To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Monday, April 14, 2025

Hans Jacob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen - The Adventures Of Simplicius Simplicissimus

 From Introduction 

Two hundred years after it ended, the collective memory of the Thirty Years’ War continued to exert a strong pull on the historical imagination of Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Luise Mühlbach’s popular historical novel of the war, Die Opfer des religiösen Fanatismus (‘The Victims of Religious Fanaticism’), was breathlessly advertised in 1872 as the story of ‘an epoch of the most fanatical and savage conflict’ that raged through Germany ‘with devastation and fire for a quarter of a century … a time filled with shame and horror!’. In German folklore the second decade of the conflict, the period between 1630 and 1638 known as the ‘Swedish War’, was remembered as the ‘time of annihilation’. Farmers throughout central and southern Germany, when questioned by travellers curious about the ruins of nearby abandoned villages and manors, would recall the tales passed down through the generations into the nineteenth century and reply, ‘That happened in the Swedish War – the Swede did that!’

Even as the passage of time gradually effaced the scars the war left on the German landscape, the estimation of the extent of the civilian losses caused by Europe’s first ‘total war’ understandably fluctuated, given the lack of exact and reliable demographic data for historians to work with. For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the popular belief, endorsed by many historians, was that almost 70 per cent of Germany’s pre-war population, some fifteen million people, died in the conflict. Estimates at the other end of the scale put the number of lost at anywhere between 15 and 30 per cent, that is, between three and six million dead, while claiming 

that some of the most devastated areas, notably the Rhine Palatinate, northern Bavaria, Bohemia, Mecklenburg and Brandenburg, were virtually depopulated by famine, disease and forced migration. Modern scholarship has arrived at a consensus that estimates that the total demographic decline amounted to about a third of the pre-war population, that is between six and six and a half million dead. But, as Peter Wilson has pointed out, even a population loss of 15 per cent would put the Thirty Years’ War at the top of the list of the most destructive of European conflicts, with the First World War (6 per cent) and the Second World War (5.5 per cent) ranking a distant second and third. Even after the wars of the twentieth century, for many Germans the Thirty Years’ War, in the scale of the suffering it had inflicted on the German nation, would be remembered as a catastrophe unique in history.1The cruel nature of the war, and the lasting bitterness it generated, were both rooted in religious conflict. For most historically literate Germans, the Thirty Years’ War was a civil war whose origins were to be found in the ‘great schism’ of the Reformation of 1517. This collapse of the universal Catholic Church led to the division of authority among the sovereign German polities of the Holy Roman Empire between rulers who had adopted Protestantism and those who continued to adhere to the Catholic Church (and the secular authority of the Habsburg emperor in Vienna). An uneasy ‘confessional peace’ had been negotiated in 1555 between the Catholic and Lutheran princes which stipulated that subjects were to follow the confession of their ruler (‘cuius regio, eius religio’). Though few expected the settlement to be permanent, the Peace of Augsburg was largely successful in keeping the peace in Central Europe for over half a century.

This peace finally broke down in 1618 in the form of a revolt of the aristocracy in Bohemia (now part of the Czech Republic), who asserted what they believed was their legal right to choose a Protestant ruler from one of the smaller German states. Ferdinand II, the Habsburg emperor in Vienna who had assumed the throne in 1619, viewed this as a usurpation of 

his authority and an impermissible Protestant infiltration of the Habsburg crown lands. With the aid of the Catholic League army under Maximilian I of Bavaria, and the financial support of Spain and the Pope, Ferdinand crushed the Bohemian rebellion, dispersed the forces of the Protestant Union that had been mobilized to support the rebels, and brutally restored his control over the renegade territory. The conflict expanded, however, as Ferdinand opportunistically used the suppression of the revolt to advance the larger cause of the Counter-Reformation and re-Catholicize the Protestant German states of the Holy Roman Empire by force. In the meantime, those powers that had supported the Protestant Union, France, the United Netherlands, Denmark and, eventually, Sweden, also came to see the conflict as an opportunity and determined to intervene in the war on the side of the German Protestant princes to acquire territory and accelerate the dissolution of Habsburg power in Europe. What had started as a localized rebellion, fuelled by religious animosities, in the Holy Roman Empire soon turned into a war for strategic dominance in Central Europe. It would drag on, waxing and waning in intensity, for another thirty years. Yet the treaty signed in 1648 that ended the war, the Peace of Westphalia, more or less confirmed the religious status quo and balance of power that had existed in 1618. How, then, to make sense of the horrific destruction the war had wreaked?

The sharp confessional divide between Protestant and Catholic Germany shaped all subsequent narratives of the war (as it shaped German politics and culture) well into the twentieth century. Germany’s Protestants recalled the war as one more chapter in Germany’s long struggle, beginning in 1517 (and culminating in German unification in 1871 under Prussian leadership), to liberate itself from foreign domination and territorial and political disunity. Catholic Germans, on the other hand, saw this Protestant narrative (primarily advanced by Prussian historians) as a calculated attempt to write them out of German history as less-than-‘authentic’ Germans whose ancestors had fought for a ‘confederal’ idea of Germany under an Imperial Catholic monarchy. Coming to grips with the 

meaning of the war, passionately contested in German national memory, persisted as a collective spiritual burden and psychological trauma because it was seen as a civil war that pitted two very different visions of ‘Germany’ against each other.2

History has shown that the wounds left by civil wars take the longest to heal. This is why the Thirty Years’ War, for many Germans, was a past that would not pass (Americans, in particular, should be able to recognize this persistence of memory). ‘Germany’s Darkest Hour’ was the title that the cultural historian Karl Biedermann chose for his influential 1862 history of the war. In it Biedermann lamented the ‘unparalleled ruin of the entire German national body’ by the war and its devastating psychological legacy, which he diagnosed as ‘the weakening of the national spirit’. Gustav Freytag’s best-selling series of popular histories, Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit (‘Pictures from the German Past’), which appeared in numerous editions from the 1860s on, warned readers that they were taking up a story of ‘a sad, joyless time’. Freytag introduced his history of ‘the Great War’ by describing it as a ‘terrible natural disaster … which had destroyed the strength of the German people’.

The dark maelstrom of the Thirty Years’ War, a chaotic time when the natural order of society and authority was inverted, shadowed modern Germany with multiple narratives of victimization. Prevalent anxieties about German cultural backwardness, political weakness, religious fragmentation and economic progress measured against that of rival nations found vivid expression in the nineteenth-century histories of the war. In his commemorative history marking the bicentennial of the Peace of Westphalia in 1848, Karl Schmidt wrote that the war had undermined ‘all the foundations of civil, domestic, and moral life’. Writing in the early 1830s, the historian Friedrich von Raumer lingered on the image of a world turned upside down in which ‘the maxim became all crimes were virtuous, all virtue the work of the devil’. Some two decades later, Heinrich Hecht declared that ‘cunning and deceit became universal’, while Otto Krabbe mourned that ‘the word of God was exiled from the land’. A deluxe modern edition of 

Freytag’s history, published in 1925 (two years after the ‘Great Disorder’ of Weimar Germany’s period of hyperinflation), was illustrated with a reproduction of a seventeenth-century series of satirical woodcuts entitled ‘The World Turned Upside Down’ that depicted, among other disquieting marvels, the master serving the servant, the blind leading the sighted, the lamb eating the wolf and the sheep shearing the shepherd.

Grimmelshausen’s novel, The Adventures of Simplicius Simplicissimus, is, at its heart, a story of the pilgrim Simplicius’s journey through the inverted moral universe of the Thirty Years’ War. As a narrative of Simplicius’s progress across the battlefields of Germany, from innocence through temptation to redemption, Grimmelshausen’s novel resists easy categorization. Its title promises, at one level, a heroic picaresque romance in the metafictional mould of Cervantes’s Don Quixote (first published in 1605; Simplicissimus was written in 1668), but it also anticipates the Bildungsroman (‘novel of development’) tradition of German Romanticism, notably Wieland’s History of Agathon (1766–7) and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (1795–6). The mystical passages of the novel’s concluding sections even suggest that Grimmelshausen, a convert to Catholicism, wanted his book, at least in part, to be read as a Christian allegory on the models of the Psychomachia (c.AD 400), Hartmann’s Der Arme Heinrich (c.1190) and Piers Plowman (c.1370–90).

But Simplicissimus perhaps holds the greatest meaning for the modern reader as a story of war in all its horror and absurdity, which is among the reasons why this new translation is so welcome. The catastrophic violence of total war, shot through with the red thread of ideological and genocidal terror that is woven into the history of the twentieth century, was prefigured in the wars of religion that racked Europe from 1517 to 1648. Like all wars fought to advance the ‘one true faith’, these were conflicts of surpassing cruelty. Grimmelshausen makes this cruelty the foundation of his story and the main force that shapes his protagonist because, as Montaigne declares in his own meditation on cruelty, ‘Virtue demands a harsh and thorny road.’ Montaigne, born a century before Grimmelshausen and whose entire adult life was lived 

amid the upheaval of the French wars of religion, knew well how war put reason and virtue to flight:

[O]wing to the licence of our civil wars … there is nothing to be found in ancient histories more extreme than what we witness every day … I could hardly persuade myself, before I had actual evidence, that there exist any souls so unnatural as to commit murder for the mere pleasure of doing so; as to hack and chop off men’s limbs, as to sharpen their wits for the invention of unusual tortures and new forms of death … merely for the enjoyment of the pleasing spectacle afforded by the pitiful gestures and motions, the lamentable groans and cries, of a man dying in anguish.3In condemning the barbarism of his epoch’s holy wars, Montaigne undermined an essential myth of European civilization: the elevating conviction that the light of Christianity was guiding the world out of pagan darkness and brutality.

Yet, through the eyes of Grimmelshausen’s protagonist, we see war as it has always been and always will be: a destructive energy that is integral to all cultures and all civilizations.

(...)

Who had suffered more in the Thirty Years’ War, Protestant or Catholic, for Germany and their faith? Writing in 1816, a Catholic playwright described the advance of the Swedish army on Villingen and the desperate resistance of the town: ‘Our loyalty to the Kaiser,’ one citizen declared, ‘and the fact that we remain true to our faith, enrages [the Swedes] so much that they refuse to spare the elderly, the mothers, the children [and threaten] that the name of Villingen will be wiped from the face of the earth, and those set wandering from the ruins will loudly lament: here was the revenge of the Swedes!’ One hundred years later, in 1917, a counter-narrative of Protestant suffering was invoked to inspire Germans in the midst of another catastrophic conflict. The foreword to this volume, a collection of contemporary accounts of the Thirty Years’ War, reprinted the preface to the 1683 edition of Simplicissimus which reminded ‘the Loyal German Reader’ of the destruction of that seventeenth-century war: the burnt villages, destroyed churches, and raped women, ‘a time when German blood had flowed like water’: all sacrifices demanded in defence of Germany liberty against the forces of tyranny.

Like Thucydides, Grimmelshausen had seen war at first hand. His experience of war, first as a bewildered and innocent civilian and then as a hardened and cynical soldier, informs his novel with the same visceral moral power that Francisco Goya would etch into his Disasters of War, accompanied by his simple, horrified declaration: ‘I saw this.’ At one level, The Adventures of Simplicius Simplicissimus belongs in the canon of the great first-person depictions of the horror of war along with Goya’s Disasters, Jacques Callot’s The Great Miseries of War and Otto Dix’s The War. But Grimmelshausen’s novel, as literature, also has a strikingly modern core. His narrative juxtaposes hilariously absurd and fantastical episodes that illustrate how war corrodes morality and mocks reason with passages that show with astonishing clarity and realism the true nature of war in all of its numbing cruelty, degradation and terror. In this respect, Simplicissimus creates the template for such twentieth-century masterpieces as Jaroslav Hašek’s The Good Soldier Švejk, Louis-Ferdinand Céline’s Journey to the End of the Night, Heinrich Böll’s The Train was on Time, Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 and Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow.

