To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label Leopardi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Leopardi. Show all posts

Sunday, June 16, 2024

Giacomo, at the age of fourteen, entered into possession of his father’s library, and took his education into his own hands

‘What stuff for poetry’, indeed! It was a world on which, in later years, he looked back with infinite nostalgia—claiming that with the end of those ‘illusions’ and the advent of reason, the creative spirit began to shrivel. And even at the time, he clung to it with an unchildlike, almost desperate, tenacity. His imagination, he wrote later on, was fixed with great intensity on a very few ideas (‘unlike that of most children, which leaps from one thing to another’) and this caused him to be terrified of anything unusual that might be disturbing and to clutch at all that was customary and familiar, ‘outside of which he could not find peace’.46Never, perhaps, was there a child more precociously tormented by self-awareness. ‘He already knew almost all the good and evil in himself,’ he wrote, in some fragmentary autobiographical notes, ‘and was always going au devant of his own progress.’47 What he held in his hand was already valueless; what lay before him, might never be attained. ‘When we hoped for some good thing,’ he wrote, ‘what were our anxieties, our terrors, our tremblings… at every little obstacle!’ Even when the treat, so anxiously hoped for, was reached, it lasted so short a time, and was followed by ‘such dark and intense sorrow’ at its termination! ‘Indeed our sorrow then was inconsolable—not so much because the pleasure was over, as because it had not come up to our expectations, and in consequence we sometimes suffered from a sort of remorse, as if our lack of enjoyment had been our own fault. For experience had not yet taught us to have few hopes, and to be prepared to have those hopes destroyed…’48One day his mother came upon him ‘weeping because he was a man’, and laughed at him. (But little Pietruccio, on his knee, tried to comfort him, stroking his cheek.) How could he tell her that his grief was nothing less than an awareness of mortality? Long before he could formulate his knowledge, the boy knew that nothing is stable, nothing ours; that the whole of life is but a process of losing. ‘When I saw someone going away—even a person to whom I was quite indifferent—I would consider whether it was possible or probable that I should ever see him again. And if I decided that it was not, then I would watch and listen, following our guest with all my eyes and ears, always revolving within my mind this thought: “This is the last time, I shall never see him again!”’49 Once, when he was taken to play with some other children, and was called away before the game was over, the pain of this disappointment was so intense that, many years later, he could find no more vivid image for the insecurity of human life. ‘The life of man seemed to me to be as when, in childhood, I was taken to see friends, and began to play with the other children, seated around a table—and then my parents got up and called me, and my heart was heavy—but I had to go, leaving the game unplayed and the chairs upset and the children weeping.’50So the first ten years of Leopardi’s life went by: in dreams and fantasies, in early grief, in premature self-awareness, in repressed affection. A child observant, silent, fearful, passionate, secretive, vulnerable—playing with shadows, counting the stars.

The portrait is one that the future hardly changed. But one more door was still to be opened—into the world of books.

(...)

So Giacomo, at the age of fourteen, entered into possession of his father’s library, and took his education into his own hands. He began—this at least is agreeably childish—by compiling an ‘Index of the works produced by me, Giacomo Leopardi, from 1809 to 1812’.7 These included his first sonnet, La morte di Ettore, written at the age of eleven after reading Homer, a translation of the first two books of Horace’s Odes, a parody of the ArsPoetica, a poetic epistle (dedicated ‘To his dear Father, after two months’ study of philosophy’), and—perhaps in rivalry with his father, who also fancied himself as a dramatist—two full-blown tragedies.8 All these are still, of course, merely scholastic exercises; Giacomo was playing with words, as other boys with toy soldiers—marshalling his troops into formations, making reconnaissances into unfamiliar country, conquering new positions. But all the time he was acquiring the tools of his trade. By the time he was fourteen, he could make free use of almost every verse form; he could write odes, octets, sextets, free endecasyllables, and above all, could make a free use of the Dantesque terzina. ‘It is not yet poetry,’ comments De Robertis, ‘but it is literary art—and that is something.’9And by the time Giacomo was fifteen, the apprenticeship was already over; Giacomo had become an independent, an indefatigable scholar. ‘Segregated from the world,’ says De Sanctis, ‘his father’s library became to him a sort of Pompei, in which he shut himself up to excavate, as best he could, the past.’10It was a room neither sombre nor depressing, but in winter it was bitterly cold; and here, in every season, Giacomo spent the whole day, only interrupting his studies by an hour of talk with his brothers in the evenings, while he walked up and down in the dark, to rest his aching eyes. And when, at bedtime, he retired to his own room, we know that his studies were continued far into the night, for his brother Carlo has recorded that, if he woke up, he would see him ‘kneeling by the table to write by the last dim light of the guttering candle’.

Already he was possessed by the conviction that his life would be short, that not one hour—no, not one minute—could be wasted, if he was to reach the fame for which he thirsted. It was upon the Classics that he fastened, and soon, not satisfied with Latin, he decided to teach himself Greek. A month later he was proficient enough to write a letter to his uncle in that language, and from that time onwards he left no shelf of the library unexplored. What the boy accomplished within the next four years it is almost impossible to believe. ‘He entered those rooms’, wrote De Sanctis, ‘a citizen of Recanati; he left them a citizen of the world.’ He had the enthusiasm, and also the leisure and insatiable curiosity, of a medieval scholar. ‘He came to know’, Giordani wrote, ‘the world of two thousand years ago, before he knew that of his own time; and what is more surprising, from this lost ancient world he learned what his own was, and how to value it.’11 He lived surrounded by lexicons and grammars—Greek, Latin, Hebrew—he commentated, annotated, dissertated, imitated. No classical scholar was too obscure, too erudite, to please him: ‘they formed’, he wrote, ‘my whole delight’. His first choice of an original subject, however, is suggestive: a History of Astronomy. It is, naturally enough, merely a compendium of other men’s erudition, turgidly and awkwardly presented; but the lines of Ovid which he chose for his frontispiece are significant:

… iuvat ire per alta

astra, iuvat terris et inerti sedes relicta

nube vehi, validique umeris insidere Atlantis.‡

Already the boy, for all his heavy cargo of learning, knew by instinct that the high heavens would be his dwelling-place.

But this was only the beginning. In the course of the next two years we meet with a prodigious, a truly terrifying output of erudite compositions, of which only a few need even be listed here. His genius for philology developed as suddenly, as astonishingly, as Pascal’s for mathematics. His first Greek work was a translation of the works of Hesychius of Milo; then followed a commentary on the writings of four Greek rhetoricians of the second century, and notes for a work on the Early Greek Fathers of the Church. How great his father’s pride was, may be inferred from the inscription on the flyleaf of the work which Giacomo gave him on his sixteenth birthday, a translation into Latin of Porphyry’s Commentary on the Life of Plotinus: ‘Today, August 31st, this work of his was given to me by my eldest son Giacomo Leopardi, who has had no master in the Greek language, and is sixteen years old, two months, and two days.’12 In his satisfaction, the Count even sent off the manuscript to the Abate Cancellieri, a well-known Roman philologist, who not only added his own praise upon the flyleaf but also referred to the work in Rome in a ‘Dissertation on men endowed with great memories’. ‘What may not be expected’, he wrote, ‘in maturity, of a young man of such astonishing ability?’ 

Monaldo’s gratification was no less great than his son’s, and great, too, was his satisfaction when a party of learned Jews came to Recanati from Ancona, and—or so the Count relates—Giacomo was able to converse fluently with them in Hebrew!13 But greatest of all was his paternal pride when Giacomo produced a series of ‘Discourses on Sacred Subjects’ and held two of them in Recanati, before the members of a religious confraternity. Little could the poor Count guess, from such beginnings, what a very different course his son’s genius soon would take!

