To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Friday, September 29, 2023

The religion of the 19th century, that grotesque materialization of the spiritual, profanation of divine, mechanizing of the organism and insolent disrespect to the Awful and the Unknowable

 

Perhaps there are a few souls in Europe who feel within them the religious imperative of the future. Unlikely, but possible, just as Nietzsche and Carlyle were utterly improbable in the desert of mechanistic criticism that was the 19th century. If so, they are the summit of the religious pyramid of Europe. Beneath them is the stratum of our precious and strong interim religion, making out of skepticism a Faith, and out of History a sacred philosophy. Beneath this is the great mass of the population which is still, in the religion of the 19th century, that grotesque materialization of the spiritual, profanation of divine, mechanizing of the organism and insolent disrespect to the Awful and the Unknowable. This god-killing mockery took two forms, in Europe, Christian-social politics, and in America, compulsory social entertainment in the Sunday meeting-houses. These forms it still, has, and this is today what calls itself religion in the Western Civilization. Below this stratum in the religious pyramid—not in any absolute spiritual sense, but only in a chronological sense—is the Jesuit level, the plane that regards religion as a matter of knowledge, formula, law, and in case of doubt, of authority. This is simply the Counter-Reformation, and includes members of both sides of that era. Below this is the Reformation level. Still today in Germany there are many, and elsewhere there are some who have remained permanently in the Lutheran stage. To that they attained in their personal forming, and there they stay. Below them—are there any left who feel the old, pure, monastic religiousness of the pre-Renaissance period of true religion? Yes, there must be, although they are not to be found in the offices of the church, wearing the purple, or engaging themselves to the hilt in those banking operations which constitute religious administration today. They would be in some monastery, in an isolated rural district, the plains of the Romagna, or the Spanish Sierras. This type simply, could not survive in a city. But these, together with those others of problematical existence, the religionists of the 21st and 22nd centuries, are the only true religionists in Europe; for these two groups—and for them alone—religion is directed to the transcendent, it knows and loves the Unknowable, it personalizes the impersonal, it cares for the indifferent.

***

For the other aspect of our interim religion is that the object of its tremendous feelings is unworthy of it. God and the Gods are still asleep, still in the deep slumber into which the Counter-Reformation lulled them. For when Western man introduced militarism and politics into religion, he expelled God and the Gods. Religion is the window of the Culture looking out into the cosmos, and when the culture becomes obsessed with the surface of the earth, that window is closed. But it is only the cosmos—the entirety of all things, organic, inorganic, man, culture, and meaning—that is the proper object of religion. Culture is not worthy. But there is nothing else; the divine aspect of the cosmos—god and the gods—cannot be violently reawakened. It is slowly awakening, but not for us, for those who come 2 or 3 generations after us. Every religion has its mysteries, its idiom, and even its painful point. This is ours, that our religion takes the form of a yearning which sees its satisfaction beyond its grasp, that the last perfection of religious feeling is forever denied us, moving across our dark golden-brown autumnal bridge of culture-religion, bathed in the dying light of the second twilight of our superpersonal Western life.

*
And so, nobody tells us, that to put into effect the Brotherhood ideal which our One-World apostles shower upon us from the pulpits, requires dictatorship, a reign of terror, armed force, the inequality of a system of slaves and masters, men in command and men in obedience – in short: Moscow. – (text from 1953)

When Jesus was taken before Pilate, then two worlds were facing each other in immediate and implacable hostility: a world of facts and a world of truth. At this appallingly distinct scene, overwhelming in its symbolism, human tragedy took the highest conceivable form. In the famous question of Pilate: “What is truth?” – lies the entire meaning of history, the exclusive validity of truth, the prestige of State and war and blood.

“What is actuality?” – for Pilate actuality was all; for Jesus nothing. How – otherwise – could pure religiousness stand up against history or sit in judgment on active life?

“My Kingdom is not of this world.” This final word admits of no gloss. A statesman can be deeply religious, a pious man can die for his county – but they must, both, know on which side they are standing. When the statesman ridicules the inward thought-process of the ethical philosopher in a world of fact . . . or the pious man discards all ambition in the historical world as sinful and as lacking any lasting value . . . then for the onlooker it is meaningless to argue which one of the two is right or wrong.

But if our present administration wishes to “improve” the religious feeling of our masses in the direction of political, practical, purposes – then these ten, twelve, or fourteen point acrobats stand before History as absolute fools.

And equally, when our Brotherhood Preachers try to bridge the course of History and the existence of a divine world-order – they are fools also. They’d better leave this experiment to those champion prestidigitators whose nation-feeling over the last four millennia comprised neither more nor less than what was and is covered by the Ideas of the Church of their landless, boundless Consensus.

Francis Parker Yockey

Thursday, September 28, 2023

Nanamoli Thera - Consciousness and Being

 What follows will have to be stated in terms of ordinary speech, though that necessarily involves the word “is” and logical constructions, because speech is hardly possible without them.

Nevertheless they have to be regarded here as a makeshift, and the whole of what follows tends to undermine the ultimate value of speech, retaining it, however, as a necessity for communication in conditions where separateness and individuality predominate.

The word “consciousness,” it seems to me, can only refer to what one might define provisionally as “the knowing that cannot know itself without intermediary and that cannot function in experience (of which it is an indispensable component) except negatively.”

To the question “What is consciousness,” then, a low level provisional answer might be “It is the pure subjective” or “It is the bare knowing of what it is not that constitutes (orders) experience and allows it being.” It must be added that, when consciousness is, it seems to be individualized by what it knows. But on another (higher) level the “is” in the question has still to be questioned, and so the low-level (and logical) answer is only a conventional makeshift, a conventional view, nothing more. And this qualification applies not only to logically inductive and deductive statements necessitating use of the word “is,” but also to descriptive statements that appear in “logical” form, using that term, or any equivalent.

When I ask myself, “What does the verbal expression ‘universal consciousness’ refer to?,” I confess to be unable to find an answer, because, in spite of its “attractive” form, I cannot distinguish it from non-consciousness (see below). So I seem to have no alternative but to regard the phrase as one of those abstract expressions that appear on the surface to mean something, but when more closely examined, do not. (This, I know, may seem shocking, but I am more interested here in finding the facts than in avoiding shock.) The more I examine and observe experience (What else can one do? Build castles?), the more I find that I can only say of consciousness (and in this I find a notable confirmation in the Pali Suttas) that it seems only describable (knowable) “in terms of what it arises dependent upon” (i.e. seeing-cum-seen … mind-knowing-cum-mind, known or mind cum-ideas), that is, negatively as to itself. And so, instead of being said to appear, it should rather be called that negativeness or “decompression of being” which makes the appearance of life, movement, behaviour, etc., and their opposites, possible in things and persons. But while life, etc. cannot be or not be without the cooperation of the negative presence of consciousness, which gives room for them (and itself) to “come to be” in this way (gaining its own peculiar form of negative being, perhaps from them)—the only possible way of being—they are, by ignorance, simultaneously individualized in actual experience.

Unindividualized experience cannot, I think, be called experience at all. Thus there appears the positive illusion also of individual consciousness: “illusion” because its individuality is borrowed from the individualness of (1) its percepts, and (2) the body seen as its perceiving instrument.

Unindividualized perception cannot, any more, I think, be called perception at all. The supposed individuality of consciousness (without which it is properly inconceivable) is derived from that of its concomitants. This illusory individualization of consciousness, this mirage, manifests itself in the sense both of “my consciousness” and of “consciousness that is not mine” (as e.g. in the sensation of being seen when one fancies or actually finds one is caught, say, peeping through a keyhole, and from which the abstract notion of universal consciousness develops). The example shows that the experience of being seen does not necessarily mean that another’s consciousness is seeing one, as one may have been mistaken in one’s fancy owing to a guilty sense (though the experience was just as real at the time), before one found no one was there. To repeat: my supposed consciousness seems only distinguishable from the supposed consciousness that is not mine on the basis of the particular non-consciousness (i.e.material body, etc.) through which its negativity is manifested and with which it is always and inevitably associated in some way. It is impossible, I think, to overemphasize the importance of this fact.

So of the concept, “universal consciousness,” I at present think that the word “universal” misleads. (Perhaps some hidden desire for power to “catch all consciousness in the net of one’s understanding,” and so escape the horrors of the unknown, seduces one to catch at this seemingly attractive term.)

Again it may be asked: What knows universal consciousness?

Would not individual consciousness (if the “universal” is accepted) be held inadequate to judge it? And how can it know itself, or what are the means by which it can know itself and distinguish itself from non-consciousness and individual consciousness? I can find no answer to that and so I conclude that, if I ask it, that is simply because I must have started out with an unjustified assumption about the nature of consciousness (which, platitudinous as it may seem, is horribly difficult to understand and handle in view of its negativity; when one talks about “consciousness” normally, one finds on examination that one has not been talking about it at all but about the positive things like pleasure and pain, action, perception, etc., that always accompany and screen it). Is the question then really necessary? Consciousness, of course, cannot be denied as a necessary constituent of experience, but the trouble starts when we begin to ask what consciousness (or its nature) is. We have assumed the individuality of consciousness, apparently unjustifiably, because of the observed individuality of the objective part of experience through which we say it is manifested; and the assumption of its individuality logically leads to the further assumption of some universal form. Why?

