Important Suttas on the topic:
Yamaka ; SN 22 : 94 & SN 22: 246
“What is the noble truth of suffering? Birth is suffering, ageing is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering; sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair are suffering; asso-ciation with the loathed is suffering, dissociation from the loved is suffering, not to get what one wants is suffering; in short, the five aggregates affected by clinging are suffering*.” SN 56:11
*The “five aggregates affected by clinging” (upādāna-kkhandha) are best regarded as five convenient “classes” or categories under which any arisen component of experience (in its widest sense) can be grouped for analysis and discussion; they have no existence of their own separate from the components that represent them. Their representatives do not occur separately. Also they are structurally interdependent, rather as a glass tumbler implies at once the feature of material (glass), affective (attractiveness, or the reverse or indifference), indi-vidual characteristics (shape, colour, etc.), determined utility (all these constituting the “name-and-form”), and consciousness of all this, which it is not.
Nanamoli Thera
“Lady, ‘person, person’ [sakkaya] is said. What is called person by the Blessed One?”
“Friend Visākha, these five aggregates affected by clinging are called person by the Blessed One; that is, the material form aggregate affected by clinging, the feeling aggregate affected by clinging, the perception aggregate affected by clinging, the determinations aggregate affected by clinging, and the consciousness aggregate affected by clinging. These five aggregates affected by clinging are called person by the Blessed One.” MN 44
Nanavira Thera:
Sakkāya is pañc'upādānakkhandhā (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>), and may conveniently be translated as 'somebody' or 'person' or, abstractly, 'personality'. See PARAMATTHA SACCA, also for what follows.
An arahat (while alive—that is, if we can speak of a 'living arahat') continues to be individual in the sense that 'he' is a sequence of states (Theragāthā v. 716)[13] distinguishable from other arahanto (and a fortiori from individuals other than arahanto). Every set of pañcakkhandhā[a]—not pañc'upādānakkhandhā in the arahat's case—is unique, and individuality in this sense ceases only with the final cessation of the pañcakkhandhā at the breaking up of the arahat's body. But a living arahat is no longer somebody or a person, since the notion or conceit '(I) am' has already ceased. Individuality must therefore be carefully distinguished from personality,[b] which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom objects are present), selfhood, the mirage 'I am', and so on. The puthujjana is not able to distinguish them—for him individuality is not conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood. The sotāpanna is able to distinguish them—he sees that personality or 'selfhood' is a deception dependent upon avijjā, a deception dependent upon not seeing the deception, which is not the case with individuality—, though he is not yet free from an aroma of subjectivity, asmimāna. The arahat not only distinguishes them but also has entirely got rid of all taint of subjectivity—'he' is individual but in no way personal. For lack of suitable expressions (which in any case would puzzle the puthujjana) 'he' is obliged to go on saying 'I' and 'me' and 'mine' (cf. Dīgha i,9 <D.i,202>; Devatā Samy. iii,5 <S.i,14>[14]). Individuality where the arahat is concerned still involves the perspective or orientation that things necessarily adopt when they exist, or are present, or are cognized; and for each individual the perspective is different. Loss of upādāna is not loss of point of view. See RŪPA and remarks on manasikāra in NĀMA. (from SAKKĀYA)
In the arahat's reflexion what appears reflexively is only pañcakkhandhā, which he calls 'myself' simply for want of any other term. But in the puthujjana's reflexion what appears reflexively is pañc'upādānakkhandhā, or sakkāya; and sakkāya (q.v.), when it appears reflexively, appears (in one way or another) as being and belonging to an extra-temporal changeless 'self' (i.e. a soul). The puthujjana confuses (as the arahat does not) the self-identity of simple reflexion—as with a mirror, where the same thing is seen from two points of view at once ('the thing itself', 'the selfsame thing')—with the 'self' as the subject that appears in reflexion—'my self' (i.e. 'I itself', i.e. 'the I that appears when I reflect'). For the puthujjana the word self is necessarily ambiguous, since he cannot conceive of any reflexion not involving reflexive experience of the subject—i.e. not involving manifestation of a soul. Since the self of self-identity is involved in the structure of the subject appearing in reflexion ('my self' = 'I itself'), it is sometimes taken (when recourse is not had to a supposed Transcendental Being) as the basic principle of all subjectivity. The subject is then conceived as a hypostasized play of reflexions of one kind or another, the hypostasis itself somehow deriving from (or being motivated by) the play of reflexions. The puthujjana, however, does not see that attainment of arahattā removes all trace of the desire or conceit '(I) am', leaving the entire reflexive structure intact—in other words, that subjectivity is a parasite on experience. Indeed, it is by his very failure to see this that he remains a puthujjana. (From ATTĀ)
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“But, venerable sir, in what are these five aggregates affected by clinging rooted?”
