To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Monday, October 19, 2026

‘He was in mystic delirium’: was this hermit mathematician a forgotten genius whose ideas could transform AI – or a lonely madman?


In isolation, Alexander Grothendieck seemed to have lost touch with reality, but some say his metaphysical theories could contain wonders

By Phil Hoad

One day in September 2014, in a hamlet in the French Pyrenean foothills, Jean-Claude, a landscape gardener in his late 50s, was surprised to see his neighbour at the gate. He hadn’t spoken to the 86-year-old in nearly 15 years after a dispute over a climbing rose that Jean-Claude had wanted to prune. The old man lived in total seclusion, tending to his garden in the djellaba he always wore, writing by night, heeding no one. Now, the long-bearded seeker looked troubled.

“Would you do me a favour?” he asked Jean-Claude.

“If I can.”

“Could you buy me a revolver?”

Jean-Claude refused. Then, after watching the hermit – who was deaf and nearly blind – totter erratically about his garden, he telephoned the man’s children. Even they hadn’t spoken to their father in close to 25 years. When they arrived in the village of Lasserre, the recluse repeated his request for a revolver, so he could shoot himself. There was barely room to move in his dilapidated house. The corridors were lined with shelves heaving with flasks of mouldering liquids. Overgrown plants spilled out of pots everywhere. Thousands of pages of arcane scrawling were lined up in canvas boxes in his library. But his infirmity had put paid to his studies, and he no longer saw any purpose in life. On 13 November, he died exhausted and alone in hospital in the neighbouring town of St-Lizier.

The hermit’s name was Alexander Grothendieck. Born in 1928, he arrived in France from Germany as a refugee in 1939, and went on to revolutionise postwar mathematics as Einstein had physics a generation earlier. Moving beyond distinct disciplines such as geometry, algebra and topology, he worked in pursuit of a deeper, universal language to unify them all. At the heart of his work was a new conception of space, liberating it from the Euclidean tyranny of fixed points and bringing it into the 20th-century universe of relativity and probability. The flood of concepts and tools he introduced in the 1950s and 60s awed his peers. [So, he hasn't lost touch with reality, since nobody preoccupied with relativity and non-Euclidean geometry cannot claim to be in touch with it. 😉VB]

Alexander Grothendieck teaching at the elite Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques in the 1960s. Photograph: IHES
Then, in 1970, in what he later called his “great turning point”, Grothendieck quit. Resigning from France’s elite Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques (IHES) – in protest at funding it received from the ministry of defence – put an end to his high-level mathematics career. He occupied a few minor teaching posts until 1991, when he left his home underneath Provence’s Mont Ventoux and disappeared. No one – friends, family, colleagues, the intimates who knew him as “Shurik” (his childhood nickname, the Russian diminutive for Alexander) – knew where he was.

Grothendieck’s capacity for abstract thought is legendary: he rarely made use of specific equations to grasp at mathematical truths, instead intuiting the broader conceptual structure around them to make them surrender their solutions all at once. He compared the two approaches to using a hammer to crack a walnut, versus soaking it patiently in water until it opens naturally. “He was above all a thinker and a writer, who decided to apply his genius mostly to mathematics,” says Olivia Caramello, a 39-year-old Italian mathematician who is the leading proponent of his work today. “His approach to mathematics was that of a philosopher, in the sense that the way in which one would prove results was more important to him than the results themselves.”

In Lasserre, he lived in near-complete solitude, with no television, radio, phone or internet. A handful of acolytes trekked up to the village once his whereabouts filtered out; he politely refused to receive most of them. When he did exchange words, he sometimes mentioned his true friends: the plants. Wood, he believed, was conscious. He told Michel Camilleri, a local bookbinder who helped compile his writings, that his kitchen table “knows more about you, your past, your present and your future than you will ever know”. But these wild preoccupations took him to dark places: he told one visitor that there were entities inside his house that might harm him.

Grothendieck’s genius defied his attempts at erasing his own renown. He lurks in the background of one of Cormac McCarthy’s final novels, Stella Maris, as an eminence grise who leads on its psychically disturbed mathematician protagonist. The long-awaited publication in 2022 of Grothendieck’s exhaustive memoir, Harvests and Sowings, renewed interest in his work. And there is growing academic and corporate attention to how Grothendieckian concepts could be practically applied for technological ends. Chinese telecoms giant Huawei believes his esoteric concept of the topos could be key to building the next generation of AI, and has hired Fields medal-winner Laurent Lafforgue to explore this subject. But Grothendieck’s motivations were not worldly ones, as his former colleague Pierre Cartier understood. “Even in his mathematical milieu, he wasn’t quite a member of the family,” writes Cartier. “He pursued a kind of monologue, or rather a dialogue with mathematics and God, which to him were one and the same.”

Beyond his mathematics was the unknown. Were his final writings, an avalanche of 70,000 pages in an often near-illegible hand, the aimless scribblings of a madman? Or had the anchorite of Lasserre made one last thrust into the secret architecture of the universe? And what would this outsider – who had spurned the scientific establishment and modern society – make of the idea of tech titans sizing up his intellectual property for exploitation?

In a famous passage from Harvests and Sowings, Grothendieck writes that most mathematicians work within a preconceived framework: “They are like the inheritors of a large and beautiful house all ready-built, with its living rooms and kitchens and workshops, and its kitchen utensils and tools for all and sundry, with which there is indeed everything to cook and tinker.” But he is part of a rarer breed: the builders, “whose instinctive vocation and joy is to construct new houses”.

Now his son, Matthieu Grothendieck, is working out what to do with his father’s home. Lasserre lies on the top of a hill 22 miles (35km) north of the Spanish border, in the remote Ariège département, a haven for marginals, drifters and utopians. I first walk up there one piercingly cold January morning in 2023, mists cloaking forests of oak and beech, red kites surveying the fields in between. Grothendieck’s home – one of Laserre’s few three-storey houses, build by affluent dressmakers – is at the village’s southern extremity. Hanging above the road beyond are the snow-covered Pyrenees: a promise of a higher reality.

Matthieu answers the door wearing a dressing gown, with the sheepish air of a man emerging from hibernation. The 57-year-old has deeply creased features and a strong prow of a nose. Inheriting the house where his father experienced such mental ordeals weighs on him. “This place has a history that’s bigger than me,” he says, his voice softened by smoking. “And as I haven’t got the means to knock it into shape, I feel bad about that. I feel as if I’m still living in my father’s house.”

A former ceramicist, he is now a part-time musician. In the kitchen, a long, framed scroll of Chinese script stands on a sideboard, next to one photograph of a Buddha sculpture and two of his mother, Mireille Dufour, whom Grothendieck left in 1972. (Matthieu is her youngest child; he has a sister, Johanna, and brother, Alexandre. Grothendieck also had two other sons, Serge and John, with two other women.) Above Matthieu’s bed is a garish portrait of his paternal grandfather, Alexander Schapiro, a Ukrainian Jewish anarchist who lost an arm escaping a tsarist prison, and later fought in the Spanish civil war.

• Even with all his wisdom and the depth of his insight, there was always a sense of excessiveness about my father. He always had to put himself in danger.

Schapiro and his partner, the German writer Johanna Grothendieck, left the five-year-old Grothendieck in foster care in Hamburg when they fled Nazi Germany in 1933 to fight for the socialist cause in Europe. He was reunited with his mother in 1939, and lived the remainder of the war in a French internment camp or in hiding. But his Jewish father, interned separately, was sent to Auschwitz and murdered on arrival in 1942. It was this legacy of abandonment, poverty and violence that drove the mathematician and finally overwhelmed him, Matthieu suggests: “Artists and geniuses are making up for flaws and traumas. The wound that made Shurik a genius caught up with him at the end of his life.”

Matthieu leads me into the huge, broken-down barn behind the house. Heaped on the bare-earth floor is a mound of glass flasks encased in wicker baskets: inside them are what remains of the mathematician’s plant infusions, requiring hundreds of litres of alcohol. Far removed from conventional mathematics, Grothendieck’s final studies were fixated on the problem of why evil exists in the world. His last recorded writing was a notebook logging the names of the deportees in his father’s convoy in August 1942. Matthieu believes his father’s plant distillations were linked with this attempt to explain the workings of evil: a form of alchemy through which he was attempting to isolate different species’ properties of resilience to adversity and aggression. “It’s hard to understand,” says Matthieu. “All I know is that they weren’t for drinking.”

Later, Matthieu agrees to let me look at his father’s Lasserre writings – a cache of esoterica scanned on to hard disk by his daughter. At the start of 2023, the family were still negotiating their entry into the French national library; the writings have now been accepted and at some point will be publicly available for research. Serious scholarship is needed to decide their worth on mathematical, philosophical and literary levels. I’m definitely not qualified on the first count.

I open a first page at random. The writing is spidery; there are occasional multicoloured topological diagrams, namechecks of past thinkers, often physicists – Maxwell, Planck, Einstein – and recurrent references to Satan and “this cursed world”. His children are struggling to fathom this prodigious output, too. “It’s mystic but also down to earth. He talks about life with a form of moralism. It’s completely out of fashion,” says Matthieu. “But in my opinion there are pearls in there. He was the king of formulating things.”

After a couple of hours’ reading, head spinning, I feel the abyss staring into me. So imagine what it was like for Grothendieck. According to Matthieu, a friend once asked his father what his greatest desire was. The mathematician replied: “That this infernal circle of thought finally ceases.”

The colossal folds of Mont Ventoux’s southern flank are mottled with April cloud shadow as cyclists skirt the mountain. In the Vaucluse département of Provence, this is the terrain where Alexander Grothendieck took his first steps into mysticism. Now, another of his sons, Alexandre, lives in the area. I wander up a bumpy track to see the 62-year-old ambling out of oak woods, smiling, to meet me. Wearing a moth-eaten jumper, dark slacks and slippers, Alexandre is slighter than his brother, with wind-chafed cheeks.

He leads me into the giant hangar where he lives. It is piled with amps and instruments; at the back is a workshop where he makes kalimbas, a kind of African thumb piano. In 1980, his father moved a few kilometres to the west, to a house outside the village of Mormoiron. In the subsequent years, Grothendieck’s thoughts turned inwards towards bewildering spiritual vistas. “Even with all his wisdom and the depth of his insight, there was always a sense of excessiveness about my father,” says Alexandre. “He always had to put himself in danger. He searched for it.”

