To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Tuesday, September 26, 2023

Envy in Language


Both in literature and in discussions with a number of people as to what they understand by envy I have been struck by the tendency to use the word ‘jealousy’ instead of ‘envy,’ the former no doubt being more tolerable to those who confess to it than the latter, which is an ignominious sentiment. The jealous man has been defeated in a struggle for power or in competition; he is not inferior in relation to the asset under contention as, by definition, the envious man is. Yet even the behavioural sciences often shirk the phenomenon of envy and of envious behaviour as though it were taboo, disguising the motive of envy with concepts such as ambivalence, aggression, tension, rivalry, jealousy and similar indirect descriptions.

The primary role of envy in human society and the comparatively unproblematical nature of common jealousy—or what is usually meant by the term—are apparent both from language and from proverbs.

Envy and jealousy in English

The Oxford English Dictionary[1] treats ‘envy’ and ‘envious’ as ‘jealousy’ and ‘jealous.’ About four columns are devoted to both terms.

‘Envy’ and ‘envious’ in modern English are derived from the Latin invidia and invidiosus, which have the same meanings. The verb ‘to envy’ corresponds to the Latin invidere. In Spanish, Portuguese and Italian there are similar derivatives from the Latin to denote the same states of mind.

Early English examples are: ‘There be others that be envious to see other in gretter degree thanne they.’ ‘No lawful meanes can carrie me Out of enuies reach.’ ‘It is much more shame to have envy at other for mony, clothing, or possessions.’

Definitions emphasize the feeling of hostility, spite and ill-will. According to these, envy is present when there is ‘mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation of superior advantages.’ On the other hand, envy may simply mean that one wishes one might do the same as someone else. The first definition of envy as a verb is most specific: ‘To feel displeasure and ill-will at the superiority of (another person) in happiness, success, reputation, or the possession of anything desirable.’

It is also called envy when a person withholds a thing from someone else out of spite; further on we shall have to consider the phenomenon of avarice and its relationship to envy. Thus in England at the beginning of the seventeenth century it was said of the peacock that he so envied men their health that he would eat his own droppings (then used for medicinal purposes).

Incidentally, the modern English words of Latin origin for ‘envy’ and ‘envious’ have practically the same meaning as those in modern German deriving from ancient Germanic words, which express the same states of feeling and of mind.

‘Jealous’ and ‘jealousy’ are given detailed treatment by the Oxford English Dictionary. Obviously ‘jealous’ at first denoted simply an intense or highly excited emotional state, and then came to include a craving for the affection of someone else. Later it came to designate the fear of losing another person’s affections, just like ‘jealous’ in the modern sense. Sometimes ‘jealous’ has the sense of ‘envious,’ as in: ‘It is certain that they looked upon it with a jealous eye.’ Earlier there was also an English term ‘jealous glass,’ meaning the frosted glass used for ground-floor windows, analogous to the French jalousie. But the principal meaning of ‘jealousy’ remains the passionate endeavour to keep something that is one’s own by right. In complete contrast to the envious man, therefore, one may postulate a man of jealous disposition whose mind is at rest once he knows that he is free of rivals. In 1856 Emerson wrote: ‘The jealousy of every class to guard itself, is a testimony to the reality they have found in life.’ Where jealousy acquires undertones of mistrust or hatred, what is meant is generally the suspicion that somebody is seeking to take something from us which we have hitherto enjoyed in tranquillity. In some cases jealousy may even represent the pugnacity of the rightful defender holding his own against the envious miscreant.

More precisely, the jealous man can never normally become a spontaneous, primary aggressor. His hostile behaviour begins only when a rival appears on the scene to give him specific reason for anxiety. This rival may be genuinely striving for an asset, or he may be driven by envy. Everyone is familiar with the type, often described in fiction, who wants to seduce his friend’s fiancée, not because he wants to marry her, but only because he begrudges the other his happiness.

In contrast to the envious man, who usually knows exactly what provokes him, the jealous man is often in doubt as to the nature of his antagonist: whether he is a genuine, honourable rival on his own level or an envious man, ostensibly a rival but in fact intent merely on destruction. The envious man, on the other hand, may have hostile feelings towards a person who may actually be ignorant of his existence. Sociologically, therefore, envy and jealousy represent basically distinct social situations, for in jealousy two or more persons must confront each other in a relationship that is avowedly reciprocal.

The fully revised edition of the most comprehensive dictionary of American English, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, which appeared in 1961, devotes very little space to the terms ‘envy’ and ‘envious.’ Two examples of contemporary usage are cited: ‘the sterile and envious principle of artificial equality’ from Time magazine; and, ‘examining the tire with envious appreciation.’ ‘Envious’ is defined as a disgruntled emotional state arising from the possessions or achievements of another, a spiteful wish that the other should lose them. By contrast, the word ‘jealous’ is used when we observe or imagine with mistrust or dissatisfaction that someone is acquiring something which is really our due or which belongs to us.

Thus the decisive difference is evident: jealousy is only directed against a definite transfer of coveted assets or their removal elsewhere, never against the asset as such. Envy very often denies the asset itself. Further, ‘jealous’ may be used with no critical implications at all, as when John Galsworthy writes: ‘. . . conscious of their duty, and jealous of their honour.’

Webster’s examples of envy eliminate this fine distinction and give samples of contemporary English, or more especially and significantly of American English, according to which one says ‘I envy you’ when it should in fact be ‘I am jealous of your. . .’ Thus Hollis Alpert writes: ‘I have a wild envy of the man in the taxi with her,’ while V. S. Pritchett writes: ‘I often envy the writer who works in a university.’

The emphasis, in the definitions of ‘envy’ and ‘envying’ in Webster’s third edition, is laid on the desire to possess what belongs to the other, not to see it destroyed. Indeed, this shift in emphasis corresponds almost exactly to the present American view of envy. Thus an American advertisement is able to declare that one should buy this or that in order to be envied—that is to say, so that the other man should at once do his utmost to get the same thing, not, as in earlier cultures, that he should try to damage it out of spite.

Jealousy as compared with envy is defined by Webster principally as fear of unfaithfulness or rivalry, but the dictionary also mentions that ‘jealous’ can be used in the sense of ‘envious,’ as in: ‘Jealous because her coat isn’t as nice as yours.’ ‘Jealousy’ has rather the meaning of hostile rivalry, and we believe that, as opposed to genuine envy, it does not anticipate the downfall of the rival. Webster’s example of this is: ‘Intense local jealousies among existing villages.’

Envy and emulation

A masterly definition and description of envy is found in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, published in 1912. Therein, William L. Davidson, Professor of Logic at the University of Aberdeen, has this to say:

Envy is an emotion that is essentially both selfish and malevolent. It is aimed at persons, and implies dislike of one who possesses what the envious man himself covets or desires, and a wish to harm him. Grasping-ness for self and ill-will lie at the basis of it. There is in it also a consciousness of inferiority to the person envied, and a chafing under this consciousness. He who has got what I envy is felt by me to have the advantage of me, and I resent it. Consequently, I rejoice if he finds that his envied possession does not give him entire satisfaction—much more, if it actually entails on him dissatisfaction and pain: that simply reduces his superiority in my eyes, and ministers to my feelings of self-importance. As signifying in the envious man a want that is ungratified, and as pointing to a sense of impotence inasmuch as he lacks the sense of power which possession of the desired object would give him, envy is in itself a painful emotion, although it is associated with pleasure when misfortune is seen to befall the object of it.

The writer of the article also quotes Dryden:

Envy, that does with misery reside,

The joy and the revenge of ruin’d pride.

The article compares envy with jealousy. They have much in common yet represent completely different emotions. Jealousy differs from envy in being infinitely more spiteful, as well as more impassioned and less restrained. Jealousy arises out of an opinion as to what is one’s due; it is not purely a sense of inferiority, as is envy. For the jealous man, furthermore, there is a twofold source of irritation and uneasiness, since three people are involved: he is not engaged with one rival only, but with two (individuals or groups). If I am jealous of somebody this is because he has won someone else’s affections to which I think I have a right. Thus I hate not only the usurper but the person he has seduced.

Next, envy is compared with emulation, a term that has been equated with it. Americans, for example, prefer ‘envy’ to the obsolete use of ‘emulation,’ but are quite unaware of the shift in meaning. They have forgotten envy’s spiteful, destructive aspect.

The article rightly considers emulation to be very different from envy. He who emulates, who seeks to do what another has done, is neither self-seeking, spiteful, nor filled with hatred. Emulation requires a rival, a competitor, but the latter does not have to be seen as an enemy. He may even be a friend whose example stimulates our own powers and talents. Behaviour that reveals emulation is observable in many animals and is also apparent in the simple games of young children.

Again, the article draws a distinction between ambition and emulation. While ambition may be laudable, it may also degenerate into a ruthlessness leading ultimately to methods of harming a rival very similar to those of the envious man. Emulation may turn into envy as when, for instance, shortly before the end of the race a runner realizes that he will not be able to outpace the winner and so tries to trip him up. The article cites the following distinction drawn by Joseph Butler in one of his sermons (Sermon 1, note 20):

‘Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. . . . To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy.’[2] John Gay (1669–1745), philosopher and Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, gives a brilliant analysis of the phenomenon of envy in his study of the fundamental principles of virtue or morality.[3] He regards envy as a diabolical passion and concurs with Locke in believing it possible for some people to be completely devoid of it. Moreover, Gay rightly observes that most people, were they to give the matter some consideration, would remember the first time they ever felt themselves to be under the influence of envious emotions. This he sees as being especially important, since the ability to remember the first active experience of envy indicates the series of fundamental motives that leave their stamp on the personality. Because the most important experiences of envy cannot easily be forgotten, Gay believes, those people who think they have never been affected by it are probably right. He could not, of course, have been aware of such a factor as repression.

To begin with, Gay keeps to the common definition of envy as the anguish that besets us when we observe the prosperity of others; but this he at once qualifies with the statement that it is not the prosperity of all and sundry but of specific persons. What persons? As soon as we look around us to discover who it is we might envy we will, Gay maintains, find the source of this passion: the objects of envy invariably prove to be persons who had formerly been the envious man’s rivals. Gay rightly comments on the importance of social proximity in envy. It is usually directed only towards persons with whom it has been possible to compete. But to restrict envy to genuine and factual rivalry is to go too far, for it blurs its distinction from jealousy. There is no doubt that envy may occur where competition has been only imagined, or even where it is inconceivable. What is decisive, however, as we shall see repeatedly, is the envious man’s conviction that the envied man’s prosperity, his success and his income are somehow to blame for the subject’s deprivation, for the lack that he feels. Now if the capacity for envy derives from the experience of sibling jealousy, this aspect of envy becomes explicable; for within a family the favouring of one child (even if this be purely imaginary) will necessarily involve discrimination against the other (or will arouse a sense of injury).

