The actor’s public self-presentations, which may initially have been intended largely to create a desired impact on others, may come to influence the actor’s subsequent private self-assessments. Early social theorists like Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) proposed that the self is constructed through social interaction, as people come to view themselves partly in terms of the roles they publicly enact and other people’s reactions to them. Consistent with this view, research shows that people’s strategic self-presentations will produce changes in their subsequent self-appraisals, as people change their global self- evaluations (Gergen, 1965; Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986) and the corresponding contents of their self-beliefs (McKillop, Berzonsky, & Schlenker, 1992; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990; Tice, 1992) to become more like the public roles they played.
People are more likely to internalize their self-presentations when their actions appear to be representative of self. The appearance of representativeness is created when people freely chose to play the role or are asked to draw on their own prior personal experiences when enacting the role rather than on experiences that are obviously taken from the life of someone else (Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990; Tice, 1992). There are limits to how extreme role-playing can be before the actor rejects it as unrepresentative. Roles that are greatly discrepant from clear prior self-beliefs are not internalized; people reject them as “not me” (Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). However, if the role is only somewhat discrepant from clear prior self-beliefs, or if self-beliefs are less clearly formed on the dimension, people will shift their private self-beliefs in the direction of the role (Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). Furthermore, social validation is important in perceiving representativeness. People are more likely to internalize public portrayals that are met with approval and acceptance from others (Gergen, 1965). Thus, to the extent that people label their own public actions as self-representative or have the label applied by others, they become more likely to see themselves in corresponding ways.
Role or identity enactments have a more powerful impact on private self-beliefs when they carry with them a public commitment, as compared to when they are privately performed with few or no public repercussions. Tice (1992) found that self-characterizations produced more change in self- conceptions if they were enacted publicly rather than privately. Furthermore, public behavior produced more change if it was freely selected, drew on episodes of one’s own past rather than on the obvious pasts of others, and involved expected future interactions with the audience. Schlenker et al. (1994) found that having people think about past experiences that were consistent with specific roles did not affect later self-beliefs, but having people play the role publicly produced shifts in self-appraisals. In another study, Schlenker et al. (1994) had participants role play a desirable identity. Those whose characterizations were made during an actual interview or who made a public commitment to portray that identity in an upcoming interview later shifted their self-beliefs to become more like the person they portrayed.
In contrast, those who learned that they would not have to portray that identity because the interview was canceled, and those whose portrayals were private, did not change their self-beliefs. These findings indicate that public commitment has a powerful shaping effect on private self-beliefs.
Public self-presentations can not only produce corresponding changes in self-beliefs, they can also produce changes in behavior in new situations with different audiences (Tice, 1992; Schlenker et al., 1994). Participants who presented themselves as more extraverted rather than introverted (Tice, 1992) or who portrayed themselves as more sociable (Schlenker et al., 1994), acted in a more extraverted, sociable way when later meeting a new person. Thus, self-presentations can produce carry-over effects that linger beyond the initial interaction. If one wants to become a certain type of person, one should try to publicly act like that type of person. Eventually, if the portrayal is unmarred by out-of-character incidents and audience feedback appears to be accepting, one is likely to become it.
As this research suggests, authenticity is not a static concept. Self-presentations that once may have been tentatively proffered and tenuously documented can become true as the actor gains confidence playing the role and receives feedback suggesting that others accept the portrayal. Thus, the somewhat shy student who wants to become more outgoing can, through hard work, perseverance, and public commitment to new self-presentations, gradually become, in his or her own mind and in social reality, more extraverted.
Truth in Packaging
The theme of this section is that packaging information to achieve goals is independent of truthfulness or sincerity. Packaging can be guided by the goal of aiding the audience by imparting truth, as in the case of the teacher who wants to impart useful information to students, or by the goal of selfishly manipulating the audience, as in the caricature of the deceptive used-car salesperson. Stories or narratives can be true or false in their major themes as well as in the factual detail that is communicated to support them.
Sometimes true stories contain unintended errors of factual detail, and lies contain just enough true facts to make them appear credible. To determine deceit, one must look to the motives of the actor and the extent to which the message corresponds with information that can be independently assessed, not to whether information is packaged for consumption by audiences.
Information may be packaged in nearly unlimited ways to make desired points. This is not to suggest, however, that all is appearance without substance or that any and all interpretations of reality are equally valid. Reality imposes constraints on what can be credibly claimed. There are rules for de¬ termining the truthfulness of an assertion and comparing claims to accomplishments and characteristics. Goffman (1959, p. 13) noted that society is organized on the principle that people who have certain social characteristics have a “moral right” to expect that others will “value and treat” them in the appropriate fashion and, correspondingly, that people have a duty to be what they claim to be. People are socialized to match their words and their deeds and to tell the truth. Society cannot function if deceit on substantive matters is tolerated.
A reputation for honesty is an important interpersonal asset. People react negatively to those whose words and deeds deviate (Schlenker & Leary, 1982a). Furthermore, when presenting themselves to others, people demonstrate an appreciation of the importance of consistency between words and deeds. People present themselves consistently with publicly known information about them, even though they may exaggerate their claims when potentially contradictory information can be hidden from public view (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Schlenker, 1975). Reality, in the form of publicly known information and independently verifiable facts, provides constraints on what people can credibly claim.
People do not have free reign to package information in any and all ways that serve their self-interests. People are accountable to others for being what they claim to be, and they risk social censure and sometimes legal peril for deceit. However, deceit is determined by judgments of the actor’s motives and whether independently verifiable information supports or refutes the claims. The packaging of information for consumption by audiences, in and of itself, tells us nothing about the actor’s truthfulness.
THE STRATEGIC CONTROL OF INFORMATION: IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT AND SELF-PRESENTATION IN DAILY LIFE BARRY R. SCHLENKER BETH A. PONTARI
In PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELF AND IDENTITY
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