Change and Permanence
Thee formal structure of philosophy can be further fleshed out with an important material characteristic. Philosophical conversion occurs within the field of the antinomy of change/permanence, which characterizes the tension between the starting point and the endpoint of the person striving toward wisdom. The end-point, happiness, was universally understood as the act of possessing the highest sum of the goods proper to man.138 The condition of happiness was therefore, obviously, the character of that which a man actually possessed. Permanence is the basic quality inherent in the nature of intellectual goods. Th is is why virtue and contemplation (understood as forms of spiritual possession) of the unchanging essence of things are the objective guarantee of the most lasting type of happiness.139 Man’s unhappiness comes from his turning his sight away from the necessary and universal (or, at the very least, comparatively lasting), and his turning toward everything which is characterized by change, decay and death.
The diagnosis of philosophy (frequently called the medicine of the soul140) connects all the dismal aspects of human life with man’s fatal turning toward the side of the transient. Th e two basic types of passions—the ones connected to desiring changeable goods and the ones connected to worrying about losing them—are the tragic symptoms of spiritual illness. The desire for wealth, power, beauty, popularity or success can never be satisfied and even when they are attained they never give us the sense of permanence. The passions destroy our happiness. As Socrates said, the chase after apparent goods is essentially just like carrying water in a sieve.141 The unavailability of certain goods and the spiral of insatiable desire on the one hand (individual), and the image of a conflagration consuming a granary or of the ingratitude of the crowd on the other (social), are the basic images of a human life consumed by unquenchable desire, uncertainty, and fear. The nature of desired goods dictates the nature of our life, which is also fleeting, fills us with the greatest of all passions: the fear of death. Therefore the diagnosis is gloomy and the transformation of fered by philosophy accomplishes itself within the perspective of an unavoidable (without the saving cure) destruction, enslavement, disease, animality and non-existence. The medicine of the soul promises freedom, self-sufficiency, and happiness, which is the freedom from the passions, independence from what does not depend upon us, and the hope of possessing the goods which cannot be taken away by anyone. This was the common promise of the philosophers; the same was said by the Epicureans, Stoics, and even the Skeptics.
Why is it that, as the philosophers so gladly repeated after the Orphics, if we are souls trapped in bodies, we do not ignore our bodily prisons or graves?142 Why does philosophy treat man as a psychophysical whole? How to explain the fact that when the soul discovers its spiritual identity, it does not become indifferent to the fate of the body, negligently allowing the passions to do as they please? There is no such negligence because responsibilities toward the body come from the discovery of the simultaneous opposition and dependence of the spiritual with the bodily. Man—through whom runs the boundary of ontological oppositions—can only have one ruler. When reason sleeps, the passions enslave the mind, by making it their servant they degrade it and destroy it in practice.143 Happiness is the possession of that which we desire, so long as we do not desire anything evil. Philosophers discovered early that, “It is not better for people to get all that they want!”144 Or as Cicero put is, “nor is it so miserable not to obtain what you will, than to will to obtain what you ought not.”145 Man is like a rider on a horse, that is, even though in truth they form a somewhat accidental totality, the rider controls his mount and the horse does not take the rider where the horse wants to go. If we do not secure the rule of reason over the whole of existence then reason will be sabotaged and the whole person will be reduced to the level of the passions. Therefore, an existential reduction will take place, an animalization that is characterized by moral and epistemological corruptions.
There is no place for compromise, the rule of one element occurs at the price of the other, “It is difficult to fight passion (one’s heart), for whatever it wishes it buys at the price of the soul.”146 Each of us, like young Hercules at the crossroads of the story told by Socrates, must choose either virtue or pleasure.147
The details of our picture of the goal of philosophizing will depend upon our view of human nature, which will determine the character of the highest good and the degree of man’s unavoidable dependence upon the body. We can assume that for all philosophers that highest good is a spiritual good, a state of internal harmony that expresses itself through the rule of reason over the passions. For the extremists, it will take the form of a cosmic order victorious over disorder and immorality.148 For everyone it will be the state of the highest spiritual freedom available to man, an internal independence understood as the state of an optimally lasting happiness. This theme expresses itself with equal force in Socrates, Plato, just as it does in the Cynics, Epicureans, and the Stoics. The common ideal is a perfect self-sufficiency, a life based upon a foundation that is reasonably lasting and independent of the vicissitudes of life, from the general ontological impermanence of sensual goods. Perfection understood as independence leads to the judgment that the happiness and unhappiness of man is essentially the state of his soul. As Democritus put it, “Happiness, like unhappiness, is a property of the soul.”149 You can search for permanence and immutability in the soul (not in the world of the senses) because it is where authentic delight, freedom, control, and the good are to be found.
