To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts

Friday, March 6, 2026

From Morality to Mental Health

 


Preface

The therapeutic trend in ethics is the tendency to approach moral matters in terms of mental health, for example by pathologizing vices (alcoholism as a disease), psychologizing virtues (self-respect as self-esteem), and liberalizing attitudes (sex as good, guilt as suspect). The trend unfolded throughout the twentieth-century, although its roots extend to Plato and the Stoics. At its worst, the trend is a confused and dangerous attempt to replace morality with therapy. At its best, the trend integrates moral and therapeutic understanding to yield creative solutions to otherwise intractable problems. In this book I develop an integrated, moral-therapeutic perspective centered on three themes: (1) sound morality is healthy; (2) we are responsible for our health; (3) moral values are embedded in mental health and psychotherapy.

Part I connects Plato’s virtue-oriented ethics with psychiatrists’ definition of mental disorders. It also explores Freud’s and Nietzsche’s therapeutic critiques of sick forms of morality. I show how moral virtues overlap and interweave with the criteria for positive mental health—that is, psychological well-being in addition to the absence of mental disorders. Here, as throughout the book, I reject any general dichotomy between moral and therapeutic attitudes.

Part II develops a conception of responsibility for mental health and applies it both to therapist-client relationships and to moral accountability within society. I take seriously the criticism that the therapeutic trend in ethics fosters evasion of responsibility, but I recast the criticism as a caution rather than a basis for opposing the trend. I also respond to the concern that responsibility for mental health leads to blaming victims of mental illness.

Part III discusses responsibilities for health in connection with alcoholism, pathological gambling, serious crime, unjustified violence, and visceral bigotry.

In each instance, I make sense of how the same pattern of conduct can be both wrongdoing and sickness. The aim is to show why expansive definitions of mental disorders do not provide automatic excuses for harming others.

Part IV shifts the focus to positive health and personal meaning. I explore the confluence of morality and mental health in pursuing meaningful lives.

Topics include depression, self-deception, and philosophical counseling, as well as love, work, and philanthropy.
*******

Self-deception and hope

Ever since Socrates pronounced the unexamined life not worth living, ethicists have linked meaningful life and honesty with oneself.1Similarly, therapists regard honesty with oneself as integral to healing, and they regard contact with reality as a criterion for positive mental health.
Some recent psychologists, however, suggest that self-deception and unrealistic optimism might be good for us. I agree with them that self-deception sometimes contributes to hope and love, and thereby to meaningful life and healthy functioning. It does so in a limited way, however, and not to the extent that justifies abandoning contact with reality as a criterion for mental health. Even when self-deception advances psychological health, there is no fundamental clash between therapy and morality, for all the values involved—hope, love, and honesty—are both moral and therapeutic values that are sometimes in tension.

By reaffirming truthfulness within a moral-therapeutic perspective, morality and mental health once again emerge as interwoven.

Vital Lies

‘‘The life-lie, don’t you see—that’s the animating principle of life,’’ proclaims Dr. Relling in Ibsen’s The Wild Duck.2Life lies, or vital lies, are self-deceiving beliefs based on unfounded optimism, unwarranted hopes, and rationalizations about our failures. We rely on them in order to cope and to maintain happiness and health:

‘‘Deprive the average man of his vital lie, and you’ve robbed him of happiness as well.’’3 Dr. Relling fosters inflated self-images in his patients. In particular, he encourages Hjalmar Ekdal to believe he is on the verge of a revolutionary dis-covery in photographic technology, when actually he is tinkering with a bunch of useless gadgets. Ekdal is a cooperative patient who is already prone to self-deception. He believes he is the sole provider for his family, yet his wife balances their household budget by relying on large subsidies from the former business partner of Ekdal’s father. Ekdal also assumes he is the father of Hedvig, his greatest joy, when in fact she is the offspring of the former business partner.

The son of the former business partner, Gregers Werle, calls for complete honesty and encourages Ekdal to abandon his illusions about work and family. Yet Werle’s moralizing is self-righteous and neurotic, motivated by unconscious hatred of his father and shame at his extramarital affair and illegitimate child. When Ekdal learns that Hedvig is not his biological daughter, he immediately becomes estranged from her. Feeling disowned by the father she adores, the emotionally fragile Hedwig sinks into depression and kills herself. At least in this instance, honesty is apparently self-destructive, undermines love, and has dubious motives.
Most of us do not need a Dr. Relling to prescribe our vital lies. As self-deceivers, we have ample resources within. Like Ekdal, we need reinforcement from family and friends, but usually they are willing to indulge illusions that keep us buoyant with optimism—assuming we reciprocate. Beyond these social dimensions of self-deception, what mental activities and states are involved in deceiving ourselves? The question has generated a substantial literature in philosophy and psychology.4 The central issue is whether the paradigm, gar-den-variety, cases of self-deception involve purposeful evasion of truth. Or do they instead consist entirely of motivated irrationality—biased beliefs that are false and contrary to the evidence? I believe both kinds of self-deception exist and are commonplace.

To begin with motivated irrationality, we are all familiar with how biases, such as self-esteem and happiness, filter what we see and think. Thinking along these lines, Stanley Paluch concludes that ‘‘self-deception’’ is a metaphor for false and unsupported beliefs formed by biased assessments of evidence.5 More recently, Alfred Mele says that self-deception consists in forming false beliefs that go against the evidence, and doing so under the influence of a biasing desire or emotion.6 There is no intention to evade reality or to embrace a falsehood.

Suppose, for example, my physician informs me that I have a fatal and untreatable cancer, giving me six months to live. My doctor is well-qualified, and a second opinion confirms her diagnosis; on balance, I have every reason to believe my chances are slim. Yet, hoping against hope, I believe I will beat the odds. My belief is influenced by a desire to live and a fear of dying, but there are various possibilities. One possibility is honest hope, whereby I struggle to believe I will survive even though I am painfully aware of the evidence to the contrary. The other possibility is motivated irrationality, in which I downplay the contrary evidence (‘‘What do doctors know, anyhow?’’[that's very good question VB]) and highlight positive evidence. Self-deception occurs when I lose my grasp of what the evidence indicates.

I believe there is another possibility, however: purposeful evasion. Paluch and Mele reject this possibility because they believe it involves modeling self-deception on lying to other people, which generates two paradoxes. First, when I lie to another person, I know (or believe) something unpleasant and get the other person to believe the opposite. By analogy, when I lie to myself it seems I know (or believe) one thing and simultaneously get myself to believe the self-deception and hope opposite. But that seems impossible, for my knowledge would prevent me from acquiring the false belief. Freud offers one solution to this paradox: the unpleasant belief is kept unconscious, and the opposing belief is held consciously.

A different solution is that the unpleasant knowledge is held at a less-explicit level of consciousness and ignored.7 I believe self-deception can involve either unconscious beliefs or disregarded beliefs. Most purposeful evasion, however, does not involve self-contradictory beliefs at all, but instead one belief formed by evading unwanted evidence or its implications.

Turning to the second paradox, when I lie to another person I intend to mislead them. By analogy, when I lie to myself it seems I must be aware of an unpleasant truth and use that awareness to form an intention to flee the truth. But that is a psychological impossibility, except perhaps in cases of dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality). Here the solution is to specify that my intention is to evade a reality and its evidence, rather than (a muddled) intention to believe what I know is false. In addition, the intention is formed and acted on spontaneously rather than self-reflectively. As a self-deceiver, typically I have some suspicion of an unpleasant reality and use the suspicion to ignore the reality, discounting evidence contrary to what I want to believe.8 Selective attention, willful ignorance, and distorted use of evidence suffice to explain purposeful self-deception, without postulating a conscious intention to believe what I know is false. As Herbert Fingarette writes: ‘‘The crux of the matter . . . is that we can take account of something without necessarily focusing our attention on it. That is, we can recognize it, and respond to it, without directing our attention to what we are doing, and our response can be intelligently adaptive rather than merely a reflex or habit automatism.’’9 For example, we write on a computer without thinking about the specific motions of our fingers across a keyboard, and we drive a car while taking account of many details in the environment without attending to them, much less attending to our patterns of attention. Similarly, in self-deception we take account of unpleasant truths and evidence without attending to them. We do so as part of ‘‘a purposeful and skillfully pursued policy’’ in which typically we ‘‘secretly do know’’ or suspect the unpleasant truths and evidence.10 To sum up, self-deception includes both purposeful evasion and motivated irrationality. Both kinds might be involved in the same case, and often are. And both kinds are relevant to understanding the interplay of honesty and hope, as well as morality and mental health.

Healthy Self-Deception: Honesty versus Health?

Some recent psychological studies echo Ibsen’s insight that self-deception con-tributes to vitality and happiness.11 For example, an anthology of essays adopts the theme that ‘‘self-deception is a normal and generally positive force in human behavior.’’12 Again, Jonathon Brown cites an extensive body of psychological studies, including his own, showing that healthy, well-adjusted individuals healthy morality and meaningful lives ‘‘possess unrealistically positive views of themselves.’’13 And in Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind, Shelley E. Taylor argues that ‘‘unrealistic optimism’’ promotes mental and physical health: ‘‘Normal human thought and perception is marked not by accuracy but by positive self-enhancing illusions about the self, the world, and the future.’’14 I focus on Taylor’s book because, by presenting the experimental literature to a wide audience, it enters into the therapeutic trend. Because she avoids moral language, she does not explicitly affirm mental health over honesty, but clearly she implies as much. Taylor groups healthy ‘‘positive illusions’’ under four headings: egocentricity, illusions of control, illusions of progress, and self-fulfilling beliefs.