And meanwhile, with undiminished enthusiasm, Giacomo was continuing his studies. After his first taste of praise from Rome, he was impatient to reach a larger audience. He had just finished a long Essay on the Popular Errors of the Ancients, when an exciting piece of news reached him: the Abate Angelo Mai, the librarian of the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan, had discovered a new manuscript by Fronto—an author almost wholly, and perhaps deservedly, unknown. With great difficulty he succeeded in obtaining the book, and feverishly set himself to translating it. Might not this be the first step to fame? The whole family shared in the boy’s hopes—Paolina and Carlo copying out his work, and Conte Monaldo hastening to send it off to a printer in Milan, Antonio Stella. And at the same time Giacomo himself sent to Angelo Mai his graceful dedication: ‘Others, when they dedicate, make a gift—I return to you a gift I have received.’ But the Abate’s acknowledgment, though civil, was not warm; Stella seemed disinclined to publish; and so the matter dropped.

It was, however, at this time that—fortunately for literature—the young man’s mind was again taking another turn; he was returning to the fabulous world of his boyhood. Had he indeed ever wholly left it? ‘Sometimes,’ he wrote later on, ‘when I was sitting quite still and thinking of other things, I would hear some verse of the Classics, quoted accidentally by a member of my family, and I would catch my breath and find myself obliged to take heed (tener dietro) to those lines.’14 And indeed his brother has recorded that, when any member of the family wanted to draw Giacomo out of the brown study in which he often sat at meals, this was the only way to do so.15 He read Virgil, and noted the ‘marvellous childishness’ of Circe’s song; he read Ariosto—and as he was reading, some boys in the street were singing, ‘Amore, amore, amore!’16 Many years later, he could hear their voices still.

But still nothing was further from his thoughts than that he himself could become a poet; it was only through scholarship that he hoped to be famous. ‘My head was full of modern ideas, I scorned and rejected the study of our own language… I despised Homer, Dante, all the Classics… What has made me change my tune? The grace of God.’17

This change, which he himself called his ‘conversion’, and which he also compared to a gradual falling in love, took place between his seventeenth and his eighteenth year. ‘My passage’, he says, ‘from erudition to poetry, was not sudden, but gradual—that is, I began to note in the Classics something more than I had before.’ He discovered that the Iliad or an ode of Anacreon’s aroused in him ‘a crowd of phantasies, that people both my mind and my heart’; and when he read the Aeneid, and reached the second book, he found that inadvertently he was ‘reciting it aloud, and changing tone, and catching fire, and perhaps sometimes letting a tear fall’.18 Could he render such great art as this, he wondered, in his own language? ‘Constantly and arduously I tried to find a way of making mine, if it were at all possible, that divine beauty.’19 Moreover, in the boy’s enthusiasm, the writer’s deep instinct of assimilation and selection, for his own purposes, was already at work. ‘When I have read a classical author, my mind is all in a turmoil and confusion. Then I begin to translate the best passages and their beauties, perforce examined and recollected, one by one, take their place within my mind, and enrich it, and bring me peace.’20First he translated, in verse, a fragment of the Odyssey, the Idylls of Moschus, and the Battle of Frogs and Mice (of which, later on, he made a second translation), and then the second book of the Aeneid; and all were published between 1815 and 1817, in a literary review of Milan, Lo Spettatore.21 They are works still at times scholastic or imitative; the strains of Moschus reach us by way of Tasso, of Politian: ‘Sicule Muse, incominciate il pianto.’ Yet sometimes faintly, on the breeze, another note is borne. ‘Nelle mie quiete stanze.’… ‘Pure alla rana Donar le ninfe interminabil canto.’ To those whose ear is attuned the accent, already, is prophetic.

At all these translations, but especially at the Aeneid, Leopardi laboured with meticulous, anxious care. ‘Innumerable passages are corrected and altered,’ he wrote, and yet in the end he rejected the whole translation as insufficiently polished. In his hands, he said ruefully, Virgil’s brush had become a mere pen. Yet with what high hopes and fears these works were sent off—to receive, as he hoped, the verdict which would shape his whole future! ‘On my knees,’ he wrote, in a short preface to the Odyssey, ‘I implore the literary men of Italy to give me their opinion.’22 He was ‘torn between hope and fear’; he wrote to his publisher, ‘forgive this importunity from a man who has no other thoughts or pleasures in his life but these’.23The phrase about the Odyssey was then thought ridiculous, and no one took the pains to answer. But now the young man’s amazing versatility had taken another turn. Might he not follow, he thought, the example of Michelangelo, ‘who buried a Cupid he had sculpted, and when the man who had dug up the statue believed it to be antique, brought him the missing arm’?24 Giacomo’s Cupid was a Hymn to Neptune which—so he informed the readers of Lo Spettatore—had recently been discovered by a Roman scholar in ‘a torn codex, of which only a few pages remain in a small library’,25 and had been translated by himself from the original Greek; and this was followed by two Greek odes—the Odae adespotae—purporting to have been found in the same codex, and to be by Anacreon, but of course really composed by Leopardi himself, and by him, too, translated into Latin verse.26 Always Anacreon’s poems had pleased Leopardi greatly. ‘Were I to attempt to describe the indefinable effect that Anacreon’s odes have upon me, I could find no more suitable image than the passing of a summer breeze, scented and refreshing… that opens your heart to a delight that is already fled, before you have fully felt or savoured it.’27 And now it was this elusive melody that the young poet sought to capture, and his verses bring us to the threshold of the world that, afterwards, he made his own. The first poem, indeed—a madrigalesque address To Love—still has something of the workshop, but in the second, To the Moon, there is already a clearer promise.Medium per caelum tacite

Nocturna solaque iter facis.

Super montes, arborumque

Cacumina, et domorum culmina.§

Have not these lines—to the reader of the Canto notturno and La sera del dì di festa—a strangely familiar ring? And in the same year the young writer composed another poem, Le rimembranze, which began:

Era in mezzo del ciel la curva luna.¶

Thus, in the first faint foreshadowing of a theme by a single flute, we may hear already the violins and trumpets, the oboes and the drums, of a great orchestra.

So Giacomo spent his youth, and it was the only period of his life of which, later on, he could say that he was happy. ‘The days passed without my knowing it, and all their hours seemed short; and I myself at the time often marvelled at the happiness I felt… And this state’, he added, ‘I shall never find again.’28 No, it would not return. For at some moment between his seventeenth and his eighteenth year—how or why, we do not know—a sudden anguish seized him. He realized what, in these mole-like years, he had done to himself. For seven years he had lived only in his books; he had allowed himself no time for recreation, for exercise, for intercourse with friends of his own age; he had grudged even the short time snatched for his meals. ‘What a life,’ cried the ladies of Recanati, ‘what a way to spend one’s youth!’29 Perhaps one morning his eyes ached so much that he was forced to stop reading, and looked in a mirror; perhaps he tried, as in the old days, to run a race with his brother, and discovered how quickly he became exhausted, how his head hammered and his pulses beat; perhaps his eyes fell upon some ridiculous, but none the less painful, verses, addressed to him by a young lady of his acquaintance: 

Non ti crucciare, almo giovinetto,

Se il dorso ’ai curvo, se ansimante il seno.||

Suddenly his eyes were opened, and what he saw aroused in him not only despair, but rage. The seven happy years at his books he now called ‘seven years of mad and desperate study’; and his father’s indulgence, ‘criminal blindness’; while to his mother he attributed a still more sinister motive. ‘She considered beauty a true misfortune, and seeing her children ugly or deformed, gave thanks to God.’ Such thoughts are not healthy food for a boy of eighteen; their bitterness warped and haunted him for the rest of his life. ‘I have miserably and irremediably ruined myself’, he wrote, ‘by rendering odious and contemptible my outer appearance… the only part of a man which most people take into account. And not only the common herd, but also all those who desire that virtue should have some physical adornment, when they find me utterly wanting in this respect, will hardly dare to love me—will hardly dare to love a man, in whom nothing but his soul has beauty.’30

