To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label Marías. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Marías. Show all posts

Saturday, August 9, 2025

Human Time


Our era, more than any other, has thought and written about time as a condition of human life. Twentieth-century thought has taken temporality seriously, perhaps for the first time in history. Not only has philosophy centered on this theme, from Dilthey and Bergson to the present day, passing through Ortega and Heidegger, not only is the title of the latter’s most important book Sein und Zeit, but the other intellectual disciplines have explored temporality in all directions: in society—theory of generations—in psychology, in literature, in art. In my own work I have had to devote many pages, from different perspectives, to the problem of time and temporality, pages which I am not going to repeat here; I shall limit myself to recalling them to the degree indispensable for comprehension of what I must now say.

We are dealing—let us not forget—with an anthropological perspective, but we must be well aware that this anthropology is metaphysical. This means, as we have said repeatedly, a biographical perspective; not the perspective of human life as radical reality, not that of analytical theory, but that which pertains to the empirical structure of that life. And so we must try to see how temporality functions, in a precise way, as one of the ingredients of this life; that is, of the empirical but structural form in which it actually takes place, and which we call “man.”

Human life is temporal and successive. The definition of eternity given by Boethius is literally presented as a negative cast of human temporality: interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, “the simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life.” Human life is not everlasting, but has begun and will end—most important of all, will end, whatever its ulterior fate. Furthermore, its possession is not simultaneous, but specifically successive—it is possessed bit by bit—and it is not perfect, but highly imperfect and precarious: unstable in the present instant, pale and impoverished in memory of the past, uncertain and vague in anticipation of the future. Life presents itself in any case as affected by temporal finitude: its formula is that of “our days are numbered.” Stretching from birth to death, we might say that the radical form of “installation” in life is precisely time; time is that in which I “am,” properly speaking, and the temporal mode of being—as we saw in general elsewhere—is “to keep on being”: expressed more succinctly, “to endure.”Birth is the absolute past. While all the contents of my previous life have been present at some time, birth was never present: it was never present to me, I did not “attend” it. The past is recalled in memory and the future is anticipated in the imaginary project; but, in a more immediate way, life is both “retention” and “protention.” The “instant” is not a point without duration, but a temporal surrounding when we are dealing with human life and not with cosmic time. Past and future are present in a decision, in a human doing. What is done is done “because of something and for some purpose,” and it is that presence—no matter how “abbreviated” it may be—of motivation and aim, which introduces temporal distension, duration, into every instant of my life. This means that, strictly speaking, life does not consist of instants, but moments. This is the form of the intrinsic temporality of human life.That temporal and successive quality is expressed, in a way that cannot be improved upon, by saying that human life happens. Language uses different and ultimately metaphorical expressions to describe what “goes on.” The most frequent of these—which unconsciously emphasize the chance dimension of life, a point which we shall have to discuss—allude to “falling”: incident, incidence, accident, and so on. The particular shading of “hazard” is explicit in the Greek τυνχάνειν (tynkhánein), from the same root as τύχη (tykhé), luck or fortune. The idea of “arriving” or “coming” is very close to συμβαίνειν, (symbaínein), hence συμβεβηκός, (symbebekós) “accident,” occur (oc-currere), and the French arriver. In the English word happen we again find the idea of luck, fortune, or chance; in the Spanish word acaecer (“to fall out”), the idea of falling reappears. The word acontecer (happen) in Spanish is deeper and more interesting: it is derived from contigere, a Vulgar Latin form of the Classical contingere (that is, con-tangere); it is “what touches,” that is, the luck which falls to someone; it is not mere casualidad (coincidence), derived from casus or fall, but the “lot” or portion (méros, mórion); in short, it is what corresponds to μοῐρα (moîra), and in this sense the word acontecer is semantically related to destino, “destiny” or “fate.” (We find something similar in the German Ereignis and the reflexive verb sich ereignen, in which the root eigen, “own,” shows through: in acontecer, one makes something one’s own, what happens belongs to one or touches one.) And this etymologicnl connection shows us that man’s temporality and contingency are unexpectedly linked.What happens happens to us; that is, it takes place, it “touches” us (contingit, attingit, from which the Spanish verb atañer, to touch or affect). Therefore, what happens “remains”; it gradually constitutes the content of life, its “resources,” its “riches,” its ousía, and in this sense is the substance of life. The future, for its part, is a reality which does not yet exist, and therefore is not possessed, but with which we have to make our life. Hence we live “on credit,” reckoning with the future which is possessed by anticipating it in the form of belief. As it passes, time “brings me into realization” and, in a certain sense, “thingifies” me. I mean that the past “I,” as it “continues to be,” once that it “has been,” ceases to be I and becomes circumstance: the “I” which I was is something that I encounter, with which I have to count, which conditions me, which opens up certain possibilities to me and closes off others. (I can speak English because I learned it before, because an “I” who is now past learned it; I cannot speak Russian because no past “I” of mine learned it, or because I forgot it, and so on.) That is, time affects me, like the other ingredients of my circumstance. The executive I, the true I in its pronominal function—not the substantive one, not “the I”—the function in which I say “I,” is present, is pure presentness and momentness, but its reality consists in projecting itself vectorially toward the future. I am not future, but present and actual and acting, and therefore future-oriented.On the other hand, if we attempt to understand in a concrete, non-abstract way, not in the sense of pure measurement, the meaning of the finitude of life, of the limited time of its duration, we must regard it dramatically. Human life does not “last” a longer or shorter time, like a building or a utensil, not even like an organism, but has a “plot.” In the phrase ars longa, vita brevis, the brevity of life depends on the longevity of art. Life is short because it is not long enough for the art which must be learned and executed; that is, for one’s projects. Human time is not a mere quantity, but is always the time there is not enough of—or too much of. When there is too much time, that tremendous situation we call boredom occurs, and then we say that we have to “kill time.” There is not enough when the “plot” of our life needs more time than is available. Man frequently complains that he “has no time for anything,” but then he usually discovers that he “has nothing for time,” and his life takes on the form of tedium. This means that time is not mere passage or flow, that it does not limit itself to “passing,” but has structure; and this structure is not that of simple duration or quantification, but the structure imposed by the projective reality of life. Once more we encounter the dual structure which we find everywhere when we analyze human life: installation and vectors. Man is “in” time, the substance of his life. But to live temporally is to aim vectorially in different directions, near or far. There is no such thing as an “indefinite” vector, and this will lead us to the ultimate questions posed by human life when it is considered as totality, and when, in consequence, its configuration becomes problematical.