Now, as I said earlier, when I begin to ask what something is (is, say, consciousness individual, universal, both, or neither?), we have taken being for granted and failed to examine the nature of a part of my question. In one sense consciousness seems correctly describable as functioning (that is in its true negativity) by putting everything in question: What is this? What am I? What is life? What is consciousness? What is being? Now here the emphasis must be removed from “what” and “this” and placed squarely on “is.”

Suppose I suggest this: for “is” read “belief-attitude” (as a mode of craving combined with ignorance). In other words, it is the nature of consciousness to make be (with the aid of desire-for-being and of ignorance-of-how-anything-comes-to-be) and the nature of being to depend on consciousness. The multiplicity and the contradictoriness of the answers normally given to these questions ought to be sufficient evidence for something of the sort, or at least for the suspicion, that all the methods of answering them in the way normally done are radically wrong in some way. In fact the contradictory answers in all their variety, as usually given, each bolstered up by logic, betray, it seems to me, just that form of ignorance-craving combination which make perception/non-perception, change/immortality, time/eternity, life/death, action/ inaction, choice/fatality, unity/variety, individuality/universality, seem not only possible but real. (It then seems necessary or “right” [here we have craving] to determine what among these is [here we have ignorance] real and what is not.) And the trouble begins again: I begin asserting “I am this, I am not that,” “This is that,” “A is B,” “Consciousness is life,” “Truth is beauty,” “Life is good,” “Killing is right,” “The end is the justification of the means,” “I am,” “God is,” etc., all of which others may deny. Perhaps we get angry and come to blows. How many more people in history have been killed for the sake of opinions about what is and what is not than have been killed for the sake of facts? View-points, interpretations, and opinions about the raw material of experience differ, less or more, from individual person to individual person. The more consistent and logically strengthened any moral, religious, or philosophical system becomes, the more possible it becomes for it to be contradicted by an opposing system. And then bare craving has to arbitrarily choose and bash the opponent on the head if it can. That is why Buddhism (especially Nāgārjuna, but also Theravada) favours a dialectic that pulls down all such positivistic-negativistic systems (the positive is always haunted by the negative, and so there is really no true via negativa or via positiva in any absolute sense). It pulls them down using their own premises.

Of whatever I can say that it is, by that very fact I imply that it is not: It is this, is not that. It then is in virtue of what it is not, being so constituted by the consciousness that determines it thus. But the consciousness on which its being depends is negative, whose negativity appears in objective things as their temporality and change, the change in their being. But while the being of whatever is objective to it appears as positive, even though it may change, its own being appears as a negation of itself and a denial, flight or movement, the temporalizing of the temporalized objective world.

Now, perhaps, you will understand why it is really impossible for a Buddhist to answer the questions, “Does Buddhism teach the extinction of consciousness? Is nibbāna the extinction of consciousness?” On the basis of what has been said above, could it be answered yes or no without examining each term of the question?

There is, of course, another, different approach to the analysis of (not the answer to) that question: Why should consciousness (however conceived) seem preferable to cessation-of-consciousness (however conceived)? Consciousness of deprivation, of an “abyss of nothingness,” is not cessation of consciousness. Would not any preference (absolute one-sided choice) for one over the other show craving in the aim if that were set up as the ultimate aim? The desire-to-end-craving, as I see it, is a provisional measure adopted while craving is still present in order to use craving to terminate itself, while the aim is absence-of-craving and consequently ending of suffering. Use of the word is (which implies presence of ignorance) in this way is also use of present ignorance to terminate itself, while the aim is (to me in this state) liberation from ignorance.

Second, suppose a state of consciousness without suffering.

Would it not have to be entirely without change since the slightest change in the state must imply a degree of suffering intruding. But can a state of consciousness absolutely without change be distinguished at all from absence of consciousness? I do not see how it can. However a mixture of longing for the incompatible (craving) and fear of or disinclination to face the facts of the association and complexity which are inseparable from conscious experience (ignorance) can make it seem as possible and realizable as the catching of the red in a rainbow with a butterfly net. So out we go with our butterfly nets chasing colour … and get wet instead.

Craving and ignorance persist in heaven, though suffering may be suspended there for a time.

That is how I see Emerson’s “Take what you will but pay the price,” viz. “Pay death as the price of life,” or “Pay suffering as the price of consciousness.” May get it on loan, but if one does not pay up when the bill comes in, the bailiffs distrain. But that does not mean that I think one should counter with undiminished craving and ignorance and use them to denounce life, consciousness, etc. I say one should take them as they are and develop understanding of them. That, as I see it, and only that, along with the sharing of it, is the true source of joy, not joy of life haunted by fear of loss-of-consciousness, and so on. This you know, so I am not saying anything new.

If I ask myself “Is it possible for me to end consciousness?” I have to reply to myself that I see no possibility at present. (What might happen if I succeeded in ending craving and ignorance, of which I see no prospect at present, is, of course, hard to say!) If the possibility were available now, I at present see no sound reason why I should not avail myself of it. Pure speculation! Yes, but at least it prevents me coming down one-sidedly in favour of consciousness or in favour of non-consciousness in the crude mode.

I do regard death (my life’s end, murder, or suicide) as the ending of consciousness: to presume that conscious continuity (negativity) ends because a particular continuity of its material objective world (including its body) ends seems to me a pure assumption whose opposite is just as valid, with possibly better logical arguments in favour of it if the evidence is observed without bias. However, what happens to me at death cannot be known. Consequently I am at liberty to assume (since I cannot avoid assuming something about it) what seems most reasonable. Death seems above all to be forgetting. I do not know. But since I have to believe something about it whether I like it or not, I do not believe that consciousness ends with death. Memory may well do so. I don’t, however, know that this is what I want not to believe.

It is, I think, rather important to bear in mind one thing in regard to what has been said above. With this view there are two scales of value (not so much divorced as crossing at right-angles) which must be carefully discriminated. The physical world of consciousness-being-action in which we live and are, biased by ignorance and propelled by craving, is governed by perception of being and the practical values based on that. But any positive metaphysical system, whether based only logically or emotionally on it, which is founded on that, is haunted by the shadows that it cannot avoid casting and that it cannot itself see (like the Sun). It acts in virtue of cause and effect and its thought is logical by its dependence on the word “is.” As far as we live in this world we have to live its mode and by its values, or we risk falling into wells through star-gazing. But none of its laws are made absolute (without divorcing idea from experience). The Void, of which it cannot be said that it is or is not, nor that it has consciousness or has none, while it denies absoluteness to any experiential value (alike to being and to consciousness) cannot be identified. And that is the doctrine of not-self (anattā) as I see it in one aspect at present. This voidness cannot be “is-ed” and so introduced into the worldly scheme, except as the denial of absoluteness of all particular values. It has no more effect on ordinary life than the theory of relativity. But just as that theory completely alters calculation of enormous speeds, so, as I see it, this void-element completely alters calculations of extraordinary situations, of death (as killing, suicide or the partner of old age).

Written in June 1957



Solalterism versus Solipsism—Dialectic

 The solalterist description of the world, as used openly by the Behaviourists, and as used covertly by such scientists as Ross Ashly, contains a hidden ‘dishonesty principle’ (i.e., active functioning of ignorance as self-deception) when it claims and believes its description to be subjectively adequate and altogether complete.

The difficulty of the ‘Theory of Types’ which questions, the validity of any ‘complete’ description of ‘all’ because it cannot include itself, need not be brought in here. The ‘dishonesty principle’ is evident in Ross Ashly in his, on the one hand, admitting that he is not dealing with consciousness and, on the other, claiming that pain ‘is’ a certain physical behaviour pattern.

Association (whether absolutely co-essential or not, is not known) of purely subjective pain is identified with that behaviour pattern, which, unlike the pain aspect, is describable in purely physicists’ terms. That includes the two principles of Adaptation and Feed-back. Resting on that identification, which is false, the conclusion that conscious man is only an elaborate machine follows, and it proves that he has no soul. This proof has nothing to do with the Buddhist proof of anattā. 

The illusion created by the apparent completeness of behaviourist-physicist description is reinforced by the absence of any strict solipsistic (correspondingly inversely false) description to oppose to it. All solipsistic theories so far have been badly self-deceptive on the point that they have never been pursued with scientific and logical ruthlessness and have always contained a large element of properly solalteristic material mixed up. They are thus easily shown to be absurd and consequently solipsistic thought has been bullied and frightened off the subject. 

The difficulty lies in re-stating and purifying the true solipsistic from injected solalteristic material and in finding a set of terms in which to describe it. 

What is essential therefore is (a) to show clearly where the solalterist treatment (absolutely necessary as it is) must necessarily end in incompleteness (which can only be glossed over by false identification with the purely subjective) and where it deceives itself and others by covertly smuggling in (properly) solipsistic material (pain) and (b) to make a correspondingly adequate solipsistic description showing where the deception and the ‘smuggling-in’ or injection of solalterist material lies. (Sep. 56)

658. …And this is so not only with technicalities as these but also with theories of importance current in Western thought, about Perception, Causality, Consciousness and Being. It is said that the (strictly objective and so most respectable) sciences have abandoned speaking in terms of ‘causes’ and ‘effects’; and Hume remains unrefuted where Causes (as usually conceived) are upheld. There is no agreed theory of Perception. That, perhaps most fashionable now, which (tacitly treating consciousness as an ‘epiphenomenon’) looks for its justification to the laws of Physics, to Neurology and to Protoplasm, is an admitted makeshift at best and ultimately vitiated by its failure to take proper account of the subjective side of experience (to deal with ‘I’); for it remains awkwardly incontestible that all data are ultimately private. Should Consciousness be taken to include, or not, also the ‘Unconscious’ of the Psychoanalysts, which Existentialists deny? Fear of solipsism seems to have shepherded the main body of thinkers towards the opposite, perhaps more insidious, fallacy of solalterism.