Grimmelshausen’s biography is somewhat sketchy, with many of its details subject to dispute. The original title page of the novel offers the book as a ‘description of the life of a strange vagabond’, but only a minority of the book’s episodes, primarily in its opening chapters, are believed to correspond more or less to the author’s own experiences. It wasn’t until the middle of the nineteenth century that scholars even reliably identified Grimmelshausen as the novel’s author (the original title page gives the name of the ‘strange vagabond’ as Melchior Sternfels von Fuchshaim). Hans Jacob Christoffel (the ‘von Grimmelshausen’ was added later) was probably born in March of 1621 or 1622 in the Hessian town of Gelnhausen near Frankfurt am Main. Raised by his grandparents, Grimmelshausen is believed to have been attending school in 1634 in Gelnhausen, which had long been occupied by Spanish Catholic troops, when Protestant forces invaded the region in August. As the Imperial 

and Protestant armies clashed thousands of civilians, including the young Grimmelshausen, sought refuge in the nearby fortress of Hanau, which was itself invested until 1636 (the lifting of the siege by Swedish forces was celebrated in Hanau through the nineteenth century with an annual midsummer festival). However, Grimmelshausen was taken prisoner by Imperial forces in 1635. As was common with many prisoners taken in the Thirty Years’ War, the teenager was quickly impressed into Imperial service. As a stable boy, he very likely witnessed the second siege of Magdeburg (whose destruction in 1631 had become a contemporary byword for brutality) and the Battle of Wittstock in 1636.

By 1639, after serving in General Götz’s Rhine army in 1637 and 1638, Grimmelshausen was a musketeer in an Imperial regiment deployed near Strasbourg. By virtue of his Latin school education, he managed to lift himself out of the ranks when he became the regiment’s clerk, an assignment that eventually led to his appointment as the personal secretary of another Imperial regimental commander, Johann von Elter, in 1645. After the peace, Grimmelshausen converted to Catholicism (though some accounts date his conversion to the late 1630s), settled in Offenburg on the Rhine across from Strasbourg, married (and added ‘von’ to his name), and took the job of administering the family properties of his first commander, Hans Reinhard von Schauenburg. From 1662 to 1665, he worked as the caretaker of a property of a Strasbourg doctor while running a small inn, ‘The Silver Star’, in the village of Gaisbach. In 1667 he was appointed magistrate of the nearby town of Renchen, a post he held until he died in August 1676. It was in this latter period that he began work on the novel that would make him the most widely read German author of the seventeenth century.4

(...)

lifetime.5Simplicissimus was ‘rediscovered’ as a great German novel in the first half of the nineteenth century when a younger generation of patriotic Germans, basking in the victorious glow of the ‘wars of liberation’ that had freed the German states from occupation by Napoleonic France in 1813, began to envision a unified German nation and were determined, as part of the broader intellectual enterprise of promoting a ‘German consciousness’ (as opposed to the patchwork of regional loyalties that characterized the defunct Holy Roman Empire), to recover a narrative testifying to German suffering, resilience and ‘national spirit’. The outpouring of new histories of the Thirty Years’ War in the nineteenth century, when the war was ‘refought’ as part of the great debate over the shape of a future unified Germany, was a remarkable manifestation of this nationalist project. The rediscovery of Simplicissimus or, more precisely, the reassessment of Grimmelshausen’s reputation as a ‘writer of the people’ (Volksschriftsteller) and the novel itself as an authentic expression of the ‘true German voice’ – and as such a reliable first-person account of Germany’s martyrdom during the war – formed an integral part of this debate.6 It also 

provided historians with a rich source for their accounts of the barbarism and devastation Germany had endured during the war. In countless histories of the war written during the first half of the nineteenth century, we find these historians incorporating, in detail and often verbatim, Grimmelshausen’s descriptions of the atrocities committed by the Swedish soldiers and the tortures meted out in return by peasants bent on retribution. In the novel’s harrowing opening chapters, we read of two gang rapes, a peasant roasted alive in an oven, numerous horrific mutilations, the crushing of skulls with knotted ropes and thumbs in the flintlocks of pistols, and the administration of the notorious ‘Swedish Punch’, which consisted mainly of liquid offal and manure forced down the victim’s throat. To understand the context within which these historians were using Grimmelshausen, it is important to remember that through the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, Grimmelshausen’s accounts of these atrocities were considered factually accurate. Because of the brutal realism of its descriptions of action and landscape, and its rendering of the different German regional dialects, the novel was held in high regard as a singularly valuable seventeenth-century historical source. It needs to be pointed out that one notable peculiarity of the nineteenth century’s use of the novel as a historical source is that Protestant historians, while appropriating exactly the details of the atrocities in their own accounts, would simply transform the Swedish (and Protestant) perpetrators into Imperial (and Catholic) soldiers.

It was the German Romantics who were probably the most influential in sparking modern interest in Simplicissimus as a work of literature. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the towering figure of the German Enlightenment, was an early promoter of the novel’s importance to German culture, and his advocacy was cited as the inspiration for three new editions that appeared between 1785 and 1810, a period that coincided with the breakdown of absolutist Europe into revolution and war.7 As the story of a ‘German hero’ it was primarily commendable as a Bildungsroman (though the 1810 edition was advertised as 

an ‘adventure novel’). The publication of the first ‘modern’ edition of the book in 1836 (based on the revised versions published between 1669 and 1671) was largely due to the endorsement of the poet Ludwig Tieck, one of the leading lights of the German Romantic movement. In 1838, the literary scholar Theodor Echtermeyer was able, for the first time, conclusively to establish Grimmelshausen as the author of the novel. Before Echtermeyer’s research was published, ‘Grimmelshausen’ had been widely assumed to be a pseudonym which, among other things, had encouraged the proliferation of amended, ‘improved’ and radically altered versions of the novel over the course of a century and a half (one estimate puts the number at over 150 different versions). Adelbert von Keller supervised a ‘scholarly’ edition (based on the 1668 version) that was published in 1854. Keller also included a bibliography of Grimmelshausen’s works and a list of all the variant editions of Simplicissimus that had appeared since the author’s death.8Most of the ‘improvements’ made to the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century editions of the novel were intended to render the language more accessible to modern readers, trimming what were considered the overly long ‘didactic’ and moralizing sections (of uncertain authorship, some of these having been added since 1668), and, most importantly, to tone down the ‘obscene’ and explicit descriptions of torture, rape and sexual activity.9 By 1871, the year of German unification, Simplicissimus was firmly established as a chronicle of ‘true German life’ of great national and cultural significance. In 1878, one reviewer praised Simplicissimus ‘as a true German novel, not only the best and most significant of the seventeenth century, but one of the best of all time’. It had become the German ‘national book’ (Volksbuch). Its popularity in the nineteenth century has been ascribed to three main factors, one patriotic and two cultural.10 It appealed to the German nationalist imagination with its depiction of a genuine German hero and survivor emerging out of the chaos and destruction of the Thirty Years’ War. It satisfied the yearning for the recovery of examples of a lost and authentically German 

‘people’s art’ (Volkskunst). Finally, it entered a market in which there was a rising demand for ‘realistic’ fiction that dealt with the major events of German history.11

As an illustration of the prominence Simplicissimus had assumed in German cultural and intellectual life, it is worth pointing out that the novel became the subject of a very revealing debate in the German parliament in 1876. The historical background to this debate was the ongoing political conflict known in Germany as the ‘culture war’ (Kulturkampf). With the establishment of the unified German state in 1871 under the leadership of the Protestant Prussian Hohenzollern monarchy, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck introduced a series of laws between 1872 and 1875 that progressively restricted the rights and independence of the Catholic Church and its clergy in German civil and educational life. This legislation provoked a sharp pushback by the German Catholic Church and its members and created an environment in which the Catholic Centre Party consolidated its role as the main defender of the political, cultural and social interests of German Catholics. In the midst of this, the government’s Minister for Cultural Affairs (which included education), Adalbert Falk, introduced a decree in 1876 to establish a curriculum in Prussian schools whose reading list included Simplicissimus. Since the government allocated the funds for the purchase of schoolbooks, this curriculum became the subject of an intense parliamentary debate that illustrated all of the tensions at the heart of the ‘culture war’, especially conservative Catholic concerns about the elimination of the Church’s role in education. The problem was that there was some dispute over which version of the novel Falk was recommending for use in the schools. As it happened, Falk was actually proposing that a special ‘youth edition’, scrubbed of its most graphic depictions of sex, violence and moral degradation, be adopted. But some Catholic members of parliament were concerned that other versions, replete with ‘aimless wandering, sexual encounters, larceny, indecency, murder, and oath-breaking’, might find their way into students’ hands and lead to the ‘corruption of their souls’ (also bear in mind that the book had been placed on the Catholic Church’s Index of Prohibited Books). The leading 

journal of Catholic opinion, Germania, condemned the book as ‘no more than a compendium of filthy obscenities and lies from the dissolute life of a mercenary in the Thirty Years’ War’. It can be presumed that this debate, and the press coverage it attracted, did nothing to depress sales of the novel. Nevertheless, expurgated versions continued to be used in schools through the 1960s. By 1940, the abridged and sanitized ‘youth edition’ first published in 1911 (with illustrations) had sold over 200,000 copies.12

Critical editions of Grimmelshausen’s collected works, annotated and edited by prominent scholars of German literature, first appeared in the early 1880s and continued to be published in new and revised editions into the 1990s. The annotated editions of the novel that came out in 1919 and 1922 both emphasized the comparisons to be drawn between Germany’s suffering in the Thirty Years’ War and in the First World War.13Simplicissimus has remained by far the most widely read of Grimmelshausen’s works and, in all of its variants (including the large number of pirated and ‘improved’ editions), has never been out of print. The first English translation, by A. T. Goodrick, appeared in 1912, followed by French and Italian translations in 1922 and 1928 respectively. In the half-century after 1945, the novel was translated into an additional thirteen languages, including Chinese, Russian and Japanese.14While the reputation of Simplicissimus as a canonical work of German literature was solidified in the second half of the nineteenth century, its enduring influence on German history-writing and the culture of remembrance surrounding modern Germany’s understanding of the Thirty Years’ War also has to be taken into account. In particular, the novel’s influence on the historical writings of Friedrich Schiller and Gustav Freytag, arguably the two most formative voices that shaped the popular historical consciousness in nineteenth-century Germany, must be examined. (...)

Kevin Cramer


Sunday, April 13, 2025

Canetti on Burckhardt

 Jacob Burckhardt: How little he discouraged you, despite his acceptance of Schopenhauer!

You owe a great deal to Burckhardt:

His rejection of any system derived from history

His sense that nothing had gotten better but, on the contrary, worse

His respect for expressiveness of form, as opposed to pure conceptuality

His warm feeling for life truly lived, nourished by the tenderness of his renunciation

His unprettified knowledge of the Greeks

His resistance to Nietzsche, an early warning for me.

The shadow that lay upon Burckhardt’s thought was not cast by feeling. His enthusiasm was reserved for particular things. If some have withered, others retain their significance. One need not accept him. One cannot dismiss him.

There is no historian of the previous century for whom I feel such unreserved admiration.

In the years of preparation, when I read the most diverse things in order to lengthen the road to Crowds and Power, I appeared to be lost in an ocean of reading. People who learned of this situation thought me obsessed; even my best friends offered tactful advice. They said it was pointless to read nothing but primary sources; the great ancient books had been sifted a thousand times and been reduced to a few lasting insights. All the rest was ballast. Getting rid of superfluous material, they said, was paramount in any major undertaking.

But I kept rowing rudderless in my ocean and did not let myself be deterred. I had no justification for this attitude—until I came across the following sentence:

“It is possible that Thucydides, for example, contains a fact of prime importance that will not be noticed until a hundred years from now.” This sentence appears in the introduction to Reflections on World History. My most intimate debt to Burckhardt, my justification for those years, is that sentence.