Egocentricity. We are heroes in our own dramas, interpreting the world through a subjective lens. In doing so, we cast our actions, talents, achievements, and prospects in a favorable light in order to maintain self-esteem, hope, and happiness. We selectively ignore unpleasant evidence that goes against what we want to believe about ourselves. Failures and setbacks are conveniently forgotten, and painful events are affirmed as positive learning experiences.

Illusions of Control. Typically we exaggerate the control we have in our lives, thereby manifesting unrealistic optimism about the role of chance and external influences. Most gamblers, for example, think they can beat the odds and that they have skills in areas where pure luck dictates the outcome. They roll the dice gently when they want low numbers and more vigorously when want high numbers. Again, most drivers—about 90 percent in one study—believe they are above average in skill, including drivers who have caused major accidents. And we blame victims of all kinds by holding false stereotypes about them, thereby creating the illusion that we are protected against dangers because we are more careful than them.

Illusions of Progress. Most of us are optimistic about progress in our lives (as distinct from progress in the world). For example, in a study of college students enrolled in a special program that promised increased study skills and better grades, students reported dramatic improvements. Even when they failed a test they would reinterpret the failure as progress in learning how to do better next time. In fact, no differences in results were found between students enrolled and not enrolled in the program.

Self-Fulfilling Beliefs. Belief in the prospects of achieving a specific goal tends to bring about favorable results by strengthening motivation and bolstering hope. A familiar example is the placebo effect, which is any positive therapeutic impact due to patients’ beliefs about medical procedures. This includes sugar pills given to patients who believe they are taking an active drug, and it includes beliefs in the effectiveness of health professionals and their institutions. The extent of placebo effects is controversial, but many researchers believe it affects about a third of us. Positive beliefs and attitudes also encourage others to support our efforts.

Citing a wealth of studies in the preceding areas, Taylor concludes that self-deceptive positive illusions are healthy: ‘‘Increasingly, we must view the self-deception and hope  psychologically healthy person not as someone who sees things as they are but as someone who sees things as he or she would like them to be.’’ The mentally healthy person has a positive self-image and abilities to be happy, to care about others, to work productively, and to continue to grow.15

Taylor vastly overstates her case. She does so because she equivocates between two senses of ‘‘positive illusions’’: unproven beliefs and irrational beliefs.16 Unproven beliefs are beliefs not shown to be true by the evidence, and which might be true or false. Using this sense, Taylor defends optimism: unproven positive beliefs in the form of hope, faith, and optimism promote mental health. This is an important insight, but hardly revolutionary. Common sense tells us that positive attitudes promote our ability to maintain self-esteem and to cope with work, personal relationships, and ambitious projects. Irrational beliefs, in contrast, are false beliefs contrary to the available evidence. In using this sense, Taylor successfully defends only some, not most, self-deception as healthy because it promotes hope, coping, and self-esteem. For example, she claims that irrational, self-deceiving beliefs are ‘‘normal’’ because most of us believe we are above average at everyday tasks such as driving.17 In fact, these studies merely show that unproven beliefs are ubiquitous. Drivers who hold unwarranted beliefs are not necessarily evading evidence about their rankings as drivers, for they are not provided with such evidence. The drivers value (affirm) their driving skills, endeavors, and future prospects, without having hard data about how to accurately evaluate (rank) them.

Sometimes Taylor says that positive illusions are false beliefs, but other times she suggests they can simply be unproven beliefs that cast reality in a positive light.18 Now, there is no basis for counting all unproven beliefs illusions— ’’unproven’’ does not mean ‘‘proven false.’’ Why, then, did Taylor count unproven beliefs, whether true or false, as illusions? I suspect she borrowed the deviant usage from Freud’s Future of an Illusion. Freud writes: ‘‘What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes. . . . Illusions need not necessarily be false—that is to say, unrealizable or in contradiction to reality.’’19 Freud’s odd notion that illusions can be true contributed to the polemical tone of his book in denigrating religion. In turn, by conflating unproven and false beliefs, Taylor greatly exaggerates the health benefits of self-deception.

Truthfulness and Mental Health The tendency to perceive accurately and to maintain justified beliefs is a traditional criterion for mental health, as we saw in chapter 2. The criterion is embedded in Freud’s ‘‘reality principle,’’ the norm of living in tune with reality. It is equally central to cognitive psychologists’ emphasis on realistic cognition. And Marie Jahoda assumed that ‘‘as a rule, the perception of reality is called mentally healthy when what the individual sees corresponds to what is actually there.’’20 In explaining the caveat ‘‘as a rule,’’ however, Jahoda emphasized the healthy morality and meaningful lives plurality of reasonable interpretations of the world. Equally important, she said mental health requires only ‘‘relative freedom’’ from distortion by our desires, together with a disposition to test reality to check whether it conforms to our wishes. Likewise, Taylor’s arguments should lead us to qualify, not abandon, truthfulness as a criterion for mental health.

Although Taylor’s main interest is in positive mental health, she devotes a chapter to psychopathology, focusing on pathological depression and mania. Mild depression and low self-esteem involve fewer positive illusions and more accurate beliefs than healthy states, an idea called ‘‘depressive realism.’’ Taylor suggests that therapy should encourage positive illusions.21 Once again, however, her suggestion is marred by ambiguity. Is she saying that the absence of self-deceptive beliefs contributes to depression, so that therapists should encourage self-deception in their clients? Or is she saying that the absence of unproven positive beliefs contributes to depression, so that therapists should encourage hope? The first claim is a Dr. Relling–like prescription for untruthfulness; the second claim is a morally responsible endorsement of honest hope.

Depression involves loss of caring about ourselves and our world. Depression is primarily a diminished valuing of ourselves, other people, relationships, activities, and life itself, regardless of whether it involves unwarranted evaluation. Accordingly, when therapists cure depression they are not encouraging untruthfulness. They are helping patients value themselves and their world by restoring honest hope, faith, and caring.

Taylor discusses mania more briefly, again focusing on mild cases. Mania is rarer than depression, and usually it is connected with bipolar disorder (manic depression). Mania interests Taylor as the exaggeration of normal positive il-lusions. Frequently, it contributes to the work of the creative artist, the daring leader, and the religious innovator. In discussing these ideas, she again fails to distinguish unwarranted evaluations from positive valuing. Either might be involved, of course, but blurring them exaggerates the contribution of self-deception to creativity. And by stipulating that mania is an excessive illusion that differs from ‘‘milder’’ positive illusions, she neglects how self-deception sometimes contributes to psychopathology.

Moving to more serious disorders, a few writers believe self-deception enters into psychosis, but for the most part self-deception is a different phenomenon than involuntary hallucinations, psychotic delusions, and other complete breaks with reality. Even so, there are continuities, not absolute differences, between psychosis and ordinary self-deception. Families immersed in untruthfulness breed pathology.22 Self-deception also plays a role in personality disorders, such as narcissistic and histrionic disorders defined by grandiose views of one’s talents, worth, and entitlement.

Addictions provide a more straightforward example of how self-deception contributes to pathology. Indeed, Alcoholics Anonymous portrays alcoholism as the disease of denial. And addiction specialist Abraham J. Twerski exposes the rationalizations used to maintain optimism about how much one drinks (‘‘I am self-deception and hope a social drinker’’), about the degree of one’s self-control over the addiction (‘‘I can stop at any time’’), and about the desirability of using drugs (‘‘They help me cope and cause minor problems at most’’).23 Addicts might also deceive themselves about their diminished self-respect and gradually lose a sense of who they are.24 Self-deception also enters into the neuroses, understood as the result of psychological defense against anxiety, although defense can also serve healthy ends.25 Thus, defense might undergird an artist’s fanatical devotion to her work, but only in the workaholic might pathology be involved. Psychological defense is often interpreted as self-deception, even though Freud rarely used the term ‘‘self-deception.’’26 Yet, psychological defense can be understood in two ways, paralleling the two varieties of self-deception. Sometimes Freud described repression, denial, projection, and other defense mechanisms as motivated biases that operate unconsciously and without any activity by the person. Other times he described psychological defense as purposeful and intentional activities.

Most likely, he thought defense might involve either or both. Moreover, defense ranges from activities that are partly conscious and preconscious (available to consciousness) to processes below the level of mental contents available to consciousness without special help from a therapist.27 Either way, removing repression can lead to both more realistic cognition and better coping.28 Finally, pathological self-deception is not an automatic excuse for wrong-doing. When we have, or should have, good reason to believe that unconscious motives are distorting moral understanding, we are obligated to take special precautions to ensure that we are meeting our responsibilities.29 Unconscious motivations are not automatically excuses, and they often lead to culpable negligence. The same is true of self-deception involving conscious activities. Here again, the therapeutic trend does not replace morality but instead integrates it with therapeutic understanding.