What was the appearance of the young man who wrote these despairing words? It was not, surely, as unpleasing as he thought it. He was slight and pale, and not very tall, but his face still had the ‘serious and wistful’ look which had charmed the ladies of Recanati when he was a child; and his blue eyes held not only intelligence, but tenderness. But the rather large head was sunk deeply between his shoulders, and a very slight double hump had just begun to be perceptible. To himself—for self-deception was never Leopardi’s weakness—he was quite plain about it. He was not like other young men: in a society where to be different was to be an outcast, he was a gobbo. Medical opinion seems to agree that what he suffered from was scoliosis—a curvature of the spinal column which generally takes place in adolescence, and which throws the frame of the thorax out of place in such a way as to produce a slight double hump, on the back and chest, and eventually—as in Leopardi’s case—may affect the functions of both the lungs and the heart. But how soon this deformity began, we do not know. All we know is that in childhood Giacomo was as strong and straight as Carlo himself, and that when, in 1816, his publisher Stella saw him for the first time, the deformity was already noticeable. The silk cape of his ecclesiastical cloak, ‘which is lifted up by the slightest breeze’, concealed it a little, and this, in Carlo’s opinion, was one of the chief reasons why his family wished him to become a priest.31For Conte Monaldo was not indifferent to his son’s welfare, nor was he wholly blind; he merely walked in blinkers. Undoubtedly the long years that the boy spent, while he was growing, bent over his books, may have aggravated the condition of his spine, as well as straining his eyesight. But none of this would Conte Monaldo admit. Yet he was, in other ways, a careful father. We have seen how he watched over the children’s health when they were small, and in a long letter to Ranieri after Giacomo’s death he said with pride that, although the boy had had ‘a dangerous inflammatory illness of the chest’ (pneumonia?) at the age of six, he had had no other severe illness, ‘and, although never very robust, never spent a day in bed’. He related, however, a number of nervous symptoms of his adolescence, and observed with some complacency that, however foolish his son’s caprices might be, ‘with me he was always docile, and yielded to my arguments and my prayers’.32 On one point only was he silent: he never referred, even by implication, to his son’s deformity.

In vain did the other members of the family try to arouse his alarm. In 1813, when Giacomo was fifteen, his uncle, Marchese Carlo Antici, sent his father a long letter of warning. ‘You tell me that your unequalled Giacomo is learning Greek without a teacher, and hopes to master it in the course of one year, and afterwards to teach himself Hebrew. I congratulate you, him, and the priesthood, to which he already seems dedicated—but allow me to express my apprehensions for his health. Were Giacomo to mitigate his exhausting concentration by some exercise in horsemanship, my fears would be greatly diminished; but knowing that his long hours of study are broken only by the discharge of ecclesiastical duties, I cannot escape the distressing thought that his body is likely to become as frail as his intellect is strong.’33 And Marchese Antici begged his brother-in-law to send Giacomo to stay with him in Rome, where the boy, while still pursuing his studies with eminent scholars, could lead a more active life.

But Conte Monaldo—was it only owing to his satisfaction in his son’s brilliance, or from a deeper, less acknowledgeable pride of race?—would not heed. He denied that Giacomo’s health was being undermined, and though he agreed that a visit to Rome might benefit his studies, he firmly refused to let him go. ‘For the present my preference is, that he should be less learned, but belong to his father, and live peacefully and cheerfully in the town in which Providence has placed him… Depriving myself of him, I should lose the only friend I have, or hope to have, in Recanati, and I do not feel disposed to such a sacrifice.’34 This at least is frank, and there is something pathetic in Monaldo’s belief that his son was also his friend. Little did he foresee that Giacomo was soon to revolt against all the principles he had been at pains to instil; little did he realize that his rule already seemed a tyranny.

The months dragged on, and the years, and the boy was still in Recanati—and subject to long attacks of black, capricious melancholy. Sometimes it drove him to a more violent frenzy of study than ever before; sometimes, instead, it manifested itself in a total apathy, in which, far from studying, he could not even read. Periods of intense emotionalism alternated with others of complete aridity; sudden bursts of gaiety, with attacks of anguish. At one time he would take interminable daily walks across the hills in total silence, even if his father or brother were with him; at another, he shut himself up for weeks, with no exercise at all. Sometimes he played with the thought of suicide. Leaning over the rim of the deep round well in the garden, he longed to sink down, down into its brown depths, never to return:Pensoso di cessar dentro quell’acque

La speme e il dolor mio.**

But an hour later he would admit to himself—and note, with characteristic self-appraisal, in his diary—the inconstancy of even that desire. ‘If I were to throw myself in, I would climb up on to the rim again, as soon as I reached the surface… and feel some moments of pleasure at having saved myself, and of affection for this life, which I now so deeply despise.’35For several months he was convinced that he had, at most, only a year or two more to live, and it was then that, in eleven days, he wrote a long visionary poem entitled The Approach of Death. ‘Composition of Cantica’, he noted in his diary, ‘at night, in the midst of grief.’36

Dunque morir bisogna, e ancor non vidi

Venti volte gravar neve il mio tetto,

Venti rifar le rondinelle i nidi.††

Then this apprehension, too, receded. He would live, he believed, but ‘clinging on to life by my teeth and doing only the half of what other men can do’,37 and ‘torn always and without relief between acute pain and lack of all pleasures, between chronic tedium and burning shame at [my] physical deformities’.38 What could life hold for such a man? ‘I have not yet seen the world,’ he wrote, ‘but when I shall see it and have some experience of other men, I shall certainly have to retreat within myself… What I fear are the things that will wound my heart.’39

It was with a mind set in this key that he stumbled into his first romance.

A STUDY in SOLITUDE

The Life of Leopardi – Poet, Romantic and Radical

Iris Origo

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

Today contempt for others, and open and ostentatious self-esteem, is very often necessary


“Pride separates us from society: our self-love gives us a rank apart, and one that is always contested: a self-esteem that makes itself too much felt is almost always punished by universal contempt”]. Mme. de Lambert, Avis d’une mère à sa fille, in her Oeuvres complètes quoted above (p. 633), p. 99, end. So it is naturally in society, that is the nature of this human institution, which, being designed to further the common good and pleasure, does not truly exist if the individual does not to a greater or a lesser degree combine [670] his esteem, his interests, his goals, thoughts, opinions, sentiments and emotions, inclinations, and actions with those of others, and if all the above is designed simply to further himself. The more of a himself there is in the individual, the less society truly exists. Thus, if egoism is complete, society exists only in name. Because when each individual has only himself as a goal, and pays no heed at all to the common good, and when no thought or action of his is designed to further the good or pleasure of others, each individual by himself forms a society apart, complete and utterly distinct, since his goal is wholly distinct; and thus the world reverts to what it was at the beginning, and before the origin of society, which is left dissolved in fact and in substance, and in its reason and essence. Consequently, egoism has always been the scourge of society, and the greater it is, the worse [671] the condition of society has been; and hence so much the worse in essence those institutions which particularly further egoism either directly or indirectly, as despotism does above all. (Under that regime France became the homeland of the most pestilential egoism, greatly mitigated by the revolution, notwithstanding the immense harm it caused, as all the philosophers have noted.) Egoism, that is to say, self-love, is inseparable from man, but by egoism is meant more particularly an ill-directed, ill-employed self-love, designed to further one’s own real advantages and not those which derive from heroism, from sacrifices, from virtues, from honor, from friendship, etc. When, therefore, this egoism reaches its peak, in intensity and in universality; and when, on account of both its intensity and, more especially, its universality, the mask has been lifted (which no longer serves to conceal it, because it is too vigorous, and because all are inspired by the same sentiment), the nature of social dealings (whether in relation to conversation [672] or generally in relation to life) changes almost entirely. Because, with each thinking only of himself (as much because that is his actual inclination as because no one any longer has a thought for the other, and the good of each is entrusted to himself alone), all respect is set aside, and one seizes the prey from the mouth and talons of another; the individuals in what is termed society are in a state of more or less open war with one another, and with all at once; the strongest in every respect wins; and surrendering anything whatsoever, whether through politeness or through virtue, honor, etc., is pointless, harmful, and crazy, because others will not thank you or give you anything in return, and your surrendering to them, and putting up less resistance to them, simply works to their advantage, and hence to your detriment. And so, to take an example from the passage by Mme. de Lambert quoted above, we see, in fact, that today contempt for others, and open and ostentatious self-esteem, is not only no longer as harmful as [673] it once was but is very often necessary, and someone who does not know how to make use of it wins nothing in the world as it is at present. Because others are not disposed to grant you anything spontaneously, on the strength of truth and merit, not even, by the same token, esteem, therefore you must win it as if by force, in open war, and in a spirit of hostility, showing that you are altogether persuaded of your own merit, in spite of anyone else, despising and trampling others underfoot, deriding them, profiting from their slightest shortcomings, casting these back in their faces, forgiving them nothing, striving, in short, to humble them and to render them inferior to you, either in conversation or otherwise, and by the most effective means available. So that today if you wish to earn the esteem of others by showing respect, by treating them courteously, by flattering their self-love, by disregarding their faults, etc., and, as far as you’re concerned, by behaving modestly and by maintaining a decorous silence, etc., precisely the opposite will occur. They will take advantage of you and of the respect you accord them to elevate themselves, and of your faint show of resistance to crush you. What you concede [674] to them they simply use to their own advantage, and to your detriment; what you do not appropriate or lay claim to, or the merit that you disguise, they deny you and seize, in order to view you as inferior, etc. Thus, in the way I have said, savage customs—or customs of that first age, when, since society did not exist, each was friend to himself alone, and enemy to all other beings, whether like or unlike himself, insofar as they opposed his slightest interest or desire, or insofar as he could enjoy things at their expense—do indeed come back into the world, customs that in the social state are barbarous, because destructive of society, and directly contrary to its essence, reason, and purpose. Hence it may be seen just how true it is that the present state of the world is really and truly barbarism, or as close to barbarism as anything ever was. Every so-called society that is dominated by individual egoism is barbarous, and barbarous with the utmost barbarism. (17 Feb. 1821.)