The Secret Heart of the Clock 

Elias Canetti

Friday, April 11, 2025

Stillness

 

The divine is an event of stillness. It lets us listen: ‘The verb myein, “to initiate”, means etymologically, “to close” – notably the eyes but, more importantly, the mouth. At the beginning of the sacred rites, the herald would “command silence” (epitattei ten siopen).’1 We live in a time without consecration. The fundamental verb of our time is not ‘to close’ but to open – ‘the eyes but, more importantly, the mouth’. Hypercommunication, the noise of communication, desecrates the world, profanes it. Stillness produces nothing. Capitalism therefore dislikes stillness. Information capitalism produces the compulsion of communication.

Stillness sharpens our sense for the higher order, which, however, need not be an order of rule or power. Stillness can be extremely peaceful, even friendly and deeply delightful. A ruling power may be able to silence the subjugated, but an enforced silence is not stillness. Real stillness knows no compulsion. It does not subjugate; it elevates. It does not take away, but gives.

For Cézanne, the task of the painter is to establish silence. The Montagne Sainte-Victoire appears to him as a rising massif of stillness that he must obey. The vertical, the rising, demands stillness. Cézanne creates stillness by withdrawing and becoming no one. He becomes a listener: ‘His only aspiration must be to silence. He must stifle within himself the voices of prejudice, he must forget, always forget, establish silence, be a perfect echo. Then the landscape will inscribe itself on his sensitive tablet.’2

Listening is the religious gesture par excellence. Hölderlin’s Hyperion says:

My whole being stills and listens when the gentle ripple of the breeze plays about my breast. Often, lost in the immensity of blue, I look up into the aether and out into the hallowed sea, and it’s as if a kindred spirit opened its arms to me, as if the pain of isolation were dissolved in the life of the godhead.

To be one with everything, that is the life of the godhead, that is the heaven of man.

To be one with everything that lives, to return in blissful self-oblivion into the all of nature, that is the summit of thoughts and joys, that is the holy mountain pinnacle, the place of eternal peace.3

We are no longer familiar with that divine falling silent that elevates us to the life of the godhead, to the heaven of man. Blissful self-oblivion has given way to the excessive self-production of the ego. Digital hypercommunication, unlimited connectedness, does not bring about attachment or a world. Rather, it effects isolation, deepens loneliness. The isolated, worldless, depressive I moves away from that delightful all-embracing unity, that holy mountain pinnacle.

We have abolished all transcendence, all vertical order, that demands stillness. The vertical gives way to the horizontal. Nothing rises. Nothing becomes deeper. Reality is flattened out into information and data streams. Everything sprawls and proliferates. Stillness is a phenomenon of negativity. It is exclusive, whereas noise is the result of permissive, extensive, excessive communication.

Stillness emanates from what is unavailable. What is not available stabilizes and deepens our attention; it brings forth a contemplative gaze. That gaze has the patience needed to see the long-lasting and slow. When everything is available and accessible, attention remains shallow. The gaze does not linger. Like that of a hunter, it wanders.

For Nicolas Malebranche, attentiveness is the natural prayer of the soul. Today, the soul no longer prays. It produces itself. Extensive communication distracts the soul. Only those activities that resemble prayer go together with stillness. Contemplation, however, is opposed to production. The compulsion of production and communication destroys contemplative immersion.

According to Roland Barthes, photography ‘must be silent’. He does not like ‘blustering photographs’. He holds that, ‘in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close your eyes’.4 The punctum, even the truth, of photography reveals itself in silence, when one closes one’s eyes. The information tracked by the studiumis blustering. It imposes itself on our perception. The imagination is set in motion only by silence, by closing our eyes. Barthes quotes Kafka: ‘We photograph things in order to drive them out of our minds. My stories are a way of shutting my eyes.’5Without imagination, there is only pornography. Today, perception itself has something pornographic about it. It has the form of immediate contact, almost of a copulation of image and eye. The erotic takes place when we close our eyes. Only stillness, the imagination, discloses subjectivity’s deep inward spaces of desire:

Absolute subjectivity is achieved only in a state, an effort, of silence (shutting your eyes is to make the image speak in silence). The photograph touches me if I withdraw it from its usual blah-blah: … to say nothing, to shut my eyes.6

What is so ruinous about digital communication is that it means we no longer have time to close our eyes. The eyes are forced into a ‘continuous voracity’.7 They lose the capacity for stillness, for deep attentiveness. The soul no longer prays.

Noise is a visual as well as an acoustic filth. It pollutes the attention. Michel Serres derives the pollution of the world from the animal’s will to appropriate:

Tigers piss on the edge of their lair. And so do lions and dogs. Like those carnivorous mammals, many animals, our cousins, mark their territory with their harsh, stinking urine or their howling, while others such as finches and nightingales use sweet songs.8

We spit in the soup so that we may have it all to ourselves. The world is polluted not only by excretions and material waste but also by junk communication and information. It is plastered with advertisements. Everything is crying out for attention on a

planet completely covered with garbage and billboards … On each mountain rock, each tree leaf, each agricultural plot of land, you have advertisements; letters are written on each blade of grass … Like the legendary cathedral, the landscape is swallowed by the tsunami of signs.9Non-things block out things, pollute them. Junk information and communication destroy the silent landscape, the discreet language of things:

Imperious images and letters force us to read, while the pleading things of the world are begging our senses for meaning. The latter ask; the former command…. our products already have a meaning, which is flat. They are the easier to perceive because they are less elaborate, similar to waste. Images are the waste of paintings; logos, the waste of writing; ads, the waste of vision; announcements, the residues of music. Forcing themselves on our perception, those low and facile signs clog up the landscape, which itself is more difficult, discreet, silent, and often dying because unseen by any saving perception.10The digital seizure of land produces a lot of noise. The battle for territory gives way to the battle for attention. Appropriation also takes an altogether different form. We incessantly produce information that has to be liked by others. Today’s nightingales do not sing sweet songs in order to chase away others. Rather, they tweet in order to attract others. We do not spit in the soup to prevent others from enjoying it. Rather, our motto is sharing. We now want to share everything with everyone else. The result is a roaring tsunami of information.

Things and territories determine the terrestrial order. They are not noisy. The terrestrial order is still. The digital order is ruled by information. Stillness is alien to information. It contradicts the essence of information. Still information is an oxymoron. Information steals the silence by imposing itself on us and demanding our attention. Stillness is a phenomenon of attentiveness. Stillness is created only by deep attentiveness. Information, however, dissects attention.

According to Nietzsche, in a ‘noble culture’, people do ‘not … react immediately to a stimulus’. Such a culture develops ‘the inhibiting, excluding instincts’. You need to ‘let foreign things, new things of every type, come towards you while assuming an initial air of calm hostility’. Keeping ‘all your doors wide open’ and being ‘constantly poised and ready to put yourself into – plunge yourself into – other things’, that is, ‘the inability to resist a stimulus’, is destructive of the spirit. The ‘inability not to react’ is ‘a pathology, a decline, a symptom of exhaustion’.11 Total permissiveness and permeability destroy a noble culture. We are increasingly losing the ‘excluding instincts’, the ability to say ‘no’ to the advancing stimuli.

We need to distinguish between two kinds of potentiality. Positive potentiality consists in the ability to do something. Negative potentiality is the ability to do nothing. The latter is, however, not identical with the inability to do something. It is not a negation of positive potential but a potential of its own. It enables spirit to engage in still, contemplative lingering, that is, deep attentiveness. In the absence of negative potential, we develop a destructive hyperactivity. We become submerged in noise. Stillness can be restored only by a strengthening of negative potentiality. But the dominant compulsion of communication, which is ultimately the compulsion to produce, intentionally destroys negative potentiality.

We constantly produce ourselves. This production of self is noisy. Creating stillness means withdrawing. Stillness is also a phenomenon of namelessness. I am not the master of myself, of my name. I am a guest at myself; I am only the tenant of my name-hood. Michel Serres creates stillness by deconstructing his name:

It is indeed Michel Serres. Because my language and my society call it my own name, they pretend that I have the ownership of these two words. However, I know hundreds of Michels, Miguels, Mikes, or Mikhails. Similarly, there are Serreses, Sierras, Junipero Serras, all derived from a Ural-Altaic name designating a mountain. I have sometimes met exact homonyms…. And so, proper names sometimes mimic or repeat common names, even place names on occasion. Mine, for instance, quotes the Mont-Saint-Michel, in France, Italy, or Cornwall, three neatly aligned locations. We inhabit sites that are more or less prestigious. My name is Michel Serres, but it is not my own; I am just its tenant.12

The appropriation of a name, in particular, produces a lot of noise. The strengthening ego destroys the stillness. Where I step back, where I lose myself in namelessness, where I become weak, there is stillness: ‘Soft, I mean aerial and volatile. Soft, white. Soft, peaceful.’13Nietzsche knew that stillness goes along with the withdrawal of the I. Stillness teaches me to listen, to take note:

the genius of the heart, that makes everything loud and complacent fall silent and learn to listen, that smooths out rough souls and gives them the taste of a new desire, – to lie still, like a mirror that the deep sky can mirror itself upon … the genius of the heart, that enriches everyone who has come into contact with it … [making everyone] perhaps less certain, more gentle, fragile, and broken.14

Nietzsche’s ‘genius of the heart’ does not produce itself. Rather, it withdraws into namelessness. As a will to power, the will to appropriate retreats. Power turns into friendliness. The ‘genius of the heart’ discovers the strength in weakness that finds expression in the splendour of stillness.

Only in stillness, in the great silence, do we enter into a relation with the nameless, which exceeds us and in the face of which our efforts at appropriating the name seem feeble. The genius ‘who becomes each man’s guardian at the moment of birth’ also rises above the name.15 The genius makes life more than the miserable survival of the I. He represents a timeless present:

Genius’ youthful face and long, fluttering wings signify that he does not know time … That is why a birthday cannot be the commemoration of a past day but, like every true celebration, must be an abolition of time – the epiphany and presence of Genius. This inescapable presence prevents us from enclosing ourselves within a substantial identity and shatters the ego’s pretension to be sufficient unto itself.16Absolutely silent perception resembles a photograph taken with a very long exposure. Daguerre’s photograph Boulevard du Temple actually shows a very busy street in Paris, but because of the extremely long exposure, typical of daguerreotypes, all movement disappears. Only what stands still is visible. Boulevard du Temple exudes an almost rural calmness. Apart from buildings and trees, only one human figure is recognizable, a man who is standing still to have his shoes cleaned. Perception of the long-lasting and slow thus recognizes only still things. Everything that rushes is condemned to disappear. Boulevard du Temple can be interpreted as a world seen through divine eyes. Only those who linger in contemplative calmness appear to God’s redeeming gaze. Stillness redeems.

 Notes

1. Giorgio Agamben and Monica Ferrando, The Unspeakable Girl: The Myth and Mystery of Kore, London: Seagull Books, 2014, p. 10.

2. Joachim Gasquet, Cézanne, Paris: Bernheim-Jeune, 1931, pp. 131–3. Quoted in Theodore Reff, Cézanne: The Late Work, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1977, p. 406.

3. Friedrich Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2019, p. 8.

4. Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 53ff.

5. Ibid., p. 53.

6. Ibid., p. 55.

7. Ibid.

8. Michel Serres, Malfeasance: Appropriation through Pollution?, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 1.

9. Ibid., pp. 69f.

10. Ibid., p. 51.

11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 153–229; here: pp. 190f.

12. Serres, Malfeasance, pp. 87f.

13. Ibid., p. 89.

14. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 175.

15. Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, New York: Zone Books, 2007, p. 9.

16. Ibid., pp. 11f.

Non-things

Upheaval in the Lifeworld

Byung-Chul Han

Translated by Daniel Steuer

Being as Passion

 

 Gesthemane hours of my life

In the dull glow

Of glum apprehension

You have often seen me.