Moral Values in Tension If self-deception were always dishonest, then Taylor’s psychological studies would support a morality-therapy dichotomy: honesty condemns self-deception; health celebrates self-deception. Some philosophers do in fact condemn all self-deception as dishonest. Kant wrote: ‘‘By a lie a man makes himself contemptible—by an outer lie, in the eyes of others; by an inner lie [i.e., self-deception], in his own eyes, which is still worse—and violates the dignity of humanity in his own person.’’30 Jean-Paul Sartre condemned all self-deceivers as cowards and scum.31 And Daniel A. Putman says that ‘‘self-deception always works to destroy a fundamental virtue, integrity. Self-deception isolates part of the self and prevents that part from being integrated into consciousness.’’32

These absolute condemnations are too extreme, however, for not all self-deception is immoral. Despite its enormous importance, honesty is one virtue and one obligation among others, and it is not paramount in all situations. Thus, an instance of self-deception might be untruthful and yet justified by other moral values that promote meaningful lives—for example, hope and faith, self-esteem and self-respect, and love and friendship. Hence, the therapeutic contributions of some self-deception do not threaten morality in its entirety. To return to an earlier example, suppose I am a self-deceiving cancer patient who distorts the evidence about my condition. Untruthful, yes, but the self-deception might be embedded in a pattern of other virtues. Faced with great danger, including the danger of collapsing from fear, I might be courageous in keeping hope alive.33 Doing so manifests self-respect in trying not to fall apart, in struggling to carry on with dignity, integrity, and self-respect. It also helps my family cope with a difficult situation. Honesty and hope are sometimes in tension, but they are connected within a complex web of virtues.34 Not surprising, the occasional tension between honesty and hope parallels tensions between realistic cognition and coping as criteria for mental health. On the one hand, truthfulness and healthy cognition largely overlap; indeed, truthfulness is the primary moral ideal guiding realistic cognition. By definition, truthful persons care about truth: they try to perceive accurately, reason cogently, respond rationally to evidence, and expand understanding in light of new information. On the other hand, truthful persons need hope and mental health. Hope overlaps with healthy coping, social adaptation, and self-esteem.

Because moral values are embedded in mental health, we might expect wide congruence between healthy and morally permissible self-deception.

Finally, an instance of self-deception might be healthy in one respect, by contributing vitality or happiness, but unhealthy in other respects, by distorting reality. Perhaps that is true of Hjalmar Ekdal. This complexity parallels the moral complexity of self-deception. Hope, in many (though not all) forms, is just as much a moral value as honesty, and the tensions between them are as much moral as therapeutic.
To conclude, I have suggested that moral and therapeutic values are not inherently at loggerheads with regard to honesty, hope, and self-deception. The complexity revealed by therapeutic perspectives parallels and is interwoven with the complexity within morality itself. Self-deception, both motivated irratio-nality and purposeful evasion, does sometimes advance mental health, but it also advances moral values such as hope and love. Even so, self-deception is less beneficial than suggested by Taylor and others who conflate unproven beliefs and irrational beliefs, and frequently it is linked to unhealthy evasions of reality. And the tensions between honesty and hope reveal tensions internal to morality and mental health alike, not a basis for a morality-therapy dichotomy.

From Morality to Mental Health:
Virtue and Vice in a Therapeutic Culture
Mike W. Martin

Friday, January 30, 2026

The Profound Impact of Profanity: How Swearing Affects the Brain, Emotions and Soul


It is a peculiar irony of modern life that while most people strive to improve their lives with technology and sophistication, language is sliding comfortably into the gutter. Profanity has become the linguistic wallpaper today, increasingly commonplace among the youth and emblematic of a shift toward a lifestyle that is as casual as it is vulgar.

Tragically, swearing has taken up permanent residence in the repertoire of the masses, especially among the youth. Unlike mathematics or history, it is not a subject taught in a classroom—at least, not in the traditional sense.

Instead, it is absorbed through osmosis from peers, parents, and, most aggressively, social media and Hollywood. There is a rich contradiction here: society largely condemns the use of expletives, turning up its nose at their rude offensiveness, yet simultaneously consumes them with a voracious appetite.

Swear words are sanctioned and restricted under the vague assumption that harm will befall society if they are used, especially if they become a habit. Yet the exact nature of this harm—whether to the speaker, the listener or society at large—remains ever so vague.

Swearing is done to vent. Sharp, jagged words release pressure valves of anger, frustration, or even exuberant excitement. There is a pervasive notion that no other collection of sounds is quite as efficient or effective at conveying raw emotion. In a sense, this is true; curse words are not merely random insults.

Why Swear?

They pack an emotional wallop. Linguists, such as Timothy Jay, author of Why We Curse, suggest that profanity hijacks the brain’s limbic system—the very center of emotions. When an expletive is spoken, it triggers a dopamine surge, embedding itself in memory with a tenacity that polite language simply cannot match.

Hollywood and social media, in their infinite wisdom, seem intent on promoting this vulgarity. They prioritize profanity for drama, embedding it into iconic movie lines. Curse words are short, punchy and versatile—a scriptwriter’s dream for quick character development and an even quicker shock value sure to be remembered.

Social media and streaming platforms have become central pillars of modern life, particularly for the younger generation. While these tools were ostensibly created to entertain and connect us, they have arguably succeeded in spreading a contagion of unhealthy trends—online vulgarity being among the most pernicious. This growing tide is eroding young minds, undermining moral frameworks, and weakening emotional health in ways we are only just beginning to understand.

The Psychological Drive to be Vulgar

The relentless parade of vulgar and provocative content distorts what “popularity” actually looks like. Many young people have come to believe they must display bold behavior, air their dirty laundry, or act in shocking ways simply to garner likes and followers. Consequently, they drift away from cultivating genuine talent or personality. Rather than focusing on developing culture, education, or creativity, they begin to value the fleeting attention gained from shock value over the enduring peace of self-respect.

This online vulgarity is fundamentally altering how young people view human connection. On many platforms, the superficiality of physical appearance and attraction is elevated above virtue, emotional depth, respect, and trust, fostering wildly unrealistic expectations of love and companionship.

SATANIC CHRIST PORN-BLASPHEMY AT WALMART — SIGN PETITION

Many young people begin to operate under the delusion that relationships are solely about appearances, pleasure, and excitement rather than about understanding, virtue, patience or responsibility. The inevitable result is a landscape of unstable relationships and emotional confusion, contributing to the fracturing of families and higher divorce rates.

The algorithms that govern our digital lives only exacerbate the situation. Because platforms are designed to promote posts that elicit strong reactions, vulgar content travels much faster than meaningful discourse. This creates a perverse structure of incentive in which creators post increasingly provocative material to remain relevant.

The more young people consume this content, the more they crave that specific brand of excitement, eventually losing their taste for the God-given beauty of normal life. Over time, they experience reduced concentration, diminished motivation and poor emotional control.

The Hidden Impact of Profanity: How Swearing Affects Your Brain, Emotions, and Spirit

Ancient wisdom, particularly within the Catholic tradition, has long emphasized the importance of pure, respectful speech as a reflection of one’s inner values. Religious teachings encourage us to use language that inspires, comforts, and uplifts rather than degrades.

When we speak with forethought and restraint, it reflects internal discipline and strength. Choosing respectful language is not just about manners; it is a way to nurture both the soul and the society it inhabits.

From a psychological perspective, habitual profanity can deeply affect our emotional and cognitive landscape. Swearing is inextricably linked to the expression of intense emotions such as anger or stress.

When these explosive words become the default in our vocabulary, they reinforce negative emotional patterns and atrophy our ability to manage stress with grace. Research in cognitive psychology indicates that frequent exposure to harsh language may actually lower one’s emotional self-regulation and self-esteem.

Habitual profanity creates cognitive ruts that hinder the development of adaptive coping strategies, affecting our overall mental health. Studies show that profanity activates brain regions linked to emotion and impulsivity, such as the amygdala and the limbic system.

Over time, the repeated firing of these neural pathways strengthens our tendency toward intemperate, quick and unfiltered emotional reactions, while diminishing the faculties responsible for self-control and thoughtful regulation.

Profanity’s Adverse Effect on Family and Society

Changing speech habits that have been etched into our psyche may seem like a Herculean task, but it is entirely possible with self-awareness and resolve. Our choice of words has a profound impact on mental well-being and relationships. Practicing self-reflection allows one to identify triggers and replace negative verbal reflexes with constructive language.

Pursuing the company of supportive individuals who model positive communication can further reinforce these changes. The goal is not to surgically remove strong emotions but to express them in ways that promote self-control, mental clarity and emotional resilience.

Understanding the profound effects of foul language on mental, emotional and spiritual health is essential to personal growth. Profanity, used to express deep emotion, reinforces negative thought patterns, increases stress and disrupts interpersonal harmony. In short, foul language accelerates vice.

The journey toward a healthier way of communicating begins with self-awareness and a commitment to practicing virtue. The power of thoughtful speech must be embraced through self-awareness, the exploration of alternative expressions, and the fostering of respectful interactions. In doing so, an important step can be taken toward not only improving one’s mental health but also contributing to more compassionate and understanding relationships.

To solve this issue, a coalition of the willing—the clergy, families, schools, governments, and the youth themselves—must work together. Parents need to engage in open, honest dialogue with their children. Schools must teach the curriculum of digital responsibility. Governments must enforce strict rules against harmful content*. Most importantly, young people need to develop the armor of self-control, valuer eal-life relationships over digital ones, and eliminate the harmful noise generated by social media and Hollywood.