According to Adam Smith, envy, malice and resentment are the only passions which could bring someone to injure another’s person or reputation, yet few people succumb frequently to these passions and the worst scoundrels only on occasion. And even if one does give way to such feelings, little is gained. Therefore, Smith opines, in most human beings envy is restrained by rational reflection.[4]

The evidence for Smith’s confident assumption is, of course, the fact that it would not be possible to imagine any kind of orderly co-existence if the prevailing society had not succeeded in largely suppressing mutual envy.

Causal delusion in envy

Scheler is responsible for a very important conceptual clarification. He sees envy, in the ordinary sense of the word, as the product of the feeling of impotence

which inhibits the striving after a possession that belongs to another. The tension between such striving and such impotence only leads to envy, however, when it is discharged into an act of hatred or vindictive behaviour towards the owner of the possession; when, that is, owing to a delusion, the other with his possession is experienced as the cause of our painful failure to have the possession. This delusion, whereby what is in fact our impotence to obtain the possession appears to us as a positive force ‘opposing’ our striving, has the effect of somewhat reducing the initial tension. Genuine envy is no more possible without the particular experience of such impotence than it is without the causal delusion.

Now it is significant that, as we shall show, many primitive peoples (e.g., the Dobuans and the Navaho Indians), as well as some village communities in more developed societies (e.g., in Central America), bring about the kind of causal delusion described by Scheler, not unconsciously or subconsciously like our contemporaries in modern societies, but with intent: my neighbour’s harvest can only have turned out better than mine because he has somehow succeeded in reducing mine by black magic. It is this view of the world, the magic thinking of the primitive man within us—also discernibly at work in many other forms of superstitious compulsive behaviour—which provides the dynamic of envy in modern, enlightened society.

Scheler declares explicitly:

Mere displeasure at the fact that another possesses the thing which I covet does not constitute envy; it is, indeed, a motive for acquiring in some way the desired object or a similar one, e.g., by working for it, by buying it, by force or by theft. Only when the attempt to obtain it by these means has failed, giving rise to the consciousness of impotence, does envy arise.[5]

 From:

ENVY A Theory of Social Behaviour

by Helmut Schoeck

Freud's projections and dark side of ignorance


The article provides an ariyan interpretation of the ancient Greek tragedy Oedipus Rex, plus very interesting although shocking data, which shows that Freud’s reading of the play is a projection of very real problem in his own ethnic group. As Herve Ryssen says: "The truth is that everything they ever say about others and about “humanity” is, at bottom, nothing but the reflection of themselves". With such knowledge we immediately can recognise ethnicity of "Polish" writer Herling-Grudziński. In his journal several times he informs readers that incest is much more common practice than they suppose! In his particular case it may not be a deliberate subversion, since otherwise he is indeed the first class writer, but ...

For instance, let us apply what we have learnt from our author to a work composed by one of the Buddha’s contemporaries, in order to better understand a critical Pali concept. Probably the most famous ancient Greek tragedy is Oedipus Tyrannus, also known as Oedipus Rex. It dramatizes the downfall of the protagonist, a foundling, who by virtue of his acumen rose to power in the city of Thebes. Abandoned on a mountain by his father King Laïus, who was warned by the god Apollo that his son would kill him, he was saved from death by a shepherd, then adopted and raised kindly by Polybus and Merope, king and queen of Corinth. But upon hearing the prophecy that he would kill his father and marry his mother, he flees Corinth. On his journey he quarrels with and kills a man who blocks his way. He then travels to Thebes, which at the time was being harassed by the Sphinx, a monster who posed a riddle to passers-by and devoured all who could not answer it. Oedipus solves the riddle, thus freeing Thebes, and in reward is made its ruler and given in marriage to its widowed queen Jocasta, by whom he has four children. Subsequently, Thebes is ravaged by famine and plague, and according to the Delphic Oracle, these calamities will persist until the slayer of King Laïus, Jocasta’s first husband, is banished from the Boeotian capital. Oedipus is charged with finding and punishing the offender. Tiresias, a blind seer, comes forward and hints that the tyrant himself is the one responsible for the city’s plight. Oedipus becomes enraged, refuses to admit guilt and accuses others of plotting against him. However, ensuing evidence confirms his true parents are Laïus and Jocasta, not Polybus and Merope, and that the stranger he murdered was his own father. At last, the protagonist is forced to admit to himself and others that he is guilty of parricide and incest. Upon these revelations, Jocasta hangs herself in the palace, and out of grief and remorse, Oedipus puts out his eyes.

Many who have never seen or read the play by Sophocles are familiar with Sigmund Freud’s famous analysis of it, the basis for his controversial theory known as the ‘Oedipus complex’, explained in The Interpretation of Dreams (V, D). For the Austrian psychologist, the drama represents a latent sexual attraction on the part of every male child to his mother, accompanied by jealousy and antipathy towards his father.x Hence the universal appeal of the tragedy since, according to Freud, we all share the guilt of Oedipus: ‘His destiny moves us only because it might have been ours—because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him.’

Freud’s reading of the play has been widely accepted. It does merit consideration, especially for perceiving that Sophocles dramatizes a latent guilt in all of us. However, the major drawback of his theory is that a crucial component of it—the contention that everyone undergoes an Oedipus complex in his early years—is purely speculative. While it is possible I was once infatuated with my mother, I do not recall my infancy; so I must rely on a psychologist, who in turn does not remember his, to tell me about it: because, according to Freud, memories of incestuous desire are “repressed”, i.e. buried in the unconscious. This fails to meet the criteria of Ven. Ñāṇavīra’s method, in which all assertions about human experience must be immediately verifiable. Even if I could recall events of a repressed past, even of a past life, I would remain in doubt: for as our author avers in “A Note on Paţiccasamuppāda” §7, ‘memory is not on the same level of certainty as present reflexive experience’. Therefore, we must go beyond the incest taboo in order to explain why ‘the oracle laid the same curse upon us as upon him’.xi

Let us see if we can arrive at a more satisfactory interpretation of the myth. The Italian novelist and essayist Alberto Moravia raises some crucial questions about the great Sophoclean tragedy which are seldom, if ever, addressed.* While allowing that myths portray improbable events, he says it is reasonable to assume they still have realistic elements to them. So, for him it is striking that throughout their long marriage, Oedipus and Jocasta apparently never spoke of King Laïus, in whose palace they sleep; or, assuming they did, why does Oedipus—married to an older widow, and knowing full well the prophecies of the oracle—never suspect that those prophecies have come true? From his arrival in Thebes through the epidemic of the plague, he remains strangely ignorant or unaware of who he is and what he is doing. For as we recall, he is renowned for his intelligence, having solved the Sphinx’s riddle.

The only plausible explanation is that the protagonist makes himself deaf and blind to his own guilt, ignoring or repressing, if you will, the obvious connection between what he knows and what he fears. Thus, his is a studied, intentional ignorance with moral implications, unlike a mere lack of knowledge.

There is no riddle to his motives. Clearly, Oedipus continues to act in bad faith because it suits him. He prefers to remain in the dark because in so doing he may unabashedly prolong his enjoyment of power and pleasure: for only as long as he conceals the facts from himself and others may he maintain the position he usurped from his father, as ruler over Thebes by day and lover of Jocasta by night.

Hence, for Moravia the story of Oedipus is not one of illicit love and failed ambition, which, though powerful, would lack universal relevance. More profoundly, it is the tragedy par excellence of ‘wilful, presumptuous, cowardly and wicked ignorance’, which is ‘the origin of all evils’. Therefore, in the standard “recognition scene” of Greek drama, in which the identity of someone previously unknown is at last revealed to the protagonist, Oedipus is compelled, like Joseph K., to arrest himself. The charge is neither parricide nor incest, but rather that of closing his eyes to his own self-deception; his past crimes are not so grievous as his refusal to admit them, nor so despicable as his ongoing indulgence in greed and sensuality, facilitated by remaining conveniently unknowing and ‘unseeing’. Thus his comeuppance is not death or castration, but self-induced blindness.

In sum, we have witnessed the ultimate drama of crucial aspects of taṇhā and avijjā. As Ven. Ñāṇavīra writes in Letter 149, ‘Avijjā functions automatically, but conceals this fact from itself. Avijjā is an automatically functioning blindness to its automatic functioning.’  (...)

* See L’attenzione (Milano: Bompiani, 1965) pp. 86–89.

John Stella from The introduction to Ven Nanavira's Letters

**

The Myth of the Oedipus Complex

The father of psychoanalysis built his theories based on the study of hysterical pathology, which was obviously no accident. Based on his personal case history and on a study of and his fellow Viennese Jews, he showed that incest was the major cause of hysteria.

 In 1896, Freud categorically supported the notion that the specific cause of hysteria must be sought in some sort of sexual problem. Thirteen cases analysed by him permitted him to arrive at this conclusion. Hysteria, he affirmed, was caused by a serious incident of a sexual nature, passively experienced and occurring before puberty.

What his biographer Ernst Jones writes is edifying, as long as one understands that we are only speaking of the Jewish community: “From May 1893, the time in which he speaks for the first time to Fliess, in September 1897… he admitted that a sexual seduction committed against a child by an adult – most often the father – was the essential cause of hysteria. The proofs provided by the analytical materials seemed irrefutable. For more than four years, his conviction remained unshakeable, although the frequency of these so-called incidents surprised him more and more. Everything appeared to indicate that agreat number of fathers were addicted to the commission of incestuous crimes… Freud concluded that, judging by certain symptoms observable in his brotherand a few of his sisters, his father might havebeen guilty, too” (letter to Fliess, 11 February 1897).

In this letter, as Freud wrote to his great friend, Dr. Wilhem Fliess, “Unfortunately, my own father was one of these perverts: he is thecause of my brother’s hysteria (whose condition I am still striving todiagnose), and some of my younger sisters…

”In 1897, however, after his father’s death, which occurred at the end of October 1896, Freud abandoned the “seduction theory” and adopted the “fantasy theory”: hysterical women were no longer the unfortunate victims of incest committed against them during their childhood, but were now merely fantasizing about their fathers! His father was henceforth washed clean of any suspicion. Parents were no longer guilty. It was now necessary to believe that the children were in love with their parent of the opposite sex and desired incestuous relations.