Philosophy as a Spiritual Exercise
Philosophical transformation is neither easy nor definitive. When Hercules gives his hand to virtue he does not thereby take possession of it. Th e famed Diogenes of Sinope, the first to call philosophy an exercise,150 ostensibly mocked the automatism of ritual purifications.151 Diogenes is not an isolated case. All the philosophical schools, even though they defined health differently and differed in their methods of healing, agreed that the cure of the soul takes a long time.
Philosophy, as Pythagoras is said to have told Leon of the Phliasians, is the skill of striving for wisdom.152 Just like any other skill, it must be perfected. From this perspective, says Plato, “Now, it looks as though the other so-called virtues of the soul are akin to those of the body, for the really aren’t there beforehand but are added later by habit and practice [spiritual exercises].” 153 The systematized practice of Stoic, Epicurean, and Platonic was based upon methods of work upon the soul and grew out of the conviction that the basic problem of spiritual transformation is its permanence and that spiritual progress has a differentiated and gradual structure. The constant repetition of the exercises, adjusting them to the level of spiritual development, and their engagement of a person on all sides meant that conversion became the second, that is, proper nature. The spiritual masters took to heart the opinion of Democritus who taught that, “Nature is similar to teaching, since teaching transforms a man and by transforming him creates a new [second] nature.”154 There is an understanding of the role of habit (ethos) at the root of spiritual exercises, which, if we are to believe Krokiewicz’s interpretation, was already discovered by Heraclitus.155 The habit that leads to happiness, the habit of denying the heart (the realm of passions) and degrading pleasures, is the foundation of the developed concept of virtue conceived as fitness or ability (dynamis). What’s interesting is that habit is also an important element of theoretical knowledge156, which, much like virtue, the Greeks included in the wider category of abilities (dynameis). Therefore the art of properly grasping the essence of things is an ability, which, just like any art, can be perfected. This is an important qualification, which capably reflects the teleological paradigm of Greek thinking. Just like all of reality and all dynameis, knowledge and acting has its goal-oriented dimension, its proper function. The art of building ships, leading an army, the art of playing a cither, the art of healing are all different types of abilities, whose more perfect use requires the proper kinds of exercises.157 The essence of spiritual exercises is therefore the gradual perfection of man in realizing the functions proper to him qua human being. The realization of these, that is, their able and proper use, constitutes a specific type of good, a spiritual good, whose possession is synonymous with happiness.
Therefore the task of philosophy is to tear man away from unconsciousness, to wake him, to put his life under question, and then, while leading him through the succeeding phases of spiritual development, to protect him from the reefs of impermanence and doubt. The authentic doctor begins by awakening consciousness, by convincing the patient that he is sick. This is, we can assume, one of the functions of paradox: wonder, which opens up one’s eyes up to the truth. This is how Socrates saw the starting-point of his therapy. It is the reason why Socrates is like a torpedo-fish which paralyzes the confidence of so many of those who approach him158, the birth, during an incidental conversation, of the consciousness of a factual ignorance and the evanescence of goods for which people strive, and finally a brutal examination of conscience which allows one to discover, as Alcibiades acknowledges with extraordinary honesty that “my life isn’t worth living!”159 This, however, is only the beginning. Spiritual development is a slow achievement. As Pierre Hadot demonstrates in his wonderful study, paideia always takes a concrete person into consideration.160 The set and scope of the exercises depends upon the actual stage of development and the intellectual attunement of the student. Philosophy is the perfecting of the whole person, therefore we must remember the mutual conditioning of the exercises. Even though they are concerned with various aspects of human existence, they are parts of an overall personal development. In some sense logic has the quality of a moral exercise, whereas battling with the passions is an element of epistemological development. Reason cannot submerge itself in contemplation if the desiring part of the soul is in chaos. This is the elementary level of the tie between epistemology and ethics.161 Putting an end to the rebellion of the passions not only cures the soul of anxiety, but it also is the necessary condition for the proper functioning of reason. Moral asceticism must be understood as part of the cognitive cure and vice-versa. We should also remember that the exercises deal with different aspects of one and the same person and the development of the aspects tends in principle to be parallel.