Every word matters when it comes to cultivating a healthy mental state and a positive social environment. We must choose words wisely and take pride in meaningful, expressive dialogue bereft of swear words. If society hopes to build a healthy and emotionally robust future generation, it must recognize the serious pitfalls of vulgarity and return to the principles of a well-ordered, Christian civilization.

Gary Isbell
https://www.returntoorder.org/2026/01/the-profound-impact-of-profanity-how-swearing-affects-the-brain-emotions-and-soul/.

* Governments in modern world aim for the destruction of the society, so expecting anything positive from government is naivety.

Saturday, November 22, 2025

Morality

 THE relation of the various peoples of the earth to the supreme interests of life, to God, virtue, and immortality, may be investigated up to a certain point, but can never be compared to one another with absolute strictness and certainty. The more plainly in these matters our evidence seems to speak, the more carefully must we refrain from unqualified assumptions and rash generalisations.

This remark is especially true with regard to our judgment on questions of morality. It may be possible to indicate many contrasts and shades of difference among different nations, but to strike the balance of the whole is not given to human insight. The ultimate truth with respect to the character, the conscience, and the guilt of a people remains for ever a secret; if only for the reason that its defects have another side, where they reappear as peculiarities or even as virtues. We must leave those who find a pleasure in passing sweeping censures on whole nations, to do so as they like. The peoples of Europe can maltreat, but happily not judge one another. A great nation, interwoven by its civilisation, its achievements, and its fortunes with the whole life of the modern world, can afford to ignore both its advocates and its accusers. It lives on with or without the approval of theorists.

Accordingly, what here follows is no judgment, but rather a string of marginal notes, suggested by a study of the Italian Renaissance extending over some years. The value to be attached to them is all the more qualified as they mostly touch on the life of the upper classes, with respect to which we are far better informed in Italy than in any other country in Europe at that period. But though both fame and infamy sound louder here than elsewhere, we are not helped thereby in forming an adequate moral estimate of the people.What eye can pierce the depths in which the character and fate of nations are determined?—in which that which is inborn and that which has been experienced combine to form a new whole and a fresh nature?—in which even those intellectual capacities, which at first sight we should take to be most original, are in fact evolved late and slowly? Who can tell if the Italian before the thirteenth century possessed that flexible activity and certainty in his whole being—that play of power in shaping whatever subject he dealt with in word or in form, which was peculiar to him later? And if no answer can be found to these questions, how can we possibly judge of the infinite and infinitely intricate channels through which character and intellect are incessantly pouring their influence one upon the other. A tribunal there is for each one of us, whose voice is our conscience; but let us have done with these generalities about nations. For the people that seems to be most sick the cure may be at hand; and one that appears to be healthy may bear within it the ripening germs of death, which the hour of danger will bring forth from their hiding-place.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the civilisation of the Renaissance had reached its highest pitch, and at the same time the political ruin of the nation seemed inevitable, there were not wanting serious thinkers who saw a connexion between this ruin and the prevalent immorality. It was not one of those methodistical moralists who in every age think themselves called to declaim against the wickedness of the time, but it was Macchiavelli, who, in one of his most well-considered works,[981] said openly: ‘We Italians are irreligious and corrupt above others.’ Another man had perhaps said, ‘We are individually highly developed; we have outgrown the limits of morality and religion which were natural to us in our undeveloped state, and we despise outward law, because our rulers are illegitimate, and their judges and officers wicked  men.’ Macchiavelli adds, ‘because the Church and her representatives set us the worst example.’

Shall we add also, ‘because the influence exercised by antiquity was in this respect unfavourable’? The statement can only be received with many qualifications. It may possibly be true of the humanists (p. 272 sqq.), especially as regards the profligacy of their lives. Of the rest it may perhaps be said with some approach to accuracy, that, after they became familiar with antiquity, they substituted for holiness—the Christian ideal of life—the cultus of historical greatness (see Part II. chap. iii.). We can understand, therefore, how easily they would be tempted to consider those faults and vices to be matters of indifference, in spite of which their heroes were great. They were probably scarcely conscious of this themselves, for if we are summoned to quote any statement of doctrine on this subject, we are again forced to appeal to humanists like Paolo Giovio, who excuses the perjury of Giangaleazzo Visconti, through which he was enabled to found an empire, by the example of Julius Cæsar.[982] The great Florentine historians and statesmen never stoop to these slavish quotations, and what seems antique in their deeds and their judgments is so because the nature of their political life necessarily fostered in them a mode of thought which has some analogy with that of antiquity.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Italy at the beginning of the sixteenth century found itself in the midst of a grave moral crisis, out of which the best men saw hardly any escape.

Let us begin by saying a few words about that moral force which was then the strongest bulwark against evil. The highly gifted men of that day thought to find it in the sentiment of honour. This is that enigmatic mixture of conscience and egoism which often survives in the modern man after he has lost, whether by his own fault or not, faith, love, and hope. This sense of honour is compatible with much selfishness and great vices, and may be the victim of astonishing illusions; yet, nevertheless, all the noble elements that are left  in the wreck of a character may gather around it, and from this fountain may draw new strength. It has become, in a far wider sense than is commonly believed, a decisive test of conduct in the minds of the cultivated Europeans of our own day, and many of those who yet hold faithfully by religion and morality are unconsciously guided by this feeling in the gravest decisions of their lives.[983]It lies without the limits of our task to show how the men of antiquity also experienced this feeling in a peculiar form, and how, afterwards, in the Middle Ages, a special sense of honour became the mark of a particular class. Nor can we here dispute with those who hold that conscience, rather than honour, is the motive power. It would indeed be better and nobler if it were so; but since it must be granted that even our worthier resolutions result from ‘a conscience more or less dimmed by selfishness,’ it is better to call the mixture by its right name.[984] It is certainly not always easy, in treating of the Italian of this period, to distinguish this sense of honour from the passion for fame, into which, indeed, it easily passes. Yet the two sentiments are essentially different.

There is no lack of witnesses on this subject. One who speaks plainly may here be quoted as a representative of the rest. We read in the recently-published ‘Aphorisms’ of Guicciardini:[985] ‘He who esteems honour highly, succeeds in all that he undertakes, since he fears neither trouble, danger, nor expense; I have found it so in my own case, and may say it and write it; vain and dead are the deeds of men which have not this as their motive.’ It is necessary to add that, from what is known of the life of the writer, he can here be only speaking of honour, and not of fame. Rabelais has put the matter more clearly than perhaps any Italian. We quote him, indeed, unwillingly in these pages. What the great, baroque Frenchman gives us, is a picture of what the Renaissance  would be without form and without beauty.[986] But his description of an ideal state of things in the Thelemite monastery is decisive as historical evidence. In speaking of his gentlemen and ladies of the Order of Free Will,[987] he tells us as follows:—

‘En leur reigle n’estoit que ceste clause: Fay ce que vouldras. Parce que gens liberes, bien nayz,[988] bien instruictz, conversans en compaignies honnestes, ont par nature ung instinct et aguillon qui toujours les poulse à faitz vertueux, et retire de vice; lequel ilz nommoyent honneur.’

This is that same faith in the goodness of human nature which inspired the men of the second half of the eighteenth century, and helped to prepare the way for the French Revolution. Among the Italians, too, each man appeals to this noble instinct within him, and though with regard to the people as a whole—chiefly in consequence of the national disasters—judgments of a more pessimistic sort became prevalent, the importance of this sense of honour must still be rated highly. If the boundless development of individuality, stronger than the will of the individual, be the work of a historical providence, not less so is the opposing force which then manifested itself in Italy. How often, and against what passionate attacks of selfishness it won the day, we cannot tell, and therefore no human judgment can estimate with certainty the absolute moral value of the nation.

A force which we must constantly take into account in judging of the morality of the more highly-developed Italian  of this period, is that of the imagination. It gives to his virtues and vices a peculiar colour, and under its influence his unbridled egoism shows itself in its most terrible shape.

The force of his imagination explains, for example, the fact that he was the first gambler on a large scale in modern times. Pictures of future wealth and enjoyment rose in such life-like colours before his eyes, that he was ready to hazard everything to reach them. The Mohammedan nations would doubtless have anticipated him in this respect, had not the Koran, from the beginning, set up the prohibition against gambling as a chief safeguard of public morals, and directed the imagination of its followers to the search after buried treasures. In Italy, the passion for play reached an intensity which often threatened or altogether broke up the existence of the gambler. Florence had already, at the end of the fourteenth century, its Casanova—a certain Buonaccorso Pitti,[989] who, in the course of his incessant journeys as merchant, political agent, diplomatist and professional gambler, won and lost sums so enormous that none but princes like the Dukes of Brabant, Bavaria, and Savoy, were able to compete with him. That great lottery-bank, which was called the Court of Rome, accustomed people to a need of excitement, which found its satisfaction in games of hazard during the intervals between one intrigue and another. We read, for example, how Franceschetto Cybò, in two games with the Cardinal Raffaello Riario, lost no less than 14,000 ducats, and afterwards complained to the Pope that his opponent had cheated him.[990] Italy has since that time been the home of the lottery.

