To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label homo monasticus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label homo monasticus. Show all posts

Sunday, October 11, 2026

Flight from the World and Constitution

 

3.1. There is, however, an aspect of the rules according to which they can be considered as juridical acts; it does not concern civil or penal law, but public law. It is possible, that is to say, to consider the rules as constituent acts, which bear on the formation of those “political” communities that cenobies and convents undoubtedly are, even if in a peculiar sense. At the foundation of this jurispublic nature of the rules stands the doctrine of the fuga saeculi as a so-to-speak constituent process of the community of believers, which was elaborated by Philo and picked up and developed by Ambrose.

Let us first consider Philo’s De fuga et inventione (On Flight and Finding). Here the flight of Jacob is motivated first of all by the fact that Laban has abandoned all care for the law, in such a way that the “ascetic powers” that drive Jacob to flee act in order to reclaim an inheritance that has been unjustly taken from them. And the places of refuge and exile (phygadeutēria; phygē, in Greek, means in the first place exile) are here—on the basis of a midrash on Numbers 35:11–14, with regard to the places where those guilty of involuntary homicide could find refuge—genuine cities that each symbolize, however, a divine power. There are six of them: the first, the mother-city (mētropolis), is the divine word (logos), the first place in which it is useful to seek refuge. The other five, which are “colonies” (apoikiai) with respect to the first, are described as follows:

their leader being creative [poietikē] power, in the exercise of which the Creator produced the universe by a word; second in order is the royal [basilikē] power, in virtue of which he that has made it governs [archei] that which has come into being; third stands the gracious [hileōs] power, in the exercise of which the Great Artificer takes pity and compassion on his own work; fourth is the legislative power, by which he prescribes duties incumbent on us; and fifth that division of legislation, by which he prohibits those things which should not be done. (17, 95)

Flight is thus conceived as a process that carries the fugitive or the exile through six cities that are so many constitutive “political” powers: the divine word (identified with the great/high priest), creation, kingdom, governance, positive and negative legislation.

The cities are, moreover, Levitical cities, because the Levites are themselves in a certain way also fugitives and exiles (phygades), who have abandoned parents, children, and brothers in order to please God. To the Levites and priests are entrusted the care of the temple and the leitourgia (that is, the public function of the cult). In the same way, even the fugitives who have been rendered guilty of an involuntary fault “are also engaged in a service [leitourgousi]” (17, 93). In this dense midrash, which was to have a long posterity in Christianity, exile is seen paradoxically as a “liturgy,” a public service by which the exiled are assimilated to priests.

It is well known that Ambrose’s De fuga saeculi (Flight from the World) depends heavily on Philo’s text and that, in this sense, it certainly does not sparkle with originality. Yet the very fact that he had decided to insert Philo’s midrash into one of the foundational works of Christian asceticism inscribes the theme of the flight from the world within a peculiar perspective, in which renunciation and asceticism are linked closely to the exercise of the priesthood, that is to a public practice. Not only does chapter 2 take up once again, almost literally, Philo’s exegesis of the cities of refuge, but with a development that is pregnant with significance, the high priest, whom Philo already assimilated to the divine logos, is identified without reserve with the Son.

Who is this chief priest but the Son of God, the Word of God? We enjoy his advocacy in our behalf before the Father, for he is free from every offense, both willed and unintentional, and in him subsist all things which are on earth and which are in heaven. For all things have been bound by the bond of the Word and are held together by his power and subsist in him, because in him they have been created and in him all God’s fullness dwells. And so all things endure, because he does not allow what things he has bound to be loosened, since they subsist by his will. Indeed, as long as he wills, he keeps all things in check by his command and rules and binds them by a harmony of nature. (Ambrose, pp. 85/291)

At the suggestion of Philo and the Pauline letter to the Hebrews, the Word is immediately associated with the great priest of Psalm 109:4:

Be satisfied now that he is the great high priest. The Father swore an oath in his regard, saying, “You are a priest forever.” . . . This is the Word of God, in whom there inheres the high priesthood. In the account of the clothing of the high priest, Moses describes the garments symbolically, because the Word put on the world by his own power and is resplendent among all men as if he were clothed with it. . . . Christ is the head of all, and from him the whole body extends and is joined by a mutual joining of its parts to one another, while receiving its increase in the building up of itself in love. (ibid., pp. 88–90/293–94)

Here the theme of the flight from the world, so constitutive of monasticism, is united with the exercise of an ecclesial practice in which the fugitive appears as a true minister of the community: “the minister of God’s holy altar is one who is in flight from his own” (fugitans igitur est suorum sacri altaris eius minister; pp. 78/285). And it is on this basis that monastic exile from the world could be conceived as the foundation of a new community and a new public sphere.

א By making exile a constitutive political principle, Philo was in reality referring to a tradition established in Greek philosophy, which made use of exile as a metaphor of the perfect life of the philosopher. In the celebrated passage of the Theatatus (176a–b), in which assimilation to God appears as a phygē (phygēēde homoiōsis theōi kata ton dynaton), it is necessary to restore to phygē its originary meaning of exile (“assimilation to God is virtually an exile”). And it is in perfect analogy with the Platonic metaphor that in the Politics (1324a 15–16) Aristotle can define the form of the philosopher’s life as “alien” (xenikos bios). And centuries later, when Plotinus at the end of the Enneads will define the life of “divine and happy” men (that is, of philosophers) as a phygēmonou pros monon, the passage becomes fully intelligible only if the political character of the image is not lost: “exile in solitude to the solitary” (Ennead 6.9.11). “Exile from the world” is first of all a political gesture that in Philo and Ambrose is equivalent to the constitution of a new community.

3.2. In 1907 Ildefons Herwegen, the initiator of the liturgical movement in the Benedictine abbey of Maria Laach, called attention to an exceptional document that casts new light on the rules and monastic professions and, in particular, allows one to situate them in a jurispublic perspective. The text in question is the so-called Pactum, which is found at the end of St. Fructuosus of Braga’s Regula communis. The interest of this document, from a little before 670, is that it is presented as an accord or contract between two parties, the group of monks on the one hand (designated with the generic term nos omnes) and the abbot on the other (defined as tu dominus), in which they found and regulate the community through decreeing reciprocal obligations:

Thus, fired with divine ardor, lo, all of us whose names are subscribed below entrust our souls to God and to you, our master and our father, that we may live in one monastery under Christ’s guidance and your teaching according to the edict of the apostles and the Rule, and as sanctioned by the authority of the fathers in the past. Whatever you desire for the safety of our souls to pronounce, teach, perform, reprimand, excommunicate, or correct in accordance with the Rule [annuntiare, docere, agere, increpare, imperare, excommunicare, secundum regulam emendare], we shall completely carry out with humble heart, all arrogance aside, with mind intent, with burning zeal, with the aid of divine grace, without making excuses [inexcusabiliter], and with the Lord’s favor. If any of us shall be complaining, obstinate, disobedient, or slandering against the Rule and against your command [contra regulam et tuum praeceptum murmurans, contumax, inobediens vel calumniator], then, you may have the power to bring all into an assembly and to read the Rule in the presence of all and to correct our guilt publicly, and each one who is guilty shall receive his due, the lash or ban of excommunication, with due consideration for his misconduct. If anyone shall secretly intrigue with his parents, brothers, sons, relatives, or neighbors, or especially with a fellow brother in the absence of the above-mentioned father, you may have the power over each one who has attempted such a crime to have him put under ban of excommunication and confined to a dark cell for six months on bread and water alone, wearing a penitential tunic or sackcloth, without cincture and without shoes. If a monk is unwilling to undertake such a penance with full consent, he is to be stretched out naked and given 72 blows with a lash and to be deprived of the clothing of the monastery and to be expelled from the institution in conspicuous disgrace. (Fructuosus, “Pact,” p. 208; cf. Herwegen, pp. 2–3)

Opposite this subjection of the monks to the sovereignty of the abbot stands, however, the obligation of the abbot to govern with justice and equity:

We remind you, our master, that if you should treat any of us unjustly—which it is unreasonable to believe and which may God not allow to happen—if you should treat any of us with pride or anger, or should love one and show hatred and rancor for another, or should dominate one but revere another, as people often do, then we shall have the right also granted to us by God to take our complaint without pride and without anger through the dean to the prior, and the prior shall humbly kiss the foot of you our lord and lay before you the details of our complaint, and you must be willing to listen patiently and to bend your neck humbly to the common rule and correct and reform yourself. If you are not willing to correct yourself, then we may also have the power of consulting another monastery, or else a bishop who lives under the Rule, or a Catholic count who is a defender of the Church, and of inviting them to meet with us, that, in their presence, you may correct yourself and fulfill the tenets of the Rule. (Fructuosus, “Pact,” p. 209; cf. Herwegen, pp. 3–4)

Herwegen, who lingers on the juridical meaning of the document, renders an account of the constitutional character of the pact with respect to the convent community, but without drawing all its consequences. “This formula,” he writes, “is the expression of a juridical negotiation through which a multiplicity is united for a common cloistered life. A superior power, under the reservation of certain rules, is conferred on an abbot defined as ‘lord and father,’ in the form of a monastic profession. The agreement is presented here as the foundation of a convent, connected with the subjection of the monks to the abbot” (Herwegen, p. 4). From this perspective, he seeks to demonstrate the possible influence on the pactum, on the one hand, of the oaths of subjection between subjects and sovereign contained in the lex Visigothorum and, on the other, of the Roman legionnaire’s oath of obedience. It is all the more surprising, then, that Herwegen, exclusively preoccupied with relating the pactum to its Visigothic context and distinguishing it from the monastic profession in the strict sense, does not notice that the pactum constitutes, perhaps, the first and only example of a social contract in which human beings in a group subject themselves unconditionally to the authority of a dominus, attributing to him the power to direct the life of the community that is thus founded in all its aspects. With respect to the Hobbesian covenant or Rousseau’s social contract, in which the authority of the sovereign knows no limits, to the monks’ obligation of subjection there corresponds the obligation to govern with justice on the part of the abbot. In any case, however, what is decisive is that the pactum is not in any way assimilable to a private contract and that by abstracting the question from the discussion—which is, all things considered, sterile—of the contractual or votive character of the monastic profession, it allows us in some way to consider the rules in their integrity as true and proper constituting documents (constitutiones, as they are after all often designated) of the cloistered community.

