To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label Cioran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cioran. Show all posts

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Cioran – quotes from Notebooks

 



E. M. Cioran (1911-1995)
[Source: Notizen/Cahiers 1957-1972, Karolinger]

“Emily Dickinson: 'I felt a funeral in my brain,' I could add, like Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, 'every moment of my life'. The eternal funeral of the mind.” [P. 15]

“I sought my salvation in utopia and found only a little comfort in the apocalypse.” [P. 17]

“To make more plans than an impostor or a researcher, and at the same time to be struck by a lack of will, reaches - without metaphor - to the root of will.” [P. 21]

“What cannot be translated into religious terms doesn't deserve to be lived.” [P. 22]

“Sometimes, deep inside, I feel endless powers. Unfortunately, I don't know what to use them for; I believe in nothing, and to act one must believe, believe, believe... I lose myself every day, then I let the world that resides in me die. With the arrogance of a fool, and yet dawning in disgracefulness, in sterile sadness, in powerlessness and in silence.” [P. 22]

“There is a certain pleasure in resisting the call of suicide.” [P. 23]

“The two greatest sages of late Antiquity: Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, a slave and an emperor.” [P. 23]

“All fame is ridiculous; those who seek it must truly have a taste for decay.” [P. 25]

“I must create a smile, arm myself with it, get under its protection, put something between the world and myself, hide my wounds, finally learn the mask.” [P. 26]

“Success doesn't necessarily encourage success, but failure always encourages failure. Fate is a word that makes sense only in misfortune.” [P. 27]

“Boredom: empty suffering, diffuse agony. One does not experience boredom in hell; only in paradise does one feel bored.” [P. 29]

“No matter how much I exert myself, I could never accept this universe without feeling guilty of deception.” [P. 27]

“There are moments of weakness and doubt in which truth, and even the idea of truth, seems so inaccessible and incomprehensible that the slightest probability appears as an unexpected perspective.” [P. 31]

“Up close, everything that lives, even the tiniest insect, seems full of mystery; from a distance, boundless insignificance. There is a distance that displaces metaphysics; to philosophize means to still be an accomplice of the world.” [P. 31]

"The rudeness of being 'profound.'" [P. 32]

“The entire Hindu philosophy can be summed up as terror, not of death, but of birth.” [P. 33]

“Not taking revenge poisons the soul as much, if not more, than taking revenge. Does one have the right not to take revenge?” [P. 35]

“We exist only for our enemies - and a few friends who don't love us.” [P. 35]

“I would give all the poets for Emily Dickinson.” [P. 35]

“I am a Mongol laid waste by melancholy.” [P. 35]

“Evil is as much a creative force as Good. Yet of the two, it is the more active. For too often Good loafs.” [P. 36]

“With each insult, we hesitate between a slap and a death blow; and this hesitation, which makes us waste precious time, confirms our cowardice.” [P. 39]

“We don't demand freedom, we demand the illusion of freedom. For millennia, humanity has been tormented by this illusion. And since freedom, as they say, is a feeling, what difference is there between being free or thinking you are free?” [P. 40]

“Man is inevitably heading towards catastrophe. To the extent that I remain convinced of this, I am interested in him, with greed, with passion.” [P. 40]

“For a skeptic to be born, a thousand believers must rage.” [P. 41]

“The breadth and depth of a mind are measured by the sufferings that he has endured to attain knowledge. No one knows who has not suffered. A keen intellect can be completely superficial. Every step towards knowledge must be paid for.” [P. 42]

“The story of the Fall may be the profoundest thing ever written. Here everything is told of what we were to experience and suffer. All of history in one page.” [P. 45]

“Some seek fame, others seek truth. I dare to join the latter. An unattainable goal is more seductive than an attainable one. The approval of men - what a humiliation to strive for it!” [P. 55]

“I am only interested in spirits endowed with the dimension of darkness.” [P. 55]

“The spirit flourishes neither in the excesses of freedom nor in those of terror. It requires a bearable constraint.” [P. 63]

“The more I think of life as a phenomenon distinct from matter, the more it frightens me: Life is based on nothing, it is an improvisation, an experiment, an adventure. It seems to me so fragile, so inconsistent, so devoid of any reality, that I cannot contemplate life and its conditions without shuddering. It is only a spectacle, a whim of matter. We would cease to exist if we knew how unreal we are. If one wants to live, one must forbid oneself to think about life, to isolate it in the universe, to want to bring it to the point.” [P. 63]

“There are no pure emotions between individuals who are engaged in the same pursuit. A novelist is not jealous of a philosopher, but novelists inevitably hate each other, as do philosophers, especially poets. Think of the hateful glances prostitutes throw at each other when they share the same sidewalk. Adam was only a beginner; Cain remains our universal sovereign, the true ancestor of our race.” [P. 68]

“If one is unfit for indifference, one cannot live without pleading. The soul is an eternal crucifixion.” [P. 71]

“Lady Macbeth, Brinvilliers - women to my liking. In moments of deep discouragement, there is a certain longing for cruelty.” [P. 71]

“I appreciate a thinker only to the extent that he doesn't conform to his time, just as I admire only those who become renegades of it, or better still, those who betray time and history.” [P. 72]

“If everything continues - the reason is that people lack the courage for hopelessness.” [P. 79]

“My strength: to have found no answer to anything.” [P. 84]

“The only benefit of funerals is to allow us to reconcile with our enemies.” [P. 104]

“To live is to be capable of indignation. The sage is a man who no longer protests. Hence he is not above but alongside life.” [P. 117]

“Every day that passes increases the dangers that threaten humanity. It will pay dearly for the 'progress' it doesn't cease to indulge. The means to preserve life are ridiculous compared to those suspected of destroying it, and whatever man may undertake, he will never be right against this disproportion. What one advances in months or years, one destroys in an instant. What makes destruction in general so immoral is its ease. Except for suicide, all destruction is effortless. These are edifying thoughts…” [P. 120]

“The state of the unconscious is the natural state of life. In it, life is at home, thrives, and finds the benevolent slumber of growth. As soon as it awakens, and especially stays awake, it becomes hurried, burdened, and begins to wither.” [P. 120]

“Among friends, feelings are inevitably false. How can one form a genuine attachment to someone they know too well without hidden intentions?” [P. 120]

“When I think that in my youth I regarded the anarchist as humanity's fulfillment! Is it progress or is it decline to have arrived at a resignation which makes me consider any act of rebellion as a sign of infantilism? And yet, if I no longer rebel, I continue to be indignant (which perhaps comes down to the same thing). This is because life and indignation are virtually equivalent terms. Nothing that is alive is neutral. Neutrality is a victory over life, not life.” [P. 120/121]

“I call 'naive' he who is unaware of his insignificance and consequently enjoys recognition. One can see that this definition encompasses almost the entire human race.” [P. 122]

“To repeat oneself is a sin against the spirit. How I love the writers who have written almost nothing!” [P. 123]

“A book must have weight and present itself as a fatality that, when we read it, gives us the impression that it couldn't have remained unwritten. That in the end it came into being by a decree of Providence.” [P. 123]

“The only realization I am proud of, because I had it so early, before my twentieth year, is that one shouldn't reproduce. My disgust for marriage, family, and all social conventions stems from this. It is a crime to pass on one's faults to offspring, forcing them to endure the same sufferings, perhaps an even worse crossroads than oneself. I have never been able to give life to a being that would have inherited my unhappiness and infirmities. All parents are either irresponsible or murderers. Only animals should give birth. Compassion prevents us from 'reproducing'. It is the worst word I know.” [P. 123]

“In essence, indifference cannot be learned; it is part of a civilization. It is not a goal; it is a gift.” [P. 128]

“'Sadness will last forever.' These seem to have been Van Gogh's last words. I could have spoken them at any moment of my life.” [P. 129]

“The profound word of the Gitâ, that one should always keep in mind: 'It is better to perish by one's own law than to be saved by another's.'” [P. 134]

“I am not afraid of death, but of life. As far back as I can remember, it has always seemed unfathomable and frightening to me. My inability to fit in. Then the fear of people, as if I belonged to a different species. Always the feeling that my interests were in no way in line with theirs.” [P. 142]

“No friend ever tells us the truth. That is why only the silent dialogue with our enemies is fruitful.” [P. 142]

“I have noticed that I am almost always happy when everyone else is not.” [P. 143]

“My inability to tell people the truth directly, in short, my cowardice, has entangled me in more complications than if I had been a moral hero. I fall over people as such, but in the face of an individual, I lack all courage. I am terribly afraid of hurting others and, no doubt, of being hurt myself. One can be afraid because of an excess of sensitivity.” [P. 144]

“I see it confirmed every day, one can have compassion for people, but to love them, that is impossible. Here, precisely on this central point, Christianity is mistaken.” [P. 144]

“The role of insomnia in history. From Caligula to Hitler. Is the inability to sleep the cause or the consequence of cruelty? The tyrant lies awake: that is what defines him as such.” [P. 147]

“One speaks of the diseases of the will, and forgets that the will itself is a disease, that to want is not a natural action.” [P. 150]

“From a Christian, I have only the desire to torment myself and unnecessarily burden my conscience and my days.” [P. 162]

“As soon as one doesn't accept the irreparable, one falls back into the obsession of suicide.” [P. 165]

“The sufferings of those one loves are morally more unbearable than one's own.” [P. 165]

“One doesn't become better as one ages, one only learns to hide one's shame.” [P. 168]

“First condition of a perfect society: being able to kill all those one detests.” [P. 175]

“The whole secret of life is to surrender to illusions without knowing that they are illusions. Once you recognize them as such, the spell is broken.” [P. 175]

“The melancholy of being understood - for a writer, there is none greater.” [P. 210]