Leopardi - Zibaldone

Friday, March 13, 2020

Even if reason tells us otherwise, the heart...

"It is quite true, we judge men’s character by the way they behave toward us, because they either thought they needed or actually did need to behave in a particular way, whether arbitrarily or by force of circumstance, or indeed intentionally. And if [195] the wickedest person in the world has not done us any harm and for whatever reason has had occasion to help us, even just to treat us well, to be affable, polite, respectful, etc., this will be enough to ensure that we do not think badly of him and even take him for an honest man. Even if reason tells us otherwise, the heart and the imagination will always cling to this conviction. This ought to be the general rule whenever we hear people speaking well or badly of someone. If the person speaking is doing so on behalf of someone else or if he is in bad faith, his motives may be different. But with these two exceptions, normally in your dealings with people you should assume that if someone is telling you about someone else, he has been either well or badly treated by that person, and not expect to learn any more than that from what he is saying. (31 July 1820.)" 

(from "Zibaldone" by Giacomo Leopardi)

An excellent remedy for the monotony of existence


It was a masterstroke for nature to interrupt life, as it were, with sleep. This interruption is almost a renewal, and waking up is like being reborn. In fact, the day also has its own youth, etc., see p. 151. As well as the great variety they provide, these continuous interruptions make a single life feel like so many different ones. And separating one day from another is an excellent remedy for the monotony of existence."
*

The origin of a profound sense of unhappiness, or the development of what is called sensibility, usually comes from the lack or the loss of great and vivid illusions. And, in fact, it was in Latium that Virgil first gave expression to this sentiment, at the precise moment that all great and vivid illusions were fading for ordinary Romans, who had lived by them for so long, and life and public affairs had become ordered and monotonous. The sensibility you see in young people still unfamiliar with the world and its ills, although tinged with melancholy, is different from this experience, and promises and gives to those who possess it not pain but pleasure and happiness. (6 Sept. 1820.)"
*

"It is a property of works of genius that, even when they represent vividly the nothingness of things, even when they clearly show and make you feel the inevitable unhappiness of life, even when they express the most terrible despair, nevertheless to a great soul that finds itself in a state of extreme dejection, disenchantment, nothingness, boredom, and discouragement about life, or in the most bitter and deathly misfortune (whether on account of lofty, powerful passions or something else), such works always bring consolation, [260] and rekindle enthusiasm, and, though they treat and represent nothing but death, they restore, albeit momentarily, the life that it had lost. And so, while that which is seen in the reality of things grieves and kills the soul, when seen in imitation or any other form in works of genius (e.g., in lyric poetry, which is not, properly speaking, imitation), it opens and revives the heart. In fact, just as the author who described and felt so powerfully the vanity of illusions, but still preserved a great fund of them and gave ample proof of this by conveying their vanity so accurately (see pp. 214–15), in the same way, the reader, however disillusioned both about himself and about what he reads, is yet drawn by the author into the same deception and illusion that he experienced and that are hidden in the most intimate recesses of his spirit. And the recognition of the irredeemable vanity and falsity of all beauty and all greatness is itself a kind of beauty and greatness that fills the soul when it is conveyed by a work of genius."

(from "Zibaldone" by Giacomo Leopardi)

To go on living and hoping, utterly contrary to reason

So it is mistaken to say, as some people do (the authors of La morale universelle, vol. 3),1 that suicide can happen only as a result of a kind of madness, since without it, it is impossible to lose hope entirely, etc. Actually, once religious beliefs are discounted, it is a happy and natural, though real and constant, state of madness to go on living and hoping, one utterly contrary to reason, which shows us all too clearly that there is no hope for us. (23 July 1820.)"

 (from "Zibaldone" by Giacomo Leopardi, )

A work of genius: it makes us sensitive to the nothingness of things

"And the spectacle of nothingness is itself a thing in these works, and seems to enlarge the reader’s soul, to raise it up and to make it take satisfaction in itself and its despair. (A great thing, and sure mother of pleasure and enthusiasm, and magisterial effect of poetry when it succeeds in enhancing the reader’s concept of himself, and of his misfortunes, and of his own dejection and annihilation of spirit.)1 In addition, [261] the feeling of nothingness is the feeling of something dead and deathly. But when this feeling is vivid, as in the case I am describing, its vividness prevails in the reader’s mind over the nothingness of the thing that it makes him feel, and the soul receives life (if only fleetingly) from the very force with which it feels the perpetual death of things, and its own death. For no small effect of knowing the great nothing, and no less painful, is the indifference and insensibility that it very commonly inspires, and must naturally inspire, toward nothingness itself. This indifference and insensibility is removed by the reading or contemplation of a work of genius: it makes us sensitive to the nothingness of things, and this is the main cause of the phenomenon I have discussed. I will note that it is much more difficult to experience this phenomenon in the dark and gloomy poems of the north, especially the modern sort like Lord Byron’s, than in southern poems, which retain a measure of light in their most somber, painful, and desperate themes. Reading Petrarch, e.g., his Triumphs, or the meeting of Achilles and Priam, and I will also add Werther, produces this effect much more than The Giaour or The Corsair,1 etc., despite the fact that they treat and demonstrate the same human unhappiness, and the vanity of everything. (4 Oct. 1820.) I know that when I read Werther, I was heated in my despair. Reading Byron, I was left completely cold and devoid of enthusiasm, let alone consolation. [262] And Lord Byron certainly didn’t make me any more sensitive to my desperation: if anything, he probably made me more insensitive and stone-cold than before."

