To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label Byung-Chul Han. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Byung-Chul Han. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Friendly Big Brother


‘Newspeak’ is the name for the ideal language in George Orwell’s surveillance state. It is meant to supplant ‘oldspeak’ entirely. Newspeak has only one goal: to restrict room for thinking freely. Every year, words decrease in number, and the space for conscious thought diminishes. Syme, a friend of 1984’s hero Winston, raves about the beauty of destroying words. ‘Thoughtcrimes’, he enthuses, will be made impossible when the words necessary for them are struck from the lexicon. In the process, the notion of freedom will be abolished too. On this score, Orwell’s surveillance state differs fundamentally from the world of the digital panopticon – which uses freedom to excess. Today’s society of information is not characterized by destroying words, but by multiplying them without end.

The spirit of the Cold War and the negativity of enmity dominate Orwell’s novel. The country it describes is in a state of permanent war. Julia, Winston’s love interest, speculates that the bombs raining down on London every day have been launched by Big Brother and the Party in order to maintain fear and terror in the populace. The ‘Enemy of the People’ is called Emmanuel Goldstein. He commands a network of underground conspirators seeking to overthrow the government. Big Brother is at ideological war with Goldstein. ‘Two Minutes Hate’, broadcast daily on the ‘telescreen’, takes aim at Goldstein. In the ‘Ministry of Truth’ – in fact, a Ministry of Lies – the past is revised and fitted to ideology. Orwell’s surveillance state employs the psychotechnical methods of brainwashing: electroshock, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, drugs and physical torture. The ‘Ministry of Plenty’ (newspeak: ‘Miniplenty’) sees to it that consumer goods are always lacking, so that an artificial state of need may be maintained.

Orwell’s surveillance state, with its telescreens and torture chambers, is fundamentally different from today’s digital panopticon, with its internet, smartphones and Google Glass. In the digital panopticon, the illusion of limitless freedom and communication predominates. Here there is no torture – just tweets and posts. Nor is there a mysterious ‘Ministry of Truth’. Transparency and information have taken the place of truth. The new conception of power does not involve controlling the past, but steering the future psychopolitically.

The neoliberal technology of power does not prohibit, protect or repress; instead, it prospects, permits and projects. Consumption is not held in check, but maximized. No production of scarcity occurs; instead, surplus is generated – indeed, a superabundance of positivity. Everyone is encouraged to communicate and consume. The principle of negativity, which still defined Orwell’s state, has yielded to the principle of positivity. Needs are not repressed, but stimulated. Confession obtained by force has been replaced by voluntary disclosure. Smartphones have been substituted for torture chambers. Big Brother now wears a friendly face. His friendliness is what makes surveillance so efficient.

Bentham’s Big Brother was invisible, but he was everywhere in prisoners’ minds. Inmates interiorized him. In contrast, the inhabitants of today’s digital panopticon never really feel that they are being watched or threatened. Consequently, ‘surveillance state’ is an imprecise name for describing the digital panopticon. Here, everyone feels free. However, precisely this feeling of freedom – which is nowhere to be found in Orwell’s state – is now the problem.

The digital panopticon thrives on its occupants’ voluntary self-exposure. Self-exploitation and self-illumination follow the same logic. In either case, freedom is exploited. The digital panopticon lacks a Big Brother wresting information from us against our will. Instead, we lay ourselves bare voluntarily.

The advertisement that Apple aired during the 1984 Superbowl has become the stuff of legend. In it the company presented itself as a force of liberation, which would counter the Orwellian surveillance state. In lock-step, listless workers – evidently without a will of their own – march into a vast hall and listen to Big Brother’s fanatical declamations on the telescreen. Then the ad shows a woman rushing into the assembly hall, the Thought Police in hot pursuit. Bearing a sledgehammer before her heaving breast, she dashes forward. Full of resolve, she runs straight up to Big Brother and throws the sledgehammer at the telescreen with all the force she can muster; it explodes in a dazzling burst of light. The assembled workers promptly awaken from their torpor. A voice declares: ‘On January 24th, Apple Computer will introduce Macintosh. And you’ll see why 1984 won’t be like 1984.’ But despite Apple’s message, 1984 did not signal the end of the surveillance state so much as the inception of a new kind of control society – one whose operations surpass the Orwellian state by leaps and bounds. Now, communication and control have become one, without remainder. Now, everyone is his or her own panopticon.

Psychopolitics

Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power

Byung-Chul Han

Saturday, January 31, 2026

An ethics of listening

 One can develop an ethics of listening from Michael Ende’s novel Momo. Momo is characterized first of all by a wealth of time: ‘time was Momo’s only form of wealth’.8 Momo’s time is a special time. It is the time of the Other, the time that she gives Others by listening to them. Momo is admired for her ability to listen. She appears as a listener:

[…] what little Momo was better at than anyone else was listening.

Anyone can listen, you may say – what’s so special about that? – but you’d be wrong. Very few people know how to listen properly, and Momo’s way of listening was quite unique.9Momo just sits there and listens. But her listening works wonders. She gives people ideas that would never have occurred to them on their own. Her listening is actually reminiscent of Hermann Broch’s hospitable listening, which frees the Other for themselves:

She simply sat there and listened with the utmost attention and sympathy, fixing them with her big, dark eyes, and they suddenly became aware of ideas whose existence they had never suspected.

Momo could listen in such a way that worried and indecisive people knew their own minds from one moment to the next, or shy people felt suddenly confident and at ease, or downhearted people felt happy and hopeful. And if someone felt that his life had been an utter failure, and that he himself was only one among millions of wholly unimportant people who could be replaced as easily as broken windowpanes, he would go and pour out his heart to Momo. And, even as he spoke, he would come to realize by some mysterious means that he was absolutely wrong: that there was only one person like himself in the whole world, and that, consequently, he mattered to the world in his own particular way.

Such was Momo’s talent for listening.10

Listening gives everyone back what is theirs. Momo also resolves conflict merely through pure listening:

Another time, a little boy brought her his canary because it wouldn’t sing. Momo found that a far harder proposition. She had to sit and listen to the bird for a whole week before it finally started to trill and warble again.11

8 Michael Ende, , transl. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (London: Puffin, 1985), p. 19.

9 Ibid., p. 18.

The Expulsion of the Other

Society, Perception and Communication Today

Byung-Chul Han

10 Ibid., pp. 18f.

11 Ibid., p. 23.

Wednesday, April 16, 2025

Smartphone

 

In the early days of the telephone, this new technology had an aura of fate-like power about it. Its resounding ringing was like an order to which one had to submit. In his Berlin Childhood around 1900, Benjamin describes how, as a child, he was helplessly at the mercy of the apparatus:

At that time, the telephone still hung – an outcast settled carelessly between the dirty-linen hamper and the gasometer – in a corner of the back hallway, where its ringing served to multiply the terrors of the Berlin household. When, having mastered my senses with great effort, I arrived to quell the uproar after prolonged fumbling through the gloomy corridor, I tore off the two receivers, which were heavy as dumbbells, thrust my head between them, and was inexorably delivered over to the voice that now sounded. There was nothing to allay the violence with which it pierced me. Powerless, I suffered, seeing that it obliterated my consciousness of time, my firm resolve, my sense of duty. And just as the medium obeys the voice that takes possession of him from beyond the grave, I submitted to the first proposal that came my way through the telephone.1The medium is the message. The resounding telephone in the dark corridor, with receivers as heavy as dumbbells, prefigures the message and lends it something of the uncanny. The noises of the first telephone conversations were ‘nocturnal noises’.2 The mobile phones we carry around in our pockets today do not possess the heavy weight of fate. They are handy and light; we literally have a grip on them. Fate is that alien power that immobilizes us. A message, as the voice of fate, does not leave us much room to manoeuvre. The mobility of the smartphone is enough to give us a feeling of freedom. No one is terrorized by its ringing. The smartphone does not force us into a helpless passivity. No one is delivered over to the voice of another.

The constant typing and swiping on the smartphone is an almost liturgical gesture, and it has a substantive impact on our relation to the world. I swipe away the information that does not interest me. I zoom in on the content that I like. I have the world firmly in my grip. The world has to accord with my desires. In this way, the smartphone amplifies self-referentiality. Through all my swiping, I submit the world to my needs. The world appears to me under the digital illusion of total availability.

According to Roland Barthes, the sense of touch ‘is the most demystifying of all senses, unlike sight, which is the most magical’.3The truly beautiful cannot be touched. It demands distance. Faced with the sublime, we stand back in awe. When praying, we fold our hands. The sense of touch destroys distance. It knows no astonishment. It demystifies, de-auratizes and renders profane what is touched. The touchscreen sublates the negativity of the other, of the unavailable. It generalizes the haptic compulsion to make everything available. In the age of the smartphone, even the sense of sight succumbs to haptic compulsion, and loses its magic. It loses the capacity for astonishment. The distance-destroying, consuming way of seeing approximates the sense of touch. It desecrates the world. To this way of seeing, the world appears only in the form of availability. For the frantically typing index finger, everything is consumable. The index finger that orders commodities or food necessarily transfers its consumerist habitus to other areas. Everything it touches takes on the form of a commodity. On Tinder, it degrades the other, who becomes a sexual object. Deprived of his or her otherness, the other becomes consumable.

In digital communication, the other is increasingly absent. Smartphones allow us to retreat into bubbles that screen us off from the other. Digital communications rarely involve salutations; the other is not explicitly addressed. We prefer to write a text message rather than ring someone up, because in writing we are less exposed to the other. Thus, the other as a voice disappears.

Communication with a smartphone is disembodied and without a gaze. Community has a bodily dimension. Because of its lack of corporeality, digital communication weakens community. The gaze stabilizes community. Digitalization makes the other as gaze disappear. The absence of the gaze is partly responsible for the loss of empathy in the digital age. When a parent stares at a smartphone, the infant is deprived of the gaze. The gaze of the mother, in particular, provides an infant with stability, self-affirmation and community. The gaze builds primordial trust. Without the gaze, a disturbed relationship to self and others develops.

What makes a smartphone different from a conventional mobile phone is that it is not just a telephone but, primarily, a medium for transmitting images and information. The world only becomes fully available and consumable once it is reified into an image:

‘Picture’ means … that which sounds in the colloquial expression to be ‘in the picture’ about something…. To ‘put oneself in the picture’ about something means: to place the being itself before one just as things are with it, and, as so placed, to keep it permanently before one.4

The smartphone places the world: it takes hold of it by placing [herstellen] it in front of us in the form of an image. The camera and the screen are the central elements of the smartphone because they intensify the becoming-image of the world. Digital images transform the world into available information. The smartphone is a ‘Ge-Stell’, enframing, in Heidegger’s sense: a Gestell, the essence of technology, unites in itself all forms of placing [Stellens] that make available, such as ordering [Bestellen], presenting [Vorstellen] or producing [Herstellen]. The next step in the process of civilization goes beyond the becoming-image of the world. It consists of the production of the world out of images, the production, that is, of a hyper-real reality.

The world consists of things as objects. The word ‘object’ is derived from the Latin verb obicere, which means ‘set against’, ‘throw against’ or ‘oppose’. The negativity of resistance is inherent in it. An object is something that turns against me, that opposes and resists me. Digital objects lack the negativity of obicere. I do not experience them as resistance. The smartphone is smart because it deprives reality of its character as resistant. Even the smooth surface of the smartphone conveys the sense of a lack of resistance. On its smooth touchscreen, everything seems tame [handzahm] and obliging. Everything is available at the tip of one’s fingers. The smartphone’s smooth surface is a digital flatterer that blandishes the hand and thus constantly elicits ‘likes’ from us. Digital media may be effective in overcoming the resistance of space and time, but it is precisely the negativity of resistance that constitutes experience. The smart environment of digital non-resistance impoverishes world and experience.

The smartphone is the main informaton of our time. It not only makes many things superfluous but also dereifies the world by reducing it to information. The material aspect of the smartphone recedes, and information takes its place; the materiality of the smartphone is not perceived in its own right. Smartphones do not really differ in their appearance. We look through them into the infosphere. An analogue watch also provides us with information regarding time, but it is not an informaton; it is a thing, even an adornment. Its material aspect is central to it.

A society that is dominated by information and informatons is unadorned. Adornment [Schmuck] originally meant splendid attire. Non-things are naked. The decorative and the ornamental are characteristic of things. They are life’s way of telling us that life is about more than mere functioning. In the baroque age, the ornamental was theatrum dei, the theatre of the gods. If we submit life fully to functionality and information, we drive the divine out of life. The smartphone is a symbol of our time. The smartphone is not embellished in any way. It is dominated by the smooth and straight. Even the communication that takes place via smartphones lacks the magic of beautiful forms. It is dominated by a straightforwardness that finds its best expression in affects. The smartphone also intensifies hypercommunication: everything is levelled out, abraded and ultimately made to conform [gleichgeschaltet]. We may live in a ‘society of singularities’, but paradoxically the singular, the incomparable, is hardly to be found.

We present our smartphones everywhere, and even delegate our perception to these apparatuses. We perceive reality through the filter of the screen. The digital window dilutes reality into information that we register. There is no physical contact with reality. Reality is deprived of its presence. We no longer perceive the material vibrations of reality. Perception is disembodied. The smartphone de-realizes the world.

Things do not spy on us. This is why we trust them. The smartphone, by contrast, is not only an informaton but also a very efficient informant that keeps its user under constant surveillance. Anyone familiar with its internal algorithmic life will rightly feel tracked by it. We are controlled and programmed by it. It is not we who use the smartphone; the smartphone uses us. The real actor is the smartphone. We are at the mercy of this digital informant, beneath the surface of which various actors steer and distract us.

The emancipatory aspects of the smartphone are not all there is to it. There is no fundamental difference between being reachable at all times and being enslaved. The smartphone is a mobile labour camp in which we voluntarily intern ourselves. The smartphone is also a pornophone: we voluntarily expose ourselves. The smartphone functions like a mobile confessional box. It is the continuation of the ‘sacral rule of the confessional box’ in another form.5Every form of rule has its own devotional objects. The theologian Ernst Troeltsch speaks of ‘devotional objects that fascinate the imagination of the people’.6 These objects stabilize rule by making it habitual and anchoring it in the body. In German, devot also means submissive. Smartphones have established themselves as the devotional objects of the neoliberal regime. As apparatuses that serve the purpose of submission, they resemble the rosary, which is just as mobile and handy. The like is the digital amen. By clicking on the like button, we submit ourselves to the context of rule.

