To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Friday, November 20, 2026

Rogue Messiahs

 In June 2001, Wilson turned seventy. It was a relatively quiet year for him in terms of publications. But Rogue Messiahs had come out the year before. It was called The Devil’s Party in the UK; the title was taken from William Blake’s remark about his fellow poet John Milton, who was “of the Devil’s party, without knowing it,” something Wilson believed was true of his false messiahs. The Mail on Sunday gave the book a thumbs-up, and even the Times Literary Supplement (TLS) took notice, although their review, while on the whole positive, did point out some editorial problems.

One of Wilson’s main themes in the book is that the downfall of many bogus spiritual leaders is sex; they tend to become obsessed with it as an expression of their dominance over their flock. The careers of Jim Jones (Jamestown massacre), David Koresh (Waco massacre), and even less-murderous characters such as Aleister Crowley make this clear. Noting this, the TLS reviewer pointed out that, although Wilson had written about “the occult, magic, and other esoteric themes,” the “world of sex and violence . . . has clearly engaged him most closely.”8 While acknowledging that Wilson “writes entertainingly”—“his large cast of misguided aspirants to Messianic status . . . preach, plot, quarrel, rage, rape, break every law, suffer and die . . . across his colourful pages”— the reviewer assures us that this is not in “any way an academic offering. . . . Sharper editing” could have pruned some repetition, and he could have relied less heavily on anecdote. There was also the standard reflection that because Wilson’s interests range “across diverse fields,” allowing for a wide perspective, there is also an unfortunate tendency toward digression.9

This tendency toward digression does make for an at times choppy read, a handicap the book shares with The Atlantis Blueprint. Before publication several chapters dealing with contemporary French philosophy, which are fascinating in themselves but seem out of context with the rest of the book, found their way to the cutting room floor. They were later resurrected in Below the Iceberg and are engaging evidence that Wilson kept abreast of developments such as structuralism, deconstructionism, and postmodernism. As we might expect, he was critical of all three. He takes especial argument with the work of Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida, some of the biggest names in postexistentialism France. Sartre had died in 1980, but had been out of fashion for some time. In an obituary for the Evening News, Wilson remarked that while Sartre’s death may seem an “out-of-date sort of catastrophe,” he was nonetheless “one of the most exciting and brilliant figures in twentieth century literature.”10The link between Foucault and a mad messiah such as David Koresh may not be immediately clear, but in the end Wilson found that Foucault—a homosexual who had a taste for dark eroticism, S&M, and “sex with the stranger”—was as much a charlatan as Koresh; he was an “intellectual con-man” out to deceive his readers.11 Barthes was a “depressive romantic” whose attempt to write literary criticism as if it were phenomenology displayed his “philosophical ineptitude.”12 Derrida’s rejection of meaning in any text—something he shares with the other two—was “ultimately sterile.”13 Wilson’s rejection of Derrida, and his warranted exasperation with the fact that he was considered one of the most important intellectuals of the age, comes through in a brief account of deconstructionism, written for his son Rowan’s literature course at Oxford, also included in Below the Iceberg. Rowan had found Derrida’s work “gobbledegook”—“understandably,” Wilson sympathized—so his father explained it to him in plain English.14 What Rowan’s literature professor may have thought of this is unknown.

Yet even without the digressions into French philosophical fashions, Rogue Messiahs seems to suffer from a lack of a solid center. Its main argument is that false messiahs and their followers are made for each other. The messiahs are members of the dominant 5 percent on the lookout for ways to express their dominance. Their followers are individuals looking for some meaning beyond the triviality of everydayness. The bad guru needs the adoration of his flock; unlike the dominant .005 percent, he still relies on other people to feed his self-esteem, and, as Wilson’s often gruesome pages show, in some cases he will go to murderous lengths to secure it. Multiple killings surrounding Shoko Asahara, leader of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), and Jeffrey Lundgren, leader of a breakaway cult from the Church of Latter Day Saints—to mention only two examples—provide gory evidence of this. The follower, on the other hand, is too lazy to work toward his own salvation, and in exchange for a life in which all problems vanish in light of the teaching, he gives up his freedom. The complete control over his followers’ lives exhibited by Jim Jones and their masochistic acceptance of it are sad evidence of the level to which a powerful need for belief and belonging can reduce someone.

Yet Wilson argues that in both cases, positive drives are at work; the problem is that they can easily become warped. The false messiah is in search of an identity; the masochistic believer has a powerful “will to believe,” in William James’s phrase. “Human beings need to believe,” Wilson writes, “because belief leads to action and human beings are born with a need to act. . . . Without purpose, human beings feel only half-alive.”15 The problem is that this hunger for purpose can lead to some very strange altars.

Not all the messiahs Wilson looks at were monsters. He writes of Rudolf Steiner’s rise to European fame after World War I, and of Krishnamurti’s refusal to be a theosophical world avatar and subsequent career as a nonteacher of a nonteaching. Freud, Jung, and the spiritual writer Paul Brunton make important appearances. But in our time, many charismatic but frustrated individuals adopt the mantle of guru in order to bolster a fragile self-esteem. Their need to impress others inevitably draws them into a whirlpool of indulgence and self-destruction. Very few messiahs avoid the paranoia that seems part of their bargain with the Devil.

