To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.

Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)

Nanamoli Thera

Friday, September 22, 2023

Intelligent Design and information theory

 Intelligent Design  became an informal “movement” about twenty-five years ago. In 1990, the lawyer and Darwin-skeptic Norman Macbeth unexpectedly received in the mail a manuscript from the U. C. Berkeley law professor Phillip E. Johnson. He questioned Darwinism in much the same way that Macbeth had in his bookDarwin Retried. Not long after that, Johnson’s manuscript was published asDarwin on Trial(1991). It’s convenient to think of the intelligent design [ID] movement as beginning with that book.

Some of ID’s leading researchers soon joined Phillip Johnson and gave him their full support. Here are seven, in alphabetical order: Michael Behe, William Dembski, David Klinghoffer, Stephen Meyer, Paul A. Nelson, Richard Sternberg, and Jonathan Wells. Today, many more names could be added. Discovery Institute also opened its doors in 1991.

Others say that claims about intelligent design began earlier—in the 1980s. The (atheist) astronomer Fred Hoyle used the term in 1982, and in 1984, three scientists, Charles Thaxton, Walter Bradley, and Roger Olsen, publishedThe Mystery of Life’s Origin. They argued for an “intelligent cause” behind the origin of the information in DNA.In 1861, Charles Darwin referred to intelligent design, but in a way that Richard Dawkins surely would have liked and admired. Here’s Darwin:

 One cannot look at this Universe with all living productions & man without believing that all has been intelligently designed; yet when I look to each individual organism, I can see no evidence of this.1

And here’s Dawkins: “Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”2InThe Origin of Species, Darwin did not address the problem of how life began, beyond saying that it was “breathed” into some primordial form. Later, in an 1871 letter to his friend J. D. Hooker, he said that life may have begun in a “warm little pond.” Darwin’s allies have basically accepted that because they don’t have anything better to offer.

To this day, the origin of life remains a mystery. No one has been able to create life, whether in a warm little pond or in a test tube—but not for lack of trying. Nita Sahei, a professor at the University of Akron and an origin-of-life researcher, listed some of the types of molecules that would have to be coordinated to form life, including (as she put it) “four nucleotides, twenty amino acids, a few lipids… several clays and other minerals.”3In a 2014 lecture entitled “The Origins of Life: From Geochemistry to Biochemistry,” she called the task of getting just the right components to form life in a lab “a combinatorial nightmare.” Then she said: “We need to use intelligent—not intelligent design…”4Oops, she almost invoked the forbidden theory. She was quickly rescued by another professor who told her to say “careful selection.” So she changed the wording: “We need to carefully select which nucleotides to start with, which amino acids and minerals…”5

As this intervention suggests, “intelligent design” has become unmentionable in biology departments, except as something to deny, disdain, or attack. I shall say more about biologists’ hostility to the very idea of intelligent design later in this chapter.

Meanwhile, it is more than reasonable to maintain that the origin of life did indeed require “intelligent design.” No one yet has been able to explain that origin without design. When Ben Stein asked Richard Dawkins in the movieExpelled: No Intelligence Allowedhow life began, Dawkins said that he had no idea, and neither did anyone else.

 Late in the Day

ONE MIGHT say that, for those who dispute Darwinism, intelligent design theory came along late in the day. One explanation is that an effective critique of Darwinism can be mounted without relying on intelligent design, just as Macbeth did inDarwin Retried. Furthermore, ID in its recent incarnation has largely depended on the discovery of DNA and its details, in the 1950s and 1960s.

Nonetheless, intelligent design adds considerably to the case against neo-Darwinism. It confronts the theory with huge improbabilities that Darwin himself could not have foreseen. Random DNA change is the only mechanism at the Darwinists’ disposal, so they must either abandon their creed or accept that highly improbable events routinely occur within the cell.

Recall that Darwin and his contemporaries had no way of knowing just how complex a cell is. Today it is sometimes compared to a high-tech factory. But a cell is far more complex than that. For one thing, factories can’t replicate themselves.

Meanwhile, we are repeatedly told that ID can’t be right because Darwinian evolution “is a fact.” But we can search in vain for facts that establish the truth of the theory. Natural selection? It cannot create new species. Instead, it works in the Darwinian mind as a magic wand that makes problems disappear as easily as a magician’s props.

Further, natural selection is not available as a mechanism until the first replicating cell has appeared. Common descent is a deduction from Darwin’s theory, but it has never been demonstrated. Homology is a fact of nature, but it is also common in human design. Organisms are observed to vary about a mean, but never to “depart indefinitely from the original type.” And so it goes.

But one philosophy has attached itself like a limpet to Darwinism. That is the philosophy of materialism, or naturalism, and it does seem to support the theory. But it turns out that philosophical materialism severely restricts the possibilities of science. In fact, science was long promoted by Christians without any reliance on materialism. InThe Genesis of Science(2011) James Hannam elaborates on his thesis that the Christian Middle Ages launched the scientific revolution. Later, Isaac Newton, a theist, saw that design was necessary in explaining the origin of the Solar System’s planetary orbits.

 ID as an Inference

INTELLIGENT DESIGN is not a deduction from a philosophy but an inference from observed facts. In everyday life we make inferences to design all the time. The philosopher William Lane Craig put it this way: “A beachcomber who comes upon a sand castle recognizes that it’s not the result of the action of the waves and the wind, but of intelligent design.”6An archaeologist excavating a site can tell the difference between a human artifact, such as a statue, and an object misshaped due to erosion. Sometimes it can be difficult to make that distinction, as with an early hand axe, but the occasional difficulty does not render the distinction itself invalid.Inferences to design are often made long after the designer has departed from the scene, or whose identity may never be known. Anyone who tried to argue that the image of four U.S. presidents on Mount Rushmore was a product of wind erosion would be judged insane. We know that they were designed, and we know that without necessarily knowing the name of the designer, the number of his assistants, or when or how the carving was done. Stonehenge? We know it was designed thousands of years ago, although we don’t know by whom. As for its purpose, that is still uncertain and debated.

We have no problem, then, in inferring human design. After all, humans design things every day. But an inference to design in nature, and biology in particular, is contrary to the unwritten rules of contemporary science. Allowing that organisms are designed would take us into forbidden territory. That reminds us of the materialist philosophy that currently presides over science, even though its role is often inexplicit.

 In a purely materialistic universe design is impossible. In such a world, all we have are colliding atoms and molecules. Matter, on a materialistic theory, creates mind. Phillip Johnson once allowed that “evolution is the most plausible explanation for life if you’re using naturalistic terms,” or materialistic philosophy.7Why should our everyday judgments about design be suspended in the case of living organisms? Because admitting design in biology would immediately overthrow Darwin’s theory. Its whole thrust from the beginning was to eliminate the need for a designer—to persuade us that nature could construct organisms without any “input” from a designer. That is precisely what natural selection was supposed to have achieved. But of course it didn’t.

“In order to find out what or who its designer is,” said Thomas Woodward, a historian of intelligent design, “one must go outside the narrow discipline of biology.”8

From; Darwin’s House of Cards: A Journalist’s Odyssey Through the Darwin Debatesby Tom Bethell

Thursday, September 21, 2023

Human exceptionalism and its enemies

  AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THE CLAIM THAT HUMANS ARE unexceptional—and arrogant for thinking otherwise—was first made by Darwin. He asked in a notebook over twenty years beforeThe Originwas published: “Why is thought[,] being a secretion of brain, more wonderful than gravity[,] a property of matter? It is our arrogance, it [is] our admiration of ourselves.”1

And in the same notebook: “Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work, worthy [of] the interposition of a deity. More humble & I believe truer to consider him created from animals.”2

He speculated that grinning began with baboons baring their “great canine teeth,” and that “Laughing [was] modified barking, smiling modified laughing.” Barking itself may have started out as a way of signaling the “discovery of prey.” Darwin allowed that “crying is a puzzler.”3He never changed his opinion. InThe Descent of Man(1871) he said that his object was “to shew that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties.”4What about language? “With respect to animals,” he said, “I have already endeavoured to show that they have this power, at least in a rude and incipient degree.”5

Darwin repeatedly adopted this strategy of minimizing the difference between the mental powers of humans and animals. In another variation on this theme, he claimed that some humans are mere “savages” or “barbarians.” The Fuegians at the tip of South America, for example, “rank amongst the lowest barbarians.”6They and other such are little removed from the “higher animals.” Any remaining gap could then easily be bridged by Darwin’s all-purpose mechanism, natural selection.

 For his followers, the alleged ordinariness of human beings was little more than a deduction from common descent. His supporter Thomas Huxley wrote in 1863:

Is man a peculiar organism? Does he originate in a wholly different way from a dog, bird, frog, or fish? And does he thereby justify those who assert that he has no place in nature, and no real relationship with the lower world of animal life? Or does he develop from a similar embryo, and undergo the same slow and gradual progressive modifications?

The answer is not for an instant doubtful, and has not been doubtful for the last thirty years. The mode of man’s origin and the earlier stages of his development are undoubtedly identical with those of the animals standing directly below him in the scale; without the slightest doubt, he stands in this respect nearer the ape than the ape does to the dog.7It didn’t seem to occur to Huxley that even though human development in the womb may resemble that of other animals, the end-product is quite different.

Darwin’s accusation of “arrogance” was changed to a charge of “vanity” by Huxley, for whom ridicule was the preferred weapon: “It is not I who seek to base Man’s dignity upon his great toe, or insinuate that we are lost if an Ape has a hippocampus minor.”