“The true prophet is the one who suffers from the horror of the future without believing in 'progress.'” [P. 221]

“Children who are not ashamed of their parents are irrevocably condemned to mediocrity. Nothing makes one more sterile than admiring one's 'creators.'” [P. 227]

“Only the failed works allow us to glimpse the essence of art.” [P. 227]

“In a century, or perhaps even sooner, people will speak of our time as an earthly paradise. When the whole earth is populated, humanity will only be able to draw hope from the past…” [P. 233]

“No one digests an insult or humiliation, no matter how insignificant it may be. Revenge is the fundamental fact of the moral universe.” [P. 235]

“I am not a pessimist, I love this terrible world.” [P. 235]

“I can only love those who show a certain impotence in the face of life.” [P. 236]

“Every newborn is for me one more unhappy person, just as every death is one less. It's a mechanical reaction of mine. Condolences for birth, congratulations for death.” [P. 247]

“When the Olympic gods descended to earth, they often took the form of an animal. This says a lot about their appreciation for humans.” [P. 257]

“'Judge no one until you have put yourself in his place.' This old saying (where does it come from?) makes any judgment impossible, for we judge someone precisely because we cannot put ourselves in his place.” [P. 257]

“If one wants to know what life is worth, it is important to remember that the only thing that reconciles us with it is sleep, that is, exactly what it is not: its negation.” [P. 259]

“Suffering created me, suffering will destroy me. I am its creation. In return, I render it a service: it lives through me, persists through my sacrifices.” [P. 261]

“When the fear of death fades, everything becomes frighteningly simple.” [P. 273]

“The enormous sadness in the eyes of a gorilla. An elegiac animal. It is from this stare that I am descended.” [P. 289]

“'No creature can attain the highest degree of nature without ceasing to exist.' (Thomas Aquinas) This is the anticipated response to the aberrations of the Übermensch. Man is condemned to be what he is. He cannot change his nature. He can even (not) improve himself without punishment. To be fallen is his nature. Much more, it is his way of life.” [P. 296]

“I have almost always ended by adopting the opinions of those I most opposed. (The Iron Guard, which I had detested at the start, became for me a phobic obsession.) Having attacked Joseph de Maistre, I suffered his contagion. The enemy insidiously triumphs over a man without character. By dint of thinking against someone or something, you become its prisoner, and reach the point of loving that servitude.” [P. 306]

“Nietzsche tires me. My weariness sometimes reaches the point of disgust. One cannot embrace a thinker whose ideal lies in the opposite of what he is. There is something repulsive about the weak pretending to be strong, about the weak without pity. All this is good for adolescents.” [P. 328]

“Greatness exists only where a man stands alone against all others.” [P. 341]

“The Demiurge is called Ialdabaôth in Hebrew, which means 'Son of Chaos.'” [P. 341]

“To withdraw into oneself forever, like God after creation!” [P. 343]

"'Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct.'" (F. H. Bradley) [P. 352]

“Injustice is not a mystery but the visible essence of this world.” [P. 355]

“For some, the prospect of dying (Proust, Hitler...) impels them to a frenzy of activity: they want to conclude everything, complete their work, and thereby become eternal; not a moment to lose, they are stimulated by the notion of their end - for others, the same prospect paralyzes them, leads them to a sterile sagesse, and keeps them from working: what's the use? The idea of their end flatters their apathy, instead of disturbing it; whereas among the first group, it rouses every energy, good as well as bad. Who is right here, where is reason? It is hard to say, especially since both reactions are justified. Everything depends on our inclinations, on our nature. In order to really know someone, you have to know what the thought of his end releases in him: is it exciting or benumbing? Lucky those who set to work because they think they're going to die, who in this idea find a truly dynamic impulse! Less fortunate those who lay down their arms and wait, for they have too much time to envisage their conclusion. They die during all the moments they dedicate to the idea of death: moribund in the full sense of the word, inexhaustibly moribund.” [P. 359]

“I think I would be the worst psychiatrist one could imagine, because I would understand and agree with all my patients.” [P. 360]

“Time is my life, my blood; the others - vampires who feed on it, exhausting me. Someone is robbing me of my substance, or at least gnawing at it.” [P. 364]

“If this universe were cleansed of life, there would be nothing to complain about.” [P. 372]

“The only interesting part of any doctrine of salvation (whether religious or political) is the destructive part.” [P. 399]

“You cannot argue with physical pain.” [P. 425]

“Life in its most beautiful moment is merely a balance of its disadvantages.” [P. 431]

“Hitler's marriage with Eva Braun took place a few hours before their suicide. An official was hurriedly summoned, and asked each of them separately the obligatory question: 'Are you Aryan?' They answered in the affirmative. If Hitler had said: 'No,' that would have been the most extraordinary answer in History.” [P. 446]

“The scapegoat. We cannot do without it, its existence is required by our biological constitution. Someone must pay for our faults and our failures; if we consider ourselves as alone responsible, what complications, what additional tortures! To have a good conscience, is all that we ask: the scapegoat serves that function. It takes an almost superhuman effort to be able to assume the blame ourselves for everything. But when we have made the effort we have the distinct sensation that we are approaching the truth. Alas! This doesn't make us more modest, only more vainglorious.” [P. 466/467]

“My love of Bach has overwhelmed me again. I love to listen to him in the dark. I turn off the light and take my pleasure in a tomb. Sometimes it's as if I were listening to music after my death.” [P. 526]

“Those who don't die young deserve to die.” [P. 545]

“There is no means to prove that being is preferable to non-being.” [P. 548]

“If revenge were to miraculously disappear, almost the entire human race would become a victim of previously unknown mental illnesses.” [P. 551]

“Every noble attitude is false. Insults are unforgivable, except those from strangers, - never if they come from a friend or an acquaintance.” [P. 556]

“Never hurt anyone: how to manage this? By not manifesting yourself. For every action hurts someone. By abstaining, one spares every one. But perhaps death is even better than abstention.” [P. 556]

“What an extraordinary sensation, for a writer, to be forgotten! To be posthumous in one's own lifetime, no longer to see one's name anywhere. For all literature is a question of names and of nothing else. To have a name, the expression speaks volumes. Well then, no longer having a name, if one has ever had such a thing, may be better than having one. Such is the price of freedom. Freedom, and even more: deliverance. A name - all that remains of a being. It's stupefying that one can toil and torment oneself for such a trifle.” [P. 556/557]

“One is driven by the demon every time one doesn't want to play the 'game,' every time one speaks a truth that necessarily goes against oneself.” [P. 557]

“Suicide is the most normal act one can commit. Every thought should lead to it, and every career should end with it. It should replace the unwanted and humiliating end everywhere. Everyone should choose his last hour.” [P. 564]

“Only the one who questions the very fact of existence is truly revolutionary; all others, the anarchist first and foremost, pact with the established order.” [P. 566]

“Children turn against their parents; and parents deserve their fate. Everything turns against everything; everyone creates their own enemy. Such is the law.” [P. 570]

“'Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires.'" (Blake) [P. 571]

“Over time, tolerance brings forth more evil than intolerance - that is the true drama of history. If this assertion is true, it is the greatest indictment against man.” [P. 576]

“To be able to kill oneself and not do it is to be an autocrat who doesn't make use of his authority.” [P. 599]

“If a person forces himself to believe in something, it is only to avoid killing himself, for suicide is the logical consequence of the realisation that nothing withstands rigorous analysis, cruel reflection.” [P. 599]

“I am always afraid of scandal, I am always afraid of defamation, against which there is no defense. But I say to myself: if I were dead, what would it matter to me if people said these or those abominations about me? For the most honorable man in the world, death is not only a liberation, but an acquittal. One is no longer guilty; one is no longer a monster once six feet under. Death is truly immoral. Suicide even more so. One feels like committing all sorts of crimes and saying to oneself: what does it matter, a single bullet would free me from guilt, and I would find a peace as perfect as that enjoyed by the innocent.” [P. 606]

“If the fear of death were to miraculously disappear, life would have no protection at all: it would be at the mercy of our first whim. It would lose all value and perhaps all meaning. The sages who urge us so vehemently to free ourselves from this fear do not know what they are doing. They don't realize that they are destroyers.” [P. 623]

“The greatest misfortunes are those foreseen.” [P. 627]

“To understand other people, you must be obsessed by yourself to the point of disgust, such disgust being a symptom of health, a necessary condition in order to look beyond your own troubles.” [P.638]

“An advancing army knows nothing, doesn't even suspect defeat. Mankind drags itself forward in the belief that it is rushing towards victory. Where it is really heading is only glimpsed by those who have turned away from the march, those who anticipate the end.” [P.639]

“The truth is in neither revolution nor in reaction. It resides in the questioning both of society and of those who attack it.” [P.647]

“Health, like freedom, has no positive content, since you don't consciously enjoy it when you possess it. It contributes nothing to you, it can enrich no one. So it would be absurd to say that someone made some discovery or had some vision because he was feeling well. It is when you feel ill that you discover something new, health being a state of absence, since you are not conscious of it. You would have to be able to tell yourself at any moment at all: I am feeling well, and from this derive a real, conscious well-being. But such consciousness would be in contradiction with health and would merely prove that health is or is about to be compromised. Any conscious health is a threatened health. Health is a good, certainly, but those who possess it have been denied the opportunity of knowing their happiness. And one might speak without exaggeration of a just punishment of the healthy.” [P.647/648]

“One should humble man. The resulting dangers are much less than those caused by arrogance. A naturally arrogant animal - the only means to bring him to reason is to show him what mud he is made of.” [P.652]

"'My life is the hesitation before birth.' (Kafka) ... As I have always felt.” [P.658]