3.3. In reality, what is decisive here is not so much the problem of the more or less juridical nature of the rules, which cannot be proposed for the earliest rules, but more generally that of the peculiar relation between life and norm that comes to be established in the rule. What is in question is thus not what in the rule is precept and what is advice, nor the degree of obligation that it implies, but rather a new way of conceiving the relation between life and law, which again calls into question the very concepts of observance and application, of transgression and fulfillment.

Already in the earliest rules, the penal apparatuses often refer not to individual actions, but to something like a vice or a spiritual condition of the monk. Qui facilis est ad detrahendum, si in hoc peccato fuerit deprehensus . . . iracundus et furiosus si frequenter irascitur (“The one who is quick to slander, if he is caught in this sin . . . if an irascible and raging person frequently becomes angry”), one reads in Pachomius’s Praecepta atque iudicia. Si quis frater contumax aut superbus aut murmurans aut inoboediens . . . (“If any brother is stubborn or proud or given to complaining or disobedient . . .”), begins the chapter De excommunicatione culparum (About Excommunication for Faults) in the Rule of the Master (Vogüé2, 2, pp. 33/149). And in the rule of Isidore, the index that enumerates the most serious offences is more similar to a catalog of vices than to the outline of culpable offences: si temulentus quisquam sit, si discors, si turpiloquus, si feminarum familiaris, si seminans discordias, si iracundus . . . (“if anyone is drunk, disagreeable, foul-speaking, friendly with women, a sower of discord, irascible . . .”; Regula monachorum, p. 886).

This holds even more so for the monk’s positive obligations. A passage from Bernard of Clairvaux’s De praecepto et dispensatione (On Precept and Dispensation) is particularly significant from this perspective. Responding in an imaginary dialogue to a monk who, having professed the rule, laments not being able to fulfill his vow in the monastery where he is, Bernard writes:

But truly, I say, neither of these complaints is just. He who thinks it perjury not to observe the rule in its purity [ad purum], has I think paid scant attention to what he actually promised. No one at profession [cum profitetur] really promises “the Rule” [spondet regulam], but specifically, that he will act “according to the rule” [secundum regulam] from the moment of his conversion and in his form-of-life [conversionem suamque . . . conversationem dirigere]. This sort of profession formula has, in our day, been adopted by almost all monks. However, God is served in many diverse ways in the various monasteries. So long as one carefully observes the good customs of his house he is beyond any doubt living according to the rule, for the rule admits of variations in local customs. (Bernard of Clairvaux, De praecepto et dispensatione, pp. 250–52/140–41)

As the opposition between a technical legal term (spondere, to obligate oneself personally to something) and an expression drawn from ascetic language (to lead the proper form of life) shows clearly, the passage testifies to a transformation that affects the way we understand the relationship between norm and life. The one who promises does not obligate himself, as happens in the law, to the fulfillment of the individual acts expected in the rule, but puts into question his way of living, which is not identified with a series of actions or exhausted in them. As Bernard adds immediately after, “those who undertake to live according to the Rule [secundum regulam vivere], even if they do not keep it completely in every detail [ad unguem], and even if they change or omit certain details according to the customs of their house, as long as they are faithful to what is locally accepted as a ‘sober, just, and pious life’ [sobrie et iuste et pie vivere], they are truly living the Rule” (ibid., pp. 286/141).

It is most likely in reference to this passage that Thomas can write that “he who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the things contained in the rule [non votet observare omnia quae sunt in regula], but he vows the regular life [votet regularam vitam] which consists essentially in the three aforesaid things [poverty, continence, and humility]. Hence in certain religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live according to the rule [profitentur non quidem regulam, sed vivere secundum regulam]” (Summa theologica, 2a 2ae, q. 186, art. 9). Even if Thomas seems to reduce the problem to that of the difference between precept and rule, the decisive point, which the authors have difficulty putting in focus, is the transformation that is in question in the passage from “promising the rule” to “promising to live according to the rule” (promising life). The object of the promise is here no longer a legal text to observe or a certain action or a series of determinate behaviors, but the subject’s very forma vivendi.

3.4. In Suárez, this special character of the monastic profession assumes the paradoxical form of an obligation that doesn’t have a certain human act as its object, but the obligation itself. He begins first of all by distinguishing two meanings of the term votum: in the first, the word designates “the obligation and the bond that remains in one who has pronounced the vow” (pro obligatione et vinculo quod manet in homine habente votum), in the second, “the act by which the obligation immediately comes about” (pro actu illo a quo immediate nascitur obligatio; Suárez, p. 804). “I say,” he continues, “that the vow properly so-called, insofar as it signifies that act by means of which a person obliges himself with respect to God, cannot have for its object any human act other than the obligation itself, that is the bond that is realized through the act of vowing oneself” (non habere pro obiecto alium actum humanum sed obligationem ipsam, seu vinculum efficiendum per actum vovendi; ibid.).

The vow, insofar as it “is nothing other than the obligation, by which someone is bound spontaneously to God [se spontanee obligat deo],” does not obligate one, like the law, simply to fulfill determinate acts and keep away from others, but produces in the will a “permanent and, as it were, habitual bond” (vinculum permanens et quasi in habitu; ibid.). Here the vow is a “vow of the vow” (habet pro obiecto votum), in the sense that it does not refer immediately to a certain action or a certain series of acts, but first of all to the bond that is itself to be produced in the will:

And this will, through which the human being obliges himself with respect to God, has for its object the very obligation to God and thus has for its object the vow or the promise, to the extent to which this signifies the bond itself that is to be realized through the vow, and not to the extent in which it signifies the acts to be vowed or promised [habet pro obiecto votum vel promissionem, quatenus haec significat vinculum ipsum efficiendum per votum, non quatenus significat actum vovendi aut promittendi]. (ibid.)

What Suárez here tries laboriously to conceptualize by multiplying his distinctions is the paradox of an obligation whose primary content is not a certain behavior, but the very form of the will of the one who, by promising the vow, has been bound to God. The vow has, that is, the form of law, but not its content, and like the Kantian imperative, it has no immediate object except the very will of the one vowing. For this reason, in the next chapter, Suárez takes care to distinguish the votum in the proper sense, which is realized only through the promise (per solam promissionem), from the traditio, which is added to it in the case of the solemn vow of chastity, in which the one vowing “consigns and consecrates his body to God as chaste in perpetuity” (ibid., p. 805). In distinction from the pagan devotio, in which the devotus consigned to the gods his body and his biological life, the Christian vow is, so to speak, objectively vowed and has no other content than the production of a habitus in the will, whose ultimate result will be a certain form of common life (or, from the liturgical perspective, the realization of a certain officium or a certain religio).

Once more, the decisive core of the monastic condition is not a substance or content, but a habitus or a form. Understanding that condition will require us to turn toward the task of confronting of the problem of “habit” and form of life.

א In our archeology of duty (Agamben 1, §4, chap. 8), we showed that religio is the name that theologians give to that singular relation between norm and life, which configures a sort of juridical duty in the form of a virtue or a habitus.

In order to understand the new figure of the relation between norm and life that here starts to be delineated, it is necessary to refer to juridical situations which find their technical form only later in administrative law—that is, in that branch of modern law that had its gestation in the sphere of the practices of Church administration. It is here that one encounters norms (called instrumental) that provide veritable outlines of behavior, linked to the definition of a “competence-duty,” that is, to an obligation or a legitimation to act that derives from a determinate situation (for example, the assumption of an office). The “duties of office” that result from it configure a type or a normative outline of a practice that is not exhausted in an individual action, but defines a definite conduct of life, whose objective element and subjective element tend to coincide and which recalls, in this sense, the monk’s vivere secundum regulam and religio.

3.5. What is decisive in any case is that the form of life that is in question in the rules is a koinos bios, a common life. Every interpretation of the monastic rules must first of all situate them in this context, from which they cannot be separated. When we ask ourselves about the relation between monks and rules, it is necessary not to forget Wittgenstein’s observation according to which it is not possible to follow a rule privately, because referring to a rule necessarily implies a community and a set of habits. Even for the monk the principle holds according to which “it is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person followed a rule. . . . To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions)” and “‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’” (Wittgenstein 1, pp. 381–82/87–88).

It is important to specify, therefore, that the common life is not the object that the rule must constitute and govern. On the contrary—as both the claim of a “power conceded to us by God” in the “Pact” of St. Fructuosus and the insistence on the distinction between “promising the rule” and “promising life” in Bernard and Thomas testify—it is the rule that seems to be born from “cenoby,” that (to use the language of modern public law) seems to be placed with respect to cenoby like constituent power with respect to the text of the constitution. If the ideal of a “common life” obviously has a political character, cenoby is perhaps the place in which the community of life as such is claimed without reserve as the element that is in every sense constitutive. What is in question, in the life of cenoby, is thus a transformation of the very canon of human practice, which has been so determinate for the ethics and politics of Western society that perhaps still today we cannot fully grasp its nature and implications.

The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life

Giorgio Agamben 

Saturday, October 10, 2026

Warriors of God the Great Religious Orders and their Founders


Introduction

A strange poem in Rainer Maria Rilke’s Stunden-Buch tells of monks who “buried themselves deep down in the earth,” returning, as it were, into the womb; of a life that was “as a thousand years ’ because it was no longer divided into night and day; of pilgrims who come to gaze with reverent eyes upon the “buried ones” whose bodies have never known decay.¹ Rilke was writing about the monks of a cave-monastery in Kiev which had become a famous place of pilgrimage; he was also—unwittingly, no doubt —creating an image of the fate of monasticism in modern times.

