(‘Conceit’, māna, is to be understood as a cross between ‘concept’ and ‘pride’ – almost the French ‘orgueil’ suitably attenuated. Asmi is ‘I am’ without the pronoun, like the Latin ‘sum’; but plain ‘am’ is too weak to render asmi, and ahaü asmi (‘ego sum’) is too emphatic to be adequately rendered ‘I am’.)
**
1 Conceit "I am" as root of suffering (cessation of suffering = nibbāna)
Pleasurable is dispassion in the world,
The getting beyond sensuality.
But the putting away of the conceit ‘I am’
—this is the highest pleasure.
Udāna 11
... eradication the conceit ‘I am,’ is nibbāna here and now.
AN IX 1
2 Conceit "I am" as responsible for rebirth:
...as long as there is the attitude ‘I am’ there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body.
SN 22 : 47
3 Conceit "I am" as fundamental condition responsible for mental suffering and confusion:
“Then, a bhikkhu might say: ‘I have discarded [the notion] “I am,” and I do not regard [anything as] “This I am,” yet the dart of doubt and bewilderment still obsesses my mind.’ He should be told: ‘Not so! Do not speak thus. Do not misrepresent the Blessed One; for it is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One would certainly not speak in such a way. It is impossible and inconceivable, friend, that when [the notion] “I am” has been discarded, and one does not regard [anything as] “This I am,” the dart of doubt and bewilderment could still obsess one’s mind. There is no such possibility. For this, friend, is the escape from the dart of doubt and bewilderment, namely, the uprooting of the conceit “I am.”’
AN VI 13
4 Conceit "I am" as a condition for three discriminations:
“When any monk or brahman, with form (and the rest) as the means, which is impermanent, suffering and subject to change, sees thus ‘I am superior’ or ‘I am equal’ or ‘I am inferior,’ what is that if not blindness to what actually is?”
SN 22:49
[The Blessed One:]
“One who conceives ‘I am equal, better, or worse,’
Might on that account engage in disputes.
But one not shaken in the three discriminations
Does not think, ‘I am equal or better.’
“If you understand, spirit, speak up.”
“In this case too, venerable sir, I do not understand in detail …
let the Blessed One explain it to me in such a way that I might understand in detail the meaning of what he stated in brief.”
[The Blessed One:]
“He abandoned reckoning, did not assume conceit;
He cut off craving here for name-and-form.
Though devas and humans search for him
Here and beyond, in the heavens and all abodes,
They do not find the one whose knots are cut,
The one untroubled, free of longing. (...)
SN 1 : 20
Khema
On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Now on that occasion the Venerable Khema and the Venerable Sumana were dwelling at Sāvatthī in the Blind Men’s Grove. Then they approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Venerable Khema then said to the Blessed One:
“Bhante, when a bhikkhu is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the spiritual life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyed the fetters of existence, one completely liberated through final knowledge, it does not occur to him: (1) ‘There is someone better than me,’ or (2) ‘There is someone equal to me,’ or (3) ‘There is someone inferior to me.’”
This is what the Venerable Khema said. The Teacher agreed. Then the Venerable Khema, thinking, ‘The Teacher agrees with me,’ got up from his seat, paid homage to the Blessed One, circumambulated him keeping the right side toward him, and left.
Then, right after the Venerable Khema had left, the Venerable Sumana said to the Blessed One: “Bhante, when a bhikkhu is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the spiritual life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyed the fetters of existence, one completely liberated through final knowledge, it does not occur to him: (4) ‘There is no one better than me,’ or (5) ‘There is no one equal to me,’ or (6) ‘There is no one inferior to me.’”
This is what the Venerable Sumana said. The Teacher agreed. Then the Venerable Sumana, thinking, ‘The Teacher agrees with me,’ got up from his seat, paid homage to the Blessed One, circumambulated him keeping the right side toward him, and left.
Then, soon after both monks had left, the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus: “Bhikkhus, it is in such a way that clansmen declare final knowledge. They state the meaning but don’t bring themselves into the picture.[ Attho ca vutto attā ca anupanīto.]