Crying I shout: never in vain.

My young being

Weary of plaints

Trusted none but the angel of mercy.

—Martin Heidegger

In an essay on entertainment, Peter Glotz hints at a possible connection between the critique of entertainment and the passion for death: “The condemnation of entertainment, diversion, light art, has religious roots. In Pascal, for example, for whom ‘diversion’ disrupted concentration on a life centered around death.”1Martin Heidegger, too, stands in this intellectual, even theological tradition, which perceives in entertainment a lapse, even apostasy, from the authentic form of life. Distraction is, for Heidegger, a “flight from death.”2 It circumvents the “possibility of authentic existence” for Dasein.3 Only by facing death as “the measureless impossibility of existence” does Dasein become aware of the possibility of authentic existence.4 As on many other occasions, Heidegger resorts here to the language of the Christian religion. Dasein is exposed to the “constant temptation of falling-prey.” Being-in-the-world is “tempting.”5 Diversion leads to “falling-prey.” It is the antagonist of an earnest, struggling life centered on death.6 “Struggle” and resoluteness are essential to Heidegger’s existential-ontological vocabulary.7 In “struggling” resoluteness, Dasein “chooses its heroes,” according to Heidegger. Existence is passion. It is even a passion unto death.

The term “entertainment” does not belong to the vocabulary of Being and Time. But Heidegger’s existential-ontological analysis of “everydayness” contains the lineaments of a potential phenomenology of entertainment. Heidegger’s “they” may be interpreted as the subject of mass entertainment, even as the hypersubject of mass media: “In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This being with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of being of ‘the others’ in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they unfolds its true dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and the way they see and judge.”8 The they embodies, even verbalizes the horizon of average meaning and understanding according to which the masses understand themselves and the world. The they comprises everyday patterns of understanding and conduct to which the masses are oriented. The they is constitutive for understanding, for its patterns of apprehension generate a reality, an “everyday and stubborn reality.”9In numerous ways, entertainment media impart patterns of interpretation and conduct. Entertainment thus maintains the world. Entertaining is also maintaining. Television, which is never addressed in Being and Time, may be considered a defining medium for the they. It does not passively display an “objective” reality. Instead it actively produces reality, or that which must be taken as real. Television is a reality machine. Watching television (fernsehen) does not produce distance (Ferne), instead it engenders proximity. It places distance at a distance by configuring reality as proximity to “the everyday way of being interpreted.”

Mass entertainment permits meanings and values to circulate on narrative and emotive pathways. It also shapes feelings, which are constitutive for apprehension: “The domination of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already decided upon even the possibilities of being attuned, that is, about the basic way in which Dasein lets itself be affected by the world. The they prescribes that attunement, it determines what and how one ‘sees.’”10 The function of entertainment media is to re-impregnate the “public way in which things have been interpreted” which is determined by “average understanding” or the normal view of the world.11 Conduct and interpretation patterns are internalized through physical and psychological channels of desire. In this way, entertainment stabilizes the existing social structure. The they is sustained insofar as the they is entertained. The meaning-structure, which may only be reproduced, “disburdens” judgment and understanding.12 The invention of a world, of something completely alien is far more laborious and demanding than the discovery of an already interpreted world. Television too effects a “disburdening of being” by proffering prefabricated meaning-formations or myths: “And since the they constantly accommodates Dasein, it retains and entrenches its stubborn dominance.”13 Hence, entertainment is not the antithesis of “care,” is not a careless giving-oneself-over to the world, but is rather a depraved form of “care” in which Dasein is concerned with things that un-burden its existence.

Entertainment is an unburdening of being that generates pleasure. This is the conclusion of a phenomenology of entertainment based on Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness. “Idle talk” unburdens talk. It represents the sum or whole of everyday meaning-formations or convictions: “The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its being public, but encourages it. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter.”14 Gossip and scandal are also “idle talk.” As forms of entertainment, they help preserve “the public way of being interpreted.” They do not celebrate meaninglessness, but instead possess their own form of disclosedness. Everydayness is rife with average presentations of meaning that people consent to unawares: “This interpretedness of idle talk has always already settled itself down in Dasein. We get to know many things initially in this way, and some things never get beyond such an average understanding. Dasein can never escape the everyday way of being interpreted into which Dasein has grown initially.”15Heidegger does not consistently describe the they or idle talk in phenomenologically neutral terms. Frequently his interpretation is colored by value judgments or representations with clearly religious roots. Idle talk retains a “disparaging sense.” Heidegger’s value judgments let what is positive in everydayness slips continually into the negativity of the inauthentic. Everydayness talks into the ground any possibility of authentic existence: “Ontologically, this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the world, toward Mitdasein, toward being-in itself.”16 Idle talk is contrasted with its positively inflected counterpart, the passionate form of talk that is “keeping silent,” which renders audible the “uncanniness of the suspension.” The they un-burdens existence. But being as such is burdensome. Being is passion. The they and entertainment dispassion existence into “the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness.”17 In truth, idle talk is everything but groundless: it establishes or reinforces a communicative ground. Groundless or cryptic would better describe that keeping-silent which congeals into passion.

Being and Time could equally have been called Passion and Entertainment. Homo doloris as a passion figure represents the antithesis of the they. Only in the “primordial individuation of reticent resoluteness that expects Angst of itself” does Dasein arrive at authentic existence.18 Passion is individuation. Homo doloris is also Homo solitudinis. Entertainment is different: it gives no impression of individuality. In contrast to the they, which sustains the familiar and “holds any new questioning and discussion at a distance because it presumes it has understood and in a peculiar way it suppresses them and holds them back,” Heidegger’s Homo solitudinis ventures forward into the uncertain.19 He exposes himself to that angst which frees him from “the illusions of the they.”20 “Thus Angst takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted.”21Acquiescence to the world is constitutive of falling-prey. Entertainment too is based on acquiescence to what is. It is condemned to generate or at the very least sustain what is. Angst as the reagent of authentic existence is a negative expression in this respect. It comprises “clinging to whatever existence one has reached.”22 It leaves Dasein homeless by tearing Dasein away from the familiar world. Entertainment, on the other hand, makes Dasein at home in the present world. It maintains the home. Entertainment is homekeeping. In the face of death, Dasein finds itself away from home. It becomes aware of that uncanniness of being that remains concealed in the unambiguous, familiar world of the they.

In falling-prey, Dasein’s striving does not extend past the known and familiar. Its condition is one of acquiescence to the world. Dasein has always already arrived. The “temporality of falling-prey” is the “present.”23 The future is only a pale continuation and extension of the here and now. The temporality of falling-prey excludes the completely other. For it, the future in the emphatic sense, in the sense of the recognized-as-approaching, is closed. The temporality of falling-prey is also that of entertainment. The Dasein that entertains itself clings to the here and now. Entertainment reinforces that which is. Its temporality is also the present. The past is the old. The new is what is to come. But neither the old nor the new are the other.

The passion of authentic existence exhibits an entirely different time structure. In contrast to falling-prey, what determines it is not the present but the future. The future is the temporality of passion. A messianic future, in which the completely other discloses itself, may well by foreign to Heidegger’s thinking, but his authentic future as “anticipation of death” does abandon the known and familiar. It makes the world appear in light of “not-being-at-home,” casting Dasein out of the “being-at-home of publicness.”24 “Not-being-at-home” drives Dasein to passion, compels it to heroic resolution.

The passion of authenticity presides over Heidegger’s Being and Time. The they remains a form of degeneration. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Heidegger’s approach to it is not ontologically neutral. It forces into the background the constitutive function of unimpassioned everydayness, of the they, which among other things consists of tending to the world through patterns of meaning and identification, maintaining it in a special sense.

Heidegger’s Dasein primarily and above all resides in the “work world.” Already in Being and Time, Heidegger grasps work as a basic form of human existence. The first world is the “work world.” Work is guided by “circumspection.” Circumspection discovers things in their whereto, that is, in their meaning, and reflexively, prior to any expressive thematization. It creates a nearness to things by classifying them in or admitting them into the functional context of the familiar work world. They are situated within the work world in accordance with their particular whereto. Heidegger calls this admitting, situating bringing-into-nearness of things “de-distancing.” De-distancing “circumspection” as “nearness” eradicates distance. But if work ceases, then circumspection sheds its association with the work world. This generates free time as time liberated from work, wherein “circumspection becomes free.” Possessed of an “essential tendency toward nearness,” Dasein perpetuates the activity of de-distancing outside of the work world.25 In its free time it wanders through “a distant and strange world,” appropriating it “only in its outward appearance,” gawking at it, as Heidegger might say. In free time Dasein looks into the distance. This looking-into-the-distance has its own particular mode of vision: “Dasein seeks distance solely to bring it near in its outward appearance. Dasein lets itself be intrigued just by the outward appearance of the world.”26 In its free time, Dasein, liberated from circumspection, gives itself over to the “lust of the eyes,” its craving for images. It looks into the distance.27Heidegger’s remark on “free circumspection” may also be read as a critique of television: “When curiosity has become free, it takes care to see not order to understand what it sees, that is, to come to a being toward it, but only in order to see. It seeks novelty only to leap from it again to another novelty. The care of seeing is not concerned with comprehending and knowingly being in the truth, but the possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Thus curiosity is characterized by a specific not-staying with what is nearest. Consequently, it also does not seek the leisure of reflective staying, but rather restlessness and excitement from continual novelty and changing encounters. In not-staying, curiosity makes sure of the constant possibility of distraction.” Television viewing, then, is a passive “being delivered over to the world.” Only images are consumed. Curious, restive seeing is analogous to channel surfing. Dasein channel surfs through the world. Channel surfing as “not staying” is, translated into ontological terms, an inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world. Channel surfing ontologically disperses Dasein in an inauthentic existence.

In the year Being and Time was published (1927), Heidegger was not yet familiar with television. In Germany the first experimental broadcasts took place in 1934. Being and Time does, however, expressly address radio, which enables a kind of distance-hearing. Heidegger views relates radio to the aforementioned “essential tendency toward nearness”: “All kinds of increasing speed which we are more or less compelled to go along with today push for overcoming distance. With the ‘radio,’ for example, Dasein is bringing about today a de-distancing of the ‘world’ which is unforeseeable in its meaning for Dasein, by way of expanding and destroying the everyday surrounding world.”28 Heidegger is unusually judgmental here. But his ontology of the Dasein alone fails to clarify why radio simultaneously expands and destroys the “everyday surrounding world,” which is destroyed to the very degree to which the de-distancing of the world is adjudged negative. Is the true world, which would mean home, destroyed through the sounds or images of the “distant and strange world”? Or do images themselves, as mere representations, destroy what is worldly in the world? Some thirty years later, Heidegger expresses himself more clearly with regard to the massive diffusion of television: images and representations merely propagate a world that is in fact no world: “And those who have stayed on in their homeland? Often they are still more homeless than those who have been driven from their homeland. Hourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. Week after week the movies carry them off into uncommon, but often merely common, realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is no world.”29The late Heidegger likewise mistrusts the eye and the image. His critique of “representation” is in its way a critique of the image. Images do not only disclose; they also enclose or conceal. They divert vision from the preeminent, from the real, both of which evade mediated representation. An interesting apercu appears in Heidegger’s often-mocked essay “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?” After a detailed description of his hut in Todtnauberg, he remarks:

This is my work world—seen with the eye of an observer: the guest or summer vacationer. Strictly speaking I never myself observe the landscape. I experience its hourly changes, day and night, in the great comings and goings of the seasons. The gravity of the mountains and the hardness of the primeval rock, the slow and deliberate growth of the fir trees, the brilliant, simple splendor of the meadows in bloom, the rush of the mountain brook in the long autumn night, the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered in snow—all of this moves and flows through and penetrates daily existence up there, and not in forced moments of “aesthetic” immersion or artificial empathy, but only when one’s own existence stands in its work. It is the work alone that opens up space for the reality that is these mountains. The course of the work remains embedded in what happens in the landscape.30Heidegger speaks critically of “the eye of an observer.” World and landscape elude mere observation. The worldly in the world cannot be objectified as image or representation. The “gravity of the mountains” and the “hardness of the primeval rock” are what is real in the world. The world emerges as resistance, which work alone can share in. Whoever does not work, whoever merely observes and enjoys like a tourist, thus has no access to the world. Emphasis is placed repeatedly on work. Only work grants access to the world. Only work “opens up space” for “the reality that is these mountains.” Mere observation leads to the vanishing of the world. The real in the world is only accessible prior to media dissemination. It reveals itself only in the moving and flowing through and penetrating of meadows in bloom and flatlands covered in snow, the rush of the mountain brook and the deliberate growth of the fir trees: “all this moves and flows through and penetrates.” Media destroy this moving and flowing through and penetrating proper to the real. Media replace “daily existence” (this expression, tägliche Dasein, still bears echoes of Being and Time) with “realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is no world.”