“These five aggregates affected by clinging are rooted in desire, bhikkhu.”
6. “Venerable sir, is that clinging the same as these five aggregates affected by clinging, or is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates affected by clinging?”
“Bhikkhu, that clinging is neither the same as these five aggregates affected by clinging, nor is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates affected by clinging. It is the desire and lust in regard to the five aggregates affected by clinging that is the clinging there.”
7. “But, venerable sir, can there be diversity in the desire and lust regarding these five aggregates affected by clinging?”
“There can be, bhikkhu,”the Blessed One said. “Here, bhikkhu, someone thinks thus: ‘May my material form be thus in the future; may my feeling be thus in the future; may my perception be thus in the future; may my determinations be thus in the future; may my consciousness be thus in the future.’ Thus there is diversity in the desire and lust regarding these five aggregates affected by clinging.”
8. “But, venerable sir, in what way does the term ‘aggregates’ apply to the aggregates?”
“Bhikkhu, any kind of material form whatever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—this is the material form aggregate. Any kind of feeling whatever…far or near—this is the feeling aggregate. Any kind of perception whatever…far or near—this is the perception aggregate. Any kind of determinations whatever… far or near—this is the determinations aggregate. Any kind of consciousness whatever…far or near—this is the consciousness aggregate. It is in this way, bhikkhu, that the term ‘aggregate’ applies to the aggregates.”
9. “What is the cause and condition, venerable sir, for the manifestation of the material form aggregate? What is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate… the perception aggregate…the determinations aggregate…the consciousness aggregate?”
10. “The four great elements, bhikkhu, are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the material form aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate. Contact is the cause and the condition for the manifestation of the perception aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the determinations aggregate. Name-and-matter is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate.”
10. “Venerable sir, how does personality view (sakkāyaditthi )come to be?”
“Here, bhikkhu, an untaught ordinary person, who has no regard for noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who has no regard for true men and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards material form as self, or self as possessed of material form, or material form as in self, or self as in material form. He regards feeling as self…perception as self…determinations as self…consciousness as self, or self as possessed of consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That is how personality view comes to be.”
11. “But, venerable sir, how does personality view not come to be?”
“Here, bhikkhu, a well-taught noble disciple, who has regard for noble ones and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, who has regard for true men and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard material form as self, or self as possessed of material form, or material form as in self, or self as in material form. He does not regard feeling as self…perception as self…determinations as self…consciousness as self, or self as possessed of consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That is how identity view does not come to be.”
12. “What, venerable sir, is the gratification, what is the danger, and what is the escape in the case of material form? What is the gratification, what is the danger, and what is the escape in the case of feeling…in the case of perception…in the case of determinations…in the case of consciousness?”
“The pleasure and joy, bhikkhu, that arise in dependence on material form—this is the gratification in the case of material form. Material form is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—this is the danger in the case of material form. The removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for material form—this is the escape in the case of material form.
“The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on feeling…in dependence on perception…in dependence on determinations…in dependence on consciousness—this is the gratification in the case of consciousness. Consciousness is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—this is the danger in the case of consciousness. The removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for consciousness—this is the escape in the case of consciousness.”
13. “Venerable sir, how does one know, how does one see, so that in regard to this body with its consciousness and all external signs, there is no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit?”