(from "Zibaldone" by Giacomo Leopardi, )

Every so-called society that is dominated by individual egoism is barbarous

“Pride separates us from society: our self-love gives us a rank apart, and one that is always contested: a self-esteem that makes itself too much felt is almost always punished by universal contempt”]. Mme. de Lambert, Avis d’une mère à sa fille, in her Oeuvres complètes quoted above (p. 633), p. 99, end. So it is naturally in society, that is the nature of this human institution, which, being designed to further the common good and pleasure, does not truly exist if the individual does not to a greater or a lesser degree combine his esteem, his interests, his goals, thoughts, opinions, sentiments and emotions, inclinations, and actions with those of others, and if all the above is designed simply to further himself. The more of a himself there is in the individual, the less society truly exists. Thus, if egoism is complete, society exists only in name. Because when each individual has only himself as a goal, and pays no heed at all to the common good, and when no thought or action of his is designed to further the good or pleasure of others, each individual by himself forms a society apart, complete and utterly distinct, since his goal is wholly distinct; and thus the world reverts to what it was at the beginning, and before the origin of society, which is left dissolved in fact and in substance, and in its reason and essence. Consequently, egoism has always been the scourge of society, and the greater it is, the worse [671] the condition of society has been; and hence so much the worse in essence those institutions which particularly further egoism either directly or indirectly, as despotism does above all. (Under that regime France became the homeland of the most pestilential egoism, greatly mitigated by the revolution, notwithstanding the immense harm it caused, as all the philosophers have noted.) Egoism, that is to say, self-love, is inseparable from man, but by egoism is meant more particularly an ill-directed, ill-employed self-love, designed to further one’s own real advantages and not those which derive from heroism, from sacrifices, from virtues, from honor, from friendship, etc. When, therefore, this egoism reaches its peak, in intensity and in universality; and when, on account of both its intensity and, more especially, its universality, the mask has been lifted (which no longer serves to conceal it, because it is too vigorous, and because all are inspired by the same sentiment), the nature of social dealings (whether in relation to conversation [672] or generally in relation to life) changes almost entirely. Because, with each thinking only of himself (as much because that is his actual inclination as because no one any longer has a thought for the other, and the good of each is entrusted to himself alone), all respect is set aside, and one seizes the prey from the mouth and talons of another; the individuals in what is termed society are in a state of more or less open war with one another, and with all at once; the strongest in every respect wins; and surrendering anything whatsoever, whether through politeness or through virtue, honor, etc., is pointless, harmful, and crazy, because others will not thank you or give you anything in return, and your surrendering to them, and putting up less resistance to them, simply works to their advantage, and hence to your detriment. And so, to take an example from the passage by Mme. de Lambert quoted above, we see, in fact, that today contempt for others, and open and ostentatious self-esteem, is not only no longer as harmful as [673] it once was but is very often necessary, and someone who does not know how to make use of it wins nothing in the world as it is at present. Because others are not disposed to grant you anything spontaneously, on the strength of truth and merit, not even, by the same token, esteem, therefore you must win it as if by force, in open war, and in a spirit of hostility, showing that you are altogether persuaded of your own merit, in spite of anyone else, despising and trampling others underfoot, deriding them, profiting from their slightest shortcomings, casting these back in their faces, forgiving them nothing, striving, in short, to humble them and to render them inferior to you, either in conversation or otherwise, and by the most effective means available. So that today if you wish to earn the esteem of others by showing respect, by treating them courteously, by flattering their self-love, by disregarding their faults, etc., and, as far as you’re concerned, by behaving modestly and by maintaining a decorous silence, etc., precisely the opposite will occur. They will take advantage of you and of the respect you accord them to elevate themselves, and of your faint show of resistance to crush you. What you concede [674] to them they simply use to their own advantage, and to your detriment; what you do not appropriate or lay claim to, or the merit that you disguise, they deny you and seize, in order to view you as inferior, etc. Thus, in the way I have said, savage customs—or customs of that first age, when, since society did not exist, each was friend to himself alone, and enemy to all other beings, whether like or unlike himself, insofar as they opposed his slightest interest or desire, or insofar as he could enjoy things at their expense—do indeed come back into the world, customs that in the social state are barbarous, because destructive of society, and directly contrary to its essence, reason, and purpose. Hence it may be seen just how true it is that the present state of the world is really and truly barbarism, or as close to barbarism as anything ever was. Every so-called society that is dominated by individual egoism is barbarous, and barbarous with the utmost barbarism. (17 Feb. 1821.)"


(from "Zibaldone" by Giacomo Leopardi)

Wednesday, March 4, 2020

Leopardi - Theory of Pleasure

[165] The sense of the nothingness of all things, the inadequacy of each and every pleasure to fill our spirit, and our tendency toward an infinite that we do not understand comes perhaps from a very simple cause, one that is more material than spiritual.1 The human soul (and likewise all living beings) always essentially desires, and focuses solely (though in many different forms), on pleasure, or happiness, which, if you think about it carefully, is the same thing. This desire and this tendency has no limits, because it is inborn or born along with existence itself, and so cannot reach its end in this or that pleasure, which cannot be infinite but will end only when life ends. And it has no limits (1) either in duration (2) or in extent. Hence there can be no pleasure to equal (1) either its duration, because no pleasure is eternal, (2) or its extent, because no pleasure is beyond measure, but the nature of things requires that everything exist within limits and that everything have boundaries, and be circumscribed. The desire for pleasure has no limits of duration, because, as I have said, it ends only with existence, and so human beings would not exist if they did not feel this desire. It has no limits of extent because it belongs to the substance of ourselves, not as the desire for one or more pleasures but as the desire for pleasure. Now, such a nature carries infinity materially within it, for every single pleasure is circumscribed, but not pleasure itself, whose extent is indeterminate, and the soul, which loves pleasure substantially, embraces the whole imaginable extent of this feeling, without being able even to conceive of its extent, because it is not possible to form a clear idea of something desired without limit. Let us proceed to the consequences. If you desire a horse, you have the impression that you desire it as a horse, and as such and such a pleasure, but in fact you desire it as an unlimited and abstract pleasure. When you take possession of the horse, [166] you encounter a pleasure that is necessarily circumscribed, and you feel an emptiness in your soul, because the desire that you actually had is not satisfied. Even if it were possible for it to be satisfied in extent, it could not be so in duration, because the nature of things requires again that nothing be eternal. And assuming that the material cause that once gave you such and such a pleasure were to remain with you forever (for example, you desired wealth, you obtained it, and forever), it would remain materially, but no longer as the cause of such a pleasure, because another property of things is that everything wears out, all impressions vanish little by little, and as habit takes away pain, so it extinguishes pleasure. Add that even if a pleasure that you felt once lasted your whole life long, your spirit would still not be satisfied, because its desire is also infinite in extent, so that, even if that particular pleasure equaled the duration of this desire, yet, because it would be unable to equal its extent, the desire would always remain, either for ever new pleasures, as happens in fact, or for one pleasure that might fill your entire soul. Therefore, you may readily conceive that pleasure is always utterly vain, something which surprises us very much, as if this came from some particular nature of its own, while pain, boredom, etc., do not possess this quality. The fact is that when the soul desires a pleasurable thing, when it desires the satisfaction of an infinite desire, it really desires pleasure, and not a particular pleasure; now, when it finds, in fact, a particular pleasure, not an abstract one, embracing the full extent of pleasure, the result is that, since its desire is far from being satisfied, this pleasure is scarcely pleasure, because it is a matter not of a small but of a vast [167] inferiority to our desire, not to mention our hopes. And therefore all pleasures must be mingled with displeasure, as experience shows, because in the process of obtaining them the soul is desperately searching for something it cannot find, that is, an infinity of pleasure, or the satisfaction of an unlimited desire.