It was to the imagination of the Italians that the peculiar character of their vengeance was due. The sense of justice was, indeed, one and the same throughout Europe, and any violation of it, so long as no punishment was inflicted, must have been felt in the same manner. But other nations, though they found it no easier to forgive, nevertheless forgot more easily, while the Italian imagination kept the picture of the  wrong alive with frightful vividness.[991] The fact that, according to the popular morality, the avenging of blood is a duty—a duty often performed in a way to make us shudder—gives to this passion a peculiar and still firmer basis. The government and the tribunals recognise its existence and justification, and only attempt to keep it within certain limits. Even among the peasantry, we read of Thyestean banquets and mutual assassination on the widest scale. Let us look at an instance.[992]In the district of Aquapendente three boys were watching cattle, and one of them said: ‘Let us find out the way how people are hung.’ While one was sitting on the shoulders of the other, and the third, after fastening the rope round the neck of the first, was tying it to an oak, a wolf came, and the two who were free ran away and left the other hanging. Afterwards they found him dead, and buried him. On the Sunday his father came to bring him bread, and one of the two confessed what had happened, and showed him the grave. The old man then killed him with a knife, cut him up, brought away the liver, and entertained the boy’s father with it at home. After dinner, he told him whose liver it was. Hereupon began a series of reciprocal murders between the two families, and within a month thirty-six persons were killed, women as well as men.

And such ‘vendette,’ handed down from father to son, and extending to friends and distant relations, were not limited to the lower classes, but reached to the highest. The chronicles and novels of the period are full of such instances, especially of vengeance taken for the violation of women. The classic land for these feuds was Romagna, where the ‘vendetta’ was interwoven with intrigues and party divisions of every conceivable sort. The popular legends present an awful picture of the savagery into which this brave and energetic people had relapsed. We are told, for instance, of a nobleman at Ravenna, who had got all his enemies together in a tower, and might have burned them; instead of which he let them out, embraced  them, and entertained them sumptuously; whereupon shame drove them mad, and they conspired against him.[993] Pious and saintly monks exhorted unceasingly to reconciliation, but they can scarcely have done more than restrain to a certain extent the feuds already established; their influence hardly prevented the growth of new ones. The novelists sometimes describe to us this effect of religion—how sentiments of generosity and forgiveness were suddenly awakened, and then again paralysed by the force of what had once been done and could never be undone. The Pope himself was not always lucky as a peacemaker. ‘Pope Paul II. desired that the quarrel between Antonio Caffarello and the family of Alberino should cease, and ordered Giovanni Alberino and Antonio Caffarello to come before him, and bade them kiss one another, and promised them a fine of 2,000 ducats in case they renewed this strife, and two days after Antonio was stabbed by the same Giacomo Alberino, son of Giovanni, who had wounded him once before; and the Pope was full of anger, and confiscated the goods of Alberino, and destroyed his houses, and banished father and son from Rome.’[994] The oaths and ceremonies by which reconciled enemies attempted to guard themselves against a relapse, are sometimes utterly horrible. When the parties of the ‘Nove’ and the ‘Popolari’ met and kissed one another by twos in the cathedral at Siena on Christmas Eve, 1494,[995] an oath was read by which all salvation in time and eternity was denied to the future violator of the treaty—‘an oath more astonishing and dreadful than had ever yet been heard.’ The last consolations of religion in the hour of death were to turn to the damnation of the man who should break it. It is clear, however, that such a ceremony rather represents the despairing mood of the mediators than offers any real guarantee of peace, inasmuch as the truest reconciliation is just that one which has least need of it.

This personal need of vengeance felt by the cultivated and highly placed Italian, resting on the solid basis of an analogous  popular custom, naturally displays itself under a thousand different aspects, and receives the unqualified approval of public opinion, as reflected in the works of the novelists.[996] All are at one on the point, that, in the case of those injuries and insults for which Italian justice offered no redress, and all the more in the case of those against which no human law can ever adequately provide, each man is free to take the law into his own hands. Only there must be art in the vengeance, and the satisfaction must be compounded of the material injury and moral humiliation of the offender. A mere brutal, clumsy triumph of force was held by public opinion to be no satisfaction. The whole man with his sense of fame and of scorn, not only his fist, must be victorious.

The Italian of that time shrank, it is true, from no dissimulation in order to attain his ends, but was wholly free from hypocrisy in matters of principle. In these he attempted to deceive neither himself nor others. Accordingly, revenge was declared with perfect frankness to be a necessity of human nature. Cool-headed people declared that it was then most worthy of praise, when it was disengaged from passion, and worked simply from motives of expedience, ‘in order that other men may learn to leave us unharmed.’[997] Yet such instances must have formed only a small minority in comparison with those in which passion sought an outlet. This sort of revenge differs clearly from the avenging of blood, which has been already spoken of; while the latter keeps more or less within the limits of retaliation—the ‘jus talionis’—the former necessarily goes much farther, not only requiring the sanction of the sense of justice, but craving admiration, and even striving to get the laugh on its own side.

Here lies the reason why men were willing to wait so long for their revenge. A ‘bella vendetta’ demanded as a rule a combination of circumstances for which it was necessary to wait patiently. The gradual ripening of such opportunities is described by the novelists with heartfelt delight.

There is no need to discuss the morality of actions in which plaintiff and judge are one and the same person. If this Italian thirst for vengeance is to be palliated at all, it must be by proving the existence of a corresponding national virtue, namely gratitude. The same force of imagination which retains and magnifies wrong once suffered, might be expected also to keep alive the memory of kindness received.[998] It is not possible, however, to prove this with regard to the nation as a whole, though traces of it may be seen in the Italian character of to-day. The gratitude shown by the inferior classes for kind treatment, and the good memory of the upper for politeness in social life, are instances of this.

This connexion between the imagination and the moral qualities of the Italian repeats itself continually. If, nevertheless, we find more cold calculation in cases where the Northerner rather follows his impulses, the reason is that individual development in Italy was not only more marked and earlier in point of time, but also far more frequent. Where this is the case in other countries, the results are also analogous. We find, for example, that the early emancipation of the young from domestic and paternal authority is common to North America with Italy. Later on, in the more generous natures, a tie of freer affection grows up between parents and children.

It is in fact a matter of extreme difficulty to judge fairly of other nations in the sphere of character and feeling. In these respects a people may be developed highly, and yet in a manner so strange that a foreigner is utterly unable to understand it. Perhaps all the nations of the West are in this point equally favoured.

(...)

In the imagination then, which governed this people more than any other, lies one general reason why the course of every passion was violent, and why the means used for the gratification of passion were often criminal. There is a violence which cannot control itself because it is born of weakness; but in Italy what we find is the corruption of powerful natures. Sometimes this corruption assumes a colossal shape, and crime seems to acquire almost a personal existence of its own.

The restraints of which men were conscious were but few. Each individual, even among the lowest of the people, felt himself inwardly emancipated from the control of the State and its police, whose title to respect was illegitimate, and itself founded on violence; and no man believed any longer in the justice of the law. When a murder was committed, the sympathies of the people, before the circumstances of the case were known, ranged themselves instinctively on the side of the murderer.[1005] A proud, manly bearing before and at the execution excited such admiration that the narrator often forgets to tell us for what offence the criminal was put to death.[1006] But when we add to this inward contempt of law and to the countless grudges and enmities which called for satisfaction, the impunity which crime enjoyed during times of political disturbance, we can only wonder that the state and society were not utterly dissolved. Crises of this kind occurred at Naples during the transition from the Aragonese to the French and Spanish rule, and at Milan, on the repeated expulsions and returns of the Sforzas; at such times those men who have never in their hearts recognised the bonds of law and society, come forward and give free play to their instincts of murder and rapine. Let us take, by way of example, a picture drawn from a humbler sphere.

When the Duchy of Milan was suffering from the disorders which followed the death of Giangaleazzo Sforza, about the year 1480 (pp. 40, 126), all safety came to an end in the provincial cities. This was the case in Parma,[1007] where the Milanese Governor, terrified by threats of murder, and after vainly offering rewards for the discovery of the offenders,  consented to throw open the gaols and let loose the most abandoned criminals. Burglary, the demolition of houses, shameless offences against decency, public assassination and murders, especially of Jews, were events of everyday occurrence. At first the authors of these deeds prowled about singly, and masked; soon large gangs of armed men went to work every night without disguise. Threatening letters, satires, and scandalous jests circulated freely; and a sonnet in ridicule of the Government seems to have roused its indignation far more than the frightful condition of the city. In many churches the sacred vessels with the host were stolen, and this fact is characteristic of the temper which prompted these outrages. It is impossible to say what would happen now in any country of the world, if the government and police ceased to act, and yet hindered by their presence the establishment of a provisional authority; but what then occurred in Italy wears a character of its own, through the great share which personal hatred and revenge had in it. The impression, indeed, which Italy at this period makes on us is, that even in quiet times great crimes were commoner than in other countries. We may, it is true, be misled by the fact that we have far fuller details on such matters here than elsewhere, and that the same force of imagination, which gives a special character to crimes actually committed, causes much to be invented which never really happened. The amount of violence was perhaps as great elsewhere. It is hard to say for certain, whether in the year 1500 men were any safer, whether human life was after all better protected, in powerful, wealthy Germany, with its robber knights, extortionate beggars, and daring highwaymen. But one thing is certain, that premeditated crimes, committed professionally and for hire by third parties, occurred in Italy with great and appalling frequency.