Grothendieck had abandoned the commune he had been part of since 1973 in a village north of Montpellier, where he still taught at the university. From 1970 onwards, he had been one of France’s first radical ecologists and became increasingly preoccupied with meditation. In 1979, he spent a year dwelling intensely on his parents’ letters, a reflection that stripped away any lingering romanticism about them. “The myth of their great love fell flat for Shurik – it was a pure illusion,” says Johanna Grothendieck, who bears her grandmother’s name. “And he was able to decrypt all the traumatic elements of his childhood. He realised he had been quite simply abandoned by his own mother.”

This preoccupation with the past intensified into the mid-1980s, as Grothendieck worked on the manuscript for Harvests and Sowings. A reflection on his mathematical career, it was filled with stunning aphoristic insights, like the house metaphor. But, choked with David Foster Wallace-like footnotes, it was relentless and overwhelming, too – and steeped in a sense of betrayal by his former colleagues. In the wake of his revelations about his parents, this feeling became a kind of governing principle. “It was a systematic thing with our papa – to put someone on a pedestal, in order to see their flaws. Then – bam! – they went down in flames,” says Alexandre.

Although he still produced some mathematical work during this period, Grothendieck delved further into mysticism. He looked to his dreams as a conduit to the divine; he believed they were not products of his own psyche, but messages sent to him by an entity he called the Dreamer. This being was synonymous with God; as he conceived it, a kind of cosmic mother. “Like a maternal breast, the ‘grand dream’ offers us a thick and savorous milk, good to nourish and invigorate the soul,” he later wrote in The Key of Dreams, a treatise on the subject. Pierre Deligne, the brilliant pupil he accused in Harvests and Sowings of betraying him, felt his old master had lost his way. “This was not the Grothendieck I admired,” he says, on the phone from Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study.

• He became totally isolated. He was no longer in contact with nature. He had cut ties with everyone

By summer 1989, the prophetic dreams had intensified into daily audiences, “absorbing almost all of my time and energy”, with an angel Grothendieck called either Flora or Lucifera, depending on whether she manifested as benevolent or tormenting. She tutored him in a new cosmology, central to which was the question of suffering and evil in God’s greater scheme. He believed, for example, that the speed of light being close to, but not precisely, 300,000km a second, was evidence of Satan’s interference. “He was in a form of mystic delirium,” says another former pupil, Jean Malgoire, now a professor at Montpellier University. “Which is also a form of mental illness. It would have been good if he could have been seen by a psychiatrist at that point.”

In real life, he had become forbidding and remote. Matthieu spent two months in Mormoiron working on the house; during that time, his father invited him in only once. His son blew his top: “He’d lost interest in others. I could no longer feel any authentic or sincere empathy.” But Grothendieck was still interested in people’s souls. On 26 January 1990, he sent 250 of his acquaintances – including his children – a messianic, seven-page typed epistle, entitled Letter of the Good News. He announced a date – 14 October 1996 – for the “Day of Liberation” when evil on Earth would cease, and said they had been chosen to help usher in the new era. It was “a kind of remake of the most limited aspects of Christianity”, says Johanna.

Then in June 1990, as if to firm up his spiritual commitment, Grothendieck fasted for 45 days (he wanted to beat Christ’s 40), cooling himself in the heat of summer in a wine barrel filled with water. As he watched his father shrivel to an emaciated frame reminiscent of the Nazi concentration camp prisoners, Alexandre realised he may have been emulating someone else: “In some way, he was rejoining his father.”

Grothendieck almost died. He only relented when persuaded to resume eating by Johanna’s partner. She believes the fast damaged her father’s brain on a cellular level in a way impossible for a 62-year-old to recover from, further loosening his grip on rationality. Shortly afterwards, he summoned Malgoire to Mormoiron to collect 28,000 pages of mathematical writings (now available online). He showed his student an oil drum full of ashes: the remains of a huge raft of personal papers, including his parents’ letters, he had burned. The past was immaterial, and now Grothendieck could only look ahead. One year later, without warning, he moved away from his house on a trajectory known only to him.

Acircular slab of black pitted sandstone, fashioned by Johanna and now smothered in wild roses, marks Grothendieck’s resting place in Lasserre churchyard. It’s almost hidden behind a telegraph post. The mathematician was alone when he died in hospital; after several weeks in their company, he had spurned his children again, only accepting care from intermediaries.

The presence of his family seemed to stir up unbearable feelings. In his writings, he evaluates the people in his life for how much they are under the sway of Satan. But, as Alexandre points out, this was also a projection of his own seething unconscious: “He didn’t like what he saw in the mirror we held out to him.”

They only discovered his whereabouts in Lasserre by accident: one day in the late 90s Alexandre signed up for car insurance, and the company said they already had an address for an Alexander Grothendieck on file. Deciding to make contact, Alexandre spotted his father across the marketplace in the town of St-Girons, south of Lasserre. “Suddenly, he sees me,” says Alexandre. “He’s got a big smile, he’s super-happy. So I said to him: ‘Let me take your basket.’ And all of a sudden, he has a thought that he shouldn’t have anything to do with me, and his smile turns the other way. It lasted a minute and a half. A total cold shower.” He didn’t see his father again until the year he died.

At least until the early 00s, Grothendieck worked at a ferocious pace, often writing up the day’s “meditation” at the kitchen table in the dead of night. “He became totally isolated. He was no longer in contact with nature. He had cut ties with everyone,” says Johanna.

He vacillated about the date of the Day of Liberation, when evil on Earth would cease. Recalculating it as late August or early September 1996 instead of the original October date, he was crestfallen at the lack of celestial trumpets. Mathematicians Leila Schneps and Pierre Lochak, who had tracked him down a year earlier, visited him the day afterwards. “We delicately said: ‘Perhaps it’s started and people’s hearts are opening.’ But obviously he believed what we believed, which was that nothing had happened,” Schneps says.

Experiencing an “uncontrollable antipathy” to his work, that he attributed to malign forces but sounds a lot like depression, he wrote in early 1997: “The most abominable thing in the fate of victims is that Satan is master of their thoughts and feelings.” He contemplated suicide for several days, but resolved to continue living as a self-declared victim.

The house was weighing on him. In 2000, he offered it to his bookbinder, Michel Camilleri, for free, deeming him the perfect candidate because he was “good with materials”. The sole condition was that Camilleri look after his plant friends. When Camilleri refused, he was outraged – seeing the hand of Satan once more. A year later, the building was nearly destroyed when his unswept stove chimney caught fire. Some witnesses say Grothendieck tried to prevent the firefighters from accessing his property (Matthieu doesn’t believe this).

The curate at Lasserre church, David Naït Saadi, wrote Grothendieck a letter in around 2005, attempting to bring the hermit into the community. But Grothendieck fired back a missive full of biblical references, saying Saadi had a “viper’s tongue” and that he should nail his reply to the church noticeboard.

By the mid-00s, his writing was petering out. The endpoint of his late meditations, according to Matthieu, is a chronicle in which his father painstakingly records everything he is doing, as if the minutiae of his own life are imbued with immanence. Matthieu finds these writings so painful to read that he kept them back from the national library donation. Grothendieck was lost in the rooms and corridors of his own mind.

In mid-April, dapper Parisians are filing out of the polished foyer of a redeveloped hotel in the seventh arrondissement, heading for lunch. The first French TV programmes were broadcast from the building; now, Huawei is pushing for a similar leap in AI here. It has set up the Centre-Lagrange, an advanced mathematics research institute, on the site and hired elite French mathematicians, including Laurent Lafforgue, to work there. An aura of secrecy surrounds their work in this ultra-competitive field, compounded by growing suspicion in the west of Chinese tech. Huawei initially refuse to answer any questions, before permitting some answers to be emailed.

Grothendieck’s notion of the topos, developed by him in the 1960s, is of particular interest to Huawei. Of his fully realised concepts, toposes were his furthest step in his quest to identify the deeper algebraic values at the heart of mathematical space, and in doing so generate a geometry without fixed points. He described toposes as a “vast and calm river” from which fundamental mathematical truths could be sifted. Olivia Caramello views them rather as “bridges” capable of facilitating the transfer of information between different domains. Now, Lafforgue confirms via email, Huawei is exploring the application of toposes in a number of domains, including telecoms and AI.

Caramello describes toposes as a mathematical incarnation of the idea of vision; an integration of all the possible points of view on a given mathematical situation that reveals its most essential features. Applied to AI, toposes could allow computers to move beyond the data associated with, say, an apple; the geometric coordinates of how it appears in images, for example, or tagging metadata. Then AI could begin to identify objects more like we do – through a deeper “semantic” understanding of what an apple is. But practical application to create the next generation of “thinking” AI is, according to Lafforgue, some way off.

A larger question is whether this is what Grothendieck would have wanted. In 1972, during his ecologist phase, concerned that capitalist society was driving humanity towards ruin, he gave a talk at Cern, near Geneva, entitled Can We Continue Scientific Research? He didn’t know about AI – but he was already opposed to this collusion between science and corporate industry. Considering his pacifist values, he would probably also have been opposed to Huawei’s championing of his work; its chief executive, Ren Zhengfei, is a former member of the People’s Liberation Army engineering corps. The US department of defense, as well as some independent researchers, believes Huawei is controlled by the Chinese military.

Huawei insists it is a private company, owned by its employees and its founding chairman, Ren Zhengfei, and that it is “not owned, controlled or affiliated to any government or third-party company”.

We are at the very beginning of a huge exploration of these manuscripts. And certainly there will be marvels in them
Lafforgue points out that France’s IHES, where Grothendieck and later he worked, was funded by industrial companies – and thinks Huawei’s interest is legitimate. Caramello, who is the founder and president of the Grothendieck Institute research organisation, believes that he would have wanted a systematic exploration of his concepts to bring them to fruition. “Topos theory is itself a kind of machine that can extend our imagination,” she says. “So you see Grothendieck was not against the use of machines. He was against blind machines, or brute force.” What is unsettling is a degree of opaqueness about Huawei’s aims regarding AI and its collaborations, including its relationship with the Grothendieck Institute, where Lafforgue sits on the scientific council. But Caramello stresses that it is an entirely independent body that engages in theoretical, not applied research, and that makes its findings available to all. She says it does not research AI and that Lafforgue’s involvement pertains solely to his expertise in Grothendieckian maths.