Schopenhauer described the Solipsist as ‘a madman shut up in an impregnable blockhouse’. But the Solalterist, who ignores the observer,—the Behaviourist who only admits the existence of ‘the Other’—may perhaps be considered scarcely more sane and to have shut himself out of his house, slamming the door with the latchkey inside: ‘the philosophy of the subject leaving himself out of his calculations,’ to quote Schopenhauer again. Then the indispensable words ‘being’ and ‘existence’ (there are and is—as copula or as absolute), with their ambiguity and the homeless family of fundamental assumptions that they are often made to shelter, are normally taken for granted (the otherwise critical authors of The Meaning of Meaning, for example, are strangely content not to examine them at all), or they are left to the more inaccessible of the post-Hegelian ontologists. It has even been complained that there is no longer in European philosophy any agreement on what these words stand for. Such conditions have made of European Ethics, as it were, a displaced person: she has to take shelter where she can.

*

22. The observer does not appear in his observed field in any way at all, which ‘lacks nothing’ (§ 7), which is why he is symbolized by ‘o.’ While he is everywhere, while he is absolutely essential, he ‘does not count’ at all. Whether he is one or many it is impossible to tell except from the field or fields that are being observed. But this anticipates. Consequently, while his singularity or plurality may be a matter for consideration in an inquiry into his nature, in an inquiry into the nature of the observed he can be disregarded (so long as I remember that there I learn nothing about him). I shall therefore, for the moment at least, put him in brackets (‘o’) and forget him (remembering, of course, that I have forgotten him). 

This is what all Objective Science claims to do (and often forgets to do) and for which admiration is commonly expected.

(The results of this I shall call ‘Solalterism’ or the ‘Science of the Subject leaving himself out of his calculations’). Since He counts for zero in the observed, which is not observed without him, he can easily be reintroduced. It is, of course, the converse of the opposite procedure, where results are usually condemned without trial as detestable and are commonly called solipsism’ or that of the ‘madman who has shut himself up in, an impenetrable ‘blockhouse.’ (the last passage comes from The Essential Relation in Observing 195

Nanamoli Thera 

Michaux or rare indeed are the madmen equal to madness

 The Waking Zone.

 The above observations of micro-operations* in rapid action, noticed and recorded as they are happening, require tremendous accuracy of perception. It is remarkable that, in spite of all the mental turbulence of the micro-operations, this wakefulness and precision is completely available during the second state. Michaux called this function of intelligence an “incorruptible observer”: “All is madly shaken. All or almost all, because at the same instant, a new, hitherto unknown watchfulness is there, installed, observing, reflecting . . . purely me, a separate me, irreducible me, beside the mistreated, fragmentary, intermittent one.”47  This acute awareness appears to function almost unaffected by mental speed and has an unshakable capacity to discriminate the micromoments of experience. It is on this “waking zone” that all recovery depends.

During the hallucinogenic experience there are moments, sometimes long moments, when there is a direct perception, a direct “knowing” of the waking zone. It happens most strikingly when there is a “slowing of associations,” as Michaux called it. Thoughts may entirely cease. It has been likened to entering a calm sea or the relaxation after the struggle of birth, of truly being on earth or in the true depths of oneself. It is sometimes described as being pristinely clear to the extent that the cause and effect of all activity happening in the realm of mind is illuminated. This experience is usually overlooked and ignored by everyone around the person having it. Professionals, especially, dismiss these experiences as having no value, of being only further “imaginings.” Yet the one who experiences the waking zone as being at the very core of existence feels it as a momentous event of life-changing and “spiritual” proportions.

A psychotic episode may contain within it the beginnings of a spiritual breakthrough. The spiritual qualities of extreme mental states are real and powerful, and they are part and parcel of the pain, confusion, and dangerous quality of madness. To devalue or negate these spiritual aspects is to devalue or negate the person who experiences them, for these qualities are inseparable from the person. That is the true definition of stigma—a devaluation or negation that marks as shameful those qualities that are in a person's heart. 48

It is almost impossible to chemically obliterate this awareness. But it can be obstructed. It can be clouded over, or made dysfunctional by a variety of conditions. For instance, there can be an extreme swing of the pendulum toward slowing down. Just as the speed of mind can be seem-ingly infinitely accelerated, so it can be decelerated, to the point of com-plete “numbness” or
total inertia. 49  Thus, the waking zone needs to be protected, supported, and strengthened during the turmoil of the micro-operations. Recognizing both the existence and the vulnerability of this waking zone is therefore of critical importance to an intelligent administration of powerful mind-altering “antipsychotic” medications.

What happens within the waking zone that makes it so indispensable to recovery? It precisely separates and distinguishes between the appearances of mental events. It is attentive without bias or distortion. It can recognize what is happening within the mind for what it is, whether sane or insane. It focuses particularly on a fundamental quality of mind, the impermanent nature of the field of consciousness.

During the speed of the second state, no phenomenon of mind is brought to as much painful realization as the impermanent flux, the continual arising and dissolving of mental worlds and apparitions. This impermanence is also responsible for the momentary breaks in what might otherwise be an unbearable intensity:

No matter what the spectacle you were watching in your vision . . . it will suffer a general overthrow. Another composition will take its place, will be developed, will be repeated until a new upheaval occurs and your attention will turn to the next sight. It is then that you give a low sigh, a sigh of extreme relief which is very moving to anyone who hears it and understands. But the new presentation will follow without delay. Here it comes: it emerges, grows distinct, is developed, is manipulated, changes, multiplies, then in turn, when its time has run out, it collapses and is not seen again.50

The shock-substance is not creating this spectacle of “change.” It simply allows what is ordinarily taking place to be unveiled in agonizing clarity. Many people who have not necessarily been in extreme mental states have spoken of the inherent and fundamental role of the impermanent nature of mind. It is crucial to early Greek philosophy, to the Hindu and Buddhist meditative traditions, to the philosophy of Nietzsche, and, in its most abstract form, to modern physics.51

In its most subjective form, impermanence is dazzling. It gives no quarter. Michaux called it the “torture of what is unstable,” and it is at the very center of the infinitizing machinery. This fundamental situation of chaos is itself represented, is itself theatricalized in hundreds of ways. A deluge of images dramatizes what is happening. Here is one of Michaux's “field notes,” called “The Razor of Impermanence”:

Dazzling scythes of light, scythes set in flashes of lightning, enormous, made to cut down whole forests, start furiously splitting space open from top to bottom with gigantic strokes, miraculously swift strokes which I am forced to accompany internally, painfully, at the same unendurable speed and up to the same impossible heights, then immediately after-wards down into the same abysmal depths, with the ruptures even more and more monstrous, dislocating, insane . . . and when it is going to end . ..if it is ever going to end? . . . Finished. It's finished.52

Impermanence in excess and the chaos of losing orientation are translated into bodily feelings of huge extension. The sense of the body loses its limits: transformed into another body, or into an abstracted body, one without restraint, or released from measure and restriction, in a delirium of vastness. The mental mechanism, following the body's delirium, is also repeatedly drawn to the infinite: “an impression familiar to dozens and hundreds of unsuspecting, dumbfounded mescaline experimenters, which has it equivalents in several mental illnesses and ranges far into unreality and megalomania.” 53 The razor of impermanence is the most cutting blade of all the micro-operations within the infinitizing machinery.

Overbearing metaphysical convictions abound. In the second state Michaux is in a chasm of reaching for divinity (a “theomania,” as he calls it) and he claims direct contact with a palpable infinite. Everything leads him to it:

a certain metaphysical banality consisting of the common human basis of thought that instantly transmutes itself into beliefs bearing on Immensity, Eternity, Immortality. The Absolute. Immanence. What is beyond Time, Space, the accidental, the phenomenal.54

It must never be forgotten, Michaux warns, that all these disorders occurring to someone in the second state are the results of “innumerable little internal ambushes,” which only later becomes visible to others. Even when he is delirious, said Michaux, “he creates and manifests a disorder much less acute than the multiple minute disorders that hack him, shake him, unbalance him from all sides.”55

Michaux expressed this further in his poetry:

Firing
Firing in the head
firing which doesn’t stop.

Collapse
Outside became too strong

A man standing in a corner of the room
suddenly there
suddenly disappeared

Sabotages
innumerable little sabotages56 

The critical factor for being able to protect one's mind during madness is the recognition of impermanence. Madness is a violent lesson in impermanence. The basic fact of the inevitable decay and death of every aspect of life is terrifyingly highlighted during the second state. If recognition of this is resisted, denied, or repressed, it causes tremendous psychological tension and a recurring escalation in the wildness of mind.57 A final chasm-situation might evolve: “The infinitization, the perpetuation, the atomization, the undifferentiated fragmentation, aggravated by the antagonistic and conflicting agitation which reduces everything to absurdity, permits nothing but ambivalence, reiterations, obstinacy, refusal, and an inhuman detachment.”58  Detachment may be the result, becoming “chronic” psychosis, the psychosis of arrest, where many simply “let go,” and live and mean to live on the “other side.”

