Kant and Heiddeger on being alone

 Kant, for his part, distinguishes between inferior and admirable reasons for wanting to be alone:

We must, however, remark that separation from all society is regarded as sublime, if it rests upon Ideas that overlook all sensible interest. To be sufficient for oneself, and consequently to have no need of society, without at the same time being unsociable, i.e. without flying from it, is something bordering on the sublime; as is any dispensing with wants. On the other hand, to fly from men from misanthropy, because we bear ill-will to them, or from anthropophoby (shyness), because we fear them as foes, is partly hateful, partly contemptible. There is indeed a misanthropy (very improperly so-called), the tendency to which frequently appears with old age in many right-thinking men; which is philanthropic enough as far as goodwill to men is concerned, but which through long and sad experience is far removed from satisfaction with men. Evidence of this is afforded by the propensity to solitude . . .13Kant otherwise warns against a learned philosopher eating alone, as he will lose his vivacity and mental gaiety, exhausting his thoughts and, furthermore, allowing him to miss out on those thoughts he could have enjoyed in conversation with others.14 Placing such stress on the idea that a philosopher should seek out society is rather atypical. As we shall see, it is more common to consider solitude a prerequisite for philosophical discernment.

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Surprisingly enough, solitude remains an undeveloped theme in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. As far as I can tell, the expression does not appear in Being in Time (1927), but the phenomenon is briefly addressed in his lectures from 1929–30, and appears in isolated places in his later writings. Still, we find no overall discussion of solitude in his works. One main problem with Heidegger’s philosophy is that the ‘I’ has a tendency to hide from itself by erecting a kind of wall of ‘self-evidence’ against itself.43 The goal is to make the self transparent in order to grasp an authentic life.44 Our being is always a being-with, and being-with others is just as intrinsic as being-in-the-world.45 That is the reason solitude can exist. If others were not already a part of my existence, solitude would not be a problem, because it would not exist. Being-with is wholly compatible with not being with others – it is wholly compatible with being a hermit – but even a hermit cannot avoid the thought that he is a self in a world with other selves.46 However, Heidegger also has a tendency to emphasize that being left to oneself is actually the most innate condition. Every single one of us is predetermined to die.47 Our being is a being-until-death. Death is a negation of who you are, but it is also that towards which you are always moving. Death individualizes. It is I myself who will die. No one can die my death for me, as they might do some other job for me, such as doing the cleaning or making a meal. Death is my death, a moribundus sum that reveals itself to us as anxiety.48 Because death as such belongs to you alone, anxiety individualizes you and draws you back into yourself. According to Heidegger, however, this withdrawal is also a condition where the bonds to all other people are torn asunder, and such tearing is a prerequisite for living in freedom, truth and actuality.49 Heidegger argues that our concrete being-with becomes irrelevant in this condition.50 He uses the expression ‘existential solipsism’, that is, that in an existential sense one’s I is the only thing that exists.51 In that state, you are thrown entirely back on yourself, and all ties to others are cut. When you enter into truth and freedom, then, it is a freedom and truth without ties to others. That is the background for Heidegger’s assertions that philosophical discernment requires solitude. Solitude can essentially be regarded as a kind of degenerative phenomenon for Heidegger, since being alone is described as an inferior mode of being with others, but for Heidegger solitude is simultaneously a prerequisite for an authentic life. Therefore it is also a prerequisite for an authentic community. For example, he writes that there are certain things that prove determinate for a community, but which cannot grow within a community – just in the individual’s solitude.52 For Heidegger, the way to self-knowledge passes through solitude. He writes that in solitude people come close to the essential in all things, close to the world and close to the self.53 It is only in solitude that you can become who you are. And all true philosophy takes place in ‘enigmatic solitude’.54

From A Philosophy of Loneliness

Lars Svendsen