujjana does not by any means experience his 'self' as an abstraction, and this because it is not rationally that notions of subjectivity are bound up with nescience (avijjā), but affectively. Reason comes in (when it comes in at all) only in the second place, to make what it can of a fait accompli. Avijjāsamphassajena bhikhave vedayitena phutthassa assutavato puthujjanassa, Asmī ti pi'ssa hoti, Ayam aham asmī ti pi'ssa hoti, Bhavissan ti pi'ssa hoti,... ('To the uninstructed commoner, monks, contacted by feeling born of nescience-contact, it occurs '(I) am', it occurs 'It is this that I am', it occurs 'I shall be',...') Khandha Samy. v,5 <S.iii,46>. And in Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,66-8> it is in relation to feeling that the possible ways of regarding 'self' are discussed: Vedanā me attā ti; Na h'eva kho me vedanā attā, appatisamvedano me attā ti; Na h'eva kho me vedanā attā, no pi appatisamvedano me attā, attā me vediyati vedanādhammo hi me attā ti. ('My self is feeling; My self is not in fact feeling, my self is devoid of feeling; My self is not in fact feeling, but neither is my self devoid of feeling, my self feels, to feel is the nature of my sesf.

[d] Manifest impermanence and unpleasurableness at a coarse level does not exclude (false) perception of permanence and pleasure at a fine level (indeed, manifest unpleasurableness requires false perception of permanence, as remarked above [this refers, of course, only to sankhāradukkha]). But the coarse notion of 'self' must be removed before the subtle conceit '(I) am' can go. What is not regarded as 'self' is more manifestly impermanent and unpleasurable (and, of course, not-'self') than what is so regarded. Therefore the indirect approach to dhammā by way of sankhārā. Avijjā cannot be pulled out like a nail: it must be unscrewed. See MAMA & SANKHĀRA.