Platforms like Facebook or Google are our new feudal lords. We tirelessly work their land and produce the valuable data that they exploit. We feel free, although we are completely exploited and controlled. In a system that exploits freedom, there is no resistance. Once it coincides with freedom, rule becomes total.

At the end of her The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff invokes collective resistance, pointing to the fall of the Berlin Wall:

The Berlin Wall fell for many reasons, but above all it was because the people of East Berlin said, ‘No more!’ We too can be the authors of many ‘great and beautiful’ new facts that reclaim the digital future as humanity’s home. No more! Let this be our declaration.7The communist system that represses freedom differs fundamentally from the neoliberal surveillance capitalism that exploits freedom. We are too intoxicated by our digital drugs, by communication, to raise the voice of resistance and cry ‘No more!’. There is simply no place here for any romantic notion of revolution. The conceptual artist Jenny Holzer’s remark ‘Protect Me From What I Want’ expressed a truth that Zuboff apparently failed to appreciate.

The neoliberal regime is itself smart. Smart power does not operate through orders or prohibitions. It does not make us docile; it makes us dependent and addicted. Instead of breaking our wills, it serves our needs. It wants to be liked. It is permissive rather than repressive. It does not condemn us to silence. Rather, we are constantly asked to share our opinions, preferences, needs and desires – even to tell the stories of our lives. Smart power conceals its intention to rule by coming across as friendly, smart. The subject is not even aware of its submission. It believes that it is free. Capitalism culminates in the capitalism of the like. Because it is permissive, it need not fear resistance or revolution.

Our almost symbiotic relationship with our smartphones has led some to suggest that they represent transitional objects, the term coined by the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott to refer to those things that secure an infant’s safe passage towards reality. Only with the help of transitional objects can the infant create a play area, an ‘intermediate area’,8 in which it ‘relaxes as in a secure and uncontested resting place’.9 Transitional objects build a bridge to reality, to the other, to what escapes the fantasy of omnipotence. Young infants will grasp at the corner of a blanket or cushion, to put it in their mouth or to stroke. Later, they grasp a complete object, such as a doll or cuddly toy. Transitional objects have an existential function. They give the child a feeling of security. They take away the fear of being alone. They create trust and a feeling of being sheltered. Transitional objects allow children to slowly grow into the world. They are the first things of the world which stabilize the life of the infant.

A child has a very intense, deep relationship with the transitional object. The object must be neither modified nor washed. Nothing is allowed to interrupt the experience of closeness. The child panics if it loses the beloved object. The child possesses the transitional object, but to a certain extent it also has a life of its own. It appears as an independent, personal counterpart to the child. Transitional objects open up a dialogical space in which the child can encounter the other.

We react with uncontrollable panic when we lose our smartphones. We have intimate relationships with them. We do not like to give them to other people. Can the smartphone therefore be understood as a transitional object, a digital teddy bear? The fact that the smartphone is a narcissistic object suggests not. A transitional object represents the other. The child speaks to it, cuddles it, as if it were another person. No one cuddles a smartphone. No one perceives it as an independent counterpart. Unlike a transitional object, it is not something close to our heart; it is not irreplaceable. We regularly buy new smartphones.

The way the child plays with the transitional object is analogous to later creative activities, for instance in the arts. It opens up a free space. The child, as though in a dream, takes the position of the transitional object; it gives free rein to its fantasies. The child imbues the transitional object with symbolic value. The object becomes the vessel in which the child’s dreams are concentrated. The smartphone, by contrast, floods us with stimuli and represses our imagination. Transitional objects are poor in stimuli and therefore intensify and structure attention. The flood of stimuli that comes from the smartphone fragments our attention. Where the transitional object stabilizes the psyche, the smartphone destabilizes it.

Transitional objects create a relationship with the other. Our relationship with the smartphone, by contrast, is narcissistic. The smartphone is similar in many ways to a so-called ‘autistic object’. We could also call it a narcissistic object. Transitional objects are soft. The child snuggles up to them. When doing so, it feels not itself but the other. Autistic objects are hard: ‘The hardness of the object allows the child, when manipulating and pressing the object, to feel not so much the object but itself.’10 Autistic objects lack the dimension of the other. They do not fuel our fantasying. Our dealings with them are repetitive, not creative. Repetitiveness and compulsion characterize our relationship to the smartphone.

Like transitional objects, autistic objects are a substitute for the absent person, but they reify this person into an object. They take away the person’s otherness:

Autistic objects are the most extreme example of objects taking the place of human beings, even of serving the purpose of avoiding the imponderables and always possible separations that are an inevitable part of relations with autonomously acting human beings. To put it even more radically: they make it possible not to perceive others as independent human beings at all.11

The similarity between smartphones and autistic objects is obvious. Unlike the transitional object, the smartphone is hard; it is not a digital teddy bear. Rather, it is a narcissistic, autistic object through which we feel, most of all, ourselves. It thus also destroys empathy. We use the smartphone to retreat into a narcissistic sphere in which we are protected against the imponderables pertaining to the other. The smartphone puts the other at our disposal by reifying the other into an object. It turns the you into an it. The disappearance of the other is the ontological reason why the smartphone makes us lonely. We communicate so compulsively, so excessively, because we are lonely and empty. But hypercommunication is not fulfilling. Because it lacks the presence of the other, it only deepens the loneliness.

 Notes

1. Walter Benjamin, Berlin Childhood around 1900, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 49f.

2. Ibid., p. 48.

3. Roland Barthes, Mythologies, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1972, p. 90.

4. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in Off the Beaten Track, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 67 (emph. B.-Ch. H.).

5. Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Epochen und Typen der Sozialphilosophie des Christentums’, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4: Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie, Tübingen: Mohr, 1925, pp. 122–55; here: p. 134.

6. Ibid., p. 135.

7. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, London: Profile Books, 2019, p. 525.

8. Donald Winnicott, Playing and Reality, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 2.

9. Tilmann Habermas, Geliebte Objekte: Symbole und Instrumente der Identitätsbildung, Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1996, p. 325.

10. Ibid., p. 336.

11. Ibid., p. 337.

Non-things

Upheaval in the Lifeworld

Byung-Chul Han

Monday, April 14, 2025

Porn

 

Porn is a matter of bare life on display. The antagonist of eros, it annihilates even sexuality. In this respect, it is more effective than morality: “Sexuality does not fade into sublimation, repression and morality, but fades much more surely into the more sexual than sex: porn.”1 Pornography derives its appeal from the “anticipation of dead sex in living sexuality.”2 What is obscene about pornography is not an excess of sex, but the fact that it contains no sex at all. Today, sexuality is not threatened by that “pure reason” which puritanically avoids sex as something “dirty,”3 but by pornography. Porn is not sex in virtual space. Today, even real sex is turning into porn.

The pornographication of the world is unfolding as the profanation of the world. Porn profanes the erotic. Agamben’s “In Praise of Profanation” fails to recognize this social process. “Profanation” means using things that have been set aside for the gods through consecration (sacrare) and stand removed from regular contact. It involves practicing “a special form of negligence”4 with respect to what has been set apart in this manner. Hereby, Agamben adopts the thesis of secularization, assuming that every instance of setting-apart has an authentically religious core. In this light, the museum represents a secularized form of the temple — here, too, objects are placed at a remove and made unavailable for use. Likewise, Agamben considers tourism a secularized version of pilgrimage: pious journeys from holy site to holy site correspond, today, to sightseers’ restless trips through a world that has become one big museum.

Agamben places profanation alongside secularization. What has been made to stand apart should be made available for use again. However, the examples of profanation he provides range from the tenuous to the outlandish:


What could it mean to “profane defecation”? Certainly not to regain a supposed naturalness, or simply to enjoy it as a perverse transgression (which is still better than nothing). Rather, it is a matter of archaeologically arriving at defecation as a field of polar tensions between nature and culture, private and public, singular and common. That is: to learn a new use for feces, just as babies tried to do in their way, before repression and separation intervened.5


Sade’s libertine consuming a woman’s excrement practices eroticism as transgression, in Bataille’s sense. But how can defecation be profaned beyond the threshold of transgression and renaturalization? Agamben’s “profanation” is meant to suspend the repression that a theological (or moral) dispositive has cast over things. The example he finds in nature is a cat playing:


The cat who plays with a ball of yarn as if it were a mouse —just as the child plays with ancient religious symbols or objects that once belonged to the economic sphere— knowingly uses the characteristic behaviors of predatory activity… in vain. These behaviors are not effaced, but, thanks to the substitution of the yarn for the mouse…, deactivated and thus opened up for a new, possible use.6


Agamben sees compulsion or constraint behind every purpose; the profanation he proposes would liberate things into “means without ends.”

Agamben’s thesis of secularization blinds him to the particularity of a phenomenon that can no longer be traced back to religious practice and even stands opposed to it. It may well be that in a museum objects stand “at a remove,” as they do in a temple. However, musealization and exhibition are precisely what destroy their cult value and replace it with exhibition value. Likewise, tourism and pilgrimage stand in opposition to each other. Tourism creates “nonsites,” whereas pilgrimage is tied to places. According to Heidegger, the quality that makes human dwelling (Wohnen) possible is the “divine.” Such sites are constituted by history, memory, and identity. These same features are missing in the “non-sites” of tourism, where people pass by instead of lingering and spending time. Likewise, Agamben seeks to understand nakedness beyond the dispositive of theology — that is, “beyond the prestige of grace and the chimeras of corrupt nature.”7 He claims that exhibition offers an excellent opportunity to profane nudity:


It is this brazen-faced indifference that fashion models, porn stars, and others whose profession it is to show themselves must learn to acquire: they show nothing but the showing itself (that is, one’s own absolute mediality). In this way, the face is loaded until it bursts with exhibition-value. Yet, precisely through this nullification of expressivity, eroticism penetrates where it could have no place: the human face. […] Shown as a pure means beyond any concrete expressivity, it becomes available for a new use, a new form of erotic communication.8


However, nudity that is displayed without secrecy or expression approaches pornographic bareness. What is more, the pornographic face says nothing. It has no expressivity or mystery: “From one figure to the other, from seduction to love, then to desire, sexuality, finally to pure and simple porno; the farther you go, the closer you come to the lesser secret, the smaller enigma.”9 In contrast, the erotic is never free of secrecy. Contra Agamben, a face loaded with exhibition-value to the point of bursting promises no “new collective use of sexuality.”10 Indeed, exhibition destroys any and all possibilities for erotic communication. A naked face without mystery or expression —reduced simply to being on display— is obscene and pornographic. Capitalism is aggravating the pornographication of society by making everything a commodity and putting it on display. Knowing no other use for sexuality, it profanes eros — into porn. On this score, Agamben’s “profanation” amounts to just so much profanity.

This profanation is unfolding as deritualization and desacralization. Today, ritual spaces and actions are disappearing. The world is becoming more naked and more obscene. Bataille’s conception of “holy eroticism” still included ritualized communication: festivals and ceremonial games providing particularized sites, places at a remove. Today, love —inasmuch as it is supposed to amount only to warmth, intimacy, and pleasant arousal— points to the destruction of sacred eros. By the same token, pornography is eliminating erotic seduction, which toys with scenic illusion and deceptive appearances. Indeed, Baudrillard sets seduction in opposition to love: “Ritual is in the realm of seduction. Love is born from the destruction of ritual forms, from their liberation. Its energy is an energy of the dissolution of these forms.”11 Pornography completes the deritualization of love. Agamben’s profanation even promotes the deritualization and pornographication of the world in that it suspects ritual spaces of constituting compulsive forms of sequestration.

1. Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, trans. Phil Beitchmann (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2008), 30.

2. Ibid., 53.

3. See Robert Pfaller, Das schmutzige Heilige und die reine Vernunft (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2008).

4. Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone, 2007), 75.

5. Ibid., 86.

6. Ibid., 85.

7. Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 57.

8. Agamben, Profanations, 90.

9. Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, 137–138.

10. Agamben, Profanations, 91.

11. Ibid., 133.

The agony of eros 

 Byung-Chul Han

Friday, April 11, 2025

Stillness

 

The divine is an event of stillness. It lets us listen: ‘The verb myein, “to initiate”, means etymologically, “to close” – notably the eyes but, more importantly, the mouth. At the beginning of the sacred rites, the herald would “command silence” (epitattei ten siopen).’1 We live in a time without consecration. The fundamental verb of our time is not ‘to close’ but to open – ‘the eyes but, more importantly, the mouth’. Hypercommunication, the noise of communication, desecrates the world, profanes it. Stillness produces nothing. Capitalism therefore dislikes stillness. Information capitalism produces the compulsion of communication.

Stillness sharpens our sense for the higher order, which, however, need not be an order of rule or power. Stillness can be extremely peaceful, even friendly and deeply delightful. A ruling power may be able to silence the subjugated, but an enforced silence is not stillness. Real stillness knows no compulsion. It does not subjugate; it elevates. It does not take away, but gives.

For Cézanne, the task of the painter is to establish silence. The Montagne Sainte-Victoire appears to him as a rising massif of stillness that he must obey. The vertical, the rising, demands stillness. Cézanne creates stillness by withdrawing and becoming no one. He becomes a listener: ‘His only aspiration must be to silence. He must stifle within himself the voices of prejudice, he must forget, always forget, establish silence, be a perfect echo. Then the landscape will inscribe itself on his sensitive tablet.’2

Listening is the religious gesture par excellence. Hölderlin’s Hyperion says:

My whole being stills and listens when the gentle ripple of the breeze plays about my breast. Often, lost in the immensity of blue, I look up into the aether and out into the hallowed sea, and it’s as if a kindred spirit opened its arms to me, as if the pain of isolation were dissolved in the life of the godhead.

To be one with everything, that is the life of the godhead, that is the heaven of man.