Ernst Jones writes here: “During the winter following the death ofhis father (more precisely, in February), Freud accused his father ofacts of seduction; three months later (on 31 May 1897), an incestuous dream he had put an end to his doubts relating to the seduction story”.

In his letters of 3, 4, and 15 October 1897, Freud described the progress of his self-analysis and acknowledged “his father’s innocence” – or so it would appear. Ernst Jones appears satisfied with this explanation and supported the Freudian hypothesis: “What is important above all, more than the parent’s incestuous desires, even more than occasional acts of this kind, was the general fact of incestuous desires inspired in the child by the parent of the opposite sex”. Et voilà: “infantile sexuality” and the “Oedipus complex” were born!

Freud was obviously the object of very heavy pressure from his fellow Jews while he was still in the process of constructing his theories on the origins of hysteria, so as to avoid revealing to the world the heavy secret of Judaism. By inventing the theory of the “Oedipus complex”, he concealed the reality of incest within Jewish families while exculpating Jewish parents. And he covered his tracks even further by projecting this Jewish specificity onto a universal plane, through the mechanism of a Greek hero (Oedipus). In reality, the famous “Oedipus complex” is in reality and above all nothing more than an “Israel complex”, i.e., the complex of a son who has slept with his own mother, and who wishes to “kill his father”, for quite understandable reasons.

We nevertheless owe it to Freud for raising the question of incest, which is the one true great secret of Judaism. The only thing we need to do now is place this “psychoanalytic theory” in front of a mirror, which will then reflect the following conclusion: “Judaism is the illness which psychoanalysis sets out to cure”. Everything written by Jews must be read with a mirror. The truth is that everything they ever say about others and about “humanity” is, at bottom, nothing but the reflection of themselves.

After Freud, psychoanalysts replaced priests in caring for the souls of the faithful. The only difference, really – from the Jewish point of view – was that while priests were free of charge, while psychoanalysts demand to be paid cash on the barrel head! Or possibly credit card. Just the same, it’s a little bit comical to see all these “sick people” (the phrase is from Jacques Attali) forming the heavy battalions of all those who set out to cure humanity of its ills. But this is just one of the “paradoxes” of Judaism. The truth is that Jewish psychoanalysts don’t just practice their profession to treat their patients; rather, they treat their patients to try to treat themselves.

Typically, in claiming that the origin of neurosis were to be found in the repression of sexual impulses by Christian morality, Freud was, once again – and, once again, typically – deliberately projecting his own neurosis – and the neurosis of Judaism – onto a civilization which he consciously hated. He himself warned us, in embarking for America: “They do not know that we are bringing them the plague”.

*

Sexual Crimes Against Children

Paedophilia in the Jewish community is much more widespread that it appears. The media pass over the problem in silence and accuse Catholic priests. In reality, the phenomenon is incomparably more important within the Jewish sect, particularly among Orthodox Jews. We have compiled innumerable testimonies and legal proceedings since the publication of The Psychoanalysis of Judaism, in 2006.

In the United States, an Internet site – the Awareness Center – listed hundreds of rabbis, both Israeli and American, persecuted for sexual attacks on children. The site, unfortunately, no longer exists, but we compiled a few of these cases in the chapters of our books ( ThePsychoanalysis of Judaism, The Mirror of Judaism). Each week, the American and Israeli press provides us with new examples. In December 2011, the umpteenth scandal erupted in the Orthodox Jewish community of Brooklyn, where the New York City Police Department investigated charges of sexual abuse brought by no fewer than 117 children. 85 people were arrested in this one case. 

In January 2012, the rabbi Daniel Fahri, eminent founder of the Jewish liberal movement of France, was indicted for similar misdeeds. This Daniel Fahri was also the father of rabbi Gabriel Fahri, who had been much talked about in 2003, who claimed to have been attacked with knives in a Paris street. Police investigations very quickly established that the rabbi had stabbed himself. (We have listed numerous cases of similar affairs in Jewish Fanaticism).

These sexual deviations are explained in part by the content of the Talmud, the holy book of Judaism, which contains the teachings of the rabbis, and which the Jews consider more important than the Torah. We have already studied this question in our books. Let us summarize the essential facts here: 

The Sanhedrin treatise (54b-55a) teaches that as long as children have not reached sexual maturity, they are not physiologically capable of having sexual relations, are not considered persons, and the laws on sodomy do not apply to them. Many pages are dedicated to the description of paedophilia and “cohabitation” with young children. Sanhedrin 55a clearly establishes that a boy is considered sexually mature at age 9 years and 1 day, and a little girl at the age of 3 years and 1 day.

In France, very well known personalities have defended paedophilia in their books. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, former “68” leader, or the TV announcer Michel Polac, for example. We have long been aware of the morals of former Minister of Culture, Jack Lang, who declared in the newspaper Gay Pied on 31 January 1991: “The sexuality of children is still a forbidden continent. It is the task of the discoverersof the 21st century to approach the shores”. In September 2009, at the time of the arrest of the film director Roman Polanski, all Jewish intellectuals defended the paedophile as one man: Bernard-Henry Levi, Claude Lelouch, Constantin Costa-Gavras, etc. Even Frédéric Mitterrand got involved. It is necessary, once again, to note the convergences between Judaism and the “sexual minorities”.

At Last: Psychoanalysis Explained

The question of incest is a nagging one among Jewish intellectuals. Direct testimonies are rather rare, due to the fact that incest victims are highly reluctant to discuss the matter, and very few victims bring charges against their own parents. But if we read the Jews with a mirror, we will soon see that this whole problem is an absolute obsession in the cultural production of Judaism. Jewish intellectuals and film makers always talk about it with an air of great mystery, in an anecdotal way, or by projecting the problem onto a universal level, always using a goy family as an example. We know that the Jewish people love to encourage an air of mystery and secrecy, and that incest, in particular, is one of the secrets, if not the top secret of Judaism. 

In our books The Psychoanalysis of Judaism (2006), Jewish Fanaticism (2007), and The Mirror of Judaism (2009), various chapters show that the near-totality of Jewish intellectuals, artists and film-makers have dealt with the problem at one time or another, usually via the mechanism of “projection”. This is not an accident.

Of course, incest is formally proscribed among Jews, as stipulated by the Torah (Leviticus 18) and the Babylonian Talmud (Yabamot 2a). But the interpretations of Jewish intellectuals are always ambiguous. Everything is ambiguous in Judaism. 

Ambiguity may even be said to constitute the principal characteristic of Judaism. In the case in question, one must observe that the Jews know how to rationalize their war around the Biblical texts.

 See for example, the film Chinatown, by Roman Polanski (USA, 1974): at Los Angeles, in the 1930s, a drought compels small farmers to sell their land. The land is purchased at rock-bottom prices by large landowners with the connivance of the municipality, which releases the badly needed, precious water over a spillway every night. Jack Nicholson, private detective, investigates the affair, which displeases powerful enemies. At the end of the film, the beautiful Faye Dunaway, slapped by Nicholson, finally admits that the little girl she has been hiding from everyone is both her daughter and her sister. Her father is a monster, a rich landowner. This is a typical example of the manner in which an intimate and highly sensitive, almost uniquely Jewish problem is projected onto the goyim, by a Jew who is a child rapist himself, Roman Polanski. 

Examples of this genre are very numerous. Incest may also be depicted as occurring between father and son. Director and actor Tim Roth, for example, has admitted being abused by his own father. In his film The War Zone (Great Britain, 1999) he denounces the incestuous relations between a father and his daughter. The horror finally ends when Tom and his sister stab their father to death. 

An article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, on 13 December 2006, reports interesting statistics. We learn that Israel, over the course of the year, received more than 2,000 complaints alleging the sexual abuse of children under the age of 12, and nearly 2,500 others concerning adolescents aged between 13 and 18 years. 90% of the victims were attacked by someone they knew; 60% of the cases involving children below the age of 12 were incestuous relationships. One must remember that, in the immense majority of cases, the victims of incest never bring charges. 

In the film They Live, (USA, 1988), by John Carpenter, the hero, Nada, thanks to special glasses, discovers that a small part of the population consists of extra-terrestrials who look like everybody else, constituting an elite which governs the world through lies. Nada (“nothing”, in Spanish) we learn, was the victim of an abusive father.

 Some mention must be made at this point of the famous “Jewish mother”, which means an over-possessive, abusive mother. Jacques Attali, Bernard-Henry Levi, Romain Gary, Alain Finkielkraut and many others have left more than just a few ambiguous testimonies on this subject. This is what Elie Wiesel wrote on the subject, in Talmudic Celebration (1991): A woman visits Rabbi Yeoshoua. “So what’s theproblem?

 Here it is: ‘B’nai hakatan mibni hagadol’, she says, “my younger son’s father is my older son”. […] Jewish mothers are always guilty ofwhat happens to their beloved children”.

Wiesel puts it elliptically: “As a good Jewish son, he loved his mother – a little bit too much”. 

The philosopher Alain Finkielkraut felt the need to see a psychiatrist: “My fears and problems were no doubt a result of our frenzied intimacy… whether it was irritation or just weariness, it has happened to me to be weak and offer my Jewishness to psychoanalysis”. Finkielkraut himself writes: “Hysterical, I hadbecome Jewish to make people look at me”. 

The American novelist Philip Roth, in Portnoy’s Complaint(1967), also “let go” a little (cf. Jewish Fanaticism): “Please, who crippled us so? Who made us so morbid, so hysterical and weak? … Doctor, whatdo you call this sickness I have? Is it the Jewish suffering which I used to hear so much about?… My own mother… Her beloved, she calls me!” Jewish mothers, “in love” with their sons, no doubt imagine that they have given birth to the long-awaited Messiah of Israel. And Philip Roth adds, sickened, “What was it with these Jewish parents, what, that theywere able to make us little Jewish boys believe that we were little princes on the other hand, unique as unicorns on the one hand, geniuses and brilliant like nobody had ever been brilliant and beautiful before in the whole history of childhood”?