Let us move on to man’s inclination toward the infinite. Independent of the desire for pleasure, there exists in man an imaginative faculty that can conceive of things that do not exist, and in a way in which real things do not exist. Considering man’s innate tendency toward pleasure, it is natural that the imaginative faculty makes the imagining of pleasure one of its principal occupations. And given the said property of this imaginative power, it can fashion pleasures that do not exist, and it can fashion them infinite (1) in number, (2) in duration, (3) and in extent. The infinite pleasure that cannot be found in reality can thus be found in the imagination, from which derive hope, illusions, etc. For this reason, it is no surprise (1) that hope is always greater than the outcome, (2) that human happiness cannot consist in anything other than imagination and illusion. Therefore, we must consider the great mercy and great teaching of nature, which, while it could not, on the one hand, deprive man and all other living beings of the love of pleasure—which is an immediate consequence of, and almost the same thing as, self-love and the self-preservation necessary to the continued existence of things—and, on the other, could not provide them with real infinite pleasures, chose to make up for them (1) with illusions, in which she was most generous to them, and which we need to consider as something arbitrary in nature, which could perfectly well have done without them, (2) with immense variety, [168] so that when man was tired or disappointed by one pleasure he could turn to another, or even if he was disillusioned with all pleasures he could be distracted and confused by the great variety of things, and also he could not so easily tire of a particular pleasure, because he did not have so much time to linger on it and let it wear itself out, and there again not have too much space to reflect on the inability of all the pleasures to satisfy him. Therefore, you may deduce the usual consequences of the superiority of the ancients over the moderns on the question of happiness. (1) Imagination, as I have said, is the principal source of human happiness. The more imagination rules in man, the happier he will be. We can see it in children. But it cannot rule without ignorance, at least a certain ignorance, like that of the ancients. Knowledge of the true, that is, of the limits and definitions of things, circumscribes the imagination.1 And observe that since the imaginative faculty is often stronger in educated people than among the ignorant, it is so more potentially than in actuality, and therefore, because it is much more active among the ignorant, it makes them happier than those on whom nature would seem to have bestowed a richer source of pleasures. And note, second, that nature did not wish humans to regard imagination as such, that is, it wished them not to think of it as a deceptive faculty but rather to confound it with the cognitive faculty, and therefore to think of the dreams of the imagination as real things and so be stimulated by the imaginary as much as by the true (indeed more, since the imaginary has more natural powers, and nature is always superior to reason).2 But now educated people, even when their illusions are plentiful, regard them as such, and follow them more out of will than out of persuasion, in contrast to the ancients, [169] the ignorant, children, and the order of nature. (2) Since all pleasures, like all suffering, etc., are as great as we think they are, it follows that, the vaster and richer our illusions, the vaster and richer will be our pleasures, and although even the ancients did not experience particular pleasures as infinite, they did experience them as very great indeed, and capable of giving them at least contentment if not fulfillment. Nature did not wish us to know, and primitive man does not know, that no pleasure can satisfy us. Therefore, both by experiencing each pleasure as much greater than we do, and imparting to it through the imagination an almost unlimited extent, and by passing from one desire to another, with the hope of greater pleasures and full satisfaction, the ancients achieved the purpose that nature had set, which is to live, if not entirely satisfied by that particular life, at least content with life in general. In addition, the variety I mentioned provided endless distraction and enabled them to switch rapidly from one thing to another without the time to know anything completely or for pleasure to be worn down by habit. (3) Hope is as infinite as the desire for pleasure, and has, in addition, the power, if not to satisfy us, at least to replenish us with consolation and keep us in the fullness of life. The hope peculiar to human beings, that of the ancients, children, the ignorant, scarcely exists for the wise of today. See the thought beginning “Diogenes Laertius describes” on p. 162.

Moreover, since the desire for pleasure is materially infinite in extent (not only in man but in every living being), man’s pain in experiencing a pleasure is to see immediately the limits of its extent, which someone who is not very deep will see only vaguely. Therefore, it is obvious: (1) Why everything [170] good seems beautiful and special from a distance, and the unknown seems more beautiful than the known, this being an effect of the imagination determined by our natural inclination toward pleasure, an effect of the illusions willed by nature. (2) Why the soul, in poetry and everywhere, prefers airy beauty and infinite ideas. Given the previous argument, the soul must naturally prefer above all others that pleasure which it cannot embrace. The ancients have this airy beauty, these ideas, in abundance, as do their poets, especially Homer, the earliest of all, children have them in abundance, and are truly Homeric in this respect (see the thought “As to the imagination” on p. 57 and the other on p. 100), as are the ignorant, etc., in short, nature. Learning and knowledge play havoc with such ideas, and it is very difficult for us to experience them. Melancholy, modern sentimentalism, etc., are so sweet precisely because they immerse the soul in an abyss of indeterminate thoughts that seem bottomless and vast. And this is also the reason that in love, etc., as I said on p. 142. Because at such times the heart loses itself in some vague, undefined space. The type of such beauty and such ideas does not exist in reality but only in the imagination, and only illusions can represent them to us, nor does reason have any power to do so. But our nature created them in great abundance and meant them to be part of our lives. (3) Why our soul hates everything that restricts its sensations. The soul searching everywhere for pleasure and not finding it cannot be satisfied. Where it does find it, it loathes any limitation, for the reasons given above. So seeing the beauty of nature, it likes to let its eye wander as far as possible. Which Montesquieu (Essai sur le goût, “De la curiosité,” pp. 374–75)1 attributes to curiosity. Wrongly. Curiosity is nothing but a determination [171] of the soul to desire that pleasure, as I will explain. So it could be the immediate cause of this effect (which is to say that if the soul did not find pleasure in a view of the countryside, etc., it would not desire the extension of this view), but it is not the main one, and this effect is special or peculiar not only to matters of curiosity but to everything that is pleasurable, so it could be said that curiosity is an immediate cause of the pleasure experienced in looking at the countryside, but not of the desire for that pleasure to be unlimited. Except insofar as each desire for each pleasure may be unlimited and permanent in the soul, like the general desire for pleasure. Besides, sometimes the soul might desire, and actually does desire, a view that is restricted or confined in some way, as in Romantic situations. The reason is the same, a desire for the infinite, because then, instead of sight, the imagination is at work and the fantastic takes over from the real. The soul imagines what it cannot see, whatever is hidden by that tree, that hedge, that tower, and wanders in an imaginary space and pictures things in a way that would be impossible if its view could extend in all directions, because the real would exclude the imaginary. Hence the pleasure I always experienced as a child, and still do, in looking at the sky, etc., through a window or doorway or casa passatoia as they call it.1 Conversely, the vastness and the multiplicity of sensations delight the soul enormously. People deduce from this that the soul is born for the large scale, etc. This is not the reason. It is rather that a multiplicity of sensations overwhelms the soul [172] and prevents it from recognizing where one ends and another begins, allowing it to roam freely from one pleasure to another without dwelling on any of them, and this in a way makes the pleasure seem infinite. Similarly, vastness, even without multiplicity, occupies more space in the soul, and is almost inexhaustible. Wonder, too, leaves the soul astonished, occupies it entirely, and makes it incapable in that moment of desire. Besides, novelty (intrinsic to wonder) is always precious to the soul, whose greatest ill is weariness with particular pleasures.

From this theory of pleasure, you may deduce that the greatness of things that are not pleasing in themselves can be a pleasure simply as greatness. Do not attribute this to some imaginary greatness of our nature. According to this theory, we learn (as is indeed the case) that the desire for pleasure becomes a torment, a kind of habitual anguish of the soul. So it follows that (1) a drowsiness of the soul is pleasurable.1 The Turks procure it with opium, and the soul gratefully accepts this temporary relief for its troubles, because it is like an escape from the torments of desire that can never fully be satisfied, an interval like sleep, when the soul, even if it does not entirely cease from thinking, is not aware of doing so. (2) The happiest life is one of constant occupation, even when its occupations and sensations are neither exciting nor varied.2 A busy mind is distracted from that innate desire which would not leave it in peace, or directs it toward the little aims that fill the day (finishing a piece of work, providing for everyday needs, etc. etc. etc.), for these come to seem like pleasures (pleasure being anything that the soul desires), and, having achieved one aim, it moves on to the next, so that it is distracted from major desires and has no time to trouble itself about the futility and emptiness of things; and the hope invested in those [173] modest aims, and the modest plans for future work or hopes for some generally successful outcome in the distant future, provide enough satisfaction,1 and amusement in leisure time, which never lasts long enough to become boring; besides, rest after hard work is a pleasure in itself. This is what human life was meant to be, and it was so for primitive peoples, and is still true for tribal and peasant communities, etc., and it is mainly for this reason, and no other, that animals live happily. Notice how even today, for those living in society, a life of hard work and domesticity seems a vision of happiness, also because of the absence of suffering or real cares and afflictions. (3) The extraordinary, the marvelous, is pleasurable, even if its essential qualities do not usually belong to any class of pleasurable things. The soul always feels pleasure when it is full (as long as it is not filled with pain), and any total, vivid distraction is an absolute pleasure where the soul is concerned, just as rest from toil is a pleasure, because such distraction is a release from desire. And, just as the stupor produced by opium is pleasant (because real cares can be forgotten), so is that produced by wonder, novelty, or singularity. Even when our astonishment is not sufficient to overwhelm us completely, it can still have a powerful effect and this in itself is pleasant. Notice that nature had intended that wonder (1) should be something very normal for mankind, (2) should very often be absolute, so that it fills the entire soul. It happens this way in children, and used to happen in primitive man and now among the ignorant, but it cannot occur without ignorance, and ignorance today can never be the same as it is for people who do not live in society, because living in society [174] means being taught by the experience of the past and the present, to a greater or lesser degree, but experience always teaches us something, and novelty becomes increasingly rare. (4)1 Even images of suffering and other terrible things, etc., can be pleasurable in plays, poetry of every kind, and performances, etc. As long as we ourselves are not afraid or suffering, the power of distraction is always pleasurable. These images do not need to be of anything extraordinary: in that case they would come under the previous category. But the image of suffering, etc., alone is enough to occupy the mind and provide distraction. (5) Magnitude, of any kind whatsoever (except of our own suffering), is pleasurable.