AN VI 49
5 Conceit "I am" and upādāna (relationship)
I am’ is derivative, not underivative. Derivative upon what? Derivative upon form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness.”
“Friends, the Venerable Puṇṇa Mantāniputta was very helpful to us when we were newly ordained. He exhorted us with the following exhortation:
“It is by clinging, Ānanda, that [the notion] ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging*. And by clinging to what does ‘I am’ occur, not without clinging? It is by clinging to form that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling … to perception … to determinations … to consciousness that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging.
“Suppose, friend Ānanda, a young woman—or a man—youthful and fond of ornaments, would examine her own facial image in a mirror or in a bowl filled with pure, clear, clean water: she would look at it with clinging, not without clinging. So too, it is by clinging to form that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling … to perception … to determinations … to consciousness that ‘I am’ occurs, not without clinging.
Bhikkhu Bodhi:
*Upādāya has a double meaning that is difficult to capture in translation. As absolutive of upādiyati it means “having clung to,” but it also has an idiomatic sense, “derived from, dependent on,” as in the expression catunnañ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ, “the form derived from the four great elements.” I have translated it here “by clinging to,” on the supposition that the literal meaning is primary, but the gloss of Spk emphasizes the idiomatic sense: Upādāyā ti āgamma ārabbha sandhāya paṭicca; “upādāya: contingent on, referring to, on the basis of, in dependence on.”
The mirror simile can support either meaning, and both are probably intended: The youth looks at his or her image with concern for his or her personal appearance (“with clinging”), and the image becomes manifest in dependence on the mirror. Similarly, a person conceives “I am” by clinging to the five aggregates, and it is in dependence on the five aggregates, i.e., with the aggregates as objective referents, that the notion “I am” arises. See 22:151, which again plays upon this dual meaning of upādāya.
“Here, bhikkhus, some recluse or brahmin, with the relinquishing of views about the past and the future, through complete lack of resolve upon the fetters of sensual pleasure, and with the surmounting of the rapture of seclusion, unworldly pleasure, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, regards himself thus: ‘I am at peace, I have attained Nibbāna, I am without clinging.’
“The Tathāgata, bhikkhus, understands this thus: ‘This good recluse or brahmin, with the relinquishing of views about the past and the future…regards himself thus: “I am at peace, I have attained Nibbāna, I am without clinging.” Certainly this venerable one asserts the way directed to Nibbāna. Yet this good recluse or brahmin still clings, clinging either to a view about the past or to a view about the future or to a fetter of sensual pleasure or to the rapture of seclusion or to unworldly pleasure or to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. And when this venerable one regards himself thus:
“I am at peace, I have attained Nibbāna, I am without clinging,” that too is declared to be clinging on the part of this good recluse or brahmin.
We have already mentioned that conceit "I am" is condition for rebirth. But since without upādāna there is no the attitude "I am" we can assune that without upādāna there is no rebirth. Is it so?
This ascetic Gotama—the leader of an order, the leader of a group, the teacher of a group, the well known and famous spiritual guide considered holy by many people—declares the rebirth
of a disciple who has passed away and died thus: “That one was reborn there, that one was reborn there.” But in the case of a disciple who was a person of the highest kind, a supreme person, one who had attained the supreme attainment, when that disciple has passed away and died he does not declare his rebirth thus: “That one was reborn there, that one was reborn there.” Rather, he declares of him: “He cut off craving, severed the fetter, and, by completely breaking through conceit, he has made an end to suffering.”’
“There was perplexity in me, Master Gotama, there was doubt: ‘How is the Dhamma of the ascetic Gotama to be understood?’”