The feminist Elisabeth Badinter explains ( XY: On MasculineIdentity, 1992), that this is all quite natural: “The good mother isnaturally incestuous and paedophile. Nobody would ever dream ofcomplaining of it, but they all wish to forget it, including the motherand son”. There are many glimpses of this type in cosmopolitan cinema. In 1997, the Jewish director Milos Forman presented Larry Flynt, a film on the scandalous life of a pornographic magazine tycoon who became the flag-bearer of the struggle against the moral order in the United States. We see this “Pope” of porn (represented as a goy) persecuted by the representatives of the “moral order” for caricaturizing the moral order in his magazine and claiming to have had sex with his own mother in a toilet. Here again, accusatory inversion is the norm. In France, Catholic associations were successful in bringing about the withdrawal of the film poster, which represented a man being crucified on a woman’s pubis. 

Incestuous relations between brother and his sister are made to appear rather common, at least judging by the cultural production of Jewish cinema. References to incest are seen to be very numerous in film as soon as one starts paying attention. Here are a few: in Land ofLight (2008), director Stephane Kurc projects a history of incest between brother and sister among the French in Algeria, in a film dripping with anti-goy racism. There is also the film Disengagement by Israeli director Amos Gitai (2007); Kika by Pedro Almovodar (Spain, 1993), In Brotherhood of the Wolf (2001), Christophe Gans shows us the rape of a sister by her brother. The film is also very “anti-racist”: an Iroquois Indian beats the stuffing out of a load of French peasants, in the 18th century!

In the novel by Jonathan Littell entitled The Kindly Ones (Goncourt Prize 2006), the hero is a homosexual SS officer, madly in love with his twin sister Una. This is a clear case of accusatory inversion, traditional among Jewish intellectuals.

The novelist Isaac Bashevis Singer also projects his guilt onto others. In his novel entitled Scum, published in 1991, we read: “In Argentina, Peru, in Bolivia, Chile and elsewhere, little girls are rapedby their fathers, brothers sleep with their sisters, mothers have sex withtheir own sons. People do not always put a stop to such crimes. They go talk to the priest, confess, and they are absolved with a little holywater.” 

In his book On Anti-Semitism, Stéphane Zagdanski himself warns us that the reader will have to “decode” his remarks and put the following sentence in the right place. With reference to “anti-Semites”, he writes: “To be decoded: they are egotistically addicted to this obscure enjoyment of incest, access to which is prohibited to them. Anti-Semites, you understand, are very greatly disturbed by incest,which is logical, since they suffer from a lack of boundaries.”

Incest, as we see, is an absolute obsession among Jews. Mother and son, father and daughter, brother and sister, uncles and daughters, etc. … there are what are called “stove pipe” families, in which everybody “fits” into everybody else, from generation to generation. There is no doubt an urgent need for an official inquiry into the problem to provoke a discussion, intended to break the succession of “incestuous generations”. 

At this point, there can no longer be any talk of any “Chosen People”; what the Jews need is a medical diagnosis. The “German poet”, Heinrich Heine, had the habit of declaring sardonically that Judaism is not a religion, but a “family misfortune” ( Familienunglück). Freud himself no doubt also understood that the origin of Judaism is not religious in nature, but sexual. But he lacked the courage to reveal to the world at large that the famous “Oedipus complex” was in reality nothing by an “Israel complex”, preferring to project the neurosis of Judaism onto humanity as a whole. One must always read the Jews with a mirror.

Hevre Ryssen

Understanding the Jews, Understanding Anti-Semitism



Darwinism as a spiritual poison

Note: The article in no way undermines validity of Kevin MacDonald's work.

On the level of worldview Dawinism is a spiritual poison, it is animalisation of the man, and it replaced morality received from divine power with that of animal, blindly insisting on survival, and so it is in total contradiction with Dhamma, where the highest goal is the cessation of being in space and time.

Today a naturalistic approach to knowledge is being applied to virtually every field. Some say we’re entering an age of “universal Darwinism,” where it is no longer just a scientific theory but a comprehensive worldview.

It has become commonplace to say that America is embroiled in a “culture war” over conflicting moral standards. But we must remember that morality is always derivative, stemming from an underlying worldview. The culture war reflects an underlying cognitive war over worldviews—and at the core of each worldview is an account of origins. ↓

The pragmatists were among the first, however, to face squarely the implications of naturalistic evolution. If evolutionary forces produced the mind, they said, then all beliefs and convictions are nothing but mental survival strategies, to be judged in terms of their practical success in human conduct. William James liked to say that truth is the “cash value” of an idea: if it pays off, then we call it true.

Pragmatism Today 

This Darwinian logic continues to shape American thought more than we might imagine. Take religion. William James was raised in a household with an intense interest in religion. (In the Second Great Awakening his father converted to Christianity, then later converted to Swedenborgianism). As a result, James applied his philosophy of pragmatism to religion: we decide whether God exists depending on whether that belief has positive consequences in our experience. “An idea is ‘true’ so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives,” James once said. Thus, “If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God’s existence?”3 (...) As Lutheran theologian John Warwick Montgomery puts it, “Truths do not always ‘work,’ and beliefs that ‘work’ are by no means always true.”4

If James’s religious pragmatism has become virtually the American approach to spirituality today, then Dewey’s pragmatism has become the preferred approach to education. Virtually across the curriculum—from math class to moral education—teachers are trained to be nondirective “facilitators,” presenting students with problems and allowing them to work out their own pragmatic strategies for solving them. Of course, good teachers have always taught students to think for themselves. But today’s nondirective methodologies go far beyond that. They springboard from a Darwinian epistemology that denies the very existence of any objective or transcendent truth.*

NANCY PEARCEY How Darwinism Dumbs Us Down. Evolution and Postmodernism

* Revilo Oliver: By denying the concept of truth, Pragmatism necessarily denies the possibility of moral values. With the abolition of right and wrong, man can consult only his appetites and his calculations of expediency. The only test of an action is whether "it works". Logically a Pragmatist must condemn himself for a foolish weakness if he refuses, for example, to grind up his grandmother and sell her for hamburger in circumstances in which it is certain that he could get away with it and either realize a profit or have fun in the process. (...)

There are less spectacular, though not less baneful, applications of the doctrine to daily life. When the practicing Pragmatist expounds an argument, his words are merely the cover for his purposes. They are the flag hoisted by the pirate while stalking or approaching his victim. Where there is no truth there can be no rational debate, and the function of speech is to befuddle the gullible. And when the disinterested pursuit of truth is recognized as the Quixotic pursuit of an illusion, colleges must become hunting grounds for petty scoundrels. From: America's Decline 

Jonas Alexis:

... according to Darwinism’s fundamental principle, whatever is, is right in the animal kingdom. As Crook again puts it, “Struggle and competition, violence, bloodshed, and cruelty were the filtering mechanisms, crude, chancy, wasteful, by which species change and natural progress occurred.”[92]

In other words, according to the Darwinian mechanism, there cannot be “progress” without violence, bloodshed, and struggle. If Darwin is right, then “violence is a constant human potential, war is not aberrant and may even be commended as a biological necessity.”[93] So Darwinists, including Crook, have to do a lot of mental gymnastics in order to avoid Darwin’s fundamental principle. (...) Wilson is commonly known as the father of sociobiology. Yet listen to what Wilson has to say on ethics or morality:

“Ethics as we understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to co-operate. It is without external grounding. Ethics is produced by evolution but not justified by it, because, like Macbeth’s dagger, it serves as a powerful purpose without existing in substance.”[96]

For Wilson and other staunch Darwinists, morality is just a product of sociobiological evolution which has been ingrained in us and which has no serious objectivity. As Ruse again puts it, “Morality is just a matter of emotions, like liking ice cream and sex and hating toothache and marking student papers.”[97] If you think that Ruse is just joking, then think again. He elaborates on these in his work The Darwinian Paradigm:

“Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth . . . . Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says ‘Love their neighbor as thyself,’ they think they are referring above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless such reference is true without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory . . .”[98]

As we have argued in the past, Darwin saw almost the same thing. He argued in the Descent of Man that “If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.”[99]

The Edinburgh Review quickly saw the logical conclusion of Darwin’s point here. It declared then that if Darwin is right, then:

“most earnest-minded men will be compelled to give up these motives by which they have attempted to live noble and virtuous lives, as founded on a mistake; our moral sense will turn out to be a mere developed instinct…If these views are true, a revolution in thought is imminent, which will shake society to its very foundations by destroying the sanctity of the conscience…”[100]

Science writer Robert Wright agrees that Darwin’s Descent of Man “has indeed sapped the moral strength of Western civilization” and replaced it with something else.

“Sympathy, empathy, compassion, conscience, guilt, remorse, even the very sense of justice, the sense of doers of good deserve reward and doers of bad deserve punishment—all these can now be viewed as vestiges of organic history on a particular planet. What’s more, we can’t take solace, as Darwin did, in the mistaken belief that these things evolved for the greater good—the ‘good of the group.’ Our ethereal intuitions about what’s right and what’s wrong are weapons designed for daily, hand-to-hand combat among individuals. It isn’t only moral feelings that now fall under suspicion, but all of the moral discourse.”[101]

https://www.veteranstoday.com/2023/04/02/david-duke-meets-jared-taylor-and-michael-hart/


Francis Parker Yockey on Darwinism

 As a world view, Darwinism cannot of course be refuted, since Faith is, always has been, and always will be, stronger than facts

One of the most fruitful discoveries of the 20th century was the metaphysics of nations. The unveiling of the Riddle of History showed that nations are different manifestations of the soul of the High Cultures. They exist only in Cultures, they have their life span for political purposes, and possess — vis-à-vis the other nations of the Culture — individuality. Each great nation is given an Idea, a life-mission, and the history of the nation is the actualizing of this Idea. This Idea, again, must be felt, and cannot be directly defined. Each Idea, to actualize which a given nation was chosen by the Culture, is also a stage of the development of the Culture. Thus Western History presents during the recent centuries, a Spanish period, a French period, an English period. They correspond to Baroque, Rococo, and early Civilization. These nations owed their spiritual and political supremacy during these years solely to the fact that they were the custodians of the Spirit of the Age. With the passing of the Age, these custodians of its Spirit lost their spiritually dominating position in the Culture. 

The early Civilization was the English period of the West, and all the thought and activity of the whole Civilization was on the English model. All nations embarked upon economic imperialism of the English type. All thinkers became Anglicized intellectually. English thought-systems ruled the West, systems which reflected the English soul, English life-conditions, and English material conditions. Prime among these systems was Darwinism, which became popular, and thus politically effective. 

Darwin himself was a follower of Malthus, and his system implies Malthusianism as a foundation. Malthus taught that population increase tends to outrun increase of food supply, that this represented an economic  danger, and that “checks” on this population increase alone can prevent it from destroying a nation, such as epidemics and wars, unhealthy living conditions and poverty. Malthusianism expressly regards care for the poor, the aged, and orphans, as a mistake. 