Naturally, large things attract more attention than small ones, unless the small is extraordinary, in which case it takes up more of our attention than the ordinarily large. The point I am making is that the effect of size is a material one deriving materially from our inclination toward pleasure, not from our inclination toward greatness of size. The same could perhaps be said about the sublime, being something different from the beautiful, which we find pleasurable in itself. In short, boredom is nothing but a lack of the pleasure that is fundamental to our existence and of anything that could distract us from desiring it. If it were not for this overpowering drive for pleasure in whatever form, boredom, that most familiar, recurrent, and dreaded affliction, would not exist. And, in fact, what reason should a man have to feel so bad when there is nothing wrong with him? Take, for example, a man in isolation with nothing to occupy him physically or mentally, with no worries, problems, or actual pain, or bored by [175] the uniformity of something neither onerous nor unpleasant in itself, and tell me why this man should suffer. And yet we can see that he does suffer, that he is desperate and would prefer any kind of anguish to this state. (Indeed, the reply in the affirmative given by the doctors consulted by the Duke of Brancas when asked if boredom could be fatal is famous. Lady Morgan, France, bk. 8, notes.)1 It is simply because in such times the inborn desire that accompanies us throughout life is unsatisfied, undeceived, neither assuaged nor put to rest. Nature has done everything possible to prevent this malady, man’s horror and repugnance toward which could be compared to the fear of the vacuum in nature posited by ancient physicists to explain certain natural phenomena. Nature has provided for it by giving man certain basic needs, the satisfaction of which (hunger, thirst, cold, heat, etc.) brings pleasure as well as keeping him occupied; by its sheer variety, by the imagination, which can occupy itself with almost nothing, and also by fear (in regard to which, although it, too, is a natural, spontaneous effect of self-love, we must nevertheless take account of the whole system of nature and the astonishing balance and relationship between the different effects by which it achieves this purpose or that), by dangers that make us love life more and banish boredom, by natural disturbances of the elements, by suffering and by actual ills, because it is sweeter to recover from ills than to live without them, and by many other natural disasters regarded as evils, almost failings of nature, and explained away as extraordinary accidents, which may be true of each individual case, but not of all of them together; they, too, are part of the great system of the universe.2 In short, the natural order with respect to man is always aimed at warding off the terrible evil of boredom, which according to all the philosophers is very common in modern man but almost unknown in primitive peoples (and also in animals). And notice how children, even in a state of almost perfect inaction, never or very rarely feel [176] the true torment of boredom, because even the slightest thing is sufficient to occupy them completely, and the force of their imagination gives body and life and action to every fantasy that presents itself to their minds, etc., and in short, they find within themselves an inexhaustible, constantly changing source of amusements. And this without any knowledge, any experience, without having traveled, without having seen heard, etc., in a very confined and uniform little world. And while it might appear that the more this world and this field of interests expand and diversify, the greater and more varied should be the supply of inner activity, such as children have, and boredom all the rarer, nevertheless we see that quite the opposite happens. Let this be a lesson to those who will not admit that nature is almost uniquely the source of our happiness, and its corruption a certain cause of unhappiness. In addition, the fact that the force and fertility of the imagination (1) just as they very easily stimulate action, so very often they encourage inaction, (2) are quite different from the power of the mind, which on the contrary leads to unhappiness, is apparent from the example of southern peoples, particularly in Italy, compared with northern. This is because (1) just as the Italians were once very active on account of an enthusiasm born of a lively and vivid, rather than profound, imagination, so now one of the reasons that they do not notice or at least do not despair of a life that is unchanging and perfectly inactive is that this same imagination is still as rich and varied, and provides a great abundance of ideas, and so, almost without realizing it, they can immerse themselves in a kind of rêve [dream], as children do when they are alone, etc., something repeatedly stressed by Staël, while northerners, lacking these internal sources of consolation, are obliged to seek them outside and thus become extremely active; (2) intellectual depth, [177] and the ability to penetrate the innermost recesses of the truth, the abstract, etc., while not unknown among the Italians because of their subtlety, quickness, and insight (which makes it easier for them to conceptualize and grasp the truth, whereas others struggle and can often make mistakes despite their profundity), is nevertheless not their strength, and on the contrary constitutes the entire activity and therefore unhappiness of educated northerners (note, as a consequence, the high suicide rate in England),1 because there is nothing to distract them from this search for the truth. And however much it might appear that imagination in northern people is just as vivid, original, etc., nevertheless this is philosophy and learning rather than imagination, and their poetry is more metaphysics than poetry, owing more to thought than to illusions. And the sentimental in them is more desperation than consolation. Precisely for this reason, ancient poetry has never appealed to them; precisely for this reason, they have entirely different tastes and particularly like allegorical entities, abstractions, etc. (see p. 154); precisely for this reason, it will always be true that our country really is the homeland of poetry, and theirs of reason (see pp. 143–44).

Once nature had given mankind an unlimited inclination toward pleasure, it was free to arrange that this or that thing would be considered pleasure. So the reasons that something is pleasurable are quite independent of the theory expounded above, depending only on the whim of nature to determine what a pleasure should consist of, and consequently what should be the properties of the objects of this inclination in man. Leaving aside the pleasures I listed earlier (pp. 172ff.), which are pleasures not because it suited nature to make them such independently of man’s inclination toward pleasure but only or mainly because man’s desire [178] for pleasure is limitless. Since, as I have said, by pleasure I understand, and so it should be understood, everything that man desires, as for the rest, virtue, corporal pleasures, the pleasures of curiosity (see, if you will, Montesquieu as cited on p. 170 above), etc. etc., are pleasures because nature has willed it, and they might not have been, despite all man’s inclination toward pleasure, just as the abstract idea of propriety is not a reason that this thing or that seems proper or beautiful. Some pleasures are common, others are peculiar to this nation or that, others to this or that class of people, like the pleasures associated with greed, ambition, etc., some are individual depending on a person’s habits, opinions, physical constitution, the climate, etc., just as the idea of beauty is relative, depending on customs, habits, opinions, etc. (see Montesquieu, loc. cit., “De la sensibilité,” p. 392). Nature has given man many different qualities, some of which develop as a matter of necessity, while others may develop or remain latent depending on circumstances. Of this second group, nature wished or did not inhibit the development of some qualities, but there are others it did not wish, which, if allowed to develop, make man unhappy. And the reason it placed them in man without wishing them to be developed must lie in the depths of nature’s system, and could probably be discovered if we were not now concerned with more general matters. According to these different qualities, man finds different things pleasurable, and civilized man enjoys different pleasures than does primitive man, and will experience pleasures that primitive man never knew and will not experience many of those which primitive man used to enjoy. And therefore, the fact that something is pleasurable to us now, the pleasure of which depends on our excessive sophistication, does not mean that this is something willed by nature. And although now, [179] for example, an excessive fascination with the truth gives us great pleasure when we succeed in discovering it, we should not assume that nature intended us to be so curious, or that this pleasure is natural, or that primitive man shared this desire and was incapable of controlling it, nor should we conclude, therefore, that man’s unhappiness was necessary or that it comes from his absolute nature, when it is a product of our own relative and corrupt nature. For many of the circumstances that have produced this or that quality in us were not intended by nature, and derive from man, not nature. Furthermore, given this theory of particular pleasures, it might also be the case that the idea of infinity, wonder, or any of the things I included as being pleasurable simply because of our inclination toward pleasure might be pleasurable independently of this, the reason being the will of nature, as in the case of other pleasures. However, it does seem to me that I have given an adequate explanation of the reason for their being pleasurable, and that these considerations cover all aspects of the ideas in question.