“My task is to awaken people from their eternal slumber, even though I know that I am committing a crime and that it would be a thousand times better to leave them in it. Even if they are awakened - I have nothing to offer them.” [P.680]

“Life is extraordinary, in the sense that the sexual act is extraordinary: during, and not after. Once you position yourself outside of life and consider it from an external point of view, everything collapses, everything seems deception, as after the sexual performance. All pleasure is extraordinary and unreal, as is the case for every act of life.” [P.689]

“You have to let people say what they want. Eventually the truth will be reestablished. Anything is better than humiliation. Injustice is necessary to the mind; it fortifies, cleanses it. A victim is always, with regard to lucidity, above his persecutors. To be a victim is to understand.” [P.693]

“Spring and suicide are two related concepts for me. Spring represents an idea that I am not ripe enough for, or rather one that doesn't fit into my system.” [P.698]

“In essence, I only love religions that have transcended the idea of God. That is why I hold Buddhism in such high regard.” [P.701]

“I believe that there is no greater pleasure than trampling upon that which one has worshipped.” [P.702]

“Attachment is the origin of all servitudes. The more you want to be free, the less you tie yourself to beings and things. But once you are tied to them, what a drama it is to be released! We begin living by creating ties for ourselves; the older we grow the stronger they become. A moment comes when we understand that they represent so many chains, that it is too late to shake them off, for we are too used to them.” [P.715]

“Being born is a catastrophe, we are all survivors of birth.” [P.730]

“Perceiving thought as a self-destructive poison, the product of a viper turned against itself.” [P.731]

“Only he who creates the void around us does us a service. My gratitude to those who have made me more alone, who - in spite of themselves, but no matter - have contributed to my spiritual consolidation.” [P.736]

“Man has been deceived by the gods. There is no other way to understand history.” [P.753]

“Birth and guilt are correlative concepts. Objective guilt, I am inclined to say: a mistake for which one cannot be held responsible, although one can imagine that one is. Thus, I can attribute the guilt of my birth to myself, but no one will consider me 'guilty.'” [P.753]

“How am I responsible for my birth? - I am responsible as soon as I am happy to be born.” [P.753]

“The Anti-Zarathustra. It is more likely that the future belongs to the subhuman rather than to the superhuman. It is ridiculous to speak of the superhuman, for ever since man has existed he has done nothing but surpass himself, to tear himself out of his origins. But he tears himself out of them only to fall back into them better; and when he is farthest from his beginnings he will fall deeper than ever. He will pay dearly for his will to ascend and transcend. I see man shrinking more and more until there is nothing left of him.” [P.753]

“One who lacks the strength to take revenge, or who overcomes the desire to take revenge, is impure.” [P.759]

“He who lacked the courage to kill himself in his youth will blame himself for the rest of his life.” [P.763]

“To write about suicide is to have left it behind.” [P.770]

“People accept without excessive terror the notion of eternal sleep; on the other hand, an eternal waking (which is what immortality would be, if such a thing were conceivable) is unbearable, in thought as in fact: it gives you the shivers.” [P.821]

“What is called 'pessimism' is nothing but the 'art of living', the art of tasting the bitter flavor of everything that exists.” [P.838]

“He who has a sense of justice should go into the desert.” [P.862]

“If I had a son, he would have been a murderer.” [P.868]

“To feel destructive impulses doesn't mean to be evil, but rather to be out of balance. One can be good and a monster, an angel and a murderer at the same time.” [P.871]

“The only revolution, the only upheaval that interests me and that I really understand is the apocalypse. A social change is not significant enough.” [P.878]

“The truth lies in discouragement. Therefore courage, hope, lies, ignorance, are false. To live is to opt for the unreal, the non-true. There is a heroism of truth and a heroism of falsehood. Which should one advocate for? There are those who waver between the two for their entire existence, unable to commit. Perhaps in this wavering lies the true secret, or at least the art of not erring.” [P.883]

“Everything is surrender, except unrest, except the unquenchable thirst for truth.” [P.890]

“I think it is a given that a balanced mind of an ordinary constitution is incapable of imagining the future, or even of grasping a single aspect of it. This has always been the case and will be even more so in the future. For a common mind cannot feel or imagine the extent of what man is capable of, both in good and, above all, in evil. To understand the future is to understand one more stage on the path towards the end of humanity. This is precisely what man refuses to imagine. A lower wisdom prevents them from doing so. Here, the prophet demonstrates their superiority, derived from a very precise matter: because their instinct for self-preservation is deeply shaken. This is their weakness but also their strength. If they had kept their defenses and self-preservation reflexes intact, they wouldn't have the audacity to look beyond the present.” [P.898]

“Universal happiness would only be possible in the midst of a completely disillusioned humanity, which, at the same time, shouldn't be so embittered, a humanity that would be thrilled to have no more illusions...” [P.939]

“Not committing suicide is a sign of complicity.” [P.939]

“Being conscious is a drama that ends with death. Let us at least hope so.” [P.966]

“Clairvoyance doesn't eradicate the desire to live, it simply renders one unfit for life.” [P.971]

“If the whole world had 'understood,' history would have ended long ago. But it is biologically impossible to 'understand.' And even if all but one were to succeed, history would continue because of him. Because of a single illusion!” [P.972]

“Every truth, at the moment of its discovery, gives a feeling of liberation; then it becomes a chain. The same can be said of a god; in the beginning, when one clings to Him, one breathes a sigh of relief - and then one suffocates.” [P.976]

“Last night I told Christabel that I love life, but that doesn't prevent me from believing that it would be better for me and everyone else never to have existed. She disagrees and replies, 'Every being is unique, so...' I have noticed that people are incapable of radically questioning their own lives. Why is that? Because everyone looks at themselves from the inside and believes they are necessary, indispensable. Each person feels like a whole, like the entirety. Once you identify completely with yourself (and almost all living beings do), you react like God, you are God. How could one then accept the idea that it would have been better never to have existed? Only by living both within and on the edge of oneself can one simultaneously experience the feeling of one's own uniqueness and worthlessness, and accept, without a trace of despair, that it would have been better, on the whole, never to have existed.” [P.976]

“One must liberate oneself from life without hating it.” [P.982]

“Every living person is a defeated one, for birth is only the prelude to surrender.” [P.985]

“There is no more wrong attitude than to have understood everything and yet continue living.” [P.996]

“Non-consent to death is the greatest drama of mortals.” [P.996]

“Without the notion of a failed universe, the spectacle of injustice under every regime would put even an indifferent man in a straitjacket.” [P.1006]

Thank you for reading!


https://www.reddit.com/user/_AmaNesciri_/

Monday, October 5, 2026

The Decor of Knowledge

 

Our truths are worth no more than those of our ancestors. Having substituted concepts for their myths and symbols, we consider ourselves “advanced"; but these myths and symbols expressed no less than our concepts. The Tree of Life, the Serpent, Eve, and Paradise signify as much as Life, Knowledge, Temptation, Unconsciousness. The concrete figurations of good and evil in mythology go as far as the Good and Evil of ethics. Knowledge—if it is profound—never changes: only its decor varies. Love continues without Venus, war without Mars, and if the gods no longer intervene in events, those events are neither more explicable nor less disconcerting: the paraphernalia of formulas merely replaces the pomp of the old legends, without the constants of human life being thereby modified, science apprehending them no more intimately than poetic narratives.

Modern complacency is limitless: we suppose ourselves more enlightened, more profound than all the centuries behind us, forgetting that the teaching of a Buddha confronted thousands of beings with the problem of nothingness, a problem we imagine we have discovered because we have changed its terms and introduced a touch of erudition into it. But what Western thinker would survive a comparison with a Buddhist monk? We lose ourselves in texts and terminologies: meditation is a datum unknown to modern philosophy. If we want to keep some intellectual decency, enthusiasm for civilization must be banished from our mind, as well as the superstition of History. As for the great problems, we have no advantage over our ancestors or our more recent predecessors: men have always known everything, at least in what concerns the Essential; modern philosophy adds nothing to Chinese, Hindu, or Greek philosophy. Moreover, there cannot be a new problem, despite our naïvete or our infatuation which would like to persuade us to the contrary. In the play of ideas, who ever equaled a Chinese or a Greek sophist, who was ever bolder in abstraction? All the extremities of thought were reached from the first—and in all civilizations. Seduced by the demon of the Unpublished, we forget too quickly that we are the epigones of the first pithecanthropus who bothered to reflect.

Hegel is chiefly responsible for modern optimism. How could he have failed to see that consciousness changes only its forms and modalities, but never progresses? Becoming excludes an absolute fulfillment, a goal: the temporal adventure unfolds without an aim external to itself, and will end when its possibilities of movement are exhausted. The degree of consciousness varies with the ages, such consciousness not being aggrandized by their succession. We are not more conscious than the Greco-Roman world, the Renaissance, or the eighteenth century; each period is perfect in itself—and perishable. There are privileged moments when consciousness is exasperated, but there was never an eclipse of lucidity such that man was incapable of confronting the essential problems, history being no more than a perpetual crisis, even a breakdown of naïvete. Negative states—precisely those which exasperate consciousness—are variously distributed; nonetheless they are present in every historical period; balanced and “happy,” they know Ennui—the natural name for happiness; unbalanced and tumultuous, they suffer Despair and the religious crises which derive from it. The idea of an Earthly Paradise was composed of all the elements incompatible with History, with the space in which the negative states flourish.