On the contrary [Huxley added], I have done my best to sweep away this vanity. I have endeavored to show that no absolute structural line of demarcation, wider than that between the animals which immediately succeed us in the scale, can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves.8To be sure, inThe Uniqueness of Man(1951), Thomas Huxley’s grandson Julian did acknowledge uniquely human features, among them language, conceptual thought, and the transmission of knowledge by writing. But the theme of “arrogance” took hold, and has been regularly repeated since. Here is Stephen Jay Gould inEver Since Darwin(1977):

 Chimps and gorillas have long been the battleground of our search for uniqueness; for if we could establish an unambiguous distinction—of kind rather than of degree—between ourselves and our closest relatives, we might gain the justification long-sought for our cosmic arrogance. The battle shifted long ago from a simple debate about evolution: educated people now accept the evolutionary continuity between humans and apes.

But we are so tied to our philosophical and religious heritage that we still seek a criterion for strict division between our abilities and those of chimpanzees. For as the Psalmist sang: ‘what is man, that thou art mindful of him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and has crowned him with glory and honor.’9The accusation of arrogance is self-defeating on its face. Only humans are capable of arrogance or of seeing themselves as superior to other animals. Animals cannot rise to that level of abstraction. Do cats or dogs think themselves superior to humans? (Well, dogs don’t, but I’m not so sure about cats.) The criticism of arrogance itself rests on human exceptionalism. Meanwhile Gould, who lost his own faith—as Darwin did his—saw himself as someone who had lost nothing but his arrogance.

The University of Washington biologist and liberal activist David P. Barash introduced a variation on the same theme. In theNew York Timeshe denied the uniqueness of human moral values:Before Darwin, one could believe that human beings were distinct from other life-forms, chips off the old divine block. No more. The most potent take-home message of evolution is the not-so-simple fact that, even though species are identifiable (just as individuals generally are), there is an underlying linkage among them—literally and phylogenetically, via traceable historical connectedness.10

He added that “no literally supernatural trait has ever been found in Homo sapiens; we are perfectly good animals, natural as can be and indistinguishable from the rest of the living world at the level of structure.”

 But at the level of structure, what would a good materialist like Barash expect to find? Seraphic wings? Looking for supernatural traits at the natural level is as illogical as hunting for the mind in brain cells.

Human Exceptionalism versus Darwinism

SENTIMENT FOR human exceptionalism is inversely related to Darwinism. If we regard humans as exceptional, we are likely to reject Darwin’s theory. In his bookCreated from Animals(1990), James Rachels (1941–2003) claimed that after Darwin, “we can no longer think of ourselves as occupying a special place in creation—instead, we must realize that we are products of the same evolutionary forces, working blindly and without purpose, that shaped the rest of the animal kingdom.”11An animal rights activist, Rachels was also a supporter of “active” euthanasia.

Here’s a conventional-wisdom update fromNew Scientist:

For much of our existence on Earth, we humans thought of ourselves as a pretty big deal. Then along came science and taught us how utterly insignificant we are. We aren’t the center of the universe. We aren’t special. We are just a species of ape living on a smallish planet orbiting an unremarkable star in one galaxy among billions in a universe that had been around for 13.8 billion years without us.12But wait; there was a correction. “Maybe we were too hasty to write ourselves off,” the editorial continued:

There is a sense in which we are still the center of the universe. Science also teaches us that the laws of physics are ridiculously, almost unbelievably ‘fine-tuned’ for you and me. Take the electromagnetic force. It has a value that is perfectly set for getting stars to bind protons and neutrons to create carbon—the building block of life as we know it. Or the strong nuclear force, which binds the insides of protons and neutrons. If it were even a tiny bit stronger, the whole world would be made of hydrogen; if it were weaker, there would be no hydrogen at all. In either case, life as we know it wouldn’t be possible.13A more elaborate version of that revisionist argument was made by Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Richards inThe Privileged Planet(2004).

 The ancient (and modern) claim that humans display a unique intelligence has been met with a search for it elsewhere: within the solar system or outside it; in our machines, in the form of artificial intelligence; or in other animals—most commonly chimpanzees.

The search for extraterrestrial intelligence, artificial intelligence, or chimp-talk thus constitutes a three-pronged search for what humans possess by the age of four. They are looking for something that evolutionists are convinced should be there, so they keep on looking. The un-stated goal is to justify Darwinism by denying human uniqueness.

Chimp Talk

THE ASPECT of human uniqueness that Darwin might have examined more closely is language. We can talk to one another; animals can’t. We can put words on paper and others can read them. Darwin did discuss “articulate language” inThe Descent of Man, and he allowed that it is “peculiar to man”—but with his own reservations. Humans, “like the lower animals,” make inarticulate cries “to express their meaning, aided by gestures,” he said.14Darwin used such observations to convince himself that the gap between animals and humans is not so great after all.

He also noted “the tendency in our nearest allies, the monkeys, to imitate what they hear.” And “monkeys certainly understand much that is said to them by man.” (Not really, of course.) So it’s possible that “some unusually wise ape-like animal should have thought of imitating the growl of a beast of prey, so as to indicate to his fellow monkeys the nature of the expected danger.” This “would have been a first step in the formation of a language.”15And at that point Darwin seemed to imagine that his problem was all but solved.Earnest attempts to get chimpanzees—not monkeys—to communicate did not begin for about another 100 years. In the 1970s and later we heard about Lana, Moja, Kanzi, Washoe, Panbanisha, and maybe a dozen other chimpanzees. The most celebrated was Nim Chimpsky, a pun on Noam Chomsky. MIT’s Chomsky had earlier poured cold water on the project, saying that the ability to use language is an innately and uniquely human development. Nonetheless, Gould became so convinced by the chimp reports that he thought the only honest alternative to human exceptionalism was to admit

 strict continuity in kind between ourselves and chimpanzees. And what do we lose thereby? Only an antiquated concept of soul to gain a more humble, even exalting vision of our oneness with nature… We are more nearly akin to the chimpanzee than even Huxley dared to think.16

Language was “the last bastion for potential differences in kind,” Gould wrote. True, “early experiments on teaching chimps to talk were notably unsuccessful.” But there was a simple explanation. “The vocal cords of chimpanzees are constructed in such a way that large repertories of articulated sounds cannot be produced.”17But as the linguist Noel Rude, an expert on Native American languages, has pointed out, parrots can accurately reproduce words with only a beak.18Next, Gould promoted sign language. When “Lana” of the Yerkes laboratory began to ask for the names of objects she had not previously seen, “can we any longer deny to chimps the capacity to conceptualize and to abstract?” Gould asked. “This is no mere Pavlovian conditioning.”19

Baby chimps began making recognizable signs, and their progress “is no slower than that of a human child,” Gould said. In short, we have seen “a striking demonstration of how we have underestimated our closest biological relatives.”20Likewise, primatologist Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, formerly with the Iowa Primate Learning Sanctuary, promoted a gradation of linguistic skills, from primates to humans.

But animal language research fell into disrepute when “talking” chimps like Washoe and Nim Chimpsky were exposed as unintentional frauds. Scientists found strong evidence that the chimps had simply learned to please their teachers by contorting their hands in various ways. The trainers, straining to find examples of linguistic communication, thought they saw words, “like children seeing pictures in the clouds.”21

 Mark Seidenberg, a graduate student at Columbia during the Nim project, doubted whether chimp signing and human language were ever related. Animal rights activist Peter Singer cited results using the most generous possible interpretations. In deciding what Washoe or Koko meant when they signed “banana,” for example, researchers relied on what is called “rich interpretation.” They assumed that the ape possesses whatever knowledge a child possesses in using the same word. The real challenge—to determine whether ape and child do possess the same knowledge—was sidestepped. Seidenberg and others with no personal investment in particular outcomes challenged Singer’s account. Eventually much of the research funding was withdrawn because the science was not credible.

“In my mind, this kind of research is more analogous to the bears in the Moscow circus who are trained to ride unicycles,” said Dr. Steven Pinker, a cognitive scientist at MIT (later Harvard) who has studied language acquisition in children. “You can train animals to do all kinds of amazing things.” He doubted that the chimps learned anything more than how to press the right buttons in order to get humans “to cough up M & M’s, bananas and other tidbits of food.”22

Linguists have also noted how quickly children (but not chimps) can go from cobbling together two-word utterances to spinning out complex sentences with phrases embedded within phrases. Children can easily put together sentences that they never heard before and will never use again.

In the journalScience, Nim Chimpsky’s trainer Dr. Herbert Terrace, a Columbia University psychologist, asked: “Can an ape create a sentence?” He “reluctantly” concluded that the answer was no. There was no evidence that chimps had acquired a generative grammar—the ability to string words together into sentences of arbitrary length and complexity. Like Pinker, Terrace said that Kanzi, another trained chimp, was simply “going through a bag of tricks in order to get things.”23

 Terrace rejected comparisons to human children. “If a child did exactly what the best chimpanzee did, the child would be thought of as disturbed.”24Helene Guldberg, editor of theSpiked Review of Books,wrote that, despite the dedication of a number of primatologists, “the cognitive and linguistic abilities of the great apes have never surpassed those of a two-year-old child.”25

From Chimps to the Stars

FIRST, I’LL briefly mention the mundane explanation for the ongoing search for intelligent life at the extraterrestrial level: funding. NASA keeps looking for extraterrestrial intelligence because it will greatly increase the agency’s popularity on Capitol Hill. Congress is far more likely to fund sorties to outposts of life than to barren rocks. Expeditions to planets outside the solar system are not remotely plausible, but maybe distant civilizations can be detected using short-wave radio receptors.

But the Copernican Principle, sometimes called the Mediocrity Principle, claiming that there was nothing special about the Earth, soon gave way to the Fermi Paradox. In 1950, at Los Alamos, the nuclear physicists Enrico Fermi, Edward Teller, and others were discussing the latest ideas about the universe: it was much larger and older than had earlier been thought; it contained billions of stars evolving over billions of years, probably accompanied by more planets than stars; and the physical laws that apply here also applied out there.

So, “where is everybody?” Fermi famously asked. It became known as the Fermi Paradox.

