To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Thursday, April 30, 2026

The Ideology of Sameness

   ‘I regard the history of the world, and that of societies, as being fully interpretable in accordance with two major principles: the principle of equalisation and that of differentiation (i.e. the propensity for similarity and the tendency to be different), which are always connected through constant relations of re-balancing, (genuine, fake, symbolic or real) compensation, or consolation’, writes sociologist Paul Yonnet.16 

I personally share this point of view, which is why I think that, lurking behind the egalitarian rhetoric, one must actually distinguish something else: a rising aspiration for homogeneity, for the resorption of all differences — the rise of what one could term the ‘ideology of Sameness’.

The ideology of Sameness unfolds from what all men have in common. In fact, it unfurls by only taking into account their commonalities and interpreting them as being the Same. In the absence of a precise criterion allowing it to be assessed in a more specific manner, equality is but another way of referring to Sameness. The ideology of Sameness thus presents universal human equality as being equality per se, remaining disconnected from any concrete element that would actually make it possible to ascertain or invalidate such equality. To put things more simply, the ideology of Sameness surfaces as soon as equality is (wrongly) posited as a synonym for Sameness. It is an ideology that is allergic to anything that specifies, one which interprets any distinction as potentially devaluing and considers all differences to be incidental, transitory, inessential or secondary. Its driving force is the notion of the Unique, with the latter defined as anything that cannot bear otherness and that aims to reduce everything to a state of unity: one God, one civilisation, and one line of thought. Nowadays, the ideology of Sameness remains largely prevalent, acting simultaneously as the fundamental norm (in the Kelsenian sense of the Grundnorm17  ) — i.e. as one from which all the others stem — and the unique norm of a norm-less era refusing to experience any other norms.

This ideology is meant to be both descriptive and normative, since it presents the fundamental identity of all men as both an established fact and a desirable and achievable objective — without ever (or rarely) questioning the origin of the gap that separates the existing state of affairs from future reality. It thus seems to proceed from what actually is to what should be. In reality, however, it is on the basis of its own normativity, of its own conception of what should be, that it postulates an imaginary unitary being, a simple reflection of the mentality that inspires it.

Insofar as it emphasises the fundamental identity of individuals, of course, the ideology of Sameness comes up against everything that, in real life, actually sets them apart. It thus finds itself compelled to explain that these differences are but secondary and fundamentally insignificant specifications. Men may well differ in appearance, but are nonetheless essentially the same. Essence and existence are thus disconnected, as are the soul and the body, spirit and matter, and even rights and duties (the former stemming from the attributes of ‘human nature’ and the latter only performed within a social relationship and in a specific context). Concrete existence is then nothing more than a deceptive embellishment, one that prevents you from perceiving the essential. It thus follows that the ideology of Sameness itself is not unitary in its postulate at all. Heir to both the Platonic myth of the cave and to the theological distinction between the created and the uncreated, it is dualistic in terms of structure and inspiration, in the sense that it can only convey the perspective of Sameness by relying on something that is foreign to diversity or that actually transcends it.

To eradicate diversity and guide humanity back to political and social unity through its profane formulations, the ideology of Sameness usually resorts to theories that identify the social superstructure, the effects of domination, and the influence of upbringing or the environment as the very source of the distinctions that it regards as a transitory and temporary evil. (Note, in passing, that the theories in question identify the immediate causes of the state of affairs that they deplore, without ever wondering about the cause of these causes, that is to say, about their original source and the reasons why they never cease to re-emerge). Evil (fons et origo malorum18  ) is thus said to be external to man, as if the exterior were not, most and foremost, a product of the interior. By modifying the external causes, one could thus alter man’s inner core, or even bring out his true ‘nature’. In order to achieve this, one alternatively makes use of authoritarian and coercive methods, social conditioning or counter-conditioning, and ‘dialogue’ and ‘appeals to reason’, never achieving better results in one case than in the other and with failure always attributed not to erroneous starting assumptions, but to the ever-insufficient character of the means employed. The underlying vision is that of a pacified or ideal society, or, at the very least, that of a society rendered ‘just’ as soon as one has removed the external contingencies that impede the advent of Sameness.