Gravity and sustenance compose the facticity of the world. Heidegger’s objection to media is, in the end, that media images de-factify the world, that they cannot sustain the weight of the world, the particular weight of things. The medial eventuates in the disappearance of the real. Heidegger lays special stress on the characteristics of things that evade media representation or mere seeing, such as “the gravity of the mountains” or “the hardness and scent of oak.”31 Neither the “scent of oak” nor the “deliberate growth of the firs” may be objectified through media. Authentic things, the things of an integrated world, have a special gravity, a special materiality opposed to mediality. The weightlessness of the medial, virtual world defactifies the world. Only the “the wide expanse of everything that grows” “bestows world,” Heidegger states.32 Medial things do not grow, but are instead produced. Things that grow, that are integrated, that are rooted, are opposed in Heidegger to medially produced, defactified things.

Heidegger’s thinking comprises a refactification of the world, above all on the linguistic plane. Rhymes and half-rhymes (delight/autumn night, fir/pasture) suggest an original, unspoiled order in the world which eludes both representation and medial fabrication. The refactification of the world is enabled by a refactification of language. This is true for Heidegger’s things, as well. Heidegger’s things are well known: “brook and bluff,” “mirror and clasp,” “book and picture,” “crown and cross.”33 Alliteration binds these things to an originary world. They make up a reality perhaps no less unreal or virtual than the world of medial things.

Heidegger’s expressions—“hardness,” “gravity,” “gloom,” “obscurity,” or “burden”— not only evoke the facticity of the world; they also propagate his language of passion. Being is suffering. During entertainment, which unburdens Dasein, we distance ourselves from being as passion. Only work corresponds to the passional character of being. Heidegger’s emphasis on work persists through the transition from the work-world to the mountain-world. In “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces,” he states: “It is the work alone that opens up space for the reality that is these mountains. The course of the work remains embedded in what happens in the landscape.” Even work is, particularly in the late Heidegger, not a form of action, of making or producing. It is passion. It is based on thrownness. In its peculiar passivity and passion it attends to “what happens in the landscape.”

For Heidegger, thinking, too, is work. Thinking as work is, again, passion. It is distinguished by the passivity of “suffering.” The task of thinking consists in being “an echo.” “To be an echo is the suffering of thinking. Its passion is quiet sobriety.”34 Sober passion is an oxymoron. But Heidegger understands passion in the original sense of passio or suffering, as passivity in self-sacrifice or self-surrender to the given matter of thought, which is accessible not to active grasping but rather to passive suffering. Thinking must allow itself to be determined (be-stimmen), modulated (durch-stimmen), indeed overruled (über-stimmen) by “what cannot be thought in advance” or by “what sustains and binds.”35 This is the basis of the facticity of thinking.

Heidegger’s thinker is a man of pain. His theology of pain runs as follows: “In the rift of pain, what is granted on high guards its perseverance. The rift of pain rends the veiled procession of grace into an un-needed arrival of favor.”36 The rift in thinking is an opening for the “magnitude” that is “too great for humans.” The closed inwardness of thinking without this rift is not receptive to the “arrival of favor.” Only the rift, only pain opens human thinking for the superhuman. Pain is transcendence. Pain is god. Entertainment is immanence. It is godlessness. Heidegger’s inclination toward passion is mirrored in his selection of things. Notably, his last things are “crown and cross.” By its proximity to “cross,” “crown” recollects the crown of thorns of Homo doloris. Heidegger calls to God in despair when faced with the world of “machinations” defactified by technology and media: “Only a god can save us.”37Being as pain, as prayer, is opposed to the immanence of beings, which in the modern era is irremediably submitted to experience and entertainment. Entertainment is a kind of machination that dispenses with all “timidity” before the divine, before that which cannot be thought in advance.

In many respects, Peter Handke is in agreement with Heidegger. In Handke, the defactification of the world is “dépaysement,” disorientation or “being out of the country.”38 The media world obviates, one could also say, authentic being-in-the-world. Heidegger equates “the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered in snow” in the Black Forest in winter with the happiness of being-in-the-world as being-at-work. For his part, Handke sets forth on a winter journey to the Danube, Sava, Morava, and Drina Rivers. Handke grasps the happiness of “repaysement,” or “repatriation,” of being-thrown-back-into-the-world, while “pressing the ancient iron door-handle” and “pushing open the shop door almost laboriously.” The facticity of the world appears primarily through gravity, through the resistance of things: “In the mild resistance of things, generated by age and material gravity, in their contact with the body of the person entering, an independent counter-body reveals itself. ... The Serbian shop door is literally an object, part of a momentary intensive communication of bodies, even the subject of a spatial-concrete event, possessed of its own existence. ... This slight resistance, the detectable inner force of the simplest things, draws them away from representation, salvages them from disappearance into the rehearsed accessibility of perception.”39 His true things, however, once brought into language, that is, translated into signs, again resonate with the unreal and the ghastly: “forest-dark honey pots, soup chickens big as turkeys, oddly yellow noodle nests or crowns and the often predator-mouthed, often storybook fat river fish.”40 This storybook world is just as unreal as the media world. Its strangely manipulated language generates a kind of virtual world.

Medial things, which whir through space without gravity, which are everywhere, that is to say, nowhere, must also have struck Handke as ghastly. They certainly bothered Kafka a great deal. Media for him are ghosts that de-realize the world, that divest it of its grasp-ability:

The easy possibility of writing letters—from a purely theoretical point of view—must have brought wrack and ruin to the souls of the world. Writing letters is actually an intercourse with ghosts and by no means just with the ghost of the addressee but also with one’s own ghost. ... How did people ever get the idea they could communicate with one another by letter! One can think about someone far away and one can hold on to someone nearby; everything else is beyond human power. ... Written kisses never arrive at their destination; the ghosts drink them up along the way. It is this ample nourishment which enables them to multiply so enormously. People sense this and struggle against it; in order to eliminate as much of the ghosts’ power as possible and to attain a natural intercourse, a tranquility of soul, they have invented trains, cars, aeroplanes—but nothing helps anymore: These are evidently inventions devised at the moment of crashing. The opposing side is so much calmer and stronger; after the postal system, the ghosts invented the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless. They will not starve, but we will perish.41Kafka’s ghosts have in the meantime invented television, the internet, and email. These are disembodied means of communication, and for this reason are ghastly. “We will perish”—Handke too might have said this with regard to medial things, which whir without bodies or gravity around the entire planet, and render true witnessing impossible. Media messages and images are ghosts that procreate independently of human beings: “Writing letters is actually an intercourse with ghosts and by no means just with the ghost of the addressee but also with one’s own ghost, which secretly evolves inside the letter one is writing or even in a whole series of letters, where one letter corroborates another and can refer to it as witness.”42 Everything, following Handke, is ghastly reflections unrelated to reality: “Nearly all the photographs and reports of the last four years ... seemed to me increasingly to be simple mirrorings of the usual coordinated perspectives—distorted reflections in the very cells of our eyes and not eyewitness accounts.”

Media make people blind. They generate a world without witnessing. They do not bear witness to reality. They falsify and deflect the world. Their “machinations” obscure its facticity. Dasein, on the other hand, is a being-thrown. The human Dasein exists thanks to the “appeal of the highest heaven” and “protection of sustaining earth.”43 One ought to respond to this appeal and let oneself be borne by that which oversteps the human. Neither human Dasein nor the world is producible. This is the basis of their facticity. As humans, we are determined and modulated by “what cannot be thought in advance.” This is the basis of our facticity. Only so long as our thrownness, our facticity, resides within ourselves are we safe from becoming a “slave” of “machinations.” People are, Heidegger states, “servile to their future.” Distraction, which in Being and Time cuts Dasein off from authentic existence, makes people deaf to the language of the future: “But the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are men, born in its atmosphere, who can hear it. They are servants of their origin, not slaves of machination. ... The danger looms that men of today cannot hear its language. The only thing they hear is the noise of the media, which they almost always take for the voice of God. So man becomes disoriented and loses his way. To the disoriented, the simple seems monotonous.”44“Book” and “mirror” make the language of the future audible. Film and television deafen the ear to it, so that people grow hard of hearing and distracted. The book is bearing witness. Film is a machination. “Jug” and “plow” are traces of origin. They are not “devices.” Radio and television, on the other hand, lead to homelessness. Heidegger constructs the authentic world through a highly arbitrary distinction. What Heidegger lacks is serenity before the world. His language of passion is willful, and achieves its effects through crude selection and exclusion. It is not friendly. Not only “herons” and “deer” belong to the world, but also mice and Mickey Mouse.

1. Peter Glotz, “Über die Vertreibung der Langeweile oder Aufklärung und Massenkultur,” in Die Zukunft der Aufklärung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 217.

2. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 357.

3. Heidegger, Being and Time, 242.

4. Heidegger, 242.

5. Heidegger, 165.

6.Earnest, related to the German ernst, derives from the Proto-Germanic ernustuz, meaning “struggle” or “fight.”

7. Heidegger, Being and Time, 352.

8. Heidegger, 119.

9. Heidegger, 159.

10. Heidegger, 159.

11. Heidegger, 159.

12. Heidegger, 120.

13. Heidegger, 120.

14. Heidegger, 158.

15. Heidegger, 158–159.

16. Heidegger, 159.

17. Heidegger, 167.

18. Heidegger, 297.

19. Heidegger, 158.

20. Heidegger, 145.

21. Heidegger, 177.

22. Heidegger, 244.

23. Heidegger, 317.

24. Heidegger, 177.

25. Heidegger, 98.

26. Heidegger, 161.

27. [There is an untranslatable play on words here: fern sehen—“to see into the distance”; fernsehen—“to watch television”; Fernseher—“television.” Below Han speaks of the radio as enabling a kind of Fern-hören or distance-hearing.—Trans.]

28. Heidegger, 98.

29. Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 48.

30. Martin Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?” in Martin Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 27.

31. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay,” 70.

32. Heidegger, 70.

33. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), 180. [Translation slightly modified to stress alliterative elements.—Trans.]

34. Martin Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 79 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), 66.

35. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 199, 292, 283.

36. Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, 122.

37. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay,” 57.

38. Peter Handke, A Journey to the Rivers: Justice for Serbia, trans. Scott Abbott (New York: Viking, 1997), 30.

39. Hubert Winkels, Leselust und Bildermacht. Literatur, Fernsehen und Neue Medien (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1997), 89–90.