So far as regards brigandage, Italy, especially in the more fortunate provinces, such as Tuscany, was certainly not more, and probably less, troubled than the countries of the North. But the figures which do meet us are characteristic of the country. It would be hard, for instance, to find elsewhere the case of a priest, gradually driven by passion from one excess to another, till at last he came to head a band of robbers. That  age offers us this example among others.[1008] On August 12, 1495, the priest Don Niccolò de’ Pelegati of Figarolo was shut up in an iron cage outside the tower of San Giuliano at Ferrara. He had twice celebrated his first mass; the first time he had the same day committed murder, but afterwards received absolution at Rome; he then killed four people and married two wives, with whom he travelled about. He afterwards took part in many assassinations, violated women, carried others away by force, plundered far and wide, and infested the territory of Ferrara with a band of followers in uniform, extorting food and shelter by every sort of violence. When we think of what all this implies, the mass of guilt on the head of this one man is something tremendous. The clergy and monks had many privileges and little supervision, and among them were doubtless plenty of murderers and other malefactors—but hardly a second Pelegati. It is another matter, though by no means creditable, when ruined characters sheltered themselves in the cowl in order to escape the arm of the law, like the corsair whom Massuccio knew in a convent at Naples.[1009] What the real truth was with regard to Pope John XXIII. in this respect, is not known with certainty.[1010]The age of the famous brigand chief did not begin till later, in the seventeenth century, when the political strife of Guelph and Ghibelline, of Frenchman and Spaniard, no longer agitated the country. The robber then took the place of the partisan.

In certain districts of Italy, where civilization had made little progress, the country people were disposed to murder any stranger who fell into their hands. This was especially the case in the more remote parts of the Kingdom of Naples, where  the barbarism dated probably from the days of the Roman ‘latifundia,’ and when the stranger and the enemy (‘hospes’ and ‘hostis’) were in all good faith held to be one and the same. These people were far from being irreligious. A herdsman once appeared in great trouble at the confessional, avowing that, while making cheese during Lent, a few drops of milk had found their way into his mouth. The confessor, skilled in the customs of the country, discovered in the course of his examination that the penitent and his friends were in the practice of robbing and murdering travellers, but that, through the force of habit, this usage gave rise to no twinges of conscience within them.[1011] We have already mentioned (p. 352, note 3) to what a degree of barbarism the peasants elsewhere could sink in times of political confusion.

A worse symptom than brigandage of the morality of that time was the frequency of paid assassination. In that respect Naples was admitted to stand at the head of all the cities of Italy. ‘Nothing,’ says Pontano,[1012] ‘is cheaper here than human life.’ But other districts could also show a terrible list of these crimes. It is hard, of course, to classify them according to the motives by which they were prompted, since political expediency, personal hatred, party hostility, fear, and revenge, all play into one another. It is no small honour to the Florentines, the most highly-developed people of Italy, that offences of this kind occurred more rarely among them than anywhere else,[1013] perhaps because there was a justice at hand for legitimate grievances which was recognised by all, or because the higher culture of the individual gave him different views as to the right of men to interfere with the decrees of fate. In Florence, if anywhere, men were able to feel the incalculable con sequences of a deed of blood, and to understand how insecure the author of a so-called profitable crime is of any true and lasting gain. After the fall of Florentine liberty, assassination, especially by hired agents, seems to have rapidly increased, and continued till the government of Cosimo I. had attained such strength that the police[1014] was at last able to repress it.

Elsewhere in Italy paid crimes were probably more or less frequent in proportion to the number of powerful and solvent buyers. Impossible as it is to make any statistical estimate of their amount, yet if only a fraction of the deaths which public report attributed to violence were really murders, the crime must have been terribly frequent. The worst example of all was set by princes and governments, who without the faintest scruple reckoned murder as one of the instruments of their power. And this, without being in the same category with Cæsar Borgia. The Sforzas, the Aragonese monarchs, the Republic of Venice,[1015] and later on, the agents of Charles V. resorted to it whenever it suited their purpose. The imagination of the people at last became so accustomed to facts of this kind, that the death of any powerful man was seldom or never attributed to natural causes.[1016] There were certainly absurd notions current with regard to the effect of various poisons. There may be some truth in the story of that terrible white powder used by the Borgias, which did its work at the end of a definite period (p. 116), and it is possible that it was really a ‘velenum atterminatum’ which the Prince of Salerno handed to the Cardinal of Aragon, with the words: ‘In a few days you will die, because your father, King Ferrante, wished to trample upon us all.’[1017] But the poisoned letter which Caterina Riario sent to Pope Alexander VI.[1018] would hardly have caused his death even if he had read it; and when Alfonso the Great was warned by his physicians not to read in the ‘Livy’ which Cosimo de’ Medici had presented to him, he told them with justice not to talk like fools.[1019] Nor can that poison, with which the secretary of Piccinino wished to anoint the sedan-chair of Pius II.,[1020] have affected any other organ than the imagination. The proportion which mineral and vegetable poisons bore to one another cannot be ascertained precisely. The poison with which the painter Rosso Fiorentino destroyed himself (1541) was evidently a powerful acid,[1021] which it would have been impossible to administer to another person without his knowledge. The secret use of weapons, especially of the dagger, in the service of powerful individuals, was habitual in Milan, Naples, and other cities. Indeed, among the crowds of armed retainers who were necessary for the personal safety of the great, and who lived in idleness, it was natural that outbreaks of this mania for blood should from time to time occur. Many  a deed of horror would never have been committed, had not the master known that he needed but to give a sign to one or other of his followers.

Among the means used for the secret destruction of others—so far, that is, as the intention goes—we find magic,[1022] practised, however, sparingly. Where ‘maleficii,’ ‘malie,’ and so forth, are mentioned, they appear rather as a means of heaping up additional terror on the head of some hated enemy. At the courts of France and England in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, magic, practised with a view to the death of an opponent, plays a far more important part in Italy.

In this country, finally, where individuality of every sort attained its highest development, we find instances of that ideal and absolute wickedness which delights in crimes for their own sake, and not as means to an end, or at any rate as means to ends for which our psychology has no measure.

Among these appalling figures we may first notice certain of the ‘Condottieri,’[1023] such as Braccio di Montone, Tiberto Brandolino, and that Werner von Urslingen whose silver hauberk bore the inscription: ‘The enemy of God, of pity and of mercy.’ This class of men offers us some of the earliest instances of criminals deliberately repudiating every moral restraint. Yet we shall be more reserved in our judgment of them when we remember that the worst part of their guilt—in the estimate of those who record it—lay in their defiance of spiritual threats and penalties, and that to this fact is due that air of horror with which they are represented as surrounded. In the case of Braccio, the hatred of the Church went so far that he was infuriated at the sight of monks at their psalms,  and had thrown them down from the top of a tower;[1024] but at the same time ‘he was loyal to his soldiers and a great general.’ As a rule, the crimes of the ‘Condottieri’ were committed for the sake of some definite advantage, and must be attributed to a position in which men could not fail to be demoralised. Even their apparently gratuitous cruelty had commonly a purpose, if it were only to strike terror. The barbarities of the House of Aragon, as we have seen, were mainly due to fear and to the desire for vengeance. The thirst for blood on its own account, the devilish delight in destruction, is most clearly exemplified in the case of the Spaniard Cæsar Borgia, whose cruelties were certainly out of all proportion to the end which he had in view (p. 114 sqq.). In Sigismondo Malatesta, tyrant of Rimini (pp. 32, 228), the same disinterested love of evil may also be detected. It is not only the Court of Rome,[1025] but the verdict of history, which convicts him of murder, rape, adultery, incest, sacrilege, perjury and treason, committed not once but often. The most shocking crime of all—the unnatural attempt on his own son Roberto, who frustrated it with his drawn dagger,[1026]—may have been the result, not merely of moral corruption, but perhaps of some magical or astrological superstition. The same conjecture has been made to account for the rape of the Bishop of Fano[1027] by Pierluigi Farnese of Parma, son of Paul III.

If we now attempt to sum up the principal features in the Italian character of that time, as we know it from a study of the life of the upper classes, we shall obtain something like the following result. The fundamental vice of this character was at the same time a condition of its greatness, namely, excessive individualism. The individual first inwardly casts off the  authority of a state which, as a fact, is in most cases tyrannical and illegitimate, and what he thinks and does is, rightly or wrongly, now called treason. The sight of victorious egoism in others drives him to defend his own right by his own arm. And, while thinking to restore his inward equilibrium, he falls, through the vengeance which he executes, into the hands of the powers of darkness. His love, too, turns mostly for satisfaction to another individuality equally developed, namely, to his neighbour’s wife. In face of all objective facts, of laws and restraints of whatever kind, he retains the feeling of his own sovereignty, and in each single instance forms his decision independently, according as honour or interest, passion or calculation, revenge or renunciation, gain the upper hand in his own mind.

If therefore egoism in its wider as well as narrower sense is the root and fountain of all evil, the more highly developed Italian was for this reason more inclined to wickedness than the member of other nations of that time.

But this individual development did not come upon him through any fault of his own, but rather through an historical necessity. It did not come upon him alone, but also, and chiefly by means of Italian culture, upon the other nations of Europe, and has constituted since then the higher atmosphere which they breathe. In itself it is neither good nor bad, but necessary; within it has grown up a modern standard of good and evil—a sense of moral responsibility—which is essentially different from that which was familiar to the Middle Ages.

