To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Sunday, October 2, 2022

Walter Hadwen


British physician Walter Hadwen’s medical career spanned the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The outspoken critic of both the theory and the practice of vaccination was arrested nine times for refusing to vaccinate his own children. Later, he was charged with manslaughter because he refused to participate in the fashionable practice of killing people with toxic smallpox and diphtheria vaccines. Hadwen had no respect for his colleagues who refused to stand up to the tyrannical vaccine culture of the time. The eloquent public speaker stated in 1925,

It is the great commercial manufacturing firms who are providing the brains for the medical man of today. [Applause and laughter.] We are deluged with circulars of ready-made medicines for every ailment under the sun. There never was a day when a medical man had less need for the use of his brains than he has at the present time. The commercial firms do all the thinking for him. [Hear, hear.] With a pocket syringe and a case of concentrated tabloids he can go forth a veritable medical Don Quixote to do battle with every imaginary foe. [Laughter.]45

The US has its own history of jailing vaccine informed medical professionals including naturopathic doctor and chiropractor, Herbert M. Shelton, in the 1940s.46 Shelton’s victimization by an abusive system led him to conclude, “Medical science is a form of delusional madness from which few medical men ever recover. Backed by commercialism, this madness runs roughshod over the life and health of the people.”47

Medical journalist Larry Husten writes of the problem of “eminence-based medicine” and “the culture of medicine, which rewards the hubris of eminence and actively punishes or offers subtle disincentives to anyone who question[s] this process.” According to Husten,

Medical training is disturbingly similar to military training, where immediate and unreflecting obedience is the goal. Both basic training and residency are designed to break down the mindset and instincts of a young person in order to mold them to the needs of the profession. In both, the submission to authority is a central tenet.48

The need to submit is so extreme that numerous healthcare professionals have been known to guard the secret of senior colleagues who commit medical atrocities including the routine performance of unnecessary and dangerous surgeries and sexual abuse of patients.49 If the culture of medicine sanctions acts such as these, one must ask the question: who is more sick, doctors or their patients?

45. “Dare Doctor’s Think?” Verbatim Report of the Great Meeting held at Queen’s Hall, London, Fri, Feb. 6, 1925, In connection with the Rex versus Hadwen manslaughter charge, http://soilandhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/02/0201hyglibcat/020119hadwin/020119hadwin.daredocsthink.html.
46. Victoria BidWell, “Timeline for the Life & Hard Times of Dr. Shelton,” http://soilandhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/02/0201hyglibcat/shelton.bio.bidwell.htm.
47. Eleanor McBean, The Poisoned Needle: Suppressed Facts About Vaccination, 1957, http://www.whale.to/a/mcbean.html#CHAPTER 9: MEDICAL INTERFERENCE.
48-49. Larry Husten, “The Big Dirty Secret Every Doctor Knows,” MedPageToday, August 2, 2016, http://www.medpagetoday.com/Cardiology/CardioBrief/59481.

from the book Jabbed
by Brett Wilcox

Georg Simmel on envy


In Chapter 4 of his Sociology, which is concerned with conflict, Georg Simmel investigates the phenomenon of envy, which he sees as contained within the concepts of hatred, jealousy and ill-will. Like so many authors, Simmel is immediately confronted by terminological ambiguity:

Finally, there is a fact, apparently of merely individual importance, yet in reality very significant sociologically, which may link extreme violence of antagonistic excitement, to close proximity: jealousy. Popular usage is not unequivocal in regard to this term, often failing to distinguish it from envy.

As we have already seen, Simmel here underrates the precision of the German language (as also of English and French). The big dictionaries, already available in his day, could have given him a clue. Simmel continues:

Both affects are undoubtedly of the greatest importance in the formation of human relations. In both, an asset is involved whose attainment or preservation is impeded by a third party, either truly or symbolically. Where attainment is concerned, we should speak of envy, and where preservation, rather of jealousy; in this the semantic differentiation of the words is in itself, of course, quite meaningless and of importance only for the dis-tinction of the psycho-sociological processes.

Here I would not agree with Simmel unconditionally: the use of the words is not incidental, as we have already shown in Chapter 2. Proverbial lore, as well as the literature of different cultures, has, over the course of centuries, ranged so much precise knowledge under the dis-tinct concepts 'jealousy' and 'envy' that we should retain the existing terminology. On the whole Simmel, too, adheres to tradition:

It is peculiar to the man described as jealous that the subject believes he has a rightful claim to possession, whereas envy is concerned not with the right to, but simply with the desirability of, what is denied; it is also a matter of indifference whether the asset is denied him because a third party owns it, or whether even its loss or renunciation by the latter would fail to procure itforhim.6

Jealousy or envy?