Matthieu Grothendieck is clear about whether his father would have consented to Huawei, or any other corporation, exploiting his work: “No. I don’t even ask. I know.” There is little doubt that the mathematician believed modern science had become morally stunted, and the Lasserre papers attempted to reconcile it with metaphysics and moral philosophy. Compared with Grothendieck’s delirious late-1980s mysticism, there is structure and intent here. They begin with just under 5,000 pages devoted to the Schematic Elemental Geometry and Structure of the Psyche. According to the mathematician Georges Maltsiniotis, who has examined this portion, these sections contain maths in “due and proper form”. Then Grothendieck gets going on the Problem of Evil, which sprawls over 14,000 pages undertaken during much of the 1990s.

Judging by the 200 or so pages I attempt to decipher, Grothendieck put herculean effort into his new cosmology. He seems to be trying to fathom the workings of evil at the level of matter and energy. He squabbles with Einstein, James Clerk Maxwell and Darwin, especially about the role of chance in what he viewed as a divinely created universe. There are numerological musings about the significance of the lunar and solar cycles, the nine-month term of a pregnancy. He renames the months in a new calendar: January becomes Roma, August becomes Songha.

How much of this work is meaningful and how much empty mania? For Pierre Deligne, Grothendieck became fatally unmoored in his solitude. He says that he has little interest in reading the Lasserre writings “because he had little contact with other mathematicians. He was restricted to his own ideas, rather than using those of others too.” But it’s not so clear-cut for others, including Caramello. In her eyes, this fusion of mathematics and metaphysics is true to his boundary-spanning mind and could yield unexpected insights: she points out his use of the mathematics of fibration to explain psychological phenomena in Structure of the Psyche. “We are at the very beginning of a huge exploration of these manuscripts. And certainly there will be marvels in them,” she says.

Grothendieck remained hounded by evil until the end. Perhaps, shattered by his traumas, he couldn’t allow himself to forgive, and to conceive of the world in a kinder light. But his children, despite the long estrangement, aren’t the same. Matthieu rejects the idea that his father repeated the abandonment he suffered as a child on them: “We were adults, so it’s nothing compared to what he went through. He did a lot better than his parents.”

The shunning of his children wounded Johanna, but she understands that something was fundamentally broken in her father. “In his mind, I don’t think he left us. We existed in a parallel reality for him. The fact that he burned his parents’ letters was extremely revealing: he had no feeling of existing in the family chain of generations.” What’s striking is the trio’s lack of judgment about their father and their openness to discussing his ordeals. “We accept it,” says Alexandre. “It was the trial he wanted to inflict on himself – and he inflicted it on himself most of all.”

This article was amended on 31 August and 4 September 2024. An earlier version referred incorrectly to the speed of light as “300m a second”, rather than 300,000km a second; Alexander Grothendieck left Mireille Dufour in 1972, not 1970; and his house is not “the only two-storey house in Lasserre” but rather one of few three-storey buildings in the village. Also, a transcription error resulted in a reference to “the mathematics of vibration”, rather than to “fibration”.

Phil Hoad
https://www.theguardian.com/profile/philhoad

© 2026 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. (dcr)

An incapacity to see (or move outside) the "Universe" determined by the surrounding culture.


As I've often said, most mathematicians take refuge within a specific conceptual framework, in a "Universe" which seemingly has been fixed for all time - basically the one they encountered "ready-made" at the time when they did their studies. They may be compared to the heirs of a beautiful and capacious mansion in which all the installations and interior decorating have already been done, with its living-rooms , its kitchens, its studios, its cookery and cutlery, with everything in short, one needs to make or cook whatever one wishes. How this mansion has been constructed, laboriously over generations, and how and why this or that tool has been invented (as opposed to others which were not), why the rooms are disposed in just this fashion and not another - these are the kinds of questions which the heirs don't dream of asking . It's their "Universe", it's been given once and for all! It impresses one by virtue of its greatness, (even though one rarely makes the tour of all the rooms) yet at the same time by its familiarity, and, above all, with its immutability.

When they concern themselves with it at all, it is only to maintain or perhaps embellish their inheritance: strengthen the rickety legs of a piece of furniture, fix up the appearance of a facade, replace the parts of some instrument, even, for the more enterprising, construct, in one of its workshops, a brand new piece of furniture. Putting their heart into it, they may fabricate a beautiful object, which will serve to embellish the house still further.

Much more infrequently, one of them will dream of effecting some modification of some of the tools themselves, even, according to the demand, to the extent of making a new one. Once this is done, it is not unusual for them make all sorts of apologies, like a pious genuflection to traditional family values, which they appear to have affronted by some far-fetched innovation.

The windows and blinds are all closed in most of the rooms of this mansion, no doubt from fear of being engulfed by winds blowing from no-one knows where. And, when the beautiful new furnishings, one after another with no regard for their provenance, begin to encumber and crowd out the space of their rooms even to the extent of pouring into the corridors, not one of these heirs wish to consider the possibility that their cozy, comforting universe may be cracking at the seams. Rather than facing the matter squarely, each in his own way tries to find some way of accommodating himself, one squeezing himself in between a Louis XV chest of drawers and a rattan rocking chair, another between a moldy grotesque statue and an Egyptian sarcophagus, yet another who, driven to desperation climbs, as best he can, a huge heterogeneous collapsing pile of chairs and benches!

The little picture I've just sketched is not restricted to the world of the mathematicians. It can serve to illustrate certain inveterate and timeless situations to be found in every milieu and every sphere of human activity, and (as far as I know) in every society and every period of human history. I made reference to it before , and I am the last to exempt myself: quite to the contrary, as this testament well demonstrates. However I maintain that, in the relatively restricted domain of intellectual creativity, I've not been affected (*) by this conditioning process, which could be considered a kind of 'cultural blindness', an incapacity to see ( or move outside) the "Universe" determined by the surrounding culture.

(*) The reasons for this are no doubt to be found in the propitious intellectual climate of my infancy up to the age of 5. With respect to this subject look at the note entitled " Innocence", (R&S III,# 107) .

I consider myself to be in the distinguished line of mathematicians whose spontaneous and joyful vocation it has been to be ceaseless building new mansions. (**)

(**)This archetypal image of the "house" under construction appears and is elaborated for the first time in the note "Yin the Servant, and the New Masters" (R&S III #135)

We are the sort who, along the way, can't be prevented from fashioning, as needed, all the tools, cutlery, furnishings and instruments used in building the new mansion, right from the foundations up to the rooftops, leaving enough room for installing future kitchens and future workshops, and whatever is needed to make it habitable and comfortable. However once everything has been set in place, down to the gutters and the footstools, we aren’t the kind of worker who will hang around, although every stone and every rafter carries the stamp of the hand that conceived it and put it in its place.

The rightful place of such a worker is not in a ready-made universe, however accommodating it may be, whether one that he's built with his own hands, or by those of his predecessors. New tasks forever call him to new scaffoldings, driven as he is by a need that he is perhaps alone to fully respond to. He belongs out in the open. He is the companion of the winds and isn't afraid of being entirely alone in his task, for months or even years or, if it should be necessary, his whole life, if no-one arrives to relieve him of his burden. He, like the rest of the world, hasn't more than two hands - yet two hands which, at every moment, know what they're doing, which do not shrink from the most arduous tasks, nor despise the most delicate, and are never resistent to learning to perform the innumerable list of things they may be called upon to do. Two hands, it isn't much, considering how the world is infinite. Yet, all the same, two hands, they are a lot ....


Alexandre GROTHENDIECK

The importance of Solitude

 

A few years after I finally established contact with the world of mathematics at Paris, I learned, among other things, that the work I'd in my little niche with the means at my disposal had (essentially ) been long known to the whole world under the name of "Lebesgue's theory of measure and integration". In the eyes of my mentors, to whom I'd described this work, and even shown them the manuscript, I'd simply "wasted my time", merely doing over again something that was "already known". But I don't recall feeling any sense of disappointment. At that time the very notion of "taking credit" for my own work, either to receive compliments or even the mere interest of anyone else, ) was furthest from my thoughts. My energies at that time were completely taken up with adjusting to a totally unfamiliar environment, above all with learning what one had to know to be treated like a mathematician.(*)

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(*)I talk briefly about this transitional period, which was rather rough, in the first part of Récoltes et Semailles (R&S I), in the section entitled "Welcoming the Stranger" (#9)
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However, re-thinking those three years (1945-48), I realize that they weren't wasted in the least. Without recognizing it, I'd thereby familiarized myself with the conditions of solitude that are essential for the profession of mathematician , something that no-one can teach you. Without having to be told, without having to meet others who shared my thirst for understanding, I already knew "in my guts", that I was indeed a mathematician: because I knew that I was one who "makes mathematics", in the way someone "makes love". Quite simply, mathematics had become a mistress, ever receptive to gratifying my desire. These years of isolation laid the foundation for a faith that has never been shaken - neither by the discovery (arriving in Paris at the age of 20), of the full extent of my ignorance and the immensity of what I would be obliged to learn; nor (20 years later) by the turbulent events surrounding my final departure from the world of mathematics; nor, in recent years, by the thoroughly weird episodes of a metaphorical "Burial" of my person and my work, so perfectly orchestrated by those who were formerly my closest friends ....

To state it in slightly different terms: in those critical years I learned how to be alone (*)
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(*) This formulation doesn't really capture my meaning. I didn't, in any literal sense learn to be alone, for the simple reason that this knowledge had never been unlearned during my childhood. It is a basic capacity in all of us from the day of our birth. However these 3 years of work in isolation, when I was thrown onto my own resources, following guidelines which I myself had spontaneously invented, instilled in me a strong degree of confidence, unassuming yet enduring, in my ability to do mathematics, which owes nothing to any consensus or to the fashions which pass as law. I come back to this subject again in the note: "Roots and Solitude" ( R&S IV, #171.3, in particular page 1080).
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By this I mean to say: to reach out in my own way to the things I wished to learn, rather than relying on the notions of the consensus, overt or tacit, coming from a more or less extended clan of which I found myself a member, or which for any other reason laid claim to be taken as an authority. This silent consensus had informed me, both at the lyé and at the university, that one shouldn't bother worrying about what was really meant when using a term like "volume", which was "obviously self-evident", "generally known", "unproblematic", etc. I'd gone over their heads, almost as a matter of course, even as Lesbesgue himself had, several decades before, gone over their heads. It is in this gesture of "going beyond", to be something in oneself rather than the pawn of a consensus, the refusal to stay within a rigid circle that others have drawn around one - it is in this solitary act that one finds true creativity. All others things follow as a matter of course.

