To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera
Showing posts with label Calasso. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Calasso. Show all posts

Thursday, January 23, 2025

Publishing As A Literary Genre

 

I’d like to address something that is generally taken for granted, but turns out not to be so obvious: the art of publishing books. And first of all I would like to consider the notion of publishing itself, for it seems to be shrouded by a number of misunderstandings. If someone is asked what a publishing house does, the general and most reasonable answer is the following: it is a lesser branch of industry that tries to make money publishing books. And what should a good publishing house be? We suppose a good publishing house to be one—if you’ll allow the tautology—that publishes, so far as possible, only good books. Thus, to use a summary definition, those books of which the publisher tends to feel proud rather than ashamed. From this point of view, a good publishing house is unlikely to be of any particular interest in economic terms. Publishing good books has never made anyone terribly rich. Or, at least, not in comparison with what someone might make supplying the market with mineral water or microchips or buttons. It would appear that a publishing business can produce substantial profits only on condition that good books are submerged beneath many other things of very different quality. And when you are submerged, it is much easier to drown—and so disappear altogether.

It is also worth remembering that publishing has often shown itself to be a sure and rapid way of squandering substantial amounts of money. One might even add that, along with roulette and cocottes, founding a publishing house has always been one of the most effective ways for a young man of noble birth to fritter away his fortune. If this is so, we might wonder why the role of the publisher has attracted so many people over the centuries—and continues to be regarded as fascinating, and in some ways mysterious, even today. For example, it is not hard to see that no job title is more coveted by certain tycoons, who often obtain it literally at a high price. If such people were able to declare that they publish frozen vegetables, rather than produce them, they would presumably be very happy about it. We can therefore conclude that, apart from being one branch of business, publishing has always involved prestige, if only because it is a kind of business that is also an art. An art in every sense, and certainly a dangerous art since, in order to practice it, money is an essential element. From this point of view it can be argued that very little has changed since Gutenberg’s time.

And yet, if we look back over five centuries of publishing and try to think of publishing as an art, we immediately see paradoxes of every kind. The first might be this: on the basis of what criteria can the greatness of a publisher be judged? On this point, as a Spanish friend of mine often used to say, there is no bibliography. We can read many learned and detailed studies of the work of certain publishers, but rarely do we come across any judgment about their greatness, as normally happens when dealing with writers or painters. So what goes into making a publisher great? A few examples: the first, and perhaps the most eloquent, takes us back to the origins of publishing. A phenomenon occurred in printing that would later be repeated with the birth of photography. It seems that we were introduced to these inventions by masters who immediately achieved an incomparable excellence. To understand what is essential about photography, all you have to do is study the work of Nadar. To understand what a great publishing house can be, all you have to do is look at the books printed by Aldus Manutius. He was the Nadar of publishing. He was the first to imagine a publishing house in terms of form. And here the word form has to be interpreted in many different ways. Form is crucial, first of all, in the choice and sequence of titles to be published. But form also relates to the texts that accompany the books, as well as the way in which the books are presented as objects. It therefore includes covers, graphics, layout, typeface, paper. It was usually Aldus himself who wrote those short introductory texts—in the form of letters or epistulae—that are the precursors not only of all modern introductions, prefaces, and afterwords, but also of all cover flaps, catalogs, and publicity material of today. That was the first indication that all books published by a certain publisher could be seen as links in a single chain, or segments in a serpentine progression of books, or fragments in a single book formed by all the books published by that publisher. This, obviously, is the most hazardous and ambitious goal for a publisher, and so it has remained for five hundred years. And if you think that this is an unworkable enterprise, you may remember that literature loses all of its magic unless there’s an element of impossibility concealed deep within it. I believe that something similar can be said about publishing, or at least this particular way of being a publisher—a way that has not been practiced very often over the course of the centuries, but has sometimes produced memorable results. To give a sense of what can emerge from this conception of publishing, I will describe two books published by Aldus Manutius. The first was published in 1499 with the abstruse title Hypnerotomachia Poliphili, “The Strife of Love in a Dream.” Today it would be called a “first novel.” Moreover one by an unidentified author (and still an enigma), written in a sort of imaginary language, a sort of Finnegans Wake consisting entirely of a mishmash of Italian, Latin, and Greek (while Hebrew and Arabic appeared in the woodcuts). A fairly risky operation, you might say. But what did the book look like? It was a folio edition, illustrated with magnificent woodcuts that provided a perfect visual accompaniment to the text—something even more risky. But at this point we have to add something else: the vast majority of bibliophiles regard it as the most beautiful book ever printed. And you can see this for yourself if you ever happen to come across a copy of the book, or even just a good facsimile. It was obviously a single, unrepeatable stroke of genius. And in creating it the publisher played a fundamental part. But you mustn’t imagine that Manutius was great only as a provider of treasures for bibliophiles of future centuries. The second example that relates to him goes in a totally different direction. In 1501 and 1502, with his Virgil and Sophocles, Manutius invented “libelli portatiles in formam enchiridii” (“books that can be held in the hand”), otherwise described by him as “parva forma.” Anyone fortunate enough to handle one of them today would immediately realize that they are the first pocket-sized books in history, the first paperbacks. By inventing such a book, Manutius transformed the way in which people read. The very act of reading thus radically changed. Looking at the title page, we can admire the elegance of the Greek italic typeface used here for the first time and which would later become an invaluable point of reference. Manutius therefore managed to achieve two opposite results: first to create a book such as the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili that would remain unequaled, and is virtually the archetype of a book that is one of a kind. Then, to create completely different books that would be copied millions and millions of times over, right up until today.

You may say, fine, this is all very interesting and relevant to the glories of the Italian Renaissance, but what does it have to do with us, and with publishers today, who are inundated by a growing mass of tablets, e-books, and DVDs—not to mention the various incestuous alliances between all these devices? In order to answer this question I’ll give a few more examples. If I told you in no uncertain terms that in my view a good publisher today ought simply to try to do what Manutius did in Venice a year before the start of the sixteenth century, you might think I’m joking—but I’m not. And so I’ll tell you about a twentieth-century publisher and show you how he worked in exactly that way, even though the circumstances were completely different. His name was Kurt Wolff. He was a young German, elegant, wealthy, though not excessively so. He wanted to publish new writers of high literary quality. And so he invented a series of short books, in an unusual format, called Der Jüngste Tag, “Judgment Day,” a title that today seems highly appropriate for a series of books that mostly appeared in Germany during the First World War. If you look at these books, which are black in color, slim and austere, with labels glued on like school exercise books, you may find yourself thinking: “This is how a book by Kafka ought to be presented.” And several of Kafka’s stories were in fact published in this series. These included The Metamorphosis, in 1915, with a fine blue label and a black border. Kafka was a young, little-known, and extremely self-effacing writer at the time. But, reading the letters Kurt Wolff wrote to him, you are immediately aware, from his exquisite tact and gentle concern, that the publisher simply knew who his correspondent was.