One wonders how many sufferers are able to learn this. After all, said Michaux, “Rare indeed are the madmen equal to madness.” But it is possible, it has been done: “In the huge organism that a human being is, there always remains a waking zone, which collects, which amasses, which has learned, which now knows, which knows differently. “59

* The Infinitizing Machine

As the second state is entered, the ordinarily silent micro-operations begin to spring to life. Their “cover-up,” by the usual lumbering and meandering activity of forming a thought, is lifted. They compel and command attention.
It can feel like the micro-operations are slicing through the mind. In gigantic, razor-sharp “Zs” the undulations come, zig-zagging, severing, dissecting, disconnecting, and showing the molecu-lar structure beneath:

Everything in thought is somehow molecular. Tiny particles that appear and disappear. Particles in perpetual associations, dissociations, reassociations, swifter than swift, almost instantaneous 33

The Speed of Mind. The sense of energy, like a wind reaching gale force, is a common theme in the life of all who have lived in the second state. To them, a “speed,” of which they had no comprehension in their normal state, at first thrills them, and then dislocates them. This ubiquitous phenomenon of insane speed has been described in a number of different ways, but mostly in terms of its effects and consequences. Here, with Michaux, we are examining the nature of mind-speed itself. What is the origin of this speed, so infamous to every species of madness, and what are its characteristics?

First, the speed is already there. Anything that moves one into the functioning of the second state reveals it rather than creates it:

A speed now seen as much more considerable than previously supposed, an intensity which brings to perception the images (and micro-impulses) otherwise imperceptible, vague and remote. The drug makes the subject conscious of many other transitions and also of desires, which become sudden, violent, lightning-like impulsions.34

Man is composed of many different speeds happening simultaneously, but usually we are aware of only a narrow band of speeds, the ones we can comfortably attune to. The speed band of the micro-operations is beyond our everyday ability to observe. The ponderous speed of language—a summation of thousands of high-frequency thought processes that give birth to content and grammar—is hopelessly inadequate to describe the rapid conduction systems of the micro-operations. Meanwhile, for all of us, words and sentences calmly pass over abysses of speed: “Let us not be fooled by them. Man is a slow being, who is possible only as a result of fantastic speeds. His intelligence would have long since divined this, were it not for the very operation of intelligence.”35  For Michaux, perhaps not everyone is always so far from the real mental speed. He suggested that idiots savants and lightning calculators, those who are prodigious for their speed, somehow manage to take advantage of the ultramental speed—the fast circuit—and can enter into a direct relation with it.

The micro-operations are neither good nor bad, sane nor insane; they are simply the essential building blocks of our “macromind” abilities (of discrimination, of “holding in mind,” of following through, of imagination). We cannot function well without them. However, they are a potential problem, an enormous problem if one does not relate to them properly. Normally, they are ignored, taken for granted. In the drugged condition, they are forced into awareness; there is a direct confrontation with the reality and configurations of ultraspeed. The one who enters the second state has no choice, he must enter into some kind of relation with the speed, whether it be accurate or inaccurate. There is no reverse gear. How one relates to the micro-operations will tell a story of either health or illness. First, they need to be recognized.

Here we discuss the sequence that micro-operations appear in when someone is going mad. Sometimes they appear in a steadily advancing order, sometimes they are all happening at once. They are natural functions running amok, brush fires flamed by winds of psychosis, and moving.

Repetitions. Repetitions of ideas and images come in bursts and are related to the sensation of advancing waveforms, like a thought or an image suddenly caught reverberating in an echo chamber and becoming insistent, louder, accentuated.

Multiplication. Everything in mind is multiplying: cloning, branching off into endless varieties of itself, never tiring, producing a jungle of new species of thoughts, an insatiable evolution, filling the whole world.

Proliferation. The energy of proliferation has been let loose. Proliferation occurs in a dimension just behind the ordinary linking of thoughts. It is the energy that links thoughts together in what is ordinarily called “discursive thinking”: leaping out in any direction, generating an endless procession and what on the surface appears to be a continuous running on of thoughts. As fast as everyone knows such racing can sometimes be, it is slow motion compared to the speed of the micro-operations spinning thoughts together. The running on, or flight of ideas, happens in minute surges: First, the thought or image is “named,” then appropriated as “mine, my thought,” then judged pleasant or unpleasant and to be approached or avoided. That high-speed sequence produces a chain reaction of thoughts.

Proliferation increases as the speed increases. It loses inertia or resistance. All resistance to proliferation is swept aside as proliferation “runs over” every sense of pause, every gap in thinking, every moment of rest, becoming a wall-to-wall consciousness of thoughts. Along with this there is a gathering of suffering:

Thoughts, images, urges—everything comes at an excessive speed, disappears with the same speed, which no sentiment will influence. It thinks, it doesn't need him to think. It does without him entirely. It leaves him outside. Without thought, in a parade of thoughts! Wholly disarmed, impotent. To think is to be able to stop thoughts, to take them up again, to find them, to place them, to displace them and especially to be able to 'go back.' But he can only go forward, forward . . . His head cannot stop thinking. He cannot say 'enough' to the swarming useless activity which continues and which he cannot stop.36

Thought-Image. In a lightninglike interlock they are wedded: A thought, and the spontaneously imagined sensation of it, causing a momentary “dream” of the thought, are linked together. This linkage is a building block of ordinary “imagination,” and also of hallucination. It is the basic fast-circuit habit of a natural, or constitutional, “tendency to apparition.” The second state startlingly uncovers this linkage. It can also be seen “in action” if one is able to pay extraordinary attention to the formation of a dream, as it is being fabricated in front of one's eyes. 

For example, when one is falling asleep, a sudden “twitch” of the leg is immediately linked to the drama of stumbling.

This imaging micro-operation, the relentless illustrator, creates theater by dramatizing ideas, and it does so “without the least participation of the will and without any consciousness of desire.” Within the second state, this micro-operation can be seen to be embedded in consciousness, an automatic act of being “conscious.” Some have said that this action is in “bondage to consciousness.” 37  It is a common experience in the second state (and sometimes while dreaming) 38  that it dawns on one, “Whatever I think—happens!” Within the excesses of second-state speed one may come to feel, “I can create worlds!” Donald Crowhurst called this phenomenon “creative abstraction.”

A chasm-situation is created through a “calamity of intensifications.” Thinking, intensified by speed, repetition, multiplication and sensation-lock, becomes heard reflection. Thinking is materialized in voices, or whisperings, or buzzings. It feels like “someone is saying aloud the thought which I am about to think.” And the sound takes over, said Michaux, and “glues itself to the front of the stage which everyone carries within himself behind his brow.”

Inside or outside? Where is all of this happening? Inside or outside? That is always the question. Perception teeters on the brink of doubt as to whether what is happening is inside one's mind or in the environment. Or whether it is happening at all! One appears to have fits of inattention when all one's concern becomes fixed on a dangerous interior.

Oppositions. Oppositions are endless, whiplashing chains of thought together with their negative antithoughts, in mechanical coupling, in sub-atomic parity. This is a reflection of how the nervous system is built:

Every neural unit is an on-and-off coupling, every impulse arises with its counterimpulse, every muscle group is linked with its antagonist, every perception includes its negative afterimage. The structure of the system seems wired for instant complementary counterpoint—a primitive stereo-thinking principle. Whatever is subjected to it, whether it be a sight, sound, idea, or feeling, is as if put in a rotary blender: “Everything you offer to the mescalinian schizo will be ground to pieces.” It is “infinitized”; he is infinitized. Within the micro-operation of oppositions, speed thrives on itself, perpetuates itself, accelerates.

The chasm of oppositions is a chorus of discordant and disparaging voices, conflicting commands, and staggering ambivalence at every level. On the surface, one is unable to eat, or not to eat. At times it comes to a standstill, a gridlock, a jamming, perhaps the only “braking” this system can know.

Infernal Animation. In a sense, this is nothing more than the human tendency to “personify,” to imbue with life. It is a further action of the nervous system at liberty to do more freely what it already does. It is usually innocuous on the surface. But at the point of its microdevelopment— almost mockingly brought to light in the second state—the micro-operation of infernal animation can achieve demonic proportions. The first moment of animation feels like a sense of presence, of imminence, of “about-to-happen.” At first, it is only a potential space, pregnant with possibility, yet directly sensible. Then it begins to pulsate (and what space can resist throbbing in this atmosphere of pulsing proliferation?). A “prebeing” begins to quicken and emerge.

Yet it cannot stop there. The presence becomes a creature; the creature has eyes, around which forms a face, which looks at you, which is inquisitive, and so on—anything can happen from there. To John Perceval they often appeared out of a flame. (For years, Justice Schreber called them “fleetingly improvised men.” They could appear out of anywhere; some even lived in the pores of his skin.)