With the spread of the ideas of the French Revolution, the very concept of monasticism became increasingly unintelligible to the West. A purely utilitarian world had little place for otherworldly aspirations. Besides, monastic life must perforce be looked upon as contrary to nature. The objection, of course, was not new; it had been raised by men like Erasmus in the sixteenth century, as it had been raised by men like Jovinian in the fourth. But in the Age of Enlightenment the opposition to monasticism gathered into veritable frenzy, forcing the dissolution of numerous monasteries. And monasticism, like the monks in Rilke’s mysterious verse, responded by retreating into the catacombs, hibernating, so to speak, in the caverns of the earth, the better to preserve its secret from impious eyes.
It had not disappeared for good; monasticism is far too deeply rooted in the human heart ever to disappear completely. Signs of a revival were already apparent in the nineteenth century. And just as St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection of the dead, cried out to the Corinthians: “Behold, I show you a mystery!” (I Cor. xv, 51), so we today must tell the world none the less urgently: see, monasticism descended into the bowels of the earth only that it might rise again! Indeed, the true significance of the descent lay in the patient preparation of an imminent reawakening.

The process is a hidden one unperceived by those whose concern is only with externals; from a religious point of view, however, it is one of the most significant developments of our time, and it requires of us a new encounter with monasticism. Here we may recall Franz Overbeck’s dictum that monasticism is a phenomenon that neither Catholic nor Protestant theology is able to assess adequately. Catholic theology having long since lost the necessary purity of understanding, Protestant theology never having been sufficiently objective.² For all that it is so disputable, the statement sounds a warning that merits attention.

To grasp the reality of monasticism is clearly not as easy as it might appear to be. Wel-nigh impassable mountains of prejudice have to be scaled first. And that means, to start with, that the whole subject has to be lifted right out of the context of sectarianism. For sectarianism—not to be confused with membership of the particular denomination in which Providence has been pleased to place a particular individual—is all too conducive to malice, and tends to blur one’s vision of truth. It should be remembered, moreover, that the great monastic orders were founded in the marvelous climate of an as yet undivided Christendom. If only on ecumenical grounds, therefore, it is necessary to break through all narrow partisan attitudes in a Christian spirit that transcends polemics and keeps one mindful of the duty to serve all denominations. In such a spirit, we shall approach monasticism with a new openmindedness, and we shall look upon this mighty edifice of Christian spirituality with loving veneration, though not, of course, uncritically.

Scholarship can provide some of the means of gaining a better understanding of monasticism. Historical methods have been invaluable in the assembling of source material, and the author recalls with sincere gratitude the numerous monographs he has read on particular aspects of the monastic movement. Academic objectivity, however, often leads to an inner aloofness that blinds the scholar to the essential. Although research is necessary, therefore, it must remain peripheral to the subject and cannot be regarded as constituting the final authority.

More than scholarly treatment is needed if there is really to be a new encounter with monasticism. The academic approach has to be completed and lifted to a higher plane by an altogether different approach, such as was formulated, for instance, in the very heyday of rationalism, by the fascinating visionary who called himself Novalis (1772—1802). That Johannine emissary of the divine, having passed through the “Gothic arches of pure reason,” was able to survey the world of sense from the vantage point of a higher reality; in one of his most bewitching poems he speaks of a future when “those who sing or those who kiss will know more than all the great scholars.”³ The man who, “through tales and poems, penetrates to the heart of things” can arrive at the deeper vision of a Novalis. The supra-scholarly approach is not founded on mere emotion; intuitive perception depends upon the illumination of the Logos, and precisely this makes of the new inquiry into monasticism an act of living religion rather than an exercise in academic hairsplitting.

II

In re-evaluating monasticism, we can adopt various points of view. It is doubtless wisest to begin by considering the subject from the point of view of history; we tend, nowadays, to be very conscious of the importance of historical perspective. And history will at once show us that monasticism is heir to a venerable tradition, and that it is common to many religions.

The phenomenology of religious history shows us that there is a deep connection between man’s religious aspirations and the monastic life. India, with its extraordinary talent for religion and its profusion of monasteries, affords an interesting illustration of the point.

Indian monasticism is most strongly marked by the influence of the Buddha, that tremendous figure whose significance no Western mind has yet succeeded in comprehending to the full. Buddha opens his lapidary admonitions with the stereotyped “This, O monks, is the sacred truth, thereby indicating that he is addressing himself exclusively to men who have embraced the monastic state. And Buddha s true disciple is the radiant monk who passes through the world absolved and filled with inner peace: “His heart overflowing with loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic gladness, and even-mindedness, he abides, raying them forth toward one quarter of space, then toward the second and third, then toward the fourth, above and below, thus all around. Everywhere, into all places the wide world over, his heart overflowing, streams forth, ample, expanded, limitless, free from enmity and all ill-will.”⁴

Buddha sent forth his monks, freed from all worldly ties, for the salvation and joy of many, out of pity for the world and for the good of mankind, to announce a teaching that they were also to manifest by their own holiness, reconciling men wherever they went. Buddha s radiant monk is free of earthly dust; the love of his liberated heart transcends the baser preoccupations of the majority of men as the moonlight outshines the brightness of the stars.

Thus, the Buddhistic form of monasticism alone should give us pause: perhaps our opinion of monasticism was overhasty, and needs revision.

Monasticism is, above all, a valid development of Christianity. The single answer to the largely unfruitful discussions on the origins of Christian monasticism is that the monastic life is implicit in the Church, not the product of pagan influences. The eschatological teachings of Jesus brought about a turning-away from the world, an attitude that was already very marked in St. Paul. Christian monasticism is rooted in the New Testament, and the first hermits appealed to the Bible to justify their way of life. Oswald Spengler, whose philosophy of history was certainly innocent of all denominational bias, remarked that “Christian monasticism did not begin with Pachomius (320); he was merely the builder of the first cloister. The movement began with the original community in Jerusalem itself.”⁵

Historically speaking, Christian monasticism stemmed directly from the earliest Christian ascetics, a response to the danger that a secularized Christendom would stifle all genuine religious life. Monasticism and the teachings of the Fathers are the fairest flowers of the early Church. And it is logically impossible to recognize the fundamental importance of the early Church for all subsequent Christian generations and, at the same time, to reject as an aberration monasticism, which was an integral part of that Church. In the deplorable entanglement of ecclesiastical and political issues which was already apparent in the fourth century, the monks represented “as it were the other side of the Church,” and, “thanks to their asceticism, preserved the balance.”⁶ That, in effect, is the ultimate significance of monasticism: to express most purely what is purest in Christian spirituality. We must focus our attention on this other, oft-neglected side of the Church.

The Eastern Church was molded by monasticism; indeed, it cannot be understood at all in isolation from its monastic life. “If you want to know what Christianity really means, you have to know monasticism,” wrote Kirejewsky.⁷ This is no isolated opinion; it is echoed, for instance, by Konstantin Leontiev.⁸ And the legends of the Russian saints make abundantly clear that the Eastern Church is wholly penetrated by monasticism. The growing interest in Eastern Christianity, therefore, will be something more than a vague enthusiasm for the Russian soul only if it also extends to Eastern monasticism, which conceals a truly marvelous piety under its alien garb.

Religious Russians have always been convinced of the immense importance of monasticism in the life of their people. Gogol, for instance, himself a deeply religious man, testified to the intimate connection between faith and the monastic life in the Eastern Church when he wrote: “There is no higher vocation than the monk's. Please God that we may one day don the cowl for which my soul longs. Merely to think of it fills me with great joy. But by our own strength we can never attain to this; we can attain to it only if God calls us to it.”⁹ Even Tolstoy, for all his opposition to the Church, was to experience the loving-kindness of Russian monasticism. During his last flight, at dead of night, he knocked at a monastery door to ask whether he might spend the night there even though he had been excommunicated. “We receive everyone, was the doorkeeper’s answer. Those simple words epitomize an attitude permanently characteristic of Eastern Christian monasticism.

It was in Western Christendom, however, that monasticism flourished most abundantly. During the barbarian invasions that engulfed the Roman Empire like a second Flood, the monasteries served as so many arks, salvaging the greater part of the writings of the classical authors, of the primitive Church, and of the Fathers.

Monasticism reached its peak in the Middle Ages; nearly all the great religious figures of the time were members of orders, and it is mostly to them that we owe whatever great Christian achievements the period produced. The religious orders constituted the spiritual arsenal of the Church; monks were the mainstay of medieval Christendom.

Most of the orders were founded in pre-Reformation times, but only within the Catholic Church have they continued to receive the care and the encouragement they require. That is why one tends to identify monasticism with the Catholic Church. In any case, they are intimately connected, and have constantly enriched one another.

For the Church the orders have been an inexhaustible well of holiness without which the Christian soil would long since have dried out. They have given the Church an abundance of saints whose lives have both demonstrated the transcendent character of Christianity and inspired other men to love it. Catholicism without monasticism is, indeed, unimaginable. It is not surprising, therefore, that those who desire to deal a mortal blow to the Catholic Church always begin by attacking the monasteries, the true powerhouses of Catholicism.

Yet while the Catholic Church lives primarily by the spiritual substance of her orders, and not by their political action, the progress of monasticism within the Church has been neither smooth nor steady. The curve shows sheer ascents succeeded by steep declines—but these latter are always made up again. New orders have constantly sprung up, affording the best proof of the Church’s inner vitality. This fruitfulness certainly did not come to a halt with the founding of the Society of Jesus, with which the present work concludes. The founders of orders we treat in these pages are only the outstanding ones; they are far from exhausting the list.