Kafka wasn’t the only young writer published by Kurt Wolff. In 1917, a fairly turbulent year for publishing, Kurt Wolff collected the writings of several young authors into a yearly almanac entitled Vom jüngsten Tag. Here are some of the authors in the almanac: Franz Blei, Albert Ehrenstein, Georg Heym, Franz Kafka, Else Lasker-Schüler, Carl Sternheim, Georg Trakl, Robert Walser. They are the names of young writers who found themselves together that year under the roof of the same young publisher. And those same names, without exception, are on the list of essential authors to be read by any young person of today wanting to discover German literature in the early years of the twentieth century.

At this point my argument ought to seem fairly clear. Aldus Manutius and Kurt Wolff, living four hundred years apart, each did nothing substantially different from the other. Indeed they were practicing the same art of publishing—though this art may go unnoticed by most people, including publishers. And this art can be judged in both cases by the same criteria, the first and last of which is form: the capacity to give form to a plurality of books as though they were the chapters of a single book. And all this while taking care—a passionate and obsessive care—over the appearance of every volume, over the way in which it is presented. And finally—and this is certainly a point of no small importance—taking care of how that book might be sold to the largest number of readers.

Around fifty years ago Claude Lévi-Strauss suggested we should regard one of the fundamental activities of mankind—namely the elaboration of myths—as a particular form of bricolage. After all, myths are constructed from ready-made elements, many deriving from other myths. At this point I respectfully suggest we should also consider the art of publishing as a form of bricolage. Try to imagine a publishing house as a single text formed not just by the totality of books that have been published there, but also by all its other constituent elements, such as the front covers, cover flaps, publicity, the quantity of copies printed and sold, or the different editions in which the same text has been presented. Imagine a publishing house in this way and you will find yourself immersed in a very peculiar landscape, something that you might regard as a literary work in itself, belonging to a genre all its own. A genre that can claim to have its own modern classics: for example, the vast domains of Gallimard, which extend from the dark forests and swamps of the Série noire to the plateaus of the Pléiade, though also including various pretty provincial cities or tourist resorts resembling the papier-mâché Potemkin villages, erected, in this case, not for a visit by Catherine the Great but for a season of literary prizes. And we well know that, when a publishing house expands in this way, it can assume a certain imperial character. And so the name Gallimard rings out as far as the remotest confines of the French language. Or, on another side, we might find ourselves in the vast properties of the Insel Verlag, which appear to have been owned for many years by an enlightened feudal lord who has at last bequeathed his estates to his most loyal and trusted stewards … I don’t want to go any further, but already you can see how intricate maps can be devised in this manner.

By looking at publishing houses in this way, one of the more mysterious aspects of our profession might perhaps become clearer: why does a publisher reject a particular book? Because he realizes that publishing it would be like putting the wrong character into a novel, a figure who might throw the whole thing off balance or radically change it. A second point relates to money and copies: following this line we are forced to consider the idea that the capacity to make people read (or at least buy) certain books is a key factor in the quality of a publishing house. The market—or the relationship with that unknown, obscure being known as the public—is the first ordeal of the publisher, in the medieval sense of the word: a test of fire that can send a considerable amount of money up in smoke. Publishing could thus be described as a hybrid multimedia literary genre. And hybrid it certainly is. As for it becoming mixed up with other media, this fact is now obvious. But publishing, as a game, is nevertheless fundamentally the same as the old one played by Aldus Manutius. And a new author whom we come across with an obscure book is very much the same for us as the still elusive author of the book called Hypnerotomachia Poliphili. So long as the game lasts, I am sure there will always be someone ready to play it with passion. But if the rules should one day radically change, as we are sometimes led to fear, I am also equally sure we’ll be able to turn our hand to some other activity—and we might instead find ourselves meeting up around a roulette or écarté or blackjack table.

I would like to end with a question and a paradox. To what extreme can the art of publishing be taken? Can it still be imagined in circumstances where certain essential conditions, such as money and the marketplace, basically disappear? The answer—surprisingly—is yes. At least if we look at an example that has come to us from Russia. At the height of the October Revolution, in those days that were, in the words of Alexander Blok, “a mix of anxiety, horror, penance, hope,” when printing presses had already been indefinitely shut down and inflation was pushing up prices hour by hour, a group of writers—including the poet Vladislav Khodasevich, the thinker Nikolai Berdyaev, and the novelist Mikhail Osorgin, who then recorded those events—decided to throw themselves into the wild business of opening a Writers’ Bookshop that would still enable books—and, above all, certain books—to circulate. The Writers’ Bookshop soon became, in Osorgin’s words, “the only bookshop in Moscow and in the whole of Russia where the first to arrive could buy a book ‘without authorization.’”

What Osorgin and his friends had wanted to create was a small publishing company. But the situation made it impossible. And so they used the Writers’ Bookshop as a sort of double for a publishing house. No longer a place that produced new books, but one that sought to house and circulate large numbers of books (some valuable, some ordinary, often incomplete, but all destined to oblivion) that had ended up at their shop stall through the wreck of history. It was important to keep certain practices alive: to continue to handle those rectangular paper objects, to leaf through them, order them, discuss them, read them in the pauses between one task and another, and finally to pass them on to other people. The important thing was to create and maintain an order, a form: reduced to its lowest and most basic definition, this is the very art of publishing. And this was how it was practiced in the Writers’ Bookshop in Moscow between 1918 and 1922. It reached the acme of its noble history when the founders of the bookshop decided, as printed publishing was impracticable, to set about publishing a series of works with one single handwritten copy. The complete catalog of these books, which were literally one of a kind, remained in Osorgin’s house in Moscow and was eventually lost. But, as a hovering phantom, it is still the model and the guiding star for anyone who attempts to become a publisher in hard times. And times are always hard.

The art of the publisher 

Roberto Calasso

Monday, June 19, 2023

Sainte-Beuve & Baudelaire

 Kamchatka

Sainte-Beuve hovered over Parisian literary life like an authoritative and malevolent uncle. Baudelaire and a few others called him Uncle Beuve. A certain deference was obligatory as was the expectation of, or sometimes the demand for, some critical blessing on his part, which could be of vital importance. But this was seldom granted, especially to writers of great talent. Sainte-Beuve got rattled and became evasive as soon as he suspected certain of his contemporaries of greatness. This happened regularly: with Stendhal, with Balzac, with Baudelaire, and with Flaubert. He mentioned them only to belittle them. And sometimes he barely mentioned them at all (Baudelaire was the cruelest case) or avoided them altogether (as happened with Nerval). In those same years, he was indulgent and scrupulous with many mediocre writers. Yet Sainte-Beuve’s elusive and disparaging words went farther, even with those writers he ostentatiously ignored, and his words are of more help in understanding them than anything written by their first devotees. Subsequently, Sainte-Beuve’s sidestepping became the main argument for sidestepping Sainte-Beuve’s own work, a posthumous vendetta of the harshest sort, which made Port-Royal one of the least read great books in French literature.

But Sainte-Beuve did not ooze venom only for writers who were younger than he or his contemporaries. Even with regard to masters he ostensibly venerated, such as Chateaubriand, he was lethally venomous, and sometimes he could not manage to conceal this. 

His course on Chateaubriand et son groupe littéraire sous l’Empire teems with defamatory asides, whispered in a corner by an old friend of Mme Récamier’s who willingly let everyone suspect that Chateaubriand had a detailed knowledge of the secrets and tricks of the house, some of which he practiced himself to please the Enchanter and his lady.