“It is fitting for you to be perplexed, Vaccha, it is fitting for you to doubt. Doubt has arisen in you about a perplexing matter. I declare, Vaccha, rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel. Just as a fire burns with fuel, but not without fuel, so, Vaccha, I declare rebirth for one with fuel, not for one without fuel.” *
SN 10 : 9
* Bhikkhu Bodhi:
Sa-upādānassa khvāhaṃ Vaccha upapattiṃ paññāpemi no anupādānassa. There is a double meaning here, with upādāna meaning both “fuel” and subjective “clinging,” but I have translated the sentence in consonance with the following simile. It was also in a discourse to Vacchagotta that the Buddha used his famous simile of the fire that goes out from lack of fuel to illustrate the status of one who has attained Nibbāna; see MN I 487,11–30.
Questions which arise due to ayoniso manisakara are questions provoked by asmimāna. These questions are questions about ones own being (bhava)
“This is how he attends unwisely: ‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I become in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the present thus: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this creature come from? Where will it go?’
MN 2
These questions are asked by one who doesn't see dependent arising: with upādāna as condition bhava (being)
Puthujjana has a "direct knowledge" that "I am". It can be replaced by sotapanna direct knowledge, where the attitude "I am" is seen as dependently arisen on the present condition: ignorance, or more precisely upādāna. No past and future is involved, "my birth" depends on my present self-identification with the body.
However with upādāna as condition, rebirth is beyond sotapanna's direct knowledge and it is a function of faith to take it as a valid and true description.
6 Conceit "I am" and sakkayaditthi & attavada
The rationalized “self-theory,” which is called, in whatever form it may take, “both a view and a fetter,” is based upon a subtle fundamental distortion in the act of perceiving, the “conceit ‘I am,’ ” which is “a fetter, but not a view.” Now self-theories may or may not be actually formulated; but if they are, they cannot be described specifically without reference to the five aggregates. For that reason they can, when described, all be reduced to one of the types of what is called the “embodiment view,”* which is set out schematically. These are all given up by the stream-enterer, though the conceit “I am” is not.
“Embodiment”: sakkāya = sa (either “existing” or “own”) plus kāya (body). The identification of self (attā) with one or more of the five aggregates thus constitutes an “embodiment” of that self, and that establishes a wrong view. (Note: Sakkāyadiṭṭhi is more usually rendered “personality view”)
“Whenever any monks or brahmans see self in its various forms, they all of them see the five aggregates affected by clinging, or one or another of them. Here an untaught ordinary man who disregards noble ones … sees form as self, or self as possessed of form, or form as in self, or self as in form (or he does likewise with the other four aggregates). So he has this (rationalized) seeing, and he has also this (fundamental) attitude ‘I am’; but as long as there is the attitude ‘I am’ there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. Then there is mind, and there are ideas, and there is the element of ignorance. When an untaught ordinary man is touched by feeling born of the contact of ignorance, it occurs to him ‘I am’ and ‘I am this’ and ‘I shall be’ and ‘I shall not be’ and ‘I shall be with form’ and ‘I shall be formless’ and ‘I shall be percipient’ and ‘I shall be unpercipient’ and ‘I shall be neither percipient nor unpercipient.’ But in the case of the well-taught noble disciple, while the five sense faculties remain as they are, his ignorance about them is abandoned and true knowledge arisen. With that it no more occurs to him ‘I am’ or … ‘I shall be neither percipient nor unpercipient.’ ”
SN 22:47
The ordinary man is unaware of the subtle fundamental attitude, the underlying tendency or conceit ‘I am.’ It makes him, in perceiving a percept, automatically and simultaneously conceive in terms of ‘I,’ assuming an I-relationship to the percept, either as identical with it or as contained within it, or as separate from it, or as owning it. This attitude, this conceiving, is only given up with the attainment of Arahantship, not before. (See e.g. MN 1 and MN. 49.)