Simmel's definition needs greater precision: the expression 'jealousy' should be restricted to an asset upon which there is a legitimate claim, even if the jealous man is subjectively mistaken about his possible loss of that asset. A child in a family undoubtedly has a true a priori claim to its parents' kindness, help and love, yet it may be tormented by jealousy of its siblings if it only believes it isn't getting enough. Conversely, the husband whose wife is estranged from him has a right to claim her affections even though, seen objectively, her alienation is genuine.
Simmel's final observation is wholly correct, namely, that the envious man, in certain circumstances, does not even want to have the coveted asset, nor could he enjoy it, but would find it unbearable that another should do so. He becomes ill with annoyance over someone else's private yacht although he has never wished to board a ship in his life.
Simmel clarifies this further:

Jealousy ... is determined in its inner direction and tone by the fact that a possession is withheld from us because it is held by another, and that were this to cease, it would at once become ours: the feelings of the envious man turn rather upon the possession, those of the jealous man upon the pos-sessor. It is possible to envy a man's fame without oneself having any pretensions to fame; but one is jealous of him if one believes that one is equally or more deserving of it. What embitters and corrodes the jealous man is a kind of emotional fiction-however unjustified and senseless-that the other has, so to speak, taken the fame away from him. 7 To continue with the example of fame, there is a further distinction to be made: if there is only one foremost literary prize and one poet has missed getting it, he may be jealous of the prize-winner; but the chemist who, contrary to his expectations, has not received the Nobel Prize for his discovery can only envy his colleague the physicist who does get it.

In other words, in the case of jealousy there must be real competition, but as soon as parallel attainment of the coveted asset is or could have been factually possible, envy alone is involved.
Finally, Simmel says of jealousy that it is 'a feeling so specific in degree and kind that, having arisen as the result of some exceptional emotional combination, it aggravates the situation which gave rise to it. ' This observation is very important. But it is also true of envy. For the envious man, too, by use of his imagination will often aggravate a real situation to such an extent that he never lacks cause for envy.

Begrudging others their assets Simmel arrives at an interesting clarification of terms, distinguishing him from nearly all other writers on the subject, in his description of ill-will, of begrudging, which have always been central aspects of envy.

Approximately halfway between the clearly defined phenomena of envy and jealousy there is a third, belonging to the same scale, which might be termed begrudging: the envious desire for an object, not because it is of itself especially desirable to the subject, but only because others possess it.

This emotional reaction develops two extreme forms which mutate into the negation of the subject's own possessions. On the one hand there is the passionate form of begrudging which prefers to renounce the object itself, would indeed rather see it destroyed than allow another to have it; on the other, there is complete personal indifference or aversion to the object, and yet utter horror at the thought that someone else possesses it. Such forms of begrudging permeate human relations in every degree and variation. That great problematical area where human relations to things turn into cause and effect of their personal interrelations is largely covered by this type of affect. 8

These few sentences of Simmel's contain an observation of great importance. He does not give specific examples, yet what he has indicated here is the psycho-social dynamic, the source of numerous socially or culturally derived regulations usually known as 'sumptuary laws. '

6 G. Simmel, Soziologie. Untersuchungen aber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, Munich and Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1922, p. 210.
7 Op. cit., pp. 210-11.
8 Op. cit., p. 211.

from Helmut Schoeck  - Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour

On Tutea

 From January to April 1938 Tutea contributed articles to a well-known column on political economy in Cuvantul (The Word), edited by his mentor Nae Ionescu.

Ionescu was a charismatic university lecturer in logic and metaphysics whose concept of trairism (or 'experientialism') became the model for young intellectuals in Romania and a boost for the Orthodox faith. More than an existentialist concept, Ionescu's 'lived experience' stressed the realism of 'inner spiritual life'. Like his mentor, Tutea saw mystical love both as an individual mirroring of divine kenosis (self-emptying love) and as a collective instrument of Absolute knowledge which can happen only on the religious plane.
*
In the late 1930s and early 1940s many of the young thinkers who had taken a traditionalist and anti western position on the political right had to leave Romania.

Among them were: Eugene Ionescu, who was to become a member of the French Academy; Emil Cioran, Tutea's friend, today acknowledged as one of this century's greatest French moralists; and Mircea Eliade, who was to gain international renown as a professor of the history of religions at the University of Chicago. Despite temptations to pursue an academic career abroad, however, Tutea chose to serve the Ministry of Economy. On 12 April 1948 he was imprisoned for the first time under the communist government. During all these years, while his political views were evolving, lutea always remained a practising Christian, perhaps taking Holy Communion at Christmas and Easter. His so-called 'reconversion' was actually a clarification and confirmation of his genuinely Orthodox nature and differed from, for example, Sergei Bulgakov's move to the Church from a position of religious scepticism.
*
A remarkable prisoner, when living in isolation he used the pipes in his cell to tap out services and Bible lessons in Morse code to the other inmates. As a dormitory companion of erudite Romanian academics in seclusion, he deepened his knowledge of biblical Latin, Greek and Hebrew. The political prisoners used to consider themselves as 'living manuscripts', while calling the prison the 'Great University'. Some of the significant anecdotes of their seclusion are strikingly similar to those recorded in the Apophthegmata Patrum. Strangely enough, they used ironically to call their daily prison records Apophthegmata Patrum Rediviva.