That Protestantism saw the light of day in the lonely cell of a monastery is too often forgotten. For nineteen years Luther belonged to a religious order, and monasticism was an aid far more than an obstruction in his path. His religious development, however, brought him into serious conflict with the monastic world, and only at the very end of his life did he come to appreciate the regenerated monasteries as fortresses of peace in a wicked world.¹ Btit he arrived at this conclusion too late to prevent Protestantism from inheriting his earlier antagonism to monasticism, and that anti-monastic attitude has remained with it ever since. Luther’s tragic step is too often oversimplified, and there is a tendency to forget that, in the depths of his soul, “he remained a monk, even though he no longer belonged to an order.”²

There are positive overtones even in Melanchthon’s Apologia Confessionis Augustinae, with all its attacks on monasticism; he speaks, for instance, of a few monasteries that “do know the holy Gospel of Christ,”³ and considers that “Bernard, Francis, and other” founders of orders should not be identified with the corrupt monasticism of his own day.⁴ In any case, early Protestantism was hardly in a position to debate these matters; it was in a state of active warfare, and was therefore obliged to combat monasticism in all its forms, eradicating it down to the last decaying institutions for ladies of noble birth. The modern Protestant attitude on this score was expressed by Adolf von Harnack: “The Reformation abolished monasticism, and was bound to abolish it. It rightly affirmed that to take a vow of lifelong asceticism was a piece of presumption; and it rightly considered that any worldly vocation, conscientiously followed in the sight of God, was equal to, nay, was better than, being a monk. But something now happened which Luther neither foresaw nor desired: ‘monasticism’ of the kind that is conceivable and necessary in the evangelical sense of the word disappeared altogether. But every community stands in need of personalities living exclusively for its ends.
The Church, for instance, needs volunteers who will abandon every other pursuit, renounce 'the world' and devote themselves entirely to the service of their neighbor; not because such a vocation is ca higher one, but because it is a necessary one, and because no Church can live without also giving rise to this desire. But in the evangelical Churches the desire has been checked by the decided attitude they have been compelled to adopt towards Catholicism. It is a high price that we have paid; nor can the price be reduced by considering, on the other hand, how much simple and unaffected religious fervor has been kindled in home and family life.”⁵

Protestantism was the poorer for suppressing monasticism. The Baptists who attempted in their own way to remedy this loss were accused by Heinrich Bullinger of new monkery. Nevertheless, various attempts have been made to introduce monasticism within the framework of Protestantism, and these attempts should not be regarded as the product of mere romantic enthusiasm. We might mention the gentle Gerhard Tersteegen, who organized a Protestant monastic community on the Otterbeck estate, giving it rules that have become a revered document of Protestant monasticism. Following in the footsteps of the Muhlheim weaver, Jean de Labadie tried to organize a similar group in Holland. And Albrecht Ritschl noted the connection between monasticism and the sort of Pietism evident in the rule for German deaconesses.

Some individual Protestants, moreover, have shown quite unexpected leanings toward the monastic life. Soren Kierkegaard, in particular, makes repeated references to medieval monasticism in his principal work Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It is characteristic that he should not only have been the first once again to regard Christianity as an existential doctrine, but also should have felt that he himself belonged to the monastic world. In his autobiographical work. The Point of View for My Work as an Author, he remarks that when he was writing Either-Or, in which he set out his views on ethics and esthetics, he was already, religiously speaking, in the cloister—as shown by his use of the name “Victor- Eremita.” He saw himself as a man dwelling in a monastery, and Martin Thust in his monograph on Kierkegaard stresses the theme: “Kierkegaard was a Protestant monk in the sense that he was able to achieve a unique combination of what was deepest in the old monastic way of life with that vindication of life in the world which is characteristic of the Reformation.”⁶ -These different attempts in the direction of monasticism must not, of course, be overestimated; nevertheless, they are symptomatic of a deficiency in Protestantism. The problem has never been fully resolved in the Protestant Church, and it should, indeed, be kept alive. To deal with it is more than ever important, now, when it has become only too apparent that community consciousness by itself offers too narrow a basis for the Christian life. The tragedy occurs when the community, as one of Bernanos’s characters has it, becomes a dead community. The Christian life has to be anchored in something deeper than church communities, and Christian brotherhood offers just such an anchorage.

III

A historical sketch of the development of Christian monasticism would be incomplete without a further analysis undertaken from the point of view of religion. This would be in the nature of an inquiry into the essential significance of monasticism, a weighing of it, as it were, on Job’s scales, to assay its worth in the light of eternity.

We are reminded, in this connection, of the famous words of a sixteenth-century German general, Georg von Frundsberg: “My dear little monk, you are taking a step the like of which neither I nor many a commander in our fiercest battle would take. If you are sure of being right, thoroughly convinced that your cause is of God, then proceed in the name of God, and be of good cheer: God will never forsake you.⁷ These words, spoken on a memorable occasion, could be applied validly to all monks. Nor has the diminutive “little” any derogatory intent; on the contrary, it betrays something akin to tenderness. For the path of the monk has never been easy or smooth; it leads to stark heights and somber depths, and keen courage is needed to tread it.

We shall not grasp the religious significance of monasticism by looking at it through rose-colored spectacles. Uncritical admiration is the principal defect, for instance, of the Comte de Montalembert’s monumental study The Monks of the West; it is doubtless to be ascribed to the author’s personal inexperience of the monastic life. The seasoned religious speaks in very different tones from those of the French romanticist, but he loves his cloister none the less for that. What is needed is not insipid, sometimes downright dishonest, eulogy, but an altogether new language. And this means discarding completely the kind of apologetics which, like Job’s friends, uses deceit in defense of God (Job xiii, 7); it means pointing frankly to shortcomings. Nor does such frankness derogate from the reverence that the subject deserves. It is quite unnecessary to gloss over the infirmities of monasticism. The reality of monasticism encompasses both heroic fulfillment and pitiful failure, and it proves its Christian vitality precisely when it endures the hardest blows.
The monk is called to a life that is far from ordinary. Unfortunately, too many merely ordinary men have sought to embrace it and, being unequal to the hardships it entails, have failed lamentably. It is they who have given rise to the absurd notion that the cloistered are prisoners of their own making, gloomily wasting their lives and depriving their countries of useful citizens. It is they, too, who have created the repulsive character of the monk who seeks to deceive God by means of his tonsure, as Benedict of Nursia puts it in his rule. Such people, who have no vocation, would do better to leap over the wall like Monica Baldwin, but it is certain that no one who has really been called will leap after them. The saddest part of it is the general corruption to which such individual attitudes have led. The decline of monasticism in the late Middle Ages which resulted from the decay of monastic discipline had catastrophic consequences for the whole of Christendom.

The dark pages of monasticism, which its adversaries cite with glee, must not be mistaken for monasticism itself. At the same time, we have no intention of overrating the importance of monasticism by calling it the highest form of the Christian life. Monks themselves have warned against that kind of exaggeration. In the letters of the Russian staretz Feofan, for instance, we read: “It is best not to consider whether or not one is called to the cloister; that is not the point. If the cloister is in a man’s heart, it is immaterial whether the building is actually there. The cloister in one’s heart means only this: God and the soul.”⁸ How admirably put! In appraising the monastic life, we must not be more monkish than the monks.

Considered from the point of view of religion, monasticism cannot but impress one by its greatness. In certain periods its positive contribution far outweighs its deficiencies. Its cultural achievements are there for all to see, and their value is permanent.

And yet to consider only its cultural achievements is to miss the whole point of the monastic life. For Christian monasticism can be comprehended only in terms of its own premises, and they are of an eminently religious nature. If we do not see monasticism as an absolutely Christian phenomenon, we do not really see it at all.

What is far more significant than all its external achievements is the love of God, a love directed straight to the eternal, a love that flourishes in the cloister like a rose.
The monk is the religious man par excellence, whose ardent desire to save his soul governs his every action. He sacrifices everything to his fervent love of Christ, which blazes in him like another burning bush. By means of the rule that he seeks to fulfill, he achieves discipline, and the Christian precepts to which he deliberately submits shape and illumine his whole life. His wholehearted submission to the supremacy of an absolute lends his life an aspect of order to which all confusion, internal or external, is wholly alien. This inner security gives the monastic life its aura of the divine.

By his deference to the rule, the monk is freed from the agitation and perplexity that harass the lives of other men. He knows where he wants to go, and he knows the way there; when he entered the cloister, he resolved to tread that way unfalteringly. The monk is a guide who does not simply tell others where to go, but goes there himself. It is hardly possible to predicate anything greater of a human being, and here we approach the permanent mystery of all monasticism. One of the main causes of the attraction that monasticism has never ceased to exercise lies precisely in the monk’s spiritual power to draw from the rich storehouse of his superior religious experience a positive answer to the problems of our troubled lives. There is nothing we need more, in our cheerless times, than these people who can direct souls, and from whom a healing virtue goes forth.

The objection that this is not a life that suits everyone is easily dismissed. Of course it does not suit everyone. But is there any way of life that would? Nevertheless, monasticism possesses a mysterious power of irradiation capable of penetrating to the darkest recesses of man s being. There are few institutions, indeed, in which the power the Gospel can release in man is so clearly visible. We must learn once more to see monks with the eyes of Leon Bloy: “Those men of prayer, unlettered, uncomplaining under the goad of persecution, whom we, in our idiotic sufficiency, assume to despise, those men bore the heavenly Jerusalem in their hearts and in their minds. They translated their ecstasies, as best they could, into the stone of the cathedrals, into the burning windows of the chapels, into the parch' ments of the books of hours. And all our endeavor, if we have but a particle of genius, is to return to that source of light.⁹

IV

These words bring us to another point: the mission of contemporary monasticism, which we should consider in the light of our analysis of monasticism from the historical and religious points of view.