All the exercises are meticulously selected for their aptitude or, to put it another way, usefulness. The principle of selecting the instruments is their effectiveness. There must be enough instruments/exercises and they must be practiced in such a wide range that the transformation will change the whole person. Therefore, when we determine what human nature is, that is, when we will know by what properly conducted functions human perfection is realized, then happiness will become the criterion of choosing the exercises—thus, paradoxically, also the criterion of the reasonableness of the teachings. This is the reason why the concept of nature decides about the various canons of education proper to the different philosophical schools, and simultaneously fulfills the role of a negative criterion that demonstrates what is not worth knowing. One of the sharpest pejorative designations is that of futility, that is, of inutility. The only one worse characterization is harmfulness. The former is connected to the conviction that happiness must be reached by the most reasonably short road without wasting precious time. These motives probably stand behind the decision of the stoic Aristo of Chios, who rejected logic and physics162, or Socrates, so often praised for his negative attitude toward the natural sciences.163 When Diogenes of Sinope calls Platonism “empty pride” , he probably had in mind the futility, which, according to him, characterized most of the Platonic exercises.164 However, when Heraclitus or Plato rail against the poets they have in mind something like anti-exercises—the strengthening of spiritual degeneracy. Futility is not at stake here, instead, they are concerned with harm. On the other hand, some exercises can become acknowledged as an indispensable condition of transformation. “That’s because you neglect geometry”165, Socrates accuses Calicles, whereas Xenocrates turns back a pupil who does not know music, geometry and astronomy telling him to, “Be gone, for you have not yet the handles of philosophy” , or according to another, more brutal, version, “Be gone, for I do not card wool here.”166 Even though this might sound iconoclastic, we can confidently say that the ancient philosophers were not interested in music, geometry, physics, semiotics or what-ever else. The philosophers were interested in happiness. Neither the advocates of the astronomical enthusiasm of Thales, nor their opponents were interested in astronomy for itself. After all, pure zeal for the curiosities of astronomy produces fruitless knowledge, for “we can know nothing about such things, or, even if we knew all about them, such knowledge would make us neither better nor happier”167, so said an opponent of these types of studies, and in principle it found a resonance in the words of their proponent, who said, “First of all we must not think that there is any other aim in knowledge of heavenly phenomena, whether in combination [with other subjects] or in isolation, than peace of mind and firm assurance.”168 This is how astronomy, in cooperation with rhetoric, can be, for example, an exercise in taming the passion for fame, limiting pride, which lie at the foundation of so many human miseries. The majestic spectacle of cosmic harmony gives resources, which when repeatedly meditated upon, will establish a disdainful stance toward the spectacular triviality of human ambitions and the impermanence of earthly accomplishments.169 The matter was much the same with all the disciplines that the ancients included in philosophy’s circle of interests: logic, natural sciences or even rhetoric (which was meant to teach how to use the human imagination to gain control over the passions). The Pythagorean brotherhood was the first to create a canonical method of philosophical transformation. Studying was accompanied by the practice of individual poverty, silence and abstinence during the period of the introductory exercises.170 We also know that Pythagoras recommended to his pupils a type of continually renewed ethical autoreflection, “It is said that he used to admonish his disciples to repeat these lines to themselves whenever they returned home to their houses, ‘In what have I transgressed? What have I done? What that I should have done have I omitted?’”171 We can surmise that a similar role was played by the Pythagorean study of music, mathematics, and astronomy, namely, they allowed thanks to meditation upon the order revealed by them, the soul of the philosopher increasingly to resemble that order. We will not consider more types of exercises.
The constant effort of attention directed at oneself, the continual coming to know oneself and contemplation of the whole of the world, Stoic meditation upon the triviality of unavoidable misfortunes, or the Epicurean meditations which discover the joy of existence through meditating upon past and future pleasures, are just a few of the many activities which led philosophical novices toward a state of inner freedom. We should however turn our attention to the importance this understanding of philosophy gave to schooling and the important role it gave to the authority of a spiritual master. A.D. Nock answers the question why philosophical schools played such a substantial role in the spiritual history of antiquity with the following: “Firstly, they offered intelligible explanations of phenomena. The Greek was naturally inquisitive, and the intellectual and political ferment of the fifth century had left many open questions. Secondly—and this is a point of cardinal importance—the schools offered a life with a scheme.
