FERRARI. You mention the former, yes, but you also refer to people who have criticized books in favour of oral language. For example, there’s a passage in Plato where he says that excessive reading leads to the neglect of memory and to a dependence on symbols.
BORGES. I think that Schopenhauer said that to read is to think with somebody else’s mind. Which is the same idea, no? Well no, it isn’t the same idea but it is hostile to books.
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FERRARI. As for your personal cult of books, Borges, I recall that your favourites include The Thousand and One Nights, the Bible and, among many others, the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
BORGES. I think that the encyclopedia, for a leisurely, curious man, is the most pleasing of literary genres. And, besides, it has an illustrious forerunner in Pliny, whose Natural History is an encyclopedia too. There you have information on art, history—it isn’t simply a natural history in the current meaning of the term—and on legends, also on myths. So that when he talks about some animal, he doesn’t simply give factual information but everything recorded by legend—the magical properties attributed to it, even though Pliny probably didn’t believe in them. But, in the end, he did produce that splendid encyclopedia which was also written in a baroque style.
FERRARI. Talking specifically about the Encyclopaedia Britannica, what have you discovered in it over the years?
BORGES. Mostly, long articles. Encyclopedias are made for reference now, so there are long articles and extremely short ones. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, however, was made for reading, that is, it was a series of essays—essays by Macaulay, Stevenson, Swinburne. In the later editions there were occasional essays by Shaw as well. Essays by Bertrand Russell, for example, on Zeno of Elea. I must have told you that I used to go to the National Library with my father. I was very shy—I’m still very shy—so I didn’t dare request books. But there were reference works on the shelves, and I would simply take down by chance, for example, a volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. One day I was extremely fortunate, because I took down the volume D–R, and I was able to read an excellent biography of Dryden, who Eliot has written a book about. Then, a long article on the druids, and another on the Druzes of Lebanon who believe in the transmigration of souls. There are Chinese Druzes too. Yes, that day I was very lucky: Dryden, druids and Druzes, and all those things in the same volume that went from D to R. At other times, I wasn’t so fortunate. I’d go with my father, my father would look up books on psychology—he was a psychology teacher—while I would read the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Later I’d read Huckleberry Finn by Mark Twain in the National Library. And it never occurred to me that, one day, in an improbable future, I’d become director of the library. If someone had told me that, I’d have thought they were joking. Yet that’s what happened. And when I was director I remembered that boy who would visit with his father and timidly take down a volume of the Encyclopaedia from the shelf.
FERRARI. And you were director for almost two decades, I think.
BORGES. I don’t know the precise dates, but they appointed me in 1955, until . . . I don’t know what year Perón came back, because I couldn’t rightly carry on.
FERRARI. In 1973. So 18 years in the library.
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FERRARI. That’s to say, events are ultimately literary. But a book you always recommend, even to people who aren’t literary enthusiasts, is the Bible.
BORGES. Well, because the Bible is a library. Now, how strange that idea of the Hebrews to attribute such disparate works as Genesis, the Song of Songs, the Book of Job, Ecclesiastes, to attribute all of those works to a single author—the Holy Spirit. They are clearly works that correspond to quite different minds and quite different localities and, above all, to different centuries, to diverse periods of thought.
FERRARI. Well, it must have something to do with that other saying in the Bible: ‘The spirit blows where it will.’
BORGES. Yes, which is in the Gospel according to St John, I think, no? In the first verses.
FERRARI. Yes, if you compare it with that phrase from Whistler, ‘Art happens,’ in another of our conversations.
BORGES. I hadn’t realized, but of course, that’s the same idea, ‘Art happens,’ ‘The spirit blows where it will.’ That is, it’s the opposite of, well, a sociology of poetry, no? Of studying poetry socially, of studying the conditions that have produced poetry. . . . That reminds me of Heine, who said that the historian is a retrospective prophet (laughs), someone who prophesies what has already happened. It amounts to the same idea.
FERRARI. Of course, a prophet in reverse.
BORGES. Yes, someone who prophesies what has already happened, and what one already knows has happened, no? ‘The prophet who looks backwards’—the historian.
FERRARI. Who’s that from, Borges?
BORGES. Heine. History would be the art of divining the past, no?
FERRARI. Yes, the art of the historian.
BORGES. Yes, once something has happened, one demonstrates that it happened inevitably. But it would be more interesting to apply that to the future (both laugh).
FERRARI. That’s more difficult than to predict the past—it’s harder to be a prophet than a historian.
BORGES. Well, that’s how literary histories are written. One takes each author, then one demonstrates the influence of his background and, then, how the work must logically stem from that author. But this method doesn’t apply to the future, that is, one doesn’t give the names and works of twenty-first-century Argentine writers, does one?
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FERRARI. In your essay, there’s another idea that I find interesting—you say that, for the ancients, the written word was merely a substitute for the spoken word.
BORGES. Yes, I think Plato says that books are like living things but that they are also like statues—one talks to them but they can’t talk back.
FERRARI. Ah, of course.
BORGES. Then, precisely so that books could talk back, he invented the dialogue which anticipates the reader’s questions and allows for explanation and a proliferation of thought.
FERRARI. Yes, that applies to oral language, but you add that, towards the fourth century, written language begins to predominate over oral language.
BORGES. Ah, and I refer to the anecdote of the person who is astonished at another person reading in silence.
FERRARI. Of course. Saint Augustine is astonished at Saint Ambrose, I think.
BORGES. Yes, he’s astonished because he sees something he has never seen before—someone reading quietly to himself. Of course, he had to, because the books were written by hand. You must have experienced it many times—when you receive a letter, and the handwriting in that letter isn’t faultless, let’s say, you read it aloud to make sense of it, no?
FERRARI. Yes.
BORGES. And if the books were written by hand, it was only natural that they be read aloud. Aside from that point, I think that if you’re reading silently, and you come to a powerful passage, a passage that moves you, then you tend to read it aloud. I think that a well-written passage demands to be read aloud. In the case of verse, it’s obvious, because the music of verse needs to be expressed even if only in a murmur—it has to be heard. On the other hand, if you’re reading something that’s purely logical, purely abstract, it’s different. In that case, you can do without reading it aloud. But you can’t do without that reading if you’re dealing with a poem.
FERRARI. It’s part of that exaltation, however minimal, that poetry requires.
BORGES. Yes, but of course that’s becoming lost now, since people no longer have an ear for it. Unfortunately, everyone is now capable of reading in silence, because they don’t hear what they read—they go directly to the meaning of the text.
Borges
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To be is to be contingent: nothing of which it can be said that "it is" can be alone and independent. But being is a member of paticca-samuppada as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance.
Destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, than consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no ignorance than it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in M Sutta 22)
Nanamoli Thera
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