To forestall any possible misunderstanding, I must state emphatically at the outset that I neither accuse nor even suspect anyone mentioned by name in this book of deliberately concocting a stunt, disseminating falsehoods knowingly, or of being prompted by a desire for dishonest gain or an advancement obtained through corruption. A renowned author would have to have a most extraordinary character (indeed, he would have to be in a way superhuman) to be able to write prolifically in the full knowledge that his works are worthless and that he is a charlatan whose fame is entirely undeserved and based solely on the stupidity and gullibility of his admirers. Even if he had some doubts about the correctness of his approach at some stage of his career, success and adulation would soon persuade him of his own genius and the epoch-making value of his concoctions. When, in consequence of acquiring a controlling position in the distribution of funds, appointments and promotions, he becomes surrounded by sycophants courting his favours, he is most unlikely to see through their motivation; and, like wealthy and powerful people in other walks of life, will tend to take flattery at its face value, accepting it as a sincere appreciation (and therefore confirmation). Rather than among noted writers, cynical charlatans can be found among manipulators who write little or nothing, and whose egos are consequently not invested in any particular notion or approach, and who do not care, therefore, which gimmick they use to milk fund-dispensing bodies. Although I know one or two individuals of this kind, none of them is mentioned by name - which would not only entail unprovable imputations of motive, but also be beside the point, as my task here is to combat wrong ideas . . . not to compile a list of shady academics. Even individuals of this type, moreover, find hard-boiled cynicism difficult to sustain and normally end by persuading themselves of the value of whatever they are doing, because nobody likes to admit to himself that he is making a living by unworthy means. In any case, the most deadly agents of cultural infections are not the brazen cynics, but the sectarians prone to self-delusion and the timorous organization men anxious not to miss the band-waggon, who unquestioningly equate popularity and worldly success with intrinsic merit. As the present book deals with the phenomena which must be judged as undesirable from the standpoint of intellectual progress, the references to the literature are as a rule derogatory. This does not mean that I believe that nothing of value has been produced; but one cannot write about everything at once, and this is a tract rather than a treatise. Numerous positive contributions to knowledge are cited in my previous publications, and many more will be mentioned in other books which are in preparation, particularly if I live long enough to write a general treatise. I argue on the pages which follow that much of what passes as scientific study of human behaviour boils down to an equivalent of sorcery, but fortunately there are other things as well.
Why Foul One's Nest?
To judge by quantity, the social sciences are going through a period of unprecedented progress: with congresses and conferences mushrooming, printed matter piling up, and the number of professionals increasing at such a rate that, unless arrested, it would overtake the population of the globe within a few hundred years. Most of the practitioners wax enthusiastic about this proliferation, and add to the flood by writing exultant surveys of their crafts 'to-day', readily affixing the label of 'revolution' to all kinds of most insignificant steps forward . . . or even backwards; and sometimes even claiming to have crossed the threshold separating their fields from the exact sciences. What is particularly dismaying is that not only does the flood of publications reveal an abundance of pompous bluff and a paucity of new ideas, but even the old and valuable insights which we have inherited from our illustrious ancestors are being drowned in a torrent of meaningless verbiage and useless technicalities. Pretentious and nebulous verbosity, interminable repetition of platitudes and disguised propaganda are the order of the day, while at least 95% of research is indeed re-search for things that have been found long ago and many times since. In comparison with half a century ago, the average quality of the publications (apart from those which deal with techniques rather than the substance) has declined in a number of fields. Such a far-reaching verdict naturally calls for evidence, and much of the present book is devoted to supplying it. But perhaps even more interesting than to prove is to explain; and this is the second task of this book, the third being to offer a few hints on how this sorry state can be, if not remedied, at least alleviated.