(Questioned by Elders, the Elder Khemaka said:) “I do not see in these five aggregates affected by clinging any self or self’s property … yet I am not an Arahant with taints exhausted. On the contrary, I still have the attitude ‘I am’ with respect to these five aggregates affected by clinging, although I do not see ‘I am this’ with respect to them …. I do not say ‘I am form’ or ‘I am feeling’ or ‘I am perception’ or ‘I am determinations’ or ‘I am consciousness,’ nor do I say ‘I am apart from form … apart from consciousness’; yet I still have the attitude ‘I am’ with respect to the five aggregates affected by clinging although I do not see ‘I am this’ with respect to them. Although a noble disciple may have abandoned the five more immediate fetters still his conceit ‘I am,’ desire ‘I am,’ underlying tendency ‘I am,’ with respect to the five aggregates affected by clinging remains as yet unabolished. Later he abides contemplating rise and fall thus: ‘Such is form, such is its origin, such its disappearance’ (and so with the other four), till by so doing, his conceit ‘I am’ eventually comes to be abolished.”
SN 22:89
From DN 1
“When, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands as they really are the origin and passing away of the six bases of contact, their satisfaction, unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, then he understands what transcends all these views.
“Whatever recluses or brahmins, bhikkhus, are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, speculators about the past and the future together, hold settled views about the past and the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future—all are trapped in this net with its sixty-two divisions.
Whenever they emerge, they emerge caught within this net, trapped and contained within this very net.
Just as, bhikkhus, a skillful fisherman or a fisherman’s apprentice, after spreading a fine-meshed net over a small pool of water, might think: ‘Whatever sizeable creatures there are in this pool, all are trapped within this net, trapped and contained in this very net’—in the same way, all those recluses and brahmins are trapped in this net with its sixty-two divisions. Whenever they emerge, they emerge caught within this net, trapped and contained within this very net.
“The body of the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, stands with the leash that bound it to being (bhava) cut. As long as his body stands, gods and men shall see him. But with the breakup of the body and the exhaustion of the life-faculty, gods and men shall see him no more.
Just as, bhikkhus, when the stalk of a bunch of mangoes has been cut, all the mangoes connected to the stalk follow along with it, in the same way, the body of the Tathāgata stands with the leash that bound it to being cut. As long as his body stands, gods and men shall see him. But with the breakup of the body and the exhaustion of the life-faculty, gods and men shall see him no more.
Nanamoli Thera:
One thing among many others to be noticed here is that he is careful to spread a net with which to intercept all speculative views.
This is the Brahmajāla, the “Divine Net,” which as the first discourse of the whole Sutta Piṭaka forms as it were a kind of filter for the mind; or to change the analogy, a tabulation by whose means (if rightly used) all speculative views can be identified, traced down to the fallacy or unjustified assumption from which they spring, and neutralized. This Net, in fact, classifies all possible speculative views (rationalist or irrationalist) under a scheme of sixty-two types.
These 62 types are not descriptions of individual philosophies of other individual teachers contemporary with the Buddha (a number of those are mentioned as well elsewhere in the Suttas), but are the comprehensive net (after revealing the basic assumptions on which these speculative views all grow) with which to catch any wrong viewpoints that can be put forward. (Ultimately, these must all be traceable to the contact of self-identification in some form, however misinterpreted, but that cannot be gone into here.)
“As to the various views that arise in the world, householder, ‘The world is eternal’ …—these as well as the sixty-two speculative views mentioned in the Brahmajāla: when there is identity view, these views come to be; when there is no identity view, these views do not come to be.”
SN 41: 3
In short: all imprisoned in Brahmajala are attavadins, the fundamental upādāna taught by the Buddha is attavadupadana. They are victims of upādāna. "The body of the Tathāgata stands with the leash that bound it to being cut", since free from upādāna Tathagata is not to be found even here and now.
Nanavira Thera: The reason why the Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra-, and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found.
Conceit "I am" and conceiving
The Sheaf of Barley
“Bhikkhus, suppose a sheaf of barley were set down at a crossroads. Then six men would come along with flails in their hands and they would strike that sheaf of barley with the six flails. Thus that sheaf of barley would be well struck, having been struck by the six flails. Then a seventh man would come along with a flail in his hand and he would strike that sheaf of barley with the seventh flail. Thus that sheaf of barley would be struck even still more thoroughly, having been struck by the seventh flail.