All this is characteristic of human life in general, of biographical life as it reveals itself to the analysis of its necessary, and therefore universal, structure. But if we now go on to the higher concreteness of its empirical structure, we find some aspects which affect its temporality. Worldhood, corporeality, the actual sensorial system, the interaction of biographical life and its biological substratum, real social forms, the rhythm of history—all this conditions the true reality of human time. We must consider it briefly within this anthropological perspective.

Time appears as articulated; it is not a continuum, a permanent and homogenous flow. From the point of view of human “doing,” we have already seen that the elective and decisive quality of human life, founded on motivation and projection, imposes the structure of the moments of which life is composed. The moment is not a chronological unit—it makes no sense to ask “how long” a moment lasts—but it is a vital one, that is, a biographical unit. Man lives moment after moment—and these moments are not instantaneous—and the linkage between them establishes the articulated continuity of the biographical trajectory. But the world as it actually is imposes another empirical articulation which is superimposed on the previous one: that of day and night, with light and darkness, which correspond to the periods of wakefulness and sleep, and these are dependent on human corporeality. (But, it might be objected, are there not other more elemental and primary articulations, such as the beating of the heart or the rhythm of breathing? Do not these impose the most characteristic structure of human temporality? No; for heartbeats, inhalation and exhalation, are primarily somatic and not biographical. Normally I do not notice them, they do not have biographical relevance for me save in exceptional cases; they are abstract units, what we might call “submultiples” of vital time.)The cyclical quality of biological and terrestrial life, insofar as it conditions biography, is the primary mode of quantification of time; the “tale” of the numbered days allows them to be counted. Imagine a man who never slept, in a world that was always the same, where light was perpetual: he would have a completely different experience of life with respect to time and its finitude. On a larger scale, the rhythm of the seasons projects a new and higher structure on temporality, which reinforces the “plotlike” quality of life. To the passage of the days is added the recurrence of the seasons, and with it the “passage of the years,” which is what is counted, strictly speaking, what makes us feel at a certain level in our vital trajectory. Daily life, by its repetition, creates an illusion of eternity: that which we do “each” day makes us feel as if we could do it “every” day; that is, forever. At the same time, variation and innovation impress the “plotlike” quality of life upon us. And from this arise all the concrete forms of sensation in relation to time: expectation, waiting, hope, despair (which becomes the experience of “this can’t go on”), hopelessness (expressed in the melancholy experience of “things can go on like this indefinitely”).Naturally, the chief characteristic of time as a form of empirical structure is age. In the first place, life has a “normal” duration (which has nothing to do with “mean” duration, for that can be altered by infant mortality, accidental death, and so on). It is not the time one is going to live, but the time one counts on; in consequence, the time which makes us feel at a certain “altitude” in life. This is of an order of magnitude which in practice is constant, but by no means unchangeable: between the Romantic period and today, in a period of 150 years, the normal life of Western man has been extended by a good fifty per cent, and the end is not yet in sight. Age, on the other hand, besides being an accumulation of reality—what we call “experience,” and that is why we distinguish between the time that “passes” and the age that we “are”—presents itself as a qualification of human possibilities, inextricably linked with biological powers. According to his age, man feels himself to be in each respect—in each vectorial orientation—in a situation which could be expressed in these terms: “not yet,” “now,” and “no longer.” These expressions never affect the whole of life, but only each of its dimensions, and the “not yet” in respect to something coincides with the “now” in respect to something else, and so on.