There is no question, here, of championing a cause with single-minded passion; we are simply anticipating a particular result. The comments that follow should be regarded as the logical conclusion of the work as a whole; they are an epilogue offered as a prologue.

If we look squarely at the twentieth century, which refuses to learn from the experience of two world wars, we can hardly do otherwise than call it the century of destruction. Hurtling from one catastrophe into another, our world seems unable to find a way out of this vortex of death. The hideous symbol of this century is the man armed with a machine gun, stumping off over endless heaps of ruins. And every Christian who really takes his faith seriously is weighed down by the questions: What solution is there to this demonic apocalypse? Who is capable of offering effective challenge to the Beast from the Abyss? Who has the inner strength to meet the robot of our times and defeat him in spiritual combat? These are the tremendous questions that will run like a basic theme through Christian history in the coming decades.

To expect any solution from statesmen is vain. They cannot give what they do not possess. Governments think too exclusively in terms of politics and military strategy, to the total neglect of the spirit. That is why they are now so completely barren of any new ideas, and have to depend solely on diplomacy, which has constantly proved its inadequacy. Only Christianity can provide the means of reversing the tide that threatens to engulf civilization.

By Christianity we do not mean an interpretation of the Gospel which is itself tainted by corruption, but rather a renewed Christianity whose heralds will again go forth wholly unarmed, like sheep among wolves, truly obedient to the new commandment of love by which Christ’s disciples are known, and constituting am other little flock that has been granted the living hope of the kingdom.

Any attempt to achieve this renewal, to arrive at a Christianity free from compromise of any sort, must necessarily involve a return to the founders of the religious orders. Indeed, a renewal of the orders, in their original intent, would be one of the most effective aids in the spiritual conflict of our times. Such a reversion to the founders, unfettered by any preconceived ideas, would lead to a wonderful flowering of the noblest traditions of Western Christendom.

The fundamental and timeless virtues of the primitive Church find their purest expression in the founders of the great orders, and those monasteries whose primitive zeal has ebbed will be reinvigorated only by hearkening to their founders. The founders of the orders can be likened to a seed able to germinate, quite unexpectedly, centuries later. That is why a return to the spirit of the founders is the precondition for the new mission of monasticism in our times. If their first coming had such powerful effect, how great will be the consequences of their second epiphany for the life of the world!

Another major possibility is the deliberate endeavor to create new orders. A seemingly fantastic undertaking, perhaps, until we consider that, at a time when the face of monasticism is so radically changing, it need be no utopia. Indeed, that idea is really the purpose of the present work. And the reader must therefore bear with the author if he sometimes presents in faltering tones thoughts to which he would rather have lent the accent of adjuration.

The Christian knows, of course, that the Almighty is able to fulfill His plans in a thousand different ways that man has not even dreamed of. Yet it is difficult not to believe that it will be new religious foundations that will transform our times. Salvation, one feels, will come from a new, transfigured monasticism.

In order to realize the need for new monastic foundations, we have only to recall the significance of the religious orders of knight-hood for the Middle Ages. How much poorer Christendom became when these lines of communication between religion and the state disappeared! Nor will modern Christendom endure unless the spirit of monasticism is injected into our society anew. The urgency of this problem can no longer be ignored, but it must on no account be approached from a partisan, sectarian point of view, which never serves truth. Threatened Christendom needs new orders because only a new “brotherhood of those marked by pain,” as Albert Schweitzer put it, can provide the antidote to the spiritual malady of our day.

The creation of new orders is by no means outside the realm of possibility, as modern skeptics would have us believe, arguing that nowadays people are no longer capable of such self-sacrificing renunciation, of such an otherworldly approach to life. To this doubt, faith makes answer in the words of Christ: with God all things are possible. And the first timid steps are already being made in that direction. We might mention, among the various indications of this kind, the Protestant venture of Taize, near Cluny, even though it is still in its infancy. The development of similar communities of women in western Switzerland and Germany is proof that this undertaking is meeting a deep-seated need.

Deliverance from the distress of our times can come only from small groups with the courage to remain small, at first, so as not to be burdened by unsuitable elements. Their community life must be based on monastic rules that include binding vows and recognize the principle of religious sacrifice. In the new religious foundations the waters of mysticism are again beginning to flow. For the mystical life, which is one of the most essential conditions of a Christian renaissance, can flourish only in silence, and only in the mystical life can man achieve true union with God, without which there is no recovery.

But the new monasticism can bring about a real transformation in contemporary attitudes only if it does not remain entrenched behind a wall of traditional thinking. Instead of acting simply as the custodian of the past, it must deliberately turn toward the future.

The new foundations must blaze new trails and not be satisfied with being mere replicas of earlier orders. Throughout monastic history such daring ventures have been undertaken. For all that they are rooted in eternity, the new orders must wear the colors of the twentieth century, just as the eremitic movement was cast in a fourth'century mold.

However much we may long for new orders, they cannot be artificially created if they are not to be a mere sham. What is holy can never be commanded; it always grows like a living organism, and almost in silence. That the founders of the old orders were saints, sent by God at particular historical moments, is no coincidence. Holiness is as inseparably linked with the emergence of an order as is the order’s providential mission in history. New orders can only be prayed for; their creation depends on the breath of the Spirit. The founders of orders were vessels of the divine choice, and their foundations were works of grace. Authentic orders are always creations of the Spirit; hence their irresistible advance in their own times. And that is why, too, a new order may come into being at any time.

Until such time, we might well recall Dostoevsky’s Alyosha, that unique figure of holiness in an unholy setting. Surprisingly enough, Dostoevsky, who contributed so greatly to the understanding of the Russian monk, and who saw in him the bulwark against nihilism, does not let Alyosha, the beloved disciple, remain in Father Sossima’s monastery, but expressly sends him out into the world which needs him so very urgently. The intention is not that Alyosha should share in that “Karamazov vileness” which was the downfall of his brothers, Mitya and Ivan. On the contrary, Alyosha hastens off like an angel in human form to bring the message of salvation into the very heart of his brothers’ pain-racked world. Inwardly, Alyosha is enclosed in Father Sossima’s monastery, but outwardly he is in the world. By this duality he personifies the hidden cloister in the midst of the sinister world of the Karamazovs. By his mission, he appears as one of the first harbingers of that transfigured monasticism which we are waiting for and which will surely come. The Alyosha of our times will be a new kind of monk, proclaiming to the modern world a Christian message that alone can save it from its present peril.

WALTER NIGG

Wednesday, June 17, 2026

The Dhutanga Practices

Ācariya Mun insisted that in order to live in comfort a monk must comport himself like a worthless old rag. If he can rid himself of the conceit that his virtuous calling makes him somebody special, then he will feel at ease in all of his daily activities and personal associations, for genuine virtue does not arise from such assumptions. Genuine virtue arises from the self-effacing humility and forthright integrity of one who is always morally and spiritually conscientious. Such is the nature of genuine virtue: without hidden harmful pride, that person is at peace with himself and at peace with the rest of the world wherever he goes. The ascetic practice of wearing only robes made from discarded cloth serves as an exceptionally good antidote to thoughts of pride and self-importance.

A practicing monk should understand the relationship between himself and the virtuous qualities he aspires to attain. He must never permit pride to grab possession of the moral and spiritual virtues he cultivates within his heart. Otherwise, dangerous fangs and daggers will spring up in the midst of those virtuous qualities – even though intrinsically they’re a source of peace and tranquillity. He should train himself to adopt the self-effacing attitude of being a worthless old rag until it becomes habitual, while never allowing conceit about his worthiness to come to the surface. A monk must cultivate this noble quality and ingrain it deeply in his personality, making it an intrinsic character trait as steadfast as the earth. He will thus remain unaffected by words of praise, or of criticism. Moreover, a mind totally devoid of conceit is a mind imperturbable in all circumstances. Ācariya Mun believed that the practice of wearing robes made from discarded cloth was one sure way to help attenuate feelings of self-importance buried deep within the heart.

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[Unfortunately self-importance and pride may as well increase due to wearing such robes.VB]

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Ācariya Mun strongly believed that the observance of dhutanga practices truly exemplified the spirit of the ascetic way of life. He strictly adhered to these ascetic practices throughout his life, and always urged those monks studying under his tutelage to adopt them in their own practice.

Going on almsround every day without fail, excepting only those days when a monk is deliberately abstaining from food. Ācariya Mun taught his disciples that, when walking to the village for alms, they should always have mindfulness present and remain properly restrained in body, speech, and mind. A monk should never permit his mind to accidentally become prey to the various tempting sense objects contacting his eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, or mind while walking to and from the village on almsround. He stressed that mindfulness should bring their every movement, every thought, at every step of the route, under vigilant scrutiny. This should be treated as a sacred duty requiring reflection of the utmost seriousness each time a monk prepares to go on his morning almsround.

Eating only that food which has been accepted in the alms bowl on almsround. A monk should consider the quantity of food he receives in his bowl each day to be sufficient for his needs, as befits one who is content with little, and thus easily satisfied. For him it’s counter-productive to expect extra food by accepting the generous offerings that are made later inside the monastery. Such practices easily encourage the insatiable greed of his kilesas, allowing them to gain the strength to become so domineering that they’re almost impossible to counteract. A monk eats whatever food is offered into his bowl, never feeling anxious or upset should it fail to meet his expectations. Anxiety about food is a characteristic of hungry ghosts – beings tormented by the results of their own bad kamma. Never receiving enough food to satisfy their desires, they run madly around, desperately trying to fill their mouths and stomachs, always preferring the prospect of food to the practice of Dhamma. The ascetic practice of refusing to accept any food offered after almsround is an excellent way of contravening the tendency to be greedy for food. It is also the best method to cut off all expectancy concerning food, and the anxiety that it creates.