Enter Frank Drake, a Cornell astronomer who responded in 1959. Using radio telescopes, scientists could listen for signals from aliens. Drake cobbled together the Drake Equation, hoping to estimate how many intelligent, communicating civilizations there are in our galaxy. The novelist Michael Crichton rightly complained that the equation was vacuous because it included no data. Cosmologists and evolutionists plugged in their own numbers anyway, and in their math, the probability of life—possibly intelligent, communicating life turned out to be a near certainty. All you needed was enough habitable platforms—planets—to work with. They are now finding some of those planets. But no extraterrestrial life—let alone intelligence—has yet been discovered.

 Darwin speculated that life may have first appeared in a “warm little pond.”26No experiment has been able to generate life from non-life, and today life on Earth is the only life that we know. But Darwinians have theorized that given enough warm little ponds, life surely must have appeared somewhere else in the universe.

From Exceptionalism to Misanthropy

IN THE late twentieth century, a new element entered into our philosophy—disapproval of the human race. Misanthropy became fashionable, as it still is today. Gould jeered at our “need to see ourselves as separate and superior.”27“Exceptionalism” was now admitted, but in a different form: Human beings were exceptionally bad. For one thing, we were too numerous for our own or anything else’s good. And we did harmful things, exploding nuclear weapons and so on.In The Panda’s Thumb, reflecting on the extinction of the dodo, Gould wrote that “we who revel in nature’s diversity and feel instructed by every animal tend to brand Homo sapiens as the greatest catastrophe since the Cretaceous extinction.”28Environmentalists today see humans as doing harm and little else. Meanwhile, they worry that nothing could be more exceptional than being alone in the Cosmos. So they keep looking for life somewhere else.

Religious Implications of Extraterrestrial Life

GOULD ONCE argued that “a positive result [finding extraterrestrial intelligence] would be the most cataclysmic event in our entire intellectual history.”29But why cataclysmic? He didn’t say. Maybe what he meant was that it would be cataclysmic not to find it.

The physicist Lawrence Krauss—like Gould an atheist—said that the discovery of extraterrestrial life would be “jolting” to “orthodox Christians.” Earlier, the “revelation that the Earth is not the center of the solar system” had delivered a similar jolt, he believed.30(Actually, it didn’t.)

 Here is the columnist Charles Krauthammer on the same topic:

As the romance of manned space exploration has waned, the drive today is to find our living, thinking counterparts in the universe. For all the excitement, however, the search betrays a profound melancholy—a lonely species in a merciless universe anxiously awaits an answering voice amid utter silence. That silence is maddening. Not just because it compounds our feeling of cosmic isolation. But because it makes no sense. As we inevitably find more and more exo-planets where intelligent life can exist, why have we found no evidence—no signals, no radio waves—that intelligent life does exist?”31Maddening? Jolting? Cataclysmic? Maybe they sense that Darwin’s philosophy is at stake.

What lies beyond the solar system? Probably we’ll never know, unless extraterrestrials transmit that sequence of prime numbers that Carl Sagan and others hoped to see transmitted. Until then, a good case can be made for the uniqueness of life on Earth. And that would entail the uniqueness of intelligent, human life. The thought that life on Earth might in fact be unique is unpopular with materialists, because it raises the discomforting possibility that God was responsible for the origin of life and everything else.

The Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg said inThe First Three Minutesthat humans are “just a more or less farcical outcome of a chain of accidents reaching back to the first three minutes…”32He has also argued that if—if—“calculations showed” that the odds of a planet having the right gravity, temperature, and chemical composition were very small and “the earth on which we live were the only planet in the universe” then a “benevolent designer” might indeed “make sense.” For it would be difficult “without supposing divine intervention to understand our great good fortune in having come into being.”33 But, Weinberg added, we now know that “a good fraction of stars have planets.” So, “we need not be surprised that chance events governed by impersonal natural laws have produced intelligent life on at least one of the planets.”34Let’s just say that Weinberg was eager to avoid finding in favor of a Designer. He simply assumed that the probabilities support the case he wanted to make—that life arose accidentally and has no meaning. He has also called religion “an insult to human dignity.”35

Carl Sagan, one of the leading promoters of extraterrestrial intelligence, “believed in superior beings in space, creatures so intelligent, so powerful, as to resemble gods.”36Sagan had proposed that a new civilization is formed just in our galaxy every ten years. If so, Sagan concluded, “there are a million technical civilizations in the [Milky Way] galaxy.”37Surprisingly, Richard Dawkins has shown similar inclinations. He was quoted in theNew York Timesas saying, “It’s highly plausible that in the universe there are God-like creatures.” He was careful to stipulate that “these Gods came into being by an explicable scientific progression of incremental evolution.”38

But even if we do assume the existence of a “Goldilocks” planet—one that has the right size, temperature, and atmosphere to encourage the appearance of life—we still have no idea how likely it is that life will appear spontaneously, because we don’t know how to create life ourselves. Nor do we have any idea how likely it is that such life will evolve to the point where it can build radio telescopes.

Sagan’s faith in the widespread emergence of civilizations arose “because he believed uncritically in Progress,” said his biographer Keay Davidson.39It was the Enlightenment that had inculcated this faith. Darwin also embraced it. So did Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and a hundred other thinkers. But even as our modern-day misanthropy has been embraced, our assumption of progress has been discarded. And that puts our modern philosophy directly at odds with the evolutionist faith. I will take a closer look at this conflict in Chapter 21. Meanwhile, in the next chapter I shall examine the attempts to locate artificial intelligence within computers.

DARWIN’S HOUSE OF CARDS

A JOURNALIST’S ODYSSEY THROUGH THE DARWIN DEBATES

by


Tom Bethell

Schopenhauer - On physiognomy

 That the exteriora of a human being graphically reproduces his interiorb and the face expresses and reveals his whole essencec is an assumption whose a priori nature and thus certainty are demonstrated by the universal desire, which appears at every opportunity, to see someone who has distinguished himself in any way, bad or good, or who has produced an extraordinary work or, failing this, at least to learn from others what he looks like. Hence, on the one hand, the rush to those places where he is expected to be, and on the other the efforts of the daily newspapers, especially in England, to describe him minutely and strikingly, until soon thereafter painters and engravers give us graphic portrayals and finally Daguerre’s invention,d so highly valued for precisely this reason, satisfies our need most perfectly. Likewise in ordinary life everyone examines the physiognomy of everyone they meet and tries secretly to ascertain his moral and intellectual nature in advance from his facial features. All this could not be the case if, as some fools imagine, the appearance of a man were of no significance, as if the soul were indeed one thing and the body another, relating to the former as a coat to the man himself.

On the contrary each human face is a hieroglyph which truly can be deciphered, indeed whose alphabet we bear within us ready-made. A human being’s face even says more and is more interesting, as a rule, than his mouth, for it is the compendium of everything that he will ever 672 say, being the monogram of all this human being’s thinking and striving. It is also the case that the mouth expresses only the thoughts of a man, while the face expresses a thought of nature. Therefore everyone is worthy of being carefully observed, even if everyone is not worth talking to. – Now if each individual is worth observing as an individual thought of nature, then so too in the highest degree is beauty, for it is a higher, more universal concept of nature: it is nature’s thought of the species. This is why it compels our gaze so powerfully; it is nature’s fundamental and main thought, whereas the individual is only a secondary thought, a corollary.

Everyone tacitly proceeds from the principle that everyone is as they appear, which is a correct principle; but the difficulty lies in the application, the capacity for which is partly innate and partly to be gained by experience and which no one completely masters, so that even the most practised individual catches himself in mistakes. Nevertheless the face does not lie – regardless of what Figaro may saya – but it is we who read from it what is not there.1 To be sure, the deciphering of a face is a great and difficult art. Its principles2 can never be learned in the abstract.b The first condition for it is that we perceive our man with a purely objective look, which is not so easy. For at the faintest hint of dislike, affection, fear, hope or even the thought of what kind of impression we are now making on him, in short, as soon as anything subjective gets mixed in, the hieroglyph becomes confused and falsified. Just as the sound of a language is heard only by someone who does not understand it, because otherwise the signified immediately displaces the sign from consciousness, so too the only one who sees a person’s physiognomy is someone to whom that person is still a stranger, i.e., who has not become accustomed to his face through frequently seeing or even speaking with him. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is only at first glance that we have the pure objective impression of a face and thus the possibility of deciphering it. Just as odours affect us only when they first set in and we notice the taste of a wine really only with the first glass, so faces also make their full impression only the first time. This is why we should pay careful attention to it and make note of it, indeed, with individuals 673 who are important to us personally, we should write down our impression, that is, if we are to trust our own physiognomical feelings. Our subsequent acquaintance and socializing will efface that impression, but the sequel will someday confirm it.

Meanwhile we do not want to deny that the first sight is often extremely unpleasant – but then most people do not count for much! – With the exception of beautiful, good-natured and intelligent faces – and these are extremely few and rare – I believe the sight of every new face will generally arouse a sensation related to shock in a person of refined feelings, inasmuch as it presents something unpleasant in a new and surprising combination. It really is, as a rule, a gloomy sight (a sorry sight).c Indeed there are some whose faces display such a naïve coarseness and baseness of character, accompanied by such an animalistic limitation of the understanding, that we have to wonder how they even go about with such a face and do not wear a mask instead. Indeed, there are faces the mere sight of which makes us feel sullied. Therefore we cannot blame those whose privileged circumstances allow them the luxury of withdrawing and buffering themselves so that they remain entirely removed from the painful sensation of ‘seeing new faces’. – In the metaphysical explanation of this matter we have to consider that everyone’s individuality is precisely that from which he will be reclaimed and corrected by his existence itself. If on the other hand the psychological explanation suffices for us, then we must ask ourselves what kind of physiognomy is to be expected from those in whose hearts very rarely anything has stirred throughout their lives but petty, lowly, miserable thoughts, and crude, selfish, jealous, bad and malicious desires. Each of these has carved its impression on the face for as long as it has lasted; over time and through frequent repetition, all these traces have furrowed deeply and become like wagon ruts, so to speak. This is why the sight of most people causes us to be startled at first and we only gradually become 674 accustomed to their faces, that is, become so deadened to their impression that it no longer has an effect on us.