A word on this curious philosophy; first it has no correspondence whatever to facts, and therefore is not valid for the 20th century. Statistically it has no basis, spiritually it shows complete incomprehension of the prime fact of Destiny, Man, and History — namely that the soul is primary, and that matter is governed by soulconditions. Every man is the poet of his own History, and every nation of its History. A rising population shows the presence of a life-task, a declining population points to insignificance. This philosophy would legitimate a man’s existence by whether or not he is born into an adequate food-area! His gifts, his life task, his Destiny, his soul, are put at naught. It is one example of the great philosophic tendency of materialism: the animalization of Culture-man. 

Malthusianism taught that the food-population ratio imposed a continuous struggle for existence among men. This “struggle for existence” became a leadingidea for Darwinism. The other leading ideas of Darwinism are found in Schopenhauer, Erasmus Darwin, Henry Bates, and Herbert Spencer. Schopenhauer in 1835 set forth a Nature-picture containing the struggle for self-preservation, human intellect as a weapon in the struggle, and sexual love as unconscious selection according to the interest of the species. In the 18th century, Erasmus Darwin had postulated adaptation, heredity, struggle, and self-protection as principles of evolution. Bates formulated before Darwin the theory of Mimicry, Spencer the theory of descent, and the powerful tautological catchword “survival of the fittest” to describe the results of the “struggle.” 

This is only the foreground, for actually the road from Darwin back to Calvin is quite clear: Calvinism is a religious interpretation of the “survival of the fittest” idea, and it calls the fit the “elected.” Darwinism makes this election-process mechanical-profane instead of theological-religious: selection by Nature instead of election by God. It remains purely English in the process, for the national religion of England was an adaptation of Calvinism.

The basic idea of Darwinism — evolution — is as little novel as the particular theories of the system. Evolution is the great central idea of the philosophy of the 19th century. It dominates every leading thinker and every system: Schopenhauer, Proudhon, Marx, Wagner, Nietzsche, Mill, Ibsen, Shaw. These thinkers differ in their explanation of the purpose and technique of evolution; none of them question the central idea itself. With some of them it is organic, with most purely mechanical. 

Darwin’s system has two aspects, of which only one is treated here, for only one was effective. This was Darwinism as a popular philosophy. As a scientific arrangement it had considerable qualifications, and no one paid any attention to these when converting it to a journalistic world-outlook. As the latter, it had a sweeping vogue, and was effective as a part of the world-picture of the age. 

The system shows its provenance as a product of the Age of Criticism in its teleological assumptions. Evolution has purpose — the purpose of producing man, civilized man, English man — in the last analysis, Darwinians. It is anthropomorphic — the “aim of evolution” is not to produce bacilli, but humanity. It is free trade capitalism, in that this struggle is economic, every man for himself, and competition decides which life-forms are best. It is gradual and parliamentary, for continual “progress” and adaptation, exclude revolutions and catastrophes. It is utilitarian, in that every change in a species is one that has a material use. The human soul itself — known as the “brain” in the 19th century — is only a tool by which a certain type of monkey advanced himself to man ahead of his fellow-monkeys. Teleology again: man became man in order that he might be man. It is orderly; natural selection proceeds according to the rules of artificial breeding in practice on English farms. 

II 

As a world view, Darwinism cannot of course be refuted, since Faith is, always has been, and always will be, stronger than facts. Nor is it important to refute it as a picture of the world, since as such it no longer influences any but day-before-yesterday thinkers. However, as a picture of the facts, it is grotesque, from its first assumptions to its last conclusions. 

In the first place, there is no “Struggle for existence” in nature; this old Malthusian idea merely projected Capitalism on to the animal world. Such struggles for existence as do occur are the exception; the rule in Nature is abundance. There are plenty of plants for the herbivores to eat, and there are plenty of herbivores for the carnivores to eat. Between the latter there can hardly be said to be “struggle,” since only the carnivore is spiritually equipped for war. A lion making a meal of a zebra portrays no “struggle” between two species, unless one is determined so to regard it. Even so, he must concede that it is not physically, mechanically, necessary for the carnivores to kill other animals. They could as well eat plants — it is the demand of their animal souls however to live in this fashion, and thus, even if one were to call their lives struggles, it would not be imposed by “Nature” but by the soul. It becomes thus, not a “struggle for existence,” but a spiritual necessity of being one’s self. 

The capitalistic mentality, engaged in a competition to get rich, quite naturally pictured the animal-world also as engaged in an intensive economic contest. Both Malthusianism and Darwinism are thus capitalistic outlooks, in that they place economics in the center of Life, and regard it as the meaning of Life. 

Natural selection was the name given to the process by which the “unfit” died out to give place to the “fit.” Adaptation was the name given to the process by which a species gradually changed in order to be more fit for the struggle. Heredity was the means by which these adaptations were saved for the species. 

As a factual picture, this is easier to refute than it is to prove, and factual biological thinkers, both Mechanists and Vitalists, like Louis Agassiz, Du BoisReymond, Reinke, and Driesch rejected it from its appearance. The easiest refutation is the palaeontological. Fossil deposits — found in various parts of the earth — must represent the possibilities generally. Yet they disclose only stable specie-forms, and disclose no transitional types, which show a species “evolving” into something else. And then, in a new fossil hoard, a new species appears, in its definitive form, which remains stable. The species that we know today, and for past centuries, are all stable, and no case has ever been observed of a species “adapting” itself to change its anatomy or physiology, which “adaptation” then resulted in more “fitness” for the “struggle for existence,” and was passed on by heredity, with the result of a new species. 

Darwinians cannot get over these facts by bringing in great spaces of time, for paleontology has never discovered any intermediate types, but only distinct species. Nor are the fossil animals which have died out any simpler than present-day forms, although the course of evolution was supposed to be from simple to complex Life-forms. This was crude anthropomorphism — man is complex, other animals are simple, they must be tending toward him, since he is “higher” biologically. 

Calling Culture-man a “higher” animal still treats him as an animal. Culture-man is a different world spiritually from all animals, and is not to be understood by referring him to any artificial materialistic scheme. 

If this picture of the facts were correct, species ought to be fluid at the present time. They should be turning into one another. This is, of course, not so. There should actually be no species, but only a surging mass of individuals, engaged in a race to reach — man. But the “struggle,” again, is quite inconclusive. The “lower” forms, simpler — less fit? — have not died out, have not yielded to the principle of Darwinian evolution. They remain in the same form they have had for — as the Darwinians would say — millions of years. Why do they not “evolve” into something “higher”?

The Darwinian analogy between artificial selection and natural selection is also in opposition to the facts. The products of artificial selection such as barnyard fowls, racing dogs, race horses, ornamental cats, and song-canaries, would certainly be at a disadvantage against natural varieties. Thus artificial selection has only been able to produce less fit lifeforms. 

Nor is Darwinian sexual selection in accordance with facts. The female does not by any means always choose the finest and strongest individual for a mate, in the human species, or in any other. 

The utilitarian aspect of the picture is also quite subjective — i.e., English, capitalistic, parliamentarian — for the utility of an organ is relative to the use sought to be made of it. A species without hands has no need of hands. A hand that slowly evolved would be a positive disadvantage over the “millions of years” necessary to perfect the hand. Furthermore, how did this process start? For an organ to be utile, it must be ready; while it is being prepared, it is inutile. But if it is inutile, it is not Darwinian, for Darwinism says evolution is utilitarian. 

Actually all the technics of Darwinian evolution are simply tautological. Thus, within the species it is individuals which have a predisposition to adapt themselves that do so. Adaptation presupposes adaptation. 

The process of selection affects those specimens with definite aptitudes which make them worthy of selection, in other words, they have already been selected. Selection presupposes selection. 

The problem of descent in the Darwinian picture is treated as finding the interrelations of the species. Having assumed their interrelationship, it then finds they are interrelated, and proves the interrelationship thus. Descent presupposes descent. 

The utility of an organ is a way of saying it works for this species. Utility thus presupposes the existence of the very species which has the organ, but lacking that organ. The facts however, have never shown a species to pick up a certain missing organ, which seemed necessary. A Life-form needs a certain organ because it needs it. The organ is utile because it is utile. 

The naive, tautological, doctrine of utility never asked “Utility for what?” That which serves duration might not serve strength. Utility is not a simple thing, but entirely relative to what already exists. Thus it is the inner demands of a life-form which determine what it would like to have, what would be useful to it. The soul of the lion and his power go together. The hand of man and his brain go together. No one can say that the strength of the lion causes him to live the way he does, nor that the hand of man is responsible for his technical achievements. It is the soul in each case which is primary.

This primacy of the spiritual inverts the Darwinian materialism on the doctrine of utility. A lack can be utile: the lack of one sense develops others; physical weakness develops intelligence. In man and in animals alike, the absence of one organ stimulates others to compensatory activity — this is often observed in endocrinology in particular. 

III 

The whole grotesquerie of Darwinism, and of the materialism of the entire 19th century generally, is a product of one fundamental idea — an idea which happens also to be nonfactual to this century, even though it was a prime fact a century ago. This one idea was that Life is formed by the outer. This generated the sociology of “environment” as determining the human soul. Later it generated the doctrine of “heredity” as doing the same. And yet, in a purely factual sense, what is Life? Life is the actualizing of the possible. The possible turns into the actual in the midst of outer facts, which affect only the precise way in which the possible becomes actual, but cannot touch the inner force which is expressing itself through, and, if necessary, in opposition to, the outer facts. 

Neither “heredity” nor “environment” determine these inner possibilities. They affect only the framework within which something entirely new, an individual, a unique soul, will express itself. 

The word evolution describes to the 20th century the process of the ripening and fulfilling of an organism or of a species. This process is not at all the operation of mechanical-utility “causes” on plastic, formless, protoplasmic material, with purely accidental results. His work with plants led de Vries to develop his Mutation theory of the origin of species, and the facts of paleontology reinforce it to the extent of showing the sudden appearance of new species. The 20th century finds it quite unnecessary to formulate mythologies, either in cosmogony or biology. Origins are forever hidden from us, and a historical viewpoint is interested in the development of the process, not in the mysterious beginning of the process. This beginning, as set forth by scientific mythology, and by religious mythology, has only an historical interest to our age. What we note is that once these world-pictures were actual and living. 