Since then I've had the chance, in the world of mathematics that bid me welcome, to meet quite a number of people, both among my "elders" and among young people in my general age group, who were much more brilliant, much more "gifted" than I was. I admired the facility with which they picked up, as if at play, new ideas, juggling them as if familiar with them from the cradle - while for myself I felt clumsy, even oafish, wandering painfully up a arduous track, like a dumb ox faced with an amorphous mountain of things that I had to learn( so I was assured), things I felt incapable of understanding the essentials or following through to the end. Indeed, there was little about me that identified the kind of bright student who wins at prestigious competitions or assimilates, almost by sleight of hand, the most forbidding subjects.

In fact, most of these comrades who I gauged to be more brilliant than I have gone on to become distinguished mathematicians. Still, from the perspective of 30 or 35 years, I can state that their imprint upon the mathematics of our time has not been very profound. They've all done things, often beautiful things, in a context that was already set out before them, which they had no inclination to disturb. Without being aware of it, they've remained prisoners of those invisible and despotic circles which delimit the universe of a certain milieu in a given era. To have broken these bounds they would have had to rediscover in themselves that capability which was their birth-right, as it was mine: the capacity to be alone.

The infant has no trouble whatsoever being alone. It is solitary by nature, even when it's enjoying the company surrounding him or seeks his mother's tit when it is in need of it. And he is well aware, without having to be told, that the tit is for him, and knows how to use it. Yet all too often we have lost touch with the child within us. And it's often the case that we pass by the most important things without bothering to look at them...

If, in Récoltes et Semailles I'm addressing anyone besides myself, it isn't what's called a "public". Rather I'm addressing that someone who is prepared to read me as a person , and as a solitary person. It's to that being inside of you who knows how to be alone, it is to this infant that I wish to speak, and no-one else. I'm well aware that this infant has been considerably estranged. It's been through some hard times, and more than once over a long period. It's been dropped off Lord knows where, and it can be very difficult to reach. One swears that it died ages ago, or that it never existed - and yet I am certain it's always there, and very much alive.

And, as well, I know how to recognize the signs that tell me I'm being understood. It's when, beyond all differences of culture and fate, what I have to say about my person finds an echo and an resonance in you, in that moment when you see, your own life, your own experience, in a light which, up to that moment, you'd not thought of paying attention to. It's not a matter of some sort of "re-identifying " something or someone that was lost to you. It means that you have rediscovered your own life, that which is closest to you, by virtue of the rediscovery that I've made of mine in the course of my writing these pages of R8#233coltes et Semailles, and even in those pages that I am in the process of setting down at this very moment.

Alexandre GROTHENDIECK

* It's easy to "fight" for what you believe to be your right, when you're part of a group, however small, with which you feel in unison. But the one who is alone against all, the outcast, the unwelcome stranger, is like a tree deprived of its soil. The strength within him is of no help; it becomes bitterness that turns against itself, as if to chorus with the whole world, which rejects him.

When I held in my hands this book which consecrated the exhumation of the motifs as well as the burial of the worker who had brought them to light, this book signed by four of the most brilliant authors of a brilliant generation (which I had helped to shape) - when I finally became acquainted with it, by the greatest of coincidences (given that until then nobody had noted anything in particular that was worth pointing out to me. . . ) - at that moment I knew, for the first time in the thirty-six years I had been acquainted with the world of mathematicians, that I was alone against all. ) - at that moment I knew, for the first time in the thirty-six years I'd been acquainted with the world of mathematicians, that I was alone against all of them.

A lot of things that had happened over the past eight years suddenly came together and made sense. It's a funny feeling when you suddenly rediscover that solitude. I had to catch my breath that day, and throughout the weeks that followed, taking in day by day the full dimension of L'Enterrement - a burial worthy of the work.

Alexandre GROTHENDIECK

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Cioran – quotes from Notebooks

 



E. M. Cioran (1911-1995)
[Source: Notizen/Cahiers 1957-1972, Karolinger]

“Emily Dickinson: 'I felt a funeral in my brain,' I could add, like Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, 'every moment of my life'. The eternal funeral of the mind.” [P. 15]

“I sought my salvation in utopia and found only a little comfort in the apocalypse.” [P. 17]

“To make more plans than an impostor or a researcher, and at the same time to be struck by a lack of will, reaches - without metaphor - to the root of will.” [P. 21]

“What cannot be translated into religious terms doesn't deserve to be lived.” [P. 22]

“Sometimes, deep inside, I feel endless powers. Unfortunately, I don't know what to use them for; I believe in nothing, and to act one must believe, believe, believe... I lose myself every day, then I let the world that resides in me die. With the arrogance of a fool, and yet dawning in disgracefulness, in sterile sadness, in powerlessness and in silence.” [P. 22]

“There is a certain pleasure in resisting the call of suicide.” [P. 23]

“The two greatest sages of late Antiquity: Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, a slave and an emperor.” [P. 23]

“All fame is ridiculous; those who seek it must truly have a taste for decay.” [P. 25]

“I must create a smile, arm myself with it, get under its protection, put something between the world and myself, hide my wounds, finally learn the mask.” [P. 26]

“Success doesn't necessarily encourage success, but failure always encourages failure. Fate is a word that makes sense only in misfortune.” [P. 27]

“Boredom: empty suffering, diffuse agony. One does not experience boredom in hell; only in paradise does one feel bored.” [P. 29]

“No matter how much I exert myself, I could never accept this universe without feeling guilty of deception.” [P. 27]

“There are moments of weakness and doubt in which truth, and even the idea of truth, seems so inaccessible and incomprehensible that the slightest probability appears as an unexpected perspective.” [P. 31]

“Up close, everything that lives, even the tiniest insect, seems full of mystery; from a distance, boundless insignificance. There is a distance that displaces metaphysics; to philosophize means to still be an accomplice of the world.” [P. 31]

"The rudeness of being 'profound.'" [P. 32]

“The entire Hindu philosophy can be summed up as terror, not of death, but of birth.” [P. 33]

“Not taking revenge poisons the soul as much, if not more, than taking revenge. Does one have the right not to take revenge?” [P. 35]

“We exist only for our enemies - and a few friends who don't love us.” [P. 35]

“I would give all the poets for Emily Dickinson.” [P. 35]

“I am a Mongol laid waste by melancholy.” [P. 35]

“Evil is as much a creative force as Good. Yet of the two, it is the more active. For too often Good loafs.” [P. 36]

“With each insult, we hesitate between a slap and a death blow; and this hesitation, which makes us waste precious time, confirms our cowardice.” [P. 39]

“We don't demand freedom, we demand the illusion of freedom. For millennia, humanity has been tormented by this illusion. And since freedom, as they say, is a feeling, what difference is there between being free or thinking you are free?” [P. 40]

“Man is inevitably heading towards catastrophe. To the extent that I remain convinced of this, I am interested in him, with greed, with passion.” [P. 40]

“For a skeptic to be born, a thousand believers must rage.” [P. 41]

“The breadth and depth of a mind are measured by the sufferings that he has endured to attain knowledge. No one knows who has not suffered. A keen intellect can be completely superficial. Every step towards knowledge must be paid for.” [P. 42]

“The story of the Fall may be the profoundest thing ever written. Here everything is told of what we were to experience and suffer. All of history in one page.” [P. 45]

“Some seek fame, others seek truth. I dare to join the latter. An unattainable goal is more seductive than an attainable one. The approval of men - what a humiliation to strive for it!” [P. 55]

“I am only interested in spirits endowed with the dimension of darkness.” [P. 55]

“The spirit flourishes neither in the excesses of freedom nor in those of terror. It requires a bearable constraint.” [P. 63]

“The more I think of life as a phenomenon distinct from matter, the more it frightens me: Life is based on nothing, it is an improvisation, an experiment, an adventure. It seems to me so fragile, so inconsistent, so devoid of any reality, that I cannot contemplate life and its conditions without shuddering. It is only a spectacle, a whim of matter. We would cease to exist if we knew how unreal we are. If one wants to live, one must forbid oneself to think about life, to isolate it in the universe, to want to bring it to the point.” [P. 63]

“There are no pure emotions between individuals who are engaged in the same pursuit. A novelist is not jealous of a philosopher, but novelists inevitably hate each other, as do philosophers, especially poets. Think of the hateful glances prostitutes throw at each other when they share the same sidewalk. Adam was only a beginner; Cain remains our universal sovereign, the true ancestor of our race.” [P. 68]

“If one is unfit for indifference, one cannot live without pleading. The soul is an eternal crucifixion.” [P. 71]

“Lady Macbeth, Brinvilliers - women to my liking. In moments of deep discouragement, there is a certain longing for cruelty.” [P. 71]

“I appreciate a thinker only to the extent that he doesn't conform to his time, just as I admire only those who become renegades of it, or better still, those who betray time and history.” [P. 72]

“If everything continues - the reason is that people lack the courage for hopelessness.” [P. 79]

“My strength: to have found no answer to anything.” [P. 84]

“The only benefit of funerals is to allow us to reconcile with our enemies.” [P. 104]

“To live is to be capable of indignation. The sage is a man who no longer protests. Hence he is not above but alongside life.” [P. 117]

“Every day that passes increases the dangers that threaten humanity. It will pay dearly for the 'progress' it doesn't cease to indulge. The means to preserve life are ridiculous compared to those suspected of destroying it, and whatever man may undertake, he will never be right against this disproportion. What one advances in months or years, one destroys in an instant. What makes destruction in general so immoral is its ease. Except for suicide, all destruction is effortless. These are edifying thoughts…” [P. 120]

“The state of the unconscious is the natural state of life. In it, life is at home, thrives, and finds the benevolent slumber of growth. As soon as it awakens, and especially stays awake, it becomes hurried, burdened, and begins to wither.” [P. 120]

“Among friends, feelings are inevitably false. How can one form a genuine attachment to someone they know too well without hidden intentions?” [P. 120]

“When I think that in my youth I regarded the anarchist as humanity's fulfillment! Is it progress or is it decline to have arrived at a resignation which makes me consider any act of rebellion as a sign of infantilism? And yet, if I no longer rebel, I continue to be indignant (which perhaps comes down to the same thing). This is because life and indignation are virtually equivalent terms. Nothing that is alive is neutral. Neutrality is a victory over life, not life.” [P. 120/121]

“I call 'naive' he who is unaware of his insignificance and consequently enjoys recognition. One can see that this definition encompasses almost the entire human race.” [P. 122]

“To repeat oneself is a sin against the spirit. How I love the writers who have written almost nothing!” [P. 123]

“A book must have weight and present itself as a fatality that, when we read it, gives us the impression that it couldn't have remained unwritten. That in the end it came into being by a decree of Providence.” [P. 123]