All means and methods of knowing are valid: reasoning, intuition, disgust, enthusiasm, lamentation. A vision of the world propped on concepts is no more legitimate than another which proceeds from tears, arguments, or sighs—modalities equally probing and equally vain. I construct a form of universe; I believe in it, and it is the universe, which collapses nonetheless under the assault of another certitude or another doubt. The merest illiterate and Aristotle are equally irrefutable—and fragile. The absolute and decrepitude characterize the work ripened for years and the poem dashed off in a moment. Is there more truth in The Phenomenology of Mind than in Epipsychidion? Lightninglike inspiration, as well as laborious investigation, offers us definitive results—and ridiculous ones. Today I prefer this writer to that one; tomorrow will come the turn of a work I detested quite recently. The creations of the mind—and the principles which preside over them—follow the fate of our moods, of our age, of our fevers, and our disappointments. We call into question everything we once loved, and are always right and always wrong; for everything is valid—and nothing has any importance. I smile: a world is born; I frown: it vanishes, and another appears. No opinion, no system, no belief fails to be correct and at the same time absurd, depending on whether we adhere to it or detach ourselves from it.

We do not find more rigor in philosophy than in poetry, nor in the mind than in the heart; rigor exists only so long as we identify ourself with the principle or thing which we confront or endure; from outside, everything is arbitrary: reasons and sentiments. What we call truth is an error insufficiently experienced, not yet drained, but which will soon age, a new error, and which waits to compromise its novelty. Knowledge blooms and withers along with our feelings. And if we are in a position to scrutinize all truths, it is because we have been exhausted together—and because there is no more sap in us than in them. History is inconceivable outside of what disappoints.Which accounts for the desire to submit ourselves to melancholy, and to die of it. . . .

True knowledge comes down to vigils in the darkness: the sum of our insomnias alone distinguishes us from the animals and from our kind. What rich or strange idea was ever the work of a sleeper? Is your sleep sound? Are your dreams sweet? You swell the anonymous crowd. Daylight is hostile to thoughts, the sun blocks them out; they flourish only in the middle of the night. . . . Conclusion of nocturnal knowledge: every man who arrives at a reassuring conclusion about anything at all gives evidence of imbecility or false charity. Who ever found a single joyous truth which was valid? Who saved the honor of the intellect with daylight utterances? Happy the man who can say to himself: “Knowledge turned sour on me.”

History is irony on the move, the Mind’s jeer down through men and events. Today this belief triumphs; tomorrow, vanquished, it will be dismissed and replaced: those who accepted it will follow it in its defeat Then comes another generation: the old belief is revived; its demolished monuments are reconstructed . . . until they perish yet again. No immutable principle rules the favors and severities of fate: their succession participates in the huge farce of the Mind, which identifies, in its play, impostors and enthusiasts, ardors and devices. Consider the polemics of each age: they seem neither motivated nor necessary. Yet they were the very life of that age, Calvinism, Quietism, Port-Royal, the Encyclopedia, the Revolution, Positivism, etc. . . . what a series of absurdities . . . which/tai to be, what a futile and yet fatal expense! From the ecumenical councils to the controversies of contemporary politics, orthodoxies and heresies have assailed the curiosity of mankind with their irresistible non-meaning. Under various disguises there will always be pro and con, whether apropos of Heaven or the Bordello. Thousands of men will suffer for subtleties relating to the Virgin and the Son; thousands of others will torment themselves for dogmas less gratuitous but quite as improbable. All truths constitute sects which end by enduring the destiny of a Port-Royal, by being persecuted and destroyed; then, their ruins, beloved now and embellished with the halo of the iniquity inflicted upon them, will be transformed into a pilgrimage-site. . . .

It is no less unreasonable to grant more interest to the arguments around democracy and its forms than to those which took place, in the Middle Ages, around nominalism and realism: each period is intoxicated by an absolute, minor and tiresome, but in appearance unique; we cannot avoid being contemporaries of a faith, of a system, of an ideology, cannot avoid being, in short, of our time. In order to be emancipated from that, we would require the coldness of a god of scorn. . . .

That History has no meaning is what should delight our hearts. Should we be tormenting ourselves for a happy solution to process, for a final festival paid for by nothing but our sweat, our disasters? for future idiots exulting over our labors, frolicking on our ashes? The vision of a paradisiac conclusion transcends, in its absurdity, the worst divagations of hope. All we can offer in excuse for Time is that in it we find some moments more profitable than others, accidents without consequence in an intolerable monotony of perplexities. The universe begins and ends with each individual, whether he be Shakespeare or Hodge; for each individual experiences his merit or his nullity in the absolute. . . .

By what artifice did what seems to be escape the control of what is not? A moment of inattention, of weakness at the heart of Nothingness: the grabs took advantage of it; a gap in its vigilance: and here we are. And just as life supplanted nothingness, life in its turn was supplanted by history: existence thereby committed itself to a cycle of heresies which sapped the orthodoxy of the void.

E. M. CIORAN

A Short History of Decay

Dealing With the Mystics

 

NOTHING is more irritating than those works which “coordinate” the luxuriant products of a mind that has focused on just about everything except a system. What is the use of giving a so-called coherence to Nietzsche’s ideas, for example, on the pretext that they revolve around a central motif? Nietzsche is a sum of attitudes, and it only diminishes him to comb his work for a will to order, a thirst for unity. A captive of his moods, he has recorded their variations. His philosophy, a meditation on his whims, is mistakenly searched by the scholars for the constants it rejects.

The obsession with a system is no less suspect when it is applied to the study of the mystics. It will do, possibly, in the case of a Meister Eckhart, who took the trouble to discipline his thought: was he not a preacher? A sermon, however inspired, partakes of the course, sets forth a thesis, and labors to reveal its cogency. But what can we say of an Angelus Silesius, whose distichs readily contradict one another and possess only one theme in common: God—presented in so many aspects that it is difficult to identify the true one? The Cherubic Wanderer, a series of irreconcilable remarks, a splendor of confusion, expresses only the strictly subjective states of its author: to try to detect its unity, its system, is to spoil its capacities for seduction. Angelus Si-lesius is preoccupied less with God than with his own god. A host of poetical insanities are the consequence, which must bewilder the scholar and appall the theologian. But such is not the case. Both do their utmost to put these remarks in some kind of order, to simplify them, to compress them into some specific idea. Maniacs of rigor, they try to find out what their author thought about eternity and death. What he thought? Anything. They are experiences of his, personal and absolute. As for his god, never completed, always imperfect and changing, Angelus Silesius registers his moments and translates his becoming into a thought which is no less imperfect and changing. Let us beware of the definitive, let us avoid those who claim to possess an exact view of anything. To be surprised that Angelus Silesius in one distich should identify death with evil, and in another with good, is to lack both probity and humor. Since death itself is a becoming in us, let us consider its stages, its metamorphoses; to reduce it to a formula is to halt, to impoverish, to sabotage death.

The mystic experiences neither his ecstasies nor his disgusts within the limits of a definition: his claim is not to satisfy the demands of his thought, but those of his sensations. And he tends much more toward sensation than the poet, for it is by sensation that he verges upon God.

No frissons are identical, none may be repeated ad libitum: the identity of a word conceals, as a matter of fact, a number of divergent experiences. There are a thousand perceptions of Nothing, and only one word to translate them: the indigence of language renders the universe intelligible … In Angelus Silesius, the interval which separates one distich from another is diminished, if not canceled, by the familiar image of the same words which recur, by that poverty of language which makes his sighs and his horrors and his ecstasies lose their individuality. Hence the mystic denatures his experience by expressing it, almost as much as the scholar denatures the mystic by glossing him.

*

It is a mistake to suppose that mysticism derives from a softening of the instincts, from a compromised vitality. A Luis of Leon, a John of the Cross crowned an age of great enterprises and were necessarily contemporaries of the Conquest.

Far from being defectives, they fought for their faith, attacked God head on, appropriated heaven for themselves. Their idolatry of the wilFs abeyance, of gentleness and passivity, secured them against a scarcely bearable tension, against that superabundant hysteria which is responsible for their intolerance, their proselytism, their power over this world and the next. To get a sense of them, imagine a Hernando Cortez in the middle of an invisible geography.

The German mystics were conquerors too. Their penchant for heresy, for personal assertion, for protest expressed—on the spiritual level—the will of an entire nation to individualize itself. Such was the meaning of the Reformation which gave Germany its historical orientation. At the height of the Middle Ages, Eckhart overflows the tradition and follows his own path : his vitality anticipates Luther’s. He also suggests the direction German thought will take. But what assures him a unique position is that as the father of paradox in religious matters, he was the first to have given a tonality of intellectual drama to the relations between man and God. This tension was particularly appropriate to an age in which a whole people was in ferment and in search of itself.

There was something of the knight, the Ritter, in these mystics. Wearing a secret cuirass, invincible even in their passion for torturing themselves, they could moan with a swagger and possessed a contagious, incendiary madness. Suso yields nothing to the most extravagant anchorites, so skillful is he in varying his torments. The knightly spirit, turned toward the intemporal, perpetuates there the love of adventures. For mysticism is an adventure, a vertical adventure: it forays upward and seizes another form of space. Thereby it differs from those doctrines of the decadence, whose characteristic is not to well up from the spot, to come from elsewhere, like those transplanted from the Orient to Rome. Hence they answered only to the thirst for stagnation of a civilization incapable of creating a new religion or of cleaving still to the glamors of mythology. The same is true of today’s mystics, with their imported absolute, for the use of the weak and the disappointed.

Piety, that insolent sigh of the creature, is inseparable from energy and from vigor. Port-Royal, for all its idyllic appearance, was the expression of an exultant spirituality. There France knew her last moment of interiority. Subsequently she could lay claim to excess and power only in the lay world: she made the Revolution; after the advent of a sugared Catholicism, it was all she could undertake. Having lost the temptation of heresy, she became sterile in religious inspiration.