Reeducation Experience In 1949, at the Ocnele Mari labour camp, Tutea was included in the 'preparatory psychology group' of political prisoners who were to be 'reeducated' through torture.
The aim of this so-called reeducation was to replace the victims' identity with that of their executioners. The 'new men' were intended to become ' tortionari': their psychology was 'subjected to torsion' until they should confess to, and repent of, crimes they had never committed - crimes which in fact they themselves had been subjected to. The process displayed a sadistic ability on the part of the torturers to induce psychopathology in their most courageous opponents. Amongst so much suffering, Tutea discovered his inspirational preaching vocation.
With his fellows morally and physically dying around him, he offered his own life to God. When his young friends were exposed to extreme torture Tutea actually used to encourage them to consider their deprivation as voluntary fasting and to declare a hunger strike. At the same time he would give them lectures on topics linking theology and faith with culture and philosophy. Two of his favourite themes were 'suicide and sacrifice in the Bible' and 'inspiration and adventure in Shakespearean plays'. Tutea did not regard accounts of suicide in the Hebrew scriptures as models for pious imitation. He considered suicide a violation of the inherent sanctity and wholeness of the human body. Producing Shakespeare's plays, he argued, was a continuous process of 'discovering' Christian values beyond the moral message of his tragedies.

It was at Aiud prison in the early 1960s that Petre Tutea became a representative of Orthodox martyrdom in communist lands. Those who had undergone 'reeducation' (brainwashing) were required to make a public confession of their past errors. Tutea's 'reeducation confession' was a three-hour speech on the subject 'Plato and Jesus Christ: reflections on Christianity as consolatory religion'. Apparently the prison governor asked Tutea to redictate the speech for his own private records and told him that he would no longer regard him as an 'enemy of the people'. The priests in detention, who all listened to Tutea's public confession, decided to elect him Metropolitan of Aiud Prison without any preliminary ordination. Tutea refused humbly, but from then on the prison inmates and even some of the guards would ask to see him for personal confession and counsel. Tutea believed that pastoral guidance to overachievers had been given by the Apostle Paul, who reminded his hostile Corinthian flock that all historical achievements must be viewed soteriologically (l Cor. 6:9-10).

Rediscovering Hesychasm

Paradoxically, Tutea's spiritual experience was facilitated by his time of imprisonment. It was his extraordinary intellectual abilities which had made him an obvious target for communist purging of intellectuals; but it was something beyond these intellectual powers that helped him survive the visible world in order to take the spiritual way of perfection: 'If you want to be perfect ... come and follow me' (Mt 19:21). For Tutea, 'suffering in silence is the soul's sublime way to redemption', and 'prayer and kneeling are two halves of a whole, because God will not have us love him if we do not humble ourselves before him. ' In Aiud prison hundreds of inmates shared a single dormitory. In the community so formed the company of political dissidents helped Tutea deepen his spirituality and biblical knowledge. The prison turned out to be for Tutea a 'university open to God' where he sought to break down the walls separating the church from the world.

There he met Father Dumitru Staniloae, professor at the Theological Faculty of Sibiu and at the Theological Institute of Bucharest, who by 1948 had translated the first three volumes of the Romanian version of the Philokalia, the compendium of patristic writings on prayer and hesychasm. Together with him Tutea discovered the truth which had been formulated by another Orthodox lay thinker, Nicolas Cabasilas, that prayer and meditation on a spiritual level make laymen and priests equal to those who live in solitude. Both Tutea and Staniloae were highly educated but valued what they had learned from traditional village life.

After Prison, 1964-1989 Tutea was released from prison in 1964, at a time when the initially Stalinist regime headed by Gheorghiu-Dej had distanced itself from Moscow and was promising Romanian autonomy. Gheorgiu-Dej died suddenly in March 1965 after he had designated the young Nicolae Caeauescu as the next leader of the Communist Party.

Ceauescu would continue to develop Gheorgiu-Dej's independent foreign policy, initially also showing signs of liberalisation in domestic policy. From his release from prison until December 1989, Tutea nevertheless lived under either house arrest or city arrest in Bucharest in a room no larger than a monk's cell, with built-in microphones behind the walls which were monitored by Securitate officers day and night for almost thirty years. During the year before his death (on 3 December 1991) Tutea was cared for in the 'Christiana' Orthodox Hospital in Bucharest.

In October 1965 Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the president of India who was an activist for peace and human rights, paid an official visit to Romania. 


He urged Ceauescu to change his policy of violating the human rights of former prisoners of conscience. From March 1967 Tutea was, against his will, designated to receive a nominal pension from the Ministry of Health and Social Security. In July 1968, following a decision of the Romanian Writers' Union which had perhaps taken into account Tutea's phenomenal influence in underground intellectual circles, he was granted pensionary writer status despite not having had any book published. Tutea used to joke about this, saying that his 'books' had been recorded on tape by Securitate agents and that he was therefore de jure a member of the Writers' Union.
One of these agents came to see Tutea after the 1989 Revolution to tell him he had been converted to Christianity while listening to Tutea's secretly recorded tapes.