But precisely that slow formative process of the enduring facial expression through countless transitory, characteristic contractions of the features is the reason why intelligent faces develop only gradually and even achieve their elevated expression only in old age, whereas portraits from their youth show only the earliest traces of it.3 On the other hand, what I just said about the first shock is in keeping with the above observation that a face only makes its correct and full impression the first time. For in order to receive this impression purely objectively and unfalsified, we must not have any kind of relationship to the person, indeed if possible not have spoken with him yet, since every conversation has a befriending effect, to some extent, and introduces a certain rapport, a mutually subjective relationship under which the objectivity of perception immediately suffers. Moreover since everyone tries to win respect and friendship for himself, the one to be observed will immediately apply all kinds of dissimulation techniques already available to him, and with his various looks will dissemble and flatter until we are so corrupted that we can no longer see what the first glance clearly showed us. Accordingly we then say that ‘most people gain from a closer acquaintance’, but we should be saying most people ‘fool us’. But when negative circumstances later set in, the judgement of the first glance is usually vindicated and often asserts itself scornfully. If on the other hand the ‘closer acquaintance’ is hostile from the start, then likewise we will not discover that people gained anything by it. Another cause for the alleged gain from closer acquaintance is that the man whose first glance warned us of him no longer shows merely his own nature and character once we converse with him, but also his education, i.e., not merely what he really is by nature, but also what he has acquired as shared property with the whole human race; three-quarters of what he says does not belong to him but has entered him from outside,4 then we are often surprised to hear such a minotaur speaking so humanely. But if we proceed from the ‘closer acquaintance’ to an even closer one, then ‘the 675 bestiality’ promised by the face will ‘soon be splendidly revealed’.a – Thus whoever is gifted with physiognomical acumen should pay careful attention to the expressions which preceded all closer acquaintance and were therefore unfalsified. For the face of a human being says precisely what he is, and if it deceives us, then it is our fault, not his. Conversely, the words of a human being say merely what he thinks, and more often only what he learned or even what he merely pretends to think. To this must be added that when we speak with him, or even hear him speak to others, we abstract from his actual physiognomy by setting it aside as the substratum, the strictly given, and pay attention only to its pathognomical dimension, the play of facial expressions while he is speaking; but he arranges this in such a way that he puts forward only the good side.

Now when Socrates said to a young man who was introduced to him for the purpose of testing his abilities: “Speak, so that I can see you”, then he was right (assuming that by seeing he did not mean hearing) to the extent that only when speaking do someone’s features become animated, especially the eyes, and his intellectual means and abilities make their imprint on his facial expressions, allowing us then to provisionally assess the degree and capacity of his intelligence, which was exactly Socrates’ goal here. Otherwise, however, we should qualify this by saying first that it does not include the moral qualities of a person, which lie deeper, and secondly that what we gain objectively in the clearer development of his facial features through his facial expressions, we in turn lose subjectively through our personal relationship, into which he immediately enters with us and which brings about a mild fascination that does not leave us unbiased, as explained above. Therefore it would be more correct given this latter point of view to say: “Do not speak, so that I can see you.”

For in order to comprehend the true physiognomy of a man purely and deeply, we must observe him when he is alone and left to himself. Any socializing and conversation with others already cast a foreign reflection on 676 him, mostly to his advantage, since he is set in motion by action and reaction and elevated by them. On the other hand, alone and left to himself, stewing in his own thoughts and sensations – only then is he completely and utterly himself. Then a deeply penetrating physiognomical glance can comprehend his entire nature in general at once. For on his face, in and of itself, the fundamental tone of all his thoughts and strivings is impressed, the irrevocable decreea of what he has to be and what he only completely senses himself when he is alone.

Now for this reason physiognomics is a principal means to knowledge about people, because physiognomy in the narrower sense is the only thing that cannot be reached by their techniques of dissimulation, since its realm is merely that of pathognomy and mimicry. This is precisely why I recommend that everyone be interpreted when he is alone and focused on himself and before we have spoken with him, partly because only then do we have the physiognomical before us purely and unalloyed, since in conversation the pathognomical immediately rushes in and he then applies his deliberate dissimulation techniques, and partly because every personal relationship, even the most fleeting, makes us biased and thus subjectively contaminates our judgement.

One more thing I need to point out is that generally it is much easier physiognomically to discover a man’s intellectual abilities than his moral character, since the former tend to display outwardly and have their expression not only in the face and its play of expressions, but also in the gait, indeed in every movement no matter how small. Perhaps one could even distinguish from behind a dummkopf, a fool, and a man of intellect. The dummkopf is characterized by the leaden sluggishness of all his movements; foolishness stamps its imprint on every gesture; intellect and reflection do the same thing. This is the basis of Labruyère’s observation: ‘There is nothing so subtle, so simple and so imperceptible that it does not contain a mannerism that betrays us. A dummkopf cannot enter, exit, sit down, stand up, keep silent or stand on his feet like a man of intellect.’b Incidentally this explains that ‘sure and prompt instinct’c which ordinary 677 minds possess, according to Helvétius, so as to recognize people of intellect and flee them. The matter itself is based first of all on the fact that the larger and more developed the brain and the thinner the spinal cord and nerves in relation to it, the greater are not only intelligence but at the same time the mobility and suppleness of the limbs, because they are then more directly and decisively controlled by the brain and consequently everything is pulled more by one string, such that every movement expresses its precise purpose. But the whole affair is analogous to and indeed connected with the fact that the higher an animal is on the scale of beings, the more easily it can be killed by an injury to a single spot. Take for instance the batrachia; just as they are sluggish, lethargic and slow in their movements, so too are they unintelligent and yet extremely tenacious of life, all of which can be explained by the fact that they have very thick spinal cord and nerves despite a tiny brain. Generally speaking, gait and arm movement are mainly functions of the brain, because the outer limbs receive their movement and every modification thereof, no matter how small, from the brain by means of the spinal cord nerves. This is also precisely why voluntary movements exhaust us, and this exhaustion, like pain, has its seat in the brain and not, as we imagine, in the limbs, and therefore it induces sleep; whereas those not stimulated by the brain, that is the involuntary movements of organic life such as the heart, lungs and so on proceed tirelessly. Now since the same brain is responsible both for thinking and controlling the limbs, the character of its activity is expressed in the one as in the other according to the constitution of an individual; stupid people move like automata, while in intelligent people every joint is expressive.5 – Nevertheless, intellectual qualities are much better recognized from the face than from gestures and movements, from the shape and size of the brow, the tension and mobility of the facial features and above all from the eyes – ranging from the small, cloudy, dull and dim eyes of a pig through all the intermediate stages up to the radiant and flashing eyes of a genius. – The look of cleverness,a even of the finest, differs from that of 678genius in that it bears the stamp of service to the will; the latter, on the other hand, is free of it.6 – And so the anecdote taken from Petrarch’s contemporary Joseph Brivius and related by Squarzafichi in his life of Petrarch is quite credible, namely that once at the court of the Visconti, as Petrarch stood among many gentlemen and nobles, Galeazzo Visconti instructed his son, who was at that time still a boy and later would become the first Duke of Milan, to pick the wisest man among all those present. The boy looked at all of them for a while, but then took Petrarch by the hand and led him to his father to the great admiration of all who were present. For nature presses the stamp of its dignity so clearly on the privileged of our species that a child can recognize it. Therefore I would advise my perspicacious countrymen that if they ever again get the urge to trumpet an ordinary brain for thirty years as a great mind, they at least do not select such a tavern keeper’s physiognomy as Hegel’s, on whose all too familiar face nature had written ‘ordinary fellow’a in her most legible handwriting.

But things are different from the intellectual when it comes to morals, to the character of a human being; this is much more difficult to recognize physiognomically because, as something metaphysical, it lies incomparably deeper and while it is indeed also associated with corporality or the organism, this only indirectly and not in connection with a specific part and system of it, like the intellect. We must add that whereas everyone is generally very satisfied with their understanding and strives openly to display it at every opportunity, morals are very rarely exposed to the light of day and are in fact for the most part deliberately concealed, the long practice of which brings about great mastery. Meanwhile, as detailed above, bad thoughts and worthless aspirations gradually leave their mark on the face, especially the eyes. Accordingly when judging physiognomically it is easy for us to guarantee that a man will never produce an immortal work, but not that he will never commit a major crime.

adas Aeußere

bdas Innere

cWesen

d [The daguerreotype, an early form of photography]

a [Figaro says ‘My face lies, but not I’ in Mozart’s The Marriage of Figaro, Act II]

bin abstracto

c [Schopenhauer’s English in parentheses]

a [Goethe, Faust, I, 2297–8]

aarrêt irrévocablebIl n’y a rien de si délié, de si simple, et de si imperceptible, où il n’y entrent des manières, qui nous décèlent: un sot ni n’entre, ni ne sort, ni ne s’assied, ni ne se lève, ni ne se tait, ni n’est sur ses jambs, comme un homme d’esprit. [Caractères (Characters), I, ch. 2]

cinstinct sûr et prompt [De l’esprit, Disc. II, ch. 3]

aKlugheit

aAlltagsmensch


Parerga and Paralipomena 2

The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer


Sunday, September 17, 2023

The scandal of creation

 With the exception of some aberrant cases, man does not incline to the good: what god would impel him to do so? Man must vanquish himself, must do himself violence, in order to perform the slightest action untainted by evil. And each time he succeeds, he provokes or humiliates his Creator. If he manages to be good—no longer by effort or calculation, but by nature—he owes his achievement to an inadvertence from on high: he situates himself outside the universal order; he was foreseen by no divine plan. It is difficult to say what station the good man occupies among what we call beings, even if he is one. Perhaps he is a ghost?