“The only realization I am proud of, because I had it so early, before my twentieth year, is that one shouldn't reproduce. My disgust for marriage, family, and all social conventions stems from this. It is a crime to pass on one's faults to offspring, forcing them to endure the same sufferings, perhaps an even worse crossroads than oneself. I have never been able to give life to a being that would have inherited my unhappiness and infirmities. All parents are either irresponsible or murderers. Only animals should give birth. Compassion prevents us from 'reproducing'. It is the worst word I know.” [P. 123]

“In essence, indifference cannot be learned; it is part of a civilization. It is not a goal; it is a gift.” [P. 128]

“'Sadness will last forever.' These seem to have been Van Gogh's last words. I could have spoken them at any moment of my life.” [P. 129]

“The profound word of the Gitâ, that one should always keep in mind: 'It is better to perish by one's own law than to be saved by another's.'” [P. 134]

“I am not afraid of death, but of life. As far back as I can remember, it has always seemed unfathomable and frightening to me. My inability to fit in. Then the fear of people, as if I belonged to a different species. Always the feeling that my interests were in no way in line with theirs.” [P. 142]

“No friend ever tells us the truth. That is why only the silent dialogue with our enemies is fruitful.” [P. 142]

“I have noticed that I am almost always happy when everyone else is not.” [P. 143]

“My inability to tell people the truth directly, in short, my cowardice, has entangled me in more complications than if I had been a moral hero. I fall over people as such, but in the face of an individual, I lack all courage. I am terribly afraid of hurting others and, no doubt, of being hurt myself. One can be afraid because of an excess of sensitivity.” [P. 144]

“I see it confirmed every day, one can have compassion for people, but to love them, that is impossible. Here, precisely on this central point, Christianity is mistaken.” [P. 144]

“The role of insomnia in history. From Caligula to Hitler. Is the inability to sleep the cause or the consequence of cruelty? The tyrant lies awake: that is what defines him as such.” [P. 147]

“One speaks of the diseases of the will, and forgets that the will itself is a disease, that to want is not a natural action.” [P. 150]

“From a Christian, I have only the desire to torment myself and unnecessarily burden my conscience and my days.” [P. 162]

“As soon as one doesn't accept the irreparable, one falls back into the obsession of suicide.” [P. 165]

“The sufferings of those one loves are morally more unbearable than one's own.” [P. 165]

“One doesn't become better as one ages, one only learns to hide one's shame.” [P. 168]

“First condition of a perfect society: being able to kill all those one detests.” [P. 175]

“The whole secret of life is to surrender to illusions without knowing that they are illusions. Once you recognize them as such, the spell is broken.” [P. 175]

“The melancholy of being understood - for a writer, there is none greater.” [P. 210]

“The true prophet is the one who suffers from the horror of the future without believing in 'progress.'” [P. 221]

“Children who are not ashamed of their parents are irrevocably condemned to mediocrity. Nothing makes one more sterile than admiring one's 'creators.'” [P. 227]

“Only the failed works allow us to glimpse the essence of art.” [P. 227]

“In a century, or perhaps even sooner, people will speak of our time as an earthly paradise. When the whole earth is populated, humanity will only be able to draw hope from the past…” [P. 233]

“No one digests an insult or humiliation, no matter how insignificant it may be. Revenge is the fundamental fact of the moral universe.” [P. 235]

“I am not a pessimist, I love this terrible world.” [P. 235]

“I can only love those who show a certain impotence in the face of life.” [P. 236]

“Every newborn is for me one more unhappy person, just as every death is one less. It's a mechanical reaction of mine. Condolences for birth, congratulations for death.” [P. 247]

“When the Olympic gods descended to earth, they often took the form of an animal. This says a lot about their appreciation for humans.” [P. 257]

“'Judge no one until you have put yourself in his place.' This old saying (where does it come from?) makes any judgment impossible, for we judge someone precisely because we cannot put ourselves in his place.” [P. 257]

“If one wants to know what life is worth, it is important to remember that the only thing that reconciles us with it is sleep, that is, exactly what it is not: its negation.” [P. 259]

“Suffering created me, suffering will destroy me. I am its creation. In return, I render it a service: it lives through me, persists through my sacrifices.” [P. 261]

“When the fear of death fades, everything becomes frighteningly simple.” [P. 273]

“The enormous sadness in the eyes of a gorilla. An elegiac animal. It is from this stare that I am descended.” [P. 289]

“'No creature can attain the highest degree of nature without ceasing to exist.' (Thomas Aquinas) This is the anticipated response to the aberrations of the Übermensch. Man is condemned to be what he is. He cannot change his nature. He can even (not) improve himself without punishment. To be fallen is his nature. Much more, it is his way of life.” [P. 296]

“I have almost always ended by adopting the opinions of those I most opposed. (The Iron Guard, which I had detested at the start, became for me a phobic obsession.) Having attacked Joseph de Maistre, I suffered his contagion. The enemy insidiously triumphs over a man without character. By dint of thinking against someone or something, you become its prisoner, and reach the point of loving that servitude.” [P. 306]

“Nietzsche tires me. My weariness sometimes reaches the point of disgust. One cannot embrace a thinker whose ideal lies in the opposite of what he is. There is something repulsive about the weak pretending to be strong, about the weak without pity. All this is good for adolescents.” [P. 328]

“Greatness exists only where a man stands alone against all others.” [P. 341]

“The Demiurge is called Ialdabaôth in Hebrew, which means 'Son of Chaos.'” [P. 341]

“To withdraw into oneself forever, like God after creation!” [P. 343]

"'Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct.'" (F. H. Bradley) [P. 352]

“Injustice is not a mystery but the visible essence of this world.” [P. 355]

“For some, the prospect of dying (Proust, Hitler...) impels them to a frenzy of activity: they want to conclude everything, complete their work, and thereby become eternal; not a moment to lose, they are stimulated by the notion of their end - for others, the same prospect paralyzes them, leads them to a sterile sagesse, and keeps them from working: what's the use? The idea of their end flatters their apathy, instead of disturbing it; whereas among the first group, it rouses every energy, good as well as bad. Who is right here, where is reason? It is hard to say, especially since both reactions are justified. Everything depends on our inclinations, on our nature. In order to really know someone, you have to know what the thought of his end releases in him: is it exciting or benumbing? Lucky those who set to work because they think they're going to die, who in this idea find a truly dynamic impulse! Less fortunate those who lay down their arms and wait, for they have too much time to envisage their conclusion. They die during all the moments they dedicate to the idea of death: moribund in the full sense of the word, inexhaustibly moribund.” [P. 359]

“I think I would be the worst psychiatrist one could imagine, because I would understand and agree with all my patients.” [P. 360]

“Time is my life, my blood; the others - vampires who feed on it, exhausting me. Someone is robbing me of my substance, or at least gnawing at it.” [P. 364]

“If this universe were cleansed of life, there would be nothing to complain about.” [P. 372]

“The only interesting part of any doctrine of salvation (whether religious or political) is the destructive part.” [P. 399]

“You cannot argue with physical pain.” [P. 425]

“Life in its most beautiful moment is merely a balance of its disadvantages.” [P. 431]

“Hitler's marriage with Eva Braun took place a few hours before their suicide. An official was hurriedly summoned, and asked each of them separately the obligatory question: 'Are you Aryan?' They answered in the affirmative. If Hitler had said: 'No,' that would have been the most extraordinary answer in History.” [P. 446]

“The scapegoat. We cannot do without it, its existence is required by our biological constitution. Someone must pay for our faults and our failures; if we consider ourselves as alone responsible, what complications, what additional tortures! To have a good conscience, is all that we ask: the scapegoat serves that function. It takes an almost superhuman effort to be able to assume the blame ourselves for everything. But when we have made the effort we have the distinct sensation that we are approaching the truth. Alas! This doesn't make us more modest, only more vainglorious.” [P. 466/467]

“My love of Bach has overwhelmed me again. I love to listen to him in the dark. I turn off the light and take my pleasure in a tomb. Sometimes it's as if I were listening to music after my death.” [P. 526]

“Those who don't die young deserve to die.” [P. 545]

“There is no means to prove that being is preferable to non-being.” [P. 548]

“If revenge were to miraculously disappear, almost the entire human race would become a victim of previously unknown mental illnesses.” [P. 551]

“Every noble attitude is false. Insults are unforgivable, except those from strangers, - never if they come from a friend or an acquaintance.” [P. 556]

“Never hurt anyone: how to manage this? By not manifesting yourself. For every action hurts someone. By abstaining, one spares every one. But perhaps death is even better than abstention.” [P. 556]

“What an extraordinary sensation, for a writer, to be forgotten! To be posthumous in one's own lifetime, no longer to see one's name anywhere. For all literature is a question of names and of nothing else. To have a name, the expression speaks volumes. Well then, no longer having a name, if one has ever had such a thing, may be better than having one. Such is the price of freedom. Freedom, and even more: deliverance. A name - all that remains of a being. It's stupefying that one can toil and torment oneself for such a trifle.” [P. 556/557]

“One is driven by the demon every time one doesn't want to play the 'game,' every time one speaks a truth that necessarily goes against oneself.” [P. 557]

“Suicide is the most normal act one can commit. Every thought should lead to it, and every career should end with it. It should replace the unwanted and humiliating end everywhere. Everyone should choose his last hour.” [P. 564]

“Only the one who questions the very fact of existence is truly revolutionary; all others, the anarchist first and foremost, pact with the established order.” [P. 566]

“Children turn against their parents; and parents deserve their fate. Everything turns against everything; everyone creates their own enemy. Such is the law.” [P. 570]

“'Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires.'" (Blake) [P. 571]

“Over time, tolerance brings forth more evil than intolerance - that is the true drama of history. If this assertion is true, it is the greatest indictment against man.” [P. 576]

“To be able to kill oneself and not do it is to be an autocrat who doesn't make use of his authority.” [P. 599]

“If a person forces himself to believe in something, it is only to avoid killing himself, for suicide is the logical consequence of the realisation that nothing withstands rigorous analysis, cruel reflection.” [P. 599]

“I am always afraid of scandal, I am always afraid of defamation, against which there is no defense. But I say to myself: if I were dead, what would it matter to me if people said these or those abominations about me? For the most honorable man in the world, death is not only a liberation, but an acquittal. One is no longer guilty; one is no longer a monster once six feet under. Death is truly immoral. Suicide even more so. One feels like committing all sorts of crimes and saying to oneself: what does it matter, a single bullet would free me from guilt, and I would find a peace as perfect as that enjoyed by the innocent.” [P. 606]