To be one with everything that lives, to return in blissful self-oblivion into the all of nature, that is the summit of thoughts and joys, that is the holy mountain pinnacle, the place of eternal peace.3

We are no longer familiar with that divine falling silent that elevates us to the life of the godhead, to the heaven of man. Blissful self-oblivion has given way to the excessive self-production of the ego. Digital hypercommunication, unlimited connectedness, does not bring about attachment or a world. Rather, it effects isolation, deepens loneliness. The isolated, worldless, depressive I moves away from that delightful all-embracing unity, that holy mountain pinnacle.

We have abolished all transcendence, all vertical order, that demands stillness. The vertical gives way to the horizontal. Nothing rises. Nothing becomes deeper. Reality is flattened out into information and data streams. Everything sprawls and proliferates. Stillness is a phenomenon of negativity. It is exclusive, whereas noise is the result of permissive, extensive, excessive communication.

Stillness emanates from what is unavailable. What is not available stabilizes and deepens our attention; it brings forth a contemplative gaze. That gaze has the patience needed to see the long-lasting and slow. When everything is available and accessible, attention remains shallow. The gaze does not linger. Like that of a hunter, it wanders.

For Nicolas Malebranche, attentiveness is the natural prayer of the soul. Today, the soul no longer prays. It produces itself. Extensive communication distracts the soul. Only those activities that resemble prayer go together with stillness. Contemplation, however, is opposed to production. The compulsion of production and communication destroys contemplative immersion.

According to Roland Barthes, photography ‘must be silent’. He does not like ‘blustering photographs’. He holds that, ‘in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close your eyes’.4 The punctum, even the truth, of photography reveals itself in silence, when one closes one’s eyes. The information tracked by the studiumis blustering. It imposes itself on our perception. The imagination is set in motion only by silence, by closing our eyes. Barthes quotes Kafka: ‘We photograph things in order to drive them out of our minds. My stories are a way of shutting my eyes.’5Without imagination, there is only pornography. Today, perception itself has something pornographic about it. It has the form of immediate contact, almost of a copulation of image and eye. The erotic takes place when we close our eyes. Only stillness, the imagination, discloses subjectivity’s deep inward spaces of desire:

Absolute subjectivity is achieved only in a state, an effort, of silence (shutting your eyes is to make the image speak in silence). The photograph touches me if I withdraw it from its usual blah-blah: … to say nothing, to shut my eyes.6

What is so ruinous about digital communication is that it means we no longer have time to close our eyes. The eyes are forced into a ‘continuous voracity’.7 They lose the capacity for stillness, for deep attentiveness. The soul no longer prays.

Noise is a visual as well as an acoustic filth. It pollutes the attention. Michel Serres derives the pollution of the world from the animal’s will to appropriate:

Tigers piss on the edge of their lair. And so do lions and dogs. Like those carnivorous mammals, many animals, our cousins, mark their territory with their harsh, stinking urine or their howling, while others such as finches and nightingales use sweet songs.8

We spit in the soup so that we may have it all to ourselves. The world is polluted not only by excretions and material waste but also by junk communication and information. It is plastered with advertisements. Everything is crying out for attention on a

planet completely covered with garbage and billboards … On each mountain rock, each tree leaf, each agricultural plot of land, you have advertisements; letters are written on each blade of grass … Like the legendary cathedral, the landscape is swallowed by the tsunami of signs.9Non-things block out things, pollute them. Junk information and communication destroy the silent landscape, the discreet language of things:

Imperious images and letters force us to read, while the pleading things of the world are begging our senses for meaning. The latter ask; the former command…. our products already have a meaning, which is flat. They are the easier to perceive because they are less elaborate, similar to waste. Images are the waste of paintings; logos, the waste of writing; ads, the waste of vision; announcements, the residues of music. Forcing themselves on our perception, those low and facile signs clog up the landscape, which itself is more difficult, discreet, silent, and often dying because unseen by any saving perception.10The digital seizure of land produces a lot of noise. The battle for territory gives way to the battle for attention. Appropriation also takes an altogether different form. We incessantly produce information that has to be liked by others. Today’s nightingales do not sing sweet songs in order to chase away others. Rather, they tweet in order to attract others. We do not spit in the soup to prevent others from enjoying it. Rather, our motto is sharing. We now want to share everything with everyone else. The result is a roaring tsunami of information.

Things and territories determine the terrestrial order. They are not noisy. The terrestrial order is still. The digital order is ruled by information. Stillness is alien to information. It contradicts the essence of information. Still information is an oxymoron. Information steals the silence by imposing itself on us and demanding our attention. Stillness is a phenomenon of attentiveness. Stillness is created only by deep attentiveness. Information, however, dissects attention.

According to Nietzsche, in a ‘noble culture’, people do ‘not … react immediately to a stimulus’. Such a culture develops ‘the inhibiting, excluding instincts’. You need to ‘let foreign things, new things of every type, come towards you while assuming an initial air of calm hostility’. Keeping ‘all your doors wide open’ and being ‘constantly poised and ready to put yourself into – plunge yourself into – other things’, that is, ‘the inability to resist a stimulus’, is destructive of the spirit. The ‘inability not to react’ is ‘a pathology, a decline, a symptom of exhaustion’.11 Total permissiveness and permeability destroy a noble culture. We are increasingly losing the ‘excluding instincts’, the ability to say ‘no’ to the advancing stimuli.

We need to distinguish between two kinds of potentiality. Positive potentiality consists in the ability to do something. Negative potentiality is the ability to do nothing. The latter is, however, not identical with the inability to do something. It is not a negation of positive potential but a potential of its own. It enables spirit to engage in still, contemplative lingering, that is, deep attentiveness. In the absence of negative potential, we develop a destructive hyperactivity. We become submerged in noise. Stillness can be restored only by a strengthening of negative potentiality. But the dominant compulsion of communication, which is ultimately the compulsion to produce, intentionally destroys negative potentiality.

We constantly produce ourselves. This production of self is noisy. Creating stillness means withdrawing. Stillness is also a phenomenon of namelessness. I am not the master of myself, of my name. I am a guest at myself; I am only the tenant of my name-hood. Michel Serres creates stillness by deconstructing his name:

It is indeed Michel Serres. Because my language and my society call it my own name, they pretend that I have the ownership of these two words. However, I know hundreds of Michels, Miguels, Mikes, or Mikhails. Similarly, there are Serreses, Sierras, Junipero Serras, all derived from a Ural-Altaic name designating a mountain. I have sometimes met exact homonyms…. And so, proper names sometimes mimic or repeat common names, even place names on occasion. Mine, for instance, quotes the Mont-Saint-Michel, in France, Italy, or Cornwall, three neatly aligned locations. We inhabit sites that are more or less prestigious. My name is Michel Serres, but it is not my own; I am just its tenant.12

The appropriation of a name, in particular, produces a lot of noise. The strengthening ego destroys the stillness. Where I step back, where I lose myself in namelessness, where I become weak, there is stillness: ‘Soft, I mean aerial and volatile. Soft, white. Soft, peaceful.’13Nietzsche knew that stillness goes along with the withdrawal of the I. Stillness teaches me to listen, to take note:

the genius of the heart, that makes everything loud and complacent fall silent and learn to listen, that smooths out rough souls and gives them the taste of a new desire, – to lie still, like a mirror that the deep sky can mirror itself upon … the genius of the heart, that enriches everyone who has come into contact with it … [making everyone] perhaps less certain, more gentle, fragile, and broken.14

Nietzsche’s ‘genius of the heart’ does not produce itself. Rather, it withdraws into namelessness. As a will to power, the will to appropriate retreats. Power turns into friendliness. The ‘genius of the heart’ discovers the strength in weakness that finds expression in the splendour of stillness.

Only in stillness, in the great silence, do we enter into a relation with the nameless, which exceeds us and in the face of which our efforts at appropriating the name seem feeble. The genius ‘who becomes each man’s guardian at the moment of birth’ also rises above the name.15 The genius makes life more than the miserable survival of the I. He represents a timeless present:

Genius’ youthful face and long, fluttering wings signify that he does not know time … That is why a birthday cannot be the commemoration of a past day but, like every true celebration, must be an abolition of time – the epiphany and presence of Genius. This inescapable presence prevents us from enclosing ourselves within a substantial identity and shatters the ego’s pretension to be sufficient unto itself.16Absolutely silent perception resembles a photograph taken with a very long exposure. Daguerre’s photograph Boulevard du Temple actually shows a very busy street in Paris, but because of the extremely long exposure, typical of daguerreotypes, all movement disappears. Only what stands still is visible. Boulevard du Temple exudes an almost rural calmness. Apart from buildings and trees, only one human figure is recognizable, a man who is standing still to have his shoes cleaned. Perception of the long-lasting and slow thus recognizes only still things. Everything that rushes is condemned to disappear. Boulevard du Temple can be interpreted as a world seen through divine eyes. Only those who linger in contemplative calmness appear to God’s redeeming gaze. Stillness redeems.

 Notes

1. Giorgio Agamben and Monica Ferrando, The Unspeakable Girl: The Myth and Mystery of Kore, London: Seagull Books, 2014, p. 10.

2. Joachim Gasquet, Cézanne, Paris: Bernheim-Jeune, 1931, pp. 131–3. Quoted in Theodore Reff, Cézanne: The Late Work, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1977, p. 406.

3. Friedrich Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2019, p. 8.

4. Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 53ff.

5. Ibid., p. 53.

6. Ibid., p. 55.

7. Ibid.

8. Michel Serres, Malfeasance: Appropriation through Pollution?, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 1.

9. Ibid., pp. 69f.

10. Ibid., p. 51.

11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 153–229; here: pp. 190f.

12. Serres, Malfeasance, pp. 87f.

13. Ibid., p. 89.

14. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 175.

15. Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, New York: Zone Books, 2007, p. 9.

16. Ibid., pp. 11f.

Non-things

Upheaval in the Lifeworld

Byung-Chul Han

Translated by Daniel Steuer

Being as Passion

 

 Gesthemane hours of my life

In the dull glow

Of glum apprehension

You have often seen me.

Crying I shout: never in vain.

My young being

Weary of plaints

Trusted none but the angel of mercy.

—Martin Heidegger

In an essay on entertainment, Peter Glotz hints at a possible connection between the critique of entertainment and the passion for death: “The condemnation of entertainment, diversion, light art, has religious roots. In Pascal, for example, for whom ‘diversion’ disrupted concentration on a life centered around death.”1Martin Heidegger, too, stands in this intellectual, even theological tradition, which perceives in entertainment a lapse, even apostasy, from the authentic form of life. Distraction is, for Heidegger, a “flight from death.”2 It circumvents the “possibility of authentic existence” for Dasein.3 Only by facing death as “the measureless impossibility of existence” does Dasein become aware of the possibility of authentic existence.4 As on many other occasions, Heidegger resorts here to the language of the Christian religion. Dasein is exposed to the “constant temptation of falling-prey.” Being-in-the-world is “tempting.”5 Diversion leads to “falling-prey.” It is the antagonist of an earnest, struggling life centered on death.6 “Struggle” and resoluteness are essential to Heidegger’s existential-ontological vocabulary.7 In “struggling” resoluteness, Dasein “chooses its heroes,” according to Heidegger. Existence is passion. It is even a passion unto death.

The term “entertainment” does not belong to the vocabulary of Being and Time. But Heidegger’s existential-ontological analysis of “everydayness” contains the lineaments of a potential phenomenology of entertainment. Heidegger’s “they” may be interpreted as the subject of mass entertainment, even as the hypersubject of mass media: “In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This being with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of being of ‘the others’ in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they unfolds its true dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and the way they see and judge.”8 The they embodies, even verbalizes the horizon of average meaning and understanding according to which the masses understand themselves and the world. The they comprises everyday patterns of understanding and conduct to which the masses are oriented. The they is constitutive for understanding, for its patterns of apprehension generate a reality, an “everyday and stubborn reality.”9In numerous ways, entertainment media impart patterns of interpretation and conduct. Entertainment thus maintains the world. Entertaining is also maintaining. Television, which is never addressed in Being and Time, may be considered a defining medium for the they. It does not passively display an “objective” reality. Instead it actively produces reality, or that which must be taken as real. Television is a reality machine. Watching television (fernsehen) does not produce distance (Ferne), instead it engenders proximity. It places distance at a distance by configuring reality as proximity to “the everyday way of being interpreted.”

Mass entertainment permits meanings and values to circulate on narrative and emotive pathways. It also shapes feelings, which are constitutive for apprehension: “The domination of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already decided upon even the possibilities of being attuned, that is, about the basic way in which Dasein lets itself be affected by the world. The they prescribes that attunement, it determines what and how one ‘sees.’”10 The function of entertainment media is to re-impregnate the “public way in which things have been interpreted” which is determined by “average understanding” or the normal view of the world.11 Conduct and interpretation patterns are internalized through physical and psychological channels of desire. In this way, entertainment stabilizes the existing social structure. The they is sustained insofar as the they is entertained. The meaning-structure, which may only be reproduced, “disburdens” judgment and understanding.12 The invention of a world, of something completely alien is far more laborious and demanding than the discovery of an already interpreted world. Television too effects a “disburdening of being” by proffering prefabricated meaning-formations or myths: “And since the they constantly accommodates Dasein, it retains and entrenches its stubborn dominance.”13 Hence, entertainment is not the antithesis of “care,” is not a careless giving-oneself-over to the world, but is rather a depraved form of “care” in which Dasein is concerned with things that un-burden its existence.

Entertainment is an unburdening of being that generates pleasure. This is the conclusion of a phenomenology of entertainment based on Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness. “Idle talk” unburdens talk. It represents the sum or whole of everyday meaning-formations or convictions: “The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its being public, but encourages it. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter.”14 Gossip and scandal are also “idle talk.” As forms of entertainment, they help preserve “the public way of being interpreted.” They do not celebrate meaninglessness, but instead possess their own form of disclosedness. Everydayness is rife with average presentations of meaning that people consent to unawares: “This interpretedness of idle talk has always already settled itself down in Dasein. We get to know many things initially in this way, and some things never get beyond such an average understanding. Dasein can never escape the everyday way of being interpreted into which Dasein has grown initially.”15Heidegger does not consistently describe the they or idle talk in phenomenologically neutral terms. Frequently his interpretation is colored by value judgments or representations with clearly religious roots. Idle talk retains a “disparaging sense.” Heidegger’s value judgments let what is positive in everydayness slips continually into the negativity of the inauthentic. Everydayness talks into the ground any possibility of authentic existence: “Ontologically, this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mitdasein, toward being-in itself.”16 Idle talk is contrasted with its positively inflected counterpart, the passionate form of talk that is “keeping silent,” which renders audible the “uncanniness of the suspension.” The they un-burdens existence. But being as such is burdensome. Being is passion. The they and entertainment dispassion existence into “the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness.”17 In truth, idle talk is everything but groundless: it establishes or reinforces a communicative ground. Groundless or cryptic would better describe that keeping-silent which congeals into passion.