Man’s inclination toward pleasure is infinite in a material sense, and does not allow us to conclude anything more about the grandeur or infinity of the human soul than about that of animals, who must naturally feel the same desire, of a similar intensity, this being an immediate and necessary consequence of self-love, as I shall explain below. So we can deduce nothing on this account from man’s inclination toward the infinite or from the sense of the nothingness of things (which is not a natural sentiment in human beings, and which, therefore, is not found in animals or in primitive [180] societies but arises from accidental circumstances, not willed by nature). And since the desire for pleasure is a consequence of our existence itself, infinite solely in this sense and therefore, just like thinking, our inseparable companion throughout life, it is no more a proof of the spirituality of the human soul than the ability to think. Rather, it is noticeable how this desire, which seems at first glance to be the most spiritual part of our soul (see pp. 106–107), is an immediate and necessary consequence (in our present circumstances) of the most material thing there is in living beings, namely self-love and self-preservation, something that we share with animals and that, as far as we are aware, is common to all living creatures. Certainly there is no life without love of self and love of life. As for our imagination’s ability to conceive of a certain infinity, a pleasure the soul cannot embrace, which is precisely what makes it pleasurable—I mean an ability that is independent of our inclination toward pleasure, and was nature’s decision to give us or not give us—let everyone decide for himself what it might show in favor of our greatness. Personally, I believe (1) that nature has given it to us solely for our temporal happiness, which could not survive without such illusions.

Leopardi
Zibaldone

Friday, February 28, 2020

The cardinal problems of biography: to what extent can or should one tell the truth

When I began to write again, I thought that I had better start by trying my hand at biography. I knew that I had neither the creative imagination nor the sharp ear for dialogue which produces good novels; I had long ago given up the hope of becoming a poet. I lacked the historian’s training which I might have obtained if—as I had wished at eighteen—my mother had allowed me to go to Oxford, instead of ‘coming out’. But for many years I had preferred memoirs and letters to any other form of reading, and I hoped that I might perhaps have a certain aptitude for observing and assembling the different parts of a character and a life until they came together into a pattern, giving a man what Virginia Woolf called ‘a kind of shape after his death’.

My first subject I found made to my hand: a life of Leopardi, about whom at that time no study existed in English, except an interesting essay by James Thomson and the scholarly Introduction to the translation of his works by G. L. Bickersteth. Leopardi— apart from being one of the greatest Italian poets—was an almost ideal subject for a biography in the thirties, especially for a generation whose taste had been formed by Strachey and Maurois, by Harold Nicolson and Virginia Woolf. He was young, deformed, lonely, ambitious and embittered; he lived in an old-fashioned, pious family of the noblesse de province in a little town of the Marches, and violently rebelled both against the rule of his parents and the restrictions of his environment; he was extremely articulate, setting down his loneliness, his grief, his contempt for his fellow citizens, his longings for friendship and love and his literary aspirations, in what eventually turned into five volumes of letters, as well as in the seven volumes of his daybook, Lo Zibaldone. ‘In depicting his despair and total disenchantment’—the phrase is his own—‘he drew the colours from his own heart.’

Moreover he belonged to a closed society into which English travellers have seldom penetrated (his contemporary, Byron, was perhaps the first to do so, but that was through his mistress) and about which they have consequently felt very curious. ‘You must have wondered’, wrote Basil de Selincourt in one of the first reviews of my book, ‘what went on in the huge rooms of the seemingly unoccupied palazzi . . . Here is a book that will put the key of the mystery into your hands.’

It is to these circumstances that I attribute the considerable success—perhaps greater than it deserved—of my first book. Its chief merit, it now seems to me, was the fullness with which I quoted from my subject’s letters and notebooks. For while I read those letters myself—sometimes long-winded and self-pitying, but often unendurably poignant—a man had indeed taken shape for me, whom I came to know better than most of my friends and to whom I wished to offer the only tribute that a biographer can pay to his subject—to tell (in so far as is possible) the truth about him.

This has always been one of the cardinal problems of biography: to what extent can or should one tell the truth—and what, indeed, is the truth about any of us? The second question is the more difficult one to answer. ‘The world will never know my life’, said Carlyle (and the words stand on the first page of his Life by his closest friend, Froude) ‘even if it should write and read a hundred biographies of me. The main facts of it are known, and are likely to be known, to myself alone, of all created men.’ Not only are there facts that we do not tell, but some that we ourselves do not know; at best, some small facet of the truth occasionally catches the light, and it is that which the biographer must try to seize. ‘For there is’, as Virginia Woolf remarked, ‘a virtue in truth; it has an almost mystic power. Like radium, it seems to give off forever and ever grains of energy, atoms of light.’1

1.Granite and Rainbow, p. 149: ‘The New Biography’.

Iris Origo
Images and Shadows

On Orwell:

Some years earlier he had made an unfortunate and unwelcome pass at another woman. This episode is documented by the editor with embarrassing precision—at which point readers might remember Orwell’s hostility to the very concept of biography (“every life viewed from the inside would be a series of defeats too humiliating and disgraceful to contemplate”). Do biographers, however serious and scrupulous, really need or have the right to explore and disclose such intimate details? Yet we still read them. Is it right for us to do so? These questions are not rhetorical: I honestly do not know the answer.

Simon Leys

Thursday, February 27, 2020

il vizio leopardiano

Nevertheless, eighteen years after the publication of this book, I was dissatisfied with it. Some of its comments—especially on the Leopardi family and the Recanati background—seemed to me both glib and insufficiently informed; and the passages about his writings both thin and second-hand. So I decided to write the book all over again. One excuse, which I proffered in the introduction to this new version (which I called Leopardi, A Study in Solitude and which was published in 19536) was that, in the interval, two more volumes of the poet’s correspondence had been published, as well as some important Italian critical works and biographies. But the real reason was a different one: that, like a friend whose life one has shared for many years, I felt I had got to know him (and I might have added, his country) a little better.

In the particular case of Leopardi, moreover, I have not been the only biographer who has felt the need to retrace his footsteps. I remember telling the distinguished Leopardian scholar and critic, Giuseppe de Robertis, who was then engaged on the back-breaking task of compiling a subject-index of the Zibaldone, that after eighteen years, I was just beginning a second life of the poet. He began to laugh. “I see that you have caught it, too,” he said, “il vizio leopardiano. This won’t be your last book on the subject,” he foretold—and indeed he was right, since only two years ago, in collaboration with John Heath-Stubbs, I produced a volume of Leopardi’s Selected Prose and Poetry (John Heath-Stubbs translating the poetry and I the prose, with biographical notes). Here the main change in the prose section of the book, since its purpose was to serve as an introduction to Leopardi’s work in English and American universities, has been that I have only used my own words when they were indispensable, to state a fact, sketch in a background or frame a picture. The rest of the story is told by Leopardi himself.

For more and more, as I have gone on reading and writing about other people, it is the subject’s own voice that I want to hear. When a biographer can record what a man actually said, he awakens a degree of conviction denied to any other form of narrative. “I wonder why we hate the past so,” says Howell ruminatively to Mark Twain, and when the latter replies, “It’s so damned humiliating,” we know, without a doubt, that this is precisely what the great man did say. This is the kind of material, the small change of daily life, that I have always found irresistible, and that caused me to write, some time after Leopardi, two books about persons who (in their very different ways) would not otherwise have been my choice: Lord Byron, and the fourteenth-century merchant of Prato, Francesco Datini.

Iris Origo
Images and Shadows