Perverse Impulses. The attack of perverse impulses may begin slowly, at first only by innuendos, suggestions, urgings. But they escalate into a furious onslaught of infernally animated oppositions:

a procession of mad ideas, for they always came one by one . . . I might do a thousand insane things, cut my finger, break the window, set fire to the chairs, open my veins with a razor, smash the mirrors. The contrary of normal action was what seemed tempting. The fascination of the aberrant idea, the fascination of the thing that should not be done. Any object, when an idea for dramatizing gets hold of it, is capable of anything. I was afraid to go to sleep. I was afraid to let myself go. I was afraid to turn out the light, knowing that in the dark my thoughts would be without resistance.39

The one who is attacked struggles with all his might against preposterous acts rushing into his mind. Arriving at unbelievable speeds, they seize him, goad him, throttle him to make him carry out the acts in question. Everything that has been rejected raises its head. They are all abnormal ideas and they are avid for realization, the lure of the indecent, a kind of perverse “freedom.” Many of the saints, during “sensitive” states of mind, have attested to the temptations of the demonic. But here, the brakes have faltered; Michaux felt it impossible to resist a perverse impulse: “I am they. They are identical with me, and I am more than acquiescent, I am inseparable from them the moment they appear.”40

Now arises an archetypal chasm-situation of madness, the sense of per-secution:

That he is assailed is the pure truth. He undergoes assaults, mysterious, invisible and not understood by others. This persecutes him. Who holds this extraordinary power over him? The lunatic sometimes takes years to be able to point out his persecutor or persecutors, and sometimes they never are clearly designated. Generally, both ignorant and educated people likewise end up in madness by incriminating secret societies, supernatural, paranatural beings, who act at a distance, by magic, by fluids, by rays. This is in a sense a rational reaction. It is hypotheses to be tested, which is dictated by circumstances so singular. The general idea of a persecution invades him, comes from all directions, a real cross-roads-idea which everything supports.41

There is no doubt that it feels like one is being “possessed,” sometimes by a demoniac double or opposite: “By idealized perversity which every man unknowingly carries within him, an ideal made up of thoughts and desires grouped together, momentarily forming the 'self, a self which is totally and vertiginously swept along.”42

Selves. Selves come and go. They are utterly real, new visions of oneself, at times a processional of them. In an instant, a “past life” is lived and abandoned. There may be many of them, new personalities, momentary, short-lived. They may be lives of nobility or of infamy. One may experience them like a tearing apart, a tearing down, or stripping away. While that is happening there might be flashes of insight: “There is no one self. There are no ten selves. There is no self. SELF is only a position of equilibrium. One among a thousand others continually possible and always ready.”43

Each self is experienced as complete and profound, intensified and exaggerated by the micro-operation machinery, yet it also has a certain hollowness. But it is not simply their transiency that makes them suspect. Each is transparently manufactured, and when it leaves there is a momentary disillusionment. However, when one of these selves is held onto and elaborated, it leads to chasm-situations of disastrous self-importance.

Sense of Conviction—Certitude. Everything is convincing: Once you get a mescalinian idea into your head, it is more real than anything else, and it has to be reckoned with, on the spot. An intensification of thought-images, plus the sense of “presence” linked to most sensations, gives mental images a surreal presence. These hallucinations are infinitely more compelling than the sight of ordinary reality, they are “super-real.” Ideas become reality, memories become present tense, speculations (“what-ifs”) become convictions:

In the tragedy of the measureless intensifications in the midst of which he is advancing, here comes the one which is perhaps the gravest of all (and he does not see it), the one which will cause the doors of the asylum to close on him, the sense of total certitude.44

Everything becomes a “sign” to him, or a proof of what he only sus-pected. But the glibness of his explanations gives him away. After all, he is using logic only as an afterthought. His real basis for argument is in his conviction, in knowledge by direct revelation. He is again in a chasm-situ-ation of “insight and power.”

The most natural study of the sense of conviction is, of course, the dream state. The dream state is marked by complete certitude, by a conviction in the reality of what is happening. In fact, it is a caricature of our inherent tendency to become so convinced. Thus, the apparatus, the means necessary for such an illusion of surety, is within all of us and is always disturbingly available.

Two Places at Once. Being in two places at once is a “trick” that we perform very comfortably in the normal state. It is our tendency or habit to be somewhere else, as to be in a daydream at the same time that we are trying to be here. We can eat, read, bathe, and do most of our work and at the same time we might be absorbed in a mental drama. We often seem to prefer to indulge a divided world, to dilute the world by living with a split consciousness. In the second state, too, this tendency is accentuated to the point of a chasm-situation.

The dislocated one is torn between the absolute certitudes of an inner reality and an outer reality, and both are making demands on him. John Perceval felt overwhelmed with ingratitude when he could not do it, when his world of angels and demons demanded his complete obedience at the expense of his body and mind. It is no wonder that the deranged one so typically asks himself, “In what part of the world am I at the same time that I am here?” He feels that his survival depends on how well he can perform the difficult feat, like a juggling act, of living in two places at once.
When he is able to do it, he feels that it is a most magical sensation: “The lunatic constantly talks of magic. He has a right to do so. On whom more than on him does magic operate, an altogether special magic?”45 But otherwise, and for most of the time, he lives in the great pain of feel-ing inadequate and doing poorly in both worlds—he is a “failure.”

Reorientations. In the normal state, we may notice that we have casually glanced at our watch for no apparent reason. That is only the tip of the iceberg of what we ordinarily do in the microunconscious. The one in the second state discovers himself invoking micro-orientations to trace, to recall, to grasp, to fix, to predict, to recapture a sense of place—many times a minute. He tries to find shelter. But over and over again, in hun-dreds of ways, he keeps losing track of it. This repeated orienting of him-self, this abrupt and incessant taking of coordinates, is like a continual tic movement of the mind.

These ordinarily silent operations of reorientation and realignment are uncovered and magnified in the “desperate attention” of the second state: “I had to admit it: from birth, I had spent most of my life orienting myself . . . taking bearings, second by second.”46  The amount of time and energy spent in attempted reorientations is phenomenal, and fatiguing. The moments of exhaustion can be profound.

From Recovering Sanity
by Edward M. Podvoll, M.D.

33. Michaux, Major Ordeals, 13.
34. Ibid., 23.
35. Ibid.
36. Michaux, Light Through Darkness, 175.
37. Hsiian-tsang, The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, trans. Wei Tat (Hong Kong:
1973).
38. Hervey de Saint-Denys, Dreams and How to Guide Them (London: Duckworth, 1982).
39. Michaux, Miserable Miracle, 72.
40. Ibid., 67.
41. Michaux, Light Through Darkness, 135.
42. Michaux, Infinite Turbulence, 148. ' 43. Henri Michaux, Selected Writings, trans. Richard Ellman (New York: New Direc-tions, 1968), xvi.
44. Michaux, Light Through Darkness, 156.
45. Ibid., 157.
46. Michaux, Major Ordeals, 4.
47. Michaux, Infinite Turbulence, 173.
48. Sally Clay, “Stigma,” Journal of Contemplative Psychotherapy 4 (1987).
49. Oliver Sacks, Awakenings (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983), 306.
50. Michaux, Miserable Miracle, 37.
51. Jeremy Hayward, Perceiving Ordinary Magic (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1985).
52. Michaux, Miserable Miracle, 10.
53. Michaux, Major Ordeals, 117.
54. Ibid.
55. Michaux, Light Through Darkness, 158.
56. Henri Michaux, Vers la completude (Paris: Editions G.L.M., 1967).
57. Terry Clifford, Tibetan Buddhist Medicine and Psychiatry (York Beach, Maine:
Samuel Weiser, 1984).
58. Michaux, Major Ordeals, 120.
59. Ibid., 42.

Orwell - The Principles of Newspeak

 

Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism. In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole means of communication, either in speech or writing. The leading articles in ‘The Times’ were written in it, but this was a TOUR DE FORCE which could only be carried out by a specialist. It was expected that Newspeak would have finally superseded Oldspeak (or Standard English, as we should call it) by about the year 2050. Meanwhile it gained ground steadily, all Party members tending to use Newspeak words and grammatical constructions more and more in their everyday speech. The version in use in 1984, and embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Editions of the Newspeak Dictionary, was a provisional one, and contained many superfluous words and archaic formations which were due to be suppressed later. It is with the final, perfected version, as embodied in the Eleventh Edition of the Dictionary, that we are concerned here.

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought—that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc—should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods. This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and by stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meanings whatever. To give a single example. The word FREE still existed in Newspeak, but it could only be used in such statements as ‘This dog is free from lice’ or ‘This field is free from weeds’. It could not be used in its old sense of ‘politically free’ or ‘intellectually free’ since political and intellectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless. Quite apart from the suppression of definitely heretical words, reduction of vocabulary was regarded as an end in itself, and no word that could be dispensed with was allowed to survive. Newspeak was designed not to extend but to DIMINISH the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum.

Newspeak was founded on the English language as we now know it, though many Newspeak sentences, even when not containing newly-created words, would be barely intelligible to an English-speaker of our own day. Newspeak words were divided into three distinct classes, known as the A vocabulary, the B vocabulary (also called compound words), and the C vocabulary. It will be simpler to discuss each class separately, but the grammatical peculiarities of the language can be dealt with in the section devoted to the A vocabulary, since the same rules held good for all three categories.

THE A VOCABULARY. The A vocabulary consisted of the words needed for the business of everyday life—for such things as eating, drinking, working, putting on one’s clothes, going up and down stairs, riding in vehicles, gardening, cooking, and the like. It was composed almost entirely of words that we already possess words like HIT, RUN, DOG, TREE, SUGAR, HOUSE, FIELD—but in comparison with the present-day English vocabulary their number was extremely small, while their meanings were far more rigidly defined. All ambiguities and shades of meaning had been purged out of them. So far as it could be achieved, a Newspeak word of this class was simply a staccato sound expressing ONE clearly understood concept. It would have been quite impossible to use the A vocabulary for literary purposes or for political or philosophical discussion. It was intended only to express simple, purposive thoughts, usually involving concrete objects or physical actions.