The child, whose reality is intrinsically immature, who is not yet...we shall see what...nevertheless is with unusual fullness. He has a certain very obvious “substantivity,” which on the other hand, in a form not easy to determine, persists throughout his biography: we keep on being, to an unsuspected degree, the child that we have been. But we have seen elsewhere that the child is not yet the person he is going to be. This explains the anxiety felt by parents about their children as they grow and mature: literally, they do not know who that child is going to be. This is only known—or it begins to be known—when the sexuate condition achieves the maturity of sexual development: at puberty. This is why the young person never feels quite identified with the child he has been, with that child whom people tell him about and whom he perhaps remembers: it is not obvious that “he” is that child. Hence he must “revalidate” his loves, his friendships, his devotions, his childish beliefs, and largely reject them, at least temporarily; that is why I say that he has to revalidate them. The crisis of belief—religious belief, for example—in a young person is not primarily due to the expansion of his mental horizon, to contact with books or teachers who teach hip things that are different from those he has received, but above all to the fact that the young person is a different person from the child who began to believe; and he must begin again, must revise and accept out of his own self what he cannot receive passively from the child he bears within, but whom he has left behind. This is the anthropological basis that gives meaning to the sacrament of confirmation, which is stripped of its human significance when it is administered before the age of puberty, before the “who” is established in the first fullness of adulthood.

The young person is defined by his minimum of reality and his maximum of real possibilities—those of the child are abstract, are not yet “his” possibilities. This is why youth consists very largely in the absorption of reality and the exploration of its possibilities—the traditional Lehrjahre and Wanderjahre, years of apprenticeship and travel. The child, and even the youth, considers the “grownup,” the adult, as a stable and already formed reality, but when he reaches adulthood he discovers his instability, and, in consequence, the need to keep on inventing. As for the old man, independently of what his physical state of decline may be—that is, if we consider old age as a temporal level, as a form of age—in principle he represents a positive form: the maximum richness of reality, and possibilities which are reduced but in fact broadened by the accumulation of experience of life. The old man’s powers are certainly less than those of the youth or the mature adult, but their significance is much greater to the degree in which his biographical life is a great deal more ample—at least, as long as physical decline does not impose a narrowing stemming from biological factors but with personal repercussions. The important thing about old age, however, is something different: “one can’t go beyond old age,” which means, if we look at things from inside life, that it is the last age, that there is no further age. But this means that the old man has to persevere in his vital phase, and this transforms the “plotlike” meaning of his life. Hence, the meaning of old age depends entirely on how one confronts death, on what this means for each old person. Don Juan’s famous exclamation, “What a long credit you give me!” is a strictly juvenile attitude, which the young man cannot really escape. Old age, on the other hand, is the season of realization and fulfillment, that situation where life is installed in a form which is either “definitive”—unlike all the others—or results in death. And since death is a question mark, the life of the old person is determined by it and by the meaning which, in each case and at every moment, he gives it. This brings us to another problem, one we will have to deal with in its proper place.