The good is what was or will be—it is what never is. Parasite of memory or of anticipation, past or possible, it cannot be actual—present—nor subsist in and of itself: as such, consciousness knows it not, and apprehends it only when it disappears. Everything proves its insubstantiality; the good is a great, unreal force, a principle which has miscarried from the start: lapse, immemorial failure, its effects are accentuated with the course of history. In the beginning, in that primal promiscuity where the swerve toward life occurred, something unspeakable must have happened which continues in our discomforts, if not in our reasonings. Who could help concluding that existence has been vitiated at its source, existence and the elements themselves? The man who fails to envisage this hypothesis at least once a day has gone through life as a sleepwalker.

.   .   .

It is difficult, it is impossible to believe that the Good Lord—“Our Father”—had a hand in the scandal of creation. Everything suggests that He took no part in it, that it proceeds from a god without scruples, a feculent god. Goodness does not create, lacking imagination; it takes imagination to put together a world, however botched. At the very least, there must be a mixture of good and evil in order to produce an action or a work. Or a universe. Considering ours, it is altogether easier to trace matters back to a suspect god than to an honorable one.

The Good Lord was certainly not equipped for creating: He possesses everything except omnipotence. Great by His weaknesses (anemia and kindness are partners), He is the prototype of ineffectuality: He can help no one. . . . Moreover, we cling to Him only when we cast off our historical dimension; as soon as we resume it, He is alien to us, incomprehensible: He has nothing which fascinates us, nothing of the monster. Whereupon we turn to the creator, inferior and officious god, instigator of events. In order to understand how he could have created, we must imagine him at grips with evil, which is innovation, and with good, which is inertia. This struggle must have been fatal to evil, which was thereby obliged to endure the contamination of good—thus, the creation could not be altogether wicked.

Since evil presides over all that is corruptible, in other words over all that is alive, it is absurd to try to prove it comprises less being than good does, or even that it contains none at all. Those who identify evil with nothingness suppose they are thereby saving their poor Good Lord. We save Him only if we have the courage to sever His cause from that of the Demiurge. Having refused to do so, Christianity inveterately sought to impose the inevidence of a merciful Creator: a hopeless enterprise which has exhausted Christianity and compromised the God it sought to preserve.

We cannot help thinking that the Creation, had it remained in the rough, neither could be completed nor deserved to be; the Creation is in fact a fault, man’s famous sin thereby appearing as a minor version of a much graver one. What are we guilty of, except of having followed, more or less slavishly, the Creator’s example? Easy to recognize in ourselves the fatality which was His: not for nothing have we issued from the hands of a wicked and woebegone god, a god accursed.

.   .   .

Some doomed to believe in the supreme but impotent God, others in the Demiurge, still others in the Devil, we choose neither our venerations nor our blasphemies.

The Devil is the representative, the delegate of the Demiurge, whose affairs he manages here on earth. Despite his prestige and the terror attached to his name, he is merely an administrator, merely an angel assigned to a menial task—to history.

Quite different is the sway of the Demiurge: how, in his absence, would we face our ordeals? If we were equal to them, or even worthy of them to some degree, we could abstain from invoking him. Before our evident inadequacies, we cling to him, we even beg him to exist: if he were to turn out to be a fiction, conceive our distress, our shame! Upon whom else would we vent our failures, our miseries, ourselves? Appointed by our fiat the author of our deficiencies, he serves as our excuse for all we cannot be. When furthermore we make him assume the responsibility for this defective universe, we enjoy a certain peace: no more uncertainty about our origins or our prospects, but the utmost security in the insoluble, outside the nightmare of promises. His merit is indeed inestimable: indeed he releases us from our regrets, since he has taken upon himself even the initiative of our defeats.

It is more important to recover, in divinity, our vices than our virtues. We are resigned to our qualities, whereas our defects pursue us, torment us. What a comfort, what a reassurance to be able to project them into a god susceptible of falling to our level, a god not confined in the insipidity of commonly acknowledged attributes. The Demiurge is the most useful god who ever was. If he were not under our hand, where would our bile be poured out? Each and every form of hate tends as a last resort toward him. Since we all believe that our merits are misunderstood or flouted, how admit that so general an iniquity could be the doing of mere man? It must go back further and belong to some ancient dirty work, to the very act of the Creation. Thus we know whom to blame, whom to disparage: nothing flatters and sustains us so much as being able to put the source of our indignity as far away from us as possible.

As for God in the strict sense, the good and debilitated One, we come to terms with Him whenever there no longer remains in us the trace of a world, in those moments that postulate Him, those moments that, attached to Him from the start, provoke Him, create Him, and during which He ascends from our depths for the greatest humiliation of our gibes. God is the grief of irony. Yet let our sarcasms get a hold of themselves, let them regain the upper hand, and our relations with Him are strained and broken. Then we tire of questioning ourselves on His account, we want to dismiss Him from our preoccupations and our passions, even from our contempt. So many others before us have dealt Him telling blows that it seems futile to come now and pummel a corpse. And yet He still counts for us, if only by our regret at not having trounced Him ourselves.

.   .   .In order to evade the difficulties inherent in dualism, we might postulate a single God whose history would develop in two phases: in the first, discreet, anemic, retiring, with no impulse to manifest Himself, a sleeping God exhausted by His own eternity; in the second phase, ambitious, frenzied, a God committing mistake after mistake, participating in a supremely blameworthy activity. Upon reflection, this hypothesis seems less clear-cut and less advantageous than that of the two distinct gods. But if we find that neither one accounts for what this world is worth, we shall then always have the resource of believing, with certain Gnostics, that it was drawn by lot among the angels.

(It is pitiable, it is degrading to identify the divinity with a person. Divinity will never be an idea nor an anonymous principle for the man who has frequented the Testaments. Twenty centuries of altercation are not forgotten overnight. Whether taking its inspiration from Job or from Saint Paul, our religious life is dispute, outrage, excess. Atheists, so ready with their invective, prove that they have someone in their sights. They should be less conceited; their emancipation is not so complete as they suppose: they have exactly the same notion of God as believers.)

.   .   .

The Creator is the absolute of external man; the inner man, in return, considers the Creation as an awkward detail, as a futile episode, even a fatal one. Every profound religious experience begins precisely where the realm of the Demiurge ends. It has only him to deal with—it denounces him, it is his negation. So much does he obsess us, he and the world, that there is no way of escaping either, in order to unite, in an outburst of annihilation, with the uncreated and to dissolve within it.

With the help of ecstasy, whose object is a god without attributes, an essence of god, we raise ourselves toward a purer form of apathy than that of the supreme God Himself, and if we plunge into the divine, we are nonetheless beyond any form of divinity for that. Here is the final stage, the goal of mysticism; the point of departure being the break with the Demiurge, the refusal to consort further with him and to applaud his works. No one kneels to him; no one venerates him. The only words we address to the Demiurge are backward supplications—sole mode of communication between an equally fallen creature and creator.

.   .   .

By inflicting upon the official God the functions of Father, Creator and general manager, we exposed Him to attacks to which He was to succumb. What might have been His longevity if only we had heeded Marcion, of all heresiarchs the one who most vigorously opposed evil’s sleight of hand, who contributed most to the glory of the Demiurge by the hatred he felt for him! There is no example of another religion which, at the outset, has missed so many opportunities. We should assuredly be quite different if the Christian era had been inaugurated by the execration of the Creator, for the permission to abuse Him would not have failed to lighten our burden, and to render the last two millennia that much less oppressive. By refusing to incriminate Him and to adopt the doctrines which would unhesitatingly do so, the Church was to commit itself to cunning and deception. At least we have the comfort of observing that what is most alluring in its history are its most intimate enemies, all those it has opposed and rejected, those who, in order to safeguard God’s honor, impugned—at the risk of martyrdom—His role as Creator. Fanatics of the divine nothingness, of that absence in which the Supreme Good delights, they knew the joy of hating this God and of loving that one without restrictions, without second thoughts. Swept on by their faith, they would have been in no position to discern the touch of imposture which enters into even the sincerest torment. The notion of pretext was not yet born, nor was that quite modern temptation of hiding our agonies behind some theological acrobatics.

Yet a certain ambiguity existed among them: what were these Gnostics and these Manicheans of every sort but perverts of purity, compulsives of horror? Evil attracted them, almost overwhelmed them: without evil, their existence would have been . . . vacant. They hunted it down, unflagging. And if they argued so vehemently that evil was uncreated, it was because they secretly longed for it to subsist forever, in order that they might delight in it, might practice, through all eternity, their combative virtues. Having, for love of the Father, reflected to excess upon the Adversary, they were to end by understanding damnation better than salvation. This is why they had grasped so well the essence of the fallen world. Will the Church, after having spewed them forth, be clever enough to appropriate their theses, and charitable enough to cast the Creator in a starring role in order to excommunicate Him at the end? It will be reborn only by exhuming the heresies, by annulling its old anathemas in order to pronounce new ones.

.   .   .

Timid, devoid of dynamism, the good is inept at communicating itself. Evil, much more zealous, seeks to transmit itself, and succeeds because it possesses the double privilege of being fascinating and contagious. Hence we see a bad Demiurge extend himself, get outside himself more easily than a good God.

We have all inherited something of this incapacity to remain within ourselves, whereof the Creator was to make so vexing a demonstration: to engender is to continue in another fashion and on another scale the enterprise which bears his name—it is, by a deplorable mimicry, to add to His “creation.” Without the encouragement He has given, the desire to extend the chain of beings would not exist, nor that necessity to subscribe to the gimmicks of the flesh. Every childbirth is suspect: the angels, luckily, are unsuited to it, the propagation of life being reserved to the fallen. The plague is impatient and greedy; it loves to spread. There is every reason to discourage generation, for the fear of seeing humanity die out has no basis: whatever happens, there will everywhere be enough fools who ask only to perpetuate themselves, and, if they themselves end by flinching from the task, there will always be found, to devote themselves to the cause, some hideous couple. . . .