Eating only one meal per day is just right for the meditative lifestyle of a dhutanga monk, since he needn’t worry about food at all hours of the day. Otherwise, he could easily become more worried about his stomach than he is about Dhamma – a most undignified attitude for one sincerely seeking a way to transcend dukkha. Even when eating only once a day, there are times when a monk should reduce his consumption, eating much less than he normally would at that one meal. This practice helps facilitate the work of meditation, for eating too much food can make the mental faculties sluggish and unresponsive. In addition, a monk whose temperament is suited to this practice can be expected to experience results invaluable to his spiritual development. This particular dhutanga observance is a useful tool for eliminating the greedy mentality of practicing monks who tend to be infatuated with food.

In this respect, the safeguards that society has introduced to protect itself operate in much the same manner as the safeguards of Dhamma. Enemies of society are confronted and subdued wherever they pose a threat to wealth, property, life and limb, or peace of mind. Whether it be fierce animals, such as wild dogs, snakes, elephants and tigers, or pestilent diseases, or simply pugnacious individuals, societies all over the world possess appropriate corrective measures, or medicines, to effectively subdue and protect themselves against these threats. A dhutanga monk whose mind displays pugnacious tendencies in its desire for food, or any other unwholesome qualities deemed distasteful, needs to have effective measures for correcting these threatening tendencies. Thus, he will always possess the kind of admirable self-restraint which is a blessing for him and a pleasing sight for those with whom he associates. Eating only one meal per day is an excellent way to restrain unwieldy mental states.

Eating all food directly from the alms bowl without using any other utensils is a practice eminently suited to the lifestyle of a dhutanga monk who strives to be satisfied with little while wandering from place to place. Using just his alms bowl means there’s no need to be loaded down with a lot of cumbersome accessories as he travels from one location to another, practicing the ascetic way of life. At the same time, it is an expedient practice for monks wishing to unburden themselves of mental clutter; for each extra item they carry and look after, is just one more concern that weighs on their minds. For this reason, dhutanga monks should pay special attention to the practice of eating exclusively from the alms bowl. In truth, it gives rise to many unique benefits. Mixing all types of food together in the bowl is a way of reminding a monk to be attentive to the food he eats, and to investigate its true nature using mindfulness and wisdom to gain a clear insight into the truth about food.

Ācariya Mun said that, for him, eating from the bowl was just as important as any other dhutanga practice. He gained numerous insights while contemplating the food he was eating each day. Throughout his life he strictly observed this ascetic practice.

Investigating the true nature of food mixed together in the bowl is an effective means of cutting off strong desire for the taste of food. This investigation is a technique used to remove greed from a monk’s mind as he eats his meal. Greed for food is thus replaced by a distinct awareness of the truth concerning that food: food’s only true purpose is to nourish the body, allowing it to remain alive from one day to the next. In this way, neither the pleasant flavor of good foods, nor the unpleasant flavor of disagreeable foods will cause any mental disturbance that might prompt the mind to waver. If a monk employs skillful investigative techniques each time he begins to eat, his mind will remain steadfast, dispassionate, and contented – unmoved by excitement or disappointment over the taste of the food he is offered. Consequently, eating directly from the alms bowl is an excellent practice for getting rid of infatuation with the taste of food.

Wearing only robes made from discarded cloth is another dhutanga observance that Ācariya Mun practiced religiously. This ascetic practice is designed to forestall the temptation to give in to the heart’s natural inclination to desire nice, attractive-looking robes and other requisites. It entails searching in places, like cemeteries, for discarded pieces of cloth, collecting them little by little, then stitching the pieces together to make a usable garment, such as an upper robe, a lower robe, an outer robe, a bathing cloth, or any other requisite. There were times, when the dead person’s relatives were agreeable, that Ācariya Mun collected the shroud used to wrap a corpse laid out in a charnel ground. Whenever he found discarded pieces of cloth on the ground while on almsround, he would pick them up and use them for making robes – regardless of the type of cloth or where it came from. Returning to the monastery, he washed them, and then used them to patch a torn robe, or to make a bathing cloth. This he routinely did wherever he stayed. Later as more and more faithful supporters learned of his practice, they offered him robe material by intentionally discarding pieces of cloth in charnel grounds, or along the route he took for almsround, or around the area where he stayed, or even at the hut where he lived. Thus his original practice of strictly taking only pieces of old, discarded cloth was altered somewhat according to circumstances: he was obliged to accept cloth the faithful had placed as offerings in strategic locations. Be that as it may, he continued to wear robes made from discarded cloth until the day he died.

Ācariya Mun insisted that in order to live in comfort a monk must comport himself like a worthless old rag. If he can rid himself of the conceit that his virtuous calling makes him somebody special, then he will feel at ease in all of his daily activities and personal associations, for genuine virtue does not arise from such assumptions. Genuine virtue arises from the self-effacing humility and forthright integrity of one who is always morally and spiritually conscientious. Such is the nature of genuine virtue: without hidden harmful pride, that person is at peace with himself and at peace with the rest of the world wherever he goes. The ascetic practice of wearing only robes made from discarded cloth serves as an exceptionally good antidote to thoughts of pride and self-importance.

A practicing monk should understand the relationship between himself and the virtuous qualities he aspires to attain. He must never permit pride to grab possession of the moral and spiritual virtues he cultivates within his heart. Otherwise, dangerous fangs and daggers will spring up in the midst of those virtuous qualities – even though intrinsically they’re a source of peace and tranquillity. He should train himself to adopt the self-effacing attitude of being a worthless old rag until it becomes habitual, while never allowing conceit about his worthiness to come to the surface. A monk must cultivate this noble quality and ingrain it deeply in his personality, making it an intrinsic character trait as steadfast as the earth. He will thus remain unaffected by words of praise, or of criticism. Moreover, a mind totally devoid of conceit is a mind imperturbable in all circumstances. Ācariya Mun believed that the practice of wearing robes made from discarded cloth was one sure way to help attenuate feelings of self-importance buried deep within the heart.

Living in the forest. Realizing the value of this dhutanga observance from the very beginning, Ācariya Mun found forest dwelling conducive to the eerie, secluded feeling associated with genuine solitude. Living and meditating in the natural surroundings of a forest environment awakens the senses and encourages mindfulness for remaining vigilant in all of one’s daily activities: mindfulness accompanying every waking moment, every waking thought. The heart feels buoyant and carefree, unconstrained by worldly responsibilities. The mind is constantly on the alert, earnestly focusing on its primary objective – the transcendence of dukkha. Such a sense of urgency becomes especially poignant when living far from the nearest settlement, at locations deep in remote forest areas teeming with all kinds of wild animals. In a constant state of readiness, the mind feels as though it’s about to soar up and out of the deep abyss of the kilesas at any moment – like a bird taking flight. In truth, the kilesas remain ensconced there in the heart as always. It is the evocative forest atmosphere that tends to inspire this sense of liberation. Sometimes, due to the power of this favorable environment, a monk becomes convinced that his kilesas are diminishing rapidly with each passing day, while those remaining appear to be ever more scarce. This unfettered feeling is a constant source of support for the practice of meditation.

A monk living deep in the forest tends to consider the wild animals living around him – both those inherently dangerous and those that are harmless – with compassion, rather than with fear or apathy. He realizes that all animals, dangerous and harmless, are his equals in birth, ageing, sickness, and death. We human beings are superior to animals merely by virtue of our moral awareness: our ability to understand difference between good and evil. Lacking this basic moral judgment, we are no better than common animals. Unknown to them we label these creatures ‘animals’, even though the human species is itself a type of animal. The human animal is fond of labeling other species, but we have no idea what kind of label other animals have given to us. Who knows? Perhaps they have secretly labeled human beings ‘ogres’, 6 since we’re so fond of mistreating them, slaughtering them for their meat – or just for sport. It’s a terrible shame the way we humans habitually exploit these creatures; our treatment of them can be quite merciless. Even among our own kind, we humans can’t avoid hating and harassing each other, constantly molesting or killing one another. The human world is troubled because people tend to molest and kill each other, while the animal world is troubled because humans tend to do the same to them. Consequently, animals are instinctively wary of human beings.

Ācariya Mun claimed that life in the forest provides unlimited opportunities for thought and reflection about one’s own heart, and its relation to many natural phenomena in the external environment. Anyone earnestly desiring to go beyond dukkha can find plenty of inspiration in the forest, plenty of incentive to intensify his efforts – constantly.

At times, groups of wild boars wandered into the area where Ācariya Mun was walking in meditation. Instead of running away in panic when they saw him, they continued casually foraging for food in their usual way. He said they seemed to be able to differentiate between him and all the merciless ‘ogres’ of this world, which is why they kept rooting around for food so casually, instead of running for their lives.

Here I would like to digress from the main story a little to elaborate on this subject. You might be tempted to think that wild boars were unafraid of Ācariya Mun because he was a lone individual living deep in the forest. But, when my own monastery, Wat Pa Ban Tad, was first established 7 and many monks were living together there, herds of wild boars took refuge inside the monastery, wandering freely through the area where the monks had their living quarters. At night they moved around unafraid, only a few yards from the monks’ meditation tracks – so close that they could be heard snorting and thumping as they rooted in the ground. Even the sound of the monks calling to one another to come and see this sight for themselves failed to alarm the wild boars. Continuing to wander freely through the monastery grounds every night, boars and monks soon became thoroughly accustomed to each other. Nowadays, wild boars only infrequently wander into the monastery because ogres, as animals refer to us humans – according to Ācariya Mun – have since killed and eaten almost all the wild animals in the area. In another few years, they probably will have all disappeared.

Living in the forest, Ācariya Mun met the same situation: almost every species of animal likes to seek refuge in the areas where monks live. Wherever monks take up residence, there are always a lot of animals present. Even within the monastery compounds of large metropolitan areas, animals – especially dogs – constantly find shelter. Some city monasteries are home to hundreds of dogs, for monks never harm them in any way. This small example is enough to demonstrate the cool, peaceful nature of Dhamma, a spirit of harmlessness that’s offensive to no living creature in this world – except, perhaps, the most hard-hearted individuals.