“Bhikkhu, any kind of material form whatever, whether past or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior [19] or superior, far or near—one sees all material form as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ Any kind of feeling whatever…Any kind of perception whatever…Any kind of determinations whatever…Any kind of consciousness whatever…one sees all consciousness as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ It is when one knows and sees thus that in regard to this body with its consciousness and all external signs there is no I-making, mine-making, or underlying tendency to conceit.”
14. Then, in the mind of a certain bhikkhu this thought arose: “So, it seems, material form is not self, feeling is not self, perception is not self, determinations are not self, consciousness is not self. What self, then, will actions done by the not-self affect?”
Then the Blessed One, knowing in his mind the thought in the mind of that bhikkhu, addressed the bhikkhus thus: “It is possible, bhikkhus, that some misguided man here, obtuse and ignorant, with his mind dominated by craving, might think that he can outstrip the Teacher’s Dispensation thus: ‘So, it seems, material form is not self…consciousness is not self. What self, then, will actions done by the not-self affect?’ Now, bhikkhus, you have been trained by me through interrogation on various occasions in regard to various things.
15. “Bhikkhus, what do you think? Is material form permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir.”
“Bhikkhus, what do you think: Is feeling…perception…determinations…consciousness permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, venerable sir.”—
“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”—“Suffering, venerable sir.”—“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”—“No, venerable sir.”
16. “Therefore, bhikkhus, any kind of material form whatever, whether past, future, or present…all material form should be seen as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ Any kind of feeling whatever… Any kind of perception whatever…Any kind of determinations whatever…Any kind of consciousness whatever…all consciousness should be seen as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’
17. “Seeing thus, a well-taught noble disciple becomes disenchanted with material form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with determinations, disenchanted with consciousness.
18. “Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It is liberated.’ He understands: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.’”
That is what the Blessed One said. The bhikkhus were satisfied and delighted in the Blessed One’s words. Now while this discourse was being spoken, through not clinging the minds of sixty bhikkhus were liberated from the taints.
Nanavira Thera:
Self' as subject can be briefly discussed as follows. As pointed out in PHASSA [b], the puthujjana thinks 'things are mine (i.e. are my concern) because I am, because I exist'. He takes the subject ('I') for granted; and if things are appropriated, that is because he, the subject, exists. The ditthisampanna (or sotāpanna) sees, however, that this is the wrong way round. He sees that the notion 'I am' arises because things (so long as there is any trace of avijjā) present themselves as 'mine'. This significance (or intention, or determination), 'mine' or 'for me'—see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [e]—, is, in a sense, a void, a negative aspect of the present thing (or existing phenomenon), since it simply points to a subject; and the puthujjana, not seeing impermanence (or more specifically, not seeing the impermanence of this ubiquitous determination), deceives himself into supposing that there actually exists a subject—'self'—independent of the object (which latter, as the ditthisampanna well understands, is merely the positive aspect of the phenomenon—that which is 'for me'). In this way it may be seen that the puthujjana's experience, pañc'upādānakkhandhā, has a negative aspect (the subject) and a positive aspect (the object).
But care is needed; for, in fact, the division subject/object is not a simple negative/positive division. If it were, only the positive would be present (as an existing phenomenon) and the negative (the subject) would not be present at all—it would simply not exist. But the subject is, in a sense, phenomenal: it (or he) is an existing phenomenal negative, a negative that appears; for the puthujjana asserts the present reality of his 'self' ('the irreplaceable being that I am'). The fact is, that the intention or determination 'mine', pointing to a subject, is a complex structure involving avijjā. The subject is not simply a negative in relation to the positive object: it (or he) is master over the object, and is thus a kind of positive negative, a master who does not appear explicitly but who, somehow or other, nevertheless exists.[c] It is this master whom the puthujjana, when he engages in reflexion, is seeking to identify—in vain![d] This delusive mastery of subject over object must be rigorously distinguished from the reflexive power of control or choice that is exercised in voluntary action by puthujjana and arahat alike. (From ATTĀ)
through not clinging the minds of sixty bhikkhus were liberated from the taints↓
[Puthujjana is described by upādānapaccayā bhavo - with clinging as condition, being. The state of being is dukkha, and involves in its structure not knowing the dukkha, as well as not knowing the escape from dukkha. Puthujjana doesn't see ones own upādāna.]
