Paticcasamuppāda

For a fuller discussion of some of this, see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA.

In spite of the venerable tradition, starting with the Patisambhidāmagga (or perhaps the Abhidhamma Pitaka) and continued in all the Commentaries (see Anguttara V,viii,9 <A.iii,107,§4>), paticcasamuppāda has nothing to do with temporal succession (cause-and-effect). Precedence in paticcasamuppāda is structural, not temporal:

paticcasamuppāda is not the description of a process. For as long as paticcasamuppāda is thought to involve temporal succession (as it is, notably, in the traditional 'three-life' interpretation), so long is it liable to be regarded as some kind of hypothesis (that there is re-birth and that it is caused by avijjā) to be verified (or not) in the course of time (like any hypothesis of the natural sciences), and so long are people liable to think that the necessary and sufficient criterion of a 'Buddhist'[a] is the acceptance of this hypothesis on trust (for no hypothesis can be known to be certainly true, since upon the next occasion it may fail to verify itself). 

But the Buddha tells us (Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,265>) that paticcasamuppāda is sanditthiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhi. ('immediate, timeless, evident, leading, to be known privately by the wise.') What temporal succession is akālika? (See CITTA [a].) 

For an ariyasāvaka, paticcasamuppāda is a matter of direct reflexive certainty: the ariyasāvaka has direct, certain, reflexive knowledge of the condition upon which birth depends. He has no such knowledge about re-birth, which is quite a different matter. He knows for himself that avijjā is the condition for birth; but he does not know for himself that when there is avijjā there is re-birth. (That there is re-birth, i.e. samsāra, may remain, even for the ariyasāvaka, a matter of trust in the Buddha.) The ariyasāvaka knows for himself that even in this very life the arahat is, actually, not to be found (cf. Khandha Samy. ix,3 <S.iii,109-15> and see PARAMATTHA SACCA [a]), and that it is wrong to say that the arahat 'was born' or 'will die'. With sakkāyanirodha there is no longer any 'somebody' (or a person—sakkāya, q.v.) to whom the words birth and death can apply. They apply, however, to the puthujjana, who still 'is somebody'.[b] But to endow his birth with a condition in the past—i.e. a cause—is to accept this 'somebody' at its face value as a permanent 'self'; for cessation of birth requires cessation of its condition, which, being safely past (in the preceding life), cannot now be brought to an end; and this 'somebody' cannot therefore now cease. 

Introduction of this idea into paticcasamuppāda infects the samudayasacca with sassataditthi and the nirodhasacca with ucchedaditthi. Not surprisingly, the result is hardly coherent. And to make matters worse, most of the terms—and notably sankhāra (q.v.) —have been misconceived by the Visuddhimagga.

It is sometimes thought possible to modify this interpretation of paticcasamuppāda, confining its application to the present life. Instead of temporal succession we have continuous becoming, conceived as a flux, where the effect cannot be clearly distinguished from the cause—the cause becomes the effect. But this does not get rid of the temporal element, and the concept of a flux raises its own difficulties.

The problem lies in the present, which is always with us; and any attempt to consider past or future without first settling the present problem can only beg the question—'self' is either asserted or denied, or both, or both assertion and denial are denied, all of which take it for granted (see NA CA SO). Any interpretation of paticcasamuppāda that involves time is an attempt to resolve the present problem by referring to past or future, and is therefore necessarily mistaken. The argument that both past and future exist in the present (which, in a certain sense, is correct) does not lead to the resolution of the problem.

Footnotes:

[a] To be a follower of the Buddha it is certainly necessary to accept on trust that for one who is not rid of avijjā at his death there is re-birth, but it is by no means sufficient. What is sufficient is to see paticcasamuppāda—Yo paticcasamuppādam passati so dhammam passati ('He who sees dependent arising sees the Teaching') (Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,191>). For those who cannot now see the re-birth that is at every moment awaiting beings with avijjā, the dependence of re-birth on avijjā must be accepted on trust. They cannot get beyond temporal succession in this matter and must take it on trust that it is a question of dependence (and not of cause-and-effect)—i.e. that it is not a hypothesis at all, but (for the Buddha) a matter of certainty. But accepting this on trust is not the same as seeing paticcasamuppāda. (Past and future only make their appearance with anvaye ñānam [see NA CA SO [a]), not with dhamme ñānam. 'As it is, so it was, so it will be.' Paticcasamuppāda is just 'As it is'—i.e. the present structure of dependence.)

[b] So long as there are the thoughts 'I was born', 'I shall die', there is birth and death: so long as the five khandhā are sa-upādānā, 'somebody' becomes manifest and breaks up.

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