40. Handke, Journey, 40 (translation modified).

41. Franz Kafka, Letters to Milena, trans. Philip Boehm (New York: Schocken, 1990), 229.

42. Kafka, Letters to Milena, 229. See also Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Schocken, 1977): “So if I do not write, that is due chiefly to ‘strategic’ reasons such as have become dominant for me in recent years. I do not trust words and letters, my words and letters; I want to share my heart with people but not with phantoms that play with the words and read the letters with slavering tongue. Especially I do not trust letters, and it is a strange belief that all one has to do is seal the envelope in order to have the letter reach the addressee safely.” Kafka has a more human form of art in mind: “I forgot to add to my remark above: It sometimes seems to me that the nature of art in general, the existence of art, is explicable solely in terms of such ‘strategic considerations,’ of making possible the exchange of truthful words from person to person.”

43. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay,” 70.

44. Heidegger, 70.

Good Entertainment

 A Deconstruction of the Western Passion Narrative

by Byung-Chul Han

 translated by Adrian Nathan West

Thursday, April 10, 2025

White Slavery Denial


Jim Goad: Throughout his purported “debunking,” Hogan floats the idea that white indentured servitude and black slavery were so different as to be incomparable. Why is he wrong?

Michael A. Hoffman II: White enslavement has a long history in Britain and Scandinavia. Mr. Hogan, like so many writers on this subject who conform to the Establishment line, overlooks several points and has a naive faith in the white ruling class of Britain.

The conforming authors don’t take into account that the study of white enslavement has been impeded over the centuries by two facts missing from their own studies and critiques. First, white enslavement carried with it a hereditary taint. As I demonstrate in my book, this extends back to the Vikings who looked on Scandinavian “thralls” and those born into “thralldom” as carrying a hereditary defect in part because their enslavement was hereditary. Something akin to this was operating in Anglo-Saxon England under the category of villeinage. The daughter of a villein could not be married without buying her way out of villeinage. The test of a young English woman’s status in early medieval England—whether she was slave or free—was decided by whether or not the local lord had control over her body, as all masters have over their slaves. Under English law, a villein woman was one who could not be married until she first offered the custom of the country as it was known, the “ransom of blood for merchet” (i.e., until she first submitted to sexual intercourse with the lord, prior to her marriage).

Both in early Britain and Scandinavia and much later in the sugar plantations of the West Indies and the tobacco plantations of America (before cotton became king), British-American whites whose parents or relatives had been enslaved, or who themselves had escaped it, or bought their way out (as did some black people), were exceedingly reticent to identify as former white slaves or as their progeny. “Servant” was a far more attractive category, and we see identifications with this status and less so with outright enslavement due to the stigma.

Hogan has a pictorial display allegedly confuting my thesis in which he displays a photograph of what appear to be mixed-race people in the West Indies who are Barbados residents circa 1908, and he is incredulous that no Irish white “redlegs” are in the photo or named as such. We know from primary source materials that white slaves worked alongside blacks in the West Indies and that the word “redleg” was applied to them by their darker coworkers because of the tendency of the white slaves to sunburn. Whether or not their descendants stayed on the island to pose for a camera nearly 300 years later is a flimsy device for casting doubt on a historical epoch. Limiting oneself to the search for Irish surnames is an even more egregious error because it excludes the search for traces of the English Protestants who were transported as slaves to those islands in the 17th and early 18th century.

Hogan and company also support the notion that white bondage was mostly carried out within a framework of law. Here they are swallowing the propaganda of the white ruling class who were permitting the mass kidnapping of white children off the streets of port cities such as London and Glasgow for shipment to America under no indentures whatsoever, or under forged indentures, or as criminalized paupers and “rogues.” Upon arrival these youth were often put to work clearing forests and draining swamps. They were regularly assaulted, ill-fed, and worked to death. Britain had a surfeit of poor white youth who represented a potential for a French-Revolutionary type of insurrection in the cities. The aristocracy was only too glad to be rid of them, and I draw my evidence for this from state papers and contemporary letters and eyewitness accounts.

Hogan accepts the official tale of the slavers themselves, as they obscured their monstrous crime against their own people. So for him, there is no mass “kid-nabbing” (as it was first termed). He is blind to the fact that to facilitate white bondage under penal enslavement, the British ruling class contrived laws such as the Waltham Black Act, which made simple misdemeanors (stealing lace, breaking down an aristocrat’s fish pond, poaching deer) into felonies punishable by “transportation for life into the colonies.” In the 17th century the tens of thousands of prisoners these laws netted were not sent to slavery in British America and the West Indies on indentures. They were sold at the ports on arrival. As prisoners they had no rights. Diaries, letters, and eyewitness accounts give testimony to their horrible mistreatment and slave labor. Mr. Hogan won’t call these wretches “slaves,” even though they were clearly handled like chattel (cattle).

It seems that a powerful lobby has decided that black folk have a proprietary relationship with the word slave. “You blacks are the slave race,” they are told by their liberal white alleged “allies.” If this designation is false, however, then it constitutes an act of psychological crippling. The history of the white race is in many respects synonymous with the long history of enslavement, and if blacks have a copyright on the word “slave,” someone should tell that to the Slavic people, who for generations were targets of Viking slave raids and from whom the word “slave” is derived.

The weakness of Mr. Hogan’s assertions can be found in his gullible acceptance of the party line of the white ruling class with regard to their whitewash of their role in white enslavement. The white ruling class is excoriated with contempt by the left when they minimize crimes of the British aristocracy and capitalists against people of color, but Mr. Hogan will believe them implicitly when they aver that white bondage was operated within a legal framework, and it only involved “servants.”

The kidnapping of poor whites has precedence in Britain. It does not have a legal basis per se, but it has color of law and we find it in the systematic mass kidnapping of British people for maritime slavery aboard ship for the Royal Navy. I can anticipate the objection: The bondage was for a determinate period of time. Officially, yes. An Englishmen was kidnapped of the streets and country lanes of Britain with the connivance of the judiciary and conscripted for a period of years, but in actuality these determinate number of years was not worth the ink that had been used to write the paper, when it so happened that the victim of abduction was returning home from a five- or seven-year compulsory voyage. He saw the blessed shore of England at long last, prayed that his wife had not run off and that his children and parents still lived, and then a few miles from shore, another man-of-war sailed up to his vessel, boarded it at sea with a press gang, and kidnapped him again for another multi-year abduction. This could happen two or three times. The kidnapped sailor could be gone from Britain ten, fifteen, or twenty years and killed or severely injured during that time. I doubt Mr. Hogan would confer upon this naval slave that title because if the slave survived his ordeal he eventually went home. He had been a slave for a time, and to quibble over it is to do a grave disservice to the memory of tens of thousands of Royal Navy slaves. Impressment was one of the rotten roots, along with villeinage, that created a precedent for an institutional framework for white slavery concealed under cover of “indenture” or some other deceptive and cosmetic rubric.

Jim Goad: In this passage, Hogan essentially accuses you and others of lying: “The inclination to describe these different forms of servitude using the umbrella term ‘slavery’ is a wilful [sic] misuse of language.” Didn’t contemporary legal documents often refer to alleged “indentured servants” as “slaves”?

Michael A. Hoffman II: The truth was in the writings of the white slaves themselves who referred to themselves as such, and eyewitnesses to their plight who wrote accounts of what they saw. This is in my bookThey Were White and They Were Slaves.

As for willful misuse of language, I suppose I should apologize for defying the Establishment-imposed monopoly on how the word “slave” is to be employed, but I cannot, because like all monopolies this one is a form of restraint, enforced by thought cops indifferent to truths that violate the whole foundation of their monopoly on history and white self-image.

Jim Goad: Hogan claims your book deceptively uses “selective quotations taken from nearly 200 different secondary sources,” that your motive is “to deny reparations for slavery in America,” and that your “denial has a pro-slavery ideological lineage.”

Michael A. Hoffman II: One usually can discern that something is defective about an argument when it is ad hominem, and we discover this ill omen in Mr. Hogan’s resort to Pavlovian incentives for stigmatizing a writer with pejoratives calculated to cue an intended audience of partisans that here is someone to despise and dismiss. If he’s writing mainly for the benefit of Mark Potok and members of the new religion of Multiculturalism and Diversity, then he’s in luck. If he seeks a wider audience, however, then I don’t see how such tactics help to make his case.

The idea of paying reparations to any aggrieved racial or ethnic group is something with no appeal to me. It devolves into one-upmanship in the game of guilt imposition. Even in the matter of the Irish Catholic slaves, the focus is too narrow, and the subtext is one that excludes English Protestant slaves, since the Irish narrative is too often beholden to a vision of near-perpetual victimization by the English, which excludes the reality that a vicious white ruling class in London has seldom had any compunctions against betraying and enslaving their own white English yeomanry.

Do the English pay reparations to the Irish for what Oliver Cromwell did in transporting Irish slaves to the West Indies? Do the Catholics pay reparations for the pro-Catholic Stuart King Charles II for having shipped criminalized and enslaved English Protestants to the West Indies? A world full of victims demanding payment is a definition of a madhouse, not a civilization. The reparations process is very often politicized, with war victors or the plutocracy with the most bloat apportioning the guilt and assigning the victim status.

As a revisionist historian, I wrote They Were White and They Were Slaves for the astonishing reason (to some observers) that it was a chronicle that had not been adequately addressed and thus was pure gold from the standpoint of historical rediscovery. My “sin” is to have detailed the history without regard to the idol of political correctness. My book is good news for black people: You are not inferior; you were not the only race or the main race in chattel bondage.

Jim Goad: In an earlier email you wrote to me: “the work of my opponents (at least Hogan that is; the distaff side of the trio today admitted to me that she has not read my book), is so blundering (at least what I have read so far) as to actually add ammunition to my thesis.” How so?

Michael A. Hoffman II: At this URL, Hogan, Matthew Reilly, and Laura McAtackney make the case for one of the assertions in my book. They write:

“If a white servant assaulted another servant or a slave, it was treated as a misdemeanor and they were fined. If they assaulted their master they were whipped. Their indenture was legal property therefore a servant’s remaining time could be left in wills, traded for commodities and sold. Since one’s labor is inseparable from one’s person, this meant indentured servants in Barbados were treated as a sort of commodity. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary indentured servitude is also important, but all too often serves as justification for the existence of “white slavery”. It is true that some Europeans, particularly prisoners of war or political prisoners, were sent to places like Barbados against their will and without a predetermined period of servitude. However, upon arrival, those without contracts were, by law, required to serve the master who purchased their labor for a limited number of years, depending on their age. It is also true that many servants didn’t live to see the end of their period of servitude due to brutal treatment and unsparing work regimens, but while under the conditions of servitude, they were subject to the same laws that governed European servants, not enslaved Africans.” (End quote; emphasis supplied).

Apart from the risible fiction that all white bondage was “indentured” and for a “predetermined period” and therefore all of it was scrupulously governed by some kind of “European servant” legislation and jurisprudence, Hogan, Reilly, and McAtackney concede that “many” whites in bondage suffered “brutal treatment and unsparing work regimens” which proved lethal.

Even they admit that many whites were sent into bondage in Barbados and then worked to death. This is not slavery and it cannot be designated chattel slavery? By what sufficiently dainty term do we describe it? The death of many “servants” was by accident? Were their masters prosecuted and executed for this? What sort of human being who is beaten and worked to death is undeserving of the name “slave”?

Notice as well the knee-jerk assumption the three critics of white slave history exhibit: They expect us to believe that in every case where a white person in bondage is whipped, it was because “they assaulted their master.” How do they know this? Imagine the outcry if someone made such a characterization about the whipping of blacks in bondage—that the flogging was always their fault?

How is the experience of whites in servitude, who were at the mercy of masters of all types, reducible to the notion that no master ever unjustly lashed an un-free white person? This myth presupposes that whites were never whipped due to having tried to run away, or because they were too sick to work, or they refused the master’s sexual advances. By some miracle, the human predicament by which nonwhites in bondage unjustly found themselves on the receiving end of a lash is not shared by whites in bondage. Here we observe the subhuman status of whites in servitude as we demarcate the dimensions of the distortion: They died as slaves yet must not be called slaves; unlike black human beings who experienced servitude and were unconscionably whipped, whites who were whipped almost always deserved it.