“If the fear of death were to miraculously disappear, life would have no protection at all: it would be at the mercy of our first whim. It would lose all value and perhaps all meaning. The sages who urge us so vehemently to free ourselves from this fear do not know what they are doing. They don't realize that they are destroyers.” [P. 623]

“The greatest misfortunes are those foreseen.” [P. 627]

“To understand other people, you must be obsessed by yourself to the point of disgust, such disgust being a symptom of health, a necessary condition in order to look beyond your own troubles.” [P.638]

“An advancing army knows nothing, doesn't even suspect defeat. Mankind drags itself forward in the belief that it is rushing towards victory. Where it is really heading is only glimpsed by those who have turned away from the march, those who anticipate the end.” [P.639]

“The truth is in neither revolution nor in reaction. It resides in the questioning both of society and of those who attack it.” [P.647]

“Health, like freedom, has no positive content, since you don't consciously enjoy it when you possess it. It contributes nothing to you, it can enrich no one. So it would be absurd to say that someone made some discovery or had some vision because he was feeling well. It is when you feel ill that you discover something new, health being a state of absence, since you are not conscious of it. You would have to be able to tell yourself at any moment at all: I am feeling well, and from this derive a real, conscious well-being. But such consciousness would be in contradiction with health and would merely prove that health is or is about to be compromised. Any conscious health is a threatened health. Health is a good, certainly, but those who possess it have been denied the opportunity of knowing their happiness. And one might speak without exaggeration of a just punishment of the healthy.” [P.647/648]

“One should humble man. The resulting dangers are much less than those caused by arrogance. A naturally arrogant animal - the only means to bring him to reason is to show him what mud he is made of.” [P.652]

"'My life is the hesitation before birth.' (Kafka) ... As I have always felt.” [P.658]

“My task is to awaken people from their eternal slumber, even though I know that I am committing a crime and that it would be a thousand times better to leave them in it. Even if they are awakened - I have nothing to offer them.” [P.680]

“Life is extraordinary, in the sense that the sexual act is extraordinary: during, and not after. Once you position yourself outside of life and consider it from an external point of view, everything collapses, everything seems deception, as after the sexual performance. All pleasure is extraordinary and unreal, as is the case for every act of life.” [P.689]

“You have to let people say what they want. Eventually the truth will be reestablished. Anything is better than humiliation. Injustice is necessary to the mind; it fortifies, cleanses it. A victim is always, with regard to lucidity, above his persecutors. To be a victim is to understand.” [P.693]

“Spring and suicide are two related concepts for me. Spring represents an idea that I am not ripe enough for, or rather one that doesn't fit into my system.” [P.698]

“In essence, I only love religions that have transcended the idea of God. That is why I hold Buddhism in such high regard.” [P.701]

“I believe that there is no greater pleasure than trampling upon that which one has worshipped.” [P.702]

“Attachment is the origin of all servitudes. The more you want to be free, the less you tie yourself to beings and things. But once you are tied to them, what a drama it is to be released! We begin living by creating ties for ourselves; the older we grow the stronger they become. A moment comes when we understand that they represent so many chains, that it is too late to shake them off, for we are too used to them.” [P.715]

“Being born is a catastrophe, we are all survivors of birth.” [P.730]

“Perceiving thought as a self-destructive poison, the product of a viper turned against itself.” [P.731]

“Only he who creates the void around us does us a service. My gratitude to those who have made me more alone, who - in spite of themselves, but no matter - have contributed to my spiritual consolidation.” [P.736]

“Man has been deceived by the gods. There is no other way to understand history.” [P.753]

“Birth and guilt are correlative concepts. Objective guilt, I am inclined to say: a mistake for which one cannot be held responsible, although one can imagine that one is. Thus, I can attribute the guilt of my birth to myself, but no one will consider me 'guilty.'” [P.753]

“How am I responsible for my birth? - I am responsible as soon as I am happy to be born.” [P.753]

“The Anti-Zarathustra. It is more likely that the future belongs to the subhuman rather than to the superhuman. It is ridiculous to speak of the superhuman, for ever since man has existed he has done nothing but surpass himself, to tear himself out of his origins. But he tears himself out of them only to fall back into them better; and when he is farthest from his beginnings he will fall deeper than ever. He will pay dearly for his will to ascend and transcend. I see man shrinking more and more until there is nothing left of him.” [P.753]

“One who lacks the strength to take revenge, or who overcomes the desire to take revenge, is impure.” [P.759]

“He who lacked the courage to kill himself in his youth will blame himself for the rest of his life.” [P.763]

“To write about suicide is to have left it behind.” [P.770]

“People accept without excessive terror the notion of eternal sleep; on the other hand, an eternal waking (which is what immortality would be, if such a thing were conceivable) is unbearable, in thought as in fact: it gives you the shivers.” [P.821]

“What is called 'pessimism' is nothing but the 'art of living', the art of tasting the bitter flavor of everything that exists.” [P.838]

“He who has a sense of justice should go into the desert.” [P.862]

“If I had a son, he would have been a murderer.” [P.868]

“To feel destructive impulses doesn't mean to be evil, but rather to be out of balance. One can be good and a monster, an angel and a murderer at the same time.” [P.871]

“The only revolution, the only upheaval that interests me and that I really understand is the apocalypse. A social change is not significant enough.” [P.878]

“The truth lies in discouragement. Therefore courage, hope, lies, ignorance, are false. To live is to opt for the unreal, the non-true. There is a heroism of truth and a heroism of falsehood. Which should one advocate for? There are those who waver between the two for their entire existence, unable to commit. Perhaps in this wavering lies the true secret, or at least the art of not erring.” [P.883]

“Everything is surrender, except unrest, except the unquenchable thirst for truth.” [P.890]

“I think it is a given that a balanced mind of an ordinary constitution is incapable of imagining the future, or even of grasping a single aspect of it. This has always been the case and will be even more so in the future. For a common mind cannot feel or imagine the extent of what man is capable of, both in good and, above all, in evil. To understand the future is to understand one more stage on the path towards the end of humanity. This is precisely what man refuses to imagine. A lower wisdom prevents them from doing so. Here, the prophet demonstrates their superiority, derived from a very precise matter: because their instinct for self-preservation is deeply shaken. This is their weakness but also their strength. If they had kept their defenses and self-preservation reflexes intact, they wouldn't have the audacity to look beyond the present.” [P.898]

“Universal happiness would only be possible in the midst of a completely disillusioned humanity, which, at the same time, shouldn't be so embittered, a humanity that would be thrilled to have no more illusions...” [P.939]

“Not committing suicide is a sign of complicity.” [P.939]

“Being conscious is a drama that ends with death. Let us at least hope so.” [P.966]

“Clairvoyance doesn't eradicate the desire to live, it simply renders one unfit for life.” [P.971]

“If the whole world had 'understood,' history would have ended long ago. But it is biologically impossible to 'understand.' And even if all but one were to succeed, history would continue because of him. Because of a single illusion!” [P.972]

“Every truth, at the moment of its discovery, gives a feeling of liberation; then it becomes a chain. The same can be said of a god; in the beginning, when one clings to Him, one breathes a sigh of relief - and then one suffocates.” [P.976]

“Last night I told Christabel that I love life, but that doesn't prevent me from believing that it would be better for me and everyone else never to have existed. She disagrees and replies, 'Every being is unique, so...' I have noticed that people are incapable of radically questioning their own lives. Why is that? Because everyone looks at themselves from the inside and believes they are necessary, indispensable. Each person feels like a whole, like the entirety. Once you identify completely with yourself (and almost all living beings do), you react like God, you are God. How could one then accept the idea that it would have been better never to have existed? Only by living both within and on the edge of oneself can one simultaneously experience the feeling of one's own uniqueness and worthlessness, and accept, without a trace of despair, that it would have been better, on the whole, never to have existed.” [P.976]

“One must liberate oneself from life without hating it.” [P.982]

“Every living person is a defeated one, for birth is only the prelude to surrender.” [P.985]

“There is no more wrong attitude than to have understood everything and yet continue living.” [P.996]

“Non-consent to death is the greatest drama of mortals.” [P.996]

“Without the notion of a failed universe, the spectacle of injustice under every regime would put even an indifferent man in a straitjacket.” [P.1006]

Thank you for reading!


https://www.reddit.com/user/_AmaNesciri_/

Redemption through abstention: The sex-negative antinatalism of Norbert Grabowsky (1861–1922)

 

Hello everyone.

If you are interested in the history of antinatalism, perhaps you have already seen our new video about Kurnig, the first modern antinatalist, who, among other things, published a number of books and pamphlets on antinatalism in German and French in the late 19th and very early 20th century. In that video Karim Akerma and I discuss Kurnig’s life, work, and legacy as well as the literary scenes he moved in, and I also present some of my more recent findings. As Dr. Akerma pointed out, it is important to note that Kurnig was not a “singularity”, he did not write in a literary or intellectual vacuum. Sure, Kurnig may have been the most active and arguably the most adamant of his kind, but there were more people who held similar beliefs: Marie Huot was mentioned already, but today I want to introduce you to another very obscure – and perhaps even more bizarre – writer and thinker. During my research on Kurnig there was one name in particular that popped up quite frequently, and often in the same breath as Kurnig: Norbert Grabowsky.

Grabowsky’s life and work

Norbert Grabowsky was born in January 1861 in Ostrów Wielkopolski. He studied medicine and eventually became a doctor but did not obtain a health insurance license, and despite his profession he found himself in financial trouble throughout much of his life. In addition to his day job, he published a number of short books in which he laid out his philosophy. Grabowsky died in 1922 in Leipzig.

Like Kurnig, Grabowsky published in the publishing house of Max Spohr in Leipzig – in fact, Grabowsky’s 1894 work Die verkehrte Geschlechtsempfindung oder die mannmännliche und weibweibliche Liebe (“Inverted Sexual Feeling or Man-Manly and Woman-Womanly Love”) got his publisher into quite a bit of legal trouble. Both Kurnig’s and Grabowsky’s works were actively read and discussed by people in the emerging science of sexology, as both of them held rather unconventional views on human sexuality. As you know, Kurnig was a staunch proponent of voluntary non-procreation (or “natal abstinence”), but Grabowsky went one step further and advocated for complete sexual abstinence – an even more radical and outspoken “apostle of virginity” than Philipp Mainländer himself. What these three gentlemen had it common is that all of them greatly admired and were strongly inspired by Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophical pessimism and shared his pessimistic diagnosis of life on Earth but departed from, or even outright rejected, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics.