Once more Baudelaire wrote to Sainte-Beuve, daring to ask for a review. As always, in vain. In the postscript, he added that a few days before, heading toward rue Montparnasse, where Sainte-Beuve lived, he had passed in front of a gingerbread shop – and had been struck by the ‘conviction that he [Sainte-Beuve] must have liked gingerbread.’ He followed with a detailed explanation of how to eat it (with wine, as a dessert, or also in the English manner, with butter and jam). Then the conclusion: ‘I hope you have not taken this piece of gingerbread, coated with angelica, for a naughty boy’s joke and that you have eaten it with simplicity … Warmest greetings. Wish me well. I am in a great crisis.’

About Baudelaire, Sainte-Beuve’s feelings first of all betrayed a certain fear. The great critic, whose task it was to show every Monday, with calm affability – albeit invariably with some drops of concealed venom – the correct attitude toward matters of literature and the world, realized that Baudelaire had gone too far. That he had crossed the barriers of civilized society and had by now settled in some remote territory, forest, or steppe.

Sainte-Beuve vowed not to talk about Baudelaire – or even about Poe, that sinister alter ego of his, even though his editor had judged Poe to be suitable material for him. For a critic-judge of Sainte-Beuve’s ilk, the decision not to write about a contemporary was a political act of great consequence. But at times the critic was obliged to express himself fitfully and circuitously, condensing in a few stray lines all that he was loath to discuss in depth.

On more than one occasion Sainte-Beuve, with the agility of a monkey, avoided writing an article about Baudelaire. When he finally decided to do so, he took such a roundabout approach that no one could have suspected him. On Monday, January 20, 1862, instead of dealing with a single author, as was his custom, he published an article titled ‘Des prochaines élections à l’Académie,’ a current affairs piece on a subject that was always a delicate one. This seldom happened, and all the ladies or illustrious officials whom Sainte-Beuve imagined savoring his words every Monday must have felt a mild frisson on picking up their copy of Le Constitutionnel that day. Sainte-Beuve’s arguments were, as always, clear and seamlessly written. But an attentive eye would have spotted, right from the first lines, that this was a discourse on various levels of which most readers would have done well not to notice. And yet again Sainte-Beuve would humor them in their wish not to know, thanks to his tone of ‘decent liberty,’ which implied a firm resolve to round off any rough edges. Yet the topic was fraught with risk. It was not so much a matter, as Sainte-Beuve claimed, of proposing a new procedure for the selection of candidates for the Académie, but of insinuating a sharp, peremptory judgment on what the Académie was in itself. And this, since Richelieu’s day, was tantamount to making a judgment on the state of health of the literary world. A master of reticence, Sainte-Beuve was also a master of the sudden, piercing thrust. So, after having described the academicians with affectionate irony as figures devoted to ‘perfect idleness’ and relieved of any menial task because they were held only to ‘correspond directly’ with the sovereign, Sainte-Beuve dared to write, ‘The Académie, in the persons of various important members, is, in effect, very much afraid.’ Let’s remove the padding. What remains? That the Académie is very much afraid. But who could threaten it? Perhaps politics, ever oppressive and intrusive? No, there is something even more worrisome: ‘the fear of the literary Bohème.’ At this point the prudent Sainte-Beuve realizes that he has gone over the score. And he immediately circumscribes the statement. But, notoriously, toning down statements often ends up making them even more emphatic. And that is what happens here: ‘Nonetheless it is a good thing not to exaggerate its extent, to know where it begins and ends [for a moment, Bohème returns to its geographical connotation]. A discussion of the names considered suspect would be useful [suspect? whom? and regarding what?]. It is necessary to avoid, by dint of being on one’s guard against the Bohème, to abstain from all current, vital literature.’ Prudent now, and on his guard, he ends by referring to the zone from which the danger is coming: ‘current, vital literature.’ But who are we talking about? Why should the Forty Immortals, protected as they often are by their noble birth and impregnable social position, be afraid of a certain literature of shady origin? Sainte-Beuve immediately avoids answering questions that he himself has raised and cuts things short, as if frightened by what he has done. By way of an excuse, he says that the public (‘which must always be taken more or less into account’) has not yet reached the point in which it ‘imperiously imposes one of those choices whereby renowned fame almost assumes the right to do violence to the naturally conservative spirit.’ It is an irresistibly slippery downward slope: with every word of apology and mitigation for what he has just said, Sainte-Beuve makes his situation worse. There is nothing else he can do but cut things short. And so he moves on to the examination of the candidates for M. Scribe’s position: a list made up of three lines of names now forgotten, at the end of which we read, ‘M. Baudelaire.’ For the other vacant position, that of Lacordaire, there was only one candidate: the Prince de Broglie. (And Sainte-Beuve was later to explain the reasons for this undisturbed solitude: the duke was someone who ‘has made the effort to be born’ – and by this he implied that all other efforts in his life would have been superfluous.) Brief portraits of the candidates follow, all imbued with a lethal bonheur. Praise of the critic Cuvillier-Fleury, as soon as it goes into specifics, becomes sardonic: ‘He is a man of true merit, learned, conscientious, who applies himself.’ And immediately after: ‘Sometimes he is ingenious, but after much sweat. He is more estimable than agreeable. It is never necessary to dare him to make a gaffe because he does this by himself, even without being asked to.’ Few can match Sainte-Beuve in the art of debunking with what seems like praise.

At the tail end of the list, it is Baudelaire’s turn. Since the other candidates were presented by Sainte-Beuve as highly respectable – even though, for different reasons, they have nothing much to qualify them – Baudelaire appears to be the only one to whom Sainte-Beuve’s initial argument about the perils of the ‘literary Bohème’ and the fears that it aroused may apply. Not to mention the fact that, for Baudelaire, who was certainly not a bohemian but ‘a dandy lost in the bohème,’ according to Gautier’s definition, it already sounded humiliating to be considered in such a light.

But Sainte-Beuve was only at the beginning of the humiliations he felt obliged to inflict upon the oldest of his young friends. How was it that Baudelaire had so much as entertained the idea of presenting his candidature for the Académie? Sainte-Beuve answers his own question: ‘At first one wondered if M. Baudelaire, in applying, wished to make an epigram, to mock the Académie; unless his intention was to let the Académie know in this way that the time was ripe for welcoming into its ranks that poet and writer so distinguished and so able in all genres of writing who is Théophile Gautier, his master.’ One humiliation heaped upon another: to make it understood that Baudelaire’s candidature was in itself an affront, and hence conceivable only as a joke; and even as such, comprehensible only if understood as an allusion to a better writer than Baudelaire, one who was his master (just to keep things in the right proportion). But there’s more. Baudelaire is not only minor, but nonexistent: ‘It was necessary to make known, to spell out M. Baudelaire’s name, to more than one member of the Académie, who was completely unaware of his existence.’ For no previous candidate had Sainte-Beuve felt obliged to produce such a certificate of nonexistence. Moreover, he knew Baudelaire well enough to understand how sensitive he was about the way in which his 

name was liable to be mispronounced. This time, too, Sainte-Beuve made sure he wounded at least twice with the same blow. There follow some lines of measured appreciation for Les Fleurs du mal, in which, however, the emphasis is on the generous efforts that, one is led to suppose, Sainte-Beuve had to make in order to illustrate the work: ‘It is not as easy as one might think to prove to certain political academicians and men of state that in Les Fleurs du mal there are some passages that are truly remarkable for talent and art.’ This is the highest praise that Sainte-Beuve would allow himself. But here, too, he does not hold back from betrayal, giving us the very words he might have uttered to the face of some impassive, incredulous, and bored academician absorbed with some problem of state: ‘As you can see, my dear friend, we have done everything possible.’