Refractory by vocation, rampant in their prayers, the mystics play with heaven, trembling the while. The Church has degraded them to the rank of supernatural mendicants so that, wretchedly civilized, they might serve as “models.” Yet we know that both in their lives and in their writings they were phenomena of nature and that no worse disaster could happen to them than to fall into the hands of the priests. Our duty is to wrest them away: only at this price could Christianity still admit even a hint of duration.

When I call them “phenomena of nature,” I am not claiming that their “health” was foolproof. We know that they were sick. But disease acted upon them like a goad, like a factor of excess. By sickness, they aimed at another genre of vitality than ours. Peter of Alcantara managed to sleep no more than one hour a night: was this not a sign of strength? And they were all strong, for they destroyed their bodies only in order to derive a further power from them. We think of them as gentle; no beings were tougher. What is it they propose? The virtues of disequilibrium. Avid for every kind of wound, hypnotized by the unwonted, they have undertaken the conquest of the only fiction worth the trouble; God owes them everything: his glory, his mystery, his eternity. They lend existence to the inconceivable, violate Nothing in order to animate it: how could gentleness accomplish such an exploit?

Contrary to that abstract, false void of the philosophers, the mystics’ nothingness glistens with plenitude: delight out of this world, discharge of duration, a luminous annihilation beyond the limits of thought. To deify oneself, to destroy in order to regain oneself, to engulf oneself in one’s own lucidity demands more resource and temerity than all the rest of our actions. Ecstasy—the limit-condition of sensation, fulfillment by the wreck of consciousness—is available only to those who, venturing outside themselves, substitute for the commonplace illusion which grounded their life another and supreme illusion in which everything is resolved, in which everything is transcended. Here the mind is suspended, reflection abolished and, with it, the logic of disarray. If we could, after the example of the mystics, pass beyond the evidence, beyond the impasse which proceeds from it, if we could become that dazzled, divine errantry, if we could, like them, reascend to the true nothingness! With what skill they plagiarize God, pillage Him, strip Him of His attributes with which they arm themselves in order to … remake Him! Nothing can resist the effervescence of their madness, that expansion of their soul forever threatening to fabricate another heaven, another earth. Everything they touch takes on the color of being. Having understood the disadvantage of seeing and of leaving things as they are, they have forced themselves to denature them. An optical defect on which they lavish all their care. No trace of reality, they know, subsists after the passage, after the devastations of clairvoyance. Nothing is, that is their point of departure, that is the evidence which they have managed to conquer, to reject, in order to reach the affirmation: everything is. Until we have followed the path which has led them to so surprising a conclusion, we shall never be on an equal footing with them.

*

Even in the Middle Ages, certain minds, tired of sifting the same themes, the same expressions, were obliged, in order to renew their piety and to emancipate it from the official terminology, to fall back on paradox, on the alluring, sometimes brutal, sometimes subtle formula. Hence Meister Eckhart. However rigorous, and however preoccupied with coherence, he was too much a writer not to seem suspect to Theology: his style, rather than his ideas, gained him the honor of being convicted of heresy. When we consider, in his treatises and sermons, the propositions condemned, we are amazed at the concern they betray for the niceties of expression; they reveal the inspired aspect of his faith. Like every heretic, he sinned on the side of form. An enemy of language, all orthodoxy; whether religious or political, postulates the usual expression. If almost all the mystics had their contentions with the Church, it is because they had too much talent; the Church demands none, and insists only on obedience, submission to its style. In the name of a sclerotic Word, the stakes, the pyres were erected. In order to escape them, the heretic had no other recourse than to change his formulas, to express his opinions in other terms, in terms that were consecrated. The Inquisition might nevei have existed if Catholicism had shown more indulgence and comprehension of the life of language, its departures, its variety, and its invention. When paradox is banned, one avoids martyrdom only by silence or banality.

Other reasons combine to make the mystic a heretic. If he is reluctant to let an external authority regulate his relations with God, he is no readier to admit meddling from on high: it is all he can do to tolerate Jesus. Anything but accommodating, he must nonetheless submit to certain compromises, mumble the recommended, the prescribed prayers, lacking the power to improvise ever-fresh ones. Let us forgive him this weakness. Perhaps he stoops to it only to prove that he is capable of lowering himself to the level of the vulgar and of employing their language; perhaps, too, to prove that he is not ignorant of the temptation of humility. But we know that he does not yield to it often, that he loves to innovate when he prays, that he invents on his knees, and that this is his way of breaking with the God of the common.

The mystic reanimates and rehabilitates faith, threatens and undermines it as an intimate, providential enemy. Without him, it would wither. We can guess now the reason why Christianity is dying and why the Church, deprived of both apologists and detractors, no longer thrives on praise or persecution. Fresh out of heretics, she would gladly stop demanding obedience if, in return, she discerned among her own a single fanatic who, deigning to attack her, to take her seriously, might give her some hope, some reason for alarm. To shelter so many idols and to glimpse not one iconoclast on the horizon! The faithful no longer vie with each other, nor the unbelievers, moreover: no one tries to come in first in the race for salvation or damnation …

A considerable occurrence: the two greatest modern poets, Shakespeare and Hölderlin, have bypassed Christianity. If they had yielded to its seduction, they would have made their own mythology out of it, and the Church would have had the luck of counting in her ranks two more heresiarchs. Without deigning to attack the Cross, still less to pull it up to their own level, one passed beyond it to the gods, the other resuscitated those of Greece. The first rose above prayer, the second invoked a heaven which he knew to be impotent, which he loved defunct: one is the precursor of our indifference, the other of our regrets.

*

The solitary, in his own way a combatant, feels the need to populate his solitude with enemies, whether real or imaginary. If he believes, he fills it with demons, as to whose reality he allows himself no. illusion. Without them, he would fall into insipidity: his spiritual life would suffer. It was appropriately that Jakob Boehme called the Devil “Nature’s cook,” whose art lends a. savor to everything. God himself, positing from the first the necessity of the adversary, acknowledged that He could not do without a struggle, attacking and being attacked.

As the mystic, in most cases, invents his adversaries, it follows that his thought asserts the existence of others by calculation, by artifice: it is a strategy of no consequence. His thought boils down, in the last instance, to a polemic with himself: he seeks to be, he becomes a crowd, even if it is only by making himself one new mask after the other, multiplying his” faces : in which he resembles his Creator, whose histrionics he perpetuates.

*

The mystical phenomenon lacks continuity: it flourishes, achieves its apogee, then degenerates and ends in a caricature. Such was the case of the religious flowering in Spain, in the Low Countries or in Germany. If, in the arts, the epigone manages to inspire respect, nothing is more pathetic, on the other hand, than a second-class mystic, parasite of the sublime, plagiarist of ecstasies. One can play at poetry, one can even give the illusion of originality: it suffices to have penetrated the secrets of the trade. These secrets count for nothing in the eyes of the mystic, whose art is only a means. Since he does not aspire to please men and seeks to be read elsewhere, he addresses himself to a rather limited public, a rather difficult audience which demands of him much more than talent or genius. What does he work for? To find what escapes or survives the disintegration of his experiences: the residue of intemporality under the ego’s vibrations. He erodes his senses in contact with the indestructible, contrary to the poet who exhausts his in contact with the provisional; one wrecks himself almost carnally in the Supreme (mysticism: the physiology of essences), the other revels on the surface of himself. Two sensualists, at different levels. Having once tasted appearances, the poet cannot forget their savor; it is the mystic who, unable to rise to the voluptuous pleasure of silence, restricts himself to that of the word. A chatterbox of quality, a suberior soliloquist.

*

When we read the Revelations of Margaret Ebner, when we follow her through her crises into her adorable hell, we are filled with … jealousy. For days at a time she could not unclench her teeth; when finally she opened her mouth, it was to utter cries which exalted and terrorized the convent. And what can we say about Angela of Foligno? Let us listen to her instead: “I contemplate, in the abyss into hieh I see I have fallen, the glut of my iniquities, I seek, to no avail, how to discover and manifest them to the world, I would walk naked through cities and squares, meat and fishes hung from my neck and crying out: here is the vile creature!”

Sanguine temperaments, delighting in the extremity of degradation and of purity, in the delirum of the depths and of the heights, the saints do not accommodate themselves to our rationalizations, nor to our cowardices. To see them as meditative souls is to deceive oneself altogether. Too unbridled, too fierce to be able to stop at meditation (which supposes self-control and hence a mediocrity of the blood), if they aspire to descend to the foundations of things, the steps that lead them there are not precisely “reflective.” Without prudence, without the least trace of stoicism in their gestures and their words, they believe everything is permitted to them, they parade their indiscretion through the hearts they trouble because they abominate peace and cannot endure a soul that has arrived. Indeed they would damn rather than accept themselves. Listen to Angela of Foligno once again: “Should all the sages of the world and all the saints of Paradise shower me with their consolations and their promises, and God Himself with His gifts, if He did not change me from such as I am, if He did not begin a new work in the depths of my soul instead of giving me ease, then the sages, the saints and God would exasperate beyond all expression my despair, my rage, my melancholy and my blindness.” Must we not, in the face of such declarations and such demands, liquidate our last vestiges of good sense and fling ourselves, like barbarians, toward the “darkness of the light”? Yet how can we bring ourselves to do it, fastened as we are to the infirmities of modesty? Our blood is too tepid, our appetites too well trained. No chance of getting beyond ourselves. Even our madness is too measured. To knock down the partitions of the mind, to shake it up, to seek its ruin—wellspring of the new! As it is, the mind is refractory to the invisible and perceives only what it already knows. To open itself to the true learning, it must be dislocated, must exceed its bounds, must pass through orgies of annihilation. Ignorance would not be our fate if we dared hoist ourselves above our certitudes and above that timidity which, keeping us from working miracles, bogs us down in ourselves. O for the pride of the saints!

