When a man dies, who is reborn—he or another?'

NA CA SO

Na ca so na ca añño, 'Neither he nor another'. This often-quoted dictum occurs in the Milindapañha somewhere, as the answer to the question 'When a man dies, who is reborn—he or another?'. This question is quite illegitimate, and any attempt to answer it cannot be less so. The question, in asking who is reborn, falls into sakkāyaditthi. It takes for granted the validity of the person as 'self'; for it is only about 'self' that this question—'Eternal (so) or perishable (añño)?'—can be asked (cf. PATICCASAMUPPĀDA, ANICCA [a], & SAKKĀYA). The answer also takes this 'self' for granted, since it allows that the question can be asked. It merely denies that this 'self' (which must be either eternal or perishable) is either eternal or perishable, thus making confusion worse confounded. The proper way is to reject the question in the first place. Compare Anguttara VI,ix,10 <A.iii,440>, where it is said that the ditthisampanna not only can not hold that the author of pleasure and pain was somebody (either himself or another) but also can not hold that the author was not somebody (neither himself nor another). The ditthisampanna sees the present person (sakkāya) as arisen dependent upon present conditions and as ceasing with the cessation of these present conditions. And, seeing this, he does not regard the present person as present 'self'. Consequently, he does not ask the question Who? about the present. By inference—atītānāgate nayam netvā having induced the principle to past and future (cf. Gāmini Samy. 11 <S.iv,328>)[a]—he does not regard the past or future person as past or future'self', and does not ask the question Who? about the past or the future. (Cf. Māra's question in line 2 of PARAMATTHA SACCA §1.) (The Milindapañha is a particularly misleading book. See also ANICCA [a], PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [c], RŪPA [e], & PARAMATTHA SACCA §§8-10.)

Footnotes:

[a] Dhamm'anvaye ñānam* is knowledge dependent upon the inferability of the Dhamma—i.e. knowledge that the fundamental Nature of Things is invariable in time and can be inferred with certainty (unlike rational inference) from present to past or future. See Nidāna/Abhisamaya Samy. iv,3 <S.ii,58>. In other words, generalization without abstraction.

Nanavira Thera

 Bhadraka

 On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at a town of the Mallans named Uruvelakappa. Then Bhadraka the headman approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

“It would be good, venerable sir, if the Blessed One would teach me about the origin and the passing away of suffering.” “If, headman, I were to teach you about the origin and the passing away of suffering with reference to the past, saying, ‘So it was in the past,’ perplexity and uncertainty about that might arise in you. And if I were to teach you about the origin and the passing away of suffering with reference to the future, saying, ‘So it will be in the future,’ perplexity and uncertainty about that might arise in you.

Instead, headman, while I am sitting right here, and you are sitting right there, I will teach you about the origin and the passing away of suffering. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”

“Yes, venerable sir,” Bhadraka the headman replied. The Blessed One said this:

“What do you think, headman? Are there any people in Uruvelakappa on whose account sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would arise in you if they were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured?” “There are such people, venerable sir.” “But are there any people in Uruvelakappa on whose account sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would not arise in you in such an event?” “There are such people, venerable sir.” “What, headman, is the cause and reason why in relation to some people in Uruvelakappa sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would arise in you if they were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured, while in regard to others no such sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would arise in you?”

“Those people in Uruvelakappa, venerable sir, in relation to whom sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would arise in me if they were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured—these are the ones for whom I have desire and attachment. But those people in Uruvelakappa in relation to whom no sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would arise in me—these are the ones for whom I have no desire and attachment.”

“Headman, by means of this principle that is seen, understood, immediately attained, fathomed, apply the method to the past and to the future thus:

‘Whatever suffering arose in the past, all that arose rooted in desire, with desire as its source; for desire is the root of suffering. Whatever suffering will arise in the future, all that will arise rooted in desire, with desire as its source; for desire is the root of suffering.’”

“It is wonderful, venerable sir! It is amazing, venerable sir! How well that has been stated by the Blessed One: ‘Whatever suffering arises, all that is rooted in desire, has desire as its source; for desire is the root of suffering.’353 Venerable sir, I have a boy named Ciravāsı̄, who stays at an outside residence. I rise early and send a man, saying, ‘Go, man, and find out how Ciravāsı̄ is.’ Until that man returns, venerable sir, I am upset, thinking, ‘I hope Ciravāsı̄ has not met with any affliction!’”

“What do you think, headman? If Ciravāsı̄ were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured, would sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise in you?” “Venerable sir, if Ciravāsı̄ were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured, even my life would be upset, so how could sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair not arise in me?” “In this way too, headman, it can be understood: ‘Whatever suffering arises, all that arises rooted in desire, with desire as its source; for desire is the root of suffering.’

“What do you think, headman? Before you saw Ciravāsı̄’s mother or heard about her, did you have any desire, attachment, or affection for her?” “No, venerable sir.” “Then was it, headman, because of seeing her or hearing about her that this desire, attachment, and affection arose in you?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “What do you think, headman? If Ciravāsı̄’s mother were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured, would sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise in you?” “Venerable sir, if Ciravāsı̄’s mother were to be executed, imprisoned, fined, or censured, even my life would be upset, so how could sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair not arise in me?” “In this way too, headman, it can be understood: ‘Whatever suffering arises, all that arises rooted in desire, with desire as its source; for desire is the root of suffering.’” SN 42: 9