It is not so much the appetite for life that is to be opposed as the lust for lineage. Parents—genitors—are provocateurs or mad. What could be more demoralizing than the fact that the worst freak should have the faculty of giving life, of “bringing into the world?” How contemplate without dread or repulsion the wonder that makes the first man in the street a demiurge on the brink? What should be a gift as exceptional as genius has been conferred indiscriminately upon all: a liberality of base coinage which forever disqualifies nature.

The criminal injunction of Genesis—“Be fruitful and multiply . . .”—could never have come out of the mouth of the Good Lord. “Be ye rare,” He would have suggested, surely, if He had had any say in the matter. Nor could He ever have added the fatal words: “. . . and replenish the earth.” They should be erased without delay, in order to cleanse the Bible of the shame of having garnered them.

The flesh spreads, further and further, like a gangrene upon the surface of the globe. It cannot impose limits upon itself, it continues to be rife despite its rebuffs, it takes its defeats for conquests, it has never learned anything. It belongs above all to the realm of the Creator, and it is indeed in the flesh that He has projected His maleficent instincts. Normally, the flesh should be less harmful to those who contemplate it than to those who extend its duration and assure its progress. Far from it, for they do not know what aberration it is that they are accomplices of. Pregnant women will some day be stoned to death, the maternal instinct proscribed, sterility acclaimed. It is with good reason that in the sects which held fecundity in suspicion—the Bogomils, for instance, and the Cathari—marriage was condemned; that abominable institution which all societies have always protected, to the despair of those who do not yield to the common delirium. To procreate is to love the scourge—to seek to maintain and to augment it. They were right, those ancient philosophers who identified fire with the principle of the universe, and with desire, for desire burns, devours, annihilates: At once agent and destroyer of beings, it is sombre, it is infernal by essence.

This world was not created in joy. Yet we procreate in pleasure. True enough—but pleasure is not joy, it is joy’s simulacrum: its function consists in deceiving, in making us forget that creation bears, down to its least detail, the mark of that initial melancholy from which it issued. Necessarily illusory, it is pleasure too which permits us to carry out certain performances which in theory we repudiate. Without its cooperation, continence, gaining ground, would seduce even the rats. But it is in what we call the transports of the flesh that we understand how fraudulent pleasure is. In the flesh, pleasure reaches its peak, its maximum intensity, and it is here, at the zenith of its success, that it suddenly opens to its unreality, that it collapses in its own void. The voluptuous flesh is the disaster of pleasure.

We cannot grant that a god, or even a man, proceeds from a gymnastic climaxed by a moan. It is curious that at the end of such a long period of time, “evolution” has not managed to perfect another formula. Why should it take the trouble, moreover, when the one in force functions so well and suits everybody? Let there be no mistake: life in itself is not in question, life is as mysterious and enervating as could be wished. What is not so is the exercise in question, of an inadmissible facility, given the consequences. When we know what fate permits each man, we remain stunned by the disproportion between a moment’s oblivion and the prodigious quantity of disgraces which result from it. The more one reverts to this subject, the more one finds that the only men who have understood anything about it are those who have opted for orgy or for asceticism, the debauched or the castrated.

Since procreation supposes a nameless distraction, it is certain that if we were to become prudent, in other words indifferent to the fate of the race, we should retain only a few samples, the way we preserve certain creatures of vanishing species. Let us block the way of all flesh, let us try to paralyze its alarming spread. We are in the presence of a veritable epidemic of life, a proliferation of faces. Where and how to remain, still, face-to-face with God?

No one is continually subject to the obsession with this horror. Sometimes we turn from it, almost forget it, especially when we contemplate some landscape from which our own kind is absent. Once they appear there, the obsession returns, settles down in the mind. If we were inclined to absolve the creator, to consider this world as acceptable and even satisfying, we should still have to make certain reservations about man, that blot on the creation.

.   .   .

We can imagine that the Demiurge, imbued with the inadequacy or the harmfulness of his production, might someday cause it to perish, and even manage to disappear along with it. But we can also conceive that down through the ages he has been concerned only to destroy himself and that what we call becoming is no more than the slow process of this autodestruction. Lagging or gasping, in either eventuality the process involves a reflexive movement, a scrutiny of conscience, whose result would be the casting out of the creation by its author.

What is anchored deepest in us and is least perceptible is the sentiment of an essential failure, hidden from all, including the gods. And what is remarkable is that most of us are far from realizing that we experience this sentiment. We are, moreover, by a special favor of nature, doomed not to become aware of it: Our power resides in our incapacity to know how alone we are. Blessed ignorance, thanks to which we can act, or at least act up. Once we have the revelation of this secret, our inner spring immediately breaks, and irremediably. This is what has happened to the Creator, or what will happen to Him, perhaps.

.   .   .

Always to have lived with the nostalgia to coincide with something, but not really knowing with what. . . . It is easy to shift from unbelief to belief, or conversely. But what is there to convert to, and what is there to abjure, in a state of chronic lucidity? Lacking substance, it offers no content that can be disclaimed; it is empty, and one does not disclaim the void: lucidity is the negative equivalent of ecstasy.

To coincide with nothing is not to coincide any better with ourselves; whence these faithless appeals, these vacillating convictions, these fervor-lacking fevers, this division which makes a victim of our ideas and even of our reflexes. At first we kept that ambiguity which governs all our relations with this world and the other for ourselves. Subsequently we have extended it around us, so that no one may escape it, so that no man alive knows what he may still abide by. Nothing clear anywhere: By our defection, things themselves stagger and subside into perplexity. What we need is that gift of imagining the possibility of prayer, indispensable to anyone in pursuit of his salvation. Hell is inconceivable prayer.The founding of a universal ambiguity is our most calamitous exploit—it makes us rivals of the Demiurge.

.   .   .

We were happy only in the ages when, greedy for obliteration, we enthusiastically accepted our nothingness. Religious feeling emanates not from the acknowledgement of but from the desire for our insignificance, from our need to wallow in it. How will this need, inherent in our nature, be satisfied now that we can no longer live in the wake of the gods? In other times it was the gods who abandoned us; today we abandon them. We have lived beside them too long for them still to find grace in our sight. Always within reach, we heard them stirring; they watched us, spied on us: we were no longer at home. Now, as experience teaches, there exists no being more odious than our neighbor. The fact of knowing him to be so close in space keeps us from breathing and makes our days and our nights equally unfeasible. Try as we will to brood upon his ruin, he is there, hideously present. To suppress him is the impulse of every thought; when we finally determine to do so, a spasm of cowardice grips us, just before the act. Thus, we are the potential murderers of those who live beside us; and from our incapacity to be the actual ones comes our torment, our bitterness, dilettantes and eunuchs of bloodshed that we are.

If, with the gods, everything seemed simpler, it is because their indiscretion was immemorial. We had to be done with it at all costs: Were they not too cumbersome to be endured any longer? Hence none of us could fail to add his little voice to the general hue and cry against them.

When we think of these age-old companions or enemies, of all the lords of sects, religions and mythologies, the only one we are reluctant to part with is this Demiurge, to whom we attach the very evils we so much want him to be the cause of. It is the Demiurge we think of apropos of each and every act of life and of life itself. Whenever we consider it, whenever we examine its origins, life amazes us, alarms us; it is a dreadful miracle which must proceed from him, a special god, a case utterly apart. There is no use insisting he does not exist, when our daily stupors are there to demand his reality and to proclaim it. Even if we argue that perhaps he existed but that he has died like the rest, those stupors of ours will not be gainsaid. They will busy themselves reviving him, and he will last as long as our amazement and our alarm, as long as our intimidated curiosity before all that is, all that lives. We may say: “Conquer fear, so that only amazement remains.” But to conquer fear, to make it vanish, we should have to attack its very principle and demolish its foundations, to rebuild nothing more or less than the world in its totality, nimbly to switch Demiurges, confiding ourselves, in short, to another creator.

From: The New Gods, chapter THE DEMIURGE

E. M. Cioran

Translated from the French by RICHARD HOWARD




Thursday, September 14, 2023

Julius Evola

 Evola’s political, philosophical and historical teachings were motivated by his traditionalism as a manifestation of what he termed the “revolt against the modern world”. While adhering to the cyclic conception of history Evola added to this the concept of a duality of civilisations categorised as traditional and modern. Evola saw the end cycle of Western civilisation, the beginning of which he ascribed to the Late Medieval period, as the start of the super-cycle of the modern. All those civilisations that had come and gone before were still within the context of the traditional. Evola wrote of the cycles of decline:

“Recently in contrast to the notion of progress and the idea that history has been represented by more or less continuous upward evolution of collective humanity, the idea of a plurality of the forms of civilisation and of a relative incommunicality between them has been confirmed. According to this second and new vision of history, history breaks down into epochs and disconnected cycles. … A civilisation springs up, gradually reaches a culminating point, and falls into darkness and, more often than not, disappears. A cycle has ended….” 118Evola considered this revived cyclic approach to history as “a healthy reaction to the superstition of history as progress”, which was a product of Western materialism. He offered this added dualist dimension however, and cautioned that Spenglerian cyclicism did not offer the entire story. In addition to “a plurality of civilisations”, an historical “duality” should be recognised. “Modern civilisation stands on one side and on the other the entirety of all the civilisations that have preceded it.” For the Western civilisation he put the end of the traditional phase and the beginning of the modern super-cycle as the “late Middle Ages”, when the point of rapture with tradition was complete. Since that time, “modern civilisation” has completely cut itself off from the past. “For the great majority of moderns, that means any possibility of understanding the traditional world has been completely lost”.119In 1938 Evola wrote a synopsis on the traditional approach to history, where he defined traditional and modern civilisations:

“On the one hand there are the traditional cultures… The axis of these cultures and the summit of their hierarchical order consist of metaphysical, supra-individual powers and actions, which serve to inform and justify all that which is merely human, temporal, subject to becoming and to ‘history’. On the other hand there is ‘modern culture’, which is actually anti-tradition and which exhausts itself in a construction of purely human and earthly conditions and in the total development of these, in pursuit of a life entirely detached from the ‘higher world’”.120

While Evola joined the debate over the meaning of “race” in Fascist Italy, when racial zoology suddenly gained momentum as official policy with the publication of the “Manifesto of Race” in 1938, ironically the same year he wrote in a German (that is, “Nazi”) publication an article explaining the traditionalist approach to the question of why civilisations decay. He contended that the “degeneration” of civilisation is not caused by race-crossings, which Hitlerism regards as axiomatic, but rather through the spiritual corruption of the culture-hierarchy from the top down.121Evola begins by repudiating the modernist idea of “progress”, stating that man is not ascending (evolution) but descending from a primordial higher state. One does not go from lower to higher forms. Hence, as we have seen, the widespread belief – or memory - across times, places, and cultures, in the “fall” of man from a mythic “Golden Age”, ascribed to the arrogance of man in defying the Godhead.