But the Italian of the Renaissance had to bear the first mighty surging of a new age. Through his gifts and his passions, he has become the most characteristic representative of all the heights and all the depths of his time. By the side of profound corruption appeared human personalities of the noblest harmony, and an artistic splendour which shed upon the life of man a lustre which neither antiquity nor mediævalism either could or would bestow upon it.

The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy, 

by Jacob Burckhardt

Tuesday, September 23, 2025

Moral philosophy and the "realist" philosophers


Moral philosophy, from the days of Socrates down to our own lifetime, had been regarded as an attempt to think out more clearly the issues involved in conduct, for the sake of acting better. In 1912 Prichard announced that moral philosophy as so understood was based on a mistake, and advocated a new kind of moral philosophy, purely theoretical, in which the workings of the moral consciousness should be scientifically studied as if they were the movements of the planets, and no attempt made to interfere with them. And Bertrand Russell at Cambridge proposed in the same spirit, and on grounds whose difference was only superficial, the extrusion of ethics from the body of philosophy.

The 'realist' philosophers who adopted this hew programme were all, or nearly all, teachers of young men and young women. Their pupils, with habits and characters yet unformed, stood on the threshold of life; many of them on the threshold of public life. Half a century earlier, young people in that position had been told that by thinking about what they were doing, or were about to do, they would become likely on the whole to do it better; and that some understanding of the nature of moral or political action, some attempt to formulate ideals and principles, was an indispensable condition of engaging creditably in these activities themselves. And their teachers, when introducing them to the study of moral and political theory, would say to them, whether in words or not— the most important things that one says are often not said in words—'Take this subject seriously, because whether you understand it or not will make a difference to your whole lives'. The 'realist', on the contrary, said to his pupils, 'If it interests you to study this, do so; but don't think it will be of any use to you. Remember the great principle of realism, that nothing is affected by being known. That is as true of human action as of anything else. Moral philosophy is only the theory of moral action: it can't therefore make any difference to the practice of moral action. People can act just as morally without it as with it. I stand here as a moral philosopher; I will try to tell you what acting morally is, but don't expect me to tell you how to do it.'

At the moment, I am not concerned with the sophisms underlying this programme, but with its consequences. The pupils, whether or not they expected a philosophy that should give them, as that of Green's school had given their fathers, ideals to live for and principles to live by, did not get it; and were told that no philosopher (except of course a bogus philosopher) would even try to give it. The inference which any pupil could draw for himself was that for guidance in the problems of life, since one must not seek it from thinkers or from thinking, from ideals or from principles, one must look to people who were not thinkers (but fools), to processes that were not thinking (but passion), to aims that were not ideals (but caprices), and to rules that were not principles (but rules of expediency). If the realists had wanted to train up a generation of Englishmen and Englishwomen expressly as the potential dupes of every adventurer in morals or politics, commerce or religion, who should appeal to their emotions and promise them private gains which he neither could procure them nor even meant to procure them, no better way of doing it could have been discovered.

The result of all this might have been even worse than it has been, but for the fact that the 'realists' discredited themselves with their pupils before their lessons could take effect. This self-stultification was a gradual and piecemeal business. Not only did they jettison the entire body of traditional ethics; as soon as they began work on their new brand of moral theory, whatever doctrine concerning moral action was tested, to show whether it was fit to form part of that theory, was found wanting. Another traditional philosophical science which was thrown bodily overboard was the theory of knowledge; for although 'realism' began by defining itself as a theory of knowledge pure and simple, its votaries before long discovered that a theory of knowledge was a contradiction in terms. Another was political theory; this they destroyed by denying the conception of a 'common good', the fundamental idea of all social life, and insisting that all 'goods' were private. In this process, by which anything that could be recognized as a philosophical doctrine was stuck up and shot to pieces by the 'realistic' criticism, the 'realists' little by little destroyed everything in the way of positive doctrine that they had ever possessed. Once more, I am concerned only with the effect on their pupils. It was (how could it not have been?) to convince them that philosophy was a silly and trifling game, and to give them a lifelong contempt for the subject and a lifelong grudge against the men who had wasted their time by forcing it upon their attention.

That this did actually happen any one could see. The school of Green had taught that philosophy was not a preserve for professional philosophers, but every one's business; and the pupils of this school had gradually formed a block of opinion in the country whose members, though not professional philosophers, were interested in thesubject, regarded it as important, and did not feel themselves debarred by their amateur status from expressing their own opinions about it. As these men died, no one took their place; and by about 1920 I found myself asking, 'Why is it that nowadays no Oxford man, unless he is either about 70 years old or else a teacher of philosophy at Oxford or elsewhere, regards philosophy as anything but a futile parlour game?' The answer was not difficult to find, and was confirmed by the fact that the 'realists', unlike the school of Green, did think philosophy a preserve for professional philosophers, and were loud in their contempt of philosophical utterances by historians, natural scientists, theologians, and other amateurs.

The fox was tailless, and knew it. But this mental kind of decaudation, when people part with their morals, their religion, the learning they acquired at school, and so forth, is commonly regarded by the tailless as an improvement in their condition; and so it was with the 'realists'. They were glad to have eradicated from the philosophical schools that confusion of philosophy with pulpit oratory which was involved in the bad old theory that moral philosophy is taught with a view to making the pupils better men. They were proud to have excogitated a philosophy so pure from the sordid taint of utility that they could lay their hands on their hearts and say it was no use at all; a philosophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life of pure research could appreciate it, and so abstruse that only a whole-time student, and a very clever man at that, could understand it. They were quite resigned to the contempt of fools and amateurs. If anybody differed from them on these points, it could only be because his intellect was weak or his motives bad.

The latter end of the 'realist' movement is one of those things whose history will never be written. It is a story of how the men who best understood the ideas of the original 'realists', and tried hardest to remain loyal to them, found one piece of ground after another slipping from under their feet, and stumbled from one temporary and patchwork philosophy to another in a kind of intellectual nightmare. One of them, Bertrand Russell, a gifted and accomplished writer, has left records of his successive attempts at a philosophy; but most of them are, or were, less articulate, or else struck dumb by their sufferings; and when they and their friends are dead no one will ever know how their lives were spent. What I myself know about it I shall certainly not repeat.

From the book An Autobiography - R. G. Collingwood

Monday, July 14, 2025

Some thoughts on higher ethics

 

The point is that, in the last analysis, a man chooses what he does choose in order to obtain happiness, whether it is the immediate satisfaction of an urgent desire or a remote future happiness bought perhaps with present acceptance of suffering. This means that the questions ‘What is the purpose of existence?’ and ‘How is happiness to be obtained?’ are synonymous; for they are both the ethical question, ‘What should I do?’ But there is happiness and happiness, and the intelligent man will prefer the permanent to the temporary. The question, then, is ‘How is permanent happiness, if such a thing exists, to be obtained?’
Nanavira Thera

Happiness is no easy matter; it is very difficult to find in ourselves and impossible to find elsewhere.
Chamfort

The reduction of one's needs is indeed something that should be inculcated in youth. “The fewer needs one has, the happier one is” is an old but often unrecognized truth.
Lichtenberg

We must not follow those who advise us to have human thoughts, since we are human, and mortal thoughts, as mortals should; on the contrary, we should try to become immortal as far as is possible and do our utmost to live in accordance with what is highest in us.
Aristotle

Whatever is great in the sphere of the universally human must… not be communicated as a subject for admiration, but as an ethical requirement.
Kierkegaard

A sensitive and honest-minded man, if he’s concerned about evil and injustice in the world, will naturally begin his campaign against them by eliminating them at their nearest source: his own person. This task will take his entire life.
Pessoa

An ethics that does not command us to renounce is a crime against the dignity to which we should aspire and against the happiness which we can obtain.

The man who wants to avoid grotesque collapses should not look for anything to fulfill him in space and time.

There is something definitively vile about the man who only admits equals, who does not tirelessly seek out his betters.
[There is no more important rule of conduct: attach yourself as much as you can to people who are more abler than you and yet not so very different that you cannot understand them]
Lichtenberg

Once I believe I have mastered a truth, the argument which interests me is not the one which confirms it but the one which refutes it.
[Valid as long believing is not replaced by direct knowledge. See also below ↓]
Nicolas Gomez Davila

The question that led to the essential condition of ‘knowing that I do not know’ set European thinking on solid ground. The essential thing is that I should have no illusions. Any method must have its origin here: starting from the fact that he knows that he does not know, man builds something, goes back to zero and finds his way forward. This is what Socrates originated. And where the mind refuses to be exposed and does not build on initial ignorance, there appears dogmatism.
Dragomir

[Yes, but since the Buddha knows, it is a function of faith to adhere to right dogmatism]

The word ‘inauthentic’ is used by Heidegger to describe the ostrich-like attitude of the man who seeks to escape from his inescapable self-responsibility by becoming an anonymous member of a crowd. This is the normal attitude of nearly everybody. To be ‘authentic’ a man must be constantly and deliberately aware of his total responsibility for what he is.

For example, a judge may disclaim personal responsibility for sentencing people to punishment. He will say that as a judge it is his duty to punish. In other words it is as an anonymous representative of the Judiciary that he punishes, and it is the Judiciary that must take the responsibility. This man is inauthentic. If he wishes to be authentic he must think to himself, whenever he sits on the Bench or draws his salary, ‘Why do I punish? Because, as a judge, it is my duty to punish.