Jim Goad: Isn’t it true that several historians who can in no way be smeared as “holocaust deniers” or “white supremacists” essentially agree that white slavery existed in the colonies? In my research forThe Redneck Manifesto, I found historians across the political spectrum essentially agreeing with the historical facts you raise in your research.

Michael A. Hoffman II: The cumulative evidence of A. Roger Ekirch in Bound for America (1990) is conclusive, though he employs euphemisms for white enslavement. He certainly does not fit the hysteric’s categories of “denier” or “supremacist.” Oscar and Mary Handlin openly refer to whites in servitude in the seventeenth century as “slaves. ” See “Origins of the Southern Labor System” in William and Mary Quarterly, April, 1950. Personally, I rely mainly on testimony of the white slaves themselves, their own writings and pleadings and those persons high and low who encountered them and wrote of them.

Jim Goad: With all these allegations of people trying to deny white guilt, is it possible that others are trying to deny black responsibility? Couldn’t one argue that some people are lazily trying to use slavery as a blanket and bulletproof excuse for black academic and economic failure?

Michael A. Hoffman II: Some black people are angered that there is an entire industry in the U.S.

centered on the so-called “Holocaust” of Judaic persons in eastern Europe decades ago, with museums in America and innumerable college classes, books, and movies, and a de facto “Holocaust” tax on Americans in the form of billions of dollars in US aid sent to the Israelis, while the descendants of the black people who worked the plantations and helped to bring to market the cotton—the greatest material prize of antebellum America—never did receive their “40 acres and a mule.” One wonders whether the recent energy devoted to black slave reparations and African-American museums and university curricula would be as intensely promulgated and ubiquitous if there was no “Holocaust” industry to remind American black people that they are not getting their share of the white guilt pie.

Certainly if reparations are to be paid for slavery in America, they must also be paid to the descendants of the white slaves who also performed the requisite labor that enriched the planter class and before there was much of a planter class on the eastern frontier, the white slaves of the 17th century performed the most back-breaking labor of colonial settlement: land-clearing.

Jim Goad: So much of Hogan’s alleged “debunking” simply employs the fallacies of argumentum ad hominem and appeal to motive. But since he called your motives into question, what might be someone’s motive in denying the well-documented history of white slavery?

Michael A. Hoffman II: In my book I give examples of white British aristocrats speeding in their carriages to abolitionist meetings where the plight of blacks in America was decried, heedless of white children by the side of the road who had finished toiling 16 hours, half-naked in a mine; or having their arms and legs mutilated in the factory machinery of the early Industrial Revolution whose owners, such as Josiah Wedgewood, and the famous poet and mine owner Lord Byron, considered poor British whites entirely expendable.

Charles Dickens, who had been a child laborer in a chemical factory, termed this callous hypocrisy “telescopic philanthropy.” The white elite of Britain had the apparition of black enslavement constantly before their eyes, even though it was thousands of miles away, while they were oblivious to the English boys who were sold to chimney sweeps and who sometimes burned and suffocated to death in the chimneys of the magnificent mansions of the abolitionists. Almost no one was paying attention to their agony. It’s supposed to be naughty of me to refer to child labor in the factories, mines, and chimneys of Britain as white slavery. I do not know what else to term girls and boys stripped virtually naked toiling side-by-side in a mine for 16 hours stunted and blackened, or a factory, where they often were seriously injured or killed, because if they didn’t undertake this labor they would starve to death. They went to their labor before dawn and ceased their labors after dark.

Most of your readers are familiar with white self-hatred and this perverse loathing, coupled with the legacy of the betrayal of the masses of white paupers and laborers in Britain by their rulers, has created the current situation of ruinous psychological and spiritual alienation that would seem to desire demographic extinction of their own seed.

Jim Goad: The SPLC claims that you are engaging in “an ahistorical reimagining of real events weaponized by racists and conspiracy theorists.” Speaking of “ahistorical reimaginings,” has the Southern Poverty Law Center ever addressed the Jewish role in the transatlantic slave trade?

Michael A. Hoffman II: Mr. Dees’s poverty palace is a satrap in the Israeli orbit. His hate mill seldom grinds the racist libels and murderous deeds of the settler-rabbis. Goyim-hating Chabad rabbis travel throughout the US to disseminate their racist doctrines, and the SPLC purrs like a kitten in the face of it. Dees and Potok are not going to reveal to their duped supporters—and their numerous cronies at executive levels of the US media—the pivotal role Judiac-Americans played in the merchandising of black flesh prior to the 20th century. Black academics such as the late Prof. Tony Martin of Wellesley College are marginalized and their career opportunities severely curtailed if they dare to inform their students of the vast Judaic role in black enslavement in the Americas, as detailed in the magisterial history books, The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews, Volumes I, II, and III.

Jim Goad: Hogan claims that the purpose of reviving this alleged “myth” is that it “aims to shut down all debate about the legacy of black slavery in the United States.” Yet for someone who is apparently in favor of free and open debate, you claim he’s blocked you on Twitter. Would you be willing to debate Hogan…?

Michael A. Hoffman II: I would very much hope that Mr. Hogan would be true to his fighting Celtic heritage and consent to go a round with this writer.

(Written in 2016, published in the 2018 book Whiteness: The Original Sin. The Hogan/Hoffman debate never happened, but Jim Goad interviewed Hoffman on his podcast in 2017.)

https://jimgoad.net/podcast/?episode=13

From article White Slavery Denial →

Wednesday, April 9, 2025

The Marshmallow Test and self-control

 INTRODUCTION

AS BOTH MY STUDENTS and my children can testify, self-control does not come naturally to me. I have been known to call my students in the middle of the night to ask how the latest data analysis was going, though it began only that evening. At dinners with friends, to my embarrassment my plate is often the first to be clean, when others are far from done. My own impatience, and the discovery that self-control strategies can be learned, has kept me studying those strategies for a lifetime.

The basic idea that drove my work and motivated me to write this book was my belief, and the findings, that the ability to delay immediate gratification for the sake of future consequences is an acquirable cognitive skill. In studies initiated half a century ago, and still ongoing today, we’ve shown that this skill set is visible and measurable early in life and has profound long-term consequences for people’s welfare and mental and physical health over the life span. Most important, and exciting for its educational and child-rearing implications, it is a skill open to modification, and it can be enhanced through specific cognitive strategies that have now been identified.

The Marshmallow Test and the experiments that have followed over the last fifty years have helped stimulate a remarkable wave of research on self-control, with a fivefold increase in the number of scientific publications just within the first decade of this century. In this book I tell the story of this research, how it is illuminating the mechanisms that enable self-control, and how these mechanisms can be harnessed constructively in everyday life.

It began in the 1960s with preschoolers at Stanford University’s Bing Nursery School, in a simple study that challenged them with a tough dilemma. My students and I gave the children a choice between one reward (for example, a marshmallow) that they could have immediately, and a larger reward (two marshmallows) for which they would have to wait, alone, for up to 20 minutes. We let the children select the rewards they wanted most from an assortment that included marshmallows, cookies, little pretzels, mints, and so on. “Amy,” for example, chose marshmallows. She sat alone at a table facing the one marshmallow that she could have immediately, as well as the two marshmallows that she could have if she waited. Next to the treats was a desk bell she could ring at any time to call back the researcher and eat the one marshmallow. Or she could wait for the researcher to return, and if Amy hadn’t left her chair or started to eat the marshmallow, she could have both. The struggles we observed as these children tried to restrain themselves from ringing the bell could bring tears to your eyes, have you applauding their creativeness and cheering them on, and give you fresh hope for the potential of even young children to resist temptation and persevere for their delayed rewards.

What the preschoolers did as they tried to keep waiting, and how they did or didn’t manage to delay gratification, unexpectedly turned out to predict much about their future lives. The more seconds they waited at age four or five, the higher their SAT scores and the better their rated social and cognitive functioning in adolescence. At age 27–32, those who had waited longer during the Marshmallow Test in preschool had a lower body mass index and a better sense of self-worth, pursued their goals more effectively, and coped more adaptively with frustration and stress. At midlife, those who could consistently wait (“high delay”), versus those who couldn’t (“low delay”), were characterized by distinctively different brain scans in areas linked to addictions and obesity.

What does the Marshmallow Test really show? Is the ability to delay gratification prewired? How can it be taught? What is its downside? This book speaks to these questions, and the answers are often surprising. In The Marshmallow Test, I discuss what “willpower” is and what it is not, the conditions that undo it, the cognitive skills and motivations that enable it, and the consequences of having it and using it. I examine the implications of these findings for rethinking who we are; what we can be; how our minds work; how we can—and can’t—control our impulses, emotions, and dispositions; how we can change; and how we can raise and educate our children.

Everybody is eager to know how willpower works, and everybody would like to have more of it, and with less effort, for themselves, their children, and their relatives puffing on cigarettes. The ability to delay gratification and resist temptations has been a fundamental challenge since the dawn of civilization. It is central to the Genesis story of Adam and Eve’s temptation in the Garden of Eden, and a subject of the ancient Greek philosophers, who named the weakness of the will akrasia. Over the millennia, willpower was considered an immutable trait—you either had it or you didn’t—making those low in willpower victims of their biological and social histories and the forces of the momentary situation. Self-control is crucial for the successful pursuit of long-term goals. It is equally essential for developing the self-restraint and empathy needed to build caring and mutually supportive relationships. It can help people avoid becoming entrapped early in life, dropping out of school, becoming impervious to consequences, or getting stuck in jobs they hate. It is the “master aptitude” underlying emotional intelligence, essential for constructing a fulfilling life. And yet, despite its evident importance, it was excluded from serious scientific study until my students and I demystified the concept, created a method to study it, showed its critical role for adaptive functioning, and parsed the psychological processes that enable it.

Public attention to the Marshmallow Test increased early in this century and keeps escalating. In 2006, David Brooks devoted an editorial to it in the Sunday New York Times, and years later in an interview he conducted with President Obama, the president asked Brooks if he wanted to talk about marshmallows. The test was featured in The New Yorker in a 2009 Department of Science article, and the research is widely presented in television programs, magazines, and newspapers throughout the world. It is even guiding the efforts of Sesame Street’s Cookie Monster to master his impulse to voraciously devour cookies so that he may join the Cookie Connoisseurs Club. The marshmallow research is influencing the curriculum in many schools that teach a wide range of children, from those living in poverty to those attending elite private academies. International investment companies use it to encourage retirement planning. And a picture of a marshmallow has become an immediately understood opener to launch discussions of delay of gratification with almost any audience. In New York City, I see kids coming home from school wearing T-shirts that say Don’t Eat the Marshmallows and large metal buttons declaring I Passed the Marshmallow Test. Fortunately, as the public interest in the topic of willpower increases, so does the amount and depth of scientific information on how delay of gratification and self-control are enabled, both psychologically and biologically.

In order to understand self-control and the ability to delay gratification, we need to grasp not only what enables it but also what undoes it. As in the parable of Adam and Eve, we see headline after headline that reveals the latest celebrity—a president, a governor, another governor, a revered judge and moral pillar of society, an international financial and political wizard, a sports hero, a film star—who blew it with a young intern, a housekeeper, or an illegal drug. These people are smart, and not just in their IQ intelligence but emotional and social intelligence as well—otherwise they could not have achieved their eminence. Then why do they act so stupid? And why do they have so much company in the many men and women who never make it into the headlines?

I draw on findings at the vanguard of science to try to make sense of this. At the heart of the story are two closely interacting systems within the human brain, one “hot”—emotional, reflexive, unconscious—and the other “cool”—cognitive, reflective, slower, and effortful. The ways in which these two systems interact in the face of strong temptations underlie how preschoolers deal with marshmallows and how willpower works, or doesn’t. What I learned changed my long-held assumptions about who we are, the nature and expressions of character, and the possibilities for self-generated change.