“Anyone who has come to reject the rationalist myth of ‘progress’ and the interpretation of history as an unbroken positive development of mankind will find himself gradually drawn towards the world-view that was common to all the great traditional cultures, and which had at its centre the memory of a process of degeneration, slow obscuration, or collapse of a higher preceding world. As we penetrate deeper into this new (and old) interpretation, we encounter various problems, foremost among which is the question of the secret of degeneration”.122Of the theories that have been considered Evola, writing for the Germans, alludes to the classic work of Comte Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of the Human Races, pioneering the doctrine that civilisations collapse through race-mixing. Evola quickly disposes of this by giving a passing nod to the theory, proceeding with a consideration of “a higher order of things” than blood admixture. Evola in reality does more than “expand” de Gobineau’s race-theory with “a few observations”; he disposes of it by pointing out that race-impurity does not explain the unremarkable state of present day Nordic states that have retained their race-purity:

“We can thank the Comte de Gobineau for the best and best-known summary of this problem, and also for a masterly criticism of the main hypotheses about it. His solution on the basis of racial thought and racial purity also has much truth in it, but it needs to be expanded by a few observations concerning a higher order of things. For there have been many cases in which a culture has collapsed even when its race has remained pure, as is especially clear in certain groups that have suffered slow, inexorable extinction despite remaining as racially isolated as if they were islands. An example quite close at hand is the case of the Swedes and the Dutch. These people are in the same racial condition today as they were two centuries ago, but there is little to be found now of the heroic disposition and the racial awareness that they once possessed. Other great cultures seem merely to have remained standing in the condition of mummies: they have long been inwardly dead, so that it takes only the slightest push to knock them down. This was the case, for example, with ancient Peru, that giant solar empire which was annihilated by a few adventurers drawn from the worst rabble of Europe”.123On the other hand there are cultures that Evola refers to as being outwardly motivated by modernism, yet retaining their inner traditional substance. Japan remains the prime example of such a state. One might also say that of Israel. There are also certain Buddhist states in South-east Asia that have materially prospered through the adaptation of modern techniques but have maintained a traditional nexus, as has India, despite these cultures having gone through the full cycles of rise and fall. A remnant lives, and might yet re-enter history in symbiosis with a post-Western civilisation.

Evola sees history unfolding within the great cosmic ages or yugas over vast expanses of time, and all the civilisations known to modern man as only decaying remnants of a long lost primordial civilisation. Hence, the history we know today is that of the fall of man over cycles of decline, interrupted by civilisations that have sought to maintain the cosmos connexion, but still subject to cyclic decay. Hence there are cycles of rise and fall within a great cosmic cycle; wheels within a great cosmic wheel. This outlook differs from the historical morphology of Spengler and others who work within more ordinary time-frames, yet both have broad features in common.

Evola sees “the whole of history as degeneration”, repudiating the notion of both historical and biological evolution, and the chimera of “progress”. Rather, the course of history is one of “involution”:

“From the standpoint of the latter, the whole of history is degeneration, because it shows the universal decline of earlier cultures of the traditional type, and the decisive and violent rise of a new universal civilization of the ‘modern’ type. A double question arises from this.”

“First, how was it ever possible for this to come to pass? There is a logical error underlying the whole doctrine of evolution: it is impossible that the higher can emerge from the lower, and the greater from the less. But doesn’t a similar difficulty face us in the solution of the doctrine of involution? How is it ever possible for the higher to fall? If we could make do with simple analogies, it would be easy to deal with this question. A healthy man can become sick; a virtuous one can turn to vice. There is a natural law that everyone takes for granted: that every living being starts with birth, growth, and strength, then come old age, weakening, and disintegration. And so forth. But this is just making statements, not explaining, even if we allow that such analogies actually relate to the question posed here.”

“Secondly, it is not only a matter of explaining the possibility of the degeneration of a particular cultural world, but also the possibility that the degeneration of one cultural cycle may pass to other peoples and take them down with it. For example, we have not only to explain how the ancient Western reality collapsed, but also have to show the reason why it was possible for ‘modern’ culture to conquer practically the whole world, and why it possessed the power to divert so many peoples from any other type of culture, and to hold sway even where states of a traditional kind seemed to be alive (one need only recall the Aryan East).”

“In this respect, it is not enough to say that we are dealing with a purely material and economic conquest. That view seems very superficial, for two reasons. In the first place, a land that is conquered on the material level also experiences, in the long run, influences of a higher kind corresponding to the cultural type of its conqueror. We can state, in fact, that European conquest almost everywhere sows the seeds of ‘Europeanization,’ i.e., the ‘modern’ rationalist, tradition-hostile, individualistic way of thinking. Secondly, the traditional conception of culture and the state is hierarchical, not dualistic. Its bearers could never subscribe, without severe reservations, to the principles of ‘Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’ and ‘My kingdom is not of this world.’ For us, ‘Tradition’ is the victorious and creative presence in the world of that which is ‘not of this world,’ i.e., of the Spirit, understood as a power that is mightier than any merely human or material one”.124Although Evola was writing in 1938, this “modern world” is now a global hegemony, reaching every corner of the globe. The World War which came a year later resulted in the triumph of decadence over the remnants of tradition. Now we see the present “clash of civilisations”, as it has been called by American geopolitical theorists, where the remnants of a long fellaheen – historically passé - Islam trying to resist encroachments on what remains of their cultures. As we shall see near our conclusion, American policy-makers are overt in seeing America as having a world-mission in destroying all vestiges of tradition in the name of “progress”.

“This is a basic idea of the authentically traditional view of life, which does not permit us to speak with contempt of merely material conquests. On the contrary, the material conquest is the sign, if not of a spiritual victory, at least of a spiritual weakness or a kind of spiritual ‘retreat’ in the cultures that are conquered and lose their independence. Everywhere that the Spirit, regarded as the stronger power, was truly present, it never lacked for means - visible or otherwise - to enable all the opponent’s technical and material superiority to be resisted. But this has not happened. It must be concluded, then, that degeneracy was lurking behind the traditional facade of every people that the ‘modern’ world has been able to conquer. The West must then have been the culture in which a crisis that was already universal assumed its acutest form. There the degeneration amounted, so to speak, to a knockout blow, and as it took effect, it brought down with more or less ease other peoples in whom the involution had certainly not ‘progressed’ as far, but whose tradition had already lost its original power, so that these peoples were no longer able to protect themselves from an outside assault.”125The Late Western perspective of history is that of a line of evolution from primitive to modern, culminating in the “end of history” when the world adopts liberal-democracy and free trade. The traditional perspective sees history as the waxing and waning of civilisations, each self-contained, going through analogous life-cycles of rise and fall. The two outlooks are reflections of differences in perceptions of time; the “modern” linear, the traditional cyclic. Traditional societies are premised on maintaining a connexion with the divine. The modern outlook sees this as superstition, but “progress” has become as much a religion as any form of mysticism. The “modern” road to “utopia” is through universal happiness achieved by material prosperity, and man need look for no higher purpose, state apologists such as Fukuyama. The traditional society saw human purpose not as the achieving of an elusive “happiness” based on fads but the fulfilment of one’s cosmic duty (dharma) as an integral part of a holistic order.

Decline and Fall of Civilisations

by Kerry Bolton 

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

Today contempt for others, and open and ostentatious self-esteem, is very often necessary