The grammar of Newspeak had two outstanding peculiarities. The first of these was an almost complete interchangeability between different parts of speech. Any word in the language (in principle this applied even to very abstract words such as IF or WHEN) could be used either as verb, noun, adjective, or adverb. Between the verb and the noun form, when they were of the same root, there was never any variation, this rule of itself involving the destruction of many archaic forms. The word THOUGHT, for example, did not exist in Newspeak. Its place was taken by THINK, which did duty for both noun and verb. No etymological principle was followed here: in some cases it was the original noun that was chosen for retention, in other cases the verb. Even where a noun and verb of kindred meaning were not etymologically connected, one or other of them was frequently suppressed. There was, for example, no such word as CUT, its meaning being sufficiently covered by the noun-verb KNIFE. Adjectives were formed by adding the suffix -FUL to the noun-verb, and adverbs by adding -WISE. Thus for example, SPEEDFUL meant ‘rapid’ and SPEEDWISE meant ‘quickly’. Certain of our present-day adjectives, such as GOOD, STRONG, BIG, BLACK, SOFT, were retained, but their total number was very small. There was little need for them, since almost any adjectival meaning could be arrived at by adding -FUL to a noun-verb. None of the now-existing adverbs was retained, except for a very few already ending in -WISE: the -WISE termination was invariable. The word WELL, for example, was replaced by GOODWISE.

In addition, any word—this again applied in principle to every word in the language—could be negatived by adding the affix UN-, or could be strengthened by the affix PLUS-, or, for still greater emphasis, DOUBLEPLUS-. Thus, for example, UNCOLD meant ‘warm’, while PLUSCOLD and DOUBLEPLUSCOLD meant, respectively, ‘very cold’ and ‘superlatively cold’. It was also possible, as in present-day English, to modify the meaning of almost any word by prepositional affixes such as ANTE-, POST-, UP-, DOWN-, etc. By such methods it was found possible to bring about an enormous diminution of vocabulary. Given, for instance, the word GOOD, there was no need for such a word as BAD, since the required meaning was equally well—indeed, better—expressed by UNGOOD. All that was necessary, in any case where two words formed a natural pair of opposites, was to decide which of them to suppress. DARK, for example, could be replaced by UNLIGHT, or LIGHT by UNDARK, according to preference.

The second distinguishing mark of Newspeak grammar was its regularity. Subject to a few exceptions which are mentioned below all inflexions followed the same rules. Thus, in all verbs the preterite and the past participle were the same and ended in -ED. The preterite of STEAL was STEALED, the preterite of THINK was THINKED, and so on throughout the language, all such forms as SWAM, GAVE, BROUGHT, SPOKE, TAKEN, etc., being abolished. All plurals were made by adding -S or -ES as the case might be. The plurals OF MAN, OX, LIFE, were MANS, OXES, LIFES. Comparison of adjectives was invariably made by adding -ER, -EST (GOOD, GOODER, GOODEST), irregular forms and the MORE, MOST formation being suppressed.

The only classes of words that were still allowed to inflect irregularly were the pronouns, the relatives, the demonstrative adjectives, and the auxiliary verbs. All of these followed their ancient usage, except that WHOM had been scrapped as unnecessary, and the SHALL, SHOULD tenses had been dropped, all their uses being covered by WILL and WOULD. There were also certain irregularities in word-formation arising out of the need for rapid and easy speech. A word which was difficult to utter, or was liable to be incorrectly heard, was held to be ipso facto a bad word; occasionally therefore, for the sake of euphony, extra letters were inserted into a word or an archaic formation was retained. But this need made itself felt chiefly in connexion with the B vocabulary. WHY so great an importance was attached to ease of pronunciation will be made clear later in this essay.

THE B VOCABULARY. The B vocabulary consisted of words which had been deliberately constructed for political purposes: words, that is to say, which not only had in every case a political implication, but were intended to impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them. Without a full understanding of the principles of Ingsoc it was difficult to use these words correctly. In some cases they could be translated into Oldspeak, or even into words taken from the A vocabulary, but this usually demanded a long paraphrase and always involved the loss of certain overtones. The B words were a sort of verbal shorthand, often packing whole ranges of ideas into a few syllables, and at the same time more accurate and forcible than ordinary language.

The B words were in all cases compound words. [Compound words such as SPEAKWRITE, were of course to be found in the A vocabulary, but these were merely convenient abbreviations and had no special ideologcal colour.] They consisted of two or more words, or portions of words, welded together in an easily pronounceable form. The resulting amalgam was always a noun-verb, and inflected according to the ordinary rules. To take a single example: the word GOODTHINK, meaning, very roughly, ‘orthodoxy’, or, if one chose to regard it as a verb, ‘to think in an orthodox manner’. This inflected as follows: noun-verb, GOODTHINK; past tense and past participle, GOODTHINKED; present participle, GOOD-THINKING; adjective, GOODTHINKFUL; adverb, GOODTHINKWISE; verbal noun, GOODTHINKER.

The B words were not constructed on any etymological plan. The words of which they were made up could be any parts of speech, and could be placed in any order and mutilated in any way which made them easy to pronounce while indicating their derivation. In the word CRIMETHINK (thoughtcrime), for instance, the THINK came second, whereas in THINKPOL (Thought Police) it came first, and in the latter word POLICE had lost its second syllable. Because of the great difficulty in securing euphony, irregular formations were commoner in the B vocabulary than in the A vocabulary. For example, the adjective forms of MINITRUE, MINIPAX, and MINILUV were, respectively, MINITRUTHFUL, MINIPEACEFUL, and MINILOVELY, simply because -TRUEFUL, -PAXFUL, and -LOVEFUL were slightly awkward to pronounce. In principle, however, all B words could inflect, and all inflected in exactly the same way.

Some of the B words had highly subtilized meanings, barely intelligible to anyone who had not mastered the language as a whole. Consider, for example, such a typical sentence from a ‘Times’ leading article as OLDTHINKERS UNBELLYFEEL INGSOC. The shortest rendering that one could make of this in Oldspeak would be: ‘Those whose ideas were formed before the Revolution cannot have a full emotional understanding of the principles of English Socialism.’ But this is not an adequate translation. To begin with, in order to grasp the full meaning of the Newspeak sentence quoted above, one would have to have a clear idea of what is meant by INGSOC. And in addition, only a person thoroughly grounded in Ingsoc could appreciate the full force of the word BELLYFEEL, which implied a blind, enthusiastic acceptance difficult to imagine today; or of the word OLDTHINK, which was inextricably mixed up with the idea of wickedness and decadence. But the special function of certain Newspeak words, of which OLDTHINK was one, was not so much to express meanings as to destroy them. These words, necessarily few in number, had had their meanings extended until they contained within themselves whole batteries of words which, as they were sufficiently covered by a single comprehensive term, could now be scrapped and forgotten. The greatest difficulty facing the compilers of the Newspeak Dictionary was not to invent new words, but, having invented them, to make sure what they meant: to make sure, that is to say, what ranges of words they cancelled by their existence.

As we have already seen in the case of the word FREE, words which had once borne a heretical meaning were sometimes retained for the sake of convenience, but only with the undesirable meanings purged out of them. Countless other words such as HONOUR, JUSTICE, MORALITY, INTERNATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, SCIENCE, and RELIGION had simply ceased to exist. A few blanket words covered them, and, in covering them, abolished them. All words grouping themselves round the concepts of liberty and equality, for instance, were contained in the single word CRIMETHINK, while all words grouping themselves round the concepts of objectivity and rationalism were contained in the single word OLDTHINK. Greater precision would have been dangerous. What was required in a Party member was an outlook similar to that of the ancient Hebrew who knew, without knowing much else, that all nations other than his own worshipped ‘false gods’. He did not need to know that these gods were called Baal, Osiris, Moloch, Ashtaroth, and the like: probably the less he knew about them the better for his orthodoxy. He knew Jehovah and the commandments of Jehovah: he knew, therefore, that all gods with other names or other attributes were false gods. In somewhat the same way, the party member knew what constituted right conduct, and in exceedingly vague, generalized terms he knew what kinds of departure from it were possible. His sexual life, for example, was entirely regulated by the two Newspeak words SEXCRIME (sexual immorality) and GOODSEX (chastity). SEXCRIME covered all sexual misdeeds whatever. It covered fornication, adultery, homosexuality, and other perversions, and, in addition, normal intercourse practised for its own sake. There was no need to enumerate them separately, since they were all equally culpable, and, in principle, all punishable by death. In the C vocabulary, which consisted of scientific and technical words, it might be necessary to give specialized names to certain sexual aberrations, but the ordinary citizen had no need of them. He knew what was meant by GOODSEX—that is to say, normal intercourse between man and wife, for the sole purpose of begetting children, and without physical pleasure on the part of the woman: all else was SEXCRIME. In Newspeak it was seldom possible to follow a heretical thought further than the perception that it WAS heretical: beyond that point the necessary words were nonexistent.

No word in the B vocabulary was ideologically neutral. A great many were euphemisms. Such words, for instance, as JOYCAMP (forced-labour camp) or MINIPAX Ministry of Peace, i.e. Ministry of War) meant almost the exact opposite of what they appeared to mean. Some words, on the other hand, displayed a frank and contemptuous understanding of the real nature of Oceanic society. An example was PROLEFEED, meaning the rubbishy entertainment and spurious news which the Party handed out to the masses. Other words, again, were ambivalent, having the connotation ‘good’ when applied to the Party and ‘bad’ when applied to its enemies. But in addition there were great numbers of words which at first sight appeared to be mere abbreviations and which derived their ideological colour not from their meaning, but from their structure.