Why am I a judge? Is it perhaps my duty to be a judge? No. I am a judge because I myself choose to be a judge. I choose to be one who punishes in the name of the Law. Can I, if I really wish, choose not to be a judge? Yes, I am absolutely free at any moment to stop being a judge, if I so choose. If this is so, when a guilty man comes up before me for sentence, do I have any alternative but to punish him? Yes, I can get up, walk out of the courtroom, and resign my job. Then if, instead, I punish him, am I responsible? I am totally responsible.’

Freud’s celebrated ‘unconscious’ withers and dies before the blast of Sartre’s criticism in L’Être et le Néant. Sartre gives us instead the notion of ‘bad faith’ or tacit self-deception, a far more delicate instrument. But the important point is this, that nothing of what I am at present can hide from reflexion; and I am thus totally open to self-criticism. Were this not so, meditation would be no more effective against our mental defilements than skin lotion is against smallpox.

But things are significant; that is to say, they are imperatives, they call for action (like the bottle in Alice in Wonderland labelled ‘Drink Me!’). Heidegger, and Sartre after him, describe the world as a world of tasks to be performed, and say that a man at every moment of his life is engaged in performing tasks (whether he specifically pays attention to them or not). Seen in this light the Four Noble Truths are the ultimate tasks for a man’s performance—Suffering commands ‘Know me absolutely!’, Arising commands ‘Abandon me!’, Cessation commands ‘Realize me!’, and the Path commands ‘Develop me!’.

But by transforming things into facts (and the Four Noble Truths, which are descriptions of things, into propositions) I automatically transform myself into logic—that is to say, I destroy my situation as an existing individual engaged in performing tasks in the world, I cease to be in concreto (in Kierkegaard’s terminology) and become sub specie æterni. (By regarding the Four Noble Truths as propositions, not as instructions, I automatically exempt myself from doing anything about them.) The world (if it can still be called a world) becomes a logician’s world—quite static and totally uninhabited. (It is significant that Wittgenstein, in his celebrated Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which helped to establish modern logical positivism, starts off by declaring:
‘1. The world is everything that is the case. 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.’ Compare, in this connexion, the note in the Preface to Notes where it is said ‘Things, not facts, make up my world’.)
Nanavira Thera

Clearing the Path is a work book. Its purpose is to help the user to acquire a point of view that is different from his customary frame of reference, and also more satisfactory . Necessarily, an early step in accomplishing this change is the abandonment of specific mistaken notions about the Buddha’s Teaching and about the nature of experience. More fundamentally, however, this initial change in specific views may lead to a change in point-of-view, whereby one comes to understand experience from a perspective different from what one has been accustomed to—a perspective in which intention, responsibility, context, conditionality, hunger, and related terms will describe the fun-damental categories of one’s perception and thinking—and which can lead, eventually, to a fundamental insight about the nature of personal existence.

Such a change of attitude seldom occurs without considerable prior development, and this book is intended to serve as a tool in fostering that development. As such it is meant to be lived with rather than read and set aside. These notions are developed more fully throughout Clearing the Path but it is as well that they be stated concisely at the outset so that there need be no mistaking who this book is for: those who find their present mode of existence unsatisfactory and who sense, however vaguely, the need to make a fundamental change not in the world but in themselves.
Samanera Bodhesako

Yet, sometimes at night I get a feeling of claustrophobia; of being smothered by my own personality, of choking through being in the world. During these moments the universe seems a prison wherein I lie fettered by the chains of my senses and blinded through being myself. It is like being pinned underneath the hull of a capsized boat, yet being afraid to dive deeper and get clear. In those moments it seems that there must be a way out, and that through sloughing off the personality alone can it be taken.
Connolly

The most useful knowledge is to know that we have been deceived, and the most delightful discovery is to find out that we have been mistaken. ‘Capable of forsaking an error’—this is fine praise, and a fine quality.

Those who never retract love themselves better than truth.

Joubert 

Thursday, February 27, 2020

Science is for Westerners what the Catholic Church was for Cortés and Pizarro

1941. Simone Weil is struck by a collection of recently published writings by Max Planck. She sees in Planck, much more than in Einstein, the person who has caused a “radical break in the development of science.” The idea of quanta is “extraordinary and subversive in itself,” even if perhaps it is wrong, in some of its applications. But it will become the new foundation of the world. There is then a strange fact: as soon as Planck moves away from quanta, everything he says is banal. He speaks like a decent man “in the ordinary meaning of the word,” possessed of good sense, “which is already much.” But no more. So the world is said to be based on a science it cannot understand, discovered by a man who, beyond science, has nothing meaningful to say. And yet it is “in the name of science that we, white people […] walk the terrestrial globe as its masters, treading, at every step, on some treasure.” Science is for Westerners what the Catholic Church was for Cortés and Pizarro. Except that these still had some idea about what the sacraments were.

Two years later, in London, Simone Weil wrote the Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Toward Mankind. She wanted to single out some unshakable principles. And she questioned what to rely on. Religion was no longer of use, as it was now something “for Sunday morning.” And science? Only nonbelievers, who yet believe in everyday science, “have a triumphant feeling of inner unity.” A feeling that is illusory, however. Their morality is “in contradiction with science no less than the religion of others.”

Science, in fact, is not moral. Inasmuch as no rules of behavior are offered. Weil reaches these conclusions: “Hitler has seen it clearly. What’s more, he lets many people see it, wherever there is the presence or menace of the SS, and even further away. Today only unreserved adherence to a totalitarian system, brown, red or other, can give, so to speak, a solid illusion of inner unity. This is why it constitutes such a strong temptation for so many souls in disarray.”

Roberto Calasso
The Unnameable Present

Sunday, February 23, 2020

There is ground for declaring that modern man has become a moral idiot

It is the appalling problem, when one comes to actual cases, of getting men to distinguish between better and worse. Are people today provided with a sufficiently rational scale of values to attach these predicates with intelligence? There is ground for declaring that modern man has become a moral idiot. So few are those who care to examine  their lives, or to accept the rebuke which comes of admitting that our present state may be a fallen state, that one questions whether people now understand what is meant by the superiority of an ideal. One might expect abstract reasoning to be lost upon them; but what is he to think when attestations of the most concrete kind are set before them, and they are still powerless to mark a difference or to draw a lesson? For four centuries every man has been not only his own priest but his own professor of ethics, and the consequence is an anarchy which threatens even that minimum consensus of value necessary to the political state.

Richard Weaver
Ideas have consequence

Thursday, February 20, 2020

The oath as a reminder

But the key to this experiment was what preceded it. When the participants first came to the lab, we asked some of them to write down the names of 10 books that they read in high school. The others were asked to write down as many of the Ten Commandments as they could recall.* After they finished this “memory” part of the experiment, we asked them to begin working on the matrix task.

This experimental setup meant that some of the participants were tempted to cheat after recalling 10 books that they read in high school, and some of them were tempted after recalling the Ten Commandments. Who do you think cheated more?

When cheating was not possible, our participants, on average, solved 3.1 problems correctly. When cheating was possible, the group that recalled 10 books read in high school achieved an average score of 4.1 questions solved (or 33 percent more than those who could not cheat).

But the big question is what happened to the other group—the students who first wrote down the Ten Commandments, then took the test, and then ripped up their worksheets. This, as sportscasters say, was the group to watch. Would they cheat—or would the Ten Commandments have an effect on their integrity? The result surprised even us: the students who had been asked to recall the Ten Commandments had not cheated at all. They averaged three correct answers—the same basic score as the group that could not cheat, and one less than those who were able to cheat but had recalled the names of the books.

As I walked home that evening I began to think about what had just happened. The group who listed 10 books cheated. Not a lot, certainly—only to that point where their internal reward mechanism (nucleus accumbens and superego) kicked in and rewarded them for stopping.

But what a miracle the Ten Commandments had wrought! We didn’t even remind our participants what the Commandments were—we just asked each participant to recall them (and almost none of the participants could recall all 10). We hoped the exercise might evoke the idea of honesty among them. And this was clearly what it did. So, we wondered, what lessons about decreasing dishonesty can we learn from this experiment? It took us a few weeks to come to some conclusions.

FOR ONE, PERHAPS we could bring the Bible back into public life. If we only want to reduce dishonesty, it might not be a bad idea. Then again, some people might object, on the grounds that the Bible implies an endorsement of a particular religion, or merely that it mixes religion in with the commercial and secular world. But perhaps an oath of a different nature would work. What especially impressed me about the experiment with the Ten Commandments was that the students who could remember only one or two Commandments were as affected by them as the students who remembered nearly all ten. This indicated that it was not the Commandments themselves that encouraged honesty, but the mere contemplation of a moral benchmark of some kind.

If that were the case, then we could also use nonreligious benchmarks to raise the general level of honesty. For instance, what about the professional oaths that doctors, lawyers, and others swear to—or used to swear to? Could those professional oaths do the trick?

The word profession comes from the Latin professus, meaning “affirmed publicly.” Professions started somewhere deep in the past in religion and then spread to medicine and law. Individuals who had mastered esoteric knowledge, it was said, not only had a monopoly on the practice of that knowledge, but had an obligation to use their power wisely and honestly. The oath—spoken and often written—was a reminder to practitioners to regulate their own behavior, and it also provided a set of rules that had to be followed in fulfilling the duties of their profession.

Dan Ariely
The (honest) truth about dishonesty