“Pride separates us from society: our self-love gives us a rank apart, and one that is always contested: a self-esteem that makes itself too much felt is almost always punished by universal contempt”]. Mme. de Lambert, Avis d’une mère à sa fille, in her Oeuvres complètes quoted above (p. 633), p. 99, end. So it is naturally in society, that is the nature of this human institution, which, being designed to further the common good and pleasure, does not truly exist if the individual does not to a greater or a lesser degree combine [670] his esteem, his interests, his goals, thoughts, opinions, sentiments and emotions, inclinations, and actions with those of others, and if all the above is designed simply to further himself. The more of a himself there is in the individual, the less society truly exists. Thus, if egoism is complete, society exists only in name. Because when each individual has only himself as a goal, and pays no heed at all to the common good, and when no thought or action of his is designed to further the good or pleasure of others, each individual by himself forms a society apart, complete and utterly distinct, since his goal is wholly distinct; and thus the world reverts to what it was at the beginning, and before the origin of society, which is left dissolved in fact and in substance, and in its reason and essence. Consequently, egoism has always been the scourge of society, and the greater it is, the worse [671] the condition of society has been; and hence so much the worse in essence those institutions which particularly further egoism either directly or indirectly, as despotism does above all. (Under that regime France became the homeland of the most pestilential egoism, greatly mitigated by the revolution, notwithstanding the immense harm it caused, as all the philosophers have noted.) Egoism, that is to say, self-love, is inseparable from man, but by egoism is meant more particularly an ill-directed, ill-employed self-love, designed to further one’s own real advantages and not those which derive from heroism, from sacrifices, from virtues, from honor, from friendship, etc. When, therefore, this egoism reaches its peak, in intensity and in universality; and when, on account of both its intensity and, more especially, its universality, the mask has been lifted (which no longer serves to conceal it, because it is too vigorous, and because all are inspired by the same sentiment), the nature of social dealings (whether in relation to conversation [672] or generally in relation to life) changes almost entirely. Because, with each thinking only of himself (as much because that is his actual inclination as because no one any longer has a thought for the other, and the good of each is entrusted to himself alone), all respect is set aside, and one seizes the prey from the mouth and talons of another; the individuals in what is termed society are in a state of more or less open war with one another, and with all at once; the strongest in every respect wins; and surrendering anything whatsoever, whether through politeness or through virtue, honor, etc., is pointless, harmful, and crazy, because others will not thank you or give you anything in return, and your surrendering to them, and putting up less resistance to them, simply works to their advantage, and hence to your detriment. And so, to take an example from the passage by Mme. de Lambert quoted above, we see, in fact, that today contempt for others, and open and ostentatious self-esteem, is not only no longer as harmful as [673] it once was but is very often necessary, and someone who does not know how to make use of it wins nothing in the world as it is at present. Because others are not disposed to grant you anything spontaneously, on the strength of truth and merit, not even, by the same token, esteem, therefore you must win it as if by force, in open war, and in a spirit of hostility, showing that you are altogether persuaded of your own merit, in spite of anyone else, despising and trampling others underfoot, deriding them, profiting from their slightest shortcomings, casting these back in their faces, forgiving them nothing, striving, in short, to humble them and to render them inferior to you, either in conversation or otherwise, and by the most effective means available. So that today if you wish to earn the esteem of others by showing respect, by treating them courteously, by flattering their self-love, by disregarding their faults, etc., and, as far as you’re concerned, by behaving modestly and by maintaining a decorous silence, etc., precisely the opposite will occur. They will take advantage of you and of the respect you accord them to elevate themselves, and of your faint show of resistance to crush you. What you concede [674] to them they simply use to their own advantage, and to your detriment; what you do not appropriate or lay claim to, or the merit that you disguise, they deny you and seize, in order to view you as inferior, etc. Thus, in the way I have said, savage customs—or customs of that first age, when, since society did not exist, each was friend to himself alone, and enemy to all other beings, whether like or unlike himself, insofar as they opposed his slightest interest or desire, or insofar as he could enjoy things at their expense—do indeed come back into the world, customs that in the social state are barbarous, because destructive of society, and directly contrary to its essence, reason, and purpose. Hence it may be seen just how true it is that the present state of the world is really and truly barbarism, or as close to barbarism as anything ever was. Every so-called society that is dominated by individual egoism is barbarous, and barbarous with the utmost barbarism. (17 Feb. 1821.)

Leopardi - Zibaldone

Schopenhauer - On noise and sounds

 

§378

Kant wrote an essay on the living forces,a but I would like to write a dirge and a threnody on them, because their all too excessive use in knocking, hammering and ramming has been a daily pain to me my whole life through. Of course there are people, indeed quite a few who smile at this, because they are insensitive to sounds; but these are the same ones who are also insensitive to reasons, thoughts, poetry and works of art, in brief, to spiritual impressions of any kind, due to the tough and unyielding texture of their brain matter. On the other hand, in the biographies or other accounts of personal utterances of almost all great writers, for instance Kant, Goethe, Lichtenberg,1 Jean Paul, I find complaints about the anguish caused to thinking men by noise; indeed, if such information is missing in any one case, then it is merely because the context did not lead to it. I interpret the matter as follows: just as a large diamond cut into pieces is equal in value only to so many small ones, or an army shattered to pieces and dissolved into small units is no longer capable of anything, so too a great mind is no more capable than an ordinary one as soon as it is interrupted, disturbed, distracted and diverted, because its superiority is conditioned by concentrating all its powers on one point and object, as a concave mirror does all of its rays, and precisely this is prevented by the noisy interruption. This is why eminent minds have always abhorred every kind of disturbance, interruption and diversion, especially those of a 680 violent nature through noise, whereas others are not especially bothered by this. The most sensible and intelligent of all European nations has even called the rule ‘never interrupt’b its eleventh commandment. But noise is the most impertinent of all interruptions, since it breaks up and indeed breaks down even our own thoughts. But where there is nothing to interrupt, noise is of course not particularly sensed. – Occasionally I am tormented and bothered by a moderate and constant noise before I am clearly aware of it, in that I sense it merely as a constant hindrance to my thinking, like dragging a weight with my foot, until I realize what it is. –

But transitioning now from the genus to the species, I have to denounce as the most irresponsible and scandalous noise the truly infernal whip-cracking in the echoing streets of the cities, which robs life of all peace and all pensiveness. Nothing provides me with a clearer notion of the obtuseness and thoughtlessness of mankind than the condoning of this whip-cracking.2 This sudden, sharp, brain-numbing crack, which cuts to pieces all contemplation and murders every thought, has to be painfully felt by everyone who bears anything resembling a thought in his head; therefore each of those cracks must disturb hundreds in their mental activity, however inferior it may be in quality, but they chop through a thinker’s meditations as painfully and disastrously as the executioner’s blade severs the head from the body. No sound cuts through the brain as sharply as this damned whip-cracking; the very tip of the lash can be felt in the brain, affecting it like a mimosa when it is touched, and lasting just as long. With all due respect for most sacred utility, I still do not see why a fellow who hauls off a load of sand or manure should therefore be granted the privilege of nipping in the bud every successively emerging thought in the heads of ten thousand people (for a half hour along a city route). Hammer blows, dogs barking and the screaming of children are appalling, but only the crack of a whip is the real murderer of thoughts. It is designed to crush 681 every good and pensive moment that someone might have here and there, and as the most horrific of all sounds it would only be excusable if no other means were available to drive draft animals.3 But quite the contrary: this damned whip-cracking is not only unnecessary but even useless. For the intended psychic effect on horses is completely blunted and missing because they have become desensitized by the constant misuse of the whip; they do not quicken their pace in response, as can be seen especially in the case of coachmen looking for fares and whipping constantly even though driving at the slowest pace, and the slightest touch of the whip is more effective. But assuming that it would be unavoidably necessary to remind the horses of the presence of the whip by using this sound, then a sound a hundred times weaker would suffice, since it is well known that animals notice even the slightest, indeed scarcely noticeable signs, audible as well as visible, of which trained dogs and canaries provide the most amazing examples.4 Accordingly this situation turns out to be nothing but a case of pure impudence, indeed5 of insolent scorn on the part of society that works with its arms directed against those who work with their heads. That such an infamy is tolerated in cities is a crude barbarism and an injustice, all the more so as it would be very easy to prevent by a police-mandated knot at the tip of every whip cord. It cannot hurt for the proletarians to be reminded of the mental work of the class standing above them, for they have a boundless fear of all mental work. But now a fellow who rides through the narrow streets of a populous city with free post horses or on a free cart horse, or for that matter walking along beside the animals6 and incessantly cracking his fathoms-long whip with all his might, clearly deserves to stand down immediately in order to receive five earnestly delivered blows with a stick – all the philanthropists in the world, along with the legislatures that for good reasons abolish all corporal punishment will not persuade me otherwise. But we can often enough see something even more egregious than this, namely a coachman walking 682 the streets alone and without horses, yet incessantly cracking his whip; so habituated has this man become to whip-cracking, as a result of irresponsible coddling.7 With all this universal tenderness for the body and all its gratifications, is the thinking mind the only thing that never gets the least consideration, nor protection, let alone respect? Coachmen, porters, errand boys and so on are the beasts of burden of human society; they should by all means be treated humanely with justice, fairness, consideration and care, but they should not be allowed to obstruct the higher endeavours of the human race through impudent noise. I would like to know how many great and beautiful thoughts these whips have already cracked out of the world. If it were mine to command, then an indestructible association of ideasa would be created in the minds of coachmen between whip-cracking and getting a beating.8 – We would hope that the more intelligent and finely sensitive nations will make a start on this as well, and then by way of example the Germans could also be brought along.*,9 Meanwhile, Thomas Hood (Up the Rhine) says of them: ‘For a musical people, they are the most noisy I ever met with.’b But that they are so is not based on the fact that they are more inclined to noise-making than others, but on the insensitivity stemming from the obtuseness of those who have to hear it, who are not disturbed in any thinking or reading simply because they are not thinking, but merely smoking instead, which is their surrogate for thinking. The universal toleration of unnecessary noise, for instance of the extremely ill-mannered and vulgar slamming of doors, is nothing short of a sign of the general obtuseness and thought vacuum of their minds. In Germany it is positively as though the plan were for no one to come to their senses on account of noise, such as pointless drumming, for instance.10Finally now as regards the literature dealing with the subject treated in 683 this chapter, I have only one work to recommend, but it is a beautiful one, namely a poetic epistle in terza rima by the famous painter Bronzino, entitled On Noises.a For here the anguish one has to endure from the many kinds of noise of an Italian city is described in detail, with both humour and wit, in a tragic-comical style. This epistle can be found on page 258 of the second volume of Burlesque Works of Berni, Aretino and othersb apparently published in Utrecht in 1771.

a [Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte (Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces), 1747]

b [Schopenhauer’s English]

anexus idearum

b [Quoted in English]

aDe’ romori, a Messer Luca Martini

bOpere burlesche del Berni, Aretino ed altri

* According to a ‘Bulletin of the Munich Animal Protection Society’ of December 1858, in Nuremberg superfluous whipping and whip-cracking are most strictly forbidden.

Parerga and Paralipomena II