Nanavira Thera to Sister Vajjira:
Afternote: You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat's experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.
The puthujjana's experience, however, is still more complex, since there is also avijjā, and there is thus appropriation as well as teleology. But this, too, functions automatically, without any self or agent to direct it. On account of the appropriation, however, it appears to be directed by a self, agent, or master. Avijjā functions automatically, but conceals this fact from itself. Avijjā is an automatically functioning blindness to its automatic functioning. Removal of the blindness removes the appropriation but not the teleology.
Form her answer: I can see the matter clearly now, though not, of course, all its implications. In that way, the subject is removed from experience, and the pañcakkhandhā can function apart from upādāna. Thus the question is settled. I have lost a dimension of thought, at least to the degree to grasp this matter, i.e. my own upādāna...
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“Sāriputta, I can teach the Dhamma briefly; I can teach the Dhamma in detail; I can teach the Dhamma both briefly and in detail. It is those who can understand that are rare.”
“It is the time for this, Blessed One. It is the time for this, Fortunate One. The Blessed One should teach the Dhamma briefly; he should teach the Dhamma in detail; he should teach the Dhamma both briefly and in detail. There will be those who can understand the Dhamma.”
“Therefore, Sāriputta, you should train yourselves thus: (1) ‘There will be no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to this conscious body; (2) there will be no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to all external objects; and (3) we will enter and dwell in that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, through which there is no more I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit for one who enters and dwells in it.’ It is in this way, Sāriputta, that you should train yourselves.
“When, Sāriputta, a bhikkhu has no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to this conscious body; when he has no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to all external objects; and when he enters and dwells in that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, through which there is no more I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit for one who enters and dwells in it, he is called a bhikkhu who has cut off craving, stripped off the fetter, and, by completely breaking through conceit, has made an end of suffering. And it was with reference to this that I said in the Pārāyana, in ‘The Questions of Udaya’:
“The abandoning of both
sensual perceptions and dejection;
the dispelling of dullness,
the warding off of remorse;
“purified equanimity and mindfulness
preceded by reflection on the Dhamma:
this, I say, is emancipation by final knowledge,
the breaking up of ignorance.”
AN 3: 33
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“There are, friends, wise khattiyas, wise brahmins, wise householders, and wise ascetics who question a bhikkhu when he has gone abroad—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: ‘What does your teacher say, what does he teach?’ Being asked thus, friends, you should answer: ‘Our teacher, friends, teaches the removal of desire and lust.’
“When you have answered thus, friends, there may be wise khattiyas … wise ascetics who will question you further—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: ‘In regard to what does your teacher teach the removal of desire and lust?’ Being asked thus, friends, you should answer: ‘Our teacher, friends, teaches the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling … perception … determinations… consciousness.'
“When you have answered thus, friends, there may be wise khattiyas … wise ascetics who will question you further—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: ‘Having seen what danger does your teacher teach the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling … perception … determinations… consciousness?’ Being asked thus, friends, you should answer thus: ‘If, friends, one is not devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to form, then with the change and alteration of form there arise in one sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair. If, friends, one is not devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to feeling … perception … determinations… consciousness, then with the change and alteration of consciousness there arise in one sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair. Having seen this danger, our teacher teaches the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling … perception … determinations … consciousness. ’
“When you have answered thus, friends, there may be wise khattiyas … wise ascetics who will question you further—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: ‘Having seen what benefit does your teacher teach the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling … perception … determinations … consciousness?’ Being asked thus, friends, you should answer thus: ‘If, friends, one is devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to form, then with the change and alteration of form sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair do not arise in one. If one is devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to feeling … perception … determinations … consciousness, then with the change and alteration of consciousness sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair do not arise in one. Having seen this benefit, our teacher teaches the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling … perception … determinations … consciousness.’
“If, friends, one who enters and dwells amidst unwholesome states could dwell happily in this very life, without vexation, despair, and fever, and if, with the breakup of the body, after death, he could expect a good destination, then the Blessed One would not praise the abandoning of unwholesome states. But because one who enters and dwells amidst unwholesome states dwells in suffering in this very life, with vexation, despair, and fever, and because he can expect a bad destination with the breakup of the body, after death, the Blessed One praises the abandoning of unwholesome states.