Being and Time could equally have been called Passion and Entertainment. Homo doloris as a passion figure represents the antithesis of the they. Only in the “primordial individuation of reticent resoluteness that expects Angst of itself” does Dasein arrive at authentic existence.18 Passion is individuation. Homo doloris is also Homo solitudinis. Entertainment is different: it gives no impression of individuality. In contrast to the they, which sustains the familiar and “holds any new questioning and discussion at a distance because it presumes it has understood and in a peculiar way it suppresses them and holds them back,” Heidegger’s Homo solitudinis ventures forward into the uncertain.19 He exposes himself to that angst which frees him from “the illusions of the they.”20 “Thus Angst takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted.”21Acquiescence to the world is constitutive of falling-prey. Entertainment too is based on acquiescence to what is. It is condemned to generate or at the very least sustain what is. Angst as the reagent of authentic existence is a negative expression in this respect. It comprises “clinging to whatever existence one has reached.”22 It leaves Dasein homeless by tearing Dasein away from the familiar world. Entertainment, on the other hand, makes Dasein at home in the present world. It maintains the home. Entertainment is homekeeping. In the face of death, Dasein finds itself away from home. It becomes aware of that uncanniness of being that remains concealed in the unambiguous, familiar world of the they.

In falling-prey, Dasein’s striving does not extend past the known and familiar. Its condition is one of acquiescence to the world. Dasein has always already arrived. The “temporality of falling-prey” is the “present.”23 The future is only a pale continuation and extension of the here and now. The temporality of falling-prey excludes the completely other. For it, the future in the emphatic sense, in the sense of the recognized-as-approaching, is closed. The temporality of falling-prey is also that of entertainment. The Dasein that entertains itself clings to the here and now. Entertainment reinforces that which is. Its temporality is also the present. The past is the old. The new is what is to come. But neither the old nor the new are the other.

The passion of authentic existence exhibits an entirely different time structure. In contrast to falling-prey, what determines it is not the present but the future. The future is the temporality of passion. A messianic future, in which the completely other discloses itself, may well by foreign to Heidegger’s thinking, but his authentic future as “anticipation of death” does abandon the known and familiar. It makes the world appear in light of “not-being-at-home,” casting Dasein out of the “being-at-home of publicness.”24 “Not-being-at-home” drives Dasein to passion, compels it to heroic resolution.

The passion of authenticity presides over Heidegger’s Being and Time. The they remains a form of degeneration. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Heidegger’s approach to it is not ontologically neutral. It forces into the background the constitutive function of unimpassioned everydayness, of the they, which among other things consists of tending to the world through patterns of meaning and identification, maintaining it in a special sense.

Heidegger’s Dasein primarily and above all resides in the “work world.” Already in Being and Time, Heidegger grasps work as a basic form of human existence. The first world is the “work world.” Work is guided by “circumspection.” Circumspection discovers things in their whereto, that is, in their meaning, and reflexively, prior to any expressive thematization. It creates a nearness to things by classifying them in or admitting them into the functional context of the familiar work world. They are situated within the work world in accordance with their particular whereto. Heidegger calls this admitting, situating bringing-into-nearness of things “de-distancing.” De-distancing “circumspection” as “nearness” eradicates distance. But if work ceases, then circumspection sheds its association with the work world. This generates free time as time liberated from work, wherein “circumspection becomes free.” Possessed of an “essential tendency toward nearness,” Dasein perpetuates the activity of de-distancing outside of the work world.25 In its free time it wanders through “a distant and strange world,” appropriating it “only in its outward appearance,” gawking at it, as Heidegger might say. In free time Dasein looks into the distance. This looking-into-the-distance has its own particular mode of vision: “Dasein seeks distance solely to bring it near in its outward appearance. Dasein lets itself be intrigued just by the outward appearance of the world.”26 In its free time, Dasein, liberated from circumspection, gives itself over to the “lust of the eyes,” its craving for images. It looks into the distance.27Heidegger’s remark on “free circumspection” may also be read as a critique of television: “When curiosity has become free, it takes care to see not order to understand what it sees, that is, to come to a being toward it, but only in order to see. It seeks novelty only to leap from it again to another novelty. The care of seeing is not concerned with comprehending and knowingly being in the truth, but the possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Thus curiosity is characterized by a specific not-staying with what is nearest. Consequently, it also does not seek the leisure of reflective staying, but rather restlessness and excitement from continual novelty and changing encounters. In not-staying, curiosity makes sure of the constant possibility of distraction.” Television viewing, then, is a passive “being delivered over to the world.” Only images are consumed. Curious, restive seeing is analogous to channel surfing. Dasein channel surfs through the world. Channel surfing as “not staying” is, translated into ontological terms, an inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world. Channel surfing ontologically disperses Dasein in an inauthentic existence.

In the year Being and Time was published (1927), Heidegger was not yet familiar with television. In Germany the first experimental broadcasts took place in 1934. Being and Time does, however, expressly address radio, which enables a kind of distance-hearing. Heidegger views relates radio to the aforementioned “essential tendency toward nearness”: “All kinds of increasing speed which we are more or less compelled to go along with today push for overcoming distance. With the ‘radio,’ for example, Dasein is bringing about today a de-distancing of the ‘world’ which is unforeseeable in its meaning for Dasein, by way of expanding and destroying the everyday surrounding world.”28 Heidegger is unusually judgmental here. But his ontology of the Dasein alone fails to clarify why radio simultaneously expands and destroys the “everyday surrounding world,” which is destroyed to the very degree to which the de-distancing of the world is adjudged negative. Is the true world, which would mean home, destroyed through the sounds or images of the “distant and strange world”? Or do images themselves, as mere representations, destroy what is worldly in the world? Some thirty years later, Heidegger expresses himself more clearly with regard to the massive diffusion of television: images and representations merely propagate a world that is in fact no world: “And those who have stayed on in their homeland? Often they are still more homeless than those who have been driven from their homeland. Hourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. Week after week the movies carry them off into uncommon, but often merely common, realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is no world.”29The late Heidegger likewise mistrusts the eye and the image. His critique of “representation” is in its way a critique of the image. Images do not only disclose; they also enclose or conceal. They divert vision from the preeminent, from the real, both of which evade mediated representation. An interesting apercu appears in Heidegger’s often-mocked essay “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?” After a detailed description of his hut in Todtnauberg, he remarks:

This is my work world—seen with the eye of an observer: the guest or summer vacationer. Strictly speaking I never myself observe the landscape. I experience its hourly changes, day and night, in the great comings and goings of the seasons. The gravity of the mountains and the hardness of the primeval rock, the slow and deliberate growth of the fir trees, the brilliant, simple splendor of the meadows in bloom, the rush of the mountain brook in the long autumn night, the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered in snow—all of this moves and flows through and penetrates daily existence up there, and not in forced moments of “aesthetic” immersion or artificial empathy, but only when one’s own existence stands in its work. It is the work alone that opens up space for the reality that is these mountains. The course of the work remains embedded in what happens in the landscape.30Heidegger speaks critically of “the eye of an observer.” World and landscape elude mere observation. The worldly in the world cannot be objectified as image or representation. The “gravity of the mountains” and the “hardness of the primeval rock” are what is real in the world. The world emerges as resistance, which work alone can share in. Whoever does not work, whoever merely observes and enjoys like a tourist, thus has no access to the world. Emphasis is placed repeatedly on work. Only work grants access to the world. Only work “opens up space” for “the reality that is these mountains.” Mere observation leads to the vanishing of the world. The real in the world is only accessible prior to media dissemination. It reveals itself only in the moving and flowing through and penetrating of meadows in bloom and flatlands covered in snow, the rush of the mountain brook and the deliberate growth of the fir trees: “all this moves and flows through and penetrates.” Media destroy this moving and flowing through and penetrating proper to the real. Media replace “daily existence” (this expression, tägliche Dasein, still bears echoes of Being and Time) with “realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is no world.”

Gravity and sustenance compose the facticity of the world. Heidegger’s objection to media is, in the end, that media images de-factify the world, that they cannot sustain the weight of the world, the particular weight of things. The medial eventuates in the disappearance of the real. Heidegger lays special stress on the characteristics of things that evade media representation or mere seeing, such as “the gravity of the mountains” or “the hardness and scent of oak.”31 Neither the “scent of oak” nor the “deliberate growth of the firs” may be objectified through media. Authentic things, the things of an integrated world, have a special gravity, a special materiality opposed to mediality. The weightlessness of the medial, virtual world defactifies the world. Only the “the wide expanse of everything that grows” “bestows world,” Heidegger states.32 Medial things do not grow, but are instead produced. Things that grow, that are integrated, that are rooted, are opposed in Heidegger to medially produced, defactified things.

Heidegger’s thinking comprises a refactification of the world, above all on the linguistic plane. Rhymes and half-rhymes (delight/autumn night, fir/pasture) suggest an original, unspoiled order in the world which eludes both representation and medial fabrication. The refactification of the world is enabled by a refactification of language. This is true for Heidegger’s things, as well. Heidegger’s things are well known: “brook and bluff,” “mirror and clasp,” “book and picture,” “crown and cross.”33 Alliteration binds these things to an originary world. They make up a reality perhaps no less unreal or virtual than the world of medial things.

Heidegger’s expressions—“hardness,” “gravity,” “gloom,” “obscurity,” or “burden”— not only evoke the facticity of the world; they also propagate his language of passion. Being is suffering. During entertainment, which unburdens Dasein, we distance ourselves from being as passion. Only work corresponds to the passional character of being. Heidegger’s emphasis on work persists through the transition from the work-world to the mountain-world. In “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces,” he states: “It is the work alone that opens up space for the reality that is these mountains. The course of the work remains embedded in what happens in the landscape.” Even work is, particularly in the late Heidegger, not a form of action, of making or producing. It is passion. It is based on thrownness. In its peculiar passivity and passion it attends to “what happens in the landscape.”

For Heidegger, thinking, too, is work. Thinking as work is, again, passion. It is distinguished by the passivity of “suffering.” The task of thinking consists in being “an echo.” “To be an echo is the suffering of thinking. Its passion is quiet sobriety.”34 Sober passion is an oxymoron. But Heidegger understands passion in the original sense of passio or suffering, as passivity in self-sacrifice or self-surrender to the given matter of thought, which is accessible not to active grasping but rather to passive suffering. Thinking must allow itself to be determined (be-stimmen), modulated (durch-stimmen), indeed overruled (über-stimmen) by “what cannot be thought in advance” or by “what sustains and binds.”35 This is the basis of the facticity of thinking.

Heidegger’s thinker is a man of pain. His theology of pain runs as follows: “In the rift of pain, what is granted on high guards its perseverance. The rift of pain rends the veiled procession of grace into an un-needed arrival of favor.”36 The rift in thinking is an opening for the “magnitude” that is “too great for humans.” The closed inwardness of thinking without this rift is not receptive to the “arrival of favor.” Only the rift, only pain opens human thinking for the superhuman. Pain is transcendence. Pain is god. Entertainment is immanence. It is godlessness. Heidegger’s inclination toward passion is mirrored in his selection of things. Notably, his last things are “crown and cross.” By its proximity to “cross,” “crown” recollects the crown of thorns of Homo doloris. Heidegger calls to God in despair when faced with the world of “machinations” defactified by technology and media: “Only a god can save us.”37Being as pain, as prayer, is opposed to the immanence of beings, which in the modern era is irremediably submitted to experience and entertainment. Entertainment is a kind of machination that dispenses with all “timidity” before the divine, before that which cannot be thought in advance.

In many respects, Peter Handke is in agreement with Heidegger. In Handke, the defactification of the world is “dépaysement,” disorientation or “being out of the country.”38 The media world obviates, one could also say, authentic being-in-the-world. Heidegger equates “the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered in snow” in the Black Forest in winter with the happiness of being-in-the-world as being-at-work. For his part, Handke sets forth on a winter journey to the Danube, Sava, Morava, and Drina Rivers. Handke grasps the happiness of “repaysement,” or “repatriation,” of being-thrown-back-into-the-world, while “pressing the ancient iron door-handle” and “pushing open the shop door almost laboriously.” The facticity of the world appears primarily through gravity, through the resistance of things: “In the mild resistance of things, generated by age and material gravity, in their contact with the body of the person entering, an independent counter-body reveals itself. ... The Serbian shop door is literally an object, part of a momentary intensive communication of bodies, even the subject of a spatial-concrete event, possessed of its own existence. ... This slight resistance, the detectable inner force of the simplest things, draws them away from representation, salvages them from disappearance into the rehearsed accessibility of perception.”39 His true things, however, once brought into language, that is, translated into signs, again resonate with the unreal and the ghastly: “forest-dark honey pots, soup chickens big as turkeys, oddly yellow noodle nests or crowns and the often predator-mouthed, often storybook fat river fish.”40 This storybook world is just as unreal as the media world. Its strangely manipulated language generates a kind of virtual world.