Now, Grabowsky was strongly opposed to all forms of sexual intercourse for a variety of odd reasons – but, among other things, he was very explicit about his antinatalism, as he viewed sexual reproduction as “perpetuating the misery of existence by imposing it on others” (Fortpflanzung des Daseinselends auf Andere) and as a great moral wrong that is to be avoided. Grabowsky also considered all sexual orientations and preferences that do not result in procreation, especially homosexuality, to be “subconscious struggles against procreation” and even attempted to demonstrate that “normal” heterosexual intercourse is no less “perverse”, “disgusting”, and reprehensible than those already widely condemned deviant sexual practices – which he, of course, condemned, too, but for other reasons, since he believed that all kinds of sexual and sensual love severely damaged one’s individual integrity and prevented mankind from attaining true cognition and higher levels of spirituality (Vergeistigung), which can only be achieved through a total rejection of sex. These ideas bring Grabowsky quite close to Otto Weininger (1880–1903), who was familiar with Grabowsky’s work and also referred to it in his infamous book Sex and Character, as well as to Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) and his Kreutzer Sonata – another work frequently compared to Grabowsky’s in early sexological literature. Grabowsky declared sex to be “the greatest enemy of our destiny”, and for this reason he was not too fond of the concurring Neo-Malthusian movement in France, which he felt did not address the core of the issue at hand, and he feared that recent developments in contraception will lead to even more sexual intercourse – and greater moral corruption – overall.

Grabowsky insisted that the social question is primarily a sexual question. Not only will sexual abstinence bring about moral progress, but it will also spare countless unborn beings from coming into existence and avoid a “procreative Ponzi scheme” (as David Benatar would put it). He writes:

How the course of human history has unfolded so far has been a matter of necessity. But it is also a necessity that humanity increasingly reaches greater moral and spiritual development. And the social question will also be brought ever closer to its solution, wars will also cease more and more (the abolition of wars is the solution to the social question of the social question among the individual nations). The complete solution to the social question will only be achieved with the extinction of mankind. [Enthaltsamkeit …, p. 48.]

Unlike Kurnig and many other pessimists, however, Grabowsky strongly believed in a life after death, and that earthly hardships will eventually be rewarded with heavenly bliss in the afterlife because, according to Grabowsky, the total amount of happiness in the world will always remain constant:

Since every mature person must give up hope of earthly happiness (he can only acquire peace of mind in the prospect of the hereafter), it is not justifiable for him to leave behind descendants of his misery in this sad world. It is enough that I have suffered. Why do I need to pass on my suffering to others? I want to be good and take up my cross alone, without passing it on to other shoulders. And that is the general reason for my decision of permanent sexual abstinence. […]

The probability of continued existence already exists because the earthly pain imposed on us through no fault of our own demands with compelling necessity a compensation for ourselves, which, however, cannot be found in this life. However, this probability of continued existence can only lead us to maintain our own existence despite the misery of our existence. But the mature person may not, on the basis of continued existence, grant himself the right to bring offspring into this world at will. Just as little as he may inflict an evil on anyone else with the excuse that fate will direct it for the best. [Enthaltsamkeit …, p. 8, 15.]

In addition to his work outlining his opposition to procreation, sex and sensual love, Grabowsky also wrote about – and against – all kinds of things, including diatribes against mainstream philosophy, music (of all things), vegetarianism, tobacco and alcohol. Nonetheless, he considered himself to be a brilliant thinker on par with Spinoza, Kant and Schopenhauer, who perfected what these philosophers failed to do and who, after some five millennia, finally solved the greatest mysteries of the world – Grabowsky even claimed that his contributions “surpassed the discoveries of Copernicus and Columbus”. Unsurprisingly, he was deeply outraged at the public mostly ignored his work and did not honour his “groundbreaking achievements”, which he felt should have brought him great fame and glory instead. He complained he did not have a single friend or supporter in the world, and significant portions of his work consist of bitter complaints about his very frustrating personal situation as a destitute physician and writer and as a misunderstood genius and saviour of humanity who is constantly wresting with his sexual demons.

Now, what do you make of this? Norbert Grabowsky was definitely an odd character and an unorthodox thinker whose ideas never found favour and are completely forgotten today. Was he just an extreme case of “sour grapes”? Or can we find some traces of brilliance in his work, too? I listed and linked some of his books below so you can read it for yourselves, if you are interested, and draw your own conclusions.

a selection of Norbert Grabowsky’s books

The curious case of Johann Robeck (1672–1735)


Introduction

Perhaps you have come across his name before. You might remember this passage from part 3 of Al Alvarez’s The Savage God: A Study of Suicide (1973; pp. 143–144 in my 2002 paperback edition):

First and most important, suicide is a closed world with its own irresistible logic. This is not to say that people commit suicide, as the Stoics did, coolly, deliberately, as a rational choice between rational alternatives. The Romans may have disciplined themselves into accepting this frigid logic but those who have done so in modern history are, in the last analysis, monsters. And like all monsters, they are hard to find. In 1735 John Robeck, a Swedish philosopher, completed a long Stoic defence of suicide as a just, right and desirable act; he then carefully put his principles into practice by giving away his property and drowning himself in the Weser. His death was the sensation of the day. It provoked Voltaire to comment, through one of the characters in Candide: ‘I have seen a prodigious number of people who hold their existence in execration; but I have only seen a dozen who voluntarily put an end to their misery, three negroes, four Englishmen, four Genevois, and a German professor called Robeck.’ Even for Voltaire, the supreme rationalist, a purely rational suicide was something prodigious and slightly grotesque.

The words quoted can be found in chapter 12 of Voltaire’s Candide, ou l’optimisme (Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol 48, p. 162), they are spoken by an old woman who, in spite of her pessimistic outlook on life and all the suffering she had to endure, clings to life.

Johann Robeck, his work and his fate are also mentioned in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, III, 21 (tr. Kenrick, pp. 159, 169):

You would have me apply to the test of reason: I will; let us reason. You desire me to deliberate in proportion to the importance of the question in debate; I agree to it. Let us investigate truth with temper and moderation; let us discuss this general proposition with the same indifference we should treat any other. Roebeck wrote an apology for suicide before he put an end end to his life. I will not, after his example, write a book on the subject, neither am I well satisfied with that which he has penned, but I hope in this discussion at least to imitate his moderation.

[…]

A strange letter this for the discussion of such a subject! Do men argue so coolly on a question of this nature, when they examine it on their own accounts? Is the letter a forgery, or does the author reason only with an intent to be refuted? What makes our opinion in this particular dubious, is the example of Robeck, which he cites, and which seems to warrant his own. Robeck deliberated so gravely, that he had patience to write a book, a large, voluminous, weighty, and dispassionate book; and when he had concluded, according to his principles, that it was lawful to put an end to our being, he destroyed himself with the same composure that he wrote. Let us beware of the prejudices of the times, and of particular countries. When suicide is out of fashion, we conclude that none but madmen destroy themselves; all the efforts of courage appear chimerical to dastardly minds; every one judges of others by himself. Nevertheless, how many instances are there, well attested, of men, in every other respect perfectly discreet, who, without remorse, rage, or despair, have quitted life for no other reason than because it was a burthen to them, and have died with more composure than they lived.

So, who is this guy, this early advocate of a right to die, this shining example of rational suicide? Let me tell you: Most information you can find on him, both in printed publications and on the internet (including the English Wikipedia entry), is very unreliable. (People can’t even get his name and his year of death right…) Was he German or Swedish? What was his profession? And, most importantly, what did he actually have to say about suicide?

I have done a lot of research on him, and I’ve got to set a few things straight here. Let me start with a brief overview of his life.

Biography

Johan(n) Robeck (note: some Swedish sources give his name as Jonas) was born in Kalmar, Sweden, on September 13, 1672, in a distinguished and respectable family: His father, Matt(h)ias Robeck, was the mayor of the town. He enjoyed a good upbringing, and his exceptional talents didn’t go unnoticed. He studied theology and philosophy for ten years at the university of Uppsala, Sweden. He wrote a philosophical dissertation, which he sought to defend, but, for reasons unknown, he was not permitted to do so. Frustrated, he left his native Sweden and went to Germany.

Robeck converted to Catholicism in Hildesheim, Germany, and joined the Jesuit order in 1705. He became a priest and rose to pretty high ranks, and he spent the next three decades carrying out various missions throughout Europe for the Jesuit order and the Catholic church, eventually settling in 1727 near my hometown of Hamburg, Germany. He did not, however, return to Sweden.

In 1734, Robeck left the Jesuit order and came to the town of Rinteln, Germany, in order to devote himself to his studies, especially of the Stoics, at the local university (which, by the way, closed in 1810) under Professor Johann Nicolaus Funck (1698–1778). During this time, he buried himself in his books, became a recluse, and rarely even left his room. After spending a year in Rinteln, Robeck wrote a letter to Funck, announcing he was going to undertake a final journey, citing health reasons (“an excess of black bile”). He donated most of his books and manuscripts and some money to the library and gave away most of his possessions, and, though they had not been very close, he tasked Funck with publishing one of his works and sent him the money for the printing expenses. Thus, Robeck set out for Bremen, Germany, taking only a modest suitcase with a couple of personal belongings with him. But once he arrived in Bremen, on June 17, 1735, he sent those back to Funck and, in a final letter, advised him to give them to the poor.

Then Robeck reportedly, wearing his finest clothes, rented a small boat, and, to the dismay of the bystanders, departed from the shore alone. Three days later, his corpse was found in the river Weser, about three miles from the city, and buried in a nearby village.

Upon receiving these news, Funck decided to print what would be Robeck’s famous defence of suicide. Funck was confronted with the difficult task of editing the controversial work of an esteemed colleague he fundamentally disagreed with, but, fulfilling his wish, he added an index, as well as a 52-page preface and a lot of annotations, which often take up most of the page, to try to refute Robeck’s arguments. The book was published in the following year.

• Iohannis Robeck Calmaria–Suedi exercitatio philosophica de εὐλόγῳ ἐξαγωγῇ, sive morte voluntaria philosophorum et bonorum virorum, etiam Iudaeorum et Christianorum. Recensuit, perpetuis animadversionibus notavit, praefatus est et indicem rerum locupletissimum addidit Ioh. Nicolaus Funccius Marburgensis. Rintelii 1736. (LII + 319 + 20 pp.) (Scan)

Funck’s preface includes a biographical section (pp. I–X), also quoting Robeck’s letters, and this is probably the only reliable primary source we have on Robeck’s biography.