“If, friends, one who enters and dwells amidst wholesome states would dwell in suffering in this very life, with vexation, despair, and fever, and if, with the breakup of the body, after death, he could expect a bad destination, then the Blessed One would not praise the acquisition of wholesome states. But because one who enters and dwells amidst wholesome states dwells happily in this very life, without vexation, despair, and fever, and because he can expect a good destination with the breakup of the body, after death, the Blessed One praises the acquisition of wholesome states.” SN 22 : 2
“Bhikkhus, I will teach you agitation through clinging and nonagitation through nonclinging. Listen to that and attend closely….
“And how, bhikkhus, is there agitation through clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling regards form thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’ That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.
“He regards feeling thus … perception thus … determinations thus … consciousness thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’ That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.
“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is agitation through clinging.
“And how, bhikkhus, is there nonagitation through nonclinging? Here, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple does not regard form thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’ That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.
“He does not regard feeling thus … perception thus … volitional formations thus … consciousness thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’ That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.
“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is nonagitation through nonclinging.”
SN 22 : 8
At Sāvatthī. “Bhikkhus, whatever is not yours, abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness. And what is it, bhikkhus, that is not yours? Form is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness. Feeling is not yours … Perception is not yours … Determinations are not yours … Consciousness is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness.
“Suppose, bhikkhus, people were to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and foliage in this Jeta’s Grove, or to burn them, or to do with them as they wish. Would you think: ‘People are carrying us off, or burning us, or doing with us as they wish’?”
“No, venerable sir. For what reason? Because, venerable sir, that is neither our self nor what belongs to our self.”
“So too, bhikkhus, form is not yours … consciousness is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness.”
SN 22: 33
“Bhikkhu, if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards something, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.”
“Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Fortunate One!”
“In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?”
“If, venerable sir, one has an underlying tendency towards form, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards feeling, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards perception, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards determinations, then one is reckoned¹ in terms of them. If one has an underlying tendency towards consciousness, then one is reckoned in terms of it.
“If, venerable sir, one does not have an underlying tendency towards form, then one is not reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards feeling … towards perception … towards determinations… towards consciousness, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.
“It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.”
“Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief.
SN 22 : 35
“Bhikkhu, if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is measured in accordance with it; if one is measured in accordance with something, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards something, then one is not measured in accordance with it; if one is not measured in accordance with something, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.”
“Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Fortunate One!”
“In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?”
“If, venerable sir, one has an underlying tendency towards form, then one is measured in accordance with it (...) SN 22: 36
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Nanavira Thera: The question discussed here, whether saccato thetato a 'self' is to be found, must be kept clearly distinct from another question, discussed in A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §22, viz whether saccato thetato the Tathāgata (or an arahat) is to be found (ditth'eva dhamme saccato thetato Tathāgate anupalabbhamāne... ('since here and now the Tathāgata actually and in truth is not to be found...') Avyākata Samy. 2 <S.iv,384>). The reason why the Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra-, and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found.↓
15. “Then does Master Gotama hold any speculative view at all?”
“Vaccha, ‘speculative view’ is something that the Tathāgata has put away. For the Tathāgata, Vaccha, has seen this: ‘Such is material form, such its origin, such its disappearance; such is feeling, such its origin, such its disappearance; such is perception, such its origin, such its disappearance; such are formations, such their origin, such their disappearance; such is consciousness, such its origin, such its disappearance.’ Therefore, I say, with the destruction, fading away, cessation, giving up, and relinquishing of all conceivings, all excogitations, all I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit, the Tathāgata is liberated through not clinging.”
16. “When a bhikkhu’s mind is liberated thus, Master Gotama, where does he reappear [after death]?”
“The term ‘reappears’ does not apply, Vaccha.”
“Then he does not reappear, Master Gotama?”
“The term ‘does not reappear’ does not apply, Vaccha.”
“Then he both reappears and does not reappear, Master Gotama?”
“The term ‘both reappears and does not reappear’ does not apply, Vaccha.”