Of course, all this is linked to the concrete form—not individual, but collective, historico-social—in which human life takes place. For example, at the present day longevity is encountering a number of social patterns which did not foresee it—retirement, statistical tabulations of age, difficulty of “starting over,” and so on. The scale of the generations depends on the role of ages, and is affected by alterations in the biographical structure; historical knowledge conditions possession of the past and the possibilities of invention. I have spoken at length of all these subjects—from Reason and Life to Generations: A Historical Method and The Social Structure, in a different form in “Experience of Life,” and most specifically in my “books about countries,” The Spaniards, Julián Marías on the United States, Our Andalusia, and so on—and I need not repeat what I have said before and what does not belong in this book. Just now I am interested in the anthropological aspect of what I have studied elsewhere from the viewpoint of analytical theory, social structure, or the ultimate concreteness of the historical forms of life.

Life is circumstantial invention. It is not creation, for life never exists “out of nothing,” but is a making of oneself together with things: it is not, however, mere “realization,” for it consists in the previous invention of possibilities as such. This quality of quasi-creation has a temporal correspondence which affects man as the image of God, imago Dei. In Genesis, in contrast to the instantaneous fiat of the creation of things, γενηθήτω, (genethéto in the version of the Septuagint), a very different expression is used when the creation of man is being described: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, ποιήσομεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν (poiésomen ánthropon kat’ eikóna hemetéran kai kath’ homoíosin), “let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” Leaving aside the suspicion of some theologians that the plural contains a reference to the Trinity—one that is more interesting than it seems, even in an anthropological perspective, for we have already observed that the notion of person is connected with the concept of “living-with,” and not in vain did Unamuno say: “An isolated person would cease to be one; whom, indeed, would he love?”—“Let us make” rather than “let him be made” seems to indicate a continuity, an undertaking; perhaps the best translation of faciamus would be “we are going to make.” And if we ask ourselves in what man’s resemblance to God consists, what allows us to think of man as an image of God, we would have to find it in his indefiniteness, the finite version of infinity. Man is essentially imperfect, that is, unfinished, uncompleted, always a thing-to-be-done and as yet undone. Different from God, who is infinite and eternal, but the opposite of things. Things are in time, but man is making himself from the stuff of time; and since the real man, in his empirical structure, is in a certain sense also a thing—the articulation of a who and a what—his temporality is conditioned by all the structures we have just been examining, not forgetting the sexuate condition, which introduces two forms of biographical human time. Nicholas of Cusa said that man is Deus occasionatus. We might say that in his created but creative temporality, the absolute innovation which has to make itself successively in the form of happening, we find the anthropological meaning of his nature as the image of God.

Julián Marías

METAPHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY:

The Empirical Structure of Human Life

Person and I


The theme of the person is one of the most difficult and elusive in the whole history of philosophy, and for reasons which are not at all coincidental. Around this theme perhaps the most radical transformation of that whole history has taken place—or is taking place—and strictly speaking it is a question, rather than of the different ways of studying or interpreting a reality, of the emergence of that same reality and of its establishment as such on the mental horizon of the West. Customarily the origin of the notion of person is sought in the Latin word persona, and this is considered to be the equivalent of the Greek prósopon which, as a Hellenic word, is naturally taken as “previous” to the Latin one. But none of this is particularly clear when we take a closer look at things.

In the first place, the word πρόσωπον (prósopon) is very infrequent in philosophical texts, and rarely means “person” or anything like it. Among the pre-Socratics it appears in three texts, Antiphon, Democritus, and Empedocles, and means face, countenance, even the visage of Helios, the Sun. In Plato it also means countenance. This is again the meaning which appears in Aristotle, who speaks at length of the prósopon and its parts (the nose, for example), and also of the face of the Moon. Somewhere he remarks that one says prósopon of a man, but not of an ox or a fish. This remark is interesting, for in the use of the Greek language there is frequent mention of the “face” (prósopon) of animals: ibis, dogs, horses, deer, fish. Of course, the most interesting meaning of this Greek word, the one which has been taken as a basis or starting point for the notion of “person,” is the meaning in which it coincides with the Latin word for mask, the tragic or comic mask worn by actors, for example. It is from this that meanings of “role” or “character” or “personage,” and ultimately “person,” are derived. It is possible, though not certain, that the meaning of prósopon as “mask” is indebted to influence from the Latin persona; this word has a doubtful, probably an Etruscan, etymology.The direction the word has taken—the mask and the personage represented by the actor—has led to abandonment of another which strikes me as interesting: the meaning of “face” in speaking of animals or stars, and also the “façade,” more specifically, the front of a building. In a moment we shall see why this is more important than it appears to be at first glance.