The ideology of Sameness was initially formulated on a theological level, surfacing in the West through the Christian notion that all men, regardless of their personal characteristics and of the specific context of their actual existence, are endowed with a soul as part of an equal relationship with God. All men are thus, by their very nature, equal when it comes to the honour of having been created in the image of the one single God. And that is precisely why Christian society, no matter how diverse it may have managed to remain over the ages, revolves around a specific ideal, namely that of the Oneness of the collective body (and power). Hence this observation made by Hannah Arendt:19 

Such is the monotheistic representation of God — of God, in whose image man is supposed to have been created. Hence only man can exist, men only being, after all, a more or less successful repetition of the Same.20 

The corollary, which was developed in great detail by Saint Augustine, is that of a humanity fundamentally defined as one single whole, all of whose elements are said to be destined to advance in the same direction by achieving an ever-increasing convergence. This is the Christian root of the notion of progress. When applied to our world on earth through the slow process of secularisation, this idea gives birth to that of a rationale that is common to all (‘one complete whole in every one of us’, Descartes would say), one that every man would partake in as a result of his very humanity. ‘Thanks to this representation of a single world history’, writes Hannah Arendt once again, ‘the multiplicity of men is melted into one single human individual known as humanity.’21 

This here is, of course, not the right place for us to analyse the very manner in which the ideology of Sameness has given rise, within Western culture, to all those normative/repressive strategies described by Michel Foucault.22  Let us simply bear in mind that over the course of its historical development, the nation-state has always been less concerned with integrating than with assimilating, that is to say, with the purpose of further reducing differences by standardising society as a whole. This process was taken further and accelerated by the French Revolution of 1789, a revolution which, ever faithful to geometrical logic, decreed the abolishment of all the intermediary bodies that the Old Regime had allowed to exist. Henceforth, one was merely willing to acknowledge the existence of humanity and, simultaneously, that of a citizenship whose very exercise is conceived of as one’s participation in the universality of public affairs. Jews thus became ‘citizens like any others’ and women ‘men like any others’. Whatever defined them specifically, be it their belonging to a given gender or to a given people, was deemed non-existent or required to be kept invisible by remaining confined to the private sphere. Marcel Gauchet23  remarks:

Spawned by the age of heteronomy, the configuration of Oneness would hence be destined to govern even the most extreme versions of autonomy. The preeminent commitment that the future will be imbued with is thus that of the restoration or establishment of collective unity … From this angle, the primary ideological concern can be summarised as follows: to find a way to generate the collective Oneness once produced by religion using non-religious means.24 

The main modern ideologies would, in point of fact, alternatively fantasise about the unification of the world by means of the market, about a ‘homogeneous’ society purged of all ‘foreign’ social negativity, and about a humanity that is at peace with itself, having at long last rediscovered all that defines its essence. The political ideal would thus be rooted in the gradual erasure of all those borders that arbitrarily separate men: we would thus call ourselves ‘citizens of the world’, as if the ‘world’ were (or could ever be) a political entity — which it is not.

The ideology of Sameness, however, did more than just lay the theoretical foundations of egalitarianism. Indeed, it also enabled the emergence of colonialism (in the name of the right of the most advanced ones on the road towards human convergence to bring about the ‘progress’ of those that were lagging behind on the path to progress), while simultaneously legitimising, within different states, the use of repression against all kinds of individuals that allegedly deviated from the ‘general’ standards. In the age of modernity, this tendency towards homogeneity was taken to the extreme in totalitarian societies by a central power asserting itself as the only possible source of legitimacy. And in Western post-modern societies, the same result has been achieved through the universalisation of the logic of profit and global commodification. It is a gentler yet more effective process: indeed, the degree of homogeneity characterising present-day Western societies greatly exceeds that of the totalitarian societies of the previous century.

The universalist ambition, which tends towards unity, always correlates with individualism, which, in turn, leads to separation and dissociation. The ideology that strives the most for the unification of the world is therefore also the very same one that triggers the greatest possible disunion. Such is the most flagrant contradiction engendered by the ideology of Sameness. The universalist aim is thus inevitably linked to individualism, as it can only present humanity as one fundamental whole by envisioning it as a composite of individual atoms, all of which are viewed as abstractly as possible, that is to say, completely out of context (‘soil-less’) and beyond all mediation, thus ultimately defined as both substitutable and interchangeable — which is why it aims to bring about the disappearance of all that separates the individual from humanity, namely popular cultures, intermediary bodies, and differentiated lifestyles. One thus readily understands the importance of not confusing the notion of difference with that of division. It is by eradicating differences and destroying the latter’s very source, namely flexible structures (which also differ, and within which these differences fall), that the ideology of Sameness extends its hold. Targeting any differences organised in accordance with an organic principle, it simultaneously arouses fragmentation and division. In the absence of any integrative framework, the feverish excitement surrounding the ambition of Oneness leads to the dissolution of social cohesion.