Ācariya Mun’s experience of living in the forest convinced him just how supportive that environment is to meditation practice. The forest environment is ideal for those wishing to transcend dukkha. It is without a doubt the most appropriate battlefield to choose in one’s struggle to attain all levels of Dhamma, as evidenced by the preceptor’s first instructions to a newly ordained monk: Go look for a suitable forest location in which to do your practice. Ācariya Mun maintained this ascetic observance to the end of his life, except on infrequent occasions when circumstances mitigated against it. A monk living in the forest is constantly reminded of how isolated and vulnerable he is. He can’t afford to be unmindful. As a result of such vigilance, the spiritual benefits of this practice soon become obvious.

Dwelling at the foot of a tree is a dhutanga observance that closely resembles living in the forest. Ācariya Mun said that he was dwelling under the shade of a solitary tree the day his citta completely transcended the world – an event that will be fully dealt with later on. A lifestyle that depends on the shade of a tree for a roof and the only protection against the elements is a lifestyle conducive to constant introspection. A mind possessing such constant inner focus is always prepared to tackle the kilesas, for its attention is firmly centered on the Four Foundations of Mindfulness 8 – rūpa, vedanā, citta, and dhamma – and The Four Noble Truths 9 – dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, and magga. Together, these factors constitute the mind’s most effective defense, protecting it during its all-out assault on the kilesas. In the eerie solitude of living in the forest, the constant fear of danger can motivate the mind to focus undivided attention on the Foundations of Mindfulness, or the Noble Truths. In doing so, it acquires a solid basis for achieving victory in its battle with the kilesas – such is the true path leading to the Noble Dhamma. A monk who wishes to thoroughly understand himself, using a safe and correct method, should find an appropriate meditation subject and a suitable location that are conducive for him to exert a maximum effort. These combined elements will help to expedite his meditation progress immeasurably. Used as an excellent means for destroying kilesas since the Buddha’s time, the dhutanga observance of dwelling at the foot of a tree is another practice meriting special attention.

Staying in a cemetery is an ascetic practice which reminds monks and lay people alike not to be neglectful while they are still alive, believing that they themselves will never die. The truth of the matter is: we are all in the process of dying, little by little, every moment of every day. The people who died and were relocated to the cemetery – where their numbers are so great there’s scarcely any room left to cremate or bury them – are the very same people who were dying little by little before; just as we are now. Who in this world seriously believes himself to be so unique that he can claim immunity from death?

We are taught to visit cemeteries so that we won’t forget the countless relatives with whom we share birth, ageing, sickness, and death; so as to constantly remind ourselves that we too live daily in the shadow of birth, ageing, sickness, and death. Certainly no one who still wanders aimlessly through the endless round of birth and death would be so uncommonly bold as to presume that he will never be born, grow old, become sick, or die. Since they are predisposed toward the attainment of freedom from this cycle by their very vocation, monks should study the root causes within themselves of the continuum of suffering. They should educate themselves by visiting a cemetery where cremations are performed, and by reflecting inwardly on the crowded cemetery within themselves where untold numbers of corpses are brought for burial all the time: such a profusion of old and new corpses are buried within their bodies that it’s impossible to count them all. 10 By contemplating the truly grievous nature of life in this world, they use mindfulness and wisdom to diligently probe, explore, and analyze the basic principles underlying the truth of life and death.

Everyone who regularly visits a cemetery – be it an outdoor cemetery or the inner cemetery within their bodies – and uses death as the object of contemplation, can greatly reduce their smug sense of pride in being young, in being alive, in being successful. Unlike most people, those who regularly contemplate death don’t delight in feeling self-important. Rather, they tend to see their own faults, and gradually try to correct them, instead of merely looking for and criticizing other people’s faults – a bad habit that brings unpleasant consequences. This habit resembles a chronic disease that appears to be virtually incurable, or perhaps it could be remedied if people weren’t more interested in aggravating the infection than they are in curing it.

Cemeteries offer those interested in investigating these matters an opportunity to develop a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the nature of death. Cemeteries are the great gathering places of the world. All people without exception must eventually meet there. Death is no small hurdle to be easily stepped over before a thorough investigation of the issue. Before they finally crossed over, the Lord Buddha and his Arahant disciples had to study in the ‘great academy’ of birth, ageing, sickness, and death until they had mastered the entire curricula. Only then were they able to cross over with ease. They had escaped the snares of Māra, 11 unlike those who, forgetting themselves, disregard death and take no interest in contemplating its inevitability; even as it stares them in the face.

Visiting cemeteries to contemplate death is an effective method for completely overcoming the fear of dying; so that, when death seems imminent, courage alone arises despite the fact that death is the most terrifying thing in the world. It would seem an almost impossible feat, but it has been accomplished by those who practice meditation – the Lord Buddha and his Arahant disciples being the supreme examples. Having accomplished this feat themselves, they taught others to thoroughly investigate every aspect of birth, ageing, sickness, and death so that people wanting to take responsibility for their own well-being can use this practice to correct their misconceptions before it becomes too late. If they reach that ‘great academy’ only when their last breath is taken, it will then be too late for remedial action: the only remaining options will be cremation and burial. Observing moral precepts, making merit, and practicing meditation will no longer be possible.

Ācariya Mun well understood the value of a visit to the cemetery, for a cemetery has always been the kind of place that encourages introspection. He always showed a keen interest in visiting cemeteries – both the external variety and the internal one. One of his disciples, being terrified of ghosts, made a valiant effort to follow his example in this. We don’t normally expect monks to be afraid of ghosts, which is equivalent to Dhamma being afraid of the world – but this monk was one such case.

Venerable Ācariya Mun Bhūridatta Thera

 A Spiritual Biography

 by

Ācariya Mahā Boowa Ñāṇasampanno

Tuesday, June 9, 2026

Monks who lost the battle

 

Although all the thudong monks we have been discussing won their battles with sexual desire, a number of Man’s disciples did not. The story of one of them was told by another disciple of  Man’s staying in the hills outside Chiang Mai. It occurred during the 1930s, when Man was wandering in northern Siam. The events resemble Waen’s and Fan’s experiences, except that this particular thudong monk was unable to resist his desires.

One day Monk X (no name was given) went with other thudong monks to bathe at a water hole near a path leading to the village farms. The path was quite some distance from the village and was deserted most of the time. While the monks were prepar-ing for their bath, a number of young Lahu hill-tribe women happened to pass by. Monk X caught sight of one of them and immediately fell in love with her. From that moment on he could not sleep. He was overcome by worry and fear of this strange feeling, the strength of which he never imagined existed. He was also frightened that Ajan Man would find out. Meditating all night, he tried to control his desire, hoping that it would drop away during meditation. But Man learned of this monk’s struggle, supposedly through his mind-reading ability, and tried to help him. He allowed Monk X to skip going on almsround so he could intensify his efforts in meditation alone in his hut. This did not help, however. Frustrated and embarrassed, Monk X decided to seek another location for solitude. Having received permission from the ajan, he went to stay near a hamlet farther away. But as fate would have it, he ran into the young Lahu woman again. Eventually he disrobed and married her. His fellow thudong monks saw him as a “poor victim of circumstances,” unable to get away from his kamma (M2, 168).

Even thudong monks with a strong meditation practice were not immune to temptation. In 1937 Thet spent the rains retreat at a forest hermitage near Pong Village in Mae Taeng District, Chiang Mai. He was heading a group that consisted of Bunt-ham, Kheuang, Chaup, and an unnamed monk from Loei. Of these four others, Thet recalls, Chaup and Kheuang were the most experienced.

In this group it was Ajan Chaup who was the most strict in his thudong practices. . . . Venerable Kheuang was particularly gifted in the faculty of knowing another person’s mind. If something was preoccupying anyone’s mind or if someone had committed any breach of the monastic rule, it would be detected by one of these two monks. . . .Kheuang was adept at training his mind to enter tranquillity, and he could remain in a state of calm all day and night.

While walking around in seemingly quite an ordinary way, in his mind he would feel as if he was walking on air. While at other times he might feel as if he had penetrated into the interior of earth. Shortly after the rains retreat Thet and Kheuang went off in search of solitude, following the Mae Taeng River upstream. They stayed in a secluded place in a mountainous area where tea shrubs were growing. One day, Thet left his thudong gear with Kheuang in an abandoned wat while he climbed a ridge to find a suitable place to stay. When Thet returned he noticed that Kheuang was moody. The following morning Kheuang lost his temper with Thet over some small matter, but at the end of the day he admit-ted he was at fault. Then he explained what happened the previ-ous day while Thet was away. A young woman had strolled by in the company of some local young men. Kheuang had watched her flirting with them, and this had excited him. As a result, his medi-tation was now going badly. He wanted to take leave of Thet and go off wandering alone. Thet tried to counsel him and recommended various ways of stilling the emotions—but without success.

So Thet let him go. Three months later they met again. It appears that Kheuang had stopped meditating. Thet encouraged him to make a fresh start with his meditation, but again he had no success: “Afterwards I learnt with great regret that he had disrobed.

He was a strong-willed individual and did nothing in half measures, but he was also very opinionated and even Ajan Man’s dhamma talks didn’t always convince him. He had once been a ‘tough guy’ [nakleng] back in his home village before being ordained as a monk. He left the village wat without any real goal in mind.” Like his fellow thudong monks, Thet believed that a nimit could portend the future. Before ever meeting Thet, Kheuang had a vision about him that foretold his later act of disrobing. “A road appeared leading straight from [Kheuang] to where I was. He made a trouble-free journey along the road that ended right at the foot of the stairs leading to my hut. He then seemed to catch hold of the stairs and started climbing—they seemed extremely long and steep—up to me. He bowed to me three times; I offered him a complete set of robes but he refused to accept them” (T1, 179;T2, 77). Thet concluded that Kheuang was one of those monks in whom samâdhi did not develop into pañña (wisdom): “Even though Ven. Kheuang’s mind didn’t withdraw from concentration, he lacked the wisdom to investigate tilakkhana [the three character-istics—impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and nonself]” (T1, 180).