“So too, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling is struck in the eye by agreeable and disagreeable forms; struck in the ear by agreeable and disagreeable sounds; struck in the nose by agreeable and disagreeable odours; struck in the tongue by agreeable and disagreeable tastes; struck in the body by agreeable and disagreeable tactile objects; struck in the mind by agreeable and disagreeable mental phenomena. If that uninstructed worldling sets his mind upon future renewed being [Āyatiṃ punabbhavāya ceteti.], then that senseless man is struck even still more thoroughly, just like the sheaf of barley struck by the seventh flail.
“Once in the past, bhikkhus, the devas and the asuras were arrayed for battle. Then Vepacitti, lord of the asuras, addressed the asuras thus: ‘Good sirs, if in this impending battle the asuras win and the devas are defeated, bind Sakka, lord of the devas, by his four limbs and neck and bring him to me in the city of the asuras.’ And Sakka, lord of the devas, addressed the Tāvatiṃsa devas: ‘Good sirs, if in this impending battle the devas win and the asuras are defeated, bind Vepacitti, lord of the asuras, by his four limbs and neck and bring him to me in Sudhamma, the assembly hall of the devas.’
“In that battle the devas won and the asuras were defeated. Then the Tāvatiṃsa devas bound Vepacitti by his four limbs and neck and brought him to Sakka in Sudhamma, the assembly hall of the devas. And there Vepacitti, lord of the asuras, was bound by his four limbs and neck.
“When it occurred to Vepacitti: ‘The devas are righteous, the asuras are unrighteous; now right here I have gone to the city of the devas,’ he then saw himself freed from the bonds around his limbs and neck and he enjoyed himself furnished and endowed with the five cords of divine sensual pleasure. But when it occurred to him: ‘The asuras are righteous, the devas are unrighteous; now I will go there to the city of the asuras,’ then he saw himself bound by his four limbs and neck and he was deprived of the five cords of divine sensual pleasure.
“So subtle, bhikkhus, was the bondage of Vepacitti, but even subtler than that is the bondage of Māra. In conceiving, one is bound by Māra; by not conceiving, one is freed from the Evil One.
“Bhikkhus, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall consist of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be nonpercipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour,
conceiving is a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving.’ (...) SN 22: 248
The tides of conceiving do not sweep over one who stands upon these [foundations], and when the tides of conceiving no longer sweep over him he is called a sage at peace.’ So it was said. And with reference to what was this said?
“Bhikkhu, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be possessed of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be non-percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. By overcoming all conceivings, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace. And the sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, why should he yearn? MN 140
Nanavira Thera:
The Mūlapariyāyasutta is as follows. (i) The puthujjana ‘perceives X as X; perceiving X as X, he conceives X, he conceives In X, he conceives From X, he conceives “X is mine”; he delights in X…’. (ii) The sekha ‘recognizes X as X; recognizing X as X, he should not conceive X, he should not conceive In X, he should not conceive From X, he should not conceive “X is mine”; he should not delight in X…’. (iii) The arahat ‘recognizes X as X; recognizing X as X, he does not conceive X, he does not conceive In X, he does not conceive From X, he does not conceive “X is mine”; he does not delight in X…’.
This tetrad of maññanā, of ‘conceivings’, represents four progressive levels of explicitness in the basic structure of appropriation. The first, ‘he conceives X’, is so subtle that the appropriation is simply implicit in the verb.
Taking advantage of an extension of meaning (not, however, found in the Pali maññati), we can re-state ‘he conceives X’ as ‘X conceives’, and then understand this as ‘X is pregnant’—pregnant, that is to say, with subjectivity.