One might think that, once his judgment of Les Fleurs du mal had been handed down – and once he had defined as ‘gems’ two prose pieces in Le Spleen de Paris – Sainte-Beuve no longer felt bound to justify his lukewarm attitude toward Baudelaire himself. But Sainte-Beuve was not just a shrewd voyager in the baser waters of literary life. He was also a great writer, and at times, even in the most stifling contexts, he managed to shrug off all his fears and scruples to say some tremendously precise, definitive words, which erupt in the middle of his argument. It had been hard enough to make sclerotic academicians understand the singular beauties of some of Baudelaire’s poems. But it would have been even harder to introduce them to the locus of Baudelaire. ‘All in all,’ Sainte-Beuve continues, ‘M. Baudelaire has found a way to construct, at the extremities of a strip of land held to be uninhabitable and beyond the confines of known Romanticism, a bizarre pavilion, a folly, highly decorated, highly tormented, but graceful and mysterious, where people read the books of Edgar Allan Poe, where they recite exquisite sonnets, intoxicate themselves with hashish to ponder about it afterward, where they take opium and thousands of other abominable drugs in cups of the finest porcelain. This singular folly, with its marquetry inlays, of a planned and composite originality, which for some time has drawn the eye toward the extreme point of the Romantic Kamchatka, I call Baudelaire’s folly. The author is content to have done something impossible, in a place where it was thought that no one could go.’ This passage is the foundation of all that can be said and has been said about Baudelaire. It cannot be replaced with any other description; it should be observed in every detail, as if one were wandering around that solitary folly, which stands out against a desolate landscape. It does not appear that Sainte-Beuve had particular geographical or ethnographic interests. For him, Kamchatka must have been one of those names that appeared in Le Magasin Pittoresque along with some exotic drawing. But his choice of place for the transposition of Baudelaire into an image could not have been more apt. Of course, Kamchatka is a slender strip of land (to signify that Baudelaire, too, is more like a pointed extremity than a vast rustling forest), but behind him there extends the immensity of Asia, which supports him. But to what does that boundless steppe and taiga correspond? To ‘known Romanticism,’ which borders on civilized eighteenth-century Europe to become, little by little, ever more ‘uninhabitable’ before finally extending, as if in a final lunge, to that Kamchatka pierced by one hundred and twenty volcanoes, which would be the place ‘beyond the confines’ of Romanticism itself. And there stands a folly that contains a blend of the horror vacui of primitive ornamentation and the sobriety of the products of perfect civilization (the exquisite porcelain). A place that is ‘highly decorated, highly tormented, but graceful and mysterious’: a quadrilateral of words that delimit the locus of Baudelaire, where the pleasure of ornament is united with self-inflicted torture, where mystery cannot forgo being frivolous and erotic seduction opens the doors of mystery. In the middle of a desert inhabited only by shamanic presences, what meets the eye, like a mirage, is a Folly, a name that stands not only for that which has always eluded psychic habitation and rational control – and this is the real reason for that ‘fear of the Bohème,’ which was rather a fear of Kamchatka – but also for certain enchanting maisons de plaisance, pavilions devoted to idleness and pleasure. Since the days of the Régence up to Bagatelle, which the count of Artois had built in two months, like a dream, to win a bet with the very young Marie Antoinette, such constructions dotted the outskirts of Paris. Later absorbed into the metropolis, they often became the residences of the supreme demi-mondaines. Ambiguous and mad, uninhabitable and sensual, Baudelaire’s folly was a self-sufficient, sovereign place, which would have been pointless to introduce to the academicians. They could never have understood it. Then, little by little, like successive waves of nomads who made their camps in it, there grew up around that folly the essence of that which was to appear since then under the name of literature.As soon as he had finished the memorable lines on Kamchatka, Sainte-Beuve felt the need to fall back on the triple cross, as if afraid that he had exposed himself too much. And the sound of this falling back grates more than ever. ‘At this point, and after having explained as well as possible to somewhat amazed and esteemed colleagues all these exotica, these piquant flavors, these refinements, could they then see them as qualifications for the Académie, and could the author have perhaps been able to convince himself of this?’ A brusque return to the initial argument: Baudelaire’s entire œuvre is a curiosity that the author had thought to propose to the Académie only in jest. And Sainte-Beuve wants his colleagues to be completely convinced that this is what he thinks, too. But the high point of the gibe, which Sainte-Beuve inflicts simultaneously on Baudelaire and his colleagues, and on himself, comes immediately after, in a few words as heartfelt as a peroration in favor of a young man accused of some reckless behavior: ‘Certainly, M. Baudelaire loses nothing by being seen [in person], and whereas one expects to find a strange, eccentric man, one finds oneself in the presence of a courteous, respectful, exemplary candidate, a good boy, refined in speech and entirely classical in form.’ At this point the curtain is drawn, and the ‘good boy,’ Baudelaire, withdraws again to his folly in Kamchatka.


From: Roberto Calasso

LA FOLIE BAUDELAIRE

Thursday, February 27, 2020

Science is for Westerners what the Catholic Church was for Cortés and Pizarro

1941. Simone Weil is struck by a collection of recently published writings by Max Planck. She sees in Planck, much more than in Einstein, the person who has caused a “radical break in the development of science.” The idea of quanta is “extraordinary and subversive in itself,” even if perhaps it is wrong, in some of its applications. But it will become the new foundation of the world. There is then a strange fact: as soon as Planck moves away from quanta, everything he says is banal. He speaks like a decent man “in the ordinary meaning of the word,” possessed of good sense, “which is already much.” But no more. So the world is said to be based on a science it cannot understand, discovered by a man who, beyond science, has nothing meaningful to say. And yet it is “in the name of science that we, white people […] walk the terrestrial globe as its masters, treading, at every step, on some treasure.” Science is for Westerners what the Catholic Church was for Cortés and Pizarro. Except that these still had some idea about what the sacraments were.

Two years later, in London, Simone Weil wrote the Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Toward Mankind. She wanted to single out some unshakable principles. And she questioned what to rely on. Religion was no longer of use, as it was now something “for Sunday morning.” And science? Only nonbelievers, who yet believe in everyday science, “have a triumphant feeling of inner unity.” A feeling that is illusory, however. Their morality is “in contradiction with science no less than the religion of others.”

Science, in fact, is not moral. Inasmuch as no rules of behavior are offered. Weil reaches these conclusions: “Hitler has seen it clearly. What’s more, he lets many people see it, wherever there is the presence or menace of the SS, and even further away. Today only unreserved adherence to a totalitarian system, brown, red or other, can give, so to speak, a solid illusion of inner unity. This is why it constitutes such a strong temptation for so many souls in disarray.”