I shall, among other things, try to show how the bent towards sterility and deception in the study of human affairs stems from widespread cultural, political and economic trends of our time so that the present work can be put under the vague heading of sociology of knowledge, although 'sociology of non-knowledge more correctly describes the bulk of its contents. As such an attempt ineluctably leads to the question of vested interests, and entails imputation of unworthy motives I hasten to say that I know very well that logically an argumentum ad hominem proves nothing. Nevertheless, in matters where uncertainty prevails and information is mostly accepted on trust one is justified in trying to rouse the reading public to a more critical watchfulness by showing that in the study of human affairs evasion and deception are as a rule much more profitable than telling the truth. To repeat what has been said in the foreword, I do not think that the argumentum ad hominem in terms of vested interests applies to the motives of the inventors of fads, who are much more likely to be doctrinaires and visionaries so wrapped up in the cocoon of their imagination that they cannot see the world as it is. After all, in every society with widespread literacy there are people writing all conceivable kinds of nonsense. Many of them never get as far as the printer, and among those who pass this hurdle, many remain unread, neglected, or quickly forgotten, while others are boosted, acclaimed and idolized. It is at the level of the process of social selection, which governs the dissemination of ideas, that the question of their subservience to vested interests is more germane. The general problem of the relationship between ideas and interests is one of the most difficult and fundamental. Marx based all his political analyses on the assumption that social classes uphold ideologies which serve their interests, a theory which seemed to be contradicted by the fact that no believer will admit that he has chosen his tenets for their value as instruments in the struggle for wealth and power. Freud's concept of the unconscious, however, implies what knight be described as the unconscious cunning - the idea which has been developed in a form especially applicable to politics by Alfred Adler. If such mechanisms of the mind can produce unconscious subterfuges and strategies in individuals' behaviour there is no reason why they should not operate on a mass level. But by what kind of evidence can we back imputations of this kind? What makes the problem even more difficult is Pareto's convincing point that the ruling classes often espouse doctrines which usher them along the road to a collective demise. The mechanisms of selection (emphasized by Spencer), which weed out 'unfit' patterns of organization, normally insure that only those social aggregates endure which cherish beliefs which bolster up their structure and mode of existence. But, since disintegration and destruction of collectivities of all kinds and
and sizes are just as. conspicuous as their continuing survival, Pareto's view (or model, if you like) is as applicable as Marx's. A satisfactory theory will have to synthesize these valid partial insights and transcend them, but this is not the place for such an attempt. In the present essay I cannot go beyond imputations, resting upon circumstantial evidence of congruence between systems of ideas and collective interests, of roughly the same degree of plausibility (or vulnerability) as the usual marxist assertions about the connections between the contents of an ideology and the class interests. The chief intellectual shortcoming of the marxists on this score is, firstly that they restrict unduly the applicability of their master's key concept only to groupings (i.e., social classes) which he himself has singled out; and secondly that (naturally enough) they will not apply this scheme of interpretation to themselves and their own beliefs. Every craft, every occupation - no matter whether shady or even downright criminal - gravitates towards the principle that 'dog does not eat dog'. The ancient and exclusive professions - such as law and medicine - emphasize this rule to the point of endowing it with the halo of a fundamental canon of ethics. The teachers, too, ostracize those who openly criticize their colleagues and undermine their standing in the eyes of the pupils. As with all other human arrangements, this custom has good and bad sides. Without something of this kind, it would be difficult to maintain the friendly relations required for fruitful co-operation, be it in a workshop, an operating theatre or a boardroom. By consistent tripping one another up and in mutual recriminations people can not only make their lives a misery but alio condemn their work to failure. Since a patient peace of mind and the chances of recovery depend to a considerable extent on his faith in the physician - which in turn depends on the latter's personal reputation as well as on the status of the profession - the effectiveness of medical care would be gravely impaired if practitioners fell into the habit of denigrating one another. Likewise the teachers who undermine each other's standing in the eyes of the pupils will end by being unable to teach at all; given that the adolescents are normally prone to disorder and the number of those with a spontaneous desire to learn always remains small. On the other side of the balance, however, there can be little doubt that the appeal of the 'dog does not eat dog' principle derives its strength less from an altruistic concern for fruitfulness of the work - except in so far as this makes life easier - than from the quest for collective advantage, be it pecuniary or honorific. By strictly enforcing occupational solidarity, the medical profession has not only attained affluence which in most countries is grossly out of proportion to its relative level of skill - not to speak of the extremely advantageous immunity from punishment for incompetence and negligence - but has also been able to procure for its members a substantial psychic income by putting them in a position where they can play God, regardless of frequent shortcomings of knowledge and intelligence. True, members of the medical profession enjoy an especially favourable position because they handle people at their weakest: when they are afraid and in need of a solace; reduced to the condition of patients - a very revealing word