Tutea's amazing courage as well as his self-denying modesty, shared with the many pilgrims who visited him in his guarded eighth-floor flat in Bucharest, perhaps inspired some of the events of December 1989.
*
Freedom as Monastic Counter-culture

Tutea's central view of freedom as joy fulfilled in obeying divine dogma is a continuation of the monastic claim that spiritual authority is supreme. In the third century, Antony of Egypt gave away his possessions and retreated ino the desert, and devoted his life to ascetism, attracting disciples who set up the first Christian monastic community. St Antony the Great was seeking to respond to Jesus' command 'Come, follow me.' These same fundamentally simple words stand behind Tutea's attempt to establish a quasi-monastic counter-culture. Turea consciously engaged in a 'viva voce' mission which defied the written character of the history of culture. He realised that antichristian censorship and political oppression return periodically and must be overcome each time anew by the oral counter-culture which has been recounting Jesus' message since the beginning of the Christian era. Turea always acknowledged with reverence the difficulties which must have been encountered by those inspired to compose the Gospel texts.

Tutea's life and works are within the Orthodox tradition which sees monasticism as a way of self-motivated, inspirational and non-intrusive mission. 'The man blesses the place,' says a Romanian proverb, and not vice versa. The monk does not come out into society, but individuals are encouraged to go to the monastery.

from Petre Tutea (1902-1991): the Urban Hermit of Romanian Spirituality
by Alexandru Popescu

Saturday, October 1, 2022

Alain Corbin -The Tactics of Silence

 The Tactics of Silence

Let us now leave the silence intended to aid meditation and inner reflection to focus on the role of silence in social relations, on its advantages and disadvantages, its relationship to the shaping of the self-image and its contribution to the search for distinction; in a word, on the tactics advised by the moralists and, more generally, by all who have reflected on the benefits and harms of silence in a non-solitary life.

The art of keeping quiet had been the subject of many works and had given rise to numerous aphorisms by the end of the sixteenth century. True, spirituality was often an element in these. The muteness of Jesus in the Gospels posits silence in society as a virtue; thus Ignatius Loyola proposed an art of saying nothing modelled on the silence of Christ. In 1862, you could still read in the Dictionnaire de théologie morale that silence should, above all, be regarded as a virtue: it implied speaking only to the purpose, ‘little rather than much, because it is difficult to speak much without blurting things out and sinning’, and ‘the sin is mortal because you are unable to keep a secret and you say things prejudicial to others’.1Antiquity provided examples of significant silences. Solomon, in the book of Proverbs (17:28), tells us that ‘he that shutteth his lips is esteemed a man of understanding’. Ajax, in Erebus, responds with a tragic silence when Ulysses speaks of their quarrel over who should inherit the armour of Achilles, which had led to his suicide. Dido, in the same place, answers Aeneas with a silence of terrifying power. And silence had been abundantly praised by the Stoics.

Aristotle believed that silence always brought its own reward. Seneca made it a virtue of the wise. Publilius Syrus produced many maxims on the subject. According to him, ‘you should remain silent, or your words should be more valuable than your silence’. Dionysius Cato said: ‘There is no danger in keeping quiet, there may be in speaking.’

In the early modern period, the opinion that you risked less by saying nothing than by speaking was constantly reiterated. It derived from the model of the courtier. The conviction that speech was risky was in accord with the precepts that regulated court society. Thus, the great texts which, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, dealt with the art of maintaining silence illustrate the civilizing process described by Norbert Elias. They were all of a piece with the internalization of norms that characterized it.

It was the Oráculo Manual y Arte de Prudencia (The Courtier’s Oracle or The Art of Worldly Wisdom) of Baltasar Gracián rather than the more famous Book of the Courtier of Baldesar Castiglione that was the matrix for the art of remaining silent. Nevertheless, Castiglione touched on the subject here and there in his book. He advised the courtier never to talk too much. It was dangerous rashly to embark on a conversation without being asked in the presence of a great prince. The grandee might well, in such a situation, refuse to answer so as to shame the one who had spoken out of turn. He would thus show himself to be the master of silence. The courtier should always think before saying what came into his head. Those who let their ‘loquacity . . . go beyond bounds’ become ‘silly and pointless’. Before breaking a silence it was wise to pay heed to the place where you were, the occasion and the necessary modesty. During the course of the conversation, you should now and again fall silent so as to allow the other to speak and ‘reflect in order to reply’.2The Courtier’s Oracle, by the Spanish Jesuit Baltasar Gracián, was written in 1647 and had been translated into several European languages, including English and French, by the end of the seventeenth century. Gracián reflected at greater length on the tactics of silence, which he called the ‘holy of holies of worldly wisdom’, that is, moderation and discretion. The wise man should know how to exercise self-control. Here, Gracián was influenced by Seneca and Tacitus as well as by the Spanish maxims then much in vogue. When you met someone you didn’t know, you should first test the ground. You should never talk about yourself and you should never complain. Above all, it was unbecoming to speak because you liked the sound of your own voice.3To talk, that is, to form a relationship with someone, was an art, ‘a school of knowledge and good manners’; it was how a man showed his worth.4 ‘He who is quick to speak is always on the point of being conquered and convinced.’ Gracián went further: ‘The things you want to say ought not to be said; and the things that are good to say are not good to do.’5 The man of discretion should keep quiet when there was danger in speaking the truth.