So far as it could be contrived, everything that had or might have political significance of any kind was fitted into the B vocabulary. The name of every organization, or body of people, or doctrine, or country, or institution, or public building, was invariably cut down into the familiar shape; that is, a single easily pronounced word with the smallest number of syllables that would preserve the original derivation. In the Ministry of Truth, for example, the Records Department, in which Winston Smith worked, was called RECDEP, the Fiction Department was called FICDEP, the Teleprogrammes Department was called TELEDEP, and so on. This was not done solely with the object of saving time. Even in the early decades of the twentieth century, telescoped words and phrases had been one of the characteristic features of political language; and it had been noticed that the tendency to use abbreviations of this kind was most marked in totalitarian countries and totalitarian organizations. Examples were such words as NAZI, GESTAPO, COMINTERN, INPRECORR, AGITPROP. In the beginning the practice had been adopted as it were instinctively, but in Newspeak it was used with a conscious purpose. It was perceived that in thus abbreviating a name one narrowed and subtly altered its meaning, by cutting out most of the associations that would otherwise cling to it. The words COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, for instance, call up a composite picture of universal human brotherhood, red flags, barricades, Karl Marx, and the Paris Commune. The word COMINTERN, on the other hand, suggests merely a tightly-knit organization and a well-defined body of doctrine. It refers to something almost as easily recognized, and as limited in purpose, as a chair or a table. COMINTERN is a word that can be uttered almost without taking thought, whereas COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL is a phrase over which one is obliged to linger at least momentarily. In the same way, the associations called up by a word like MINITRUE are fewer and more controllable than those called up by MINISTRY OF TRUTH. This accounted not only for the habit of abbreviating whenever possible, but also for the almost exaggerated care that was taken to make every word easily pronounceable.

In Newspeak, euphony outweighed every consideration other than exactitude of meaning. Regularity of grammar was always sacrificed to it when it seemed necessary. And rightly so, since what was required, above all for political purposes, was short clipped words of unmistakable meaning which could be uttered rapidly and which roused the minimum of echoes in the speaker’s mind. The words of the B vocabulary even gained in force from the fact that nearly all of them were very much alike. Almost invariably these words—GOODTHINK, MINIPAX, PROLEFEED, SEXCRIME, JOYCAMP, INGSOC, BELLYFEEL, THINKPOL, and countless others—were words of two or three syllables, with the stress distributed equally between the first syllable and the last. The use of them encouraged a gabbling style of speech, at once staccato and monotonous. And this was exactly what was aimed at. The intention was to make speech, and especially speech on any subject not ideologically neutral, as nearly as possible independent of consciousness. For the purposes of everyday life it was no doubt necessary, or sometimes necessary, to reflect before speaking, but a Party member called upon to make a political or ethical judgement should be able to spray forth the correct opinions as automatically as a machine gun spraying forth bullets. His training fitted him to do this, the language gave him an almost foolproof instrument, and the texture of the words, with their harsh sound and a certain wilful ugliness which was in accord with the spirit of Ingsoc, assisted the process still further.

So did the fact of having very few words to choose from. Relative to our own, the Newspeak vocabulary was tiny, and new ways of reducing it were constantly being devised. Newspeak, indeed, differed from most all other languages in that its vocabulary grew smaller instead of larger every year. Each reduction was a gain, since the smaller the area of choice, the smaller the temptation to take thought. Ultimately it was hoped to make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centres at all. This aim was frankly admitted in the Newspeak word DUCKSPEAK, meaning ‘to quack like a duck’. Like various other words in the B vocabulary, DUCKSPEAK was ambivalent in meaning. Provided that the opinions which were quacked out were orthodox ones, it implied nothing but praise, and when ‘The Times’ referred to one of the orators of the Party as a DOUBLEPLUSGOOD DUCKSPEAKER it was paying a warm and valued compliment.

THE C VOCABULARY. The C vocabulary was supplementary to the others and consisted entirely of scientific and technical terms. These resembled the scientific terms in use today, and were constructed from the same roots, but the usual care was taken to define them rigidly and strip them of undesirable meanings. They followed the same grammatical rules as the words in the other two vocabularies. Very few of the C words had any currency either in everyday speech or in political speech. Any scientific worker or technician could find all the words he needed in the list devoted to his own speciality, but he seldom had more than a smattering of the words occurring in the other lists. Only a very few words were common to all lists, and there was no vocabulary expressing the function of Science as a habit of mind, or a method of thought, irrespective of its particular branches. There was, indeed, no word for ‘Science’, any meaning that it could possibly bear being already sufficiently covered by the word INGSOC.

From the foregoing account it will be seen that in Newspeak the expression of unorthodox opinions, above a very low level, was well-nigh impossible. It was of course possible to utter heresies of a very crude kind, a species of blasphemy. It would have been possible, for example, to say BIG BROTHER IS UNGOOD. But this statement, which to an orthodox ear merely conveyed a self-evident absurdity, could not have been sustained by reasoned argument, because the necessary words were not available. Ideas inimical to Ingsoc could only be entertained in a vague wordless form, and could only be named in very broad terms which lumped together and condemned whole groups of heresies without defining them in doing so. One could, in fact, only use Newspeak for unorthodox purposes by illegitimately translating some of the words back into Oldspeak. For example, ALL MANS ARE EQUAL was a possible Newspeak sentence, but only in the same sense in which ALL MEN ARE REDHAIRED is a possible Oldspeak sentence. It did not contain a grammatical error, but it expressed a palpable untruth—i.e. that all men are of equal size, weight, or strength. The concept of political equality no longer existed, and this secondary meaning had accordingly been purged out of the word EQUAL. In 1984, when Oldspeak was still the normal means of communication, the danger theoretically existed that in using Newspeak words one might remember their original meanings. In practice it was not difficult for any person well grounded in DOUBLETHINK to avoid doing this, but within a couple of generations even the possibility of such a lapse would have vaished. A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language would no more know that EQUAL had once had the secondary meaning of ‘politically equal’, or that FREE had once meant ‘intellectually free’, than for instance, a person who had never heard of chess would be aware of the secondary meanings attaching to QUEEN and ROOK. There would be many crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore unimaginable. And it was to be foreseen that with the passage of time the distinguishing characteristics of Newspeak would become more and more pronounced—its words growing fewer and fewer, their meanings more and more rigid, and the chance of putting them to improper uses always diminishing.

When Oldspeak had been once and for all superseded, the last link with the past would have been severed. History had already been rewritten, but fragments of the literature of the past survived here and there, imperfectly censored, and so long as one retained one’s knowledge of Oldspeak it was possible to read them. In the future such fragments, even if they chanced to survive, would be unintelligible and untranslatable. It was impossible to translate any passage of Oldspeak into Newspeak unless it either referred to some technical process or some very simple everyday action, or was already orthodox (GOODTHINKFUL would be the Newspeak expression) in tendency. In practice this meant that no book written before approximately 1960 could be translated as a whole. Pre-revolutionary literature could only be subjected to ideological translation—that is, alteration in sense as well as language. Take for example the well-known passage from the Declaration of Independence:

WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT, THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL, THAT THEY ARE ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN INALIENABLE RIGHTS, THAT AMONG THESE ARE LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. THAT TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, GOVERNMENTS ARE INSTITUTED AMONG MEN, DERIVING THEIR POWERS FROM THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED. THAT WHENEVER ANY FORM OF GOVERNMENT BECOMES DESTRUCTIVE OF THOSE ENDS, IT IS THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO ALTER OR ABOLISH IT, AND TO INSTITUTE NEW GOVERNMENT...

It would have been quite impossible to render this into Newspeak while keeping to the sense of the original. The nearest one could come to doing so would be to swallow the whole passage up in the single word CRIMETHINK. A full translation could only be an ideological translation, whereby Jefferson’s words would be changed into a panegyric on absolute government.

A good deal of the literature of the past was, indeed, already being transformed in this way. Considerations of prestige made it desirable to preserve the memory of certain historical figures, while at the same time bringing their achievements into line with the philosophy of Ingsoc. Various writers, such as Shakespeare, Milton, Swift, Byron, Dickens, and some others were therefore in process of translation: when the task had been completed, their original writings, with all else that survived of the literature of the past, would be destroyed. These translations were a slow and difficult business, and it was not expected that they would be finished before the first or second decade of the twenty-first century. There were also large quantities of merely utilitarian literature—indispensable technical manuals, and the like—that had to be treated in the same way. It was chiefly in order to allow time for the preliminary work of translation that the final adoption of Newspeak had been fixed for so late a date as 2050.

From 1984

Tuesday, September 26, 2023

Michael Behe: how I came to disagree with most contemporary scientists

 But first a necessary digression to explain how I came to disagree with most contemporary scientists on this pivotal subject. Imagine my surprise a while back when I opened an academic journal called Biology & Philosophy and spotted this sentence: “To see the point quite palpably, note that Stalin, or Osama bin Laden, or Michael Behe, or your favorite villain is also . . .”7 The man who included me in that rogues gallery was Alexander Rosenberg, R. Taylor Cole Professor of Philosophy at Duke University—a fellow I’ve never met. His article had precious little to do with me. The line was an offhand remark in the course of arguing that the well-known philosopher Daniel Dennett—a founding member of the New Atheists—was something of a wimp, because in his books he didn’t clearly spell out the utter nihilism that Rosenberg saw as a consequence of Darwin’s theory.