One of the terms for a school of philosophy, whatever its kind, is agoge, which means way of teaching and way of living.”172 As Ilsetraut Hadot writes, “ Ancient philosophy was, above all, help with life’s problems and spiritual guidance, and the ancient philosopher was, above all, a spiritual guide.”173
137 Ibid., p. 267.
138 Cf. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, O szczęściu [On Happiness], Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1985, p. 20.
139 The subjective guarantee of the absolute permanence of happiness is constituted by the unchangeableness, permanence, and immortality of the human soul.
140 This understanding of philosophy was propagated by Pl.. Cf. Grg. 464b, Th t. 167a, and Ti. 87c. It was taken up by Aristotle, cf. EN 1105b13–17; and after him by the whole of the ancient world. Healing, nursing, and the hospital are the typical metaphors that served to describe the tasks of philosophy. Cf. Juliusz Domański, Erazm i filozofia [Erasmus and Philosophy], op. cit., especially the chapter, “Filozofia jako ‘medicina animi’ a wolność filozofa” [Philosophy as ‘Medicina Animi’ and the Freedom of the Philosopher], p. 79–82.
141 Cf. Pl., Grg. 493b-c.
142 Cf. Pl., Cra. 400c; Clem. Al., Str., III.3.17.1–2. When characterizing the state of the soul in the body Aristotle uses the macabre image of an Etruscan torture that consisted in tying the bodies of the dead to the bodies of the living. Cf. Arist., Protr., fr. 107.
143 The only exception known to me is the libertine sect described by Irenaeus (Adv.
haer. I.6.2–3) which combined an ontological dualism with a belief about the total freedom of the soul toward the body, so much so, that some of the perfect were permitted debauchery. Cf. Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, Boston: Beacon Press, 2001, p. 275–276.
144 Heraclit., fr. B110 op. cit., p. 65.
145 Cited in: Augustinus, De Trin. XIII.5.8, quotation from: Augustine, On the Trinity:
Books 8–15, trans. Stephen McKenna, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 112.
146 Heraclit., fr. B85, op. cit., p. 53.
147 X., Mem. II.1.21–34.
148 “Yes, Callicles, wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder.” Pl., Grg. 507e-508a, op. cit., p. 852.
149 Democritus also says, “Happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. The soul is the dwelling place of the (good and evil) genius.” Both quotes cited in: Giovanni Reale, op. cit., p. 124.
150 D.L. VI.70, op. cit., p. 243.
151 Ibid. VI.42, p. 232.
152 Cic., Tusc. V.3.8–9.
153 Pl., R. 518d, op. cit., p. 1136.
154 Democr., fr. B33, cited in: Nikolaos Bakalis, Handbook of Greek Philosophy: From Thales to the Stoics: Analysis and Fragments, Victoria BC: Traf f ord Publishing, 2006, p. 99.
155 Cf. Adam Krokiewicz, Zarys filozofii greckiej [An Outline of Greek Philosophy], op.
cit., p. 149.
156 Arist., EN 1103a15, op. cit., p. 23: “Intellectual virtue owes its origin and development mainly to teaching, for which reason its attainment requires experience and time; virtue of character is a result of habituation [ethikai from ethos], for which reason it has acquired its name through a small variation on [ethos].”
157 Ibid. 1098a5.
158 Pl., Men. 80a.
159 Pl., Smp. 216a, op. cit., p. 55.
160 Cf. Pierre Hadot, op. cit., especially the chapter “Spiritual Exercises” , p. 81–126.
161 Ibid., p. 81–83.
162 D.L. VII.160–161, op. cit., p. 318.
163 Ibid. II.21, p. 65.
164 Ibid. VI.24, p. 226.
165 Pl., Grg. 508a, op. cit., p. 852.
166 D.L. IV.10, op. cit., p. 156.
167 Cic., Rep. I.19.32, in: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, trans. James E.G. Zetzel, Cambridge: Cammbridge University Press, 1999, p. 15.
168 Epicur., Ad. Pyth., § 85. Cited in: R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 14.
169 An example of using astronomy as this type of spiritual exercise is the unusually popular “Scipio’s Dream” which concludes Cicero’s On the Commonwealth.
170 D.L. VIII.10, op. cit., p. 342.
171 Ibid. VIII.22, p. 347.
from the book The Archparadox of Death Martyrdom as a Philosophical Category (Dariusz Karlowicz, Bartosz Adamczewski)