Medial things, which whir through space without gravity, which are everywhere, that is to say, nowhere, must also have struck Handke as ghastly. They certainly bothered Kafka a great deal. Media for him are ghosts that de-realize the world, that divest it of its grasp-ability:

The easy possibility of writing letters—from a purely theoretical point of view—must have brought wrack and ruin to the souls of the world. Writing letters is actually an intercourse with ghosts and by no means just with the ghost of the addressee but also with one’s own ghost. ... How did people ever get the idea they could communicate with one another by letter! One can think about someone far away and one can hold on to someone nearby; everything else is beyond human power. ... Written kisses never arrive at their destination; the ghosts drink them up along the way. It is this ample nourishment which enables them to multiply so enormously. People sense this and struggle against it; in order to eliminate as much of the ghosts’ power as possible and to attain a natural intercourse, a tranquility of soul, they have invented trains, cars, aeroplanes—but nothing helps anymore: These are evidently inventions devised at the moment of crashing. The opposing side is so much calmer and stronger; after the postal system, the ghosts invented the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless. They will not starve, but we will perish.41Kafka’s ghosts have in the meantime invented television, the internet, and email. These are disembodied means of communication, and for this reason are ghastly. “We will perish”—Handke too might have said this with regard to medial things, which whir without bodies or gravity around the entire planet, and render true witnessing impossible. Media messages and images are ghosts that procreate independently of human beings: “Writing letters is actually an intercourse with ghosts and by no means just with the ghost of the addressee but also with one’s own ghost, which secretly evolves inside the letter one is writing or even in a whole series of letters, where one letter corroborates another and can refer to it as witness.”42 Everything, following Handke, is ghastly reflections unrelated to reality: “Nearly all the photographs and reports of the last four years ... seemed to me increasingly to be simple mirrorings of the usual coordinated perspectives—distorted reflections in the very cells of our eyes and not eyewitness accounts.”

Media make people blind. They generate a world without witnessing. They do not bear witness to reality. They falsify and deflect the world. Their “machinations” obscure its facticity. Dasein, on the other hand, is a being-thrown. The human Dasein exists thanks to the “appeal of the highest heaven” and “protection of sustaining earth.”43 One ought to respond to this appeal and let oneself be borne by that which oversteps the human. Neither human Dasein nor the world is producible. This is the basis of their facticity. As humans, we are determined and modulated by “what cannot be thought in advance.” This is the basis of our facticity. Only so long as our thrownness, our facticity, resides within ourselves are we safe from becoming a “slave” of “machinations.” People are, Heidegger states, “servile to their future.” Distraction, which in Being and Time cuts Dasein off from authentic existence, makes people deaf to the language of the future: “But the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are men, born in its atmosphere, who can hear it. They are servants of their origin, not slaves of machination. ... The danger looms that men of today cannot hear its language. The only thing they hear is the noise of the media, which they almost always take for the voice of God. So man becomes disoriented and loses his way. To the disoriented, the simple seems monotonous.”44“Book” and “mirror” make the language of the future audible. Film and television deafen the ear to it, so that people grow hard of hearing and distracted. The book is bearing witness. Film is a machination. “Jug” and “plow” are traces of origin. They are not “devices.” Radio and television, on the other hand, lead to homelessness. Heidegger constructs the authentic world through a highly arbitrary distinction. What Heidegger lacks is serenity before the world. His language of passion is willful, and achieves its effects through crude selection and exclusion. It is not friendly. Not only “herons” and “deer” belong to the world, but also mice and Mickey Mouse.

1. Peter Glotz, “Über die Vertreibung der Langeweile oder Aufklärung und Massenkultur,” in Die Zukunft der Aufklärung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 217.

2. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 357.

3. Heidegger, Being and Time, 242.

4. Heidegger, 242.

5. Heidegger, 165.

6.Earnest, related to the German ernst, derives from the Proto-Germanic ernustuz, meaning “struggle” or “fight.”

7. Heidegger, Being and Time, 352.

8. Heidegger, 119.

9. Heidegger, 159.

10. Heidegger, 159.

11. Heidegger, 159.

12. Heidegger, 120.

13. Heidegger, 120.

14. Heidegger, 158.

15. Heidegger, 158–159.

16. Heidegger, 159.

17. Heidegger, 167.

18. Heidegger, 297.

19. Heidegger, 158.

20. Heidegger, 145.

21. Heidegger, 177.

22. Heidegger, 244.

23. Heidegger, 317.

24. Heidegger, 177.

25. Heidegger, 98.

26. Heidegger, 161.

27. [There is an untranslatable play on words here: fern sehen—“to see into the distance”; fernsehen—“to watch television”; Fernseher—“television.” Below Han speaks of the radio as enabling a kind of Fern-hören or distance-hearing.—Trans.]

28. Heidegger, 98.

29. Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 48.

30. Martin Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?” in Martin Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 27.

31. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay,” 70.

32. Heidegger, 70.

33. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), 180. [Translation slightly modified to stress alliterative elements.—Trans.]

34. Martin Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 79 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), 66.

35. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 199, 292, 283.

36. Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, 122.

37. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay,” 57.

38. Peter Handke, A Journey to the Rivers: Justice for Serbia, trans. Scott Abbott (New York: Viking, 1997), 30.

39. Hubert Winkels, Leselust und Bildermacht. Literatur, Fernsehen und Neue Medien (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1997), 89–90.

40. Handke, Journey, 40 (translation modified).

41. Franz Kafka, Letters to Milena, trans. Philip Boehm (New York: Schocken, 1990), 229.

42. Kafka, Letters to Milena, 229. See also Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Schocken, 1977): “So if I do not write, that is due chiefly to ‘strategic’ reasons such as have become dominant for me in recent years. I do not trust words and letters, my words and letters; I want to share my heart with people but not with phantoms that play with the words and read the letters with slavering tongue. Especially I do not trust letters, and it is a strange belief that all one has to do is seal the envelope in order to have the letter reach the addressee safely.” Kafka has a more human form of art in mind: “I forgot to add to my remark above: It sometimes seems to me that the nature of art in general, the existence of art, is explicable solely in terms of such ‘strategic considerations,’ of making possible the exchange of truthful words from person to person.”

43. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay,” 70.

44. Heidegger, 70.

Good Entertainment

 A Deconstruction of the Western Passion Narrative

by Byung-Chul Han

 translated by Adrian Nathan West

Thursday, October 17, 2024

The Bartleby Case

 

Melville’s “Bartleby,” which has often been the object of metaphysical and theological interpretations,1 also admits a pathological reading. This “Story of Wall-Street”2 describes an inhumane working world whose inhabitants have all degraded to the state of animal laborans. The sinister atmosphere of the office, choked by skyscrapers on every side, is hostile to life and portrayed in detail. Less than three meters from the window there surges a “lofty brick wall, black by age and everlasting shade” (5). The workspace, which seems like “a huge square cistern,” proves “deficient in what landscape painters call ‘life’” (5). Melancholy and gloominess are often mentioned, and they set the basic mood for the narrative. The attorney’s assistants all suffer from neurotic disorders. “Turkey,” for example, runs around in “a strange, inflamed, flurried, flighty recklessness of activity” (6). Psychosomatic digestive troubles plague the overly ambitious assistant “Nippers,” who grinds his teeth perpetually and hisses curses through them. In their neurotic hyperactivity, these figures represent the opposite pole of Bartleby, who falls into silent immobility. Bartleby develops the symptoms characteristic of neurasthenia. In this light, his signature phrase, “I would prefer not to,” expresses neither the negative potency of not-to nor the instinct for delay and deferral that is  essential for “spirituality.” Rather, it stands for a lack of drive and for apathy, which seal Bartleby’s doom.

The society that Melville describes is still a disciplinary society. Walls and partitions, the elements of disciplinary architecture, traverse the entire narrative. After all, “Bartleby” tells “A Story of Wall-Street.” “Wall” is one of the most frequently used words. Reference often occurs to the “dead wall”: “The next day I noticed that Bartleby did nothing but stand at his window in his dead wall revery” (28). Bartleby works behind a screen and stares empty-headedly at the “dead brick wall.” The wall is always associated with death.3 Last but not least, disciplinary society is signified by the recurrent motif of the thick-walled prison called the “Tombs.” There, all life is extinguished. Bartleby ultimately lands in the Tombs and dies in complete isolation and solitude. He still represents an obedience-subject. He does not develop symptoms of depression, which is a hallmark of late-modern achievement society. Feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, or fear of failure do not belong to Bartleby’s emotional household. Constant self-reproach and self-aggression are unknown to him. He does not face the imperative to be himself that characterizes late-modern achievement society. Bartleby does not fail in the project of being an “I.” Monotonous copying—the sole activity he has to perform—leaves no free space in which private initiative would prove necessary, or even possible. What makes Bartleby sick is not excessive positivity or possibility. He is not burdened by the late-modern imperative of letting his self flourish [das Ich selbst beginnen zu lassen]. The activity of copying, in particular, does not admit initiative. Bartleby, who still lives in a society of conventions and institutions, does not know the wearing-out of the ego that leads to depressive I-tiredness.

Agamben’s ontotheological interpretation of “Bartleby,” which pays no attention to pathological elements, already founders on the facts of the narrative. It also fails to take note of the change of mental structure [psychischer Strukturwandel] in the present day.  Problematically, Agamben elevates Bartleby to a metaphysical position of the highest potency:

This is the philosophical constellation to which Bartleby the scrivener belongs. As a scribe who has stopped writing, Bartleby is the extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation derives; and at the same time, he constitutes the most implacable vindication of this Nothing as pure, absolute potentiality. The scrivener has become the writing tablet; he is now nothing other than his white sheet.4By this logic, Bartleby embodies the “mind”—a “being of pure potentiality”—as signified by the empty tablet (on which nothing yet stands).5

Bartleby exhibits neither self-reference nor reference to anything else. He exists without a world and is absent and apathic. If he counts as a “white sheet” at all, this is because he has been voided of any and all relation to the world or meaning. Bartleby’s “dim eyes” (45) already speak against the purity of divine potentiality he is supposed to embody. It is just as unconvincing when Agamben claims that Bartleby’s stubborn refusal to write announces the potency of being able to do so—that his radical renunciation of willing [das Wollen] betokens potentia absoluta. As Agamben views things, Bartleby’s refusal is kerygmatic. He embodies “pure being without any predicate.” Agamben makes Bartleby into an angelic messenger, the Angel of Annunciation, who, for all that, “predicates nothing of nothing.”6 Thereby, he disregards the fact that Bartleby refuses every “errand.” He steadfastly refuses to send the mail: “‘Bartleby,’ said I, ‘Ginger Nut is away; just step round to the Post Office, won’t you?’ . . . ‘I would prefer not to’” (19). As is well known, the tale ends with the curious addendum that Bartleby formerly worked as an employee of the Dead Letter Office:

Dead letters! does it not sound like dead men? Conceive a man by nature and misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness, can any business seem more fitted to heighten it than that of continually handling these dead letters and assorting them for the flames? (46)

 Racked by doubt, the attorney-narrator exclaims: “On errands of life, these letters speed to death.” Bartleby’s Dasein is a negative being-unto-death. This negativity contradicts Agamben’s ontotheological interpretation, which makes Bartleby the herald of a second Creation—of de-creation [Ent-Schöpfung] that undoes the border between what has been and what has not, between Being and Nothingness.

Melville allows for a tiny sprout of life to appear in the Tombs. However, given the utter hopelessness, the massive presence of death, this small, “imprisoned turf” (45) only underscores the negativity of the realm of the dead. The words of comfort the attorney addresses to the incarcerated Bartleby also offer no help: “Nothing reproachful attaches to you by being here. And see, it is not so sad a place as one might think. Look, there is the sky and here is the grass.” Unimpressed, Bartleby responds, “I know where I am” (43). Agamben interprets both the sky and the grass as messianic signs. The small patch of lawn—the only sign of life in the midst of the realm of the dead—only augments the hopeless emptiness. “On errands of life, these letters speed to death”; this is the central message of the tale. All efforts to live [Bemühungen ums Leben] lead to death.

Kafka’s “Hunger Artist” harbors fewer illusions. His death, which no one remarks, provides a great relief to onlookers—“even the most insensitive felt it refreshing.”7 His death makes room for a young panther, which embodies the joy of living free of desire:

The food he liked was brought him without hesitation by the attendants; he seemed not even to miss his freedom; his noble body, furnished almost to bursting with all that it needed, seemed to carry freedom around with it too; it seemed to lurk somewhere in his jaws; and the joy of living streamed with such ardent passion from his throat that for the onlookers it was not easy to stand the shock of it. But they braced themselves, crowded around the cage, and would not move on.8

In contrast, the hunger artist derives a feeling of freedom only from the negativity of refusal; this feeling is just as insubstantial [ scheinhaft] as the freedom that the panther guards “in his jaws.” Likewise, Bartleby is joined by “Mr. Cutlets,” who looks like a piece of meat. He extols the establishment and attempts to induce his companion to eat:

Hope you find it pleasant here, sir;—spacious grounds—cool apartments, sir—hope you’ll stay with us some time—try to make it agreeable. May Mrs. Cutlets and I have the pleasure of your company to dinner, sir, in Mrs. Cutlets’ private room? (44)

What the lawyer says in response to Mr. Cutlets after Bartleby’s death sounds almost ironic: “‘Eh!—He’s asleep, ain’t he?’ ‘With kings and counsellors,’ murmured I” (45). The narrative does not open onto messianic hope. When Bartleby dies, the “last column of some ruined temple” falls. He goes under like a “wreck in the mid Atlantic.” Bartleby’s phrase, “I would prefer not to,” defies any Christological-messianic interpretation. This “Story of Wall-Street” is not a tale of de-creation [Ent-Schöpfung], but rather a story of exhaustion [Erschöpfung]. The exclamation that ends the tale is both a lament and an indictment: “Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity!”

Byung-Chul Han

Collected Works

Wednesday, September 25, 2024

Essencing and Absencing – Living Nowhere


A good wanderer leaves no trace.1 Laozi, Daodejing

The original meanings of the German word ‘Wesen’ (Old High German wesan) [essence], interestingly, were ‘to linger in one place’, ‘stay’, ‘household matters’, ‘dwelling’ and ‘duration’. Vesta, the Roman goddess of the hearth, home and family, has the same etymological root. Essence refers to house and household, to ownership and property, to what endures and is solid. Essence is abode. The house shelters possessions and belongings. The inwardness of the house is inherent in essence. The Greek word ‘ousia’, which Aristotle uses for ‘essence’, also originally means property, estate [Anwesen] and land holdings. The concept of ‘essence’, which unites identity, duration and inwardness, dwelling, lingering and possessing, dominates occidental metaphysics. For Plato, the beautiful is the identical, the unchanging, the enduring. It is ‘itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form’.2 Plato’s Eros, who strives for divine beauty, is the son of Poros. The plural form of Poros also means intake and money. Poros, literally ‘the way’, is meant to lead to possession. This goal- directed way is fully absorbed by the intention to possess. When it does not lead to unambiguous possession, the situa-tion becomes a-poretic. Because of his father, Plato says, Eros is himself an ‘awesome hunter’.3 Power and possession animate him. Being, to him, means desire.