And, just as when a woman first conceives she has nothing to show for it, so at this most implicit level we can still only say ‘X’; but as the pregnancy advances, and it begins to be noticeable, we are obliged to say ‘In X’; then the third stage of the pregnancy, when we begin to suspect that a separation is eventually going to take place, can be described as ‘From X’; and the fourth stage, when the infant’s head makes a public appearance and the separation is on the point of becoming definite, is the explicit ‘X is mine (me, not mama)’. This separation is first actually realized in asmimāna, where I, as subject, am opposed to X, as object; and when the subject eventually grows up he becomes the ‘self’ of attavāda, face to face with the ‘world’ in which he exists. (In spite of the simile, what is described here is a single graded structure all implicated in the present, and not a development taking place in time. When there is attavāda, the rest of this edifice lies beneath it: thus attavāda requires asmimāna (and the rest), but there can be asmimāna without attavāda.) Note that it is only the sekha who has the ethical imperative ‘should not’: the puthujjana, not ‘recognizing X as X’ (he perceives X as X, but not as impermanent), does not see for himself that he should not conceive X; while the arahat, though ‘recognizing X as X’, no longer conceives X.
Nanamoli Thera:
‘Maññati – Conceives’: whatever the etymology maññati is semantically inseparable from māna (conceit) as well as manati(to measure) for other contexts see ‘Yena yena hi maññati tato taṃ hoti aññathā‘ (M. sutta __), maññussava (M. sutta 140,§§25-6), Yena kho āvuso lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. kena c’āvuso lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī? cakkhunā… (s. vol.4, 95=xxxv,116 – This closely concerns the present sutta), and ‘cakkhuṃ na maññeyya, cakkhusmiṃ na maññeyya, cakkhuto na maññeyya, cakkhu ‘me’ ti na maññeyya; rūpe na maññeyya… (etc. with the 4 modes up to vedanā) …sabbaṃ na maññeyya. so evam amaññamāne na kinci loke upādiyati… (s. vol.IV, 65=xxxv,90) See Vbh 355-6 and s.III,130 as to §29, etc. The prohibitive mā maññati can only signify that, in The Initiates case, he can, but ought not to, indulge in conceiving: he can still do so because he still has asmimanā, which is only eliminated by Arahantship. This should show that, in spite of what the commentary says, the fourfold sakkāyadiṭṭhi of sutta 44, is not directly connectable; for a sekha does not have skkāyadiṭṭhi at all.
In rendering the 4 maññati phrases, the first difficulty is the use of the transitive maññati with no object except in the first phrase (pathaviṃ maññati) (The same difficulty arises in sutta 49 where nāpahosiṃ is substituted for na maññati). The commentary suggests a rendering such ‘he conceives (self as) earth, he conceives (self as) in earth, he conceives (self as) apart from earth, he conceives earth as ‘Mine’,…, and it attempts an equation with the 4 modes of the sakkāyadiṭṭhi given for each of the 5 aggregates in sutta 44, §7). But this is perhaps rather procrustean. It may do for the ordinary man, who has sakkāyadiṭṭhi (embodiment view – see sutta 44), but that is abandoned by the Initiate, who, however still has asmi-māna (the conceit I am), which is only abandoned by the arahant. He shall secure of ‘being’ with ‘being self’. In sutta 44 the modes in which ideas of self (attā) already clearly formed are treatable is handled; but in the present sutta (and in sutta 49) the treatment is on a more general level and there is no specific mention of attā – The conceiving is simply done on the basis of the percept. Attā is no doubt implied here but not yet explicitly stated. Since, however, a subject is necessary in the rendering the only safe one seems to be one drawn from the sutta itself without introducing outside ideas, namely, the percept (also it makes sense not only here but throughout).
The conceiving can also be taken as showing the grammatical behaviour of the mind towards what it has (mis-)perceived: it conceives its earth-percept in the accusative, locative, or ablative relation, or as a possession (or as an object to take interest, positive or negative in).
But the most important aspect of this structure is the ontological one. The general question of ontology as desirable from the suttas is dealt with in the introduction. How it is relevant in this sutta appears more clearly from the use of nāpahosiṃin sutta 49 instead of namaññati; for it indicates that one of the functions of maññanā is to endow percepts with being.
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