Yet in trying to account for the often delusional psychology of many of his murderous messiahs, Wilson enters territory which, fascinating in itself—like the axed chapters on Foucault and Co.—again seems somehow out of place. In his attempt to understand the messiah’s need to “transform reality,” Wilson looks at some remarkable case studies of delusional psychosis. He tells the strange story of the “three Christs of Ypsilanti,” in which a psychiatrist tried to free three individuals of their shared delusion that they were Christ by bringing them together. Milton Rokeach, the psychiatrist in question, believed that the collision with two competitors would shake each Christ’s awareness so that they would recognize that they were, indeed, mad.

It didn’t work, for two reasons. Wilson argues that people withdraw into a psychotic other reality in the first place because they find this one—our everyday reality—too difficult to cope with. To them it is threatening and frightening; it undermines their self-esteem. They are often inadequate characters, and the necessities and demands placed on them prove too much. Rather than collapse in complete breakdown and recognize themselves as a failure, their unconscious mind provides them with an alternate reality, which, while cutting them off from our shared reality, ensures that they won’t fracture entirely. In a way it is a variant of the dictum of H. G. Wells’s Mr. Polly: “if you don’t like your life you can change it.” For the three Christs of Ypsilanti it was rather, “if you don’t like your reality you can change it.” Too weak to change their lives, they left them for another, more amenable world. They had no reason to leave it to return to the one they had left behind.

The other reason why Rokeach’s experiment failed is that the unconscious mind, responsible for the alternate reality, is incredibly powerful. We have already seen some evidence of this throughout this book. Wilson relates the strange story of “Kirk Allen and the jet-propelled couch.” Kirk Allen (a pseudonym) was an actual rocket scientist who had developed the habit of taking imaginary journeys to the Mars of Edgar Rice Burroughs’s John Carter novels. It was when his interplanetary hops began to affect his work that he was recognized as a borderline psychotic and sent to a psychiatrist. Allen came to believe that his real life was on Mars, where he was a ruler, and that like John Mack’s Paul, he was an alien here on earth. Allen’s fantasies began after a series of emotional shocks—loss of a governess mother figure, seduction at twelve by her nymphomaniac replacement, and finally the sexual advances of a too-forward workmate. As he retreated from an abrasive and invasive world, his fantasies about his life on Mars went up a notch, and after an exceptionally uncomfortable episode, suddenly he was there. “He found himself sitting at his desk on Mars, dressed in the robes of his high office, then making his way to the secret room and consulting the photographs in the filing cabinet.”16 After that, Allen spent more and more time on Mars and less on planet Earth.

Wilson points out that Allen’s psychotic fantasy of being on Mars had the kind of reality that we sometimes find in very vivid dreams. He also argues that it is not that distant from the kind of inner journeys people such as Jung took when engaged in “active imagination” or Rudolf Steiner did when reading the Akashic Records. But where in the case of Allen and Rokeach’s three Christs, the unconscious mind’s ability to provide a substitute reality is detrimental, for individuals aiming to transform their lives creatively—that is, positively—it is a powerful tool. Wilson looks at the career of the poet W. B. Yeats as an example. Yeats began as a dreamy, world-rejecting romantic poet who, like Kirk Allen, found the real world much too inhospitable. Instead Yeats sang of fairies, spirits, and Celtic myths of old. His attitude can be seen in his poem “The Stolen Child,” in which fairies lure a child away to their magic lands because “the world’s more full of weeping than you can understand.”17 Yeats was what Wilson would call a typical romantic, withdrawing from a too difficult, demanding, ugly world and creating a more suitable substitute in its place. He complained of “all things uncomely and broken / all things worn out and old,” just as Ouspensky did on his return to this “wooden world” after his experiments with nitrous oxide.18 It was exactly this desire for fairy worlds and magic that led Yeats first to Theosophy and then to the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn.

But Yeats was also a hardheaded Irishman and as he developed and matured his attitude toward reality became less defensive. He was less withdrawn and his poems took on a hardness and clarity that later earned him the Nobel Prize for literature. We can say that he began to attack reality, rather than flinch from it, to go on the offensive, to master life. Yeats never gave up his belief in magic, but rather than use his imagination to create an alternate reality he could retreat to, he used it to transform himself. As Wilson writes, Yeats’s Last Poems (1938–1939) “reveal a man who is completely adjusted to reality and who recognizes that his own sense of purpose is somehow connected to human evolution.” This is the “profane perfection of mankind” Yeats speaks of in “Under Ben Bulben.”19 Yeats, Wilson says, shows that “we are not faced with a bleak choice between self-deception and a reality that frightens and depresses us,” as Kirk Allen and Rokeach’s three Christs were frightened and depressed. The study of false messiahs, Wilson believes, teaches us that “the unconscious mind can transform reality without self-deception.”20Where does this transformation take place? In what Wilson calls “the second stream,” the current of imaginative and intellectual activity that runs parallel to the “primary stream” of ordinary, everyday life, a nod to the distinction H. G. Wells had made long ago.21 Most of the time the two streams are mixed and life is a burdensome muddle. But there are moments when they separate and, with the everyday demands quieted, the mind can “lift off” and soar into spheres of inner freedom, the kind of freedom Wilson had pursued for practically his whole life. It is difficult to achieve and fleeting—Wilson tells of reaching it one sleepless night in a Japanese hotel. It is not, he says, a “visitation,” but something that can be achieved “by direct effort.” There is no reason why these powers should respond only to self-delusion, he tells us. They are in fact presages of “the more highly controlled states of consciousness of which human beings are capable.”22

This was the real message of the book. But given its disjointed character, it’s not surprising if it was lost on some readers.

Gary Lachman 

Beyond the Robot 

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