Essence is substance. It subsists. It is the unchanging that withstands change by persisting in itself as itself and thereby differs from everything else. The Latin verb substare, from which ‘substance’ is derived, means among other things ‘withstand’. And stare is also used in the sense of ‘to assert one-self’. On the strength of its substantiveness, on the strength of its essentiality, the one withstands the other, asserts itself. Substantiveness is steadfastness, a determination to be oneself.

Only the one who has a secure, solid foothold, who solidly stands by him- or herself, can also withstand the other. Essence is the self- same, which dwells in itself and thus delimits itself from the other. Essence or substance is characterized by a striving towards itself. The Greek notion of hypostasis means not only essence and foundation but also withstanding and steadfastness. And stasis, apart from standing, stand or stand-ing place, also means revolt, discord and strife. According to its origins, essence is therefore anything but friendly. Only what is fully determined to be itself, what solidly stands by itself, what permanently dwells in itself – that is, what has the inwardness of essence – can enter into a conf l ict, into strife with the other. Without the determination to be oneself, which is the fundamental trait of essence, no strife is possible.
Only the one who is able fully to stay within him- or herself even inside the other can have power. The figure of essence prefigures power. Because of this prefiguration, a culture, or thinking, that takes its cue from essence must necessarily develop a determination to be oneself that finds expression in the desire for power and possession.

In his Monadology, Leibniz rigorously draws out the ultimate consequences of the concept of substance.4 The ‘monad’ represents this rigorous coming to a head and completion of essence. The monad dwells wholly in itself. There is no exchange with the outside. Thus, monads ‘have no windows through which something can enter or leave’.5 This total closure corresponds to the absolute inwardness of the windowless house. The monad’s only impulse is its striving towards itself, self- affection, the affect towards itself, namely ‘appetition’. The inner life of the monad is guided simply by ‘appetite’, that is, ‘perception’.6 The monad is a ‘mirror of the universe’,7 but it does not mirror the universe by abandoning itself to the things. Rather, the monad represents or expresses the universe. The monad is not passive but active or expres-sive, that is, ex- pressing. Leibniz’s soul, as a ‘living mirror’, is a place of desiring.8 The universe is simply an object of its ‘appetition’. The monad perceives the universe because it has an appetite for it. It is this appetite alone that gives the world an independent being. Existence [Dasein] is desire. Without desire there is nothing. Thus, ‘nothing is simpler and easier than something’, than existence.9 In order to exist, a striving, an effort, is required: ‘Itaque dici potest Omne possibile Existiturire.’ [‘Thus every possible can be said to strive to exist.’]10 The verbum desiderativum ‘Existiturire’ (wanting to be) signif i es the ‘conatus ad Existentiam’ [striving towards existence]. What is present is characterized by exigency in its presencing; that is, it wants. It is the soul that animates existence to exigency. The ground of existence is exigency. The ground of being is wanting, which then, in particular in the modern age, takes the form of wanting oneself. Wanting, or even liking, itself, everything present must accomplish [erwirken] itself.

Heidegger, despite his efforts at leaving metaphysical thinking behind, and despite always seeking to get closer to Far Eastern thinking, remained a philosopher of essence, of the house and of dwelling. Although he retreated from quite a few of the intellectual patterns of metaphysics, the figure of ‘essence’ still dominated his thinking. Heidegger uses the term ‘essence’ almost excessively. The fundamental traits of essence, such as having a solid foothold, steadfast-ness, selfhood and duration, appear in various guises in his writings. Expressions like ‘steadfastness’, ‘resoluteness of self’ [Entschlossenheit zu sich], ‘constancy of self’ or ‘self- constancy’ dominate the vocabulary of his analysis of Dasein. He also connects strife and essence: ‘In essential strife . . . the opponents raise each other into the self- assertion [Selbstbehauptung] of their essences.’11

As pointed out above, the dimension of strife (stasis) inheres in particular in the Greek idea of essence as hypostasis. Both the figure of strife and that of dialogue, frequently used by Heidegger, presuppose a bearer of essence, someone who presences [einen Anwesenden], that is, a person or individual who has a stand or standpoint, who is identical with him- or herself and stays the same. Those involved must properly be presencing [eigens an- wesend sein]. According to Heidegger, love consists in helping the other achieve his or her ‘essence’: ‘Found the love! Probably the deepest interpretation of love is expressed in Augustine’s word that says “amo volo ut sis”, I love, that is, I want what I love to be what it is. Love is letting be in the deep sense in which it calls forth the essence.’12

Etymologically, the Chinese sign for being (you, 有) represents a hand that holds a piece of meat. You also means ‘having’ and ‘possessing’. However, being as exigency, as appetition, does not dominate Chinese thinking. Quite the  opposite – it is enthusiastically devoted to fasting. Daoist thinking makes use of a number of negations in order to express that, fundamentally, existence is not an exigency, not an insistence, not a dwelling. The wise man ‘wanders where there is nothing at all’ (you yu wu you, 遊於無有).13 Zhuangzi also speaks of wandering ‘in simplicity’ (you yu dan, 遊於淡).14 Laozi also uses the ‘not’ (wu, 無) for negating ‘essence’ (wu, 物). The ‘not a thing’, the non-essence (wu wu, 無物) – we can say the absencing [Abwesen] – evades all substantive determination.15 It is consistent with this fact that non-essence is associated with wandering, with not-dwelling. The wise man wanders where there is ‘no door and no house’ (wu men wu fang, 無門無房).16 He is compared to a quail that has no nest, that is, no home. He is ‘a bird in flight that leaves no trail behind’ (niao xing er wu ji, 鳥行而無跡).17 

The Daoist wandering is certainly not fully identical with the Buddhist ‘non-dwelling’ (wu zhu, 無住), but the negativity of absencing connects the two.18 The Japanese Zen master Dōgen also teaches nowhere-dwelling: ‘A Zen monk should be without fixed abode, like the clouds, and without fixed support, like water.’19 The good wanderer leaves no trace (shan xing wu zhe ji, 善行無轍跡). A trace points in a particular direction, and it points to an actor and his intention. Laozi’s wanderer, by contrast, does not pursue any intention, and he does not go to any place. He walks in the ‘directionless’ (wu fang, 無方).20 He completely fuses with the way, which does not lead to anywhere. Traces are created only in being. The fundamental topos of Far Eastern thinking is not being but the way (dao, 道). The way lacks the solidity of being and essence, which is what leads to the emergence of traces. There is no teleol-ogy to force it to follow a linear path. The dao is not a poros.

Thus, it is freed of the possibility of possession and of the impossibility of the aporetic. This difference between being and path, between dwelling and wandering, between essence [Wesen] and absencing [Abwesen], is critical, and all of its consequences must be spelled out. As opposed to being, the way does not permit any substantive closure. As it is endlessly processual, it does not allow anything to subsist, insist or persist. It therefore does not allow any fixed essences to come about. A soul insists. It consists of traces, so to speak. Absencing effaces it. In this effacing consists emptiness. Zhuangzi describes the wandering in absencing as follows:
‘Already my will is vacant and blank. I go nowhere and don’t know how far I’ve gotten. I go and come and don’t know where to stop. I’ve already been there and back, and I don’t know when the journey is done.’21

The wanderer dwells nowhere. The figure who recommends to Tian Gen – ‘Heaven’s Ground’ – who is seeking his advice, to wander in non-being, is called ‘Wu Ming’ (無 名, literally the ‘nameless’).22 A name turns you into a someone in the strong sense. The wise man, by contrast, is nameless (sheng ren wu ming, 聖人無名).23 He has ‘no self’ (wu ji, 無 己, or wu wo 無我).24 This topos of absence is to be found not only in Daoism but also in Confucius. In Lunyu it says: ‘The master was without self.’ The way the negation of the self is expressed in this case is unusual: the particle for negation, wu (毋), which always precedes a verb, here precedes the self and thereby negates it. Confucius did not self. He made nothing the content of his self.

From a certain perspective, in Chinese, being, that is, you, the hand that holds a piece of meat, is something quite prosaic. In order to exist, it seems to say, all that is needed is a piece of meat. Nurturing oneself is a prosaic act. As such, it has no exigency. It lacks the insistence of desiring. Zhuangzi even counts clothing oneself and eating among the natural virtues that human beings need to practice.25 The belly (fu, 腹) does not desire. Desiring is based on the drawing of distinctions.26 What desires is not the belly but the discriminating taste that strives for something specific (wei, 味). Laozi demands: ‘Empty the heart (xu qi xin, 虛其心), and fill the belly (shi qi fu, 實其腹). Weaken the will (ruo qi zhi, 弱其志), and strengthen the bones (qiang qi gu, 強其骨).’27

Merely to be sated and strong is certainly not a Daoist ideal. 'Belly’ and ‘bones’ are here being used in figurative senses. They are organs of indifference. Daoism does not pursue an ascetic ideal; having an empty heart does not categorically exclude having a full belly. With its determination and doggedness, asceticism is based to a large extent on desire. For this reason, Zhuangzi distances himself from ascetics and hermits. Bones are given another figurative sense in section 55 of the Daodejing, where the wise man is compared to a newborn child whose bones are ‘supple’ (ruo, 弱) and whose sinews are ‘soft’ (rou, 柔).28 The weakness of the bones and softness of the sinews are opposed to the steadfastness of the essence that withstands and resists the other. Laozi might even have said: the wise man is without bones, like water.

In section 12 of the Daodejing the belly also figures as a non-desiring, non-distinguishing organ:

The five colours turn a man’s eyes blind;
The five notes turn a man’s ears deaf;
The five tastes turn a man’s palate dull;
. . .
For this reason, The ruling of the Sage is by the belly not by the eyes.29

This statement by Laozi is reminiscent of a provocative saying of the Zen master Linji: ‘When you get hungry, eat your rice; / when you get sleepy, close your eyes. / Fools may laugh at me, / but wise men will know what I mean.’30 And in Dōgen’s Shobogenzo it says: ‘In general, in the house of the Buddhist patriarchs, [drinking] tea and [eating] meals are everyday life itself.’31

Being – and on this point, at least, Laozi would agree with Leibniz – is more exhausting than non- being. Someone who exhausts himself, who struggles, remains in the realm of being. Non-being, the subtle and wondrous (miao, 妙), reveals itself only in ‘non-struggling’ (bu qin, 不勤). Emptiness, xu (虛), absencing, turns a someone into a no one. No one is conspicuous by their absence. Zhuangzi uses not only xu but also kong (空) to signify the emptying absencing:

Bright Dazzlement [Guang Yau, literally ‘glowing light’] asked Nonexistence, ‘Sir, do you exist, or do you not exist?’ Unable to obtain any answer, Bright Dazzlement stared intently at the other’s face and form – all was vacuity and blankness [kong]. He stared all day but could see nothing, listened but could hear no sound, stretched out his hand but grasped nothing. ‘Perfect!’ exclaimed Bright Dazzlement. 'Who can reach such perfection?’32

Desire, appetition, is what makes you a someone. A someone in the strong sense has no access to wandering. A someone dwells. Only someone who empties himself and becomes a no one is able to wander. A wanderer is without an I, without a self, without a name. He forgets himself (wang ji, 忘己). He does not desire anything (wu yu, 無欲) and does not hold on to anything (wu zhi, 無執). He therefore does not leave a trace. Traces, the imprints left by holding on and desiring, form only in being. The wise man, however, does not touch being.

The Daoist teaching of xu, absencing, cannot be given a purely functional interpretation. It also elevates thinking above functional calculation. In section 15, Zhuangzi remarks: ‘Emptiness, stillness, limpidity, silence, inaction – these are the level of Heaven and earth’ (tian dan ji mo, xu wu wu wei, ci tian di zhi ping, 恬淡寂漠 虛無無為 此天地之平).33 The term ‘emptiness’, xu, in the expression xu wu (虛無) bears no functional meaning. When illustrating emptiness, the nothing and inaction, Laozi and Zhuangzi may use examples that permit a functional interpretation of emptiness or the nothing.34 But the idea of effectiveness does not represent the essence of emptiness. François Jullien nevertheless interprets it almost exclusively from a functional perspective:

This return to emptiness is stripped of all mysticism (given that nothing metaphysical is at stake). The Laozi recommends it in order to dissolve the blockages that threaten all reality as soon as no gaps remain in it and it becomes saturated. For if everything is filled, there is no room in which to operate. If emptiness is eliminated, the interplay that made it possible for the effect to be freely exercised is destroyed.35

At first sight, the story about the ghastly-looking cripple whose disability saves him from going to war, and who is instead amply supported by the state, seems to confirm the idea of efficacy. And there is certainly also a functional aspect to the anecdote about the cook who cuts up his meat so effortlessly because he follows the spaces in the joints of the cut rather than using blunt force, the meat falling apart with minimal effort. According to the functional interpretation, inaction increases the efficiency of an action. The story of the gnarled tree that grows to a ripe old age because of its uselessness also admits of a utilitarian interpretation: the absence of usefulness can be useful. However, the fact that so many cripples and so many useless things populate Zhuangzi’s stories leads functionality itself into emptiness. The role of Zhuangzi’s one-legged, hump-backed, misshaped, toeless and footless characters is to demonstrate that all worries about usefulness and efficiency are superfluous. Laozi and Zhuangzi vehemently oppose all desire to bring about effects. At first sight, sections 68 and 69 of Laozi also seem to talk about the efficacy of inaction. In section 68, for instance, he says: ‘Those good at overcoming enemies do not fight them.’36 François Jullien interprets this remark purely in terms of strategy. Instead of deploying a large amount of energy in order to bring about an effect, the wise simply let it happen. They can ‘effortlessly use the energy of others’.37 Jullien also gives section 69 a purely functional interpretation:

The Laozi then applies this principle to military strategy. A good leader in war is not ‘bellicose,’ that is – as the commentator Wang Bi understands it – he does not try to take the initiative and be aggressive. In other words, ‘he who is capable of defeating the enemy does not engage in battle with him.’38

A good military leader simply ensures that the enemy is unable to find a line of attack. Pressure is exerted on the opponent, but this pressure ‘does not manifest itself at all in a localized fashion’.39 A wise strategist sees to it that the opponent is not offered anything tangible:

The Laozi explains the situation using a set of paradoxical expressions . . . ‘marching on an expedition without there being any expedition’ or ‘rolling up one’s sleeves without there being any arms there’ or ‘pressing forward to battle without there being any enemy’ or ‘holding absent weapons fi rmly in hand’ (section 69).40

Interestingly, Jullien’s interpretation does not mention the last, decisive passage of section 69: ‘the one that grieves will win’ (ai zhe sheng, 哀者勝). Laozi’s conclusion here is very surprising. It almost compels us to interpret this paragraph in a completely different way. For ‘grief’ (ai, 哀) is not a part of any military strategy, including that of Sun Tzu, who believes in the efficacy of detours, of indirect means. The victory the passage talks about is not a real victory that would be owed to a particular military strategy. Rather, it is a victory that stands above the distinction between ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’. Laozi uses the sign for ‘grief’, ‘ai’, exactly two times. The other occurrence is in section 31.