During the Scholastic period, when there was an attempt to think about “person” philosophically, the notions which have been decisive are not the ones arising from these contexts, but from those of “property” or “subsistence” (hypóstatis). Boethius’ famous definition, which has been so influential—persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia—started off from the Aristotelian notion of ousía or substantia thought of primarily in relation to “things.” Always explained with the eternal examples of the statue and the bed, this notion was founded on the old Greek ideal of the “independent” or sufficient, of the “separable” (khoristón). That this substance or thing which we call “person” is rational, is no doubt important, but not sufficiently so to react upon this quality of ousía and modify its mode of being, its manner of reality. The person is a hypóstasis or suppositum like the others, only it is of a rational nature. Signoriello’s Lexicon peripateticum, which is so careful in its distinctions, says literally: “persona nihil addit supra suppositum, nisi aliquam dignitatem et excellentiam petitam ex natura intellectuali” (“Person adds nothing to substance, except some dignity and excellence required by the intellectual nature”). That is, the person is simply a thing with a slightly greater degree of dignity and excellence than the rest.

But suppose that there were an error in all this? Suppose that the “model” of reality which has been used to think about things were not applicable to the person? Suppose it were completely inadequate? The introduction of the theological viewpoint in the theory of the person represented a decisive step as well as a risk. Beginning very early, Scholasticism spoke of divine persons; moreover, the word “person” is applied more to God than to man; in fact, man is described as homo and only secondarily as persona; it is the person—the divine person—of Christ who is simultaneously God and man (homo tends to become relegated to natura). Similarly, it was thought that the person could be divine or angelic or human. This is fruitful in one sense: the divine person is not, of course, a “thing,” and in this sense theology has been a fertile stimulus for the investigation of personal reality. But it also contains a serious risk: the notion of person was thought of in such a way that it could “harbor” the reality of divine or angelic persons as well as human ones. This has caused a loss of contact with immediate reality, with that which becomes immediately present to us. Perhaps it is better to proceed from presence, phenomenologically, reserving the right to add and subtract later so as to be able to arrive at other persons and to think about them from the only person who is clear to us. To begin with, the only persons we know are human ones: I, thou.

We cannot even say “man,” for this is to say a great deal. When we hear a knock on our door we ask “Who is it?” (Although philosophy and science have been mistakenly asking “What is man?” for 2,500 years and receiving, as was to be expected, mistaken answers.) The normal and sufficient answer to the question “Who is it?” is “I.” Naturally, an “I” is accompanied by a voice—a known voice—that is, by a circumstance. If the voice is unknown the answer does me no good, which means that the significance of that word “I” has been changed. Now it means something else, a non-circumstantial I, that is, anybody at all; as if someone were to say “an I.” But I already knew that when I asked “Who is it?” and the answer does not resolve my doubts. What I was asking for when I inquired was precisely the pronominal position of that “someone” who is knocking, his concrete circumstantialization in “I,” unsupplantable, unequivocal, irreplaceable. This pronominal function of the circumstantial “I” or “thou” is equivalent to a proper name—a personal name—if, of course, we always keep in mind that this has not only a significance but a denominative function, along with another vocative function whose full significance will become apparent later on.Certainly, when I say “I,” “thou,” or a proper name, I am thinking of a body; we must not forget this for a single moment, and we must not content ourselves with saying it once and then leaving it inoperative as we go on thinking. But we think of a body insofar as it is the body of someone. That corporeal someone is, to begin with, what we understand a person to be. But now let us try, without relinquishing that first piece of evidence, to see more clearly what we actually understand and are trying to say.The corporeal someone or person not only “happens” but is identified with futurition, that forward tension—or pretension—which is life. Now we begin to glimpse the meaning of prósopon as “front” or “façade” or “forward part.” It is important to retain that frontal quality of the person because life is an operation performed in a forward direction. That “someone” is future-oriented; that is, present and real but turned toward the future, oriented toward it, projected toward it. The face in which the person expresses and shows himself faces the future and hence the face is, among all the parts of the body, the strictly personal one, that in which the person is concentrated and revealed, in which he is expressed. But this future-oriented condition of the person contains one essential trait: it is partially unreal, for the future is not as yet, but will be. In the countenance or person we now see—truly present—the person he will be. By person we understand a reality that is not only real. A “given” person would cease to be one. The programmatic, projective quality is not something that merely happens to the person; rather, it constitutes that person. The person is not “there,” he can never be there as such, but he is arriving.When we say that he “is being made,” we can easily misunderstand what is being sought is his “result.” That is not the point: the person already is, is made as a person, and on the other hand his “finishedness” or result is unimportant. His present being is to be becoming; better still, to be arriving. Every strictly personal relationship—friendship, love—proves this. In such relationships, “being” means “to keep on being,” a condition made of duration and primarily of future, a constant arriving and setting forth, especially a “going to be.” The personal relationship, insofar as it is truly personal and not “thingified,” is always “the eve of delight” even in the fullest presence or possession.Of course, this is also true of myself. My possession of myself has the same programmatic, durative, and arriving quality, by means of which the personal pronoun—me, I—is possessive: mine. And this turns the traditional ontological definition upside down. So far from possessing sovereignty or sufficiency, the person is defined by the indigence, the neediness, the unreality of anticipation, poised on an expectant reality.