If they keep their vigils and pray, it is to tap the secret of God’s power. Perfidious supplications, the prayers of these rebels around whom the Demon prowls by choice. Cunning, they tap his secret, too, and force him to work for them. The wicked principle which inhabits them they know how to use—in order to ascend. Those among them who break down do so with a certain complacency: they collapse not as victims but as colleagues of the Devil. Saved or lost, all bear a mark of non-humanity, all scorn to assign a limit to their undertakings. If they renounce, their renunciation is complete. But instead of being diminished and weakened thereby, they find themselves more powerful than the rest of us, who preserve what they have abandoned. These giants with their shattered bodies and souls—terrify us. Contemplating them, we are ashamed of being men and nothing more. And if, in their turn, they contemplate us, we decipher the words with which our mediocrity inspires their mercy: “Poor creatures who lack the courage to become unique, to become monsters.” Decidedly, the Devil labors for them and is no stranger to their aureole. What a humiliation for the rest of us, to have come to terms with him for nothing!

*

A destructor in the service of life, a demon oriented to good, the saint is the grand master of the effort against the ego. To vanquish his tendencies as much as in terror of himself, he keeps on a regimen of goodness and, supposing himself to have brothers and duties toward them, imposes on himself the overwork of pity. He suffers, and loves to suffer, but at the end of his sufferings, he makes beings into his playthings, rushes into the future, reads the thoughts of others, heals the incurable, infringes the laws of nature with impunity. It is to acquire this freedom and this power that he has prayed and resisted temptations. Pleasure, as he is aware, relaxes, softens: if he were to resort to it, he could no longer accede nor even aspire to the extraordinary, his strength and his faculties would diminish: no longer any energy in his desires nor any flexibility in his ambition. What he seeks are satisfactions of another order, and a kind of exemplary voluptuousness: that of equaling God. His horror of the senses is calculated, and anything but disinterested. He persecutes and rejects them, knowing he will rediscover them, transfigured, elsewhere.

The moment he aspires to substitute himself for the divinity, the saint agrees to pay the price: so great an end justifies any and every means. Convinced that eternity is the apanage of a dilapidated body, he will seek out all kinds of infirmities and conspire against his well-being, from whose ruin he will expect his salvation and his triumph. If he let himself follow his own nature, he would perish; but since he utilizes his mistreated vitality, he recovers. Too long contained, it explodes. And he becomes a fearful invalid who turns toward heaven in order to dislodge the usurper there. Such a favor, dispensed to those who, by suffering, have penetrated the secret of Creation, is met with only in periods when sanctity is identified with disgrace.

*

Every inspired state proceeds from a cultivated, willed inanition. Sanctity—uninterrupted inspiration—is an art of letting oneself die of hunger without … dying, a challenge hurled at one’s entrails, and a kind of demonstration of the incompatibility of ecstasy and digestion. A well-fed humanity produces skeptics, never saints. The absolute? A matter of diet. No “inner fire,” no “flame” without the virtually complete suppression of nourishment. Let us counter our appetites: our organs will burn, our substance catch fire. He who eats his fill is spiritually doomed.

Moved by savage impulses, the saints had managed to master them, hence to preserve them in secret. They were aware that charity derives its power from our physiological dramas, and that in order to attach themselves to beings they must declare war on the body, pervert it, martyr it, and subjugate it. Each of them evokes an aggressor who, suddenly converted to love, would subsequently employ himself in hating himself. And they knew how to hate themselves to the very end; but, since this self-hatred was exhausted, they were free, released from all shackles: the askesis had revealed to them the meaning, the usefulness of destruction, prelude to purity and deliverance. In their turn, they will reveal to us what pangs we must suffer if we, too, seek to be free.

At whatever level our life is lived, it will be truly our own only in proportion to our efforts to break its apparent forms. Ennui, despair, abulia itself will aid us here, on condition, of course, that we make our experience of them complete, that we live them through to the moment when, risking surrender, we rise up and transform them into auxiliaries of our vitality. What is more fruitful than the worst, for the man who knows how to desire it? For it is not suffering which liberates, but the desire to suffer.

*

How can we laugh at the hysteria of the Middle Ages? In your cell you sighed or shrieked: the others venerated you … Your troubles did not lead you to the psychiatrist. Lest you be cured of them, you exasperated them, while you concealed your health like a stigma, a vice. Disease was the general recourse, the great remedy. Nowadays, fallen into discredit, boycotted, it continues to reign, but no one loves k, no one seeks it out. Sick men, we are at a loss for what to do with our ills. More than one of our madnesses will remain forever unexploited.

There are other hysterias which are no less admirable, those which generate hymns to the Sun, to Being, to the Unknown. Dawn of Egypt, of Greece, frenzy of mythologies, accents in first contact with the elements! At their antipodes, we are unfit to thrill to the spectacle of origins: our interrogations, instead of leaping in rhythms, drag in the lees of concept or are disfigured beneath the sneer of our systems. Where is our hymnic sensibility, the intoxication of our beginnings, the dawn of our stupefactions? Let us fling ourselves at the Pythoness’ feet, returning to our old ecstasies: the philosophy of unique moments, the only philosophy …

*

Once we have ceased linking our secret life to God, we can ascend to ecstasies as effective as those of the mystics and conquer this world without recourse to the Beyond. And if, nonetheless, the obsession of another world were to pursue us, it would be permissible to construct, to project one for the occasion, if only to satisfy our thirst for the invisible. What matters are our sensations, their intensity and their virtues, as our capacity to fling ourselves into a madness that is not sacred. In the unknown, we can go as far as the saints, without making use of their means. It will be enough for us to constrain reason to a long silence. Handed over to ourselves, nothing will keep us from acceding to the delicious suspension of all our faculties. A man who has glimpsed these states knows that our movements there lose their habitual direction: we ascend to the abyss, we fall into heaven. Where are we? A question without object: we no longer take place …

The Temptation to Exist 

Cioran 

Thursday, October 1, 2026

The Second-Hand Thinker

 

The Second-Hand Thinker—Advantages of Debility—The Parasite of Poets—Tribulations of an Alien—Ennui of Conquerors—Music and Skepticism—The Automaton—On Melancholy—The Thirst for Power—Position of the Poor.

Ideas are substitutes for griefs.

—Marcel Proust

The Second-Hand Thinker

I live in expectation of the Idea; I foresee it, close in upon it, get a grip—and cannot formulate it, it escapes me, does not yet belong to me: might I have conceived it in my absence? And how, once imminent and vague, to make it present and luminous in the intelligible agony of expression? What conditions should I hope for if it is to bloom—and decay?

Anti-philosopher, I abhor every indifferent idea: I am not always despondent, hence I do not always think. When I consider ideas, they seem even more useless than things; hence I have loved only the elucubrations of the great invalids, the ruminations of insomnia, the flashes of an incurable fear, and the doubts intersected by sighs. The amount of chiaroscuro an idea harbors is the only index of its profundity, as the despairing accent of its playfulness is the index of its fascination. How many white nights does your nocturnal past conceal? That is how we ought to confront every thinker. The man who thinks when he wants to has nothing to tell us: above—or rather, alongside—his thoughts, he is not responsible for them, not committed to them, neither wins nor loses by risking himself in a struggle in which he himself is not his own enemy. It costs him nothing to believe in Truth. Which is not the case for a mind where true and false have ceased to be superstitions; destroyer of all criteria, such a mind verifies itself like invalids and poets; it thinks by accident: the glory of a discomfort or of a delirium suffices. Is not an indigestion richer in ideas than a parade of concepts? Malfunctions of our organs determine the fruitfulness of our minds: the man who does not feel his body will never be in a position to conceive a living thought; he will wait to no purpose for the advantageous surprise of some disadvantage. . . .

In affective indifference, ideas assume a profile; yet none can take shape: it is up to melancholy to afford a climate to their blossoming. They require a certain tonality, a certain color in order to vibrate, to shine. To be sterile a long time is to lie in wait for them, to yearn for them without being able to compromise them in a formula. The mind’s “seasons” are conditioned by an organic rhythm; it is not up to “me” to be naive or cynical: my truths are the sophisms of my enthusiasm or of my dejection. I exist, I feel, and I think according to the moment—and in spite of myself. Time constitutes me; in vain I oppose myself—and / am. My undesired present unfolds, unfolds me; unable to command it, I comment upon it; slave of my thoughts, I play with them, fatality’s buffoon. . . .

Advantages of Debility

The individual who fails to transcend his quality as a splendid example, a finished model, and whose existence is identified with his vital destiny, locates himself outside the mind. Ideal masculinity—obstacle to the perception of nuance—involves an insensitivity to the aspect of the everyday supernatural, from which art draws its substance. The more one is a nature, the less one is an artist. Homogeneous, undifferentiated, opaque vigor was idolized by the world of legends, by the fantasies of mythology. When the Greeks turned to speculation, the cult of the anemic ephebe replaced that of the giants; and the heroes themselves, sublime dolts in Homer’s time, became, thanks to tragedy, bearers of torments and doubts incompatible with their rough nature.

Internal wealth results from conflicts sustained within oneself; now, the vitality which is entirely self-possessed knows only external struggle, the attack upon the object. In the male weakened by a dose of femininity, two tendencies are at grips: by what is passive in himself he apprehends a whole world of relinquishment; by what is imperious, he converts his will into law. As long as his instincts remain unslaked, he concerns only the species; once a secret dissatisfaction creeps in, he becomes a conqueror. The mind justifies, explains, and excuses him, and classifying him among the superior simpletons, abandons him to History’s curiosity—the investigation of stupidity in action. . . .