Interestingly, this paragraph also treats of war. Jullien, however, does not mention this paragraph.
The reason he doesn’t is simple: in it, Laozi condemns all use of weapons, and not because the wise military leader must be able to defeat his enemies without weapons, but simply out of benevolence. On ‘festive occasions’, the place of honour is on the left, but at ‘funerals’ it is the right. Those who have been victorious in battle must stand on the right side. The victor has to take his place according to the customary grieving ritual (ai li, 哀禮). He has to ‘lament’ (bei, 悲), ‘grieve’ (ai, 哀) and ‘cry’ (qi, 泣).41 Both Daoist and Buddhist thought distrust any substantive closedness that subsists, closes itself off and perseveres.

With regard to absencing, understood in an active sense, the Buddhist teaching of kong (空) is certainly related to Daoist emptiness, xu (虛). Both bring about an absencing heart, empty the self into a non-self, into a no one, into someone ‘nameless’. This xu of the heart resists functional interpretation. With xu, Zhuangzi expresses primarily non- exigent being, absencing. Zhuangzi’s empty mirror differs radically from Leibniz’s mirror with a soul, because it does not possess any exigential inwardness, any ‘appetition’. It does not desire anything, does not hold on to anything. It is empty and absencing. In this way, it lets the things it mirrors come and go. It goes along, not ahead. Thus, it does not lose its way, does not violate anything:

The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror – going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing . . . He is not a master (zhu, 主) of insights. He takes note of the minutest things, and yet is inexhaustible and dwells beyond the I. Down to the last thing, he receives what Heaven provides, and yet he holds it as if he held nothing.42

In section 13, Zhuangzi also uses the metaphor of the mirror:

The ten thousand things are insufficient to distract his mind – that is the reason he is still. Water that is still gives back a clear image of beard and eyebrows . . . And if water in stillness possesses such clarity, how much more must pure spirit. The sage’s mind in stillness is the mirror of Heaven and earth.43

Zen Buddhism also likes to draw on the rhetorical figure of the mirror in order to illustrate the not-holding-on of the ‘empty heart’ (wu xin, 無心):

The mirror . . . remains as it is: empty in itself . . . This is Hui-neng’s mirror; this is also Hsua-feng’s mirror . . . But what a mirroring! And what is it that is mirrored in it? There is the earth and sky; there are mountains rising and waters streaming; there is grass greening and trees growing. And in springtime, hundreds of flowers blossom . . . Is there an intention behind all this, a meaning that one could conceive? Isn’t all this simply there? . . . But only a clear mirror that is empty in itself, only someone who has realized the nullity of the world and of himself, also sees the eternal beauty in it.44

The empty mirror is based on the absence of the desiring self, on a heart that is fasting. By contrast, Fichte, the philosopher of the I and of action, scorns the empty heart:

The system of freedom satisfies my heart; the opposite system destroys and annihilates it. To stand, cold and unmoved, amid the current of events, a passive mirror of fugitive and passing phenomena, this existence is insupportable to me; I scorn and detest it. I will love: I will lose myself in sympathy; I will know the joy and the grief of life. I myself am the highest object of this sympathy.45

Originally, the German word ‘Sinn’ (sense; Middle High German: sin) also meant ‘walk’, ‘journey’ and ‘path’. But it is associated with a particular direction, a particular destination. The expression ‘Uhrzeigersinn’ (clockwise), for instance, points towards the direction in which the clock’s hand moves. The French ‘sens’ still carries the meaning of ‘direction’ or ‘side’. Wandering in non-being, by contrast, is ‘without direction’, hence ‘sense-less’ [sinn- los] or ‘empty of sense’ [sinn-entleert]. It is just this freedom from meaning, from a direction, a destination, this specific kind of emptiness of sense that makes a higher freedom, even being, possible in the first place. Being in harmony with the directionless and unlimited totality before any distinction is posited brings ‘heavenly joy’ (tian le, 天樂), ‘supreme happiness’ (zhi le, 至樂).46 Fortune (fu, 福), by contrast, rests on a distinction or preference, on a partial perception. Someone who wants to be lucky thereby exposes himself to misfortune. The aim is not to be the ‘bearer of good fortune or the initiator of bad fortune’ (bu wei fu xian, bu wei huo shi, 不為福先 不為禍始).47 The absence of sense leads not to nihilism but to a heavenly joy about being, a being without direction or trace.

Zhuangzi’s teaching of supreme happiness is the exact opposite of Kant’s theory of happiness. In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant remarks that ‘filling our time by means of methodical, progressive occupations that lead to an important and intended end . . . is the only sure means of becoming happy with one’s life and, at the same time satiated with life’.48 He compares life to a journey on which ‘the abundance of objects seen . . . produces in our memory the . . . conclusion that a vast amount of space has been covered and, consequently, that a longer period of time necessary for this purpose has also passed’, while ‘emptiness’, that is, the absence of objects to be perceived, in hindsight produces the feeling that a shorter period of time has passed.49 Thus, subjectively, emptiness shortens life. In order to become satiated with life, in order to enjoy it, no period of one’s life should be ‘empty’. Only a life that is fi lled with goal-directed actions is a happy and satisfying life. Sense is goal. Being is doing. Laozi and Zhuangzi, on the contrary, are convinced that a completely different project of Dasein, a completely different world, is possible. They juxtapose a directionless, a-teleological wandering with that linear, teleological, even vectorial design for life. Their project for Dasein does without sense and goal, without teleology and narration, without transcendence and God. In it, the absence of sense and goal is not a deprivation; rather, it means greater freedom, a more coming from less. Only through dropping the walking-towards does walking actually become possible. The world whose natural course [Gang] human beings need to follow has no narrative structure. It is therefore also resistant to the crisis of meaning [Sinnkrise], which is always a narrative crisis. The world tells neither ‘grand’ nor ‘small’ narratives. It is not a myth but nature in a particular sense. For that very reason, it is grand. All narrations are small in comparison, because every narration is based on a distinction that excludes one thing in favour of another. Narration that founds meaning is the result of a massive operation of selection and exclusion, even of a shrinking of the world. The world is pushed on to a narrow narrative path and reduced. Zhuangzi therefore teaches that one should associate oneself with the whole world, even to be as large as the world, to elevate oneself to a wide world, instead of clinging on to a small narrative, a small distinction. For that reason, his wondrous stories are often populated by gigantic figures. In fact, the very first anecdote he presents tells of a giant fish named Kun and a giant bird by the name of Peng:  

In the bald and barren north, there is a dark sea, the Lake of Heaven. In it is a fish that is several thousand li across, and no one knows how long . . . There is also a bird there . . . with a back like Mount Tai and wings like clouds fi lling the sky. He beats the whirlwind, leaps into the air, and rises up ninety thousand li, cutting through the clouds and mist, shouldering the blue sky, and then he turns his eyes south and prepares to journey to the southern darkness.50

Kun and Peng are too gigantic to fit small things; they elevate themselves above all, excluding selection and distinction. They do not care about small things; they are simply too big for that. Zhuangzi purposefully uses excessive dimensions and exaggeration in order to suspend distinctions, to achieve a de-differentiation and unbounding.

Someone who is not tied to a particular thing or place, who wanders and dwells nowhere, is beyond the possibility of loss. Someone who does not possess anything specific cannot lose anything:

You hide your boat in the ravine and your fish net in the swamp and tell yourself that they will be safe. But in the middle of the night, a strong man shoulders them and carries them off, and in your stupidity, you don’t know why it happened. You think you do right to hide little things in big ones, and yet they get away from you. But if you were to hide the world in the world, so that nothing could get away, this would be the final reality of the constancy of things.51

In this passage, Zhuangzi talks about a special relationship to the world. The demand is to un-bound and de-differentiate the being-in-the-world into a being-world. As long as it is smaller than the world, as long as it draws distinctions within the world, the human being, or, to speak with Heidegger, Dasein, will be affected by care. To free itself of care, it must be the entire world, must de-differentiate itself into the world, instead of clinging on to a particular element of the world or distinction. Being-in-the-world is being afflicted by care. Being-world, by contrast, is free of care.

Of course, postmodern thinkers also oppose ideas of substance and identity. Derrida’s ‘différance’ and Deleuze’s ‘rhizome’ radically question substantive closure and closedness, exposing them as imagined constructions. The negativity of these thinkers brings them close to absencing and emptiness, but the idea, typical of Far Eastern thinking, of a world-like totality, of the weight of the world, is alien to them, as it is to all postmodern thought. In Far Eastern thinking, emptiness or absencing ultimately has a collecting or gathering effect, whereas ‘différance’ or ‘rhizome’ cause an intense form of dispersal. They disperse identity, push diversity. Their care is not a care for the totality, for its harmony and accord. The Far Eastern thinking of emptiness leaves deconstruction behind in order to achieve a special kind of reconstruction.

Far Eastern thinking turns completely towards immanence. The dao, for instance, does not represent some monumental, supernatural or super- sensual entity that can only be talked about in negative terms, as in negative theol-ogy; it does not flee from immanence in favour of something transcendent. The dao merges fully with worldly immanence, with the ‘this- is- how- it- is’ of things, with the here and now. In the Far Eastern imagination, there is nothing outside the immanence of the world. It is not because it is too high that the dao escapes definition or direct naming; it is because it flows, because it meanders, so to speak. It signifies the permanent transformation of things, the procedural nature of the world. The wanderer leaves no trace behind because he remains in step with the wandering of things. The dao is also not a ‘lord’ over things, not a subject (zhu, 主).52 It does not retreat into secrecy. It is characterized by immanence and the natural evidence of the ‘this- is- how- it- is’. Laozi therefore emphasizes that his words are ‘most easy to understand’ (shen yi zhi, 甚易 知) and ‘most easy to practice’ (shen yi xing, 甚易行).53

The fact that the wanderer leaves no trace behind also has a temporal significance. He does not insist or persist. Rather, he exists in the actual. As he ‘moves in the directionless’, he does not walk along a linear, historical time that stretches into past and future.54 The care that Heidegger gives the status of being the fundamental trait of human existence is tied to this stretched-out, historical time. The wanderer does not exist historically. Thus, he is ‘without care’ (bu si lu, 不 思盧) and ‘does not ponder or scheme, does not plot for the future’ (bu yu mou, 不豫謀).55 The sage exists neither looking backwards nor forwards. Rather, he lives in the present. He dwells in every present, but the present does not have the sharpness or determinacy of the momentous. The moment is tied to the vigour and determination of doing. The sage exists situationally. This situationality, however, differs from Heidegger’s ‘situation’, which is based on the determination inherent in actions and on the moment. In Heidegger’s situation, Dasein resolutely takes hold of itself. This situation is the supreme moment of presence. The wanderer dwells in every instant, but he does not linger, because in lingering the focus is too much on objects. The wanderer leaves no trace because he dwells without lingering.

Zhuangzi’s famous story of the ‘butterfly dream’ is therefore suffused with an atmosphere of absence. He imagines a form of Dasein that lacks all solidity, definiteness, all exigential determinacy and finality. The story illustrates a Dasein without ‘care’:

Once Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn’t know he was Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he woke up, and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuang Zhou. But he didn’t know if he were Zhuang Zhou who had dreamed he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang Zhou.56

Oblivious to his self, Zhuangzi hovers between himself and all else. He abandons himself to a specific kind of indifference. This hovering is opposed to that steadfastness that represents the fundamental trait of essencing. Steadfastness makes it possible for someone to dwell within himself, cling on to himself, and thus to withstand the other and distinguish himself from the other. Absencing, by contrast, spreads across Dasein something dream-like and hovering, because it makes it impossible to give an unambiguous, final, that is, substantial, contour to things. Zhuangzi would respond to the concept of the individual, that is, the indivisible, by saying that he is infinitely dividable, infinitely transformable. Zhuangzi’s dream is a dream without soul, a dream that is not made up of traces. No one dreams. His dream is an absolute dream, because the world is itself a dream. The dream is therefore beyond the reach of theories of the soul, psychology or psychoanalysis. The dreaming subject is neither ‘ego’ nor ‘id’. The world itself dreams. The world is a dream. Absencing maintains everything in a dream-like hovering.