Roberto Calasso
The Unnameable Present

Wednesday, February 26, 2020

The shock of the unknown

A person’s inclination to expose himself to the shock of the unknown is a secret and cherished sensation, which says much about the quality of such a person. There are those who ignore it, and those who cannot resist it. In any event it is an archaic vestige. In a very remote age, before prehistory, that sensation was a constant experience. Today its presence is felt when we approach a site of ruins, one of those silent and enclosed places that evoke the past through fragments of stone. Many visitors want or love or expect to be accompanied there by guides or audio guides. Others wander such places as though blind. They will see the place—if they ever see it at all—only through what they have recorded through a lens. And above all, what they see again will be themselves.

Then there are those who simply look. Among these few, there are some—a meager sect—determined to lay themselves open to the shock of the unknown. They know it to be an invaluable sensation and preliminary to all connection with the past. That sensation is like the first stage of a rite of initiation that takes place in darkness and silence. But it is essential in order to establish a relationship with the unknown. Which, in the case of the past, is above all absence. Ruins bear witness to this: that the past is not there. Having once absorbed this shock, which penetrates deep into the veins, the process of knowledge can then—slowly, gradually—begin. Great historians are necromancers—and so too are visitors. They have all undergone that initial experience, which keeps happening again, even if their physiologies may be very different: austere, as in the case of Burckhardt—or visionary, as with Michelet.

Digitability is the gravest infliction for those inclined to lay themselves open to the shock of the unknown. That sensation was cultivated by few, like a secret. But the Web has obliged everyone to assume a vast weight of learning that they do not know, as though engulfed from every direction by an uninterrupted and instructive whir. A Google Earth extended over time suffocates any perception of the unknown, which is inevitably mitigated and weakened—or eventually neutralized.

Roberto Calasso
Unnameable Present

The mind starts bleeding into the world

Tourists, terrorists: ubiquitous, magnetic categories. They attract through their own force. But there are also those, as a light counterbalance, who are restive and refractory. And there always have been: a certain number—not many—of beings who can find their way through the strictures of class, of the professions, of social barriers. Who become stateless and extraterritorial by vocation. And this through no ill-will toward their fellow beings, but by trusting in a certain thrill of anonymity and the inability to feel tied to predefined roles. They are the hidden and unrecognized contemplators who have always lived in the nooks and crannies of society. In Vedic India, people would talk about the vānaprastha, those who go “into the forest.” When the forest is no longer there, they wander in everyone’s streets, but from a certain glint in their eyes it can be seen they do not belong.

If tourists are viewed with a certain embarrassment and a hint of disapproval, it is humanity that looks at itself and suspects it has lost something. It doesn’t know exactly what, but knows it is irretrievable. Someone has suggested that democracy has extended to everyone the privilege of access to things that are no longer there.
Tourism has now skidded out of control and doesn’t necessarily seem to have any more to do with travel. Rather, it looks like a second reality, which happens to be the model for virtual reality. Depleted precisely because it is augmented, like every virtual reality. If David Chalmers’s statement is true that “we are not far away from a time when a virtual reality may be indistinguishable from the real thing,” it must also be recognized that tourism is no longer a flourishing sector of the world, but the whole world has become a sector of tourism that has still to be brought up-to-date. This reflects on all that is not tourism. And which now turns out to be something depleted, as well as augmented.

Some fateful phrases say much more than they intend to say. And so, in the epilogue of the synopsis of his forthcoming book, David Chalmers announces the near future with a fanfare: “The mind starts bleeding into the world.” Which can be interpreted as the mind seeping into the world, or the mind bleeding over the world. Chalmers means the first. The second is what is happening.

For theorists of virtual reality, the constant concern is to establish what difference there is between virtual reality and ordinary reality. John Searle observed that a virtual hurricane doesn’t get anyone wet—and this might at first seem a conclusive observation. In response it was suggested to him that, since words can have many meanings, virtual hurricanes can be different from ordinary ones while still being hurricanes in the experience of those who suffer them.

But these are modest satisfactions. The true watershed is another. Virtual reality is focused on fighting a single enemy: Ananke, Necessity. Its aim is to elude it, thwarting it. Until one day … On that day, perhaps not too far off, even a virtual attack will be able to bleed the mind over the world.

With his protruding visor, destined to become miniaturized, like everything else, and replaced in the end by brain implants, the frequenter of virtual reality (also called augmented reality) is a direct descendant of the tourist who goes looking for extreme experiences. Both temporarily suspend the irreversible. The first knows he can remove his visor at any moment, the other that on a certain day he will return home. Suspending the irreversible means escaping entropy. The young Buddha followed the path in the opposite direction. He left his father’s house, which seemed untouched by change, in order to encounter the irreversible in its threefold aspect of sickness, old age, and death. That, for him, was augmented reality. But the Buddha said only that it was reality tathā, “so.” And he taught how to see the tathatā, “being so,” of everything that is.

Roberto Calasso
Unnameable Present

Neo-Darwinian scientists eager to marry evolution with fine sentiments

Christian theologians have been trying for centuries to answer the most serious question: Si Deus est, unde malum? If God exists, where does evil come from? And all the answers, over time, were regarded by someone or other as inadequate. But there is also another, no less serious, question that Leibniz formulated along exactly the same lines: “Si [Deus] non est, unde bonum?” If [God] does not exist, where does goodness come from? The origins of evil and of goodness are equally obscure. But those who tried to answer the first question, from Saint Augustine to Leibniz himself, were often supreme metaphysicians; whereas answers to the second have so far been primitive, coming from the garrulous promoters of a lay morality—led by Flaubert’s Monsieur Homais—or from Neo-Darwinian scientists eager to marry evolution with fine sentiments.
*
The eighteenth-century forebears of today’s secularists would often say that everything had to be traced back to matter if plausible explanations were to be found. But this operation has become increasingly baffling and impracticable, since scientists are no longer prepared to say what matter itself is. Having disposed of matter, which proved to be an expanse of quicksand, people tried (and are still stubbornly trying) to rely upon another unshakable primum: evolution.

From evolution there have been countless attempts to derive the necessity and justness of fine feelings—and above all of altruism. The good of evolution became the good of a single species, but this terminological slip did not, according to some, affect the scientific validity of the theories. Which yet had great difficulty in being articulated. Not least because the theory of evolution served, over the years—with equal readiness and equal lack of evidence—as a basis for the most brutal or most well-meaning extrapolations. Even the principles of eugenics, zealously applied in civilized Scandinavian countries as well as Hitler’s Germany, made reference to Darwin’s theories. The plan to establish a humanitarian ethic based on evolution remained, like every other attempt at founding a lay morality, at the stage of wishful thinking. It is—Baudelaire noted in Belgium—a funeral carriage perpetually followed by the “multitude of free thinkers.”

But pure secularists, lacking any religious affiliation and not much inclined toward spiritualistic fancies, cannot do without the need to feel good. Their ideal would be for some Neo-Darwinian biologist to demonstrate that society has been based, from the very beginning, on altruism and tolerance. And therefore, that being good constitutes an evolutionary advantage, the only criterion with which they can measure good. Every year, someone eagerly attempts to demonstrate it, in vain.