which goes far to explain why in so many public hospitals (at least in Britain) the front entrance is reserved for suppliers of the services, while the customers have to sneak in through the back door. The lawyers too manage to boost up their prestige and income by couching documents in needlessly abstruse language, designed to impede a layman's understanding, and to compel him to resort to costly legal advice. Among the suppliers of services of immediate utility to the consumers, the custom of refraining from mutual criticism merely serves as a shield against responsibility for negligence and a prop for monopolistic gains; but when it comes to an occupation which justifies its existence by claiming that it is dedicated to the pursuit of general truths, an adherence to the 'dog does not eat dog' principle usually amounts to a collusion in parasitism and fraud. Businessmen who do not feel squeamish about admitting that their main goal is to make money, and whose occupational ethics consist of few moral prohibitions have less use for dissimulation than those who earn their living in an occupation ostensibly devoted to the furtherance of higher ideals; and the higher these are, the harder it is to live up to them, and the greater the temptation of (and the scope for) hypocrisy. Honesty is the best policy for the purveyor when the customer knows what he wants, is able to judge the quality of what he gets, and pays out of his own pocket. Most people can judge the quality of shoes or scissors, and hence nobody has made a fortune by producing shoes which immediately fall apart or scissors which do not cut. In building houses, on the other hand, the defects of the work or the materials can remain concealed for much longer, and consequently shoddiness often brings profit in this line of business. The merits of a therapy, to take another example, cannot easily be assessed, and for this reason medical practice has been for centuries entangled with a charlatanry from which it is not entirely free even to-day. Nonetheless, no matter how difficult it may be to evaluate a physician's or a lawyer's services, they clearly minister to concrete needs. But what kind of services does a philosopher or a student of society render, and to whom? Who cares whether they are worth anything or not? Can those who care judge their merit? And, if so, do they decide on the rewards or bear the cost? Doubts about the worth of their services are seldom entertained by the practitioners; and if ever raised, are promptly warded off with invocations of professional standards with their presumptive power to ensure integrity and progress. Looking at this matter realistically, however, one can find few grounds for assuming that all the professions inherently gravitate towards honest service rather than monopolistic exploitation or parasitism. In reality it all depends on what kind of behaviour leads to wealth and status (or, to put it another way, on the link between true merit and reward. To analyse various types of work from this standpoint would provide a useful programme for the sociology of occupation, which might lift it above its present level of uninspired cataloguing. Seen from this angle, the social sciences appear an activity without any intrinsic mechanisms of retribution: where anybody can get away with anything. Criticising the prevailing trends and the top people may be profitable if done with the backing of a powerful pressure group – perhaps a fifth column subsidized from abroad. But unfortunately, the contours of truth never coincide with the frontiers between embattled parties and cliques. So, a free thinker can consider himself lucky if he lives in a setting where he merely gets cold-shouldered rather than imprisoned and called 'a pig who fouls his nest' - to use the felicitous expression which the Soviet police chief, Semichastny, applied to Boris Pasternak. Whether exhortation helps much may seriously be doubted, for despite centuries of inveighing against stealing and cheating, these misdemeanours do not appear to be less common nowadays than at the time of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to envisage how any standards whatsoever can continue to exist without some people taking upon themselves the task of affirming them and preaching against vice. As one could spend a whole life and fill an encyclopaedia trying to expose all the foolish antics which pass for a scientific study of human conduct, I have limited myself to a few influential examples. In any case, demolishing the idols of pseudo-science is relatively easy, and the more interesting and important task is to explain why they have found and are finding such a wide acceptance. I do not envisage that this blast of my trumpet will bring down the walls of pseudo-science, which are manned by too many stout defenders: the slaves of routine who (to use Bertrand Russell's expression) 'would rather die than think', mercenary go-getters, docile educational employees who judge ideas by the status of their propounders, or the woolly minded lost souls yearning for gurus. Nevertheless, despite the advanced stage of cretinization which our civilization has reached under the impact of the mass media, there are still some people about who like to use their brains without the lure of material gain; and it is for them that this book is intended. But if they are in a minority, then how can the truth prevail? The answer (which gives some ground for hope) is that people interested in ideas, and prepared to think them through and express them regardless of personal disadvantage, have always been few; and if knowledge could not advance without a majority on the right side, there would never have been any progress at all - because it has always been easier to get into the limelight, as well as to make money, by charlatanry, doctrinairism, sycophancy and soothing or stirring oratory than by logical and fearless thinking. No, the reason why human understanding has been able to advance in the past, and may do so in the future, is that true insights are cumulative and retain their value regardless of what happens to their discoverers; while fads and stunts may bring an immediate profit to the impresarios, but lead nowhere in the long run, cancel each other out, and are dropped as soon as their promoters are no longer there (or have lost the power) to direct the show. Anyway, let us not despair.
From the book Social Sciences as Sorcery
Stanislav Andreski