What is the actual History of Life, as this age sees it? Various species of Life exist, ranked, according to increasing spiritual content, from plants and animals, through man, to Culture-man, and High Cultures. Some of the varieties, as shown by fossils, existed in former earth-ages in their present form, while other species appeared and disappeared. 

A species appears suddenly, both in fossil-finds, and in the experimental laboratory. Mutation is a legitimate description of the process, if the idea is free from any mechanical-utility causes, for these latter are only imagined, whereas mutations are a fact. Each species has also a Destiny, and a given Life-energy, so to speak. Some are stable and firm; others have been weak, tending to split off into many different varieties, and lose their unity. They have also a life span, for many have disappeared. This whole process is not at all independent of geological ages, nor of astral phenomena. Some species, however, outlast one earth-age into the next, just as some 19th century thinkers have survived into the 20th century. 

Darwinians offered also an explanation of the metaphysics of their evolution. Roux, for instance, holds that the “fit for the purpose” survive, while the “unfit for the purpose” die. The process is purely mechanical, however, and is thus fitness for purpose without purpose. Nägeli taught that an organism perfects itself because it contains within it the “principle of perfection,” just as Moliere’s doctor explained that the sleeping potion worked because of a dormitive virtue inherent in it. Weismann denied the heredity of acquired characteristics, but instead of using it to destroy Darwinism, as it obviously does — if every individual has to start anew, how can the species “evolve”? — he props up the Darwinian picture with it by saying that the germ-plasm contains latent tendencies toward useful qualities. But this is no longer Darwinism, for the species does not evolve if it is only doing what it tends to do. 

These tautological explanations only convinced people because they believed already. The age was evolutionary, and materialistic. Darwinism combined these two qualities into a biologico-religious doctrine which satisfied the capitalistic imperative of that age. Any experiments, any new facts, only proved Darwinism; they would not have been allowed to do otherwise. 

The 20th century does not see Life as an accident, a playground for external causes. It sees the fact that Life-forms begin suddenly, and that the subsequent development, or evolution, is only the actualizing of that which is already possible. Life is the unfolding of a Soul, an individuality. Whatever explanation one gives of how Life started only reveals the structure of his own soul. A materialistic explanation reveals a materialist. Similarly the imputing of any “purpose” to Life as a whole transcends knowledge and enters the realm of Faith. Life as a whole, each great Life-form, each species, each variety, each individual, has however a Destiny, an inner direction, a wordless imperative. This Destiny is the primary fact of History. History is the record of fulfilled (or thwarted) destinies. 

Any attempt to make man into an animal, and the animals into automata, is merely materialism, and thus a product of a certain type of soul, of a certain age. The 20th century is not such an age, and looks upon the inner reality of the human soul as being the determinant of human history, and the inner reality of the Soul of the High Culture as being the determinant of the history of that Culture. The soul exploits outer circumstances — they do not form it. 

Nor does the 20th century, not being capitalistic, see any struggle for existence going on in the world, either of men or animals. It sees a struggle for power, a struggle that has no connection with cheap economic reasons. It is a struggle for domination of the world that the 20th and 21st centuries see. It is not because there is a shortage of food for the human populations of the world — there is plenty of food. The question is power, and in the decision of that question, food, human lives, material, and everything else that the participants can dispose of, will come into play as weapons, and not as stakes. Nor will it ever be decided, in the sense that a lawsuit can be decided. Readers living in 2050 will smile when told that there was once a rather widespread belief in the Western Civilization that the First World War was the “last war.” The Second World War was also so regarded, all during the preparations for the Third. It was a case of wish-thinking pacifist idealism being stronger than facts. 

Darwinism was the animalization of Cultureman by means of biology; the human soul was interpreted as a mere superior technique of fighting with other animals. We come now to Marxism, the animalization of man through economics, the human soul as a mere reflex of food, clothing and shelter. 

From Imperium

Saturday, September 23, 2023

Evola - The Mountain and Spirituality

 In the modern world there are two factors that, more than any others, are responsible for hindering our realization of the spirituality that was known in the most ancient traditions: the first is the abstract character of our culture; the second is the glorification of a blind and frantic obsession with activity.

On one hand, there are people who identify the “spirit” with the erudition acquired in libraries and university classrooms, or with the intellectual games played by philosophers, or with literary or pseudomystical aestheticism. On the other hand, the new generations have turned athletic competition into a religion and appear to be unable to conceive anything beyond the excitement of training sessions, competitions, and physical achievements; they have truly turned accomplishment in sports into an end in itself and even into an obsession rather than as means to a higher end.

Some people regard this opposition of lifestyles as some kind of dilemma. In reality, in the so-called scholarly type, we often find an innate strong dislike for any kind of physical discipline; likewise, in many sports-practicing people, the sense of physical strength fosters contempt for those in “ivory towers” who confine themselves to books and to battles of words they view as harmless.

These two lifestyles should be regarded as misguided and as the fruits of modern decadence because they are both foreign to the heroic vision of the spirit that constituted the axis of the best Western classical traditions which, in the context of the actual renovation of Italy, is being successfully evoked.

All too often people forget that spirituality is essentially a way of life and that its measure does not consist of notions, theories, and ideas that have been stored in one’s head. Spirituality is actually what has been successfully actualized and translated into a sense of superiority which is experienced inside by the soul, and a noble demeanor, which is expressed in the body.

From this perspective it is possible to appreciate a discipline which, although it may concern the energies of the body, will not begin and end with them but will become instead the means to awakening a living and organic spirituality. This is the discipline of a superior inner character.

In the ascetic, such a discipline is present in a negative way, so to speak; in the hero it is present in a positive, affirmative way, typical of the Western world. The inner victory against the deepest forces that surface in one’s consciousness during times of tension and mortal danger is a triumph in an external sense, but it is also the sign of a victory of the spirit against itself and of an inner transfiguration. Hence, in antiquity an aura of sacredness surrounded both the hero and the initiate to a religious or esoteric movement, and heroic figures were regarded as symbols of immortality.

However, in modern civilization everything tends to suffocate the heroic sense of life. Everything is more or less mechanized, spiritually impoverished, and reduced to a prudent and regulated association of beings who are needy and have lost their self-suffiency. The contact between man’s deep and free powers and the powers of things and of nature has been cut off; metropolitan life petrifies everything, syncopates every breath, and contaminates every spiritual “well.” As if that weren’t enough, faint-hearted ideologies foster contempt for those values that in other times were the foundation of more rational and bright social organizations. In ancient societies the peak of the hierarchy was occupied by the caste of warrior aristocracy, whereas today, in the pacifist-humanitarian utopias (especially in the Anglo-Saxon ones), attempts are made to portray the warrior as some kind of anachronism, and as a dangerous and harmful entity that one day will be conveniently disposed of in the name of progress.

Once it is suffocated, the heroic will seek further outlets outside the net of practical interests, passions, and yearnings, and that net becomes tighter and tighter with the passing of time: the excitement that sports induce in our contemporaries is just an expression of this. But the heroic will need to be made self-aware again and to move beyond the limits of materialism.

In the struggle against mountain heights, action is finally free from all machines, and from everything that detracts from man’s direct and absolute relationship with things. Up close to the sky and to crevasses—among the still and silent greatness of the peaks; in the impetuous raging winds and snowstorms; among the dazzling brightness of glaciers; or among the fierce, hopeless verticality of rock faces—it is possible to reawaken (through what may at first appear to be the mere employment of the body) the symbol of overcoming, a truly spiritual and virile light, and make contact with primordial forces locked within the body’s limbs. In this way the climber’s struggle will be more than physical and the successful climb may come to represent the achievement of something that is no longer merely human. In ancient mythologies the mountain peaks were regarded as the seats of the gods; this is myth, but it is also the allegorical expression of a real belief that may always come alive again sub specie interioritatis.

In life—as has been pointed out, since Nietzsche, by Simmel—humans have a strange and almost incredible power to reach certain existential peaks at which “living more” (mehr leben), or the highest intensity of life, is transformed into “more than living” (mehr als leben). At these peaks, just as heat transforms into light, life becomes free of itself; not in the sense of the death of individuality or some kind of mystical shipwreck, but in the sense of a transcendent affirmation of life, in which anxiety, endless craving, yearning and worrying, the quest for religious faith, human supports and goals, all give way to a dominating state of calm. There is something greater than life, within life itself, and not outside of it. This heroic experience is valuable and good in itself, whereas ordinary life is only driven by interests, external things, and human conventions. I use the word experience, because this state is not connected with any particular creed or theory (which are always worthless and relative); rather it presents itself in a most direct and undoubtable way, just like the experiences of pain and pleasure.

This profound dimension of the spirit, which perceives itself as infinite, self-transcending, and beyond all manifest reality, is reawakened and shines forth—even though not entirely consciously—in the “insanity” of those who, in increasing numbers and without a specific reason, dare to challenge the mountain heights, led by a will that prevails over fears, exhaustion, and the primitive instincts of prudence and self-preservation.

Feeling left with only one’s resources, without help in a hopeless situation, clothed only in one’s strength or weakness, with no one to rely upon other than one’s self; to climb from rock to rock, from hold to hold, from ridge to ridge, inexorably, for hours and hours; with the feeling of the height and of imminent danger all around; and finally, after the harsh test of calling upon all one’s self-discipline, the feeling of an indescribable liberation, of a solar solitude and of silence; the end of the struggle, the subjugation of fears, and the revelation of a limitless horizon, for miles and miles, while everything else lies down below—in all of this one can truly find the real possibility of purification, of awakening, of the rebirth of something transcendent.

It does not matter that the heroic symbolism of the mountain can only be experienced initially by a few people. When these meanings are duly focused upon, they will influence people. There is no real climber who is not able to experience mountain climbing, if only in a few occasional flashes, as something more than a mere sport. Likewise, there is no real climber who does not display, in the eyes or in the face darkened by the sun’s reflection on the snow, the mark of a race that has transformed beyond that of the people of the plains.

On this basis, we should save the mountains from the contaminating invasion of tourists who attempt to conquer them by building their “civilized” base camps. I am not just referring to those faint-hearted youths who bring with them to popular mountain resorts their vain, mundane city habits (such as discos and tennis courts), and who snobbishly display the colorful new equipment they’ve bought to use only for some harmless walk in the woods. I am also referring to those who tarnish silent and uncontaminated places with materialism and triviality, namely with a competitive spirit and a mania for that which is difficult and unusual, for the sake of setting new records.

The mountain requires purity and simplicity; it requires asceticism.