Roberto Calasso
Unnameable Present

The metaphysical animal looked around, not knowing what to grasp hold of

Secular society, in its purity, ignores ritual ceremonies. But ridding itself of them is not easy. To achieve this, squads of protestants had to clear the way, leaving as a legacy, among other things, the religious wars, a model for every civil war, and a certain way of behaving, a model for that chimera that was later to be called “secular morality.” Rituals survive in secular society for certain legal necessities: the swearing of oaths in trials, the preset pattern of words in marriages. All the rest are ingrained customs, such as birthdays. The same with military processions or New Year speeches by heads of state. Customs that come and go, practices that we can—if we wish—ignore. Strictly speaking, with a little care and planning, we could avoid being involved in any kind of ritual, from the cradle to the grave. For death there are no rites. Not even at funerals. At such moments even established customs seem particularly feeble.

Waking up each morning, rain or shine, and knowing there are no duties to follow. Making coffee, looking out the window. A feeling of blankness. Indifference. To reach this state, various millennia had passed. But nothing remained of it, apart from an opaque curtain, on all sides. No one celebrated this fact as an achievement. It was normality, reached at last. A characterless state, prior to desires. A mute foundation to existence. There would be no shortage of time for whims, plans, survival strategies. And this was the central point: time was not taken up, measured, assailed by obligatory gestures, without which there was a fear that all might fall apart. This might well have produced a feeling of exhilaration. But it was not to be. Indeed, the first sensation was of emptiness. And with it, a certain tedium. The metaphysical animal looked around, not knowing what to grasp hold of.

Roberto Calasso
Ardor

The saṃnyāsin, -“renouncer"

The saṃnyāsin, the “renouncer,” in whose traits Louis Dumont had the farsightedness to recognize the archetypal individual in the Western sense, is a figure who does not appear in the earliest stratum of the Vedic texts. The system, at that time, is compact and leaves no such space. Having once entered the process of cosmic interaction on birth, there is no way out. But on reaching the Upaniṣads, which take ritualist reasoning to an extreme, the saṃnyāsin makes his appearance—the first defector, not because he rejects the complex system of interaction on which ritual is based, but because he seeks to absorb it within himself, in the inaccessible space of the mind. So the agnihotra becomes the prāṇāgnihotra, the first case of the complete internalization of an event, an invisible ceremony that takes place in an individual’s “breath,” prāṇa. There is no longer any fire, there is no longer any milk to pour on it, the words of the texts are no longer to be heard. But all this still exists: in silence, in the activity of the mind. And so the inner man makes his first appearance in history. He is the “individual-outside-the-world,” who has severed his links with society—and who will eventually prove to be enormously effective in his action upon society. Dumont recognizes in him the earliest figure of the intellectual, right up to his most recent awkward or lethal manifestations.
*   *   *
The saṃnyāsin can quite properly be described as the inner man, since it is he who first internalized the sacrificial fires. Thanks to a subtle elaboration of correspondences, the factors that made up the liturgy of the Vedic sacrifice are moved into the body and into the mind of the saṃnyāsin; and so he becomes the only being who need not keep fires burning, since he keeps them within himself. With the advent of the renouncer, sacrificial violence no longer leaves any visible traces. All is absorbed into this solitary, emaciated, wandering being, who would eventually become the very image of India. Not the man in his village or in his house. But the man of the forest—a place of secret learning, a place far removed from social constraints.
*
This is the moment where the figure of the renouncer emerges: when he takes his first step toward the forest, without looking back and knowing he will never return. In this instant, the brahmin cuts all links with his previous life. Never again will he have to celebrate the agnihotra at dawn and sunset, pouring milk on the fire, performing a hundred or so prescribed gestures, reciting formulas. Indeed, the renouncer no longer has to kindle and feed the sacrificial fires, since he will tend them within himself. Nor will he have to comply with countless obligations that make up his life as a brahmin. Now he will eat nothing but berries and roots when he finds them in the forest. His life will interfere only to a minimal extent with the course of nature.
*
There is a subtle distinction between renunciation and detachment. To accept the life of the renouncer means following an āśrama, a stage of life like the three that have preceded it. And each stage brings its own guilt and restrictions. “Detachment,” tyāga, is something else—a mental attitude that can pertain to any stage of life. Simone Weil is extremely clear on this point: “Detachment and renouncement: often synonyms in Sanskrit, but not in the Gītā: here ‘renouncement’ (saṃnyāsa) is the lower form that consists of becoming a hermit, sitting beneath a tree and moving no further. ‘Detachment’ (tyāga) is making use of this world as if not using it.”

Roberto Calasso
Ardorl

The wakefulness

The wakefulness the Upaniṣads speak of (and the Ṛgveda before them) is a state opposed, not to sleep, but to another kind of wakefulness—inattentive, inert, automatic. Awakening means rousing oneself from that kind of wakefulness, as from a vapid dream. Philosophers have not regarded this swerve within the mind as worthy of consideration, but it became the focus of thought in one place and in one period: in India, in the time between the Veda and the Buddha—and then reverberated unremittingly through all the centuries thereafter.

The first reference, in the Ṛgveda, was clear, blunt: “The gods seek someone who crushes soma; they do not need sleep; tireless, they set off on journeys.” Even if men cannot say what “journeys” the gods endlessly devote themselves to, their duty is clearly indicated: to remain alert and, with their labor, to prepare the intoxicating drug.

But what is the relationship between the Buddha and the Veda? It is a difficult, delicate, and intricate question. However much we may emphasize their opposing positions, there remains a vast, obscure common background on which every contrast is laid out. We can see this background in the name of the Buddha himself, in the verb budh-, “to awaken,” “to pay attention.” The primacy of awakening over every other mental action was not an innovation of the Buddha, who simply offered a version of it that was both radical and by and large destructive of all that had gone before. The concern for awakening and its centrality had always been present in the Vedic texts.

Roberto Classo
Ardor

There has to be a recognition of powers situated over and beyond social order

This book was started quite a number of years ago out of the rash idea of writing a commentary on the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Brāhmaṇa of One Hundred Paths. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa is a treatise on Vedic rituals that dates back to the eighth century B.C.E. and is made up of fourteen kāṇḍas, “sections,” which add up to 2,366 pages in Julius Eggeling’s five-volume translation in the Sacred Books of the East series, published in Oxford between 1882 and 1900. This is at present the only complete translation (that of C. R. Swaminathan has so far reached only the eighth kāṇḍa). The Brāhmaṇas—and the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa stands out among them—contain thoughts that cannot be ignored yet rarely find a place in the philosophy books. Thus, very often, they were treated with impatience, as being a sort of intrusion.

The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa is a powerful antidote to current existence. It is a commentary that shows how one can live a life totally dedicated to passing into another order of things, which the text dares to call “truth.” A life that is impossible to live, since almost everything is worn down in the strains of that transition. But a life that certain people tried, very long ago—and of which they wanted to leave some record. It was a life based above all on particular gestures. We should not be led astray by the fact that some of those gestures still survive today in India and are commonly performed by a great many people who know almost nothing about how they originated, while other great civilizations have left no comparable legacy: the civilization of the Vedic ritualists did not withstand the test of time—it fell apart, remaining for the most part inaccessible, incomprehensible. And yet all that still shines out of it has a power that stirs any mind not entirely enslaved to what surrounds it.
*   *   *
People at the beginning of the twenty-first century speak much about religion. But very little in the world is religious in the strict and rigorous sense. And not so much with regard to individuals as to social structures. Whether these are churches, sects, tribes, or ethnic groups, their model is an amorphous superparty that lets people go further than the idea of the party had previously allowed, in the name of something that is often described as “identity.” It is the revenge of secularity. Having lived for hundreds and thousands of years in a condition of subjection, like a handmaiden to powers that were imposed without caring to justify themselves, secularity now—sneeringly—offers all that still makes reference to the sacred the means to act in a way that is more effective, more up-to-date, more deadly, more in keeping with the times. This is the new horror that still had to take form: the whole of the twentieth century has been its long incubation period.