The man whose existence does not constitute a disease both vigorous and vague can never establish himself among problems nor know their dangers. The condition favorable to the search for truth or for expression is to be found halfway between man and woman: the gaps in “virility” are the seat of the mind. . . . If the pure female, whom we can accuse of no sexual or psychic anomaly, is internally emptier than an animal, the intact male fits the definition of “cretin.” Consider any human being who has caught your attention or roused your fervor: something in his mechanism has been unhinged to his advantage. We rightly scorn those who have not made use of their defects, who have not exploited their deficiencies, and have not been enriched by their losses, as we despise any man who does not suffer at being a man or simply at being. Hence no graver insult can be inflicted than to call someone “happy,” no greater flattery than to grant him a “vein of melancholy". . . . This is because gaiety is linked to no important action and because, except for the mad, no one laughs when he is alone.

“Inner life” is the prerogative of the delicate, those tremulous wretches subject to an epilepsy with neither froth nor falling: the biologically sound being scorns “depth,” is incapable of it, sees in it a suspect dimension which jeopardizes the spontaneity of his actions. Nor is he mistaken: with the retreat into the self begins the individual’s drama—his glory and his decline; isolated from the anonymous flux, from the utilitarian trickle of life, he frees himself from objective goals. A civilization is “affected” when its delicate members set the tone for it; but thanks to them, it has definitively triumphed over nature—and collapses. An extreme example of refinement unites in himself the exalté and the sophist: he no longer adheres to his impulses, cultivates without crediting them; this is the omniscient debility of twilight ages, prefiguration of man’s eclipse. The delicate allow us to glimpse the moment when janitors will be tormented by aesthetes' scruples; when farmers, bent double by doubts, will no longer have the vigor to guide the plow; when every human being, gnawed by lucidity and drained of instincts, will be wiped out without the strength to regret the flourishing darkness of their illusions. . . .

The Parasite of Poets

I. There can be no issue in a poet’s life. It is from everything he has not undertaken, from all the moments fed on the inaccessible, that his power comes to him. If he finds existence a disadvantage, his expressive faculties are thereby reinforced, his inspiration dilated.

A biography is legitimate only if it focuses the elasticity of a fate, the sum of variables it contains. But the poet follows a line of fatality whose rigor nothing inflects. Life belongs to dolts; and it is in order to fill out the life they have not had that we have invented the lives of the poets. . . .

Poetry expresses the essence of what cannot be possessed; its ultimate meaning: the impossibility of all “actuality.” Joy is not a poetic sentiment (though it proceeds from a sector of the lyric universe in which chance unites, in one and the same bundle, flames and fatuities). Who has ever read a song of hope which failed to inspire a sensation of discomfort, even of disgust? And how sing a presence, when the possible itself is shadowed with vulgarity? Between poetry and hope, complete incompatibility: hence the poet is a prey to an ardent decomposition. Who would dare to wonder how he has experienced life when it is by death that he has been alive at all? When he succumbs to the temptation of happiness—he belongs to comedy. . . . But if, on the other hand, flames spring up from his wounds and he sings felicity—that voluptuous incandescence of woe—he rescues himself from the nuance of vulgarity inherent in any positive accent. Thus a Hölderlin withdrawing to a dream Greece and transfiguring love by purer intoxications, by those of unreality. . . .

The poet would be an odious deserter of reality if in his flight he failed to take his suffering alone. Unlike the mystic or the sage, he cannot escape himself, nor leave the stage of his own obsession: even his ecstasies are incurable, and harbingers of disasters. Unable to run away, for him everything is possible, except life. . . .

II. This is how I recognize an authentic poet: by frequenting him, living a long time in the intimacy of his work, something changes in myself: not so much my inclinations or my tastes as my very blood, as if a subtle disease had been injected to alter its course, its density and nature. Valéry and Stefan George leave us where we picked them up, or else make us more demanding on the formal level of the mind: they are geniuses we have no need of, they are merely artists. But a Shelley, but a Baudelaire, but a Rilke intervene in the deepest part of our organism which annexes them as it would a vice. In their vicinity, a body is fortified, then weakens and disintegrates. For the poet is an agent of destruction, a virus, a disguised disease, and the gravest danger, though a wonderfully vague one, for our red corpuscles. To live around him is to feel your blood run thin, to dream a paradise of anemia, and to hear, in your veins, the rustle of tears. . . .

III. Whereas verse permits everything—you can pour into it tears, shames, ecstasies, complaints above all—prose forbids you to give vent, to lament: its conventional abstraction is opposed to overflowing. Prose requires other truths: verifiable, deduced, measured. But what if you were to steal those of poetry, if you pillaged its substance and dared as much as the poets? Why not insinuate into discourse their indecencies, their humiliations, their grimaces, and their sighs? Why not be decomposed, rotten, corpse, angel, or Satan in the language of the vulgar, and pathetically betray so many aerial and sinister moods? Much more than in the school of the philosophers, it is in the academy of poets that we learn the courage of intelligence and the audacity to be ourselves. Their “affirmations” outdo the most strangely impertinent sayings of the ancient sophists. No one adopts them: has there ever been a single thinker who went as far as Baudelaire or who steeled himself to systematize a Lear’s howl, Hamlet’s soliloquy? Nietzsche perhaps before his end, but unfortunately he kept harping on his prophet’s string. . . . And if we looked among the saints? Certain frenzies of Teresa of Avila or Angela of Foligno. . . . But here we meet God too frequently—God, that consoling blank who, reinforcing their courage, diminishes its quality. To advance without convictions and alone among the truths is not given to a man, nor even to a saint; sometimes, though, to a poet. . . .

I can imagine a thinker exclaiming in an impulse of pride: “I’d like a poet to make his fate out of my thoughts!” But for such an aspiration to be legitimate, he himself would have to have frequented the poets a long time, he would have to have borrowed from them the joys of malediction, and given back, abstract and completed, the image of their own defections or their own deliriums; above all he would have to have succumbed on the threshold of song and, a living anthem this side of inspiration, to have known the regret of not being a poet, of not being initiated into the “science of tears,” the scourges of the heart, the formal orgies, the immortalities of the moment. . . .

Many times I have dreamed of a melancholy and erudite monster, versed in all idioms, familiar with numbers and souls alike, who would wander the world feeding on poisons, fervors, ecstasies, crossing Persias, Chinas, defunct Indies, and dying Europes—many times I have dreamed of a friend of the poets who would have known them all out of his despair at not being one of them.

Tribulations of an Alien

Offspring of some wretched tribe, he prowls the boulevards of the West. Cherishing one country after the next, he no longer hopes for any; stuck in a timeless twilight citizen of the world—and of no world—he is ineffectual, nameless, powerless. . . . Peoples without a destiny cannot give one to their sons who, thirsting for other horizons, attach themselves to a fate and ultimately exhaust it to finish their days as ghosts of their admirations and their exhaustions. Having nothing to love at home, they locate their love elsewhere, in other lands, where their fervor astonishes the natives. Overworked, the feelings erode and disintegrate, admiration first of all. . . . And the Alien who dispersed himself on so many highways of the world, exclaims: “I have set up countless idols for myself, have raised too many altars everywhere, and I have knelt before a host of gods. Now, weary of worship, I have squandered my share of delirium. One has resources only for the absolutes of one’s breed; a soul—like a country—flourishes only within its frontiers. I am paying for having crossed them, for having made the Indefinite into a fatherland, and foreign divinities into a cult, for having prostrated myself before ages which excluded my ancestors. Where I come from I can no longer say: in the temples I am without belief; in the cities, without ardor; among my kind, without curiosity; on the earth, without certitudes. Give me a specific desire and I could shake the world to its foundations. Release me from this shame of actions which makes me perform, every morning, the farce of resurrection and, every night, that of entombment; in the interval, nothing but this torment in the shroud of ennui. .. . I dream of wanting—and all I want seems to me worthless. Like a vandal corroded by melancholy, I proceed without a goal, self without a self, toward some unknown corner . . . in order to discover an abandoned god, a god who is his own atheist, and to fall asleep in the shadow of his last doubts and his last miracles.”

Ennui of Conquerors

Paris weighed on Napoleon, by his own admission, like a “leaden garment": for which ten million men were to die. This is the balance sheet of the mal du siède when a René on horseback becomes its agent. Born of the idleness of the eighteenth-century salons, this disease, in the indolence of an over-lucid aristocracy, extended its ravages deep into the countryside: peasants were to pay with their blood for a mode of sensibility alien to their nature and, with them, a whole continent. The exceptional natures in which Ennui insinuated itself, horrified by any one place and obsessed by a perpetual elsewhere, exploited the enthusiasm of the nations only to multiply their graveyards. This condottière who wept over Werther and Ossian, this Obermann who projected his void into space and who, according to Josephine, was capable of no more than a few moments of abandon, had as his unavowed mission to depopulate the earth. The dreaming conqueror is the greatest calamity for men; they are no less eager to idolize him, fascinated as they are by distorted projects, ruinous ideals, unhealthy ambitions. No reasonable being was ever the object of worship, left a name, or marked a single event with his individual stamp. Imperturbable before a precise conception or a transparent idol, the mob is roused by the unverifiable, by false mysteries. Who ever died in the name of rigor? Each generation raises monuments to the executioners of the one which preceded it. It is nonetheless true that the victims were willing enough to be immolated once they believed in glory, in that victory of one man alone, that defeat of all. . . .