O sky above me! O pure, deep sky! You abyss of light! Gazing into you, I tremble with divine desires. To cast myself into your height—that is my depth! To hide myself in your purity—that is my innocence! And when I wandered alone what did my soul hunger after by night and on treacherous paths? And when I climbed mountains, whom did I always seek, if not you, upon mountains? And all my wandering and mountain climbing, it was merely a necessity and an expedient of clumsiness: my whole will desires only to fly, to fly into you! [Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (translated by Hollingdale, Penguin, 1961), 184]

These are words that Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher who championed the will to power, wrote in the secluded mountains of Engadine. To some people these words may amount to nothing more than lyrical effusions. To others they may contain both the intimate sense of the heroic spiritual attitude, the spirit of which is action, and the discipline of ruthless self-control. The temple of this spirit is the primordial majesty of the peaks, the glaciers, the crevasses, and the boundless blue sky.

In this context the mountainous peaks and the spiritual peaks converge in one simple and yet powerful reality.

From Meditations On The Pick

If truth exists and is attainable by man - on language

 In recognizing that words have power to define and to compel, the semanticists are actually testifying to the philosophic quality of language which is the source of their vexation. In an attempt to get rid of that quality, they are looking for some neutral means which will be a nonconductor of the current called “emotion” and its concomitant of evaluation. They are introducing into language, in the course of their prescriptions, exactly the same atomization which we have deplored in other fields. They are trying to strip words of all meaning that shows tendency, or they are trying to isolate language from the noumenal world by ridding speech of tropes.

Let us consider an illustration from Hayakawa’s Language in Action, a work which has done much to put the new science before the public. It is easy to visualize a social situation, the author tells us, in which payment to unemployed persons will be termed by one group of citizens “relief” and by another “social insurance.” One can admit the possibility, but what lies behind the difference in terminology? The answer is: a conception of ends which evaluates the tendency of the action named. The same sort of thing is encountered when one has to decide whether the struggle of the American colonists against Great Britain should be termed a “rebellion” or a “war for independence.” In the first case, the bare existential thing, the payment of money to needy persons (and it will be noted that this translation does not purify the expression of tendency) is like anything else neutral as long as we consider it solely with reference to material and efficient causes. But, when we begin to think about what it represents in the totality, it takes on new attributes (emotional loading, these may be called) causing people to divide according to their sentiments or their metaphysical dream.

It is in such instances that the semanticists seem to react hysterically to the fear of words. Realizing that today human beings are  in disagreement as never before and that words serve to polarize the conflicting positions, they propose an ending of polarity. I have mentioned, earlier, people who are so frightened over the existence of prejudice that they are at war with simple predication. The semanticists see in every epithet a prejudice.

The point at issue is explained by a fundamental proposition of Aquinas: “Every form is accompanied by an inclination.” Now language is a system of forms, which both singly and collectively have this inclination or intention. The aim of semantics is to dissolve form and thereby destroy inclination in the belief that the result will enable a scientific manipulation. Our argument is that the removal of inclination destroys the essence of language.

Let us look more closely at the consequence of taking all tendentious meaning from speech. It is usually supposed that we would then have a scientific, objective vocabulary, which would square with the “real” world and so keep us from walking into stone walls or from fighting one another over things that have no existence. Actually the result would be to remove all teleology, for language would no no longer have nisus, and payment to the needy would be neither “relief” nor “social insurance” but something without character, which we would not know how to place in our scheme of values. (The fact that equalitarian democracy, to the extent that it makes leadership superfluous or impossible, is repudiating teleology must not be overlooked here. Teleology enjoins from above; equalitarian democracy takes its counsel without point of reference. The advantage of semantics to equalitarian democracy is pointed out by some semanticists.)

Hayakawa has said further that “arguments over intensional meaning can result only in irreconcilable conflict.” 2 With the proper qualifications, this observation is true. Since language expresses tendency, and tendency has direction, those who differ over tendency can remain at harmony only in two ways: (1) by developing a complacency which makes possible the ignoring of contradictions and (2) by referring to first principles, which will finally re move the difference at the expense of one side. If truth exists and is attainable by man, it is not to be expected that there will be unison among those who have different degrees of it. This is one of the painful conditions of existence which the bourgeoisie like to shut from their sight. I see no reason to doubt that here is the meaning of the verses in Scripture: “Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division” and “I bring not peace, but a sword.” It was the mission of the prophet to bring a metaphysical sword among men which has been dividing them ever since, with a division that affirms value. But amid this division there can be charity, and charity is more to be relied on to prevent violence than are the political neofanaticisms of which our age is signally productive. Positivism cannot grant theology’s basis of distinction, but neither can it provide a ground for charity.

When we look more narrowly at the epistemological problem raised by the semanticists, we conclude that they wish to accept patterns only from external reality. With many of them the notion seems implicit that language is an illusion or a barrier between us and what we must cope with. “Somewhere bedrock beneath words must be reached,” is a common theme. Some talk about achieving an infinite-valued orientation (this last would of course leave both certitude and the idea of the good impossible). Mr. Thurman Arnold, who seems to have assimilated most of the superficial doctrines of the day, takes a stand in the Folklore of Capitalism even against definition. He argues that every writer on social institutions “should try to choose words and illustrations which will arouse the proper mental associations with his readers. If he doesn’t succeed with them, he should try others. If he is ever led into an attempt at definition, he is lost.” On the same footing of ingenuousness is another observation in this work: “When men begin to examine philosophies and principles as they examine atoms and electrons, the road to the discovery of the means of social control is open.” The author of Political Semantics, fearful of the intervention of abstractions, suggests that the reader, too, add something to the defi nition given, a notion savoring strongly of progressive education. “Possibly the reader himself should participate in the process of building up a definition. Instead of being presented with finished summary definitions he might first be introduced to an array of examples arranged in such a way as to suggest the ‘mental picture’ in terms of which the examples were chosen.” 3 There is just enough here to suggest the Socratic method; but the true implication is that there are no real definitions; there are only the general pictures one arrives at after more or less induction. The entire process is but a climbing-down of the ladder of abstraction.

Now whether it is profitable to descend that ladder is certainly not a question to be begged. Semanticists imagine, apparently, that the descent is a way out of that falsity which universality imposes on all language. Do we know more definitely what a horse is when we are in a position to point to one than when we merely use the name “horse” in its generic significance? This concerns one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy—one on which we must take a stand; and I am ready to assert that we can never break out of the circle of language and seize the object barehanded, as it were, or without some ideational operation.

It must surely be granted that whatever is unique defies definition. Definition then must depend on some kind of analogical relationship of a thing with other things, and this can mean only that definition is ultimately circular. That is to say, if one begins defining a word with synonyms, he will, if he continues, eventually complete a circuit and arrive at the very terms with which he started. Suppose we allow Korzybski, who has been especially restive in what appears to him the imprisoning net of language, to testify from his experiments: “We begin by asking the ‘meaning’ of every word uttered, being satisfied for this purpose with the roughest definition; then we ask the ‘meaning’ of the words used in the definition, and this process is continued for no more than ten to fifteen minutes, until the victim begins to speak in circles as, for instance, defining ‘space’ by ‘length’ and ‘length’ by ‘space.’ When  this stage is reached, we have usually come to the undefined terms of the given individual. If we still press, no matter how gently, for definitions, a most interesting fact occurs. Sooner or later, signs of affective disturbance appear. Often the face reddens; there is body restlessness—symptoms quite similar to those seen in a schoolboy who has forgotten his lessons, which he ‘knows’ but cannot tell. . . . Here we have reached the bottom and the foundation of all non-elementalistic meanings, the meanings of undefined terms, which we ‘know’ somehow but cannot tell.”

Taking the experiment as Korzybski recounts it, I would wish to ask whether this schoolboy who has forgotten his lessons is not every man, whose knowledge comes by a process of recalling and who is embarrassed as by ignorance when he can no longer recall? He is here frustrated because he cannot find any further analogues to illustrate what he knows. Any person, it seems, can be driven back to that knowledge which comes to him by immediate apprehension, but the very fact of his possessing such knowledge makes him a participant in the communal mind. I do not desire to press the issue here, but I suspect that this is evidence supporting the doctrine of knowledge by recollection taught by Plato and the philosophers of the East. If we can never succeed in getting out of the circle of definition, is it not true that all conventional definitions are but reminders of what we already, in a way, possess? The thing we have never heard of is defined for us by the things we know; putting these together, we discover, or unbury, the concept which was there all the while. If, for example, a class in science is being informed that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” it is only being asked to synthesize concepts already more or less familiar. Finding the meaning of the definiendum is finding what emerges naturally if our present concepts are put together in the right relation. Even empirical investigations of the learning process bear this out. Such conclusions lead to the threshold of a significant commitment: ultimate definition is, as Aristotle affirmed, a matter of intuition. Primordial conception is somehow in us; from this we proceed as  already noted by analogy, or the process of finding resemblance to one thing in another. 4All this has bearing on our issue with semantics because words, each containing its universal, are our reminders of knowledge. For this reason it seems to me that semanticists are exactly wrong in regarding language as an obstruction or a series of pitfalls. Language, on the contrary, appears as a great storehouse of universal memory, or it may be said to serve as a net, not imprisoning us but supporting us and aiding us to get at a meaning beyond present meaning through the very fact that it embodies others’ experiences. Words, because of their common currency, acquire a significance greater than can be imparted to them by a single user and greater than can be applied to a single situation. In this way the word is evocative of ideal aspects, which by our premises are the only aspects constituting knowledge. On this point I shall call as my witnesses two men as far apart as Shelley and a contemporary psychologist. The poet writes in Prometheus Unbound:

Language is a perpetual Orphic song,

Which rules with Daedal harmony the throng 

Of thoughts and forms, which else senseless and shapeless were.

Wilbur Marshall Urban declares in Language and Reality: “It is part of my general thesis that all meaning is ultimately linguistic and that although science, in the interests of purer notation and manipulation, may break through the husk of language, its nonlinguistic symbols must again be translated back into natural language if intelligibility is to be possible.” 5

The community of language gives one access to significances at which he cannot otherwise arrive. To find a word is to find a meaning; to create a word is to find a single term for a meaning partially distributed in other words. Whoever may doubt that language has this power to evoke should try the experiment of thinking without words.