Young monks were not the only ones whose minds were trou-bled by sexual thoughts; older ones were, too. One such monk was Samret, a revered teacher. Samret was ordained as a novice in early youth, became a meditation monk, and eventually started teaching. He was known as a strict, serious meditator and was much respected. When he was nearly sixty years old, he fell in love with a lay supporter’s daughter. His decision to quit the monastic life shocked his disciples and lay followers, who had expected that he would remain in the robes for the rest of his life.

To the senior monks, the disrobing of a teacher was a disgrace to all practicing monks. They tried in vain to stop Samret from leaving the monkhood. Dun in particular reminded him to exert himself harder in meditation, so as to understand his mind better. But practicing meditation did not help. “I can’t remain in the monkhood. Every time I meditate, all I see is her face,” Samret told Dun. Dun, realizing that Samret’s case was hopeless, responded loudly, “[This is] because when you meditate, instead of looking at your mind, you focus on her ass. No wonder only her buttocks appeared. Go, go follow your desires. Go away.” Samret’s case indicated that older monks may have had harder battles with sexual desire. As one teacher warned his pupil, “The real trouble begins well after 45—between then and 60 you will have a hard time. For then your body revolts, your mind panics— they want to enter into their rights ere the gates close.” Decades of meditation practice did not necessarily mean that the monk was beyond temptation.

Clearly, thudong monks were not immune to sexual desire.
What about Isan administrative monks? A thudong monk’s account tells of one such monk, Ariyakhunathan (Seng).24 Maha Seng was a sangha provincial head who took up meditation and practiced it seriously for decades. It was believed that Seng had attained the higher jhânas. Yet later on, in the 1950s, he left the Lui, who spent the 1952 rains retreat with him at Deer Garden Hill in Khon Kaen, recalls: “Ven. Ariyakhunathan had a pleasant disposition. He could discuss many mystical matters. It’s a pity that he did not go directly to the Four Noble Truths. Since his practice was not supported by the three characteristics, all the supernormal knowledge he attained in his meditation practice, such as different levels of jhâna, eventually deterio-rated. So he had to disrobe.” Lui implies that Seng disrobed because he could not resist sexual desire. So in two cases, Seng and Kheuang, monks highly skilled in mental concentration lacked clear insight into this aspect of reality.

Thet and Cha are better representatives of their fellow thudong monks’ wisdom. Thet learned from experience that when clear insight occurs together with strong concentration, the mind will become disenchanted and dispassionate with regard to all conditioned things. The mind will dwell entirely in a state of mature and chastened dispassion, no matter what it sees or hears, and no matter where. Once knowledge and insight into impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and emptiness arise, Cha confirms, it is “the beginning of true wisdom, the heart of meditation, which leads to liberation.”

Forest Recollections Wandering Monks in Twentieth-Century Thailand Kamala Tiyavanich University

Monday, June 1, 2026

Nocturnal Emissions


Cassian studies the interplay of body and morality via the male phenomenon of "noclumal emissions."177 The experience was part of the monk's physical environment, especially for the young, looming larger in significance (and perhaps occurring more frequently) for monks than for nonmonks because of a lack of other sexual release.178 Cassian wrote as a male primarily for other males, and it is no surprise that he took up a topic that was a commonplace of monastic literature.

He was not alone among monastic authors in addressing this issue; such experiences evidently caused anxiety for young monks unsure of their vocations and for older monks despairing of their progress toward perfect chastity.
The issue was not exclusively or originally a monastic one. Classical writers had pondered the moral implications of orgasmic dreams,179 and early Christian writers regularly commented on the question of whether nocturnal ejaculation barred one from receiving the eucharist.180 Writing as bishop, Athanasius sent a letter to a monastic superior urging him to reassure the scrupulous among his flock.181 The monastic writers, like Cassian, were typically interested in in assessing moral responsibility for dreams and emissions,182 while nonmonastic writers were typically more concerned with avoiding scrupulosity about worthiness for communion.183 Cassian goes beyond the usual discussion of whether or not erotic dreams and/or emissions are morally culpable. He uses them as a way into the subcon-scious and unconscious mind to measure the permeation of the grace of chastity.

He is less interested in the phenomenon of nocturnal orgasm itself than in the psychodynamics thought to lie behind it. These provide Cassian with yet another example of the hindrances to perfect intention he explores elsewhere with respect to waking thoughts, images in prayer, and misinterpretation of the Bible.

According to Cassian's teaching, the erotic dreams that are often associated with nocturnal emissions replay experiences and images from past and present encounters and therefore have a moral significance.184 In linking dreams to wak-ing experiences, Cassian is following classical and Christian predecessors;185 Evagrius had provided a typically acute analysis of dreams and their relationship to larger psychological and ascetical issues.186 Cassian notes that although sexually inexperienced monks have dreams of a "simpler" kind than those of monks who have experienced intercourse, such dreams are nonetheless disturbing (Conf.12.7.4). Even certain biblical texts can fuel the juniors' fantasies and are best avoided—a concern also voiced by other monastic writers.187 For more advanced monks, dreams can indicate a perdurance in the unconscious of passions that are no longer active when the monk is awake.188 The proof of real progress in purity, then, is the absence of "illicit images" even in sleep.189 In turn, the link between dreams and nocturnal emissions (for men and, surprisingly, for women) was a commonplace of ancient medical literature.190 Cassian admits that there is disagreement about the relationship between the "deceit of dreams" (fallacia somniorum) and nocturnal emissions. While positing that the actual emissions are typically prompted by dreams, he notes that the dreams themselves can be stimulated by the "abundance" of "humor" seeking release in ejaculation.191 Cassian reflects the divergence between, on the one side, Hippocratic and similar schools that claimed that the "humor" produces the dream, and, on the other side, the tendency of some authors to emphasize the role of somnolent fantasy.192 The ambiguity affects Cassian's use of the word inlusio, which means "illusion" when he applies it to fantasies and "trick" or "humiliation" when he refers to the emission itself.193 Cassian notes that the difference between "natural" and morally culpable emissions can become a point of contention, with some people prone to plead nature when it is actually their own negligence that is to blame for their frequent emissions (Conf. 12.8.2). Even what is "natural" from the standpoint of sinful human nature can be contrary to chastity (Inst. 5.14.3).194 Augustine had written in the Confessions about the ineradicable nature of sexual memories and their ability to compel consent and ejaculation in dreams.195 Cassian argues, however, that even these "ingrained habits" of memory can be lifted from the heart by God's grace. Thus, for the truly chaste, emissions will occur for purely physiological reasons, without the nocturnal fantasies that signalled unresolved passions.196 For them even the experience of penile erection, inevitable while one is asleep, cannot be attributed to concupiscence.197 One has left the scope of physical discipline far behind; only God, through grace, can stand the night watch in the heart (Conf. 12.9-10).
Later, in both Conference 22 and its companion, Conference 23 ("On Sinlessness"), Cassian tries to maintain his ideal of chastity while backing off from the potentially misleading picture of Conferences 12 and 13. The reason for this ac-commodation is probably the pastoral one of helping young monks prone to anxi-ety and despair. Physical, moral, and ascetical perspectives converge in Conference 22 as Cassian analyzes the trap of shame and guilt into which even a well-behaved monk can fall after an emission. The Conference was set up by Germanus' cri de coeur at the end of Conference 21 that ascetical discipline some-times seems to increase rather than decrease the frequency of emissions.198 Cassian invokes a traditional explanation for emissions and "illusions": the devil uses these physical and psychological experiences to discourage the zealous. Cassian attributes to "the Elders" the view that most emissions are attributable not to excessive consumption of food or lack of moral vigilance but to demonic decep-tion.199 He then suggests that the demons use "simple" emissions (i.e., those with-out erotic dreams) to make a monk believe that there was in fact complicity of the will and consequently that he is not worthy to approach the eucharist (Conf.22.6.4).200 The point made in Conference 1 about the diabolical origin of certain kinds of thoughts now gets connected to sexual behavior (Conf. 1.19.3).

The case study Cassian presents in Conference 22, of a zealous monk who has an emission on the eve of every Sunday's eucharist, becomes a parable of monastic transparency. The troubled monk presents his situation to his seniors for discernment, answers their questions fully, and is found morally blameless. When the diagnosis of demonic instigation is made and he returns to regular communion, the "attacks" cease (Conf. 22.6.1-4).

The story is interesting for its psychological tension between shame and reward, but for Cassian the point is twofold. There is the monk's obedience to discernment, especially notable in such a private and embarassing realm. Even more, there is his complete openness, for this monk illustrates the ideal Cassian had evoked in Conference 12:

He is found to be the same at night as in the day, the same in bed as at prayer, the same alone as when surrounded by a crowd of people, he sees nothing in himself in private that he would be embarassed for others to see, nor wants anything detected by the omnipresent Eye [of God] to be concealed from human sight. (Conf. 12.8.5)201

The night, formerly so fearsome, has become like day; God has so profoundly transformed both body and spirit that even the kidneys, identified by ancient writers as the source of sexual potency, have been "possessed" by God (Ps.138 [139]: 11—13).202 This condition, "beyond the natural condition" of human beings, can only be the work of grace (Conf. 12.8.6). Such integrity and consistency of life is another form of the ideal evoked in Conference 9, where Cassian notes that because prayer follows from what precedes it, we should strive for a unified life of virtue (Conf. 9.3.4).

Cassian the Monk
Columba Stewart