True, ignorance frequently took refuge in the sanctuary of silence; the ‘defective’ found it advantageous to keep quiet because silence ‘presented him as a man of mystery’. Another good reason to avoid talking was that the heart without a secret was ‘an open letter’. Gracián went so far as to say: ‘You should speak as if you were dictating your last will and testament.’6 His book was contemporary with a series of treatises on the art of saying nothing which appeared between 1630 and 1684 and were aimed at forming the honnête homme or ‘gentleman’. Yet, writes Marc Fumaroli, his manual remained throughout Europe the undisputed classic of the best education. The wise man kept sufficiently aloof to satisfy the requirement to preserve an element of silence with regard to himself, while also avoiding the ridiculousness of pontificating. The art of saying nothing was also, says Fumaroli, a way of keeping others in suspense and of manipulating the elements of ‘appetite, curiosity, and surprise’.7 That said, the art of prudentia was, as a tactic, far from easy.

Many moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries followed in this tradition. At this period conversation acquired huge importance. It involved alternating contemplative silence and wide-ranging conversation, without, as Montesquieu wrote, doing much listening. La Rochefoucauld observed that ‘silence is the safest option for he who mistrusts himself’. He notes that people spoke little when not driven to speak by vanity. ‘It requires great skill to speak, but no less to say nothing’, and he distinguished three types of silence: eloquent, mocking and respectful. At all events, it was better to listen and never to force yourself to speak. It was important for coquettes and the old, in particular, to keep quiet, given their tendency to chatter thoughtlessly.8 According to Mme de Sablé: ‘Speaking too much is such a major fault that, when it comes to conversation, while what is good is brief, it is doubly good, and you gain by brevity what is often lost by garrulity’; and, she added, ‘to be able to discover the inner self of another and conceal your own is the mark of a superior mind’.9M. de Moncade opined that ‘if people only said useful things, there would be deep silence in the world’.10 La Bruyère noted that those who engaged in games of chance maintained ‘an absolute silence’ together with a level of attention of which they would have been incapable in other circumstances.11 Dufresny described with amusement the introduction of a newcomer to the court: ‘He did nothing and said nothing. He was a wise man, they said. In fact, there was wisdom in his modesty and in his silence; because if he had done something or said something, they would have known he was only a fool.’12The year 1771 saw the appearance of L’Art de se taire, by the Abbé Dinouart, a book destined for a large readership. In it, the author recapitulated with clarity, force and in detail all that had gone before. His main message was that ‘men are never more in possession of themselves than when in silence’.13 Given the attention it attracted, I shall look at his treatise in some detail. Dinouart distinguished eleven types of silence: prudent, artful, complaisant, spiritual and stupid, not forgetting the silences which were a mark of approval, of disdain, of humour, of caprice and of political acumen. His aim was to compose a treatise of Christian civility, which distinguished him from his predecessors. Further, he hoped to extend prudentia beyond the court to the world of Parisian salons and men of letters, in order to counteract the philosophical spirit, rationalism and materialism. He repeated an old opinion, found in the Télémaque of Fénelon, to the effect that the art of good government entailed maintaining silence. The sovereign, more than anyone, was never more in possession of himself than in silence.

Commenting on Dinouart’s treatise, Antoine de Baecque adds the link that it establishes between silence and a rhetoric of the body. To be silent, in society, went together with measured gestures, a reserved manner, a certain facial expression and the art of the minimal which constituted this rhetoric. Émile Moulin, writing in 1885, said that, in society, when a man said nothing, his silence would have no value or expression without its natural and indispensable auxiliaries, that is, physiognomy, attitude, bearing and gaze.14 To return to Dinouart, he urged that one should hold one’s tongue as a Christian, as a man of the world, as a politician and as a strategist, which, writes Antoine de Baecque, was effectively a return to the civility of the gentleman as propounded in the preceding century. Some of the abbé’s aphorisms sum up his strategy: ‘one should cease to remain silent only when one has something to say which is more valuable than silence’; ‘one only ever knows how to speak well if one has previously learned to remain silent’; ‘the wise man has an expressive silence’.15 By contrast, the mass of the people, ‘gross and stupid’, do not know how to keep quiet. This is due to their want of education, their insolence and their superstition. As for silence in literature, many authors would have done well to be inspired by it and to have published nothing.