It is thus perfectly logical that the rise of individualism, which liberals are ever so pleased with, has brought about the advent of the welfare state, whose emergence they now lament. The more community structures collapsed, the more the state had to take charge of people’s protection. Conversely, the more it guaranteed their protection, the more it exempted them from ‘maintaining family-related or community-related ties that had previously been the source of indispensable protections’,25  thus fostering assistantship and irresponsibility. A dialectical movement and vicious circle thus ensue: on the one hand, our differentiated society is now unravelling, and on the other, the homogenising state is advancing at the same pace as individualism itself. The greater the number of isolated individuals, the more uniformly they are treated by the state.

In constant competition and opposition with each other, the great modern ideologies have, as a result of their clashes, further aggravated the divisions and dissociations triggered by the spread of individualism. This paradoxical result has, however, only served to stimulate them in their ambition: faced with the spectre of ‘anarchy’ and ‘social dissolution’, with class struggle, civil war and social anomie, they argued with even greater ardour in favour of present alignment and future levelling. Once again, Marcel Gauchet remarks:

Even those who strive to highlight the very scope and inexpiable character of the antagonisms plaguing their contemporary societies do so in order to emphasise, by means of contrast, the promise to resolve the contradictions held by the future. This is typical of Marx. Bearing witness to the convulsions and heartbreaks of the present thus only strengthens one’s faith in, and hope for, the coming unity.26 

The problem is that the ideology of Sameness is bound to demand the radical exclusion of all that cannot be reduced to such Sameness. Irreconcilable otherness thus becomes the primary enemy, one that must be eradicated once and for all. Such is the motivation of all totalitarian ideologies — the elimination of all those ‘redundant men’ who, owing to their very existence, impede the advent of a homogeneous society or unified world. Whosoever speaks in the name of ‘humanity’ inevitably excludes his adversaries from it.

The contradictory logic espoused by both universalism and individualism is not the only contradiction that shapes the ideology of Sameness. In its argumentations, for instance, the latter either proceeds from the idea of ‘human nature’ (one that has been reconstructed in accordance with its own postulates, of course) or from the assertion that all natural characteristics are secondary and that man could never embrace his own humanity more faithfully than by freeing himself from these incidental characteristics. Not only do these two statements contradict each other, but the second is also at odds with scientistic ideology, according to which man can be entirely regarded as any other natural object, so much so that ‘there is nothing about him which natural sciences could, one day, fail to unveil’.27 

The corollary of abstract equality is the principle of non-difference. The logical consequence is that if all men are equal, all their opinions are equally valid — hence contemporary relativism and the liberal theory of the necessary neutrality of the state with regard to all that pertains to values and purposes (the ‘good life’ defined by Aristotle). This neutrality can only be apparent, however, because the mere fact of choosing to be neutral is, in itself, not neutral at all. In addition to this, it is obvious that liberals do not recognise antiliberal theories as having the same value as liberal ones. And obviously enough, the opinion according to which all opinions are equal does not prevent anyone from rallying against certain opinions, beginning with the one according to which not all opinions are equal.28 

There is, of course, a contradiction between planetary homogenisation and the fact of championing the cause of all peoples, which implies the recognition and preservation of their plurality. We cannot, therefore, defend both the ideal of a unified world and the right of all peoples to shape their own destiny, as there is nothing to guarantee that they will shape it in accordance with this very ideal. Similarly, one cannot advocate pluralism — defined as the legitimisation and recognition of all differences — while arguing in favour of equal conditions, which would result in the reduction of these differences. Last but not least, if the earth is indeed only populated by people who are ‘equal to each other’, what is the use of asserting the inalienable rights of each and every individual? How can one praise both what makes us unique and irreplaceable and what is said to make us virtually interchangeable? One could, admittedly, evade the issue through various slogans involving mental pirouettes, as in ‘equality in difference’. Such an expression, however, makes no sense at all, for it only refers to non-differentiating ‘difference’. One cannot support people’s right to be different while simultaneously believing that that which unites men in Sameness is fundamentally more defining with regard to their social identity than what distinguishes them from one another. Pietro Barcellona29  was thus absolutely right when using the expression ‘the tragedy of equality’ to describe the paradox according to which one can, by resorting to the notion of equality, simultaneously invalidate all forms of hierarchy and guarantee ‘diversity or what makes individuals unique’.

Alain de Benoist

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