I am a person, but “the I” is not the person. “I” is the name we give to that programmatic and arriving condition. When I say “I,” I “prepare” or “get ready” to be. For man, to be is to prepare oneself to be, to get ready to be, and therefore he consists in disposition and readiness. When we say “I” we are not dealing with a simple point or center of the circumstance, but with the fact that this circumstance is mine. Because I am I myself I can have something which is mine. In the person there is selfhood, but not identity: I am the same one but never the same. But here we must add something which I have said many times but which is often forgotten: the past “I” is not I, but circumstance with which I find myself; that is, the circumstance which I—the projective and future-oriented I—encounter when I am going to live. And mere “succession” would not be sufficient for selfhood. There is need for that anticipation of myself, that already being what I am not, that intrinsic futurition or neediness. Man can possess himself throughout his whole life and be the same man because he does not possess himself wholly at any moment in that life.The common noun signifies what is; the proper name, as I have already noted, denominates who one is. The reality of that “who” is never given, and simultaneously includes a certain infinitude and an essential opacity. That infinitude does not affect the finite character of human reality. The image of infinity is lack of definition, and only in this form is the human person infinite: not to be “given,” always able to be something more, to be arriving. The arcane quality of that reality consists in its superlatively internal condition, its intimacy (intimate is the superlative of inner). Hence, the need and possibility of the expression as the person’s mode of being: the secret intimacy in which that arcane person consists rises to the surface in the face—which is the person as he is projected forward. And one’s own person? you will ask. One’s own person is the means by which each can understand himself, interpret himself, and thus project himself. My own reality is reflected in those mirrors which are other people; in them I find my expression, I recognize myself, and thus project myself. This is why personal life is essentially living-with.In the Introduction to Lessons in Logic, Kant summed up the field of philosophy in the mundane sense (in dieser weltbürgerlichen Bedeutung) in these four questions:


What can I know? (Metaphysics.)

What ought I to do? (Ethics.)

What can I hope for? (Religion.)

What is man? (Anthropology.)


And he said that fundamentally all these questions could be included in anthropology, for the first three are reduced to the last. Well—and leaving aside the Kantian correlation between the questions and the philosophical disciplines, which today would be debatable—my point of view would be considerably different.

I think that everything could be reduced to two radical and inseparable questions, whose meaning lies in an intrinsic mutual connection: 1) Who am I? 2) What is to become of me? It is not a question of “man,” or of “what,” but of “I” and “who.” And that question can only be answered by living, with an executive response. The second is also a personal question: I ask “what,” but inquire what is to become of me. The articulation of the “who” and the “what” is precisely the problem of personal life.

But the decisive point is the interconnection of both questions. To know the first means not to know the second and in the measure in which the second is answered, the personal quality of that me vanishes and becomes more like a what, a thing. The more I know who I am, the more I possess my programmatic and projective reality, future-oriented, unreal, and “arriving.” The more authentically I am “I” in the mode of personal life, the less I know what is to become of me, the more uncertain is my future reality, which is thus the more open to possibility, to invention, chance, and innovation.This is the radical neediness of man as person, projected forward, facing the future, going toward the other and especially toward the other person. The person needs the other person in the measure in which that person is presented to him as irreplaceable and unreasonable. And since every human person is affected by that same insufficiency and neediness, we find here the reason why the personal being, considered to its ultimate consequences, brings us to the need for something that is described by one of the most obscure words there is: salvation.

Julián Marías

METAPHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY:

The Empirical Structure of Human Life