That said, wrote Émile Moulin, it can happen in society that silence is not a tactical move but simply the consequence of a trait of character, namely, ‘taciturnity’. Molière has a character say of the Diafoirus son: ‘You would see him, never saying a word.’ Émile Moulin offered a whole spectrum of individuals who were permanently silent. Ahasuerus, according to Racine’s Esther, was mute; William of Orange was surnamed the Silent. To which should be added the timid who lacked self-confidence. This led Moulin to present a series of silences which are not quite tactics and which do not correspond to the list established by Dinouart: the silences of ‘inertia’, of ‘sangfroid’, of ‘incredulity’, of ‘doubt’, of ‘irony’ and of ‘bearing’ (adopted by those who don’t understand what is going on), and not forgetting the ‘silence of delicacy’, silence in the presence of the old, and the silences of ‘respectful reserve’, of politeness, of resignation and of ‘dolorous sympathy’.16In the nineteenth century, Senancour’s Obermann criticizes those ‘conversations which multiply words and do not deal with things’.17 The eponymous hero of Benjamin Constant’s novel, Adolphe, living in Göttingen and desperately bored, doomed by his shyness to silence, sometimes feels the urge to talk, but is held back by his disappointment with the society in which he moves, where a contemptuous silence replaces mockery.18On 23 September 1854, Eugène Delacroix expounded at length in his Journal on the advantages of opting to remain silent in conversation and in ‘other human relationships’. His psychological analysis added depth to the earlier precepts. Unfortunately, he wrote, ‘nothing is harder than such restraint for men who are dominated by their imagination. Men with subtle minds who are quick to see every side of a question find it hard to refrain from expressing what they think.’ Nevertheless, ‘everything is to be gained by listening. You know what you wish to say to the other man, your mind is full of it, but you cannot know what he has to say to you . . . but how is it possible to resist giving a favourable idea of one’s mind to a man who seems surprised and pleased to hear what one is saying?’ And, ‘fools are more easily carried away by the empty pleasure of listening to their own voices . . . they are less interested in informing their readers than in dazzling them with their brilliance.’19 (...)

from:A History of Silence

From the Renaissance to the Present Day

Alain Corbin

Translated by Jean Birrell


Jean Cau - quotes

 


Jean Cau used to reproach his friends for their lack of adjustment:
Formerly, capitalism was a matter of having children work in mines. Nowadays, it is defined as compulsory school attendance until the age of 16. Capitalism was once synonymous with the presence of slums, of a sixty-hour week without a single day off; nowadays, it is Club Med. It’s time the Left understood this.
[The Left, however, clearly failed to understand, and Jean Cau left.]
*
Look at them! Look at them, will you? Behold our politicians’ horrible languid maws (keep smiling!); the courtier-like faces of department managers. They are indeed salesmen, for the very power of nations is measured in relation to their own mercantile activity. The moist glow of submission to the crowd, the mass, and the majority is what flickers in their eyes. Where has the exemplary face gone to? Where is the severe and exemplary voice? Where are the harsh words that drive the best people to gather among the crowd as the latter, now tamed, finds itself possessed by a sense of will, instead of being agitated by a gloomy sort of fever?
*
I used to be a member of the assault platoon and part of the leftist intelligentsia, but the years of service that I dedicated to them had me in a state of permanent scepticism, of often derisive contemplation. One reproached me for having such an attitude and unjustly equated it with a crime… Well, let it be my crime, then!
*
To this very day, socialism and liberty have failed to prove that they can be united in matrimony without having one of them — eek! — strangle the other.
*
It will have taken me years of reflection and lucidity before I finally dared to question — and express in the form of questions — the sacrosanct egalitarianism which had, up until recent years, been my milk and honey.
*
Let us state the facts both harshly and clearly. It takes more than a thousand tendencies to create a will. With a thousand currents, what you have before you is not a river but a maze of streams that follow the craziest directions. And I say to you: a thousand heresies do not equal a Church, nor do a thousand desires result in love. What would you do with a thousand soldiers that lack the leadership of a captain? Or of children that have neither father nor master? And what would a million words be worth without stylistic organisation, or millions of men that do not constitute a people? One might as well call it all a magma.
*
This century has gone mad, losing its mind to all the cowardice, resignations, lies, deceptions and ugliness; and what one has labelled its “civilisational crisis” is, in fact, nothing but the fearful rejection of all grandeur.
*
Going against the grain or, idea-wise, against all that the prevailing intellectual utopianism whispers or shouts in our ears, I state, in all tranquillity, that decadence is perfectly combinable with scientific progress and that our societies are not necessarily experiencing ascension and good health just because they conduct heart transplants, land on the moon, break the wall of sound and align Nobel prizes in onion rows: Euclid, Archimedes, Theophrastus, Hipparchus, Herophilus, and a hundred others rose to the very firmament of science at a time when both Athens and Greek power sank into the depths.
*
For when the day comes for people to be astounded by our failures, our grand-nephews must, after all, be made aware of the fact that there were at least a few soldiers who refused to put down their weapons and raise their hands in surrender.
*
What is valuable is not life itself, but what one does with it. […] There are a few destinies, and the rest are just lives that lack any and all interest: nothing but the stuff of women’s novels, idle rumours, the crackling of bubbles rising from the sludge of a pond when stirred, and cinematographic tales.
*
For valour has no need of recompense.
*
Your invincible dialectics, quibbler’s discourse, massive treatises and computers stand helpless in the face of all that, within me, burns your words to ashes.
*
Let us make love, not war, but where exactly shall we do so? In the Sargasso Sea. And how shall we make love? Through a sorry mixture of psychedelic orgies. To do so is to forget that love and war have not always been in a state of enmity.
In a world devoid of enemies, there are no friends either: one only loves insofar as one is also able not to love. And when everything is of equal value, everything is worthless:
War used to result in young people’s deaths. True enough. Sustained peace, however, kills and drains youth. Furthermore, war singles out the Others. The enemy. I am only an individual to the extent that Others exist and my very being is exasperated all the more strongly and intensely when this Other chooses to object and espouse self-denial. Enemies are a necessity: they hold me to my own definitions, force me to embrace myself, and compel me to draw the line that demarcates me from the rest and within which my difference is very much alive.
*
Every mother who brings a child into this world believes herself to be giving birth to a king. Looking at his own child, every father considers it to be the Lord of the Earth. All of this is very well and good, very powerful and very sweet, and very un-democratic. An ever-indignant and masochistic mother, democracy demands equality for all her children, even at the cost of their resulting worthlessness. Should any one of them break free and raise himself above the latter, the wicked mother proceeds to scold him and says: “Be like your brothers! Be their equal!”
*
It is impossible, by definition, to equal others from above, which accounts for the fact that egalitarian societies are necessarily pervaded by tedium or despair. Love supposes the presence of a Master. Once there are no longer any genuine Masters, the entire society is one of slaves. Those slaves, however, are all sad and hollow. In this kind of society, the bourgeois is nothing but a promoted and shameful slave.
*
The morality of the bourgeoisie is that ‘it is better to be a live dog than a dead lion’, which is the equivalent of forgetting that the dog will eventually die as well and that ‘before his death, the lion was indeed alive; and lion-like’. In ancient times, ‘both aristocrats and peasants were willing to come to terms with having their sons led to their deaths. The bourgeois, on the other hand, “harbours” his children because neither courage nor heroic obedience are part of his legacy. The aristocrat says: “If my son is a coward, he sullies my good name”; as for the peasant, he states: “If I fail to defend my land, my enemy will claim it”. By contrast, this is what the bourgeois says: “If my son is killed, who will be my heir and succeed me in running the business?”’.
*
How does one define politics? Is it the fact of governing people? I, for one, say that this is not the real issue and that it is a matter of providing them with reasons to live and to die, of bestowing self-forgetfulness upon them. And people’s reasons to live have always been identical to their reasons to die. To remove either lot is to collapse the other.
*
My very origin has determined my belonging to the people. My ancestors have been peasants since the dawn of time, and the very nobility of my lineage and race is epitomised by the fact that we have never bought nor sold anything. Our hard work, yes indeed — for what we give is our own blood.
*