It was a silly remark but, unfortunately, it does accurately reflect the hostility felt by a large chunk of academia toward those of us who publicly argue the case for purpose in nature. (Notice that the overt insult was passed along by the reviewers of the article and the journal editor.) We might see ourselves as just trying to puzzle out those existential questions that kept us awake at night as kids. But folks such as Rosenberg seem to envision peasants with torches and pitchforks marching on their faculty offices. We might just be wondering what the evidence of nature really shows. But “since nihilism is true,”8 too many academics think there’s nothing to think about; therefore contrary views must be dishonest. So before we begin the book I want to try to head off such charges of bad faith. To show that I come by my views honestly, let me very briefly recount the history of my own thinking.

I was born into a large Roman Catholic family and, like all of my brothers and sisters, attended Catholic grade school and high school. Unlike some Christian denominations, the Catholic Church never had much of a problem with evolution. I remember being taught about it in seventh grade by Sister David Marie. The important point, she stressed, is that God created the universe, life, and humanity. How he did that, whether quickly or slowly, employing natural law or not, was up to him, not us, and our best evidence these days shows that evolution is correct. That view was perfectly fine with me. In fact, although I wasn’t aware of it then, it had been the predominant understanding in Catholic circles for a long time. For example, the 1909 Catholic Encyclopedia has a lengthy scholarly article on evolution that makes a number of crucial distinctions, including a distinction “between the [basic] theory of evolution and Darwinism.”9 Plain “evolution” was no big theological deal. But framing it as necessarily nihilistic, as Alexander Rosenberg and many others do, was tantamount to denying Christianity. Even as a boy I had plenty of reasons to believe in God that had nothing to do with evolution.

When I went off to Drexel Institute of Technology (now Drexel University), I decided to major in chemistry, specifically because I wanted to know how the world worked; I wanted to know what made things tick. Since everything is made of chemicals, then chemistry seemed to be the obvious choice. During my college years I had a summer “co-op” job in a biochemistry lab at the Department of Agriculture research facilities near Philadelphia, where I became fascinated with the chemistry of life. Senior year at Drexel I took a course on evolutionary biochemistry to learn how it all came together.

During graduate studies in biochemistry at the University of Pennsylvania and postdoctoral work at the National Institutes of Health, I had no qualms about standard evolutionary theory and would occasionally (and smugly) tease friends who did. I remember one day at the NIH chewing over the Big Questions with a fellow Catholic postdoc, Joanne (her brother was a priest), who was in the same lab I was. Talk turned to the origin of life. Although she and I were both happy to think life started by natural laws, we kept bumping up against problems. I pointed out that to get the first cell, you’d first need a membrane. “And proteins,” she added. “And metabolism,” said I. “And a genetic code,” said she. After a short time we both looked wide-eyed at each other and simultaneously shouted, “Naaaahh!” Then we laughed and went back to work, as if it didn’t really matter to our views. I suppose we both thought that, even if we didn’t know how undirected nature could begin life, somebody must know. That’s the impressive power of groupthink.

After three years at my first job as an assistant professor at Queens College in New York City, my new wife, Celeste, our firstborn daughter, Grace, and I moved to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where a new job awaited at Lehigh University. Several very busy years later I paused to read a book that startled me and changed my view of evolution. Evolution: A Theory in Crisis by Michael Denton, a geneticist and medical doctor then teaching in Australia, offered no solution to the riddle of life, but pointed out numerous serious problems for Darwin’s theory at the molecular level that I had never even heard about—even though I was a biochemistry professor whose goal in entering science was to understand how the world worked! At that point, when I thought back, I realized I had never heard any of my teachers critique Darwin’s theory in all of my science studies.

I got mad. Over the following months I spent much time in the science library trying to find papers or books that explained in real detail how random mutation and selection could produce the exceedingly intricate systems routinely studied by biochemistry. I came up completely empty. Although many publications would pay homage to Darwin and a few would spin “Just So” evolutionary tales, none spelled out how his mechanism accounted for complex functional systems. Vague stories had kept me satisfied in the past, but no longer. Now I wanted real answers.

At that point I concluded that I had been led to believe in Darwin’s theory not because of strong evidence for it. Rather, it was for sociological reasons—that simply was the way educated people were expected to think these days. My professors hadn’t been intentionally misleading—that was the framework in which they thought about life too. But from then on I resolved to decide for myself what the evidence showed.

When one starts to treat Darwinism as a hypothesis about the biochemical level of life rather than as an assumption, it takes about ten minutes to conclude it’s radically inadequate. It takes perhaps another ten minutes to realize that the molecular foundation of life was designed, and for effectively the same reason that Anaxagoras, Galen, and Paley reached the same conclusion for visible levels of biology (although, because of progress in science and philosophy, the argument is now necessarily much more detailed and nuanced than their versions): the signature of intelligent activity is the arrangement of disparate parts to fulfill some purpose. The molecular parts of the cell are elegantly arranged to fulfill many subsidiary purposes that must blend together in service of the large overall purpose of forming life. As we’ll see in this book, no unintelligent, undirected process—neither Darwin’s mechanism nor any other—can account for that.

With the aid of the then newfangled internet, over the years I met other academics who had had experiences roughly similar to mine, who had been perfectly willing to accept Darwinian evolution, but at some point realized with shock that the larger theory was an intellectual facade. Like me, most had religious convictions, which freed them from the crippling assumption that—no matter what the evidence showed—unintelligent forces simply must be responsible for the elegance of life. Some of us banded together under the auspices of the Seattle-based think tank Discovery Institute, the better to defend and advance the topic of intelligent design (ID), to which we had become dedicated.

In conversations with them I discovered that, as a biochemist, I had ideas to contribute that the others did not. At the urging of Phillip Johnson, then a professor of law at the University of California–Berkeley, I set about writing a book that in 1996 became Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution. Except for answering extravagant Darwinian claims or attacks on ID,10 I thought I was done with writing at that point. But the rapid progress of science in the subsequent decade allowed further arguments to be made. In 2007 those became The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism, which, as the title suggests, tried to locate the point in life where what can be explained solely by unintelligent forces is reached. (One common confusion of critics is to think that ID argues everything is planned. That’s not the case. Chance is an important, if superficial, feature of biology.) Again I thought I was done, but even greater unanticipated progress in biology over the past ten years has spurred me to write this book.

Where We’re Headed

The firm conclusion I’ve drawn over the past decades is this: despite occasional questions and bumps along the road, the greater the progress of science, the more deeply into life design can be seen to extend. In Darwin’s own day, the mid-nineteenth century, scientists wondered whether there was sufficient variety in nature’s creatures to fuel his theory. After DNA and proteins were discovered in the late twentieth century, a pressing question was whether Darwin’s mechanism—natural selection acting on random mutation—could account for even the biochemical level of life and the sophisticated molecular machinery unexpectedly discovered there.

As science rapidly advanced in the early twenty-first century, large studies showed only surprisingly minor changes in genes under severe selective pressure. And as we’ll see in this book, now several decades into the twenty-first century, ever more sophisticated studies demonstrate that, ironically, random mutation and natural selection are in fact fiercely devolutionary. It turns out that mutation easily breaks or degrades genes, which, counterintuitively, can sometimes help an organism to survive, so the damaged genes are hastily spread by natural selection. Strangely, in the space of a century and a half Darwinism has gone from the chief candidate for the explanation of life to a known threat to life’s long-term integrity.

Here’s how we’ll proceed. The two chapters of Part I introduce major problems facing any theory attempting to account for life. In Chapter 1 I’ll emphasize a philosophical difficulty—the question of how we know what we claim to know. The second chapter of Part I throws down the gauntlet. It describes biological systems of astonishing elegance and complexity that demand explanation; many of them were discovered as recently as the new millennium. Part II examines a number of ideas that have been offered as answers, from Darwin’s own theory to the most recent non-Darwinian accounts of evolution such as neutral theory and natural genetic engineering. We’ll see why, although they may account for some features of life, they all are severely limited in scope.

Part III (Chapters 6 through 9) compiles pertinent evidence from numerous studies on a wide range of species by many insightful investigators. These studies have only become available in the past few decades due to rapid advances in laboratory techniques that closely examine the molecular level of life. The studies indicate that not only is the Darwinian mechanism devolutionary; it is also self-limiting—that is, it actively prevents evolutionary changes at the biological classification level of family and above. After Part IV (described below), the Appendix reexamines criticisms by top scientists and others of my earlier arguments for intelligent design from the clarifying perspective of more than twenty years later.

The failure of Darwin’s mechanism as an explanation for the evolution of all but the lowest levels of biological classification reopens the primordial question of what does account for the elegance and complexity of life. My answer appears mainly in Part IV (the final chapter). There I defend the reality of mind—a necessary foundation of science itself—and argue that, for its own sake, science must explicitly acknowledge mind’s existence. Once the reality of mind is affirmed, the explanation for life follows easily. In brief, although chance surely affects superficial aspects of biology, the newest evidence confirms that life is the intended work of a mind and that that work extends much more deeply into life than could previously be seen.

From introduction to Darwin Devolves

By Michael J. Behe