If one wants to talk about anything religious, some kind of relation has to be established with the invisible. There has to be a recognition of powers situated over and beyond social order. Social order itself must seek to establish some relations with that invisible. All this does not seem to be of great concern to religious authorities at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the higher ranks of Christian or Islamic hierarchies, or among the pandits of Hinduism, it is easy to find keen sociologists or social engineers who use the sacred names of their respective traditions to impose or sustain a certain collective order. But it would be hard to find anyone who could speak the language of Meister Eckhart or Ibn ‘Arabī or Yājñavalkya—or could even remind us of such a voice.

Roberto Classo
Ardor

Tuesday, February 25, 2020

Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana

Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana were young, rich, handsome, and noble. Together they experienced the feeling that the world is vanity. Together they set out to seek the truth of  the matter. They agreed that the first to find it would tell the other. Thus one day, in the narrow streets of Rājagṛha, Śāriputra met a monk who immediately made an impression on him. He had an enchanting way of moving, of going forward and backward with his beggar’s bowl. A way of holding his arms, of always looking at a point some distance away on the ground, and always the same distance. All his gestures were as if supported by threads. Śāriputra followed him for a long time before speaking to him, and when he did so it was with the politeness of someone who has been tempered by a strict education. “How long is it since Your Lordship left his family?” he said. “Not long,” answered the monk. It was Aśvajit, the slowest to understand of the Buddha’s first five companions. With due respect for good manners, which abhor questions that are too direct, but at the same time urged on by an impulse that demanded he find out, Śāriputra continued to converse with the monk. He wanted to know what doctrine could lead to such gracious behavior. For it must be a perfect doctrine.

Aśvajit was cagey. He was well aware of his own inadequacy. He had never been able to reconstruct the Buddha’s doctrine in all its various steps. He remembered his four companions, who had been illuminated before him. He thought how he always got there late, and was always plagued by a sort of blur, which, however, he now accepted without fuss. Looking at the ground he whispered: “I shall never be able to expound the doctrine in all its vastness. All I can do is hint at its spirit.” For a moment Śāriputra dropped his wary, delicate manners. With great excitement in his eyes, he simply said: “That is what I want.” So then Aśvajit said: “The Master has shown how phenomena spring from one cause. He has said what the cause is and what the cessation of the cause.” At that very instant, immaculate, free from any speck of dust, the eye of the Law opened in Śāriputra.

Immediately, the monk and Śāriputra set off on their separate and opposite ways. Śāriputra was desperately eager to find Maudgalyāyana. He was proud to be in a position  to keep their pact. He searched far and wide for a long time, but without success. He stared at all the travelers as if in a daze. But it was Maudgalyāyana who saw him one day from a long way off along a flat road. He immediately sensed a change in his friend’s face. His skin was as if brightened by serenity. As soon as he was within earshot, Maudgalyāyana said: “You’ve found it.” “I’ve found it,” said Śāriputra. “Now I’ll tell you.” Śāriputra then recounted his meeting with Aśvajit in every detail. He stopped a moment before repeating the monk’s words on doctrine.

As had happened with Śāriputra, the eye of the Law opened in Maudgalyāyana. Now they walked along together, in silence. When the Buddha saw them approaching, and while they were still far away, he told the monks around him: “You see those two who are coming toward us? They will be my two best disciples.” And he welcomed them. People who had known Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana in the past said: “They have set out on the path of that monk who steals children. A path full of widows. A path that destroys families.” The Buddha ordered the monks to answer only that it was the dharma that had taken away Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana. Say no more. The murmuring would end after seven days.

Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana were illuminated by two sentences. “Phenomena spring from one cause” is the first. There are those who might pass over this sentence as obvious. But it is a continent. Śāriputra immediately saw something new in those words. The world is a throw of the dice. And the worlds that follow are successive throws of the dice. They are phases of the līlā, the cosmic game. From infancy on, Śāriputra had been picking up this doctrine here and there, the way one gets to know the secrets of sex. But how can one recognize one cause, one origin, in a sovereign game that unfolds in the totality of things? Now someone was teaching: “Phenomena spring from one cause.” And then immediately afterward opening vistas on a further continent: “He has said what the cause is.” So it was  possible, then, to have a vision of the precise point from which dependence arose, the way one can see, on the ground, the place where a spring of water rises. But perhaps the most momentous words for Śāriputra were those that followed: “He has said what is the cessation of the cause.” Cessation, extinction, nirvāṇa: the most popular, the most abused, and the most mysterious word the Buddha used. Śāriputra was still thinking how wonderful it was to be able to say what the cause is, when he heard that one could also announce the cessation of the cause. But had anything ever really ceased in this world, this perennial, endlessly repeated buzz? Such a doctrine was truly unheard of.

Roberto Calasso
Ka

Pali version:

The occasion was this. The wanderer Sanjaya was living at Rajagaha with a large following of wanderers, with two hun-dred and fifty wanderers. And Sariputta and Moggallana were living the holy life under the wanderer Sanjaya. They had made a pact that whichever of them first reached the Deathless should inform the other.

Now, it being morning, the venerable Assaji dressed, and taking his bowl and outer robe, he went into Rajagaha for alms.

His manner as he went inspired confidence, whether in moving for-wards or backwards, looking ahead or aside, bending or stretching, his eyes were downcast and he moved with grace. The wanderer Sariputta saw him thus as he was begging for alms in Rajagaha, and he thought: "There are Arahants in the world, those who possess the Arahant path, and this bhikkhu is one of them. Suppose I approach him and ask under whom he has gone forth, or who is his teacher, or whose Dhamma he confesses." But then he thought: "It is not the time to ask this bhikkhu while he is wandering for alms among houses. Suppose I follow behind him to trace what the seekers have discovered?"

 When the venerable Assaji had finished his round he left Rajagaha with his alms food. Then the wanderer Sariputta went up to him and greeted him. When this courteous formal talk was finished, he stood at one side, and he said to him: "Friend, your faculties are serene, the colour of your skin is clear and bright. Under whom have you gone forth? Or who is your teacher? Or whose Dhamma do you confess?"

"There is the Great Monk, friend, the son of the Sakyans, who went forth from a Sakyan clan. I have gone forth under that Blessed One. He is my teacher. It is that Blessed One's Dhamma that I con-fess." "But what does the venerable one's teacher say, what does he tell?"

"I have only recently gone forth, friend, I have only just come to this Dhamma and Discipline. I cannot teach you the Dhamma in detail. Still I will tell you its meaning in brief." Then Sariputta said: "So be it, friend.

"Say much or little as it suits you;
Tell me but the meaning now.