Any show of power leads to finger-pointing and is soiled with spittle. Children, women, delinquents, criminals and madmen loudly protest their own “oppression” and disarm the hand that either beat them or protected them. And the more one’s head is gnawed at by the termites of weakness, the more one’s body is disintegrated by violence. Echoing the pace at which our laws grow ever weaker, the criminality in our walls gains in strength, manifesting its presence with the loud sound of solicitor-like chattering. Such is also decadence: the death of laws, the proliferation of jurisprudences and the confusion of thoughts.
*
Just imagine a President of the Republic who would declare: “Should France be attacked, either by conventional means or using an atomic bomb, I solemnly swear that it would rather choose death than submission!”. Such a president would render our country invulnerable. “Let us abstain from attacking these madmen”, the enemy would say, “they are capable of sacrificing their lives to the very last man in the name of honour”. I invite the one who would seek this supreme office to ask himself: will he, or will he not, pick liberty over life and death over slavery? His response to this single question should decide which direction our votes take. My own voting slip would bear the name of anyone who would say: “I promise you death over dishonour”. Admittedly, of course, my candidate might end up only securing two votes: his own and mine.
*
Where am I? I am where I choose to be, in the place where I feel free and unclad, in the crisp air that immerses me and strengthens me with the knowledge of harsh and therefore perfectly untimely blatancies.
*
In France, the leftist adventure through our cultural regions is an absolutely hilarious one. The Mandarin culture has approached the people with a facial expression akin to that of a modern clergyman on his way to a brothel, and the result was almost instantaneous: only the middle and petty bourgeoisie proceeded to treat itself to the cultural revolution one celebrated in some temples. On their part, the people simply went to the Châtelet, on a fishing trip or calmly turned on their TV sets.
*
In the name of God, it is all too late. In the name of man, it was and still is mere utopia. For both these reasons, let us approximate and declare that it is the irrational that awaits us next, just around history’s corner.
Prior to the cleaning of his stables,  spent thirty years living in the most unpleasant conditions. And it is now the ‘stables of the West’ that await… Hercules’ coming.
*
from the book View from the Right, Volume III
by Alain de Benoist

Solitude: a philosophical encounter

 Thoreau exclaimed, “I never found the companion that was so companionable as solitude.” Companionable? But then is it a solitude, if the loons and the raindrops are companions? Nor is this merely an eccentric remark by a man who loved paradox; for you can find in Byron’s Childe Harold a very similar exclamation

       Then stirs the feeling infinite, so felt

       In solitude, where we are least alone;5

and you can read the same sentiment in Petrarch, who objects that St. Ambrose stole it from Scipio.6 What did they all mean, exactly?