“Then he neither reappears nor does not reappear, Master Gotama?”
“The term ‘neither reappears nor does not reappear’ does not apply, Vaccha.”
17. “When Master Gotama is asked these four questions, he replies: ‘The term “reappears” does not apply, Vaccha; the term “does not reappear” does not apply, Vaccha; the term “both reappears and does not reappear” does not apply, Vaccha; the term “neither reappears nor does not reappear” does not apply, Vaccha.’ Here I have fallen into bewilderment, Master Gotama, here I have fallen into confusion, and the measure of confidence I had gained through previous conversation with Master Gotama has now disappeared.”
18. “It is enough to cause you bewilderment, Vaccha, enough to cause you confusion. For this Dhamma, Vaccha, is profound, hard to see and hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise. It is hard for you to understand it when you hold another view, accept another teaching, approve of another teaching, pursue a different training, and follow a different teacher. So I shall question you about this in return, Vaccha. Answer as you choose.
19. “What do you think, Vaccha? Suppose a fire were burning before you. Would you know: ‘This fire is burning before me’?”
“I would, Master Gotama.”
“If someone were to ask you, Vaccha: ‘What does this fire burning before you burn in dependence on?’—being asked thus, what would you answer?”
“Being asked thus, Master Gotama, I would answer: ‘This fire burns in dependence on fuel of grass and sticks.’”
“If that fire before you were to be extinguished, would you know: ‘This fire before me has been extinguished’?”
“I would, Master Gotama.”
“If someone were to ask you, Vaccha: ‘When that fire before you was extinguished, to which direction did it go: to the east, the west, the north, or the south?’—being asked thus, what would you answer?”
“That does not apply, Master Gotama. The fire burned in dependence on its fuel of grass and sticks. When that is used up, if it does not get any more fuel, being without fuel, it is reckoned as extinguished.”
20. “So too, Vaccha, the Tathāgata has abandoned that material form by which one describing the Tathāgata might describe him; he has cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, done away with it so that it is no longer subject to future arising. The Tathāgata is liberated from reckoning in terms of material form, Vaccha, he is profound, immeasurable, hard to fathom like the ocean. ‘He reappears’ does not apply; ‘he does not reappear’ does not apply; ‘he both reappears and does not reappear’ does not apply; ‘he neither reappears nor does not reappear’ does not apply. The Tathāgata has abandoned that feeling by which one describing the Tathāgata might describe him…has abandoned that perception by which one describing the Tathāgata might describe him…has abandoned those formations by which one describing the Tathāgata might describe him…has abandoned that consciousness by which one describing the Tathāgata might describe him; he has cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, done away with it so that it is no longer subject to future arising. The Tathāgata is liberated from reckoning in terms of consciousness, Vaccha; he is profound, immeasurable, hard to fathom like the ocean. ‘He reappears’ does not apply; ‘he does not reappear’ does not apply; ‘he both reappears and does not reappear’ does not apply; ‘he neither reappears nor does not reappear’ does not apply.”
MN 72
“If, Ānanda, they were to ask you: ‘Friend Ānanda, what are the things of which an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”
“Venerable sir, if they were to ask me this, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, with form an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. With feeling … perception … determinations… consciousness an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. These, friends, are the things of which an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.” “Good, good, Ānanda!
SN 22:37
“Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who regard [anything as] self in various ways all regard [as self] the five aggregates subject to clinging, or a certain one among them. What five?
“Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling, who is not a seer of the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self … perception as self … determinations as self … consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness.
“Thus this way of regarding things and [the notion] ‘I am’ have not vanished in him. As ‘I am’ has not vanished, there takes place a descent of the five faculties—of the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty. There is, bhikkhus, the mind, there are mental phenomena, there is the element of ignorance. When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, ‘I am’ occurs to him; ‘I am this’ occurs to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these occur to him.
“The five faculties remain right there, bhikkhus, but in regard to them the instructed noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true knowledge. With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, ‘I am’ does not occur to him; ‘I am this’ does not occur to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these do not occur to him.”
SN 22: 47
“Bhikkhu, in clinging one is bound by Māra; by not clinging one is freed from the Evil One.”
“Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Fortunate One!”
“In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?”
“In clinging to form, venerable sir, one is bound by Māra; by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One. In clinging to feeling … to perception … to determinations… to consciousness one is bound by Māra; by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One.
“It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.” “Good, good, bhikkhu! SN 22: 63
“Bhikkhu, in conceiving one is bound by Māra; by not conceiving one is freed from the Evil One.”
“Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Fortunate One!”
“In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?”
“In conceiving form, venerable sir, one is bound by Māra; by not conceiving it one is freed from the Evil One. In conceiving feeling … perception … volitional formations … consciousness one is bound by Māra; by not conceiving it one is freed from the Evil One.
“It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief. "Good, good, bhikkhu! SN 22: 64
“Bhikkhu, in seeking delight one is bound by Māra; by not seeking delight one is freed from the Evil One.”
“Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Fortunate One!”
“In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?”
“In seeking delight in form, venerable sir, one is bound by Māra; by not seeking delight in it one is freed from the Evil One. In seeking delight in feeling … in perception … in determinations… in consciousness one is bound by Māra; by not seeking delight in it one is freed from the Evil One.
“It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.” “Good, good, bhikkhu! SN 22: 65
“Friends, the Venerable Puṇṇa Mantāniputta was very helpful to us when we were newly ordained. He exhorted us with the following exhortation:
“It is by clinging, Ānanda, that [the notion] ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging. And by clinging to what does ‘I am’ occur, not without clinging? It is by clinging to form that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling … to perception … to determinations… to consciousness that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging.
“Suppose, friend Ānanda, a young woman—or a man—youthful and fond of ornaments, would examine her own facial image in a mirror or in a bowl filled with pure, clear, clean water: she would look at it with clinging, not without clinging. So too, it is by clinging to form that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling … to perception … to volitional formations … to consciousness that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging.
“What do you think, friend Ānanda, is form permanent or impermanent?” (...) SN 22: 83
Bhikkhu Bodhi: Upādāya has a double meaning that is difficult to capture in translation. As absolutive of upādiyati it means “having clung to,” but it also has an idiomatic sense, “derived from, dependent on,” (...) The mirror simile can support either meaning, and both are probably intended: The youth looks at his or her image with concern for his or her personal appearance (“with clinging”), and the image becomes manifest in dependence on the mirror. Similarly, a person conceives “I am” by clinging to the five aggregates, and it is in dependence on the five aggregates, i.e., with the aggregates as objective referents, that the notion “I am” arises.
“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a king or a royal minister who had never before heard the sound of a lute. He might hear the sound of a lute and say: ‘Good man, what is making this sound—so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling?’ They would say to him: ‘Sire, it is a lute that is making this sound—so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling.’ He would reply: ‘Go, man, bring me that lute.’
“They would bring him the lute and tell him: ‘Sire, this is that lute, the sound of which was so tantalizing, so lovely, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so enthralling.’ The king would say: ‘I’ve had enough with this lute, man. Bring me just that sound.’ The men would reply: ‘This lute, sire, consists of numerous components, of a great many components, and it gives off a sound when it is played upon with its numerous components; that is, in dependence on the parchment sounding board, the belly, the arm, the head, the strings, the plectrum, and the appropriate effort of the musician. So it is, sire, that this lute consisting of numerous components, of a great many components, gives off a sound when it is played upon with its numerous components.’
“The king would split the lute into ten or a hundred pieces, then he would reduce these to splinters. Having reduced them to splinters, he would burn them in a fire and reduce them to ashes, and he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Then he would say: ‘A poor thing, indeed sir, is this so-called lute, as well as anything else called a lute. How the multitude are utterly heedless about it, utterly taken in by it!’
“So too, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form, he investigates feeling to the extent that there is a range for feeling, he investigates perception to the extent that there is a range for perception, he investigates determinations to the extent that there is a range for determinations, he investigates consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness. As he investigates form to the extent that there is a range for form ... consciousness to the extent that there is a range for consciousness, whatever notions of ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘I am’ had occurred to him before no longer occur to him.” SN 22: 246
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