Part I, Delay Ability: Enabling Self-Control, tells the story of the Marshmallow Test and the experiments that showed preschool children doing what Adam and Eve could not do in the Garden of Eden. The results identified the mental processes and strategies through which we can cool hot temptations, delay gratification, and achieve self-control. They also pointed to possible brain mechanisms that enable these achievements. Decades later, a flood of brain research is using cutting-edge imaging techniques to probe the mind-brain connections and help us understand what the preschooler managed to do.

The marshmallow findings inevitably lead to the question “Is self-control prewired?” Recent discoveries in the science of genetics are providing fresh answers to that question. They are revealing the surprising plasticity of our brains and transforming how we think about the role of nurture and DNA, environment and heredity, and the malleability of human nature. The implications go far beyond the science lab and contradict widely shared beliefs about who we are.

Part I leaves us with a mystery: why does the preschooler’s ability to wait for more treats, rather than ring the bell and settle for less, predict so much about future success and well-being? I answer that question in Part II, From Marshmallows in Pre-K to Money in 401(k), where I look at how self-control ability influences the journey from preschool to retirement planning, how it paves the way to creating successful experiences and positive expectations—an “I think I can!” mind-set and a sense of self-worth. While not guaranteeing success and a rosy future, self-control ability greatly improves the chances, helping us make the tough choices and sustain the effort needed to reach our goals. How well it works depends not just on skills but on internalizing goals and values that direct the journey, and on motivation that is strong enough to overcome the setbacks along the route. How self-control can be harnessed to build such a life by making willpower less effortful and increasingly automatic and rewarding is the story of Part II, and like life itself it unfolds in unexpected ways. I discuss not just resistance to temptation but diverse other self-control challenges, from cooling painful emotions, overcoming heartbreak, and avoiding depression to making important decisions that take future consequences into account. And while Part II shows the benefits of self-control, it makes its limits equally clear: a life with too much of it can be as unfulfilling as one with too little.

In Part III, From Lab to Life, I look at the implications of the research for public policy, focusing on how recent educational interventions beginning in preschool are incorporating lessons on self-control in order to give those children living under conditions of toxic stress a chance to build better lives. I then summarize the concepts and strategies examined throughout this book that can help with everyday self-control struggles. The final chapter considers how findings about self-control, genetics, and brain plasticity change the conception of human nature, and the understanding of who we are and what we can be.

In writing The Marshmallow Test, I imagined myself having a leisurely conversation with you, the reader, much like the many I have had with friends and new acquaintances, sparked by the question “What’s the latest in the marshmallow work?” Soon we veer off into how the findings relate to aspects of our own lives, from child rearing, hiring new staff, and avoiding unwise business and personal decisions to overcoming heartbreak, quitting smoking, controlling weight, reforming education, and understanding our own vulnerabilities and strengths. I have written the book for those of you who, like me, have struggled with self-control. I’ve also written it for those who simply would like to understand more deeply how our minds work. I hope The Marshmallow Test will start some new conversations for you.

***

When we designed the experiment in the 1960s we did not film the children. But twenty years later, to record the Marshmallow Test procedure and to illustrate the diverse strategies children use as they try to wait for their treats, my former postdoc Monica L. Rodriguez filmed five-to six-year-olds with a hidden camera in a public school in Chile. Monica followed the same procedure we had used in the original experiments. First up was “Inez,” an adorable little first grader with a serious expression but a twinkle in her eye. Monica seated Inez at a small table in the school’s barren research room. Inez had chosen Oreo cookies as her treats. On the table were a desk bell and a plastic tray the size of a dinner plate, with two cookies in one corner of the tray and one in the other corner. Both the immediate and the delayed rewards were left with the children, to increase their trust that the treats would materialize if they waited for them as well as to intensify their conflict. Nothing else was on the table, and no toys or interesting objects were available in the room to distract the children while they waited.

Inez was eager to get two cookies rather than just one when given the choice. She understood that Monica had to go out of the room to do some work but that she could call her back at any time by ringing the bell. Monica let Inez try ringing it a couple of times, to demonstrate that each time she rang Monica would immediately come back in the room. Monica then explained the contingency. If Inez waited for her to come back by herself, she got the two cookies. If she did not want to wait, she could ring the bell at any time. But if she rang the bell, or began to eat the treat, or left the chair, she’d get only the single cookie. To be sure that Inez understood the instructions fully, she was asked to repeat them.

When Monica exited, Inez suffered for an agonizing few moments with an increasingly sad face and visible discomfort until she seemed about to burst into tears. She then peeked down at the treats and stared hard at them for more than ten seconds, deep in thought. Suddenly her arm shot out toward the bell but just as her hand got to it, she stopped herself abruptly. Gingerly, tentatively, her index finger hovered above the bell’s ringer, almost but not quite touching it, over and over, as if to tease herself. But then she jerked her head away from the tray and the bell, and burst out laughing, as if she had done something terribly funny, sticking her fist into her mouth to prevent herself from roaring aloud, her face beaming with a self-congratulatory smile. No audience has watched this video without oohing and laughing along with Inez in empathic delight. As soon as she stopped giggling, she repeated her teasing play with the bell, but now she alternately used her index finger to shush herself and stuck her hand in front of her carefully closed lips, whispering “No, no” as if to stop herself from doing what she had been about to do. After 20 minutes had passed, Monica returned “by herself,” but instead of eating the treats right away, Inez marched off triumphantly with her two cookies in a bag because she wanted to take them home to show her mother what she had managed to do.

“Enrico,” large for his age and dressed in a colorful T-shirt, with a handsome face topped by neatly cut blond bangs, waited patiently. He tipped his chair far back against the wall behind him, banging it nonstop, while staring up at the ceiling with a bored, resigned look, breathing hard, seemingly enjoying the loud crashing sounds he made. He kept banging until Monica returned, and he got his two cookies.

“Blanca” kept herself busy with a mimed silent conversation—like a Charlie Chaplin monologue—in which she seemed to be carefully instructing herself on what to do and what to avoid while waiting for her treats. She even mimed smelling the imagined goodies by pressing her empty hand against her nose.

“Javier,” who had intense, penetrating eyes and an intelligent face, spent the waiting time completely absorbed in what appeared to be a cautious science experiment. Maintaining an expression of total concentration, he seemed to be testing how slowly he could manage to raise and move the bell without ringing it. He elevated it high above his head and, squinting at it intently, transported the bell as far away from himself as possible on the desktop, stretching the journey to make it as long and slow as he could. It was an awesome feat of psychomotor control and imagination from what looked like a budding scientist.

Monica gave the same instructions to “Roberto,” a neatly dressed six-year-old with a beige school jacket, dark necktie on his white shirt, and perfectly combed hair. As soon as she left the room he cast a quick look at the door to be sure it was tightly shut. He then rapidly surveyed the cookie tray, licked his lips, and grabbed the closest treat. He cautiously opened the cookie to expose the white cream filling in its middle, and, with bent head and busy tongue, he began to lick the cream meticulously, pausing for only a second to smilingly approve his work. After licking the cookie clean, he skillfully put the two sides back together with even more obvious delight and carefully returned the filling-free cookie to the tray. He then hurried at top speed to give the remaining two cookies the identical treatment. After devouring their insides, Roberto arranged the remaining pieces on the tray to restore them to their exact original positions, and checked the scene around him, scanning the door to be sure that all was well. Like a skilled method actor, he then slowly sank his head to place his tilted chin and cheek on the open palm of his right hand, elbow resting on the desktop. He transformed his face into a look of utter innocence, his wide, trusting eyes staring expectantly at the door in childlike innocent wonder.

Roberto’s performance invariably gets the most cheers and the loudest laughter and applause from every audience, including, once, a congratulatory shout from the esteemed provost of one of America’s top private universities to “get him a scholarship when he’s ready to come here!” I don’t think he was joking.

***

Self-control skills are essential for pursuing our goals successfully, but it is the goals themselves that give us direction and motivation. They are important determinants of life satisfaction, and those we select early in life have striking effects both on the later goals that we reach and the satisfaction we feel about our lives. No matter how they are formed, the goals that drive our life stories are as important as the EF we need to try to reach them.

Self-control, especially when it is labeled “effortful control,” can sound as if it demands a grim commitment to very tough, trying labor—a voluntary entry into a work-driven life of self-denial, of living for the future and missing the pleasures of the moment. An acquaintance told me about a recent dinner he had with friends in Manhattan during which the topic turned to the Marshmallow Test. One of his friends, a novelist who lived in Greenwich Village, was contrasting his own life with that of his brother, a very wealthy and successful investment banker living the pinstriped-suit-with-Hermès-necktie life. The brother had long been married and had children who were all doing well. The writer had published five novels but they had had little impact and few sales. He described himself nevertheless as having a great time, spending his days writing and living the bachelor life at night, going from one short-term relationship to the next. He speculated that his solemn, straight-laced brother probably would have waited forever for his marshmallows, whereas he would have been an early bell ringer.

In fact, the novelist could not have published those five books without a great deal of self-control, and he probably also needs it when trying to maintain his fun relationships while staying uncommitted. Nor did he manage to make it through an elite liberal arts college that emphasizes creative writing without having more than enough self-control to do so. You need EF as much for a creative life in the arts as for a successful life in anything else; it’s just the goals that differ. Without EF, the chance to find and pursue your goals is lost. That’s what the kids in the South Bronx faced if they lost in the KIPP lottery. But without compelling goals and drive, EF can leave us competent but aimless.

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF WHO WE ARE

Your reactions to the research findings on brain plasticity and the malleability of behavior in this book depend importantly on your own beliefs about how much people can really control and change what they become. There are two conflicting ways to interpret what these findings tell us in the larger context of who we are and what we can be. It is worth using your cool system to think about what the results mean to you before coming to firm conclusions that your hot system has probably already reached.

The answer to the question of whether human nature is, at its core, malleable or fixed has been an enduring concern of not just scientists but, more important, each of us in our everyday lives. Some people see self-control ability, willpower, intelligence, and other characteristics as fixed, unchangeable traits from the very start of life. They read the experimental evidence that executive function and self-control improve after educational interventions and interpret that as short-term effects unlikely to make a long-term difference, just little tricks that don’t change inborn traits. These people differ from those who see the evidence as supporting the view that we are open to change and able to alter how we think and behave, that we can craft our own lives rather than being either the winners or the losers in the DNA lottery.

If we allow the evidence to make a difference to our personal theories, the discovery of the plasticity of the brain tells us that human nature is more flexible and open to change than has long been assumed. We do not come into the world with a bundle of fixed, stable traits that determine who we become. We develop in continuous interactions with our social and biological environments. These interactions shape our expectations, the goals and values that drive us, the ways we interpret stimuli and experience, and the life stories we construct.

To reiterate from the nature-nurture discussion (Chapter 7), as Kaufer and Francis point out, “Environments can be as deterministic as we once believed only genes could be, and… the genome can be as malleable as we once believed only environments could be.” And the basic message of this book has been that there is substantial evidence that we can be active agents who in part control how those interactions play out. That leaves us with a view of human nature in which we potentially have more choice, and more responsibility, than in the purely deterministic scientific views of the past century. Those views attributed the causes of our behavior to the environment, DNA, the unconscious, bad parenting, or evolution, plus chance. The story this book tells acknowledges all these sources as influences. But ultimately, at the end of that causal chain, it is the individual who is the agent of the action and decides when to ring the bell.

Walter Mischel 

When I am asked to summarize the fundamental message from research on self-control, I recall Descartes’s famous dictum cogito, ergo sum—“I think, therefore I am.” What has been discovered about mind, brain, and self-control lets us move from his proposition to “I think, therefore I can change what I am.” Because by changing how we think, we can change what we feel, do, and become. If that leads to the question “But can I really change?,” I reply with what George Kelly said to his therapy clients when they kept asking him if they could get control of their lives. He looked straight into their eyes and said, “Would you like to?”