For I need no more than the meaning With no thought of details yet." The venerable Assaji told the wanderer Sariputta this sketch of the Dhamma:

The Perfect One has told the cause
Of causally arisen things;
And what brings their cessation, too:
Such is the doctrine preached by the Great Monk.

Now when the wanderer Sariputta heard this statement of the Dhamma, the spotless, immaculate vision of the Dhamma arose in him: All that is subject to arising is subject to cessation.

This is the truth: even if that were all,
You have attained the state where is no sorrow
That we for many times ten thousand ages
Have let pass by unseen.

Sariputta the wanderer went to Moggallana the wanderer.

Moggallana the wanderer saw him coming. He said: "Your faculties are serene, friend, the colour of your skin is clear and bright. Is it pos-sible that you have found the Deathless?" "Yes, friend, I have found the Deathless." "But how did you find it, friend?" Sariputta the wanderer told what had happened. When Moggallana the wanderer heard that statement of the Dhamma—

The Perfect One has told the cause
Of causally arisen things;
And what brings their cessation too:
Such is the doctrine preached by the Great Monk—

then the spotless, immaculate vision of the Dhamma arose in him: All that is subject to arising is subject to cessation.*

This is the truth: even if that were all,
You have attained the state where is no sorrow
That we for many times ten thousand ages
Have let pass by unseen.

Then Moggallana said: "Friend, let us go to the Blessed One. The Blessed One is our teacher." "But, friend, these two hundred and fifty wanderers are living here depending on us, looking to us. They ought to be consulted first.

They will do as they think fit." They went together to the wanderers and told them: "Friends, we are going to the Blessed One. The Blessed One is our teacher." "We live depending on the venerable ones, looking to them. If they go to lead the holy life under the Great Monk, then we too will do the same." So Sariputta and Moggallana went to Sanjaya the wanderer and told him what they were going to do.

"Enough, friends, do not go. Let us three guide this community together." For the second and for the third time they told him the same thing and received the same answer.

Then Sariputta and Moggallana went with the two hundred and fifty wanderers to the Bamboo Grove. But hot blood gushed from Sanjaya the wanderer's mouth.

The Blessed One saw Sariputta and Moggallana coming in the dis-tance. When he saw them, he told the bhikkhus: "Here come these two friends, Kolita and Upatissa. These two will be my chief disciples, an auspicious pair."

Then it was that the Master announced them—
They who were already liberated
In the domain of profound knowledge,
In the supreme destruction of the stuff of existence,
Before they had yet reached the Bamboo Grove—
Saying: "Here come these two friends,
Kolita and Upatissa.
These two will be my chief disciples,
An auspicious pair."

Sariputta and Moggallana went up to the Blessed One and pros-trated themselves at his feet. They said to him: "Lord, we wish tohave the going forth under the Blessed One, and the admission."

"Come bhikkhus," the Blessed One said, "the Dhamma is well pro-claimed; lead the holy life for the complete ending of suffering." And that was those venerable ones' admission.

Now at that time a number of well-known Magadhan clansmen were leading the holy life under the Blessed One. People disapproved, they murmured and protested: "The monk Gotama is creating child-lessness and widowhood, he is obliterating the clans. Already a thou-sand matted-hair ascetics have gone forth under him, and these two hundred and fifty wanderers and now these well-known clansmen have gone to lead the holy life under the monk Gotama!" When they saw bhikkhus, they mocked them with these stanzas:

Gotama the monk did come
To the Fort of Magadha;
He led away all Sanjaya's band;
Whom will he lead away today?

Bhikkhus heard this, and they went to the Blessed One and told him. He said: "This affair will not last long. It will only last seven days. At the end of seven days it will subside. So when people mock you with that stanza, you can reprove them in return with this stanza:

'They lead by Dhamma who are
Great Heroes too, and Perfect Ones;
And when they thus lead by Dhamma,
Where is the ground for jealousy?' "

So when the people mocked them, they reproved the people in return. Then people began to think: "Monks who are sons of the Sakyans lead by Dhamma, it seems, not against Dhamma." And the affair lasted seven days, and at the end of seven days it subsided.

Vin. Mv. 1:23-24

**
*That the puthujjana does not see aniccatā is evident from the fact that the formula, 'Whatever has the nature of arising, all that has the nature of ceasing', which is clearly enough the definition of aniccatā, is used only in connection with the sotāpanna's attainment: Tassa...vītamalam dhammacakkhum udapādi. Yam kiñci samudayadhammam, sabbam tam nirodhadhamman ti. Aniccatā is seen with the sotāpanna's dhammacakkhu, or eye of the dhamma. I am glad, nevertheless, that you are managing to turn your mind towards aniccatā at times, though of course you will not really see it until you know yourself to be a sotāpanna. Nanavira Thera:

Sankhārapaccayā viññānam, as we now see, can be taken to mean that any specific series of sankhāra-sankhatadhamma pairs (one or more) of which the first contains viññāna is dependent upon the very fact that there are sankhārā at all. Avijjāpaccayā sankhārā will then mean that the very fact that there are sankhārā at all is dependent upon avijjā; and with cessation of avijjā—avijjānirodhā—all sankhārā whatsoever will cease—sankhāranirodho. This is perhaps most simply stated in the lines from the Vinaya Mahāvagga: Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā / Tesam hetum Tathāgato āha / Tesañ ca yo nirodho / Evamvādī mahāsamano. ('Of things originating with conditions, The Tathāgata has told the condition, And what their cessation is. The Great Recluse speaks thus.') Here, Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā are all things whatsoever that depend upon hetū('conditions'—synonymous with paccayā). Since each of these things depends upon its respective hetu (as in any paticcasamuppāda formulation), it shares the same fate as its hetu—it is present when the hetu< is present, and absent when the hetu is absent. Thus the hetu of them taken as a whole (all things that are hetuppabhavā) is no different from the hetu of their individual hetū taken as a whole. When there are hetū at all there are hetuppabhavā dhammā, when there are no hetū there are no hetuppabhavā dhammā; and hetū, being nothing else than sankhārā, have avijjā as condition. Tesam hetum ('their condition'), therefore, is avijjā. To see the Dhamma is to see paticcasamuppāda (as noted in §7), and avijjā is therefore non-seeing of paticcasamuppāda. Avijjāpaccayā sankhārā will thus mean 'paticcasamuppāda depends upon non-seeing of paticcasamuppāda'. Conversely, seeing of paticcasamuppāda is cessation of avijjā, and when paticcasamuppāda is seen it loses its condition ('non-seeing of paticcasamuppāda') and ceases. And this is cessation of all hetuppabhavā dhammā. Thus tesam yo nirodho is cessation of avijjā.

Awakening

If we translate bodhi as “illumination,” as most people do, the word is, like it or not, metaphorical and points toward the world, the light that pours down upon the world. If we translate bodhi as “awakening,” the word corresponds exactly to its early usage in Sanskrit, from the root budh-, “to wake,” and points exclusively to the mind, to what happens in the mind and has no counterpart in the manifest. It is only by enhancing this characteristic, which the mind shares with nothing else, that one can achieve that detachment from the existent world, that separation from what is given, that irreversible caesura: the bodhi that transforms Prince Gautama into the Buddha, into the Awakened One.

Roberto Classo
Ka