Humanity adores only those who cause it to perish. Reigns in which citizens died in their sleep do not figure in history, nor the wise prince, inveterately scorned by his subjects; the crowd loves the fictive, even at its expense, the scandal of behavior constituting the web of human curiosity and the underground current of every event. The unfaithful woman and the cuckold provide comedy and tragedy, even the epic, the quasi-totality of their motifs. Since virtue has neither biography nor charm, from the Iliad to vaudeville, only the luster of dishonor has entertained and intrigued. Hence it is quite natural that humanity should have offered itself up to the conquerors, that it should seek to be trampled underfoot, that a nation without tyrants should never be talked about, that the sum of iniquities a people commits should be the sole index of its presence and of its vitality. A nation which no longer rapes is in its decadence; the number of rapes reveals its instincts, and its future. Find out in which war it has stopped practicing, on a large scale, this variety of crime: you will have found the first symbol of its decline; find out at what moment love has become for a nation a ceremonial, and the bed a condition of orgasm, and you will identify the beginning of its deficiencies and the end of its barbaric inheritance.

Universal history: history of Evil. Take away the disasters from human evolution and you might as well conceive of nature without seasons. If you have not contributed to a catastrophe, you will vanish without a trace. We interest others by the misfortune we spread around us. “I never made anyone suffer!"—an exclamation forever alien to a creature of flesh and blood. When we feel enthusiasm for a character of the past, or the present, we unconsciously ask ourselves: “For how many people was he the cause of disaster?” Who knows if each of us doesn’t aspire to the privilege of killing all his kind? But this privilege is assigned to very few, and never integrally: this restriction alone explains why the earth is still inhabited. Indirect murderers, we constitute an inert mass, a multitude of objects confronting Time’s true subjects, the great criminals who came to something.

But we can take comfort: our descendants, remote or immediate, will avenge us. For it is not difficult to imagine the moment when men will cut each other’s throats out of disgust with themselves, when Ennui will get the best of their prejudices and their diffidences, when they will run out into the street to slake their thirst for blood, and when the destructive dream prolonged for so many generations will become the universal reality. . . .

Music and Skepticism

I have searched for Doubt in all the arts, have found it there only disguised, furtive, breaking out during the entr'actes of inspiration, rising from slackened impulse; but I have given up searching for it—even in this form—in music; it cannot bloom there: ignorant of irony, music proceeds not from the pranks of the intellect but from the tender or vehement nuances of Naïvete, stupidity of the sublime, heedlessness of the infinite. . . . Wit having no equivalent in sound, we denigrate a musician by calling him intelligent. This attribute diminishes him and is not suitable in that languorous cosmogony where, like a blind god, he improvises one universe after another. If he were conscious of his gift, of his genius, he would succumb to pride; but he is not responsible for it; born in the oracle, he cannot understand himself. Let the sterile interpret him: he is not a critic, as God is not a theologian.

Limit-case of unreality and the absolute, infinitely real fiction, a lie more authentic than the world, music loses its prestige as soon as, dry or morose, we dissociate ourselves from the Creation, and Bach himself seems no more than insipid rumors; this is the extreme point of our non-participation in things, of our coldness and our collapse. To jeer amid the sublime—sardonic victory of the subjective principle, and one which makes us members of the Devil’s brood! Lost is the man who has no more tears for music, who Eves now only by the memory of those he has shed: sterile lucidity will have vanquished ecstasy—which once created worlds. . . .

The Automaton

I breathe out of prejudice. And I contemplate the spasm of ideas, while the Void smiles at itself. . . . No more sweat in space, no more life; the least vulgarity will make it reappear: a second’s waiting will suffice.

When we perceive ourselves existing we have the sensation of a stupefied madman who surprises his own lunacy and vainly seeks to give it a name. Habituación blunts our amazement at being: we are—and move on, we go back to our place in the asylum of the existing.

A conformist, I live, I try to live, by imitation, by respect for the rules of the game, by horror of originality. An automaton’s resignation: to affect a pretense of fervor and secretly to laugh at it; to bow to conventions only to repudiate them on the sly; to be numbered in every ledger but to have no residence in time; to save face whereas it would be only duty to lose it. . . .

The man who scorns everything must assume an air of perfect dignity, deceive the others and even himself: thereby he will the more easily accomplish his task of counterfeit living. What use displaying your failure when you can feign prosperity? Hell lacks manners: it is the exasperated image of a frank and uncouth man, it is the earth conceived without one superstition of elegance and civility.

I accept life out of politeness: perpetual rebellion is in bad taste, as is the sublimity of suicide. At twenty we rage against the heavens and the filth they hide; then we grow tired of it. The tragic attitude suits only an extended and ridiculous puberty; but it takes a thousand ordeals to achieve the histrionics of detachment.

The man who, liberated from all the principles of custom, lacks any gift as an actor is the archetype of wretchedness, the ideally unhappy being. No use constructing this model of ingenuousness: life is tolerable only by the degree of mystification we endow it with. Such a model would be the immediate rain of society, the “pleasure” of communal life residing in the impossibility of giving free rein to the infinity of our ulterior motives. It is because we are all impostors that we endure each other. The man who does not consent to lie will see the earth shrink under his feet: we are biologically obliged to the false. No moral hero who is not childish, ineffectual, or inauthentic; for true authenticity is the flaw in fraud, in the proprieties of public flattery and secret defamation. If our fellow men could be aware of our opinions about them, love, friendship, and devotion would be forever erased from the dictionaries; and if we had the courage to confront the doubts we timidly conceive about ourselves, none of us would utter an “I” without shame. Masquerade rules all the living, from the troglodyte to the skeptic. Since only the respect for appearances separates us from carrion, it is death to consider the basis of things, of beings; let us abide by a more agreeable nothingness: our constitution tolerates only a certain dosage of truth. . . .

Let us keep deep down inside a certitude superior to all the others: life has no meaning, it cannot have any such thing. We should kill ourselves on the spot if an unlooked for revelation persuaded us of the contrary. The air gone, we should still breathe; but we should immediately smother if the joy of inanity were taken from us. . . .

On Melancholy

When we cannot be delivered from ourselves, we delight in devouring ourselves. In vain we call upon the Lord of Shades, the bestower of a precise curse: we are invalids without disease, and reprobates without vices. Melancholy is the dream state of egoism: no longer any object outside oneself, no reason for hate or love, but that same fall into a languid mud, that same circling of the damned without a hell, those same reiterations of a zeal to perish. . . . Whereas sadness is content with a circumstantial context, melancholy requires a debauch of space, an infinite landscape in order to spread out its sullen and vaporous grace, its shapeless evil, which, fearing to recover, dreads any limit to its dissolution and its undulation. It expands—strangest flower of self-love—among the poisons from which it extracts its vital juices and the vigor of all its failures. Feeding on what corrupts it, melancholy hides, under its melodious name, Self-Commiseration and the Pride of Defeat. .

The Thirst for Power

A Caesar is closer to a village mayor than to a mind sovereignly lucid but lacking the instinct of domination. The important fact is to command: almost all men aspire to this. Whether you have in your hands an empire, a tribe, a family, or a servant, you deploy your talent as a tyrant, glorious or absurd: a whole world or a single person obeys your orders. Thus is established the series of calamities which rise from the need, the thirst to excel . . . We jostle none but satraps: each of us—according to his means—seeks out a host of slaves or is content with just one. No one is self-sufficient: the most modest of men will always find a friend or a companion to authenticate his dream of authority. The man who obeys will be obeyed in his turn: the victim will become the executioner; this is the supreme desire—universally. Only beggars and sages do not experience it; unless theirs is an even subtler game. . .

The thirst for power permits History to renew itself and yet to remain basically the same; religions try to oppose this appetite, but manage only to exasperate it. Christianity would have found an issue whether the earth was a desert or a paradise. Under the variable forms man can assume is concealed one constant, an identical basis which explains why, against all the appearances of change, we move in a circle—and why, if we lost, following some supernatural intervention, our quality as monsters and clowns, history would immediately vanish.

Try to be free: you will die of hunger. Society tolerates you only if you are successively servile and despotic; it is a prison without guards—but from which you do not escape without dying. Where to go, when you can live only in the city and you lack the instincts for doing so, and when you are not enterprising enough to beg your bread, nor balanced enough to give yourself up to wisdom? In the end, you stay there like everyone else, pretending to busy yourself; you convince yourself of this extremity by the resources of artifice, since it is less absurd to simulate life than to live it.

As long as men have the passion of the city, a disguised cannibalism will rule there. The political instinct is the direct consequence of Sin, the immediate materialization of the Fall. Each man should be assigned to his solitude, but each man keeps an eye on that of everyone else. Angels and bandits have their leaders; how could the intermediary creatures—the very texture of humanity—lack theirs? Take away their desire to be slaves or tyrants and you demolish the city in the wink of an eye. The monkey-pact is sealed forever; and history follows its course, the horde gasping between crimes and dreams. Nothing can arrest it: even those who execrate it participate in its progress. . . .

Position of the Poor

Owners and beggars: two categories which oppose any change, any renewing disorder. Placed at the two extremities of the social ladder, they fear any modification in good and evil: they are equally settled the former in opulence, the latter in destitution. Between diem are located—anonymous sweat, the basis of society—those who strive, labor, persevere, and cultivate the absurdity of hope. The State feeds on their anemia; the notion of citizen would have neither content nor reality without them, any more than luxury and alms: the rich man and the beggar are parasites of the poor, the Pauper’s dependents.

If misery has a thousand remedies, poverty has none. How succor those who persist in not dying of hunger? God himself could not correct their lot. Between fortune’s darlings and the tatterdemalion circulate these honorable starvelings, exploited by splendor and by rags, pillaged by those who, loathing labor, settle, according to their luck or their vocation, in the salon or the gutter. And so humanity advances: with a few rich men, with a few beggars—and with all its poor. . . .

E. M. CIORAN

A Short History of Decay