It has been necessary to make these observations because our subject is the restoration of language, and semantics has appeared to some a promising departure toward scientific reconstruction. In its seeking of objective determination, however, it turns out to represent a further flight from center. It endeavors to find the truth about reality in an agglomeration of peripheral meanings, as can be seen when its proponents insist on lowering the level of abstraction. This is only an attempt to substitute things for words, and, if words stand, in fact, for ideas, here is but the broadest aspect of our entire social disintegration. Here would be a vivid example of things in the saddle riding mankind. For the sake of memory, for the sake of logic—above all, for the sake of the unsentimental sentiment without which communities do not endure—this is a trend to be reversed. Those who regard the synthesizing power of language with horror are the atomists.

From: IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES

EXPANDED EDITION

Richard M. Weaver

Friday, September 22, 2023

The Guilt of Being Unequal

 The guilt-tinged fear of being thought unequal is very deeply ingrained in the human psyche. It is found among primitive peoples and existed long before the appearance of Christianity. Yet it is striking that so many Christians, more particularly those of the twentieth century, who feel this existential sense of guilt believe it to be a special Christian quality. In so doing they overlook the New Testament’s remarkable religious, psychological and historical achievement in freeing believers from precisely this primitive, pre-religious, irrational sense of guilt, this universal fear of one’s neighbour’s envy and of the envy of the gods and spirits. For that alone made the modern world emotionally and socially possible. The essence of this idea is already to be found in Max Weber’s theory of the role of the Protestant, and more especially the Calvinist, ethic in the development of capitalism.

Under a portentous misconception as to what had really happened when, in the West and for the first time in human history, envy had been successfully mastered, socialist thinkers in the nineteenth century again began to popularize concepts on the nature of inequality and, indeed, to make them morally binding. This corresponded exactly to the concepts of primitives. Since then, however, literary left-wing sentimentalists and their ideas of values have taken things to a point where even people who in no way consider themselves socialists, Marxists or ordinary progressives, among them sincere Christians genuinely concerned with ethical imperatives, no longer know how to deal with primitive emotional complexes, nor are they able to comprehend the irrationality of those complexes. Hence they grope desperately and endlessly for ‘social’ solutions, which in fact solve nothing.

Paul Tournier

The French-Swiss doctor and depth-psychologist Paul Tournier, who endeavours to combine psychoanalysis and Protestantism in his work, has produced an uncommonly illuminating book on genuine and false feelings of guilt (1959). His honesty makes it possible to trace associations which in most writers remain concealed. I have therefore chosen this book for analysis rather than a number of others. In the first half we find autobiographical material concerning the many situations today in which feelings of guilt, often regarded as irrational, determine what a man does and what he fails to do. Anyone who supposes that we have over-estimated the extent and depth of feelings of guilt, or the part they play, should study Tournier.

Although this psychotherapist is unsparing in his revelations of different kinds of guilt feelings, both in himself and in his family, he shies away from the problem of envy. But his book is almost exclusively concerned with what happens psychologically when we are afraid of being envied. Intrinsically, Tournier knows this, and once he explicitly formulates it. The term ‘envy,’ however, does not appear in the index, and in all 340 pages is found on only one page. However desirous he is of uncovering social taboos, pharisaism and sublimated guilt feelings, he is noticeably reluctant to push ahead when his observations bring him to the threshold of envy. To give an example:

‘Everyone has his own rhythm, and people have different rhythms from one another. In an office, the great speed of one typist will constantly arouse in her slower fellow-workers a sense of guilt which will paralyse them still further in their work.’

Why does he not say ‘feeling of envy,’ which is certainly more primary? The sense of guilt comes later, particularly in typists who discover that their speed may never come up to standard. Tournier continues:

‘Yet it is a simple fact of nature which should be seen objectively. There is no special merit in the speed of the rapid typist any more than there is culpability in the slowness of her colleagues.’[1]

Of course not! But that is never the way envy reacts. Tournier comments:

‘Moreover, if she is at all sensitive, the rapid typist will come to feel guilty for being the involuntary cause of umbrage among others and will do many little services for them to win their forgiveness.’

No doubt the girl who is superior is not really aware of anything like ‘envy-avoidance’ and ‘envy-assuagement,’ feeling instead a vague sense of guilt. This is not due to the facts as they stand, but to the taboo with which we surround the phenomenon of envy. On the other hand, her conciliatory gesture in rendering small services will always bring about the opposite of what was intended—even greater resentment, that is, because she has again demonstrated her superiority. Furthermore the envious person is made really angry by such an attempt to conciliate him. In many offices, as also in schools, in America particularly, those who are quicker or more talented soon lower their own performance to the average level of the group so as to avoid envy.

Tournier is aware of the self-imposed limitation resulting from uneasiness or fear of envy in the less able or less willing, but again he only speaks of the sense of guilt of the superior worker, and not of the less capable one’s envy:

It is the fear of other people’s judgement that prevents us from being ourselves, from showing ourselves as we really are, from showing our tastes, our desires, our convictions, from developing ourselves and from expanding freely according to our own nature. It is the fear of other people’s judgement [why not ‘envy’?] that makes us sterile, and prevents our bearing all the fruits that we are called to bear.[2]Tournier rightly calls this attitude ‘false guilt feeling.’ I prefer the term ‘envy-avoidance behaviour.’ Only much later in his study, when he can no longer shut his eyes to it, does he use the word ‘envy’ three times on one page: the manifestation of envy in others arouses in us unnecessary, destructive feelings of guilt. He writes:

A certain sense of guilt is a corollary of any privilege even when the privilege is deserved. An employee of quality feels it towards his fellows when an appreciative chief entrusts him with the highest responsibilities. A girl who is asked to sing in church at Christmas has this feeling towards a friend who would have dearly liked to be invited instead. Any envy or jealousy of other people arouses some guilty conscience in us.[3]It is precisely this envy and its social consequences with which I am concerned. Tournier is aware of these consequences when further on he writes:

But in all fields, even those of culture and art, other people’s judgement exercises a paralysing effect. Fear of criticism kills spontaneity; it prevents men from expressing themselves freely, as they are. Much courage is needed to paint a picture, to write a book, to erect a building designed along new architectural lines, or to formulate an independent opinion or an original idea. Any new concept, any creation falls foul of a host of critics. Those who criticize the most are the ones who create nothing. But they form a powerful wall which we all fear to run into more than we admit. . . .[4]Tournier does not mention, however, that his observation is true of every kind of innovation and that this ‘powerful wall’ applies to every social situation or, for example, that it represents one of the main causes for the absence of even elementary progress in any so-called underdeveloped societies. A few lines further on he says: ‘On reflection, we can realize how this fear of being criticized impoverishes mankind. It is a source of all the conformism which levels men and locks them away in impersonal modes of behaviour.’[5] This is precisely where he should have written ‘fear of envy,’ but that term is not used. The envious man certainly does very often disguise his hostility, his damaging intention, giving it the form of apparently well-intentioned advice, of criticism or of mocking or insidious judgement, but that in no way alters the basic factor of envy.[6] Why does he use, instead, the colourless, exculpatory word ‘criticism’?

Here we must go back a few chapters. On page 37, in a book of more than 200 pages, he uses the word ‘envy’ three times. One mention has already been quoted; here are the second and third:

‘So what separates people is not only the differences in their positions, nor merely the envy which the differences arouse in the less privileged, but also the fact that they awaken amongst those who are envied a guilty conscience which spoils their pleasure.’[7] What eludes Tournier is the impossibility of a society, whether large or small, rich or poor, in which there are no envious people. Because the central figure of his study is the man ridden with genuine or false guilt, and not the envious man, and because he takes the latter for granted (the observer who is responsible for the sense of guilt in those who are superior, happier, etc.) and does not go into the question of the ethics and the psychology of envy, the solution to the sense of guilt about which he feels so uneasy remains hidden from him. Only when one has the courage to recognize the actually or ostensibly envious man for what he is, and to ignore him (realizing that he is insatiable and that nothing will escape him), can one rid oneself of false guilt. Why does Tournier not see this? He himself provides a clue on page 36, one page before the passage where for the first and last time in the book the word ‘envy’ escapes him.

The ‘socially permissible’ holiday

Tournier, a well-established doctor and writer in French Switzerland, recounts an event in his own family. After mentioning various often irrational feelings of guilt associated with the spending of money, he continues with the following ‘interesting experience’:

‘My wife and I were talking about taking the children for a cruise along the Dalmatian coast and on to Greece. Was such an expense legitimate, more particularly was it willed by God?’ (Is this an echo of the archaic, pagan fear of the envy of the gods which so oppressed the Greeks? Very possibly, since elsewhere Tournier admits that fundamentally the Christian God never begrudges joy and fullness of life to his earthly creatures.) ‘Such a thing can be argued interminably in one’s own mind, with a host of plausible arguments, but without altogether silencing an inner doubt.’[8] Tournier was afraid of the potential envy, imagined or real, of his colleagues, and no doubt associated this unease with a vague idea of luxury and social justice. Significantly he adds:

‘It seemed to us also, in our own meditations, that if we submitted the question to a friend from the same social milieu, this check would not be of much value.’

But why not? Because, as can be shown again and again, envy arises mainly within the same class, the same professional group, or among equals. Tournier is unable to ask those whose envy he fears. As we learn from other admissions in his book, he is not in the least averse to, or ashamed of, asking his friends much more embarrassing questions. But he cannot ask how much ‘luxury’ he and his family ought to indulge in on a holiday. His solution is revealing:

‘At the time I had close links with a group of workers in a near-by factory. One evening I went to the house of one of them with all my household accounts, all my bank statements and my tax declarations [!]. With his encouragement, we went for our cruise.’

Thus, our highly educated, successful, hard-working Genevan doctor goes to a working man for ‘social permission’ for his expensive holiday. Only when he has the assurance that the voice of the people—the circle, that is, for whose sake he was prepared to practise ‘socially just’ frugality and retrenchment—will grant him without envy the experience of an especially delightful cruise, does he feel safe from the envy of his colleagues, the very people who are able to afford a similar trip—an envy the awareness of which he had sought to repress by interposing this complex of social justice, of sacrifice for the benefit of the less well-to-do. It is an insight that eludes him. In a situation so painfully absurd that few people would ever divulge it, all he mentions is insuperable, irrational feelings of guilt and inhibitions.[9] On page 146, Tournier interprets the story of Cain and Abel. Not once does he mention envy or jealousy. Cain’s ‘wickedness,’ his ‘anger’ even, are mentioned, but never the simple word ‘envy.’ And again, towards the end of the book, when the author writes of the good son’s annoyance at the happy reunion of the prodigal son with his father, and later of the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, the motive of rebellion in either case is not called envy.[10]


From: ENVY A Theory of Social Behaviour

by Helmut Schoeck