Then too, these crowings about solitude sometimes conflict with each other. Wordsworth wrote often of solitude in words like these:

       . . . we are laid asleep

       in body, and become a living soul:

       while with an eye made quiet by the power

       of harmony, and the deep power of joy,

       we see into the life of things.

(from “Lines Composed A Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey”)

Yet he also wrote the “Elegiac Stanza” of 1805:

       Farewell, farewell the heart that lives alone,

       Housed in a dream, at distance from the Kind!

       Such happiness, wherever it be known,

       Is to be pitied; for ’tis surely blind.

Sight or blindness, which is solitude? Indeed, the conflicts grow worse. Compare, for example, Proust’s famous drearity,

       Notwithstanding the illusion by which we would

       fain be cheated and with which, out of

       friendship, politeness, deference and duty, we

       cheat other people, we exist alone.7

with D. H. Lawrence’s insistence that

       Everything, even individuality itself, depends

       on relationship . . . The light shines only when

       the circuit is completed.

       My individualism is really an illusion. I am

       part of the great whole, and I can never

       escape.8

Once the possibility of general illusion is raised, even solid ground begins to feel shaky. Perhaps those famous solitudes just recalled were not really solitudes after all? True, St. Antony lived alone in a cave for twenty years; but they were twenty years of prayer, and if prayer is communion with God, and if God is conceived as a personage . . . where is the solitude? Or take the immured Sisters: if they could see into the church and follow the service at the altar, if they could look out upon daily village life outside the cell, if they were surrounded on all sides by people with whom they felt some connection . . . what then? Is it so absurd to call their solitude illusory, as Lawrence appears to wish to do? Or consider Kafka. Is writing, at some level, always writing-for-others, and so a kind of quasi-engagement? Is living in the characters as one creates them a kind of surrogate encounter? If so, would it follow that Kafka was not really alone in that silence all those nights?

Proust might seem easier to dismiss, but his descriptions of the isolated detachment of what ought to be intimate personal encounters certainly make one cringe:

I might, if I chose, take Albertine upon my knee, take her head in my hands; I might caress her, passing my hands slowly over her, but, just as if I had been handling a stone which encloses the salt of immemorial oceans or the light of a star, I felt that I was touching no more than the sealed envelope of a person who inwardly reached to infinity.9

5.  Byron, Childe Harold, Canto III, Stanzas 842–43.

6.  Francesco Petrarch, De Vita Solitaria, trans. Jacob Zeitlin (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1978), p. 288. Compare this line from Milton’s Paradise Lost (Book IX, line 249): “For Solitude, sometimes is best society.” Edward Gibbon expressed the same feeling: “I was never less alone than while by myself” (Memoirs, I).

7.  Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past (Paris: Pleiade, 1954), vol. III, p. 459.

8.  Cited in Paul Halmos, Solitude and Privacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1953), p. v.

9.  Proust, op. cit., p. 393.

Solitude: a philosophical encounter

by Philip Koch.

Solitude: Seeking Wisdom in Extremes

 Deep solitude is strange and powerful and can be frightening. During my teenage years and into my twenties, I often spent days alone in the wilderness, but three months was a radical leap I wasn’t psychologically prepared for. I almost lost it out there in northern British Columbia. I almost didn’t survive. After six or seven weeks, without other people to help me maintain my identity, the facade of autonomous self-sufficiency started to crumble. Fear crept in as I awoke to how small and vulnerable I was in the face of an enormous and threatening universe. My life felt frighteningly tenuous, and death always instantly possible.

Bears loomed large in my solitary mind. Each night was worse than the one before, as I crouched by the safety of my campfire, hiding from the dangers in the darkness beyond. Finally, I knew I had to either return to the distractions, and apparent safety, of civilization or face the darkness alone.

I left the fire and walked into the forest, edging my way through the dark. I lay down and waited. Time passed, and even the distant glimmer of the fire had died when I heard a bear coming toward me. As it snuffled closer and closer, terror struck. I could feel myself losing it and slipping over the edge into mindless panic. If I moved even a finger, I would be lost. Beyond reason and without reserve, I called for help.

In that moment of surrender, I felt lifted and found myself floating in a pool of clear light. Looking down, I sensed myself lying peacefully on the forest floor. The world was no longer a hostile alien place, but my home. No true separation remained between me and the world.

After that night of inner transformation, the whole world seemed vibrantly alive, and I lived for several weeks deeply integrated into the universe, glorying in the beauty of mountains, lake, and sky. There was also Something Else out there; Something nonphysical and beyond definition. I was part of that, too, and felt accepted and at peace. Those weeks were so filled with joy and wonder that I decided I would someday live alone in the wilderness for a whole year.

from: Solitude

Seeking Wisdom in Extremes

Robert Kull

A YEAR ALONE IN THE PATAGONIA WILDERNESS