It is only with the influence of Buddhism that Chinese culture begins to develop a deep sensitivity for the transience and fleetingness of being. Buddhism is ultimately a religion of absence, of fading out and blowing away, a religion of ‘dwelling nowhere’.57 The Chinese culture and art of blandness would be inconceivable without Buddhism.58 The Chinese aesthetics of blandness is animated in particular by a sensitivity for the painful charm of transience. The poets of blandness mainly sing of the tender shine of the transient. The Japanese wandering monk Bashō begins the diary of his travels with words from the Chinese poet Li Bo:59

Heaven and earth – the whole cosmos – is just a guest house;
it hosts all beings together.
Sun and moon are also just guests in it, passing guests in eternal times.
Life in this fl eeting world is like a dream.
Who knows how many more times we are going to laugh?
Our ancestors therefore lit candles in praise of the night.60

Absencing does not allow for the taking of sides. Any preference for one side would disadvantage the other. Any inclination implies disinclination. Instead, the aim is to ‘embrace the ten thousand things universally’ (jian huai wan wu, 兼懷萬物).61 Love and friendship presuppose making distinctions and taking sides. They rest on appetition. For these reasons, the sage ‘has no love for men’ (bu wei ai ren, 不為愛人) and has ‘no more likes’ (qin, 親), that is, does not cultivate friendships.62 Love is something insisting, and friendship creates ties. The sage is not, however, completely detached. Disinterestedness presupposes a coherent subject who could have interests but for whom the world has become unimportant. Absencing does not empty love and friendship and make them irrelevant. It turns them into bound-less friendliness. This friendliness consists in embracing everything with complete impartiality.

Kafka’s story ‘The Cares of a Family Man’ reads like one of Zhuangzi’s wondrous tales. The ‘creature called Odradek’.is really an absencing.63 This strange creature, whose shape is that of a ‘flat star-shaped spool for thread’, is so multi-form that it evades any unambiguous definition of an essence. The name already deflies unambiguity: ‘Some say the word Odradek is of Slavonian origin, and try to account for it on that basis. Others again believe it to be of German origin, only influenced by Slavonic. The uncertainty of both inter-pretations allows one to assume with justice that neither is accurate, especially as neither of them provides an intelligent meaning of the word.’ In addition, Odradek is a motley combination of parts that appear to differ in their essence. Leibniz’s monads, as ‘simple substances’ (substance simple), by contrast, have ‘no parts’ (sans parties).64 Like Plato’s beauty, a monad is ‘always one in form’ (monoeides).65 Odradek is an absencing, even a non-essence [Ab-, ja ein Un- Wesen], in the sense that he is composed of the most heterogeneous parts. His appearance is hybrid, as if he wanted to mock the unambiguity of essences:

At first glance it looks like a flat star-shaped spool for thread, and indeed it does seem to have thread wound upon it; to be sure, they are only old, broken-off bits of thread, knotted and tangled together, of the most varied sorts and colors. But it is not only a spool, for a small wooden crossbar sticks out of the middle of the star, and another small rod is joined to that at a right angle. By means of this latter rod on one side and one of the points of the star on the other, the whole thing can stand upright as if on two legs.

His ‘diminutive’ figure also evokes the impression of an absencing. Because of his diminutiveness, it is impossible to get hold of him. He is ‘extraordinarily nimble and can never be laid hold of’. He lacks any of the solidity of an essence. His extreme nimbleness is opposed to the tenacity of essences. He also seems to be absent because he often retreats into muteness. Occasionally, he laughs, but his laughter sounds oddly bodyless and empty. This strengthens the impression of absencing: ‘it is only the kind of laughter that has no lungs behind it. It sounds rather like the rustling of fallen leaves.’

Odradek could easily join the circle of hump-backed, one-legged, footless or toeless figures and other strange, useless creatures that populate Zhuangzi’s anecdotes. Zhuangzi’s gnarled tree reaches a ripe old age because it is useless. Similarly, Odradek appears to transcend usefulness: ‘Can he possibly die? Anything that dies has had some kind of aim in life, some kind of activity, which has worn out; but that does not apply to Odradek.’ Odradek is also absencing because he never lingers in one place. He lives nowhere. He is a counter-figure to the inwardness of the home. Asked ‘And where do you live?’ his habitual answer is ‘No fixed abode’. Even when he is inside a house, he can usually be found only in places that are devoid of inwardness, such as ‘the garret, the stairway, the lobbies, the entrance hall’. He is thus not fully at home, not fully with himself. He seems to avoid closed rooms. Often he is simply absent: ‘Often for months on end he is not to be seen.’ This absence, this non-dwelling, unsettles the ‘family man’ who takes care of the house. The ‘care of the family man’ is about the absence of Odradek. We may even say that the family man is care itself. Odradek, who is free of any cares, is his opposite. It is clear, however, that Odradek is ultimately not one of Zhuangzi’s creations, because despite his long absences, which trouble the family man so much, Odradek, as Kafka writes, ‘always comes faithfully back to our house again’.

1 Transl. note: There are several translations of this sentence. I follow the suggestion by Stefan Stenudd on https://www.taois tic.com/fake- laotzu-quotes/fake-laotzu- quote- A_good_travel er.htm. Alternative translations include: ‘The good traveller leaves no cart rut’, in Laozi, Daodejing (chapter 27), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 57.
2 Plato, Symposium (211b), in Complete Works, Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1997, pp. 457–505; here: p. 493.
3 Ibid., p. 486 (203d).
4 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Principles of Philosophy, or, Monadology, in Philosophical Essays, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989, pp. 213–25.
5 Ibid., § 7, p. 214.
6 Ibid., § 15, p. 215.
7 Ibid., § 63, p. 221.
8 Ibid., § 56, p. 220.
9 Ibid., § 7, p. 210.

10 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, Vol. 7, Berlin: Weidmann, 1890, p. 289. [The English translation follows Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 50.] 11 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Off the Beaten Track, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 26.
12 Martin Heidegger, ‘Ansprache zum 80. Geburtstag Ludwig von Fickers’, in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2000, pp. 563–4; here: p. 563.
13 Zhuangzi, The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 57.
14 As well as meaning ‘simple’, the Chinese sign ‘dan’ can mean ‘non- desiring’ or ‘indifferent’. It could thus also be translated as ‘absent’. Then the translation of ‘you xin yu dan [遊心於淡]’ would be ‘let the heart wander in absence’. Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 56.
15 Laozi, Daodejing, p.  31: ‘She is called “the shape without a shape”, “the image of what is not a thing”.’ 16 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 182: ‘I go nowhere and don’t know how far I’ve gotten.’ 17 Ibid., p. 87.
18 François Jullien mostly excludes Buddhism from his view of China. According to him, Indian thinking, out of which Buddhism developed, is ‘metaphysical’, and thus follows his controversial claim that it is fundamentally different from Chinese thinking. Buddhist emptiness, ‘kong’, he holds, is the ‘non- existence’ that is part of the ‘metaphysics’ of ‘being and non- being’, whereas Daoist emptiness, ‘xu’, is that functional openness that allows the full development of an effect. Jullien’s views on Buddhism are surprisingly sweeping and one-sided. His talk about an ‘Indo- European’ metaphysics in connection with Buddhist emptiness is dubious. The ‘philosophy of emptiness’ of the Indian philosopher Nagarjuna, who was influenced by Mahayana Buddhism, certainly is anti-metaphysical. It turns any metaphysical assumption into emptiness. As is well known, Buddha himself refused to engage with genuinely metaphysical questions such as those about the creation of the world or the immortality of the soul. In this regard, he resembles Confucius, who is said to have refused to undertake any investigation into what is hidden. Interestingly, Jullien, while keeping Buddhist thinking out of his China, draws on European thinkers such as Plotinus, Augustine and Kant – all of whom were inf l uenced by Christianity – and uses them as the antagonists of his Chinese thinkers. But the origins of Christianity, after all, are not ‘Greek’ or ‘Indo- European’. How, then, are we to understand Europe without Christianity?
19 Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō zuimonki: Unterweisungen zum wahren Buddha-Weg, Heidelberg: Werner Kristkeitz, 1997, p.  168. [The English edition does not contain this exact wording. But see e.g. Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō zuimonki, Vol. 1, Moraga, CA: BDK, 2007: ‘We have already left our families and left our hometowns; we rely on clouds and rely on waters’ (pp. 59f.) The annotation to this sentence says: ‘In China and Japan monks are commonly referred to as unsui, which means “clouds and water”’ (p. 63).] 20 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 82.
21 Ibid., pp. 182f.
22 Ibid., pp. 56f. [The English translation uses the term ‘Nameless Man’.] 23 Ibid., p. 3. [The English edition translates this as ‘no self’.] 24 Ibid.
25 See ibid., pp.  65f.: ‘The people have their constant inborn nature. To weave for their clothing, to till for their food – that is the Virtue they share.’
26 In section 55 of the Daodejing, Laozi uses a rather explicit image to illustrate pure vitality without desire. He talks about the penis (zu) being aroused without any knowledge of the difference between the sexes. A direct translation of this image has often been avoided. Richard Wilhelm, a Christian missionary, translates the passage thus: ‘It [i.e. the child] does not yet know anything about man and woman, and yet its blood moves.’ (Laozi, Tao te king: Das Buch vom Sinn und Leben, Munich: Anaconda, p. 67.) [The edition used here has a straightforward translation: ‘He does not yet know the har-mony of female and male yet his penis is aroused’ (p. 115). It adds the following explanatory note: ‘most versions have yang and some interpretations read this as the male infant’s penis. In the Mawangdui version the character used clearly refers to the male sexual organ. It should be noted that the Chinese term specif i cally refers to the sexual organ of an infant’ (p. 180).]
27 Laozi, Daodejing, p. 9: ‘The government of the Sage is thus: He empties his mind, fills his belly; / Weakens his will, strengthens his bones.’
28 Ibid., p. 115.
29 Ibid., p. 27.
30 Lin-Chi, The Teachings of Zen Master Lin-Chi, Boston:
Shambala, 1993, p. 77.
31 Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō zuimonki, Vol. 3, Moraga, CA: BDK, 2008, p. 293.
32 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 185.
33 Ibid., p. 98. [The German version begins ‘Ruhe, Gelassenheit, Abwesenheit, Leere und Nicht- Tun’, literally: ‘Calmness, serenity, absence, emptiness and inaction’.] 34 Famous examples are the wheel and vessels:

Thirty spokes held in one hub;
– In beingless [Nichts] (wu, not xu) lies the cartwheel’s usefulness;
Moulding clay into pots;
– In beingless lies the pot’s usefulness;
Chiselling doors and windows to make a room;
– In beingless lies the room’s usefulness;
Therefore, Possess something to make it prof i t you;
Take it as nothing to make it useful for you. (Laozi, Daodejing, p. 25)

35 François Jullien, Treatise on Eff i cacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004, p. 112.
36 Laozi, Daodejing, p. 141.
37 Jullien, Treatise on Eff i cacy, p. 116.
38 Ibid., p. 174.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 See Laozi, Daodejing, p. 65. Jullien’s strong focus on effects and eff i cacy may itself be of ‘European’ origin.
42 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 59. [The passage following the ellipsis is not part of the English edition.] 43 Ibid., p. 98.
44 Bi-yan-lu, Meister Yuän-wu’s Niederschrift von der Smaragdenen Felswand, Munich: Hanser, 1964, p. 145. [The passage is not contained in the English edition: The Blue Cliff Record [Bi-yan-lu], compiled by Ch’ung- hsien and commented upon by K’o- ch’in, trans. Thomas Cleary, Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1998.] In this context, too, François Jullien tries to keep Buddhism away from Chinese thought. In Zhuangzi, he says, the mirror escapes ‘mystical employment and is understood in an entirely different way’: ‘The virtue of the mirror is that it accepts but does not hold; it ref l ects everything it encounters but allows things to pass by without clinging to them. It does not reject or retain. It allows things to appear and disappear without clinging to them.’ (François Jullien, Vital Nourishment: Departing from Happiness, New York: Zone Books, 2007, pp. 117f.) This description of the Daoist mirror is a good characterization of the mirror used in Zen Buddhism to illustrate the ‘empty heart’ (wu xin). Jullien does not explain the sense in which Zen Buddhism is ‘mystical’, the sense in which it is closer to Western mysticism than to Daoism. Let us remind ourselves of the famous words of the Zen Master Linji, quoted above (see note 30): ‘When you get hungry, eat your rice; / when you get sleepy, close your eyes. / Fools may laugh at me, / but wise men will know what I mean.’ In other words, the Zen Buddhist sage also takes care of the ‘belly’, and the ‘belly’ is probably not an organ of ‘mysticism’.

45 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Vocation of Man, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1931, p. 32.
46 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 99 and p. 139.
47 Ibid., p. 120.
48 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 130 (transl. mod.).
49 Ibid.
50 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 2.
51 Ibid., p. 45.
52 Laozi, Daodejing, p. 71.
53 Ibid., p. 145.
54 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 82.
55 Ibid., p. 120.
56 Ibid., p. 18.

57 See Byung- Chul Han, The Philosophy of Zen Buddhism, Cambridge: Polity, 2022, Chapter 4: ‘Dwelling Nowhere’, pp. 58–68.

58 François Jullien may want to keep Buddhism away from his China, but his description of Chinese blandness is deeply Buddhist: ‘Its [i.e. blandness’s] season is late autumn, when chrysanthemum petals are falling, touched by frost: the last colors of the year are fading, an erasing that happens on its own, in simpler withdrawal.’ (François Jullien, In Praise of Blandness: Proceeding from Chinese Thought and Aesthetics, New York: Zone Books, 2004, p.  94.) The painful charm of the falling chrysanthemum petals, the grace of disappearance, is not really typical of Daoism. Jullien even uses terms such as ‘l’absence’ and ‘l’abondon’, which, according to his image of China, are not ‘indigenous’ to its culture: ‘As usual, it is autumn. The atmosphere, introduced with this evocation of  purity . . . swells with the feeling of absence. All tangible signs gesture toward their own relinquishing.’ Ibid., p. 114.
59 Like many poets of blandness, Li Bo lived in the time of the Tang Dynasty, during which Buddhism fl ourished.
60 Transl. note: Translated from the German version in Matsuo Bashō, Auf schmalen Pfaden durchs Hinterland, Mainz: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2011, p. 42.
61 Zhuangzi, Complete Works, p. 132.
62 Ibid., p. 53.
63 All quotations from Kafka’s story: Franz Kafka, ‘The Cares of a Family Man’, in Collected Stories, London: Everyman, 1993, pp. 183–5.
64 Leibniz, The Principles of Philosophy, or, Monadology, in Philosophical Essays, pp. 213–25; here: p. 213.
65 Plato, Symposium, in Complete Works, pp.  457–505; here: p. 493 (211b).

Byung-Chul Han Absence On the Culture and Philosophy of the Far East Translated by Daniel Steuer