Some 17 years later, in 1753, Funck edited another one of Robeck’s manuscripts. This was, essentially, the second part of his treatise – not just a new edition with a different title, as this biography claims. Again, Funck added an index and a lot of annotations as well as an essay on the causes of suicide.

• Iohannis Robeck Calmaria–Suedi de morte voluntaria exercitatio, sive examen calumniarum, nugarum et fallaciarum, quibus tanquam argumentis utuntur εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς consensus generis humani, salutis et gloriae bonorum virorum honestarumque feminarum hostes et oppugnatores. Perpetuis animadversionibus notavit, praefatus est et indicem rerum addidit Iohannes Nicolaus Funccius Marburgensis. Marburgi 1753. (36 + 384 + 16 pp.) (Scan 1, Scan 2)

Let us now take a look at the work itself.

Part I

After some preliminary reflections and discussions, Robeck presents twelve arguments for the moral permissibility of voluntary death. I will attempt to give a brief outline of these here:

[pp. 101–102] The utter weakness and ridiculousness of his opponents’ arguments.

[pp. 102–123] There is no actual law that obliges us to love life so much that we may under no circumstances end it. A love for the good is innate in us, but it is not the cardinal rule of our actions. Instincts themselves do not yet constitute a law; laws are usually contrary to instincts. We are endowed with reason to control our animal nature. Self-love is older and stronger than what could be prescribed by law, and therefore, such a law would be redundant. The love of bodily life is the source of all sins and vices. — The commandment to love our neighbours as ourselves does not actually command self-love, which is presupposed and only serves as some kind of benchmark. Self-love even remains in those who choose voluntary death, some people even killed themselves out of self-love. Christ declares only the love of God and the love of neighbour to be the most important commandments, not the love of oneself, and only by virtue of the other two, self-love becomes reasonable. As with vice, sad consequences are connected to the act of committing suicide, but, likewise, also with not committing suicide.

[pp. 124–138] Unlike with animals, the love of life is not the primary driving force for thoughts, decisions and deliberate acts, and not the aim which they are, or should be, directed at. It is merely subordinate to the “main love” of happiness (εὐδαιμονία), and this type of love is peculiar to rational beings. We do not love happiness for the sake of life, but we love life as a means to achieve the supreme good of happiness. Thus, if life is only a means of unhappiness, it is not worth preserving. If we are allowed, in many cases, to kill others, why not ourselves?

[pp. 139–142] The body itself has very little value, it only receives its value through its use, and it is preserved for this reason alone. If it becomes harmful and corrupted, it may be disposed of and destroyed, like other things of this kind; it would perish anyway after a short time due to its perishable nature.

[pp. 143–156] Though philosophers have come to different conclusions about the soul, life and its purpose, nevertheless, according to all it is permissible to take one’s own life for “just and necessary” reasons. Regardless of whether the soul is simple or complex, immortal or mortal, it is always the highest and most excellent good. (Remember, guys: Главное это душа!) The body, when compared to the soul, is inferior and merely a tool, and often a useless one, often a hindrance, burden, fetters, and pain. If the soul, too, is material and mortal, then it is foolish for one, when a painful and shameful death is imminent, not to choose an easy and honourable one; if the soul is immaterial and immortal, then it is not necessary to choose a death with long agonies rather than a milder and shorter one. Likewise, it is not necessary to let oneself be abused and then killed rather than dying without disgrace by one’s own hand. Regarding the highest good, all philosophers agree that it is not life itself, but something else, for example, virtue (perfected reason), the absence of pain, etc.

[pp. 157–164] When benefits stop being beneficial, and when they start being useless, harmful and painful, and when you can barely keep them without losing virtue, then it does not make sense to force someone to keep those, or prevent them from disposing of those. God is not such a tyrant. We should, in fact, ask ourselves the question if death is, perhaps, even preferable to life as it is; many wise authors, both Christian and Pagan, have expressed a preference for death.

[pp. 164–166] Whatever can be said against voluntary death, could also be said against self-defense, that is, defending one’s life, one’s chastity, or one’s property by killing an attacker. This kind of self-defence also seems to be inconsistent with the commandments not to kill, to love one’s neighbour as oneself, to lay down one’s life for others, to resist injustice, to regard God as the master of life, to expel no one from the ‘station of life’, etc.

[pp. 167–170] In certain cases, killing oneself is in accordance with perfect reason, which is above all laws and all human authority, which judges good and evil, which is in accordance with both Nature and itself immutable, and which deserves no less respect and authority than the Holy Scripture, and more obedience than the orders of the powers that be, as it is the highest good humans can act on. It does not, however, demand that humans, under all circumstances, including the most horrible ones, continue living, as the previous arguments and refutations have shown.

[pp. 171–178] Voluntary death is the protection of natural laws, of virtues and of duties, a pillar of freedom, tranquillity, and happiness, as far as these are attainable, and master over necessity; it dismantles the excuses of shamefulness, it reveals the effects of superstition, cowardice, and excessive love of life, all of which try to hide themselves.

[pp. 178–300] There are countless examples among all peoples (Greeks, Romans, Asians, and Africans) that, through their expressed opinions, customs, and institutions, approve of such a death. There is no nation among which it would be considered forbidden to kill oneself without harm to others, for a good, just, important, and necessary cause. If anything, those who did it, are seen as great, useful, and honourable examples of a brave soul that despises life and death, while those who allowed themselves to suffer most shameful things are seen as degenerate and cowardly.

[pp. 301–306] If one is not allowed to end one’s life if there is a good reason to do so, then the use of life, wisdom, and virtue would be significantly reduced, if not eliminated altogether. One would have to abandon oneself to the wantonness and abuse of the fools and the wicked.
[pp. 307–319] The option of voluntary death is, for a wise and brave person, a strong motivation for excellent deeds; life, if you are required to keep it no matter what, is a hindrance for such deeds. Superstitious and cowardly people will, with their words, sayings, pretenses, interpretations, and threats, never be able to overcome the common human nature; and those that have a shameful and sorrowful life ahead of them, the end of which they must expect, but not bring about themselves, will not, by themselves, refuse the option of voluntary death, unless the means are taken away from them. For example, Samson’s most glorious deed was his final one, which overshadows all other actions in his life, as the Holy Scripture makes clear by stating that, in his death, he has killed more enemies than in his life. If you take voluntary death away, then all of that last glory of Samson, the enemies’ death and sorrow, the friends’ joy, and the welfare of the fatherland would be taken away along with it.

Part II

In this treatise, Robeck focusses on refuting common objections and counter-arguments made by those who deny that there is voluntary death is, or can be, morally permissible – in particular Lactantius, Augustine, Lipsius, and Rachelius. However, at the end of the work (pp. 378–379), Robeck also explains in which cases he believes suicide is not permissible:

Addo demum et adversariis concedo, atque severius etiam, quam ipsi, damno necem non sui modo, sed et aliorum, imo vel pecudis, si temere, inconsulte, promiscue, ex ira, odio, furore, crudelitate et quocunque vitio, malove impetu vel affectu fiat. […] Damno etiam, si quis se vel educat, vel occidat, dum Deo, patriae, civibus, proximis utiliter servire potest: praesertim sine intolerabili, aut graviore tormento sui. Confiteor hunc talem peccare, facereque aliquam quasi iniuriam Deo, et illis quibus prodesse posset vivus. Quod si nihil aliud velint urgeantque adversarii, lis omnis est finita; imo nulla ab initio fuit.

“Finally, I add and concede to my opponents, and, even more harshly than they themselves, I condemn murder not only of oneself, but also of others, indeed, even of cattle, if it is done without good cause, without due care and consideration, without distinction, out of anger, hate, rage, cruelty, and any vice, or bad impulse or passion. […] I also condemn, if someone ‘releases’, or kills, themself, while they can still serve God, their fatherland, fellow citizens, and close ones in a useful way: especially (if it happens) without unbearable or greater torment. I admit: Such a one sins and commits some kind of injustice against God and those to whom they could be of use while they were alive. Therefore, if my opponents want and press nothing else, then the whole debate is settled, in fact, there has never been one from the start.” (my own translation)

Conclusion

Johann Robeck may have been an odd person, but he was an extremely learned man. He dedicated most of his life to his extensive philosophical and theological studies and was held in high regard by his peers. He was not shy to show his vast knowledge and erudition, and he often cites passages from Christian, Greek and Roman authors as well as from contemporary scholars. Robeck draws a lot on Stoic philosophy, especially on Seneca’s 70th epistle. Some, as we have seen, describe his style as cold and rational, others as impassionated or even enthusiastic, and, of course, his own biases shine through here and there. It is true that the structure of the work seems somewhat convoluted at times. But one thing is for sure: He was very serious about the subject and his position, and even his most vehement critics praised the elegance of his Latin and his level of erudition.

Robeck’s work was a major contribution to the discussion of the ethics of suicide in the age of Enlightenment. Before him, there had been, for example, John Donne (1572–1631), who had already written an infamous book entitled Βιαθάνατος [Biathanatos]: A Declaration of that Paradox, or Thesis, that Self-homicide is not so Naturally Sin, that it may never be otherwise. Wherein the Nature, and the extent of all those Laws, which seem to be violated by this Act, are diligently surveyed, which was published posthumously in 1648, some 40 years after its composition, and offered an attempt to “descandalize” the phenomenon of suicide. Remarkably, Donne himself confessed: “I have often such a sickly inclination”. A few years after Robeck, perhaps following in his footsteps, David Hume (1711–1776) wrote his influential essay “On Suicide” (1755).

I believe Robeck’s work is definitely worth reading and deserves to reach a wider audience. Unfortunately, it is written entirely in Latin – but, fortunately, I am fluent in Latin. I have already transcribed both books, save for Funck’s annotations, which took me a couple of months. I am currently proof-reading the whole thing and looking for a way to adapt his 18th century orthography and formatting to somewhat more readable standards. Once that is done, I am thinking about translating the work into English. This will require even more time and effort than my Kurnig project, but please let me know if you’re interested, or if you would like to help.

Edit: Here is my work in progress file of the Latin text.

Thank you for reading.

originally posted on Reddit [2022-12-01]

https://lennysarchive.wordpress.com/2024/04/11/a-well-travelled-jesuit-priest-a-reclusive-scholar-a-convoluted-defence-of-voluntary-death-and-a-corpse-in-a-river-the-curious-case-of-johann-robeck-1672-1735/